1972:
934:'s cooperation with the United States is "sure to prevent reentry into a terrorist cell as a trusted member and most likely limits the further trust and assignments of close cell associates still at large. The captor would determine when to name names and when to remain silent." Indeed, once intelligence learns the name and characteristics of an at-large adversary, as well as some sensitive information that would plausibly be known to him, a news release could be issued to talk about his cooperation. Such a method could not be used too often, but, used carefully, could disturb the critical trust networks. The greatest uncertainty might be associated with throwing doubt onto a key member of an operational cell that has gone autonomous.
413:-cell systems work from within the government, the mass-oriented system builds a government completely outside the existing one, with the intention of replacing it. Such "insurgents patiently construct a base of passive and active political supporters, while simultaneously building a large armed element of guerrilla and regular forces. They plan a protracted campaign of increasing violence to destroy the government and its institutions from the outside. They have a well-developed ideology and carefully determine their objectives. They are highly organized and effectively use propaganda and guerrilla action to mobilize forces for a direct political and military challenge to the government." The revolution that produced the
906:"While Al-Qaeda has elements of the organization designed to support the structure, but such elements are insufficient in meeting the needs of such an organization, and for security reasons there would be redundant and secondary-/tertiary-networks that are unaware of their connection to Al-Qaeda. These networks, primarily related to fundraising and financial activities, as well as technology providers, are in a 'use' relationship with Al-Qaeda—managed through cut-outs or individuals that do not inform them of the nature of activities, and that may have a cover pretext sufficient to deflect questions or inquiry."
398:. "Insurgents also seek to infiltrate the government's institutions, but their object is to destroy the system from within." Clandestine cells form inside the government. "The use of violence remains covert until the government is so weakened that the insurgency's superior organization seizes power, supported by the armed force. One variation of this pattern is when the insurgent leadership permits the popular revolution to destroy the existing government, then emerges to direct the formation of a new government. Another variation is seen in the
339:
religious, or linguistic groups. They "perceive that the government has denied their rights and interests and work to establish or restore them. They seldom seek to overthrow the government or control the whole society; however, they frequently attempt to withdraw from government control through autonomy or semiautonomy." The
Mujahideen in Afghanistan and the Kurdish revolt in Iraq are examples of this traditional pattern of insurgency.
192:
517:
493:
452:
870:
852:
of operational cells appears to be by capabilities, region, and then task/operation. Operational cells are composed of members whose worldview has been firmly tested—necessary to front-load, because such cells are dispersed back to their own local control (or negative control—proscribed behavior—with positive control only coming in the form of contact for synchronization or support).
719:
616:
700:), information technology, communications, training, weapons and explosives, medical services, etc. Transportation alone is a huge function, including the need to buy tickets without drawing suspicion, and, where appropriate, using private vehicles. Finance includes the need to transfer money without coming to the attention of financial security organizations.
513:
them into the subcell. In principle, however, the subcell members would know ALPINE, and sometimes the other members of the ALPINE cell if they needed to work together; if ALPINE-1 and ALPINE-2 had independent assignments, they might not know each other. ALPINE-1 and ALPINE-2 certainly would not know ALASTAIR or anyone in the ALTITUDE or ALLOVER cells.
179:
direct action (often an unwise mission unless an appreciable number of the locals had military experience) it would be necessary to assemble into larger units for combat. Even then, the hideouts of the leadership were known only to subcell leaders. The legitimacy of the
Jedburgh team came from its known affiliation with Allied powers, and
715:, who must be trusted to some extent, but who may not know the contents of their messages or the actual identity of the sender and/or receiver. The couriers, depending on the balance among type and size of message, security, and technology available, may memorize messages, carry audio or video recordings, or hand-carry computer media.
930:, David W. Pendall suggested that a "catch-and-release program for suspected operatives might create reluctance or distrust in such suspects and prevent them from further acts or, perhaps more important, create distrust in the cell leaders of these individuals in the future." The author noted the press release describing
637:"Members of the core group are under what could be termed 'positive control'—long relationships and similar mindsets make 'control' not so much of an issue, but there are distinct roles, and position (structural, financial, spiritual) determines authority, thus making the core group a hierarchy topologically."
