446:, North Africa was being rolled up by Rommel with Egypt threatened, Soviet forces were falling back against the German advances toward Stalingrad and the oilfields of the Caucasus, and German U-boats in the Atlantic sank 589 ships in early 1942. On 25 August, Arnold received word of the president's request from Army Chief of Staff George Marshall. The individual AWPD-1 team members had been reassigned to a wide variety of posts and duties, so to perform the reassessment Arnold recommended Hansell, recently made brigadier general. Marshall cabled Hansell in the UK, where he had been working under General
510:
control differences between the services, as well as differing targeting preferences, would create impossible barriers to successful employment of the notional USAAF patrol bombers against enemy naval forces. The Navy flatly rejected AWPD-42, which barred acceptance by the JCS, but by 15 October 1942 the president had established it as the U.S.'s aircraft manufacturing plan, saying that the lofty aircraft production proposal "will be given the highest priority and whatever preference is needed to insure its accomplishment."
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allies that were to receive a certain number of Navy-type aircraft. Hansell decided to make his plan wholly inclusive of all
American aircraft requirements—Army, Navy, and Allied—so that there would be no misunderstanding about how aircraft-producing resources would be allocated. Hansell accepted the aircraft production plans that the Navy submitted, but with one vital change: the four-engined bombers the Navy wanted would be built as Air Corps bombers, flown by USAAF units.
253:
22:
245:(ACTS) during the preceding decade, but was sure that the Army and the War Department would not accept a strategy that assumed air attack would prevail alone. Instead, he intended to implement a middle path which began with strategic air attack but contained allowances for the eventual support of a ground invasion. In requesting autonomy to make his own plans, George gained approval from General Arnold and from General
216:
482:
industrial might. An air campaign against two major
European objectives was encompassed: first to paralyze Axis industrial power, and second to defeat Axis air power. Axis aircraft factories and aircraft engine plants were to be targeted during 1943–1944 so that, in the spring of 1944, an invasion of Europe could be undertaken.
372:
Roosevelt incorporated the Army's, Navy's and Air Staff's detailed plans into an executive policy he called his "Victory
Program". Roosevelt hoped to engage public opinion in favor of the Victory Program because the increase in production it promised meant more jobs and a healthier economy. Opponents
472:
had obtained his copy at 1 am the day it was to be released, and
Hopkins read it in time to tell Roosevelt over breakfast that the plan was sound. Roosevelt called Stimson to say he approved it, but Stimson hadn't had not seen it; nor had Marshall when Stimson called him. Hansell left hurriedly
415:
issued
Directive 39 which countered the American strategic bombing and invasion plans by massing air defenses around key industries and by greatly increasing Atlantic Ocean attacks so that an Allied invasion fleet could not be formed. Hitler directed his forces opposing the Soviet Union to go on the
129:
expansion in the U.S. George was challenged by WPD, which contested AWPD's and Air Staff's authority to make strategic plans. WPD recommended that AWPD should be limited to tactical planning, and that the Air Staff, in a subordinate role, should advise the WPD rather than make its own operational or
590:
Targeting proved a difficult task for AWPD—attaining the proper selection required a wide range of intelligence input as well as operational considerations. In
December 1942, Arnold set up the Committee of Operations Analysts (COA) to better study the problem. The COA performed target selection for
526:
aircraft and other types. Of the combat aircraft, 5000 were to be heavy and very heavy bombers. AWPD-4 increased the combat aircraft to 19,520 and the total to 146,000. Numbers increased again in AWPD-42, which proposed that combat aircraft should top 63,000 in 1943. Total U.S. aircraft production,
338:
approved AWPD-1 in
September, as did Secretary of War Stimson. Army planners were worried that both the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom would be defeated, and that an invasion of Europe would become remote. The strategy of weakening Germany by bombing, long before an invasion could be prepared,
