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End-to-end auditable voting

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1233:), and vote again. Later, independent sources, such as political parties, can obtain the file of numbered encrypted ballots and sum the different contests on the encrypted file to see if they match the election totals. The voter can ask those independent sources if the number(s) on the voter's receipt(s) appear in the file. If enough voters check that their numbers are in the file, they will find if ballots are omitted. Voters can get the decrypted contents of their spoiled ballots, to determine if they accurately match what the voter remembers was on those ballots. The voter cannot get decrypted copies of voted ballots, to prevent selling votes. If enough voters check spoiled ballots, they will show mistakes in encryptions. ElectionGuard does not detect ballot stuffing, which must be detected by traditional records. It does not detect people who falsify receipts, claiming their ballot is missing or was interpreted in error. Election officials will need to decide how to track claimed errors, how many are needed to start an investigation, how to investigate and how to recover from errors, State law may give staff no authority to take action. ElectionGuard does not tally write-ins, except as an undifferentiated total. It is incompatible with 924: 327: 1034:
verification that the overall totals correctly sum the ballot-box totals. Conventional voting schemes do not meet this standard, and as a result cannot conclusively prove that no votes have been tampered with at any point; voters and auditors must instead verify each individual step is fully secure, which may be difficult and introduces
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so that it alone does not reveal any information unless it is decrypted. The voter selects one layer to destroy at the poll. The voting machine retains an electronic copy of the other layer and gives the physical copy as a receipt to allow the voter to confirm that the electronic ballot was not later
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that can be combined with existing voting systems to add E2E support. The voting system interprets the voter's choices, stores them for further processing, then calls ElectionGuard which encrypts these interpretations and prints a receipt for the voter. The receipt has a number which corresponds to
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Comprehensive coverage of election integrity frequently involves multiple stages. Voters are expected to verify that they have marked their ballots as intended, recounts or audits are used to protect the step from marked ballots to ballot-box totals, and publication of all subtotals allows public
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Alternatively, assertions regarding ballot stuffing can be externally verified by comparing the number of ballots on hand with the number of registered voters recorded as having voted, and by auditing other aspects of the registration and ballot delivery system.
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and manual recounts measure the effectiveness of some steps, they offer only weak measurement of the integrity of the physical or electronic ballot boxes. Ballots could be removed, replaced, or could have marks added to them without detection (i.e. to fill in
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systems provide E2E properties. Rather than replacing the entire voting system, as is the case in all the preceding examples, it works as an add-on for existing optical scan voting systems, producing conventional voter-verifiable paper ballots suitable for
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The STAR-Vote system was defined for Travis County, the fifth most populous county in Texas, and home of the state capital, Austin. It illustrated another way to combine an E2E system with conventionally auditable paper ballots, produced in this case by a
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Ben-Nun, Jonathan; Farhi, Niko; Llewellyn, Morgan; Riva, Ben; Rosen, Alon; Ta-Shma, Amnon; Wikstrom, Douglas (2012). "A New Implementation of a Dual (Paper and Cryptographic) Voting System". In Manuel J. Kripp; Melanie Volkamer; Rüdiger Grimm (eds.).
1136:. After the voter selects their candidates, a voting machine prints out a specially formatted version of the ballot on two transparencies. When the layers are stacked, they show the human-readable vote. However, each transparency is 1181:, was designed to provide some of the benefits of a cryptographic voting system without using cryptography. It can in principle be implemented on paper although the presented version requires an electronic verifier. 1022:
Classical approaches to election integrity focus on ensuring the security of each step individually, going from voter intent to the final total. Such approaches have generally fallen out of favor with
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decryption procedure to check if each vote is accurately counted. Sastry, Karloff and Wagner pointed out that there are issues with both of the Chaum and VoteHere cryptographic solutions.
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It was originally believed that combining both properties would be impossible. However, further research has since shown these properties can co-exist. Both are combined in the 2005
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The Scratch and Vote system, invented by Ben Adida, uses a scratch-off surface to hide cryptographic information that can be used to verify the correct printing of the ballot.
