139:” (Fig.5), which represents the following scenario. Two hunters can choose to either hunt a stag together (which provides the most economically efficient outcome) or they can individually hunt a Rabbit. Hunting Stags is challenging and requires cooperation. If the two hunters do not cooperate the chances of success is minimal. Thus, the scenario where both hunters choose to coordinate will provide the most beneficial output for society. A common problem associated with the stag hunt is the amount of trust required to achieve this output. Fig. 5 shows a situation in which both players (hunters) can benefit if they cooperate (hunting a stag). As you can see, cooperation might fail, because each hunter has an alternative which is safer because it does not require cooperation to succeed (hunting a hare). This example of the potential conflict between safety and social cooperation is originally due to
472:, where one player's incentive is to coordinate while the other player tries to avoid this. Discoordination games have no pure Nash equilibria. In Figure 1, choosing payoffs so that A > B, C < D, while a < b, c > d, creates a discoordination game. In each of the four possible states either player 1 or player 2 are better off by switching their strategy, so the only Nash equilibrium is mixed. The canonical example of a discoordination game is the
210:(or conflicting interest coordination), as seen in Fig. 4. In this game both players prefer engaging in the same activity over going alone, but their preferences differ over which activity they should engage in. Assume that a couple argues over what to do on the weekend. Both know that they will increase their utility by spending the weekend together, however the man prefers to watch a football game and the woman prefers to go shopping.
97:
player 1 thinks their payoff would fall from 2 to 1 if they deviated to Up, and player 2 thinks their payoff would fall from 4 to 3 if they chose Left. A player's optimal move depends on what they expect the other player to do, and they both do better if they coordinate than if they played an off-equilibrium combination of actions. This setup can be extended to more than two strategies or two players.
449:. While 101 is shorter, 280 is considered more scenic, so drivers might have different preferences between the two independent of the traffic flow. But each additional car on either route will slightly increase the drive time on that route, so additional traffic creates negative network externalities, and even scenery-minded drivers might opt to take 101 if 280 becomes too crowded. A
260:. In the generic coordination game above, a mixed Nash equilibrium is given by probabilities p = (d-b)/(a+d-b-c) to play Up and 1-p to play Down for player 1, and q = (D-C)/(A+D-B-C) to play Left and 1-q to play Right for player 2. Since d > b and d-b < a+d-b-c, p is always between zero and one, so existence is assured (similarly for q).
304:
372:
number of errors accumulated by their worst performing team member. Players also had the option to purchase more time, the cost of doing so was subtracted from their payoff. While groups initially failed to coordinate, researchers observed about 80% of the groups in the experiment coordinated successfully when the game was repeated.
379:
rather than payoff dominance. Even when payoffs are better when players coordinate on one equilibrium, many times people will choose the less risky option where they are guaranteed some payoff and end up at an equilibrium that has sub-optimal payoff. Players are more likely to fail to coordinate on a
421:
analogues b > d and c > a for column-player 2). {Down, Left} and {Up, Right} are the two pure Nash equilibria. Chicken also requires that A > C, so a change from {Up, Left} to {Up, Right} improves player 2's payoff but reduces player 1's payoff, introducing conflict. This counters
338:
Games like the driving example above have illustrated the need for solution to coordination problems. Often we are confronted with circumstances where we must solve coordination problems without the ability to communicate with our partner. Many authors have suggested that particular equilibria are
134:
An assurance game describes the situation where neither player can offer a sufficient amount if they contribute alone, thus player 1 should defect from playing if player 2 defects. However, if Player 2 opts to contribute then player 1 should contribute also. An assurance game is commonly referred to
371:
was a weak-link experiment in which groups of individuals were asked to count and sort coins in an effort to measure the difference between individual and group incentives. Players in this experiment received a payoff based on their individual performance as well as a bonus that was weighted by the
105:
A typical case for a coordination game is choosing the sides of the road upon which to drive, a social standard which can save lives if it is widely adhered to. In a simplified example, assume that two drivers meet on a narrow dirt road. Both have to swerve in order to avoid a head-on collision. If
96:
Both (Up, Left) and (Down, Right) are Nash equilibria. If the players expect (Up, Left) to be played, then player 1 thinks their payoff would fall from 2 to 1 if they deviated to Down, and player 2 thinks their payoff would fall from 4 to 3 if they chose Right. If the players expect (Down, Right),
213:
Since the couple want to spend time together, they will derive no utility by doing an activity separately. If they go shopping, or to football game one person will derive some utility by being with the other person, but won’t derive utility from the activity itself. Unlike the other forms of
110:
in Fig. 2, successful passing is represented by a payoff of 8, and a collision by a payoff of 0. In this case there are two pure Nash equilibria: either both swerve to the left, or both swerve to the right. In this example, it doesn't matter
806:
233:) is a typical solution to a coordination problem. The choice of a voluntary standard tends to be stable in situations in which all parties can realize mutual gains, but only by making mutually consistent decisions.
