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referent (Jane). That is, if I am in direct contact with Jane, the reference for my utterance of the name 'Jane' may be fixed not simply by a causal chain through people who had encountered her earlier (when she was first named); it may also be indexically fixed to Jane at the moment of my utterance. Thus our modern day use of a name such as 'Christopher
Columbus' can be thought of as referring to Columbus through a causal chain that terminates not simply in one instance of his naming, but rather in a series of grounding uses of the name that occurred throughout his life. Under certain circumstances of confusion, this can lead to the alteration of a name's referent (for one example of how this might happen, see
168:", although many Frege scholars consider this attribution misguided). On such an account, the name 'Aristotle' might be seen as meaning 'the student of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great'. Later description theorists expanded upon this by suggesting that a name expressed not one particular description, but many (perhaps constituting all of one's essential knowledge of the individual named), or a weighted average of these descriptions.
336:
218:. Because speakers interact with a natural kind such as water regularly, and because there is generally no naming ceremony through which their names are formalized, the multiple groundings described above are even more essential to a causal account of such terms. A speaker whose environment changes may thus observe that the referents of his terms shift, as described in the
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argued that the causal theory, or at least certain common and over-simple variants of it, have the consequence that, however remote or obscure the causal connection between someone's use of a proper name and the object it originally referred to, they still refer to that object when they use the name.
319:
unknowingly referred to the
African Island as "Madagascar" when the natives actually used the term to refer to a part of the mainland. Evans claims that Polo clearly intended to use the term as the natives do, but somehow changed the meaning of the term "Madagascar" to refer to the island as it is
123:
use the name 'Jane', they are referring to Jane? The answer provided by causal theories is that there is a causal chain that passes from the original observers of Jane's naming to everyone else who uses her name. For example, maybe Jill was not at the naming, but Jill learns about Jane, and learns
186:
other than 'the first
European in North America' or 'the first person to believe that the earth was round'. Both of these beliefs are incorrect. Nevertheless, when such a person says 'Christopher Columbus', we acknowledge that they are referring to Christopher Columbus, not to whatever individual
115:
Such a causal process might proceed as follows: the parents of a newborn baby name it, pointing to the child and saying "we'll call her 'Jane'." Henceforth everyone calls her 'Jane'. With that act, the parents give the girl her name. The assembled family and friends now know that 'Jane' is a name
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argued for a causal theory similar to Kripke's, except that the baptised object is eliminated. A "baptism" may be a baptism of nothing, he argues: a name can be intelligibly introduced even if it names nothing. The causal chain we associate with the use of proper names may begin merely with a
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have insisted that the theory's account of the dubbing process needs to be broadened to include what are called 'multiple groundings'. After her initial baptism, uses of 'Jane' in the presence of Jane may, under the right circumstances, be considered to further ground the name ('Jane') in its
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Weaker versions of the position (perhaps not properly called "causal theories"), claim merely that, in many cases, events in the causal history of a speaker's use of the term, including when the term was first acquired, must be considered to correctly assign references to the speaker's words.
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The same motivations apply to causal theories in regard to other sorts of terms. Putnam, for instance, attempted to establish that 'water' refers rigidly to the stuff that we do in fact call 'water', to the exclusion of any possible identical water-like substance for which we have no causal
112:. Kripke argued that in order to use a name successfully to refer to something, you do not have to be acquainted with a uniquely identifying description of that thing. Rather, your use of the name need only be caused (in an appropriate way) by the naming of that thing.
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The links between different users of the name are particularly obscure. Each user must somehow pass the name on to the next, and must somehow "mean" the right individual as they do so (suppose "Socrates" is the name of a pet
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there. She then uses the name 'Jane' with the intention of referring to the child Jane's mother referred to. Jill can now use the name, and her use of it can in turn transmit the ability to refer to Jane to other speakers.
100:, Kripke provided a rough outline of his causal theory of reference for names. Although he refused to explicitly endorse such a theory, he indicated that such an approach was far more promising than the then-popular
198:, while a definite description does not. (One could say 'If Aristotle had died young, he would never have taught Alexander the Great.' But if 'the teacher of Alexander the Great' were a component of the
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claims that repeated groundings in an object can account for reference change. However, such a response leaves open the problem of cognitive significance that originally intrigued
Russell and Frege.
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A causal theory avoids these difficulties. A name refers rigidly to the bearer to which it is causally connected, regardless of any particular facts about the bearer, and in all
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We can successfully refer to individuals for whom the only identifying descriptions we have fail to refer as we believe them to. (Many speakers have no identifying beliefs about
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285:(Imagine a name briefly overheard in a train or café.) The theory effectively ignores context and makes reference into a magic trick. Evans describes it as a "
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Causal theories of reference were born partially in response to the widespread acceptance of
Russellian descriptive theories. Russell found that certain
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in 1984, introduces the idea that a minimal descriptive apparatus needs to be added to the causal relations between speaker and object. (See also
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uniquely identifying description. (For example, a speaker can talk about
Phillie Sophik even if one only knows him as 'some poet'.)
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However, not everyone who knows Jane and uses the name 'Jane' to refer to her was present at this naming. So how is it that when
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Thomas Kuhn's 'Linguistic Turn' and the Legacy of
Logical Empiricism: Incommensurability, Rationality and the Search for Truth
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Donnellan, Keith. (1972). "Proper Names and
Identifying Descriptions." In Donald Davidson; Gilbert Harman (eds.).
