1165:
But his maxim is this: from self-love I make as my principle to shorten my life when its continued duration threatens more evil than it promises satisfaction. There only remains the question as to whether this principle of self-love can become a universal law of nature. One sees at once a contradiction in a system of nature whose law would destroy life by means of the very same feeling that acts so as to stimulate the furtherance of life, and hence there could be no existence as a system of nature. Therefore, such a maxim cannot possibly hold as a universal law of nature and is, consequently, wholly opposed to the supreme principle of all duty.
918:
such, unlike perfect duties, you do not attract blame should you not complete an imperfect duty but you shall receive praise for it should you complete it, as you have gone beyond the basic duties and taken duty upon yourself. Imperfect duties are circumstantial, meaning simply that you could not reasonably exist in a constant state of performing that duty. This is what truly differentiates between perfect and imperfect duties, because imperfect duties are those duties that are never truly completed. A particular example provided by Kant is the imperfect duty to cultivate one's own talents.
1313:
hit them." It is also a hypothetical imperative in the sense that it can be formulated, "If you want X done to you, then do X to others." Kant feared that the hypothetical clause, "if you want X done to you," remains open to dispute. In fact, he famously criticized it for not being sensitive to differences of situation, noting that a prisoner duly convicted of a crime could appeal to the golden rule while asking the judge to release him, pointing out that the judge would not want anyone else to send him to prison, so he should not do so to others.
1129:(and thus contradicts perfect duty). With lying, it would logically contradict the reliability of language. If it were universally acceptable to lie, then no one would believe anyone and all truths would be assumed to be lies. In each case, the proposed action becomes inconceivable in a world where the maxim exists as law. In a world where no one would lend money, seeking to borrow money in the manner originally imagined is inconceivable. In a world where no one trusts one another, the same is true about manipulative lies.
144:
1403:
environmental life supporting features, species dependent means of child rearing. These conditions are already rooted in mutual interdependence which makes that life form possible at all to be in a state of coordination with other forms of life – be it with pure practical reason or not. It may be that the categorical imperative is indeed biased in that it is life promoting and in part promotes the positive freedom for rational beings to pursue freely the setting of their own ends (read choices).
1184:
that a society could subsist if everyone did nothing, he notes that the man would have no pleasures to enjoy, for if everyone let their talents go to waste, there would be no one to create luxuries that created this theoretical situation in the first place. Not only that, but cultivating one's talents is a duty to oneself. Thus, it is not willed to make laziness universal, and a rational being has imperfect duty to cultivate its talents. Kant concludes in the
22:
1061:, Kant goes on to formulate the categorical imperative in a number of ways following the first three; however, because Kant himself claims that there are only three principles, little attention has been given to these other formulations. Moreover, they are often easily assimilated to the first three formulations, as Kant takes himself to be explicitly summarizing these earlier principles.
681:(Wille). The will is therefore the faculty of desire considered not so much in relation to action (as choice is) but rather in relation to the ground determining choice in action. The will itself, strictly speaking, has no determining ground; insofar as it can determine choice, it is instead practical reason itself. Insofar as reason can determine the faculty of desire as such, not only
2170:
419:
1290:, the rule prescribes: "Do not impose on others what you do not wish for yourself." In its positive form, the rule states: "Treat others how you wish to be treated." Due to this similarity, some have thought the two are identical. William P. Alston and Richard B. Brandt, in their introduction to Kant, stated, "His view about when an action is right is rather similar to the
1419:
beings who are able to exercise this purely formal reason would see. The full community of other rational members – even if this 'Kingdom of Ends' is not yet actualized and whether or not we ever live to see it – is thus a kind of 'infinite game' that seeks to held in view by all beings able to participate and choose the 'highest use of reason' (see
1439:'s self-administered blows to his own bottom were vigorous. ... Now if a man is never even once willing in his lifetime to act so decisively that can get hold of him, well, then it happens, then the man is allowed to live on in self-complacent illusion and make-believe and experimentation, but this also means: utterly without grace.
