1131:'s intuitionism was influenced both by Prichard and Moore. He holds that we can know moral truths through intuition, for example, that it is wrong to lie or that knowledge is intrinsically good. Intuitions involve a direct apprehension that is not mediated by inferences or deductions: they are self-evident and therefore not in need of any additional proof. This ability is not inborn but has to be developed on the way to reaching mental maturity. But in its fully developed form, we can know moral truths just as well as we can know mathematical truths like the axioms of geometry or arithmetic. This self-evident knowledge is limited to general principles: we can come to know the
1369:, non-empirically-based intuitions of truths, such as basic truths of mathematics. Take for example the belief that two minus one is one. This piece of knowledge is often thought to be non-inferential in that it is not grounded in or justified by some other proposition or claim. Rather, one who understands the relevant concepts involved in the proposition that two minus one is one has what one might call an "intuition" of the truth of the proposition. One intuits the truth of the proposition, rather than inferring it. Likewise, the ethical intuitionist claims that basic moral truths—whether they are principles (such as
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that they are expressed in clear terms, that the different principles are mutually consistent with each other and that there is expert consensus on them. According to
Sidgwick, commonsense moral principles fail to pass this test, but there are some more abstract principles that pass it, like that "what is right for me must be right for all persons in precisely similar circumstances" or that "one should be equally concerned with all temporal parts of one’s life". The most general principles arrived at this way are all compatible with
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1100:" (1912), wherein he contended that moral philosophy rested chiefly on the desire to provide arguments starting from non-normative premises for the principles of obligation that we pre-philosophically accept, such as the principle that one ought to keep one's promises or that one ought not to steal. This is a mistake, Prichard argued, both because it is impossible to derive any statement about what one ought to do from statements not concerning obligation (even statements about what is
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1076:. There are also less general intuitive principles, like the duty to keep one's promises or to be just, but these principles are not universal and there are cases where different duties stand in conflict with each other. Sidgwick suggests that we resolve such conflicts in a utilitarian fashion by considering the consequences of the conflicting actions. Inspired by Sidgwick, 20th century philosopher
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showed there to be several logically distinct theories, both normative and epistemological, sharing the same label. For
Sidgwick, intuitionism is about intuitive, i.e. non-inferential, knowledge of moral principles, which are self-evident to the knower. The criteria for this type of knowledge include
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rationalist models of this. Some, thus, reserve the term "ethical intuitionism" for the rationalist model and the term "moral sense theory" for the empiricist model. However, the terminology is not ultimately important, so long as one keeps in mind the relevant differences between these two views.
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duty in a particular situation: what one should do all things considered. All we can do is consult perception to determine which prima facie duty has the highest normative weight in this particular case, even though this usually does not amount to knowledge proper due to the complexity involved in
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One way to understand the moral sense is to draw an analogy between it and other kinds of senses. Beauty, for example, is something we see in some faces, artworks and landscapes. We can also hear it in some pieces of music. We clearly do not need an independent aesthetic sense faculty to perceive
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Some use the term "ethical intuitionism" in moral philosophy to refer to the general position that we have some non-inferential moral knowledge—that is, basic moral knowledge that is not inferred from or based on any proposition. However, it is important to distinguish between empiricist versus
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applied to moral knowledge, the thesis that some moral truths can be known non-inferentially (i.e., known without one needing to infer them from other truths one believes). Such an epistemological view is by definition committed to the existence of knowledge of moral truths; therefore, ethical
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version—of ethical intuitionism models non-inferential ethical knowledge on sense perception. This version involves what is often called a "moral sense". According to moral sense theorists, certain moral truths are known via this moral sense simply on the basis of experience, not inference.
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Robert Audi points out that in applied ethics, philosophers frequently appeal to intuitions to justify their claims, even though they do not call themselves intuitionists. Audi hence uses the label "intuitivists" to refer to people who are intuitionists without labeling themselves as such.
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count as an intuitionist. First, they might really refrain from relying on intuitions in moral philosophy altogether (say, by attempting to derive all moral claims from claims about what certain individuals desire). Second, they might deny foundationalism in favor of (say)
1125:" to refer to the (alleged) error of confusing goodness with some natural property, and he deployed the Open Question Argument to show why this was an error. Unlike Prichard, Moore thought that one could derive principles of obligation from propositions about what is good.