380:
riskier option when the difference between taking the risk or the safe option is smaller. The laboratory results suggest that coordination failure is a common phenomenon in the setting of order-statistic games and
404:
as other agents. Conversely, game theorists have modeled behavior under negative externalities where choosing the same action creates a cost rather than a benefit. The generic term for this class of game is
214:
coordination games described previously, knowing your opponent’s strategy won’t help you decide on your course of action. Due to this there is a possibility that an equilibrium will not be reached.
315:
The pure Nash equilibria are the points in the bottom left and top right corners of the strategy space, while the mixed Nash equilibrium lies in the middle, at the intersection of the dashed lines.
27:. It describes the situation where a player will earn a higher payoff when they select the same course of action as another player. The game is not one of pure conflict, which results in multiple
264:
164:
179:
322:(ESS). The mixed Nash equilibrium is also Pareto dominated by the two pure Nash equilibria (since the players will fail to coordinate with non-zero probability), a quandary that led
151:
738:
Devetag, Giovanna; Ortmann, Andreas (2006-08-15). "When and Why? A Critical Survey on
Coordination Failure in the Laboratory". Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network.
940:
Devetag, Giovanna; Ortmann, Andreas (2006-08-15). "When and Why? A Critical Survey on
Coordination Failure in the Laboratory". Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network.
192:
433:
over the number of other players choosing the same strategy (i.e., a game with negative network externalities). For instance, a driver could take
417:). Using the payoff matrix in Figure 1, a game is an anti-coordination game if B > A and C > D for row-player 1 (with
106:
both execute the same swerving maneuver they will manage to pass each other, but if they choose differing maneuvers they will collide. In the
457:
is a game where the only objective for all players is to be part of smaller of two groups. A well-known example of the minority game is the
287:
to play A and 1-q to play B for player 2. If we look at Fig 1. and apply the same probability equations we obtain the following results:
555:
355:. Sometimes these refinements conflict, which makes certain coordination games especially complicated and interesting (e.g. the
965:
683:
422:
the standard coordination game setup, where all unilateral changes in a strategy lead to either mutual gain or mutual loss.
1869:
932:
920:
700:
1686:
1216:
1014:
1505:
1324:
903:
885:
867:
848:
830:
815:
791:
207:
1121:
500:
1595:
367:
Coordination games have been studied in laboratory experiments. One such experiment by
Bortolotti, Devetag, and
2032:
1465:
1131:
319:
1304:
1646:
1059:
1034:
779:
1996:
1422:
1171:
1161:
1096:
603:
1211:
1191:
438:
434:
1930:
1681:
1651:
1309:
1146:
1141:
311:
for 2x2 coordination games. Nash equilibria are at points where the two players' correspondences cross.