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and building yards, transportation systems, electric power generation and distribution, the petroleum industry, aluminum refining and manufacture, and the synthetic rubber industry. Hansell considered it a mistake to remove electricity from the top priority, and worse still to place submarine pens
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aircraft; he asked for the "number of combat aircraft by types which should be produced in this country for the Army and our Allies in 1943..." This meant that the Navy's aircraft needs, which were significant, were not requested, but that the aircraft needs for
America's allies would be included,
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invasion forces, making invasion extremely costly and perhaps impossible. It was also assumed that two-front tension in the German economy would lessen, and Allied damage to Axis industry would be more easily absorbed. An increase in
American air power was projected as the best way to reduce Axis
459:
and RAF Group
Captain Bobby Sharp, as well as the little data compiled from five UK-based raids which had been flown by U.S. bombers. Hansell was assisted on a consultative basis by George, Kuter and Walker, old AWPD-1 hands, and by Lieutenant Colonel Malcolm Moss, who was a sharp businessman in
454:
as Deputy Theater Air Officer. Marshall ordered Hansell to hurry back to AWPD and that "the results of the work of this group are of such far-reaching importance that it will probably determine whether or not we control the air." Hansell brought with him VIII Bomber Command Chief of Intelligence
509:
The Navy was not at all satisfied with AWPD-42. The Navy's intention to divert 1250 land-based heavy bombers from AAF requirements, to use for long-range patrol and for attacking enemy vessels, was dismissed in favor of USAAF flights to achieve the same goals. The Navy expected that command and
432:
was asked to rewrite the air plans. On 15 December, Anderson submitted AWPD-4, mostly a restatement of the goals of AWPD-1, but with augmented quantities to meet the greater needs of a two-front war. The number of combat aircraft was increased by 65%, and total aircraft production was more than
614:
assembled an Anglo-American planning team to take the COA's list of targets and schedule them for combined bomber operations. This unnamed group, sometimes called the CBO Planning Team, was led by Hansell and included among others USAAF Brigadier General Franklin Anderson and RAF Air Commodore
291:
George, Walker, Kuter, and Hansell provided the key concepts for the AWPD task force. George's vision was that the plan should not be a simple list of quantities of men and materiel—it should be a clear expression of the strategic direction required to win the war by use of air power. The main
263:
241:. An air plan would have been made emphasizing tactical air coordination with ground forces, one which targeted Axis military formations and supplies in preparation and support of an invasion. George wished to implement the strategic bombing theories that had been debated and refined at the
476:
AWPD-42 was written under the assumption that the Soviet Union would be knocked out of the war, and that German forces in the East would then be brought to bear against the West. The plan thus assumed that German ground forces defending Europe would be numerically superior to
288:. All but Samuel E. Anderson had passed through ACTS, where precision bombing theories were ascendant. Orvil Anderson was assigned to continue with ongoing projects while the rest of the men concentrated on the new request. On 4 August 1941, the augmented AWPD set to work.
541:, would be ready in time to take part in the attack on Germany. Delays in both programs kept them from consideration in Europe. In AWPD-42, the B-29 was shifted to attacks on Japan, and the B-36 development at Consolidated-Vultee was slowed in favor of manufacturing more
347:
On 9 September 1941, the president asked for more detail regarding allocation of aircraft based on estimates of peacetime production for the next nine months. In AWPD-2, Arnold and George designated two-thirds of the aircraft to be pooled for anti-Axis purposes such as
296:
to attack economic targets, the choke points of Axis industry. Hansell, fresh from a fact-finding mission to England in which he was briefed on British appreciations of German industrial and military targets, immediately became immersed in the job of target selection.
323:
and the Philippines in the Pacific Ocean. In the Atlantic, AWPD indicated bases be developed in Iceland, Newfoundland, and Greenland to augment bases in the United Kingdom. Elsewhere, bases were to be established in India and staging areas arranged in Siberia.