1451:. This aesthetic sense does not come automatically to all people with perfect vision and hearing, so it is fair to describe it as something extra, something not wholly reducible to vision and hearing. As the aesthetic sense informs us about what is beautiful, we can
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Throughout the philosophical literature, the term "ethical intuitionism" is frequently used with significant variation in its sense. This article's focus on foundationalism reflects the core commitments of contemporary self-identified ethical intuitionists.
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of value (or of evaluative facts) form the foundation of ethical knowledge; the common commitment of ethical intuitionists is to a non-inferential foundation for ethical knowledge, regardless of whether such a non-inferential foundation consists in
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Reasoning sometimes changes how things seem to us. But there is also a way things seem to us prior to reasoning; otherwise, reasoning could not get started. The way things seem prior to reasoning we may call an 'initial appearance'. An initial,
1351:, non-empirical knowledge, such as knowledge of mathematical truths; whereas moral sense theory models the acquisition of such non-inferential moral knowledge on empirical knowledge, such as knowledge of the colors of objects (see
1207:
Because it was not until
Sidgwick that it was clear there were several distinct theses sharing the label "ethical intuitionism", the term has developed many different connotations. This is liable to cause confusion; for example,
1167:' words: "This model of intuition in ethics has been demolished by a succession of critics, and the ruins of it that remain above ground are not impressive enough to invite much history of what happened to it."
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person is not necessarily able to perceive the green color of grass although he is capable of vision. Suppose we give a name to this ability to appreciate the beauty in things we see: one might call it the
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beauty in the world. Our ordinary five senses are quite enough to observe it, though merely observing something beautiful is no guarantee that we can observe its beauty. In the same way, a
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in that they are justified simply by virtue of one's understanding of the proposition believed. Others characterize "intuitions" as a distinct kind of mental state, in which something
1257:, i.e., the view that intuited moral beliefs are: infallible (indefeasible), indubitable (irresistibly compelling), incorrigible, certain, or understandable without reflection.
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defense of ethical intuitionism, yet Moore explicitly refuses the label because of the large number of differences between his own views and traditional intuitionists.
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Regardless of one's definition of rational intuition, intuitionists all agree that rational intuitions are not justified by inference from a separate belief.
1084:" to refer to the normative doctrines associated with intuitionism, leaving the phrase "ethical intuitionism" free to refer to the epistemological doctrines.
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1415:, as opposed to perceiving, remembering, or introspecting. An ethical intuition is an intuition whose content is an evaluative proposition. (§5.2)
1011:, the philosophical school usually labelled as ethical intuitionism developed in Britain in the 17th and 18th centuries. Early intuitionists like
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this way, e.g. that, generally speaking, one should keep one's promises and refrain from harming others. But intuition is unable to reveal one's
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as informing us of what is good. A modern example of a moral sensation is the impression of wrongness felt when one sees puppies being kicked.
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that reliably produces true moral intuitions. Few intuitionists, however, have explicitly required such a faculty exist, and some, such as
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Generally speaking, rationalist ethical intuitionism models the acquisition of such non-inferential moral knowledge on
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Ethical intuitionism suffered a dramatic fall from favor by the middle of the century, due in part to the influence of
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claims to update and strengthen
Rossian intuitionism and to develop the epistemology of ethics. Michael Huemer's book
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In the 19th century, ethical intuitionism was considered by most
British philosophers to be a philosophical rival of
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Ethical intuitionism was popular in the early twentieth century, particularly among
British analytic philosophers.
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in philosophy, and in part to philosophical objections based on the phenomenon of widespread moral disagreement.
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moral knowledge; this counts against considering moral sense theory to be a species of intuitionism. (see the
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On this broad understanding of intuitionism, there are only a few ways someone doing moral philosophy might
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Furthermore, intuitionists are often understood to be essentially committed to the existence of a special
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was an indefinable, non-natural property of which we had intuitive awareness. Moore originated the term "
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2212:"'Let no‑one ignorant of geometry…': Mathematical parallels for understanding the objectivity of ethics"
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Some rationalist ethical intuitionists characterize moral "intuitions" as a species of belief that are
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Despite the name "ethical intuitionism", ethical intuitionists need not (though often do) accept that
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1335:. Third, they might be non-cognitivists, holding that moral "beliefs" aren't really beliefs at all.