1294:; he says, roughly, that an act is right if and only if its agent is prepared to have that kind of action made universal practice or a 'law of nature.' Thus, for instance, Kant says it is right for a person to lie if and only if he is prepared to have everyone lie in similar circumstances, including those in which
1999:"This is indeed the well-known “Golden Rule” that we find in the teachings of Moses, and Confucius, and Jesus, and many others. I think, however, that all three of them would say that the most universal moral rule is even more universal than this one: something like "Do good and not evil." Kreeft, Peter (2009).
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Kant denied that such an inference indicates any weakness in his premises: not lying to the murderer is required because moral actions do not derive their worth from the expected consequences. He claimed that because lying to the murderer would treat him as a mere means to another end, the lie denies
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by arguing that such cruelty is a violation of a duty in relation to oneself. According to Kant, man has the imperfect duty to strengthen the feeling of compassion, since this feeling promotes morality in relation to other human beings. However, cruelty to animals deadens the feeling of compassion in
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But even though it is possible that a universal law of nature could subsist in accordance with that maxim, still it is impossible to will that such a principle should hold everywhere as a law of nature. For a will that resolved in this way would contradict itself, inasmuch as cases might often arise
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on the subject of "failing to cultivate one's talents." He proposes a man who if he cultivated his talents could bring many goods, but he has everything he wants and would prefer to enjoy the pleasures of life instead. The man asks himself how the universality of such a thing works. While Kant agrees
1164:
A man reduced to despair by a series of misfortunes feels sick of life, but is still so far in possession of his reason that he can ask himself whether taking his own life would not be contrary to his duty to himself. Now he asks whether the maxim of his action could become a universal law of nature.
668:
The faculty of desire in accordance with concepts, in-so-far as the ground determining it to action lies within itself and not in its object, is called a faculty to "do or to refrain from doing as one pleases". Insofar as it is joined with one's consciousness of the ability to bring about its object
1402:
and egotistical, not categorical. However, Schopenhauer's criticism (as cited here) presents a weak case for linking egoism to Kant's formulations of the categorical imperative. By definition any form of sentient, organic life is interdependent and emergent with the organic and inorganic properties,
1006:
conditions: that there be certain ends in themselves, namely rational beings as such. The result of these two considerations is that we must will maxims that can be at the same time universal, but which do not infringe on the freedom of ourselves nor of others. A universal maxim, however, could only
946:
The free will is the source of all rational action. But to treat it as a subjective end is to deny the possibility of freedom in general. Because the autonomous will is the one and only source of moral action, it would contradict the first formulation to claim that a person is merely a means to some
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Because a truly autonomous will would not be subjugated to any interest, it would only be subject to those laws it makes for itself—but it must also regard those laws as if they would be bound to others, or they would not be universalizable, and hence they would not be laws of conduct at all. Thus,
1418:
Thus, insofar as individuals' freely chosen ends are consistent in a rational Idea of community of interdependent beings also exercising the possibility of their pure moral reason is the egoism self-justified as being what is 'holy' good will because the motive is consistent with what all rational
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and necessarily universally binding rule on all rational agents. The Golden Rule, on the other hand, is neither purely formal nor necessarily universally binding. It is "empirical" in the sense that applying it depends on providing content, such as, "If you don't want others to hit you, then don't
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would be effectively asserting a moral right to own a person as a slave, they would be asserting a property right in another person. This would violate the categorical imperative, because it denies the basis for there to be free rational action at all; it denies the status of a person as an end in
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is of charity. He proposes a fourth man who finds his own life fine but sees other people struggling with life and who ponders the outcome of doing nothing to help those in need (while not envying them or accepting anything from them). While Kant admits that humanity could subsist (and admits it
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consent is a violation of perfect duty as interpreted through the second formulation. If a thief were to steal a book from an unknowing victim, it may have been that the victim would have agreed, had the thief simply asked. However, no person can consent to theft, because the presence of consent
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Second, we have imperfect duties, which are still based on pure reason, but which allow for desires in how they are carried out in practice. Because these depend somewhat on the subjective preferences of humankind, this duty is not as strong as a perfect duty, but it is still morally binding. As
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Kant's objection to the Golden Rule is especially suspect because the categorical imperative (CI) sounds a lot like a paraphrase, or perhaps a close cousin, of the same fundamental idea. In effect, it says that you should act toward others in ways that you would want everyone else to act toward
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Instead of resolving the problems of the poor and thinking of how the world can be different, some can only propose a reduction in the birth rate. ... To blame population growth instead of extreme and selective consumerism on the part of some, is one way of refusing to face the issues. It is an
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themselves. One cannot, on Kant's account, ever suppose a right to treat another person as a mere means to an end. In the case of a slave owner, the slaves are being used to cultivate the owner's fields (the slaves acting as the means) to ensure a sufficient harvest (the end goal of the owner).