1966:
1889:
1625:
1176:
1101:
958:
490:
442:
764:
535:
275:
In the generic coordination game in Fig. 6, a mixed Nash equilibrium is given by the probabilities:
1981:
1714:
1600:
1397:
1186:
1004:
515:
1784:
1986:
1585:
1555:
1206:
994:
579:
495:
344:
647:
627:
297:
2011:
1991:
1971:
1920:
1590:
1495:
1354:
1299:
1226:
1196:
1116:
1044:
327:
121:
1470:
1455:
1024:
751:
743:
520:
505:
401:
242:
140:
1804:
1789:
1676:
1671:
1575:
1560:
1525:
1490:
1084:
1029:
951:
510:
458:
446:
8:
1961:
1580:
1530:
1367:
1294:
1269:
1126:
1009:
836:
397:
1620:
1940:
1799:
1630:
1610:
1460:
1339:
1239:
1166:
1111:
672:
425:
The concept of anti-coordination games has been extended to multi-player situation. A
1925:
1894:
1849:
1744:
1615:
1570:
1545:
1349:
1274:
1264:
1156:
1106:
1054:
899:
881:
863:
844:
826:
811:
807:
Thinking
Strategically: The Competitive Edge in Business, Politics, and Everyday Life
787:
739:
720:
679:
485:
375:
When academics talk about coordination failure, most cases are that subjects achieve
227:
116:
303:
2006:
2001:
1935:
1899:
1879:
1839:
1809:
1764:
1719:
1704:
1661:
1515:
1289:
1151:
1088:
1074:
1039:
891:
873:
855:
712:
473:
340:
257:
31:
1904:
1864:
1819:
1734:
1729:
1450:
1402:
1284:
1049:
1019:
989:
462:
368:
223:
34:
in which players choose matching strategies. Figure 1 shows a 2-player example.
1769:
1844:
1834:
1824:
1759:
1749:
1739:
1724:
1520:
1500:
1485:
1480:
1440:
1407:
1392:
1387:
1377:
1181:
921:"Group incentives or individual incentives? A real-effort weak-link experiment"
801:
716:
701:"Group incentives or individual incentives? A real-effort weak-link experiment"
525:
430:
414:
410:
376:
352:
254:
127:
115:
side both players pick, as long as they both pick the same. Both solutions are
2026:
1884:
1874:
1829:
1814:
1794:
1565:
1540:
1412:
1382:
1372:
1359:
1259:
1201:
1136:
1069:
797:
724:
454:
409:. The best-known example of a 2-player anti-coordination game is the game of
323:
308:
107:
28:
348:
1859:
1854:
1709:
1279:
530:
263:
935:
1976:
1779:
1774:
1754:
1550:
1535:
1344:
1314:
1244:
1234:
1064:
999:
975:
393:
339:
focal for one reason or another. For instance, some equilibria may give
24:
943:
919:
Bortolotti, Stefania; Devetag, Giovanna; Ortmann, Andreas (2016-01-01).
699:
Bortolotti, Stefania; Devetag, Giovanna; Ortmann, Andreas (2016-01-01).
1605:
1254:
910:
206:
This is different in another type of coordination game commonly called
359:, in which {Stag,Stag} has higher payoffs, but {Hare,Hare} is safer).
178:
88: Figure 1: Payoffs for a Coordination Game (Player 1, Player 2)
1510:
1430:
1249:
418:
381:
356:
163:
136:
150:
1945:
1445:
1666:
1656:
1334:
392:
Coordination games are closely linked to the economic concept of
318:
Unlike the pure Nash equilibria, the mixed equilibrium is not an
237:
1435:
916:
880:, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1960 (
281:
to play Option A and 1-p to play Option B for player 1, and
191:
825:, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992 (
468:
A hybrid form of coordination and anti-coordination is the
604:"Definition of Coordination Game | Higher Rock Education"
333:
235:
In contrast, an obligation standard (enforced by law as "
698:
125:. This is not true for all coordination games, as the
669:
648:"Game theory II: Battle of the sexes | Policonomics"
628:"Game theory II: Battle of the sexes | Policonomics"
429:is defined as a game where each player's payoff is
226:, a voluntary standard (when characterized also as
671:
248:
387:
2024:
300:for 2Ă—2 coordination games are shown in Fig. 7.
786:, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998 (
737:
959:
862:, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1994 (
400:, the benefit reaped from being in the same
966:
952:
973:
536:Uniqueness or multiplicity of equilibrium
54:
665:
663:
302:
262:
190:
177:
162:
149:
41:
23:is a type of simultaneous game found in
362:
2025:
334:Coordination and equilibrium selection
217:
87:
16:Simultaneous game found in game theory
947:
660:
39:
453:is a crowding game in networks. The
580:"Assurance game - Game Theory .net"
13:
1015:First-player and second-player win
911:review of 'The Emergence of Norms'
823:Game Theory for Applied Economists
14:
2044:
841:Convention: A Philosophical Study
556:"Assurance Game - P2P Foundation"
290:p = (4-3) / (4+4-3-3) = ½ and,
1122:Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium
501:Coordination failure (economics)
241:standard") is a solution to the
326:to propose the refinement of a
249:Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium
1132:Evolutionarily stable strategy
925:Journal of Economic Psychology
896:Micromotives and Macrobehavior
731:
705:Journal of Economic Psychology
692:
670:Edna Ullmann-Margalit (1977).