922:
or the Mafia—closed societies that took the U.S. government years to get inside. 'We're getting names, the different camps they trained at, the hierarchy, the infighting,' says an intelligence official. 'It's very promising.'" The report also said that the collected data has allowed the recruiting of
856:
U.S. special operations forces sometimes wait for presidential authorization to make an attack, or even to move to staging areas. A country would have to face the consequences of an inappropriate attack, so it may tend to be overcautious, whereas a terror network might merely shrug at the world being
652:
Assume there are no losses, and Osama can be reached directly only by members of the core group. Members of outer cells and support systems might know him only as "the
Commander", or, as in the actual case of al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden's face is recognizable worldwide, but only a few people knew where
504:
ALPINE and ALTITUDE only know how to reach ALASTAIR, but they are aware of at least some of other team members' identities should ALASTAIR be unavailable, and they would accept a message from ALBERT. Most often, the identity (and location) of the radio operator may not be shared. ALPINE and ALTITUDE,
851:
Operational cells are not created, but instead 'seeded' utilizing individuals spotted or that request assistance (both groups are 'vetted' by being trained under the observation of the core group, which dramatically restricts the opportunity for passing off walk-ins under false flag). Categorization
592:
an internal leadership core. Superficially, this might be likened to a
Western cell structure that emanates from a headquarters, but the Western centrality is bureaucratic, while structures in other non-Western cultures build on close personal relationships, often built over years, perhaps involving
512:
of the subcell structure came from the recruitment process, originally by the case officer and then by the cell leaders. The cell leader might propose subcell member names to the case officer, so the case officer could have headquarters run a background check on the potential recruit before bringing
464:
singleton, who is a joint asset of the country B, and the country identified by prefix AR. ARNOLD is a case officer from the country AR embassy, who knows only the case officer BERTRAM and the security officer BEST. ARNOLD does not know the station chief of BERRY or any of its other personnel. Other
402:
revolution and is referred to as the foco (or Cuban model) insurgency. This model involves a single, armed cell which emerges in the midst of degenerating government legitimacy and becomes the nucleus around which mass popular support rallies. The insurgents use this support to establish control and
178:
Especially through the French member, they would contact trusted individuals in the area of operation, and ask them to recruit a team of trusted subordinates (a subcell). If the mission was sabotage, reconnaissance, or espionage, there was no need to meet in large units. If the team was to carry out
726:
These cells are socially embedded (less so than the core group, however), structurally embedded, functionally embedded (they are specialized into a domain), and knowledge base-specific (there does not seem to be a great deal of cross-training or lateral mobility in the organization). Such cells are
218:
Officially, the PIRA was hierarchical, but as
British security forces became more effective it changed to a semiautonomous model for its operational and for certain of its support cells (such as transportation, intelligence, cover, and security). Its leadership saw itself as guiding and as building
78:
or other hostile groups to catch them. In a cell structure, each cell consists of a relatively small number of people, who know little to no information concerning organization assets (such as member identities) beyond their cell. This limits the harm that can be done to the organization as a whole
349:
These are usually driven by an organization that contains at least some of the governing elite, some being sympathizers already in government, and others who penetrate the government. When they use violence, it has a specific purpose, such as coercing voters, intimidating officials, and disrupting
322:
Different kinds of insurgency differ in where they place clandestine or covert cells. Also, when certain types of insurgency grow in power, they deemphasize the cell system. They may still use cells for leadership security, but if overt violence by organized units becomes significant, cells become
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also more unpredictable for counterterror forces. If their cells need constant control, there are communications links that might be detected by SIGINT, and if their command can be disrupted, the field units could not function. Since there is fairly little downside for terrorists to attack out of
170:
teams were formed to lead unconventional warfare against German units by acts of sabotage and leading local resistance forces. They also acted as a liaison between Allied command and the resistance units. They were composed of two officers – one
American or British, and the other a native to the
539:
In the past, if cell members only knew the cell leader, and the leader was neutralized, the cell was cut off from the rest of the organization. But if a traditional cell had independent communications with the foreign support organization, headquarters might be able to arrange its reconnection.
488:
The diagram in this section shows that two teams, ALAN and ALICE, have successfully entered an area of operation, the country coded AL, but are only aware of a pool of potential recruits, and have not yet actually recruited anyone. They communicate with one another only through headquarters, so
580:
Such networks function by having their sub-networks provide information and other forms of support (the 'many-to-one' model), while the core group supplies 'truth' and decisions/directions (the 'one-to-many' model). Trust and personal relationships are an essential part of the Al-Qaeda network
338:
The slowest to form, these are typically indigenous insurgencies that begin with limited goals. These are more secure than others, as they tend to form from people with preexisting social, cultural, or family ties. The insurgents resent a government that has failed to recognize tribal, racial,
141:
definition of a covert operation says the identity of the sponsor is concealed, but in a clandestine operation the operation itself is concealed from the participants. Put differently, clandestine means "hidden", and covert means "deniable"—that is to say that the sponsor of a covert action is
500:
Assume that in team ALAN, ALASTAIR is one of the officers with local contacts, and might recruit two cell leaders: ALPINE and ALTITUDE. The other local officer in the team, ALBERT, recruits ALLOVER. When ALPINE recruited two subcell members, they would be referred to as ALPINE-1 and ALPINE-2.
789:
The leader of a military cell is responsible for training its members, and, when an operation is scheduled, selecting the operational commander, giving her or him the basic objective and arranging whatever support is needed, and then releasing her or him from tight control to execute the
846:
of multiple concurrent attacks, there may be an operational cell for each target location. Some operations may need support cells in the operational area. For example, it may be more secure to have a local cell build bombs, which will be delivered by cells coming from outside the area.
555:
or other sources, that the enemy had captured the leadership and the entire team, and order the other team not to attempt contact. If headquarters can have reasonable confidence that there is a communications failure or partial compromise, it might send a new contact to the survivors.
648:
If Osama, the most respected, died, the core would reconstitute itself. While different members each have an individual ideological guide, and these are not the same for all members, the core would reconstitute itself with (in our example) Richard as most respected.
271:
freedom of action, distort information about goals and ideals, and restrict communication within the insurgency. In such a split organization, public issues can be addressed overtly while military actions are kept covert and intelligence functions stay clandestine.
803:
Kim operates two systems of cells, one for secure communications and one for propaganda. To send out a propaganda message, Osama must pass it to Kim. If Kim were compromised, the core group might have significant problems with any sort of outside communications.
633:
enhances security, it can limit flexibility and the ability to scale the organization. The in-group values that tie the cell together initially, shared cultural and ideological values, are not sufficient to create additional loyalty to a bureaucratic process.
280:
Many cell systems receive support from outside the cell. This can include leaders, trainers, and supplies (such as the
Jedburgh assistance to the French Resistance), or a safe haven for overt activities (such as the NLF spokesmen who could operate in Hanoi).
438:
as a naming convention used to identify members of the cell system. Cryptonyms begin with a two-letter country or subject name (e.g., AL), followed by more letters so as to form an arbitrary word, such as "BERRY", "BEN", and "BEATLE" in the example below.
358:) that directs the military in planning carefully coordinated violence. "Employment of violence is designed to show the system to be incompetent and to provoke the government to an excessively violent response which further undermines its legitimacy." The
171:
area they would operate, preferably from the area into which they landed – and a third member who was a radio operator. They operated in France and the
Netherlands and similar teams operated in South East Asia. On the night of the 5/6 June 1944, the first
459:
Some recruits, due to the sensitivity of their position or their personalities not being appropriate for cell leadership, might not enter cells but be run as singletons, perhaps by other than the recruiting case officer. In this example, asset BARD is
447:
Station BERRY operates, on behalf of country B, in target country BE. The station has three case officers and several support officers. Case officer BETTY supervises the local agents BEN and BEATLE. Case officer BESSIE supervises BENSON and BEAGLE.