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Every rational action must set before itself not only a principle, but also an end. Most ends are of a subjective kind, because they need only be pursued if they are in line with some particular hypothetical imperative that a person may choose to adopt. For an end to be objective, it would be
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apply to someone who wishes to attain certain ends. For example, "I must drink something to quench my thirst" or "I must study to pass this exam." The categorical imperative, on the other hand, commands immediately the maxims one conceives which match its categorical requirements, denoting an
1132:
The right to deceive could also not be claimed because it would deny the status of the person deceived as an end in itself. The theft would be incompatible with a possible kingdom of ends. Therefore, Kant denied the right to lie or deceive for any reason, regardless of context or anticipated
1125:, Kant gives the example of a person who seeks to borrow money without intending to pay it back. This is a contradiction because if it were a universal action, no person would lend money anymore as he knows that he will never be paid back. The maxim of this action, says Kant, results in a
838:
A moral maxim must imply absolute necessity, which is to say that it must be disconnected from the particular physical details surrounding the proposition, and could be applied to any rational being. This leads to the first formulation of the categorical imperative, sometimes called the
636:, he would necessarily fall under the natural law of desires and inclinations. However, since the world of understanding contains the ground of the world of sense, and thus of its laws, his actions ought to conform to the autonomy of the will, and this categorical "ought" represents a
1415:– since in restricting the will's motive at its root to a purely moral schema consistent its maxims can be held up to the pure moral law as a structure of cognition and therefore the alteration of action accompanying a cultured person to a 'reverence for the law' or 'moral feeling'.
793:. Since even a free person could not possibly have knowledge of their own freedom, we cannot use our failure to find a proof for freedom as evidence for a lack of it. The observable world could never contain an example of freedom because it would never show us a will as it appears to
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e cannot possibly will that this should become a universal law of nature or be implanted in us as such a law by a natural instinct. For as a rational being he necessarily wills that all his faculties should be developed, inasmuch as they are given him for all sorts of possible
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The result, of course, is a formulation of the categorical imperative that contains much of the same as the first two. We must will something that we could at the same time freely will of ourselves. After introducing this third formulation, Kant introduces a distinction between
1434:
Kant was of the opinion that man is his own law (autonomy)—that is, he binds himself under the law which he himself gives himself. Actually, in a profounder sense, this is how lawlessness or experimentation are established. This is not being rigorously earnest any more than
1410:
also holds not merely the positive form freedom (to set ends freely) but also the negative forms of freedom to that same will (to restrict setting of ends that treat others merely as means, etc.). The deontological system is for Kant argued to be based in a
1269:. Unlike in conventional game theory, a superrational player will act as if all other players are superrational too and that a superrational agent will always come up with the same strategy as any other superrational agent when facing the same problem.
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have this form if it were a maxim that each subject by himself endorsed. Because it cannot be something which externally constrains each subject's activity, it must be a constraint that each subject has set for himself. This leads to the concept of
1346:, who asserted that since truth telling must be universal, according to Kant's theories, one must (if asked) tell a known murderer the location of his prey. This challenge occurred while Kant was still alive, and his response was the essay
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believed
Kantian autonomy was insufficient and that, if unchecked, people tend to be lenient in their own cases, either by not exercising the full rigor of the moral law or by not properly disciplining themselves of moral transgressions.
1248:
attempt to legitimize the present model of distribution, where a minority believes that it has the right to consume in a way which can never be universalized, since the planet could not even contain the waste products of such consumption.
782:. Applied to a case of the human will, a determinist would argue that the will does not have causal power and that something outside the will causes the will to act as it does. But this argument merely assumes what it sets out to prove:
1011:-legislation. Each subject must through his own use of reason will maxims which have the form of universality, but do not impinge on the freedom of others: thus each subject must will maxims that could be universally self-legislated.