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votes for undesired candidates). This shortcoming motivated the development of the end-to-end auditable voting systems discussed here, sometimes referred to as
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Support for E2E auditability, based on prior experience using it with in-person elections, is also seen as a requirement for remote voting over the
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Hao, Feng; Wang, Shen; Bag, Samiran; Procter, Rob; Shahandashti, Siamak F; Mehrnezhad, Maryam; Toreini, Ehsan; Metere, Roberto; Liu, Lana (2020).
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proposed a solution that allows each voter to verify that their votes are cast appropriately and that the votes are accurately tallied using
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has been used since 2009 by several organizations and universities for general elections, board elections, and student council elections.
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certified voting was willing to adapt their system to work with the novel cryptographic open-source components, as required by the RFP.
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Individual verifiability, by which any voter may check that his or her ballot is correctly included in the electronic ballot box, and
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designers, as these local local focus may miss some vulnerabilities while over-protecting others. The alternative is to use
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B Smyth, S. Frink and M. R. Clarkson, Election Verifiability: Cryptographic Definitions and an Analysis of Helios and JCJ,
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Universal verifiability, by which anyone may determine that all of the ballots in the box have been correctly counted.
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was used as part of the vVote poll-site electronic voting system at the 2014 Victorian State Election in Australia.
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Eligibility verifiability, by which anyone may determine that all counted ballots were cast by registered voters.
2371: 1378: 2463:— A review of existing electronic voting systems and its verification systems in supervised environments. 2421: 1752: 1560: 1214: 1094: 1018:, such as at the precinct or county level, the results from each level are combined to produce the final tally. 629: 194: 2273: 1788: 230: 2335:
Feng Hao, Matthew N. Kreeger, Brian Randell, Dylan Clarke, Siamak F. Shahandashti, and Peter Hyun-Jeen Lee.
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a 2020 MIT Media Lab article about end to end verifiable voting systems, includes discussion of blockchains
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Eldridge, Mark (May 6, 2018). "A Trustworthy Electronic Voting System for Australian Federal Elections".
557: 1823: 1344: 1062:. These attempt to cover the entire path from voter attempt to election totals with just two measures: 586: 523: 287: 79: 2468: 2444: 1870: 1572: 779: 538: 74: 985:
to provide voters with receipts that allow them to verify their votes were counted as cast, without
2494: 1739: 1435: 1225: 614: 1977: 600: 2002:"Pilot Study of the Scantegrity II Voting System Planned for the 2009 Takoma Park City Election" 2455: 2070:"Electing a University President using Open-Audit Voting: Analysis of real-world use of Helios" 1430: 1167:. As in Punchscan, the votes are made on paper ballots and a portion of the ballot is scanned. 794: 695: 576: 1742:. Proceedings of the Fourteenth USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 2005), August 2005. 1246: 1230: 1206: 649: 634: 533: 280: 268: 253: 173: 168: 1524: 2407: 1213:
in 2016, and bids were received for all the components, but no existing contractor with an
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in 2011 and 2012, as well as in the primary elections for the Israeli political party
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Proceedings of the 21st European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS)
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DRE-i (E2E verifiable e-voting without tallying authorities based on pre-computation)
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Wombat Voting was used in student council elections at the private research college
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ElectionGuard was combined with a voting system from VotingWorks and used for the
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system, invented by Peter Ryan, uses a shuffled candidate order and a traditional
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measures that are designed to demonstrate the integrity of the entire chain.
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Douglas W. Jones, End-to-End Standards for Accuracy in Paper-Based Systems,
977:) systems are voting systems with stringent integrity properties and strong 1631: 1339: 982: 891: 875: 823: 714: 705: 680: 460: 425: 59: 1695: 1591:
Aleks Essex, Jeremy Clark, Richard T. Carback III, and Stefan Popoveniuc.