460:
civil life. The team had just 11 days to finish the work. Arnold was more closely involved than before in leading the group and formulating the new plan. Like AWPD-1, the new framework was based largely on untried bombing theory. The report, entitled
74:—which slightly changed the earlier plan to incorporate lessons learned from eight months of the war. Neither AWPD-1 nor AWPD-42 were approved as combat battle plans or war operations; they were simply accepted as guidelines for the production of
441:
On 24 August 1942, in light of the grim global situation, President Roosevelt called for a major reassessment of U.S. air power requirements, "in order to have complete air ascendancy over the enemy." The Japanese had expanded quickly in the
327:
Finally, the plan detailed large tactical air formations to assist in an invasion of Europe and to fight in the land campaigns to follow, to be ready by Spring 1944—the same time that invasion forces would be ready.
307:
to describe how air power could be used to attack vulnerable nodes in Germany's economy, including electrical power systems, transportation networks, and oil and petroleum resources. The civil population of
361:
1062:. Eisenhower Presidential Library: Collection of 20th Century Military Records, 1918–1950 Series I: Historical Studies Box 35: AAF Historical Office; Headquarters, Army Air Force. pp. 13–15.
574:, the German Air Force. An arbitrary time frame was given, suggesting that six months after the strategic bombing forces were ready for large-scale attacks, the enemy targets would be destroyed.
194:
was agreed to, where American energies would primarily be directed against Germany, Italy and their European conquests, during which a secondary defensive posture was to be held against Japan.
237:. To help answer the urgent need for planning, George could have sent a couple of his air officers to WPD to assist them, following the standard Army policy since air warfare first arose in
208:
by both British and American air units based in the United Kingdom to reduce Axis military power in Europe. Incorporating this work in April 1941, the joint U.S. Army-Navy Board developed
619:. Finished in April 1943, the plan recommended 18 operations during each three-month phase against a total of 76 specific targets. The Combined Bomber Offensive began on 10 June 1943.
303:, or AWPD-1, standing for "Air War Plans Division, plan number one", was the first concrete result of AWPD; it was delivered on 12 August after nine days of preparation. The plan used
149:, for an exploration of the total war production required for the United States to prevail in case of war. The WPD, in order to project long-term numbers, realized that the
1381:
157:, Assistant Secretary of War for Air, that the USAAF be tapped for their ideas about production numbers. After some bureaucratic delay, the AWPD received the request.
82:
plan was agreed in meetings between American and British war planners, based on a combination of British plans and those from the AWPD, to create the Anglo-American
43:
with "overall production requirements required to defeat our potential enemies." The plans that were made at the AWPD eventually proved significant in the defeat of
1336:
The Controversy Behind the Air Corps Tactical School's Strategic Bombardment Theory: An Analysis of the Bombardment Versus Pursuit Aviation Data Between 1930–1939
420:
and seeing the extent of his strategic failures there, Hitler "angrily and irrationally rescinded Directive 39" and focused his armies once again on the attack.
312:
could be targeted as a final step to achieving enemy capitulation, but such an attack was optional: "No special bombardment unit set up for this purpose."
577:
AWPD-42 called for 177 targets to be hit, covering seven strategic areas, with the highest priority being enemy aircraft production. Other priorities were
111:
1123:
1015:
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including for the Navy, was set at 139,000 until it was realized that the goal could not be reached by American industry. 107,000 was instead proposed.
272:
George sought out men he knew were bombing advocates. He obtained temporary help from five more air officers: Lieutenant Colonels Max F. Schneider and
1366:
1189:] United States Army in World War II, The War Department. Published by the Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, D.C., 1990.
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commanded the USAAF and formed an Air Staff to lead it; within the Air Staff, the Air War Plans Division was established with Lieutenant Colonel
747:
187:
186:
In early 1941, American, Canadian and British war planners convened in Washington D.C. for a series of secret planning sessions called the
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on 4 February, targeting the German military, German industrial and economic systems, and German morale. More methodically, USAAF General
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attacks as the primary method of defeating Germany and its allies. A year later, after the United States became directly involved in
850:
331:
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The AWPD went beyond offering basic production requirements and provided a comprehensive air plan which was designed to defeat the
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606:(CBO) in June and set targeting priorities. Based on these priorities but with some changes, the British Air Ministry issued the
190:, or ABC-1, to determine a course of action should the United States become a belligerent in the war. An overarching strategy of
1376:
428:
After 7 December, all of America's former plans required revision—none had projected such early involvement in direct combat.