528:
says that murder is wrong because it does not maximize good for those involved, but this is irrelevant to people who are concerned only with maximizing the positive outcome for themselves. Consequently, Kant argued, hypothetical
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to further the ends of ourselves and others. If any person desires perfection in themselves or others, it would be their moral duty to seek that end for all people equally, so long as that end does not contradict perfect duty.
1027:(literally: other-law-giving). This third formulation makes it clear that the categorical imperative requires autonomy. It is not enough that the right conduct be followed, but that one also demands that conduct of oneself.
797:, but only a will that is subject to natural laws imposed on it. But we do appear to ourselves as free. Therefore, he argued for the idea of transcendental freedom—that is, freedom as a presupposition of the question "what
603:
What dictates which action can be genuinely considered moral are maxims willed to action from the categorical imperative, separate from observable experience. This distinction, that it is imperative that each action is not
869:
that we have to ourselves versus those we have to others. For example, we have an obligation not to kill ourselves as well as an obligation not to kill others. Kant also, however, introduces a distinction between
1214:
in which one would have need of the love and sympathy of others and in which he would deprive himself, by such a law of nature springing from his own will, of all hope of the aid he wants for himself.
437:
1146:
would mean that the transfer was not a theft. Because the victim could not have consented to the action, it could not be instituted as a universal law of nature, and theft contradicts perfect duty.
1064:
There is, however, another formulation that has received additional attention as it appears to introduce a social dimension into Kant's thought. This is the formulation of the "Kingdom of Ends."
835:
Kant concludes that a moral proposition that is true must be one that is not tied to any particular conditions, including the identity and desires of the person making the moral deliberation.
1853:
1387:
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According to Kant's reasoning, we first have a perfect duty not to act by maxims that result in logical contradictions when we attempt to universalize them. The moral proposition
928:
Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an end.
533:
cannot determine moral action or be regarded as bases for legitimate moral judgments against others, because the imperatives on which they are based rely too heavily on
570:
tell us which means best achieve our ends. They do not, however, tell us which ends we should choose. The typical dichotomy in choosing ends is between ends that are
1348:
226:
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Kant presents the notion of the hypothetical
Kingdom of Ends of which he suggests all people should consider themselves never solely as means but always as ends.
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conditions on the categorical imperative: that it be universal in form and thus capable of becoming a law of nature. Likewise, the second formulation lays out
1850:
713:
by impulses, and is therefore of itself (apart from an acquired proficiency of reason) not pure but can still be determined to actions by pure will.
1356:). In this reply, Kant agreed with Constant's inference, that from Kant's own premises one must infer a moral duty not to lie to a murderer.
1780:
These additional formulations, of which there are at least eight, can be seen at: 4:434 (1); 4:436–7 (1); 4:437 (4); 4:438 (1); 4:438–9 (1).
1452:
However, many of
Kierkegaard's criticisms on his understanding of Kantian autonomy, neglect the evolution of Kant's moral theory from the
1557:
occurs in the fourth volume. Citations throughout this article follow the format 4:x. For example, the above citation is taken from 4:421.
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the rationality of another person, and therefore denies the possibility of there being free rational action at all. This lie results in a
1379:) is consistent with the categorical imperative, but assume for the purposes of argument that refusing to answer would not be an option.
1075:
not to act by maxims that create incoherent or impossible states of natural affairs when we attempt to universalize them, and we have
205:
86:
1099:) rather than our rational powers, this section explores some applications of the categorical imperative for illustrative purposes.
750:
Although Kant conceded that there could be no conceivable example of free will, because any example would only show us a will as it
677:. The faculty of desire whose inner determining ground, hence even what pleases it, lies within the subject's reason is called the
58:
537:
considerations. He presented a deontological moral system, based on the demands of the categorical imperative, as an alternative.
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39:
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Rational persons regard themselves as belonging to both the world of understanding and the world of sense. As a member of the
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Thus the third practical principle follows as the ultimate condition of their harmony with practical reason: the idea of
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1984:
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others, yourself included (presumably). Calling it a universal law does not materially improve on the basic concept.
586:; to him, the latter was morally dependent on the former. In Kant's view, a person cannot decide whether conduct is
54:
846:: "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law."