1445: 1418: 1077:, most E2E voting schemes also attempt to meet a third requirement called 1789:"STAR-Vote: A Secure, Transparent, Auditable, and Reliable Voting System" 1700:
Proceedings of the 2003 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
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the encrypted interpretation. The voter can then disavow the ballot (
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changed. The system detects changes to the voter's ballot and uses a
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and was developed by a team that included Chaum, Rivest, and Ryan.
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5th International conference on electronic voting 2012 (EVOTE2012)
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Olivier de Marneffe, Olivier Pereira and Jean-Jacques Quisquater.
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to an external party. As such, these systems are sometimes called
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systems arrive at their final vote totals by a series of steps:
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No voter can prove how he or she voted to any third party.
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USENIX Journal of Election Technology and Systems (JETS)
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On the Security of Ballot Receipts in E2E Voting Systems
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Golle, Philippe; Jakobsson, Markus (October 30, 2003).
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Building on the STAR-Vote experience, Josh Benaloh at
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voters cast ballots either electronically or manually,
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Cryptographic Voting Protocols: A Systems perspective
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Douglas W. Jones, Perspectives on Electronic Voting,
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Secure Electronic Registration and Voting Experiment
1224:led the design and development of ElectionGuard, a 2461:Study on Poll-Site Voting and Verification Systems 2447:— PDF describing Ben Adida's Helios web-site 1050:contests with votes for a desired candidate or to 2230: 1593:Punchscan in Practice: An E2E Election Case Study 1011:cast vote records are tallied to generate totals, 2481: 2441:— Video of Ben Adida's 90-minute tech talk 2136:"Meretz aims to revolutionize electronic voting" 1595:. IAVoSS Workshop on Trustworthy Elections 2007. 1582:. IAVoSS Workshop on Trustworthy Elections 2007. 1379:"Voluntary Voting System Guidelines version 1.0" 2205: 1896:"Travis County - STAR-Vote - A Change of Plans" 1738:Chris Karlof, Naveen Sastry, and David Wagner. 1606:Simulation-Based Analysis of E2E Voting Systems 1571:Jeremy Clark, Aleks Essex, and Carlisle Adams. 2456:Simple Auditable & Anonymous Voting Scheme 1693: 1284:spring primary election on February 18, 2020. 2088:"Auditability and Verifiability of Elections" 1501:Workshop on Election Standards and Technology 946: 288: 2224: 1924:"Can Our Ballots Be Both Secret and Secure?" 