219:
consensus. The lowest-level cells, typically of 2–5 people, tended to be built from people with existing personal relationships. British counterinsurgents could understand the command structure, but not the workings of the operational cells.
479:
Some recruits, however, would be qualified to recruit their own subcell, as BEATLE has done. BETTY knows the identity of BEATLE-1 and BEATLE-2, since he or she had them checked by headquarters counterintelligence before they were recruited.
576:
is authentic, it demonstrates that
Eastern cell structures may differ from the Western mode. Al-Qaeda's minimal core leadership group can be viewed as a ring or chain network, with each leader/node heading their own particular hierarchy.
367:
A subversive insurgency is suited to a more permissive political environment which allows the insurgents to use both legal and illegal methods to accomplish their goals. Effective government resistance may convert this to a critical-cell
323:
less important. In Mao's three-stage doctrine, cells are still useful in Phase II to give cover to part-time guerillas, but as the insurgency creates full-time military units in Phase III, the main units become the focus, not the cells.
640:
In the illustration of the core shown here, each member knows how to reach two other members, and also knows the member(s) he or she considers her or his ideological superior. Solid lines show basic communication, dotted red arrows show
626:, in this model, had the responsibility of commanding the organization and being the spokesman on propaganda messages distributed by the propaganda cell. The other members of the core each command one or more infrastructure cells.
288:, but this is not a public position of the government of Iran, and may even be limited to factions of that government. Early U.S. support to the Afghan Northern Alliance against the Taliban used clandestine operators from the
608:
under the supervision of the core group member, and possibly to operational groups that the headquarters supports. In an organization like this, there is a point at which the operational cell becomes autonomous of the core.
362:
rise to power, in the 1930s, is another example of subversion. Nazi members of parliament and street fighters were hardly clandestine, but the overall plan of the Nazi leadership to gain control of the nation was hidden.
215:(PIRA) has a history going back to Irish revolutionary forces in the early 20th century. Its doctrine and organization have changed over time, as political, technological, and cultural situations have changed in Ireland.
326:
Different varieties of insurgency place their cells differently with respect to the existing government. The U.S. Army Field Manual FM3-07 distinguishes between varieties of insurgencies. Drawing on this work, Nyberg (a
894:(a failure of Palestinian operations in the past), as well as a shared knowledge base (which may mean, over time, that cross-training emerges inside a cell, providing redundancy of most critical skills and knowledge).
711:) than in cities with large numbers of official and unofficial financial institutions and the communications to support them. If the financial office is distant from the remote headquarters, there is a need for
563:
has electronic communications, such as the
Internet, it has a much better chance of eluding surveillance and getting emergency instructions than by using a dead drop that can be under physical surveillance.
794:. Military leaders might have direct, possibly one-way, communications with their cells, or they might have to give Kim the messages to be transmitted, by means that Anton and Hassan have no need to know.
877:
Operational cells need to have continuous internal communication; there is a commander, who may be in touch with infrastructure cells or, less likely from a security standpoint, with the core group.
585:, even while it provides enhanced security). Cell members are trained as 'replaceable' units and 'vetting' of members occurs during the training period under the observation of the core group.
918:
said that American intelligence was beginning to acquire intelligence on al-Qaeda indicating that "nce thought nearly impossible to penetrate, al-Qaeda is proving no tougher a target than the
242:
political and military organizations. In the case of the NLF, except for some individuals with sanctuary in North Vietnam, people in the political organization could not be overt during the
811:
to other cell systems that regularly report to a headquarters. The apparent al-Qaeda methodology, of letting operational cells decide on their final dates and means of attack, exhibits
551:, do not guarantee a contact. When a team finds a message in its emergency drop, it might do no more than send an alert message to headquarters. Headquarters might determine, through
1051:
425:
insurgency in Peru are examples of the mass-oriented model. Once established, this type of insurgency is extremely difficult to defeat because of its great depth of organization.
314:, for example, U.S. personnel gave covert counterinsurgency assistance to the Royal Lao Army starting in 1959, this became overt in 1961, and finally ceased operations in 1962.
798:
Note that Anton does not have a direct connection to Kim. Under normal circumstances, he sacrifices efficiency for security, by passing communications requests through Hassan.
265:
The overt political/social–covert military split postponed the inflexibility of a completely secret organization and shortage of PMC/black-ops resources as well as redundancy.
465:
than BELL and BEST, the Station personnel only know BERTRAM as someone authorized to be in the Station, and who is known for his piano playing at embassy parties. He is
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The security structure also means that Hassan does not know the members of Anton's cells, and Kim may know only ways to communicate with them but not their identity.
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1880:
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family or other in-group linkages. Such in-groups are thus extremely hard to infiltrate. Still, it may be possible for an in-group to be compromised through
1677:
544:, one for Team ALAN to leave "lost contact" messages to be retrieved by Team ALICE, and another dead drop for Team ALICE to leave messages for Team ALAN.
816:
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In contrast, BESSIE and BETTY know one another, and procedures exist for their taking over each other's assets in the event one of the two is disabled.
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as Cultural Attache, in a country that has very few pianos. Only the personnel involved with BARD know that ARNOLD is other than another
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generally operates in this mode, but if they become strong enough in a given area, they may change to the mass-oriented form (see below).
2223:
1913:
661:
Any clandestine or covert service, especially a non-national one, needs a variety of technical and administrative functions, such as:
1873:
1514:
203:, this organization grew from earlier anticolonial groups fighting the French and from anti-Japanese guerrillas during World War II.
999:
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As the networks grow, a subcell leader might create her or his own cell, so ALPINE-2 might become the leader of the ALIMONY cell.