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terms. In the case of names, for example, a causal theory of reference typically involves the following claims:
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based on evidence. Such theories have been used to describe many referring terms, particularly logical terms,
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Sainsbury, R.M. (2001). "Sense without
Reference". In Newen, A.; Nortmann, U.; Stuhlmann Laisz, R. (eds.).
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Causal theories of names became popular during the 1970s, under the influence of work by Saul Kripke and
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later uses of the name succeed in referring to the referent by being linked to that original act via a
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in 1980. This view introduces the idea of reference-passing links in a causal-historical chain.
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Machery, E.; Mallon, R.; Nichols, S.; Stich, S. P. (2004). "Semantics, Cross-cultural Style".
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which refers to Jane. This is referred to as Jane's dubbing, naming, or initial baptism.
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The causal theory has a difficult time explaining the phenomenon of reference change.
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Kripke found this account to be deeply flawed, for a number of reasons. Notably:
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Evans, Gareth; Altham, J. E. J. (1973). "The Causal Theory of Names".
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is the original version of the causal theory. It was put forward by
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An Essay
Towards a Real Character, and a Philosophical Language
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Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes
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Departing From Frege: Essays in the Philosophy of Language
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Kripke, S. "A Puzzle about Belief", in A. Margalit (ed.),
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We can successfully refer to individuals for whom we have
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could be avoided if names were considered disguised
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124:that her name is 'Jane', from Jane's mother, who
108:, according to which names are in fact disguised
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581:. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
82:also defended an analogous causal account of
421:Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth
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202:of 'Aristotle' then this would be nonsense.)
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456:(3), 221–36; reprinted in D. Lewis (1999),
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214:connection. These considerations motivate
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556:(1985). "The Causal Theory of Names". In
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237:Variations of the causal theory include:
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448:D. K. Lewis (1984), "Putnam's Paradox."
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160:(a similar view is often attributed to
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258:descriptive-causal theory of reference
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243:causal-historical theory of reference
187:satisfies one of those descriptions.)
18:Causal-historical theory of reference
377:. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. pp. 356–379.
439:, Ashgate Publishing, 2012, p. 122.
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450:Australasian Journal of Philosophy
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564:. Oxford University Press, 2012.
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390:, Reidel, pp. 239–83 (1979).
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562:The Philosophy of Language
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308:"journalistic" source.
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597:, Prometheus Books.
227:thought experiments
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1211:Metalanguage
1206:Logical form
1161:Truth-bearer
1120:Unilalianism
1030:Expressivism
979:
857:Wittgenstein
802:von Humboldt
719:Philosophers
649:
606:
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249:in 1972 and
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134:Gareth Evans
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84:natural kind
73:
69:
64:causal chain
41:natural kind
37:proper names
28:
26:
1455:Linguistics
1420:Limited Inc
1340:On Denoting
1166:Proposition
817:de Saussure
782:Ibn Khaldun
652:. Stanford.
478:: 187–225.
299:John Searle
266:David Lewis
251:Saul Kripke
53:Saul Kripke
1530:Categories
1515:Discussion
1510:Task Force
1460:Pragmatics
1251:Speech act
1181:Categories
1095:Symbiosism
1050:Nominalism
962:Watzlawick
842:Bloomfield
762:Chrysippus
567:Evans, G.
548:References
317:Marco Polo
287:photograph
233:Variations
220:Twin Earth
145:Motivation
1546:Causality
1492:Semiotics
1480:Semantics
1330:Alciphron
1266:Statement
1201:Intension
1141:Ambiguity
1020:Dramatism
1000:Cratylism
752:Eubulides
747:Aristotle
727:Confucius
658:cite book
611:CiteSeerX
603:Cognition
593:. (1981)
554:Evans, G.
492:0309-7013
47:a name's
33:referents
1505:Category
1465:Rhetoric
1290:Cratylus
1261:Sentence
1236:Property
1156:Language
1134:Concepts
972:Theories
937:Strawson
922:Davidson
912:Hintikka
907:Anscombe
852:Vygotsky
807:Mauthner
777:Averroes
767:Zhuangzi
757:Diodorus
737:Cratylus
641:15074526
633:15019555
328:See also
295:aardvark
224:Swampman
49:referent
1272:more...
1176:Concept
917:Dummett
892:Gadamer
887:Chomsky
872:Derrida
862:Russell
847:Bergson
832:Tillich
792:Leibniz
732:Gorgias
500:4106912
200:meaning
151:logical
106:Russell
86:terms.
1424:(1988)
1414:(1982)
1404:(1980)
1394:(1967)
1384:(1953)
1374:(1951)
1364:(1936)
1354:(1921)
1344:(1905)
1334:(1732)
1324:(1668)
1314:(1666)
1304:(1660)
1294:(n.d.)
1256:Symbol
957:Searle
947:Putnam
897:Kripke
882:Austin
867:Carnap
812:Ricœur
797:Herder
787:Hobbes
639:
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613:
577:1980.
560:, ed.
498:
490:
260:(also
39:, and
1536:Names
1282:Works
1191:Class
952:Lewis
942:Quine
927:Grice
877:Whorf
837:Sapir
822:Frege
772:Xunzi
742:Plato
637:S2CID
496:JSTOR
361:Notes
192:could
1241:Sign
1146:Cant
932:Ryle
902:Ayer
827:Boas
664:link
629:PMID
488:ISSN
256:The
241:The
222:and
121:they
1186:Set
621:doi
480:doi
141:).
126:was
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660:}}
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229:.
177:no
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694:e
687:t
680:v
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643:.
623::
502:.
482::
66:.
20:)
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