1073:Because of the importance of the right to a 987:revealing which candidates a voter supported 1291:system was trialed in a polling station in 1209:. The project produced a detailed spec and 655:Parallel voting (Mixed member majoritarian) 1978:"ElectionGuard - Structures and Processes" 953: 939: 620:Mixed single vote (positive vote transfer) 558:Proportional and semi-proportional systems 295: 281: 2211: 2164: 1868: 1619:Building Reliable Voting Machine Software 1444: 1434: 2158: 2024: 1621:. Ph.D. Dissertation, UC Berkeley, 2007. 1104:, the following measure can be adopted: 2369: 2052:"The Helios e-Voting Demo for the IACR" 1921: 1893: 1787:Bell, Susan; et al. (2013-08-01). 1550:2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines 1419:"End-to-end arguments in system design" 1123: 14: 2482: 2214:"E-voting trialled in local elections" 2085: 1947: 1945: 1943: 1871:"STAR-Vote collapses - Austin Monitor" 1808: 1253:for its 2009 and 2011 city elections. 2439:Verifying Elections with Cryptography 2408:"Core Technologies – Assembly Voting" 2352:Siamak F. Shahandashti and Feng Hao. 2106:. Bonn: Gesellschaft für Informatik. 2067: 2049: 1970: 1951: 1917: 1915: 1655: 2025:Hardesty, Larry (13 November 2009). 1843: 1786: 1780: 1696:"Reusable anonymous return channels" 1521:Some Problems with End-to-End Voting 1423:ACM Transactions on Computer Systems 1152:Chaum's team subsequently developed 2445:Helios: Web-based Open-Audit Voting 1940: 1297:2019 United Kingdom local elections 1240: 249:End-to-end auditable voting systems 24: 18:End-to-end auditable voting systems 2370:Patachi, Stefan (September 2019). 1912: 1527:, Oct. 13-14, 2009, Washington DC. 1525:End-to-End Voting Systems Workshop 1523:, position paper presented at the 1477:From Power Outages to Paper Trails 1091:Voluntary Voting System Guidelines 515:Plurality and majoritarian systems 25: 2506: 2432: 2388:from the original on 2 March 2023 2086:Rivest, Ron L. (March 16, 2016). 1264:Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya 1043:voter verified paper audit trails 625:Scorporo (negative vote transfer) 2476:— Article by The Economist 1728:– via ACM Digital Library. 922: 325: 259:Independent verification systems 226:Certification of voting machines 95:Voter-verified paper audit trail 2414: 2400: 2363: 2346: 2329: 2315: 2297: 2266: 2173: 2152: 2128: 2094: 2079: 2061: 2043: 2018: 1994: 1887: 1869:Pritchard, Caleb (2017-10-04). 1862: 1837: 1762: 1745: 1732: 1687: 1649: 1624: 1611: 1598: 1507:), Jan 31, 2002, Washington DC. 1016:elections are conducted locally 195:Election Systems & Software 2212:Wakefield, Jane (2 May 2019). 2050:Haber, Stuart (May 24, 2010). 1585: 1565: 1561:Election Assistance Commission 1543: 1530: 1510: 1493: 1469: 1399: 1386:Election Assistance Commission 1371: 1095:Election Assistance Commission 630:Mixed ballot transferable vote 13: 1: 2451:Helios Voting System web-site 2343:Volume 2, Number 3, July 2014 2027:"Cryptographic voting debuts" 1894:Ballard, Ginny (2017-09-28). 1608:. E-Voting and Identity 2007. 