640:
620:
596:
572:
548:
398:positive network externalities
388:Other games with externalities
320:evolutionarily stable strategy
1:
1060:Simultaneous action selection
843:, Oxford: Blackwell, 1969 (
541:
253:Coordination games also have
1997:List of games in game theory
1172:Quantal response equilibrium
1162:Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
1097:Bayes correlated equilibrium
775:Other suggested literature:
7:
1466:Optional prisoner's dilemma
1192:Self-confirming equilibrium
678:. Oxford University Press.
608:www.higherrockeducation.org
479:
293:q = (2-1) / (2+2-1-1) = ½
100:
10:
2049:
1931:Principal variation search
1647:Aumann's agreement theorem
1310:Strategy-stealing argument
1217:Trembling hand equilibrium
1147:Markov perfect equilibrium
1142:Mertens-stable equilibrium
898:, New York: Norton, 1978 (
810:, New York: Norton, 1991 (
717:10.1016/j.joep.2016.05.004
68:
57:
1967:Combinatorial game theory
1954:
1913:
1695:
1639:
1626:Princess and monster game
1421:
1323:
1225:
1177:Quasi-perfect equilibrium
1102:Bayesian Nash equilibrium
1083:
982:
491:Consensus decision-making
83:
79:
1982:Evolutionary game theory
1715:Antoine Augustin Cournot
1601:Guess 2/3 of the average
1398:Strictly determined game
1187:Satisfaction equilibrium
1005:Escalation of commitment
878:The Strategy of Conflict
854:Martin J. Osborne &
516:Self-fulfilling prophecy
298:reaction correspondences
119:. This game is called a
1987:Glossary of game theory
1586:Stackelberg competition
1207:Strong Nash equilibrium
914:(subscription required)
860:A Course in Game Theory
309:Reaction correspondence
2012:Tragedy of the commons
1992:List of game theorists
1972:Confrontation analysis
1682:Sprague–Grundy theorem
1197:Sequential equilibrium
1117:Correlated equilibrium
759:Cite journal requires
674:The Emergence of Norms
560:wiki.p2pfoundation.net
407:anti-coordination game
345:naturally more salient
328:correlated equilibrium
312:
271:
199:
186:
171:
158:
122:pure coordination game
2033:Non-cooperative games
1785:Jean-François Mertens
521:Strategic complements
506:Equilibrium selection
306:
284:q = (D-C)/(A+D-B-C),
278:p = (d-b)/(a+d-b-c),
266:
194:
181:
166:
153:
141:Jean-Jacques Rousseau
1914:Search optimizations
1790:Jennifer Tour Chayes
1677:Revelation principle
1672:Purification theorem
1611:Nash bargaining game
1576:Bertrand competition
1561:El Farol Bar problem
1526:Electronic mail game
1491:Lewis signaling game
1030:Hierarchy of beliefs
511:Non-cooperative game
470:discoordination game
459:El Farol Bar problem
396:, and in particular
363:Experimental results
1962:Bounded rationality
1581:Cournot competition
1531:Rock paper scissors
1506:Battle of the sexes
1496:Volunteer's dilemma
1368:Perfect information
1295:Dominant strategies
1127:Epsilon-equilibrium
1010:Extensive-form game
837:David Kellogg Lewis
218:Voluntary standards
208:battle of the sexes
184:Battle of the Sexes
1941:Paranoid algorithm
1921:Alpha–beta pruning
1800:John Maynard Smith
1631:Rendezvous problem
1471:Traveler's dilemma
1461:Gift-exchange game
1456:Prisoner's dilemma
1373:Large Poisson game
1340:Bargaining problem
1240:Backward induction
1212:Subgame perfection
1167:Proper equilibrium
784:Coordination Games
584:www.gametheory.net
313:
272:
243:prisoner's problem
200:
187:
172:
159:
131:in Fig. 3 shows.