481:
865:
Kant divides the duties imposed by this formulation into two sets of two subsets. The first division is between
524:
of his day, believing that it could never surpass the merely conditional command of hypothetical imperatives: a
1108:
43:
902:
universalized, then there could be no personal property, and so the proposition has logically negated itself.
890:: "It is permissible to steal" would result in a contradiction upon universalisation. The notion of stealing
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Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.
358:
191:
2200:
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determined by observable experience, has had wide social impact in the legal and political concepts of
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I to do?" This is what gives us sufficient basis for ascribing moral responsibility: the rational and
1826:
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formulation. Because laws of nature are by definition universal, Kant claims we may also express the
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287:
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143:
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absolute, unconditional requirement that must be obeyed in all circumstances and is justified as an
79:
1594:
1568:
1160:, Kant applies his categorical imperative to the issue of suicide motivated by a sickness of life:
1043:
Act according to maxims of a universally legislating member of a merely possible kingdom of ends.
950:
On this basis, Kant derives the second formulation of the categorical imperative from the first.
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501:
318:
260:
175:
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32:
1243:, applies the first formulation of the universalizability principle to the issue of consumption:
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Act as if the maxims of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature.
600:, using pure practical reason independently of the influence of felt motives, or inclinations.
412:
353:
127:
758:. He proposed that determinism is logically inconsistent: the determinist claims that because
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1088:
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We ought to act only by maxims that would harmonize with a possible kingdom of ends. We have
637:
552:
1976:
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198:
1426:
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not to use the humanity of themselves or others merely as a means to some other end. As a
8:
2195:
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How the
Categorical Imperative would apply to suicide from other motivations is unclear.
743:, is incomprehensible. Therefore, a free will must be acting under laws that it gives to
373:
335:
265:
2146:, a website on the presence and diffusion of the philosophy of Immanuel Kant in Italy (
1930:
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1423:) which is reason in its pure practical form. That is, morality seen deontologically.
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for action. It is best known in its original formulation: "Act only according to that
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of any kind, would be forbidden under any interpretation and in any circumstance. In
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not to act by maxims that lead to unstable or greatly undesirable states of affairs.
895:
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423:
1846:
Encyclical Letter
Laudato si' of the Holy Father Francis on Care for Our Common Home
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564:, by which we determine ourselves to practical action within the phenomenal world.
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Johnson, Robert; Cureton, Adam (2022), Zalta, Edward N.; Nodelman, Uri (eds.),
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Johnson, Robert; Cureton, Adam (2022), Zalta, Edward N.; Nodelman, Uri (eds.),
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whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law."
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Application of the universalizability principle to the ethics of consumption
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Kant argued that any action taken against another person to which he or she
1840:
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1395:
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The first formulation of the categorical imperative appears similar to the
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673:(WillkĂĽr); if it is not joined with this consciousness its act is called a
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By combining this formulation with the first, we learn that a person has
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can be included under the will. That choice which can be determined by
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1972:
1530:. Translated by Ellington, James W. (3rd ed.). Hackett. p.
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1087:
Although Kant was intensely critical of the use of examples as moral
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732:
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1883:
1338:
One of the first major challenges to Kant's reasoning came from the
560:, which is the capacity to know without having been shown; and mere
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1601:(Fall 2022 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University
1575:(Fall 2022 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University
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could possibly perform better) if this were universal, he states:
982:
the will of every rational being as a universally legislating will
754:
to us—as a subject of natural laws—he nevertheless argued against
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power without being caused to do so. However, the idea of lawless
2017:. Boston, London, Sydney, Toronto: Allyn and Bacon. p. 139.
1458:
The
Critique of Practical Reason, The Critique of Moral Judgment,
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if not met, as they are a basic required duty for a human being.
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man. Therefore, man is obliged not to treat animals brutally.
492:, from which all duties and obligations derive. He defines an
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can be summed up in an imperative, or ultimate commandment of
1692:
Kant's
Conceptions of the Categorical Imperative and the Will
1308:
Rather, the categorical imperative is an attempt to identify
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Kant's last application of the categorical imperative in the
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is called free choice. That which can be determined only by
550:
The capacity that underlies deciding what is moral is called
1354:
On a
Supposed Right to Lie because of Philanthropic Concerns
2054:, footnote 12. Cambridge University Press (28 April 1998).