1364: 1295:on 2 May 2019 as part of the 1177:voting protocol, invented by 231:Independent Testing Authority 2068:Adida, Ben (June 25, 2009). 1958:Wisconsin Election Integrity 1822:. 2016-10-10. Archived from 1538:Cornell's digital repository 907:End-to-end verifiable voting 567:Single non-transferable vote 7: 2240:IEEE Security & Privacy 1952:McKim, Karen (2021-03-16). 1922:Halpern, Sue (2020-07-07). 1302: 996: 971:end-to-end voter verifiable 765:Voting patterns and effects 10: 2511: 1673:10.1109/MSECP.2004.1264852 1345:homomorphic secret sharing 587:Single transferable voting 524:First-past-the-post voting 80:Optical scan voting system 2490:Electronic voting methods 2252:10.1109/MSEC.2020.3002728 1820:www.traviscountyclerk.org 1753:Making every e-vote count 1661:IEEE Security and Privacy 1197:. Scantegrity II employs 780:Voting advice application 610:Mixed-member proportional 539:Plurality-at-large voting 75:Electronic voting machine 1844:Okun, Eli (2014-07-09). 1226:software development kit 983:cryptographic techniques 645:Rural–urban proportional 640:Dual-member proportional 615:Additional member system 2360:, LNCS, Vol. 9879, 2016 1708:10.1145/1005140.1005155 1041:While measures such as 2474:A Really Secret Ballot 2323:"Wombat Voting System" 1982:www.electionguard.vote 1273:A modified version of 1036:many points of failure 795:Passive electioneering 696:Straight-ticket voting 2309:vote.heliosvoting.org 2274:"ADDER voting system" 1900:traviscountyclerk.org 1446:10.1145/357401.357402 1247:Takoma Park, Maryland 1211:request for proposals 1207:ballot marking device 650:Majority bonus system 635:Alternative Vote Plus 534:Instant-runoff voting 269:Software independence 254:Help America Vote Act 174:Software verification 169:Qualification testing 1636:U.S. Vote Foundation 1195:risk-limiting audits 1124:Proposed E2E Systems 967:End-to-end auditable 601:Mixed-member systems 100:Vote counting system 2381:. Assembly Voting. 2372:"Assembly Voting X" 1417:(1 November 1984). 1142:visual cryptography 1134:visual cryptography 1093:promulgated by the 929:Politics portal 691:Split-ticket voting 42:Election technology 2379:assemblyvoting.com 2140:The Jerusalem Post 1578:2012-07-22 at the 1555:2008-06-13 at the 1482:2008-11-28 at the 1060:E2E voting systems 1024:distributed system 981:. E2E systems use 902:Voter registration 861:Voter intimidation 385:Write-in candidate 358:Provisional ballot 164:Acceptance testing 85:Provisional ballot 65:DRE voting machine 2113:978-3-88579-299-4 1850:The Texas Tribune 1359:Assembly Voting X 1282:Fulton, Wisconsin 1120:by many experts. 1002:Electronic voting 979:tamper resistance 963: 962: 914: 913: 871:Voter suppression 851:Ballot harvesting 829: 828: 790:Paradox of voting 756: 755: 739:None of the above 671:Voting strategies 662: 661: 572:Cumulative voting 506:Electoral systems 496: 495: 431:Electronic voting 421:Compulsory voting 305: 304: 179:Usability testing 70:Electronic voting 16:(Redirected from 2502: 2426: 2425: 2424:. 19 April 2022. 2418: 2412: 2411: 2410:. 24 April 2021. 