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plan would be used as a basis for production quantities, but it lacked detailed air power figures. Stimson requested of
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In drawing up AWPD-1, George had predicted that two very heavy bombers that were on the drawing board, the Boeing
388:, from a source within the Air Corps, and on 4 December 1941 leaked the plan to two isolationist newspapers, the
115:
545:. The extra-long range of the B-36 would not be needed now that the United Kingdom appeared secure from attack.
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146:
1120:
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In late 1944, the COA was superseded by the Joint Target Group, a combined service unit organized by the JCS.
1238:
World War II in Europe, Africa, and the Americas, with general sources: a handbook of literature and research
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781:
95:
1151:. Volume 1 of Air Warfare: an International Encyclopedia. Warfare Series. ABC-CLIO, 2002, p. 59, 252.
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strategic plans. George pushed for greater autonomy—he wished to prepare all plans for all air operations.
126:
568:
AWPD-1 identified 154 targets in four areas of concern: electric power, transportation, petroleum and the
249:, head of the overworked WPD, who approved as long as AWPD held to the guidelines of ABC-1 and Rainbow 5.
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there. Political expediency dictated the shift in target priorities, not pure strategic considerations.
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The plan also described, in less detail, how to use air power to draw a defensive perimeter around the
603:
242:
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35:(AWPD) was an American military organization established to make long-term plans for war. Headed by
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219:
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defensive so that they could hold their ground at least cost. Four days later, after visiting the
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German agents monitoring American newspapers wired the compromised secret program to Berlin where
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AWPD-1 projected a force of 2.1 million airmen. AWPD-42 increased this to 2.7 million.
377:
1176:
478:
397:
396:. Vocal public opposition to the plan ceased three days later on 7 December, when the Japanese
385:
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American airpower comes of age: General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold's World War II diaries, Volume 1
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At the beginning of August 1941, the AWPD consisted of only four officers: Harold L. George,
40:
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for England so that he would not have to face Marshall's anger at being caught unprepared.
447:
408:
819:
Volume 2 of World War II in Europe: An Encyclopedia. Taylor & Francis, 1999, p. 1679.
706:
Rizer, Kenneth R. "Bombing Dual-Use Targets: Legal, Ethical, and Doctrinal Perspectives."
98:(USAAF) were established as a way to combine and streamline two conflicting air commands:
8:
1322:
Strategic bombing by the United States in World War II: the myths and the facts, Part 785
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Winged Shield, Winged Sword 1907–1950: A History of the United States Air Force, Volume 1
212:, the final version of general military guidelines the U.S. would follow in case of war.
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In the president's request, he had not asked for the combined numbers of U.S. Army and
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Masters of the air: America's bomber boys who fought the air war against Nazi Germany
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497:. Under AWPB-42, the aircraft would have been flown by Army Air Forces, not the Navy.
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Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force 1907–1960
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and other airmen present at the conference agreed on the general concept of using
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World War II in Europe: Section 5. Strategy, tactics, and operational techniques.
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AWPD-1 called for the production of 61,800 aircraft, of which 37,000 would be
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and the creation of necessary air squadrons. Finally, in 1943, an operational
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Munitions Requirements of the Army Air Forces to Defeat Our Potential Enemies
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The Quest: Haywood Hansell and American Strategic Bombing in World War II
782:"Pointblank: A Study in Strategic and National Security Decision Making."
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compromised the secret plans in his wish to keep America out of the war.
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134:
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Castles, battles, & bombs: how economics explains military history
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Up to this point, the WPD was responsible for planning all aspects of
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AAFRH-19: The Combined Bomber Offensive; April through December 1943
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at its head. George was to coordinate his planning efforts with the
1041:| Volume 3 of Cass series—studies in air power. Routledge, p. 196.