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1382:
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Cells are coordinated, not under "command smf control"—this autonomy and local control makes them flexible and enhances security
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1946:
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synchronization with other activities, the lack of positive control becomes a strength of their approach to cell organization.
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officer) describes four types of cell system (there is also a new type associated with transnational terrorist insurgencies):
310:
In a covert counterinsurgency mission, only selected host nation leaders are aware of the foreign support organization. Under
1855:
1278:
826:
Note that Hassan has two subordinates that have not yet established operational cells. These subordinates can be considered
727:
probably subjected to a mixture of both positive and negative control ('do this, do these sorts of things, don't do that').
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A national intelligence service has a support organization to deal with services like finance, logistics, facilities (e.g.,
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1504:
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in cell organizations. Game theory and graph theory have been applied to the study of optimal covert network design.
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31:
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1253:. US Southern District Court, US New York City Attorney's Office, entered as evidence in Africa embassy bombings.
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2011:
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Lindelauf, R.H.A. et al. 2009. "The influence of secrecy on the communication structure of covert networks"
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sufficiently removed from it that the sponsor can claim ignorance in the event the plot is discovered.
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External support need not be overt. Certain Shi'a groups in Iraq, for example, receive assistance from
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2140:
1899:
1337:
1307:
1166:
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Another method is to have impersonal communications as "side links" between cells, such as a pair of
1187:
1080:
1052:"The Impact of Technology on the Command, Control, and Organizational Structure of Insurgent Groups"
378:. While other cell systems try to form intelligence cells within the government, this type sets up "
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it was a structure more appropriate for unconventional warfare than for truly clandestine operations
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1509:
379:
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1936:
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382:" cells that can seize power once the status quo is overthrown. This model includes the classic
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1356:"Run and Gun: Al Qaeda arrests and intelligence hauls bring new energy to the war on terrorism"
300:
107:
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Some of these functions, such as finance, are far harder to operate in remote areas (like the
374:
These come into play when the political climate becomes less permissive than one that allowed
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For the general use of a cellular structure by an organization, such as by a business, see
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In the above graphic, note the indirect support network controlled by Richard's subcell.
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Viet Cong: Organization and Technique of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam
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1956:
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however, do not know one another. They do not know any of the members of team ALICE.
604:. Each member of the core forms another hub and spoke system, the spokes leading to
391:
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943:
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takeover of an existing government weakened by external popular revolution, or the
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2006:
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also have variants of overt political/social service and covert military wings.
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Initial team presence by two separate clandestine teams with no official cover
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and discrediting the government. Typically, there is a political arm (such as
238:
The NLF (Viet Cong) and PIRA, as well as other movements, have chosen to have
226:
had an extensive network of inactive or sleeper cells, so it could summon new
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1991:
1961:
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1620:
1605:
1103:
435:
150:
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A dual, but sometimes overlapping, Party and Military structure was top-down
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1645:
1635:
1576:
1140:"FM 3-07 (formerly FM 100-20): Stability Operations and Support Operations"
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88:
1409:
880:
Al-Qaeda's approach differs from that of earlier terrorist organizations:
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2192:
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Cells are redundant and distributed, making them difficult to "roll up"
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upset. Assuming that the al-Qaeda operational technique is not to use
253:, became increasingly overt, and then a full participant in politics.
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1591:
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645:, and dotted blue arrows show a second level of ideological respect.
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296:. As the latter conflict escalated, U.S. participation became overt.
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91:, or giving up information after being apprehended and interrogated.
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67:
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to an extremely distributed organization, depending on the group's
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The structure of a clandestine cell system can range from a strict
75:
567:
307:(counterinsurgency) may be covert and use cellular organization.
246:. After the war ended, surviving NLF officials held high office.
1331:"Modeling Terrorist Networks – Complex Systems at the Mid-Range"
1218:
819:
appropriate for a warning center. Such lists depend on seeing a
532:
Modern communications theory has introduced methods to increase
153:, that lies dormant until it receives orders or decides to act.
2097:
722:
Core group and infrastructure cells; military cells in training
594:
552:
395:
121:
1276:
516:
492:
451:
1375:"Effects-Based Operations and the Exercise of National Power"
1279:"Hunting the Sleepers: Tracking al-Qaida's Covert Operatives"
611:
Members surviving the operation may rejoin at various points.
386:, and often tries to minimize violence. Examples include the
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704:
615:
399:
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Models of insurgency and associated cell characteristics
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Counterintelligence and counter-terrorism organizations
1169:. US Marine Corps University Command and Staff College.
1000:"Chapter 3: Special Operations in the European Theater"
873:
Core group, with contact ring and ideological hierarchy
619:
Core group, with contact ring and ideological hierarchy
602:
inner hub-and-spoke structure of ideological authority
50:
is a method for organizing a group of people, such as
527:
455:
Representative diplomatic-cover station and networks
206:
118:
may also use this sort of organizational structure.
1277:Decision Support Systems, Inc. (31 December 2001).
37:"Sleeper cell" redirects here. For other uses, see
489:compromise of one team will not affect the other.
442:
187:National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam
1074:
161:
2387:
838:For each mission, one or more operational cells
1200:
1049:
568:Non-traditional models, exemplified by al-Qaeda
1138:US Department of the Army (20 February 2003).
1907:
1425:
1034:
1010:United States Army Center of Military History
813:an operational pattern, but not a periodicity
600:The core group is a ring, superimposed on an
597:or, in rare cases, by compromising a member.
520:Clandestine teams have built initial subcells
267:Once an active insurgency began, the secrecy
249:In the case of the PIRA, its political wing,
133:operations are not the same when it comes to
1005:U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II
909:
898:
122:Covert operations vs. clandestine operations
1439:
1373:Pendall, David W. (January–February 2004).
1366:
1272:
1270:
1268:
1266:
1264:
1262:
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1102:US Department of the Army (December 2006).