2404: 2398: 2397: 2395: 2393: 2387: 2376: 2367: 2361: 2350: 2344: 2333: 2327: 2326: 2319: 2313: 2312: 2301: 2295: 2294: 2292: 2291: 2285: 2279:. Archived from 2278: 2270: 2264: 2263: 2237: 2228: 2222: 2221: 2209: 2203: 2202: 2200: 2199: 2177: 2171: 2170: 2168: 2156: 2150: 2149: 2147: 2146: 2132: 2126: 2125: 2098: 2092: 2091: 2083: 2077: 2076: 2074: 2065: 2059: 2058: 2056: 2047: 2041: 2040: 2038: 2037: 2022: 2016: 2015: 2013: 2007:. Archived from 2006: 1998: 1992: 1991: 1989: 1988: 1974: 1968: 1967: 1965: 1964: 1949: 1938: 1937: 1935: 1934: 1919: 1910: 1909: 1907: 1906: 1891: 1885: 1884: 1882: 1881: 1866: 1860: 1859: 1857: 1856: 1841: 1835: 1834: 1832: 1831: 1812: 1806: 1805: 1803: 1802: 1796:usenix evtvote13 1793: 1784: 1778: 1777: 1766: 1760: 1749: 1743: 1736: 1730: 1729: 1691: 1685: 1684: 1653: 1647: 1646: 1644: 1643: 1628: 1622: 1615: 1609: 1602: 1596: 1589: 1583: 1569: 1563: 1547: 1541: 1534: 1528: 1517:Douglas W. Jones 1514: 1508: 1505:alternate source 1497: 1491: 1488:alternate source 1473: 1467: 1466: 1448: 1438: 1403: 1397: 1396: 1394: 1393: 1383: 1375: 1241:Use in elections 1079:receipt-freeness 955: 948: 941: 927: 926: 845: 844: 805:Political apathy 769: 768: 734:Election boycott 675: 674: 529:Two-round system 511: 510: 340: 339: 329: 307: 306: 297: 290: 283: 30: 29: 21: 2510: 2509: 2505: 2504: 2503: 2501: 2500: 2499: 2495:Electoral fraud 2480: 2479: 2435: 2430: 2429: 2420: 2419: 2415: 2406: 2405: 2401: 2391: 2389: 2385: 2374: 2368: 2364: 2351: 2347: 2334: 2330: 2321: 2320: 2316: 2305:"Helios Voting" 2303: 2302: 2298: 2289: 2287: 2283: 2276: 2272: 2271: 2267: 2235: 2229: 2225: 2210: 2206: 2197: 2195: 2179: 2178: 2174: 2157: 2153: 2144: 2142: 2134: 2133: 2129: 2114: 2099: 2095: 2084: 2080: 2072: 2066: 2062: 2054: 2048: 2044: 2035: 2033: 2023: 2019: 2011: 2004: 2000: 1999: 1995: 1986: 1984: 1976: 1975: 1971: 1962: 1960: 1950: 1941: 1932: 1930: 1920: 1913: 1904: 1902: 1892: 1888: 1879: 1877: 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1551: 1546: 1539: 1533: 1526: 1522: 1518: 1513: 1506: 1502: 1496: 1489: 1485: 1481: 1478: 1472: 1464: 1460: 1456: 1452: 1447: 1442: 1437: 1432: 1428: 1424: 1420: 1416: 1412: 1408: 1407:J. H. Saltzer 1402: 1387: 1380: 1374: 1370: 1360: 1357: 1354: 1351: 1348: 1346: 1343: 1341: 1338: 1336: 1333: 1330: 1328: 1325: 1323: 1320: 1318: 1315: 1313: 1310: 1307: 1306: 1300: 1298: 1294: 1290: 1285: 1283: 1278: 1276: 1271: 1269: 1265: 1260: 1258: 1254: 1252: 1248: 1238: 1236: 1232: 1227: 1223: 1218: 1216: 1212: 1208: 1202: 1200: 1199:invisible ink 1196: 1191: 1187: 1182: 1180: 1176: 1171: 1168: 1166: 1162: 1157: 1155: 1150: 1148: 1143: 1139: 1135: 1131: 1121: 1119: 1114: 1107: 1106: 1105: 1103: 1098: 1096: 1092: 1084: 1083: 1082: 1080: 1076: 1075:secret ballot 1068: 1065: 1064: 1063: 1061: 1057: 1053: 1049: 1044: 1039: 1037: 1031: 1029: 1025: 1017: 1013: 1010: 1007: 1006: 1005: 1003: 994: 992: 991:receipt-based 988: 984: 980: 976: 972: 968: 956: 951: 949: 944: 942: 937: 936: 934: 933: 930: 925: 920: 919: 908: 905: 903: 900: 898: 897:Secret ballot 895: 893: 890: 889: 888: 887: 883: 882: 877: 874: 872: 869: 867: 864: 862: 859: 857: 854: 852: 849: 848: 847: 846: 840: 835: 834: 825: 