2020:
2019:
1926:Aspiration window
1895:Suzanne Scotchmer
1850:Oskar Morgenstern
1745:Donald B. Gillies
1687:Zermelo's theorem
1616:Induction puzzles
1571:Fair cake-cutting
1546:Public goods game
1476:Coordination game
1350:Intransitive game
1275:Forward induction
1157:Pareto efficiency
1137:Gibbs equilibrium
1107:Berge equilibrium
1055:Simultaneous game
685:978-0-19-824411-0
486:Collective action
269:Coordination Game
204:
203:
156:Pure Coordination
94:
93:
21:coordination game
2040:
2007:Topological game
2002:No-win situation
1900:Thomas Schelling
1880:Robert B. Wilson
1840:Merrill M. Flood
1810:John von Neumann
1720:Ariel Rubinstein
1705:Albert W. Tucker
1556:War of attrition
1516:Matching pennies
1290:Pairing strategy
1152:Nash equilibrium
1075:Mechanism design
1040:Normal-form game
995:Cooperative game
968:
961:
954:
945:
944:
915:
892:Thomas Schelling
874:Thomas Schelling
856:Ariel Rubinstein
821:Robert Gibbons:
769:
768:
762:
757:
755:
747:
735:
729:
728:
696:
690:
689:
677:
667:
658:
657:
655:
654:
644:
638:
637:
635:
634:
624:
618:
617:
615:
614:
600:
594:
593:
591:
590:
576:
570:
569:
567:
566:
552:
496:Cooperative game
474:matching pennies
349:may be more fair
146:
145:
117:Pareto efficient
37:
36:
2048:
2047:
2043:
2042:
2041:
2039:
2038:
2037:
2023:
2022:
2021:
2016:
1950:
1936:max^n algorithm
1909:
1905:William Vickrey
1865:Reinhard Selten
1820:Kenneth Binmore
1735:David K. Levine
1730:Daniel Kahneman
1697:
1691:
1667:Negamax theorem
1657:Minimax theorem
1635:
1596:Diner's dilemma
1451:All-pay auction
1417:
1403:Stochastic game
1355:Mean-field game
1326:
1319:
1285:Markov strategy
1221:
1087:
1079:
1050:Sequential game
1035:Information set
1020:Game complexity
990:Congestion game
978:
972:
913:
773:
772:
760:
758:
749:
748:
736:
732:
697:
693:
686:
668:
661:
652:
650:
646:
645:
641:
632:
630:
626:
625:
621:
612:
610:
602:
601:
597:
588:
586:
578:
577:
573:
564:
562:
554:
553:
549:
544:
482:
463:W. Brian Arthur
451:congestion game
413:(also known as
390:
369:Andreas Ortmann
365:
336:
274:
258:Nash equilibria
251:
234:
224:social sciences
220:
103:
32:Nash equilibria
17:
12:
11:
5:
2046:
2036:
2035:
2018:
2017:
2015:
2014:
2009:
2004:
1999:
1994:
1989:
1984:
1979:
1974:
1969:
1964:
1958:
1956:
1952:
1951:
1949:
1948:
1943:
1938:
1933:
1928:
1923:
1917:
1915:
1911:
1910:
1908:
1907:
1902:
1897:
1892:
1887:
1882:
1877:
1872:
1870:Robert Axelrod
1867:
1862:
1857:
1852:
1847:
1845:Olga Bondareva
1842:
1837:
1835:Melvin Dresher
1832:
1827:
1825:Leonid Hurwicz
1822:
1817:
1812:
1807:
1802:
1797:
1792:
1787:
1782:
1777:
1772:
1767:
1762:
1760:Harold W. Kuhn
1757:
1752:
1750:Drew Fudenberg
1747:
1742:
1740:David M. Kreps
1737:
1732:
1727:
1725:Claude Shannon
1722:
1717:
1712:
1707:
1701:
1699:
1693:
1692:
1690:
1689:
1684:
1679:
1674:
1669:
1664:
1662:Nash's theorem
1659:
1654:
1649:
1643:
1641:
1637:
1636:
1634:
1633:
1628:
1623:
1618:
1613:
1608:
1603:
1598:
1593:
1588:
1583:
1578:
1573:
1568:
1563:
1558:
1553:
1548:
1543:
1538:
1533:
1528:
1523:
1521:Ultimatum game
1518:
1513:
1508:
1503:
1501:Dollar auction
1498:
1493:
1488:
1486:Centipede game
1483:
1478:
1473:
1468:
1463:
1458:
1453:
1448:
1443:
1441:Infinite chess
1438:
1433:
1427:
1425:
1419:
1418:
1416:
1415:
1410:
1408:Symmetric game
1405:
1400:
1395:
1393:Signaling game
1390:
1388:Screening game
1385:
1380:
1378:Potential game
1375:
1370:
1365:
1357:
1352:
1347:
1342:
1337:
1331:
1329:
1321:
1320:
1318:
1317:
1312:
1307:
1305:Mixed strategy
1302:
1297:
1292:
1287:
1282:
1277:
1272:
1267:
1262:
1257:
1252:
1247:
1242:
1237:
1231:
1229:
1223:
1222:
1220:
1219:
1214:
1209:
1204:
1199:
1194:
1189:
1184:
1182:Risk dominance
1179:
1174:
1169:
1164:
1159:
1154:
1149:
1144:
1139:
1134:
1129:
1124:
1119:
1114:
1109:
1104:
1099:
1093:
1091:
1081:
1080:
1078:
1077:
1072:
1067:
1062:
1057:
1052:
1047:
1042:
1037:
1032:
1027:
1025:Graphical game
1022:
1017:
1012:
1007:
1002:
997:
992:
986:
984:
980:
979:
971:
970:
963:
956:
948:
942:
941:
938:
917:
909:Adrian Piper:
907:
889:
871:
852:
834:
819:
802:Barry Nalebuff
795:
780:Russell Cooper
771:
770:
761:|journal=
730:
691:
684:
659:
639:
619:
595:
571:
546:
545:
543:
540:
539:
538:
533:
528:
526:Social dilemma
523:
518:
513:
508:
503:
498:
493:
488:
481:
478:
439:Interstate 280
435:U.S. Route 101
431:non-increasing
415:Hawk-Dove game
389:
386:
377:risk dominance
364:
361:
341:higher payoffs
335:
332:
255:mixed strategy
250:
247:
219:
216:
202:
201:
188:
174:
173:
169:Assurance Game
160:
128:assurance game
102:
99:
92:
90:
89:
85:
84:
81:
80:
77:
76:
73:
70:
66:
65:
62:
59:
56:
52:
51:
48:
44:
43:
40:
15:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
2045:
2034:
2031:
2030:
2028:
2013:
2010:
2008:
2005:
2003:
2000:
1998:
1995:
1993:
1990:
1988:
1985:
1983:
1980:
1978:
1975:
1973:
1970:
1968:
1965:
1963:
1960:
1959:
1957:
1955:Miscellaneous
1953:
1947:
1944:
1942:
1939:
1937:
1934:
1932:
1929:
1927:
1924:
1922:
1919:
1918:
1916:
1912:
1906:
1903:
1901:
1898:
1896:
1893:
1891:
1890:Samuel Bowles
1888:
1886:
1885:Roger Myerson
1883:
1881:
1878:
1876:
1875:Robert Aumann
1873:
1871:
1868:
1866:
1863:
1861:
1858:
1856:
1853:
1851:
1848:
1846:
1843:
1841:
1838:
1836:
1833:
1831:
1830:Lloyd Shapley
1828:
1826:
1823:
1821:
1818:
1816:
1815:Kenneth Arrow
1813:
1811:
1808:
1806:
1803:
1801:
1798:
1796:
1795:John Harsanyi
1793:
1791:
1788:
1786:
1783:
1781:
1778:
1776:
1773:
1771:
1768:
1766:
1765:Herbert Simon
1763:
1761:
1758:
1756:
1753:
1751:
1748:
1746:
1743:
1741:
1738:
1736:
1733:
1731:
1728:
1726:
1723:
1721:
1718:
1716:
1713:
1711:
1708:
1706:
1703:
1702:
1700:
1694:
1688:
1685:
1683:
1680:
1678:
1675:
1673:
1670:
1668:
1665:
1663:
1660:
1658:
1655:
1653:
1650:
1648:
1645:
1644:
1642:
1638:
1632:
1629:
1627:
1624:
1622:
1619:
1617:
1614:
1612:
1609:
1607:
1604:
1602:
1599:
1597:
1594:
1592:
1589:
1587:
1584:
1582:
1579:
1577:
1574:
1572:
1569:
1567:
1566:Fair division
1564:
1562:
1559:
1557:
1554:
1552:
1549:
1547:
1544:
1542:
1541:Dictator game
1539:
1537:
1534:
1532:
1529:
1527:
1524:
1522:
1519:
1517:
1514:
1512:
1509:
1507:
1504:
1502:
1499:
1497:
1494:
1492:
1489:
1487:
1484:
1482:
1479:
1477:
1474:
1472:
1469:
1467:
1464:
1462:
1459:
1457:
1454:
1452:
1449:
1447:
1444:
1442:
1439:
1437:
1434:
1432:
1429:
1428:
1426:
1424:
1420:
1414:
1413:Zero-sum game
1411:
1409:
1406:
1404:
1401:
1399:
1396:
1394:
1391:
1389:
1386:
1384:
1383:Repeated game
1381:
1379:
1376:
1374:
1371:
1369:
1366:
1364:
1362:
1358:
1356:
1353:
1351:
1348:
1346:
1343:
1341:
1338:
1336:
1333:
1332:
1330:
1328:
1322:
1316:
1313:
1311:
1308:
1306:
1303:
1301:
1300:Pure strategy
1298:
1296:
1293:
1291:
1288:
1286:
1283:
1281:
1278:
1276:
1273:
1271:
1268:
1266:
1263:
1261:
1260:De-escalation
1258:
1256:
1253:
1251:
1248:
1246:
1243:
1241:
1238:
1236:
1233:
1232:
1230:
1228:
1224:
1218:
1215:
1213:
1210:
1208:
1205:
1203:
1202:Shapley value
1200:
1198:
1195:
1193:
1190:
1188:
1185:
1183:
1180:
1178:
1175:
1173:
1170:
1168:
1165:
1163:
1160:
1158:
1155:
1153:
1150:
1148:
1145:
1143:
1140:
1138:
1135:
1133:
1130:
1128:
1125:
1123:
1120:
1118:
1115:
1113:
1110:
1108:
1105:
1103:
1100:
1098:
1095:
1094:
1092:
1090:
1086:
1082:
1076:
1073:
1071:
1070:Succinct game
1068:
1066:
1063:
1061:
1058:
1056:
1053:
1051:
1048:
1046:
1043:
1041:
1038:
1036:
1033:
1031:
1028:
1026:
1023:
1021:
1018:
1016:
1013:
1011:
1008:
1006:
1003:
1001:
998:
996:
993:
991:
988:
987:
985:
981:
977:
969:
964:
962:
957:
955:
950:
949:
946:
939:
937:
934:
930:
926:
922:
918:
912:
908:
905:
904:0-393-32946-1
901:
897:
893:
890:
887:
886:0-674-84031-3
883:
879:
875:
872:
869:
868:0-262-65040-1
865:
861:
857:
853:
850:
849:0-631-23257-5
846:
842:
838:
835:
832:
831:0-691-00395-5
828:
824:
820:
817:
816:0-393-32946-1
813:
809:
808:
803:
799:
798:Avinash Dixit
796:
793:
792:0-521-57896-5
789:
785:
781:
778:
777:
776:
766:
753:
745:
741:
734:
726:
722:
718:
714:
710:
706:
702:
695:
687:
681:
676:
675:
666:
664:
649:
643:
629:
623:
609:
605:
599:
585:
581:
575:
561:
557:
551:
547:
537:
534:
532:
529:
527:
524:
522:
519:
517:
514:
512:
509:
507:
504:
502:
499:
497:
494:
492:
489:
487:
484:
483:
477:
475:
471:
466:
464:
460:
456:
455:minority game
452:
448:
444:
443:San Francisco
440:
436:
432:
428:
427:crowding game
423:
420:
416:
412:
408:
403:
399:
395:
394:externalities
385:
383:
378:
373:
370:
360:
358:
354:
350:
346:
342:
331:
329:
325:
324:Robert Aumann
321:
316:
310:
305:
301:
299:
294:
291:
288:
285:
282:
279:
276:
270:
265:
261:
259:
256:
246:
244:
240:
239:
232:
230:
225:
215:
211:
209:
198:
193:
189:
185:
180:
176:
175:
170:
165:
161:
157:
152:
148:
147:
144:
142:
138:
132:
130:
129:
124:
123:
118:
114:
109:
108:payoff matrix
98:
91:
86:
82:
78:
74:
71:
67:
63:
60:
53:
49:
46:
45:
42:Player 2
38:
35:
33:
30:
29:pure strategy
26:
22:
1860:Peyton Young
1855:Paul Milgrom
1770:Hervé Moulin
1710:Amos Tversky
1652:Folk theorem
1475:
1363:-player game
1360:
1280:Grim trigger
931:(C): 60–73.