982:
830:, but not necessarily with a sleeper cell.
1914:
1900:
1432:
1418:
1347:
1295:
230:organizations for any specific operation.
149:refers to a cell, or isolated grouping of
114:, and unconventional warfare units led by
106:available, and the nature of the mission.
27:Compartmentalized organizational structure
1328:
605:
430:Classic models for cell system operations
233:
1257:
1068:
868:
717:
614:
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491:
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190:
175:teams parachuted into occupied France
1846:Scientific & Technical intelligence
1383:United States Army Combined Arms Center
1372:
1212:
1194:
1028:
656:
483:
14:
2388:
2219:Charities accused of ties to terrorism
1399:Find the article by going through the
1354:Kaplan, David E. (22 September 2002).
1353:
1164:
1113:
985:You're Stepping on my Cloak and Dagger
643:the first level of ideological respect
1895:
1413:
1329:Fellman, Philip Vos; Wright, Roxana.
1158:
1131:
1095:
997:
890:Trust internally to the cell provide
668:Forged documents/counterfeit currency
1668:By alliances, nations and industries
1240:
1043:
991:
833:
823:pattern to give a specific warning.
462:a different sort of highly sensitive
1322:
976:
683:Reconnaissance/Counter-surveillance
653:he was or even how to contact him.
275:
24:
2260:Victims of Acts of Terror Memorial
2224:Designated terrorist organizations
1167:"Insurgency: The Unsolved Mystery"
1127:. Foreign Language Press, Beijing.
528:Fault-tolerant cellular structures
25:
2442:
1206:Coup d'etat: A Practical Handbook
926:Writing in the U.S. Army journal
815:that could easily be used for an
294:United States Army Special Forces
213:Provisional Irish Republican Army
207:Provisional Irish Republican Army
32:Cellular organizational structure
1970:
1304:"Support to Mission: Who We Are"
1302:US Central Intelligence Agency.
547:These links, to be used only on
1816:Words of estimative probability
1678:Operational platforms by nation
1227:
1219:Guevara, Ernesto "Che" (1961).
1012:. CMH Pub 70-42. Archived from
892:redundancy of potential command
861:, their operations may be more
842:. If al-Qaeda uses its typical
767:Military training/operations 2
759:Military training/operations 1
443:Operations under official cover
783:Communications and propaganda
162:World War II French Resistance
79:by any individual cell member
13:
1:
1921:
969:
39:Sleeper cell (disambiguation)
1360:U.S. News & World Report
1104:"FM 3–24: Counterinsurgency"
916:U.S. News & World Report
588:Cells of this structure are
102:, its operational area, the
7:
1864:Intelligence cycle security
1208:. Harvard University Press.
937:
434:The examples here will use
303:(guerrilla operations) and
104:communications technologies
10:
2447:
1952:Anti-terrorism legislation
1248:"al-Qaeda training manual"
807:Terrorist networks do not
415:People's Republic of China
329:United States Marine Corps
156:
36:
29:
2268:
2242:
2234:Islamic terrorist attacks
2211:
2185:
2149:
2141:State-sponsored terrorism
2128:
2088:Environmental destruction
2057:
1979:
1968:
1947:International conventions
1929:
1854:
1796:
1756:
1701:
1658:
1523:
1485:
1465:
1456:
1447:
910:A possible countermeasure
899:Indirect support networks
743:Infrastructure commanded
409:While the subversive and
356:National Liberation Front
2431:Organized crime activity
1165:Nyberg, Eric N. (1991).
1050:Leahy, Kevin C. (2005).
998:Hogan, David W. (1992).
692:Psychological operations
677:Transportation/Logistics
574:al-Qaeda Training Manual
403:erect new institutions."
305:foreign internal defense
70:, to make it harder for
2157:Clandestine cell system
1831:Intelligence assessment
1821:All-source intelligence
1441:Intelligence management
1075:Irish Republican Army.
48:clandestine cell system
2103:Propaganda of the deed
1515:Operational techniques
1470:Special reconnaissance
1182:Cite journal requires
1035:Pike, Douglas (1970).
874:
854:
723:
620:
521:
497:
456:
301:unconventional warfare
234:Parallel organizations
196:
108:Criminal organizations
2411:Military intelligence
2406:Intelligence analysis
2243:Memorials and museums
959:Lone wolf (terrorism)
954:Leaderless resistance
872:
849:
817:indications checklist
721:
618:
519:
495:
454:
194:
112:undercover operations
2255:Topography of Terror
1942:History of terrorism
1836:Medical intelligence
1806:Competing hypotheses
1616:Industrial espionage
1601:Denial and deception
1291:on 28 November 2007.
1008:. Washington, D.C.:
983:Hall, Roger (1964).