824:Protest votes 822: 821: 816: 815:Voter turnout 813: 811: 810:Voter fatigue 808: 806: 803: 801: 798: 796: 793: 791: 788: 786: 783: 781: 778: 776: 773: 772: 771: 770: 762: 761: 750: 747: 745: 742: 740: 737: 735: 732: 730: 727: 725: 722: 721: 720: 719: 716: 715:Protest votes 713: 712: 707: 704: 702: 699: 697: 694: 692: 689: 687: 686:Fusion voting 684: 682: 679: 678: 677: 676: 668: 667: 656: 653: 651: 648: 646: 643: 641: 638: 636: 633: 631: 628: 626: 623: 621: 618: 616: 613: 611: 608: 607: 606: 605: 602: 599: 598: 593: 590: 588: 585: 583: 580: 578: 575: 573: 570: 568: 565: 564: 563: 562: 559: 556: 555: 550: 547: 545: 542: 540: 537: 535: 532: 530: 527: 525: 522: 521: 520: 519: 516: 513: 512: 507: 502: 501: 490: 487: 485: 482: 480: 477: 476: 475: 474: 471: 468: 467: 462: 459: 457: 454: 452: 449: 447: 446:Postal voting 444: 442: 441:Polling place 439: 437: 434: 432: 429: 427: 424: 422: 419: 417: 414: 413: 412: 411: 407: 406: 401: 398: 396: 393: 391: 388: 386: 383: 382: 381: 380: 377: 373: 370: 369: 364: 363:Sample ballot 361: 359: 356: 354: 351: 350: 349: 348: 345: 342: 341: 333: 332: 328: 324: 323: 320: 317: 316: 313: 309: 308: 298: 293: 291: 286: 284: 279: 278: 276: 275: 270: 267: 265: 262: 260: 257: 255: 252: 250: 247: 243: 240: 238: 235: 232: 229: 228: 227: 224: 223: 222: 221: 217: 216: 211: 208: 206: 203: 201: 198: 196: 193: 192: 191: 190: 187:Manufacturers 186: 185: 180: 177: 175: 172: 170: 167: 165: 162: 161: 160: 159: 155: 154: 149: 145: 144:Residual vote 142: 140: 137: 135: 131: 128: 126: 123: 121: 117: 116:Central count 114: 113: 112: 111: 107: 106: 101: 98: 96: 93: 91: 88: 86: 83: 81: 78: 76: 73: 71: 68: 66: 63: 61: 58: 56: 53: 52: 51: 50: 46: 45: 41: 40: 36: 32: 31: 27:Voting system 19: 2416: 2402: 2390:. Retrieved 2378: 2365: 2357: 2348: 2340: 2331: 2317: 2308: 2299: 2288:. Retrieved 2281:the original 2268: 2243: 2239: 2226: 2217: 2207: 2196:. Retrieved 2184: 2175: 2154: 2143:. Retrieved 2139: 2130: 2103: 2096: 2081: 2063: 2045: 2034:. Retrieved 2030: 2020: 2009:the original 1996: 1985:. Retrieved 1981: 1972: 1961:. Retrieved 1957: 1931:. Retrieved 1927: 1903:. Retrieved 1899: 1889: 1878:. Retrieved 1874: 1864: 1853:. Retrieved 1849: 1839: 1828:. Retrieved 1824:the original 1819: 1810: 1799:. Retrieved 1795: 1782: 1773: 1764: 1747: 1734: 1699: 1689: 1667:(1): 38–47. 1664: 1660: 1657:Chaum, David 1651: 1640:. Retrieved 1635: 1626: 1613: 1600: 1587: 1567: 1545: 1532: 1512: 1495: 1471: 1426: 1422: 1401: 1390:. Retrieved 1385: 1373: 1340:Bingo Voting 1317:Prêt à Voter 1286: 1279: 1275:Prêt à Voter 1272: 1261: 1255: 1245:The city of 1244: 1219: 1203: 1183: 1172: 1169: 1161:Prêt à Voter 1158: 1151: 1127: 1115: 1111: 1099: 1088: 1078: 1072: 1059: 1040: 1032: 1021: 1000: 990: 974: 970: 966: 964: 892:Election ink 876:Voter caging 785:Likely voter 706:Vote pairing 681:Issue voting 479:Popular vote 461:Voting booth 426:Early voting 310:Part of the 147: 133: 119: 2246:(6): 6–13. 1770:"Ben Adida" 1759:, Jan 2007. 