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783:
520:
Kant expressed his strong dissatisfaction with the popular
2133:
An architectonic interpretation of the
Critical philosophy
1905:
Diekmann, Andreas (December 1985). "Volunteer's
Dilemma".
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811:: "the property the will has of being a law unto itself."
705:). Human choice, however, is a choice that can indeed be
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declaring a certain action (or inaction) to be necessary.
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On a Supposed Right to Tell Lies from Benevolent Motives
2158:
2013:
Alston, William P.; Brandt, Richard B., eds. (1978).
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First formulation: Universality and the law of nature
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claimed that the categorical imperative is actually
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Kant also applies the categorical imperative in the
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Kant claims that the first formulation lays out the
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other end, rather than always an end in themselves.
2107:
Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals
46:. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed.
1653:. Marcus Weigelt, F. Max MĂĽller. London: Penguin.
1523:
1456:, to the second and final critiques respectively,
1388:Schopenhauer's criticism of the Kantian philosophy
1368:) and therefore the lie is in conflict with duty.
786:that the human will is part of the causal chain.
628:, a person's actions would always conform to the
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731:, we must understand it as capable of affecting
1620:"20th WCP: Why Couldn't Kant Be A Utilitarian?"
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849:Closely connected with this formulation is the
578:(e.g., enriching oneself). Kant considered the
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905:In general, perfect duties are those that are
1870:Campbell, Paul J. (January 1984). "Reviews".
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943:necessary that we categorically pursue it.
574:(e.g., helping someone) and those that are
118:Central concept in Kantian moral philosophy
1390:expresses doubt concerning the absence of
1257:One form of the categorical imperative is
142:
965:The second formulation also leads to the
789:Secondly, Kant remarks that free will is
206:Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason
106:Learn how and when to remove this message
1904:
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484:occupy a special place in creation, and
178: Question: What Is Enlightenment?
2052:Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals
2003:p. 234. Ignatius Press. Kindle Edition.
1704:
1702:
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1599:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1573:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1526:Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals
1460:and his final work on moral theory the
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1304:Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals
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1031:Fourth formulation: The Kingdom of Ends
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653:Kant viewed the human individual as a
594:means. Such judgments must be reached
185:Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals
2089:Kierkegaard and Kant: The Hidden Debt
2086:
1546:It is standard to also reference the
1375:the murderer's question (rather than
1301:Kant himself did not think so in the
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227:On a Supposed Right to Tell Lies from
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1364:(rather than the more practical one
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44:adding citations to reliable sources
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1454:Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals
1223:Kant derived a prohibition against
13:
2124:Glossary of Kant's Technical Terms
1907:The Journal of Conflict Resolution
1489:Instrumental and value rationality
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805:power of a person, which he calls
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1109:Doctrine of mental reservation
1091:, as they tend to rely on our
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299:Analytic–synthetic distinction
169: Any Future Metaphysics
1:
2129:Kant's System of Perspectives
2091:. SUNY Press. pp. 90–91.
1967:, ed. (1979). "golden rule".
1690:e.g. Pelegrinis, T. N. 1980.
1504:
1371:Constant and Kant agree that
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669:by one's action it is called
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922:Second formulation: Humanity
727:For a will to be considered
556:, which is contrasted with:
469:, it is a way of evaluating
463:. Introduced in Kant's 1785
192:Critique of Practical Reason
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2138:University Press of America
1919:10.1177/0022002785029004003
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1362:contradiction in conception
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974:Third formulation: Autonomy
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2154:The Categorical Imperative
2015:The Problems of Philosophy
1969:A Dictionary of Philosophy
1952:Confucius: The Golden Rule
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701:) would be animal choice (
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513:value beyond simply being
229: Benevolent Motives
1595:"Kant's Moral Philosophy"
1569:"Kant's Moral Philosophy"
1298:is deceived by the lie."
220:The Metaphysics of Morals
1522:Kant, Immanuel (1993) .
1136:
568:Hypothetical imperatives
502:Hypothetical imperatives
55:"Categorical imperative"
2144:Immanuel Kant in Italia
1650:Critique of pure reason
1647:Kant, Immanuel (2007).