928:
924:
895:
877:
859:
840:
822:
805:
783:
774:
752:cite journal
733:
711:(C): 60–73.
708:
704:
694:
673:
651:. Retrieved
642:
631:. Retrieved
622:
611:. Retrieved
607:
598:
587:. Retrieved
583:
574:
563:. Retrieved
559:
550:
531:Supermodular
469:
467:
461:proposed by
450:
426:
424:
406:
391:
374:
366:
351:, or may be
337:
317:
314:
295:
292:
289:
286:
283:
280:
277:
273:
268:
252:
236:
228:
221:
212:
205:
196:
183:
168:
155:
133:
126:
120:
112:
104:
95:
20:
18:
1977:Coopetition
1780:Jean Tirole
1775:John Conway
1755:Eric Maskin
1551:Blotto game
1536:Pirate game
1345:Global game
1315:Tit for tat
1245:Bid shading
1235:Appeasement
1085:Equilibrium
1065:Solved game
1000:Determinacy
983:Definitions
976:game theory
307:Figure 7 -
25:game theory
1621:Trust game
1606:Kuhn poker
1270:Escalation
1265:Deterrence
1255:Cheap talk
1227:Strategies
1045:Preference
974:Topics of
653:2021-04-23
633:2021-04-26
613:2021-04-23
589:2021-04-23
565:2021-04-23
542:References
1805:John Nash
1511:Stag hunt
1250:Collusion
936:0167-4870
725:0167-4870
419:lowercase
382:stag-hunt
357:Stag hunt
197:Stag Hunt
137:stag hunt
2027:Category
1946:Lazy SMP
1640:Theorems
1591:Deadlock
1446:Checkers
1327:of games
1089:concepts
480:See also
447:San Jose
231:standard
229:de facto
101:Examples
55:Player 1
1698:figures
1481:Chicken
1335:Auction
1325:Classes
411:Chicken
402:network
384:games.
267:Fig 6.
238:de jure
195:Fig. 5
182:Fig. 4
154:Fig. 2
902:
884:
866:
847:
829:
814:
800:&
790:
744:924186
742:
723:
682:
476:game.
167:Fig.3
135:as a “
1436:Chess
1423:Games
441:from
353:safer
343:, be
113:which
50:Right
1112:Core
933:ISSN
900:ISBN
882:ISBN
864:ISBN
845:ISBN
827:ISBN
812:ISBN
788:ISBN
765:help
740:SSRN
721:ISSN
680:ISBN
296:The
69:Down
47:Left
1696:Key
713:doi
445:to
437:or
222:In
75:2,4
72:1,3
64:1,3
61:2,4
2029::
1431:Go
929:56
927:.
906:).
894::
888:).
876::
870:).
858::
851:).
839::
833:).
818:).
804::
794:).
782::
756::
754:}}
750:{{
719:.
709:56
707:.
703:.
662:^
606:.
582:.
558:.
465:.
347:,
330:.
245:.
143:.
58:Up
19:A
1361:n
967:e
960:t
953:v
923:.
767:)
763:(
746:.
727:.
715::
688:.
656:.
636:.
616:.
592:.
568:.
Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.