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21:
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1039:
Despatch on war operations, 23rd February, 1942, to 8th May, 1945
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gave hope that America would not lose any allies in the interim.
849:
Finney, Robert T. (1998) Air Force History and Museums Program.
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1121:"Air War Plans Division 1: The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler."
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and 11,800 would be for combat. The remaining 13,000 would be
292:
feature of the plan was the proposal to use massive fleets of
1177:
http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/WCP/index.htm#contents
400:. Congress soon passed the Victory Program with few changes.
215:
58:, was completed in nine days. The plan emphasized using
39:, the unit was tasked in July 1941 to provide President
319:
and around America's interests in Alaska, Hawaii, the
411:, realized its critical importance. On 12 December,
1382:
20th-century history of the United States Air Force
373:of the policy included a powerful supporter of the
1250:McFarland, Stephen L.; Richard P. Hallion (2008).
1226:. Reprint from 1972, 1975: Ayer Publishing, 1980.
852:History of the Air Corps Tactical School 1920–1940
384:. Wheeler obtained a copy of the Victory Program,
1252:America's Pursuit of Precision Bombing, 1910–1945
1187:Washington Command Post: The Operations Division.
1358:
1133:Arnold, Henry Harley; edited by John W. Huston.
1013:"Slow Airpower Assessment: A Cause for Concern?"
1149:Air Warfare: an International Encyclopedia: A-L
1350:AWPD-42 Requirements for Air Ascendancy (pdf)
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856:Third imprint. Retrieved on 3 November 2009.
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794:, Spring 1992. Retrieved on 9 November 2009.
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710:, 1 May 2001. Retrieved on 6 November 2009.
233:(each one a lieutenant colonel), and Major
1280:Military innovation in the interwar period
1130:Spring 2003. Retrieved on 8 November 2009.
1025:, Fall 2004. Retrieved on 9 November 2009.
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133:On 9 July 1941, President Roosevelt asked
1236:Lee, Loyd E.; Robin D. S. Higham (1997).
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1161:Brauer, Jurgen and Hubert P. Van Tuyll.
1088:"Birth of the Combined Bomber Offensive"
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352:and one-third to be sent to the USAAF.
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1338:, Defense Technical Information Center
1278:Murray, Williamson; Allan R. Millett.
843:
753:
669:
667:
102:and the Army Air Corps. Major General
1254:, University of Alabama Press, 2008.
1165:. University of Chicago Press, 2008.
462:Requirements for Air Ascendancy, 1942
1282:, Cambridge University Press, 1998.
1002:
713:
700:
585:
1310:, Brassey's. (First edition 1980.)
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464:, or AWPD-42, was submitted to the
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178:proposed a combined Anglo-American
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1392:United States Army in World War II
450:as Air Planner, and under General
14:
1403:
1372:Organizations established in 1941
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1296:. The Minerva Group, Inc., 2003.
1224:The Air Plan that Defeated Hitler
748:"Army: Secretary of War," page 3.
1080:
1051:
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943:
888:
879:
809:
70:, AWPD delivered a second plan—
1387:World War II strategic bombing
1240:. Greenwood Publishing Group.
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16:American military organization
1:
1377:United States Army Air Forces
1117:Air & Space Power Journal
1023:Air & Space Power Journal
750:Retrieved on 7 November 2009.
708:Air & Space Power Journal
625:
513:
96:United States Army Air Forces
7:
1058:Stormont, John W. (1946) .
697:Hansell, 1980, pp. 157–194.
493:patrol bomber in 1943: the
468:(JCS) on 6 September 1942.
188:American–British Conference
89:
10:
1408:
1306:Overy, Richard J. (2005).
1264:Miller, Donald L. (2006).
1212:. Diane Publishing, 1999.
1196:. Diane Publishing, 1989.
1137:. Diane Publishing, 2002.
975:Griffith, 1999, pp. 97–99.
940:Griffith, 1999, pp. 94–96.
924:Arnold, 2002, pp. 375–376.