686:Operational planning
665:Recruitment/training
657:Infrastructure cells
606:infrastructure cells
590:built outwards, from
484:Clandestine presence
312:Operation White Star
2396:Counterintelligence
1869:Counterintelligence
1784:Technical (TECHINT)
1779:Open-source (OSINT)
1769:Geospatial (GEOINT)
1743:Casualty estimation
1221:On Guerilla Warfare
736:
689:Arms and ammunition
671:Finance/Fundraising
419:American Revolution
2401:Types of espionage
2073:Aircraft hijacking
1841:Military geography
1826:Basic intelligence
1764:Financial (FININT)
1705:signature (MASINT)
1631:One-way voice link
1567:Concealment device
932:Ramzi bin al-Shibh
875:
731:Core structure of
730:
724:
631:the tight coupling
621:
522:
498:
457:
199:Also known as the
197:
173:Operation Jedburgh
168:Operation Jedburgh
2426:Terrorism tactics
2383:
2382:
2129:State involvement
1957:Counter-terrorism
1889:
1888:
1792:
1791:
1683:Direction finding
1673:In modern history
1654:
1653:
1125:On Protracted War
1016:on 23 August 2020
834:Operational cells
787:
786:
583:a limiting factor
380:shadow government
166:In World War II,
16:(Redirected from
2438:
2416:Military tactics
1974:
1916:
1909:
1902:
1893:
1892:
1688:Traffic analysis
1660:Signals (SIGINT)
1495:Asset recruiting
1463:
1462:
1454:
1453:
1434:
1427:
1420:
1411:
1410:
1404:
1398:
1396:
1394:
1389:on 30 March 2008
1385:. Archived from
1370:
1364:
1363:
1351:
1345:
1344:
1342:
1336:. Archived from
1335:
1326:
1320:
1319:
1317:
1315:
1306:. Archived from
1299:
1293:
1292:
1290:
1284:. Archived from
1283:
1274:
1255:
1254:
1252:
1244:
1238:
1231:
1225:
1224:
1216:
1210:
1209:
1198:
1192:
1191:
1185:
1180:
1178:
1170:
1162:
1156:
1155:
1153:
1151:
1142:. Archived from
1135:
1129:
1128:
1117:
1111:
1110:
1108:
1099:
1093:
1092:
1090:
1088:
1079:. Archived from
1077:"The Green Book"
1072:
1066:
1065:
1063:
1057:. Archived from
1056:
1047:
1041:
1040:
1032:
1026:
1025:
1023:
1021:
995:
989:
988:
980:
944:Cloak and dagger
893:
864:
860:
859:positive control
841:
822:
814:
810:
799:
793:
737:
734:
729:
644:
632:
612:
603:
591:
584:
562:
561:the cut-off team
550:
511:
472:
468:
463:
412:
377:
366:
276:External support
270:
266:
241:
225:
182:
21:
2446:
2445:
2441:
2440:
2439:
2437:
2436:
2435:
2386:
2385:
2384:
2379:
2264:
2250:House of Terror
2238:
2207:
2198:Reign of Terror
2181:
2145:
2136:State terrorism
2124:
2053:
2007:Ethnic violence
1975:
1966:
1925:
1920:
1890:
1885:
1850:
1788:
1774:Imagery (IMINT)
1752:
1713:Electro-optical
1704:
1703:Measurement and
1697:
1650:
1626:Numbers station
1555:Black operation
1519:
1481:
1443:
1438:
1408:
1407:
1401:Military Review
1392:
1390:
1379:Military Review
1371:
1367:
1352:
1348:
1343:on 8 July 2007.
1340:
1333:
1327:
1323:
1313:
1311:
1310:on 12 June 2007
1300:
1296:
1288:
1281:
1275:
1258:
1250:
1246:
1245:
1241:
1235:Social Networks
1232:
1228:
1217:
1213:
1202:Luttwak, Edward
1199:
1195:
1183:
1181:
1172:
1171:
1163:
1159:
1149:
1147:
1146:on 27 June 2007
1136:
1132:
1118:
1114:
1106:
1100:
1096:
1086:
1084:
1073:
1069:
1064:on 30 May 2008.
1061:
1054:
1048:
1044:
1033:
1029:
1019:
1017:
996:
992:
987:. Bantam Books.
981:
977:
972:
940:
928:Military Review
912:
901:
891:
862:
858:
839:
836:
820:
812:
808:
797:
791:
775:Transportation
732:
659:
642:
630:
624:Osama bin Laden
610:
601:
589:
582:
570:
560:
548:
534:fault tolerance
530:
509:
486:
470:
466:
461:
445:
432:
410:
375:
364:
320:
299:Note that both
278:
268:
264:
239:
236:
223:
209:
189:
180:
164:
159:
124:
64:organized crime
42:
35:
28:
23:
22:
15:
12:
11:
5:
2444:
2434:
2433:
2428:
2423:
2418:
2413:
2408:
2403:
2398:
2381:
2380:
2378:
2377:
2376:
2375:
2367:
2366:
2365:
2355:
2350:
2349:
2348:
2338:
2337:
2336:
2328:
2323:
2322:
2321:
2313:
2312:
2311:
2303:
2302:
2301:
2293:
2292:
2291:
2283:
2282:
2281:
2272:
2270:
2266:
2265:
2263:
2262:
2257:
2252:
2246:
2244:
2240:
2239:
2237:
2236:
2231:
2226:
2221:
2215:
2213:
2209:
2208:
2206:
2205:
2200:
2195:
2189:
2187:
2183:
2182:
2180:
2179:
2174:
2169:
2164:
2159:
2153:
2151:
2147:
2146:
2144:
2143:
2138:
2132:
2130:
2126:
2125:
2123:
2122:
2121:
2120:
2113:Suicide attack
2110:
2105:
2100:
2095:
2090:
2085:
2080:
2075:
2070:
2068:Agro-terrorism
2064:
2062:
2055:
2054:
2052:
2051:
2045:
2040:
2031:
2026:
2024:Narcoterrorism
2021:
2020:
2019:
2014:
2004:
1999:
1994:
1989:
1983:
1981:
1977:
1976:
1969:
1967:
1965:
1964:
1959:
1954:
1949:
1944:
1939:
1933:
1931:
1927:
1926:
1919:
1918:
1911:
1904:
1896:
1887:
1886:
1884:
1883:
1878:
1877:
1876:
1866:
1860:
1858:
1852:
1851:
1849:
1848:
1843:
1838:
1833:
1828:
1823:
1818:
1813:
1811:Target-centric
1808:
1802:
1800:
1794:
1793:
1790:
1789:
1787:
1786:
1781:
1776:
1771:
1766:
1760:
1758:
1754:
1753:
1751:
1750:
1740:
1735:
1733:Radiofrequency
1730:
1725:
1720:
1715:
1709:
1707:
1699:
1698:
1696:
1695:
1690:
1685:
1680:
1675:
1670:
1664:
1662:
1656:
1655:
1652:
1651:
1649:
1648:
1643:
1638:
1633:
1628:
1623:
1618:
1613:
1608:
1603:
1598:
1589:
1584:
1579:
1574:
1569:
1564:
1563:
1562:
1552:
1547:
1546:
1545:
1540:
1529:
1527:
1521:
1520:
1518:
1517:
1512:
1507:
1502:
1497:
1491:
1489:
1483:
1482:
1480:
1479:
1478:
1477:
1466:
1460:
1458:Human (HUMINT)
1451:
1445:
1444:
1437:
1436:
1429:
1422:
1414:
1406:
1405:
1365:
1346:
1321:
1294:
1256:
1239:
1226:
1211:
1193:
1184:|journal=
1157:
1130:
1112:
1094:
1083:on 30 May 2008
1067:
1042:
1027:
990:
974:
973:
971:
968:
967:
966:
961:
956:
951:
946:
939:
936:
911:
908:
900:
897:
896:
895:
888:
885:
844:modus operandi
835:
832:
785:
784:
781:
777:
776:
773:
769:
768:
765:
761:
760:
757:
753:
752:
749:
745:
744:
741:
694:
693:
690:
687:
684:
681:
678:
675:
674:Communications
672:
669:
666:
658:
655:
569:
566:
549:losing contact
529:
526:
485:
482:
444:
441:
436:CIA cryptonyms
431:
428:
427:
426:
407:Mass-oriented:
404:
392:GĂĽlen movement
372:Critical-cell:
369:
344:
319:
316:
277:
274:
235:
232:
208:
205:
188:
185:
163:
160:
158:
155:
151:sleeper agents
123:
120:
116:special forces
26:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
2443:
2432:
2429:
2427:
2424:
2422:
2419:
2417:
2414:
2412:
2409:
2407:
2404:
2402:
2399:
2397:
2394:
2393:
2391:
2374:
2371:
2370:
2368:
2364:
2361:
2360:
2359:
2358:United States
2356:
2354:
2351:
2347:
2344:
2343:
2342:
2339:
2335:
2332:
2331:
2329:
2327:
2324:
2320:
2317:
2316:
2314:
2310:
2307:
2306:
2304:
2300:
2297:
2296:
2294:
2290:
2287:
2286:
2284:
2280:
2277:
2276:
2274:
2273:
2271:
2267:
2261:
2258:
2256:
2253:
2251:
2248:
2247:
2245:
2241:
2235:
2232:
2230:
2227:
2225:
2222:
2220:
2217:
2216:
2214:
2210:
2204:
2201:
2199:
2196:
2194:
2191:
2190:
2188:
2184:
2178:
2177:Training camp
2175:
2173:
2170:
2168:
2165:
2163:
2160:
2158:
2155:
2154:
2152:
2148:
2142:
2139:
2137:
2134:
2133:
2131:
2127:
2119:
2116:
2115:
2114:
2111:
2109:
2106:
2104:
2101:
2099:
2096:
2094:
2091:
2089:
2086:
2084:
2081:
2079:
2076:
2074:
2071:
2069:
2066:
2065:
2063:
2061:
2056:
2049:
2046:
2044:
2041:
2039:
2035:
2032:
2030:
2027:
2025:
2022:
2018:
2015:
2013:
2010:
2009:
2008:
2005:
2003:
2000:
1998:
1995:
1993:
1990:
1988:
1985:
1984:
1982:
1978:
1973:
1963:
1962:War on Terror
1960:
1958:
1955:
1953:
1950:
1948:
1945:
1943:
1940:
1938:
1935:
1934:
1932:
1930:Main articles
1928:
1924:
1917:
1912:
1910:
1905:
1903:
1898:
1897:
1894:
1882:
1879:
1875:
1874:organizations
1872:
1871:
1870:
1867:
1865:
1862:
1861:
1859:
1857:
1856:Dissemination
1853:
1847:
1844:
1842:
1839:
1837:
1834:
1832:
1829:
1827:
1824:
1822:
1819:
1817:
1814:
1812:
1809:
1807:
1804:
1803:
1801:
1799:
1795:
1785:
1782:
1780:
1777:
1775:
1772:
1770:
1767:
1765:
1762:
1761:
1759:
1755:
1748:
1744:
1741:
1739:
1736:
1734:
1731:
1729:
1726:
1724:
1721:
1719:
1716:
1714:
1711:
1710:
1708:
1706:
1700:
1694:
1691:
1689:
1686:
1684:
1681:
1679:
1676:
1674:
1671:
1669:
1666:
1665:
1663:
1661:
1657:
1647:
1644:
1642:
1641:Steganography
1639:
1637:
1634:
1632:
1629:
1627:
1624:
1622:
1621:Interrogation
1619:
1617:
1614:
1612:
1609:
1607:
1606:Eavesdropping
1604:
1602:
1599:
1597:
1593:
1590:
1588:
1585:
1583:
1580:
1578:
1575:
1573:
1570:
1568:
1565:
1561:
1558:
1557:
1556:
1553:
1551:
1548:
1544:
1541:
1539:
1536:
1535:
1534:
1531:
1530:
1528:
1526:
1522:
1516:
1513:
1511:
1510:Direct action
1508:
1506:
1505:Covert action
1503:
1501:
1498:
1496:
1493:
1492:
1490:
1488:
1484:
1476:
1475:organizations
1473:
1472:
1471:
1468:
1467:
1464:
1461:
1459:
1455:
1452:
1450:
1446:
1442:
1435:
1430:
1428:
1423:
1421:
1416:
1415:
1412:
1402:
1388:
1384:
1380:
1376:
1369:
1361:
1357:
1350:
1339:
1332:
1325:
1309:
1305:
1298:
1287:
1280:
1273:
1271:
1269:
1267:
1265:
1263:
1261:
1249:
1243:
1236:
1230:
1222:
1215:
1207:
1203:
1197:
1189:
1176:
1168:
1161:
1145:
1141:
1134:
1126:
1122:
1116:
1105:
1098:
1082:
1078:
1071:
1060:
1053:
1046:
1038:
1031:
1015:
1011:
1007:
1006:
1001:
994:
986:
979:
975:
965:
962:
960:
957:
955:
952:
950:
947:
945:
942:
941:
935:
933:
929:
924:
921:
917:
907:
904:
889:
886:
883:
882:
881:
878:
871:
867:
853:
848:
845:
831:
829:
824:
818:
809:match cleanly
805:
801:
795:
782:
779:
778:
774:
771:
770:
766:
763:
762:
758:
755:
754:
750:
747:
746:
742:
739:
738:
728:
720:
716:
714:
710:
706:
701:
699:
691:
688:
685:
682:
679:
676:
673:
670:
667:
664:
663:
662:
654:
650:
646:
638:
635:
627:
625:
617:
613:
607:
598:
596:
586:
578:
575:
565:
557:
554:
545:
543:
537:
535:
525:
518:
514:
506:
502:
494:
490:
481:
477:
474:
453:
449:
440:
437:
424:
420:
416:
408:
405:
401:
397:
393:
389:
385:
381:
373:
370:
361:
357:
353:
348:
345:
342:
337:
334:
333:
332:
330:
324:
315:
313:
308:
306:
302:
297:
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40:
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19:
2346:Soviet Union
2203:White Terror
2156:
2150:Organisation
2078:Bioterrorism
1646:Surveillance
1636:Resident spy
1577:Cryptography
1499:
1400:
1391:. Retrieved
1387:the original
1378:
1368:
1359:
1349:
1338:the original
1324:
1312:. Retrieved
1308:the original
1297:
1286:the original
1242:
1234:
1229:
1220:
1214:
1205:
1196:
1175:cite journal
1160:
1148:. Retrieved
1144:the original
1133:
1124:
1115:
1097:
1085:. Retrieved
1081:the original
1070:
1059:the original
1045:
1039:. MIT Press.
1036:
1030:
1018:. Retrieved
1014:the original
1004:
993:
984:
978:
927:
925:
923:informants.
915:
913:
905:
902:
879:
876:
855:
850:
837:
827:
825:
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796:
788:
733:non-national
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599:
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579:
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558:
546:
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531:
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507:
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487:
478:
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458:
446:
433:
423:Shining Path
406:
376:shadow cells
371:
346:
336:Traditional:
335:
325:
321:
309:
298:
283:
279:
263:
248:
237:
227:
221:
217:
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198:
177:
165:
147:sleeper cell
146:
144:
125:
93:
66:members, or
47:
45:
43:
2118:Palestinian
2083:Car bombing
2029:Nationalist
2012:Palestinian
1980:By ideology
1718:Geophysical
1500:Cell system
1487:Clandestine
1403:directories
1314:19 November
1121:Mao, Zedong
964:Stay-behind
863:random, but
840:are created
384:coup d'etat
347:Subversive:
269:could limit
244:Vietnam War
211:The modern
131:clandestine
60:mercenaries
18:Covert cell
2390:Categories
2369:Venezuela
2269:By country
2193:Red Terror
2186:Historical
2108:Proxy bomb
2058:Types and
2002:Right-wing
1937:Definition
1747:earthquake
1611:False flag
1449:Collection
1223:. Praeger.
1150:2 February
1087:4 December
970:References
698:safehouses
680:Safehouses
542:dead drops
510:legitimacy
473:diplomat.
421:, and the
388:Sandinista
135:tradecraft
89:surveilled
83:, being a
68:terrorists
54:fighters,
52:resistance
2373:Sponsored
2363:Sponsored
2353:Sri Lanka
2334:Sponsored
2326:Palestine
2319:Sponsored
2315:Pakistan
2309:Sponsored
2299:Sponsored
2289:Sponsored
2279:Sponsored
2229:Incidents
2172:Lone wolf
2162:Financing
2038:Christian
2034:Religious
1997:Left-wing
1987:Communist
1923:Terrorism
1738:Materials
1592:Defection
1587:Dead drop
1560:black bag
1525:Espionage
914:In 2002,
352:Sinn FĂ©in
259:Hezbollah
251:Sinn FĂ©in
201:Viet Cong
96:hierarchy
81:defecting
1798:Analysis
1596:Turncoat
1543:handling
1204:(1968).
1123:(1967).
938:See also
828:sleepers
751:Finance
748:Richard
713:couriers
709:Pakistan
471:friendly
341:al-Qaeda
240:parallel
100:ideology
87:, being
76:military
2421:Secrecy
2295:Kuwait
2285:Israel
2093:Nuclear
2060:tactics
2043:Islamic
2036: (
2017:Zionist
1745: (
1723:Nuclear
1693:TEMPEST
1237:31: 126
1020:12 July
949:Cut-out
792:meeting
764:Hassan
740:Member
572:If the
467:covered
354:or the
157:History
2341:Russia
2330:Qatar
2305:Libya
2098:Piracy
2048:Jewish
1582:Cutout
1533:Agents
1393:4 July
772:David
756:Anton
735:group
629:While
595:COMINT
553:SIGINT
417:, the
411:covert
396:Turkey
368:model.
228:ad hoc
127:Covert
72:police
2275:Iran
2212:Lists
2167:Front
1992:Green
1757:Other
1728:Radar
1572:Cover
1550:Asset
1538:field
1341:(PDF)
1334:(PDF)
1289:(PDF)
1282:(PDF)
1251:(PDF)
1107:(PDF)
1062:(PDF)
1055:(PDF)
821:local
559:When
400:Cuban
255:Hamas
56:spies
1395:2019
1316:2007
1188:help
1152:2008
1089:2007
1022:2010
780:Kim
705:FATA
508:The
360:Nazi
292:and
286:Iran
257:and
222:The
139:NATO
129:and
85:mole
920:KGB
707:of
394:in
290:CIA
224:IRA
2392::
1594:/
1381:.
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1358:.
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