1540:, Feb. 2017 1415:D. D. Clark 1335:ThreeBallot 1327:Scantegrity 1186:Scantegrity 1175:ThreeBallot 1165:mix network 1130:David Chaum 1100:To address 866:Vote buying 749:Spoilt vote 729:Donkey vote 456:Vote center 436:Open ballot 108:Terminology 2484:Categories 2290:2012-07-12 2198:2021-04-10 2166:1805.02202 2145:2020-01-14 2036:2009-11-30 1987:2021-10-17 1963:2021-10-15 1933:2021-10-14 1928:New Yorker 1905:2018-08-04 1880:2018-08-04 1855:2016-09-02 1830:2018-04-24 1801:2018-04-24 1642:2016-09-01 1411:D. P. Reed 1392:2020-04-07 1365:References 1179:Ron Rivest 1048:undervoted 1028:end-to-end 884:Prevention 724:Abstention 592:Spare vote 582:Party-list 416:Ballot box 408:Collection 390:Electorate 372:Candidates 210:Smartmatic 47:Technology 2260:219616040 2193:1059-1028 1463:215746877 1455:0734-2071 1431:CiteSeerX 1322:Punchscan 1293:Gateshead 1270:in 2012. 1235:overvotes 1222:Microsoft 1154:Punchscan 1138:encrypted 1128:In 2004, 993:systems. 336:Balloting 139:Undervote 2392:27 April 2383:Archived 2218:BBC News 2031:MIT news 1576:Archived 1553:Archived 1480:Archived 1303:Examples 1231:spoil it 1118:Internet 1052:overvote 997:Overview 470:Counting 451:Precinct 148:drop-off 125:Overvote 35:a series 33:Part of 2122:2015880 1726:3040325 1681:1015904 1147:mix-net 344:Ballots 156:Testing 2258:  2191:  2120:  2110:  1724:  1714:  1679:  1638:. 2015 1461:  1453:  1433:  1388:. 2005 1353:DRE-ip 1312:Helios 1289:DRE-ip 1268:Meretz 1257:Helios 1014:where 400:Ticket 319:Voting 2386:(PDF) 2375:(PDF) 2284:(PDF) 2277:(PDF) 2256:S2CID 2236:(PDF) 2185:Wired 2161:arXiv 2118:S2CID 2073:(PDF) 2055:(PDF) 2012:(PDF) 2005:(PDF) 1792:(PDF) 1722:S2CID 1677:S2CID 1459:S2CID 1382:(PDF) 1308:ADDER 1249:used 1056:spoil 484:Tally 395:Slate 237:NVLAP 233:(ITA) 2394:2023 2189:ISSN 2108:ISBN 1712:ISBN 1451:ISSN 1287:The 1188:and 1184:The 1173:The 1159:The 1054:and 374:and 242:VVSG 134:PCOS 120:CCOS 60:Chad 2248:doi 1704:doi 1669:doi 1441:doi 1215:EAC 975:E2E 969:or 146:or 132:or 118:or 2486:: 2377:. 2356:. 2339:. 2307:. 2254:. 2244:18 2242:. 2238:. 2216:. 2187:. 2183:. 2138:. 2116:. 2029:. 1980:. 1956:. 1942:^ 1926:. 1914:^ 1898:. 1873:. 1848:. 1818:. 1794:. 1772:. 1755:, 1720:. 1710:. 1698:. 1675:. 1663:. 1634:. 1559:, 1519:, 1457:. 1449:. 1439:. 1425:. 1421:. 1413:; 1409:; 1384:. 1299:. 1237:. 1081:: 1038:. 37:on 2396:. 2325:. 2311:. 2293:. 2262:. 2250:: 2220:. 2201:. 2169:. 2163:: 2148:. 2124:. 2090:. 2075:. 2057:. 2039:. 1990:. 1966:. 1936:. 1908:. 1883:. 1858:. 1833:. 1804:. 1776:. 1706:: 1683:. 1671:: 1665:2 1645:. 1503:( 1486:( 1465:. 1443:: 1427:2 1395:. 973:( 954:e 947:t 940:v 296:e 289:t 282:v 20:)

Index

End-to-end auditable voting systems
a series
Absentee ballot
Chad
DRE voting machine
Electronic voting
Electronic voting machine
Optical scan voting system
Provisional ballot
Voting machine
Voter-verified paper audit trail
Vote counting system
Central count
Overvote
Precinct count
Undervote
Residual vote
Acceptance testing
Qualification testing
Software verification
Usability testing
Election Systems & Software
Hart InterCivic
Dominion Voting
Smartmatic
Certification of voting machines
Independent Testing Authority
NVLAP
VVSG
End-to-end auditable voting systems

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