894:Griffith, 1999, pp. 73–74.
885:Nalty, 2003, pp. 187, 233.
840:Arnold, 2002, pp. 244–246.
806:Griffith, 1999, pp. 67–69.
746:magazine, 25 August 1941.
548:
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604:Combined Bomber Offensive
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243:Air Corps Tactical School
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84:Combined Bomber Offensive
1334:Severs, Hugh G. (1997).
1126:23 December 2016 at the
1072:: CS1 maint: location (
600:Combined Chiefs of Staff
539:Consolidated-Vultee B-36
1192:Futrell, Robert Frank.
674:Air & Space Journal
594:In January 1943 at the
394:Washington Times-Herald
378:America First Committee
1320:Ross, Stewart Halsey.
1308:The Air War, 1939–1945
1268:, Simon and Schuster.
999:Hansell, 1980, p. 109.
987:Hansell, 1980, p. 104.
949:Hansell, 1980, p. 100.
685:Hansell, 1980, p. 155.
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33:Air War Plans Division
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1182:17 April 2021 at the
1175:Cline, Ray S. (1951)
726:Chapter IV pp. 50–74.
661:Futrell, 1989, p. 109
617:Sidney Osborne Bufton
596:Casablanca Conference
556:
488:
466:Joint Chiefs of Staff
398:attacked Pearl Harbor
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305:industrial web theory
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139:Secretary of the Navy
94:On 20 June 1941, the
41:Franklin D. Roosevelt
24:
1222:Hansell, Haywood S.
608:Casablanca directive
602:agreed to begin the
448:Dwight D. Eisenhower
409:German General Staff
1324:. McFarland, 2003.
1206:Griffith, Charles.
1018:8 June 2011 at the
961:Boyne, 2002, p. 59.
876:Overy, 2005, p. 62.
787:8 June 2011 at the
731:8 June 2010 at the
332:Army Chief of Staff
1292:Nalty, Bernard C.
1035:Harris, Sir Arthur
815:Zabecki, David T.
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557:The interior of a
535:B-29 Superfortress
524:military transport
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452:Carl Andrew Spaatz
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317:Western Hemisphere
286:Samuel E. Anderson
278:Hoyt S. Vandenberg
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267:Haywood S. Hansell
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235:Haywood S. Hansell
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112:War Plans Division
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1147:Boyne, Walter J.
586:Subsequent groups
561:hit by an Allied
386:classified Secret
382:Burton K. Wheeler
366:Burton K. Wheeler
321:Dutch East Indies
282:Laurence S. Kuter
274:Arthur W. Vanaman
257:Laurence S. Kuter
206:strategic bombing
180:strategic bombing
64:precision bombing
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495:PB4Y-1 Liberator
356:Public knowledge
247:Leonard T. Gerow
199:Air Vice-Marshal
173:Air Vice-Marshal
155:Robert A. Lovett
147:Secretary of War
143:Henry L. Stimson
108:Harold L. George
37:Harold L. George
26:Harold L. George
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1096:. Retrieved
1092:the original
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68:World War II
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54:. The plan,
49:
45:Nazi Germany
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591:the USAAF.
457:Harris Hull
239:World War I
52:Axis powers
1361:Categories
626:References
514:Quantities
380:, Senator
350:Lend-Lease
135:Frank Knox
1068:cite book
571:Luftwaffe
503:U.S. Navy
491:U.S. Navy
433:doubled.
210:Rainbow 5
182:campaign.
151:Rainbow 5
1180:Archived
1124:Archived
1098:18 March
1016:Archived
785:Archived
729:Archived
537:and the
520:trainers
455:Colonel
392:and the
364:Senator
334:General
90:Founding
76:materiel
1119:staff.
1037:(1995)
549:Targets
437:AWPD-42
86:(CBO).
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343:AWPD-2
310:Berlin
284:, and
161:AWPD-1
145:, the
141:, and
137:, the
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1326:ISBN
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1167:ISBN
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1100:2009
1074:link
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744:Time
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