1421:Critique of Pure Reason
446:kategorischer Imperativ
319:Hypothetical imperative
261:Transcendental idealism
160:Critique of Pure Reason
2087:Green, Ronald (1992).
2037:Kreeft, Peter (2009).
1484:Generalization (logic)
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546:Pure practical reason
424:Philosophy portal
1975:in association with
1872:Mathematics Magazine
1856:3 March 2016 at the
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1474:Deontological ethics
1383:Questioning autonomy
1320:thought so as well,
660:being with "impure"
649:Freedom and autonomy
590:, or moral, through
331:Political philosophy
199:Critique of Judgment
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2039:Socrates Meets Kant
2001:Socrates Meets Kant
1977:The MacMillan Press
1762:, p. 44. 4:439
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1334:Lying to a murderer
1241:his 2015 encyclical
1113:Kant asserted that
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480:According to Kant,
374:Arthur Schopenhauer
266:Critical philosophy
2201:Ethical principles
2120:Palmquist, Stephen
1413:synthetic a priori
1373:refusing to answer
1263:Douglas Hofstadter
1225:cruelty to animals
1219:Cruelty to animals
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843:universalizability
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2060:978-0-521-62695-8
1948:Freedman, Russell
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272:Sapere aude
153:Major works
96:August 2022
2196:Kantianism
2191:Deontology
2185:Categories
2175:Philosophy
1971:. London:
1624:www.bu.edu
1555:Groundwork
1505:References
1494:Kantianism
1408:deontology
1273:Criticisms
1186:Groundwork
1123:Groundwork
1089:yardsticks
1059:Groundwork
1024:heteronomy
1004:subjective
711:determined
655:rationally
535:subjective
494:imperative
364:David Hume
250:Kantianism
66:newspapers
2122:. 1993. "
1973:Pan Books
1935:143954605
1814:Kant 1993
1802:Kant 1993
1790:Kant 1993
1760:Kant 1993
1739:Kant 1993
1727:Kant 1993
1406:However,
1286:. In its
1193:purposes.
1119:deception
1103:Deception
1000:objective
737:free will
592:empirical
515:desirable
511:intrinsic
438:‹See Tfd›
336:Teleology
1854:Archived
1694:. p. 92.
1669:51622849
1549:Akademie
1468:See also
1442:—
1173:Laziness
1097:feelings
1046:—
1018:autonomy
987:—
931:—
824:—
716:—
709:but not
707:affected
699:stimulus
642:a priori
630:autonomy
614:equality
597:a priori
486:morality
413:Category
309:Category
304:Noumenon
289:A priori
128:a series
126:Part of
1892:2690298
1629:6 March
1605:6 March
1579:6 March
1551:Ausgabe
1366:in will
1198:Charity
1154:In the
1150:Suicide
1057:In the
872:perfect
774:, that
770:caused
762:caused
752:appears
722:6:213–4
541:Outline
496:as any
80:scholar
2161:Portal
2126:." In
2058:
2021:
1983:
1933:
1927:174243
1925:
1890:
1831:, § 17
1825:Kant,
1667:
1657:
1538:
1392:egoism
1340:French
867:duties
795:itself
766:, and
745:itself
733:causal
683:choice
671:choice
490:reason
442:German
348:People
283:Schema
82:
75:
68:
61:
53:
1931:S2CID
1923:JSTOR
1888:JSTOR
1750:4:431
1717:4:423
1708:4:421
1681:4:454
1377:lying
1239:, in
1137:Theft
1117:, or
1115:lying
799:ought
588:right
580:right
572:right
475:maxim
87:JSTOR
73:books
2056:ISBN
2019:ISBN
1981:ISBN
1851:§ 50
1665:OCLC
1655:ISBN
1631:2024
1607:2024
1581:2024
1536:ISBN
1009:self
874:and
784:viz.
729:free
687:wish
679:will
675:wish
612:and
584:good
576:good
431:The
291:and
59:news
2110:at
1915:doi
1880:doi
857:as:
517:.
459:of
42:by
2187::
2136:.
2131::
2073:.
1950:.
1929:.
1921:.
1911:29
1909:.
1886:.
1876:57
1874:.
1849:.
1699:^
1663:.
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130:on
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768:B
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