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Some recent work suggests the view may be enjoying a resurgence of interest in academic philosophy.
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1043:'s moral philosophy would be received in Britain as a German analog to Price, though according to
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Sufficiently broadly defined, ethical intuitionism can be taken to encompass cognitivist forms of
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However, none of these positions are essential to the view; most ethical intuitionists (such as
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to one to be the case (whether one believes it or not) as a result of intellectual reflection.
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that is not dependent on inference from other beliefs and that results from thinking about
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Secondly, sometimes the term "ethical intuitionism" is associated with a pluralistic,
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Traditionally, intuitionism was often understood as having several other commitments:
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1187:(2005) also provides a recent defense of the view. Furthermore, authors writing on
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As a foundationalist epistemological position, ethical intuitionism contrasts with
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is one of the main contemporary supporters of ethical intuitionism. His 2005 book
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While there were ethical intuitionists in a broad sense at least as far back as
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Stratton-Lake, Philip (2013). "Rational
Intuitionism". In Roger Crisp (ed.).
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The rationalist version of ethical intuitionism models ethical intuitions on
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would prove especially attractive to
Moorean intuitionists seeking to avoid
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Sturgeon, Nicholas (2002). "Ethical
Intuitionism and Ethical Naturalism".
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This article is about the view in moral epistemology. For the book by
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The view that moral properties are "simple" (as held by G.E. Moore).
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1572: – Temporary inability to see the ethical aspects of decisions
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273:
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2198:(2013). "Ethics in the Analytic Tradition". In Roger Crisp (ed.).
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3135:
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3125:
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The Good in the Right: A Theory of
Intuition and Intrinsic Value
1589:
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3185:
3110:
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2293:
Louden, Robert B (1996). "Toward a Genealogy of 'Deontology'".
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173:
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1999:
1039:, himself sometimes considered a sentimentalist intuitionist.
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positions in moral epistemology, such as those that depend on
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642:
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An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation
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as they present allegedly obvious or intuitive examples or
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293:
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1306:, a position defended by most ethical intuitionists, with
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2566:
2557:, a contemporary defense of the theory by Michael Huemer.
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1721:
1403:
appearance is an 'intuition'. That is, an intuition that
1394:, for example, defines "intuition" as a sort of seeming:
452:
2211:
1685:
1625:
1338:
1891:
1740:
1738:
1736:
1709:
1697:
1031:. Later, their views would be revived and developed by
1818:
1816:
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1789:
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2035:
1987:
1975:
1963:
1939:
1879:
1801:
1755:
1753:
1733:
1047:
it is questionable whether Kant is an intuitionist.
1813:
881:. In order to explore related topics, please visit
2415:
2369:Shafer-Landau, Russ; Cuneo, Terence, eds. (2012).
2368:
2005:
1915:
1903:
1855:
1843:
1833:
1831:
1777:
1619:
1595:
1279:) simply happen to have held those views as well.
2434:
2116:Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd Edition
2029:
2017:
1750:
1550:
1468:Philosophers commonly identified as intuitionists
994:section of this article for further discussion).
3775:
2072:
1649:
1601:
1536:
2462:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University
2329:(revised ed.). Cambridge University Press.
1828:
1068:, which is why Sidgwick sees a harmony between
2484:Stratton-Lake, Philip (2014). E. Zalta (ed.).
2301:(4). Johns Hopkins University Press: 571–592.
2582:
2483:
2474:
2416:Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter (17 August 2006a).
2184:Craig, Edward (1996). "Ross, William David".
1691:
1667:
1643:
1631:
1035:and pitted against the moral sense theory of
901:
3529:Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel
2477:The Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics
2200:The Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics
2113:Borchert, Donald (2006). "Sidgwick, Henry".
1170:
2126:Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics
1225:
2589:
2575:
2336:"Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?"
2261:Honderich, Ted (2005). "Sidgwick, Henry".
2173:Craig, Edward (1996b). "Sidgwick, Henry".
1317:
1290:, would have explicitly denied it exists.
1023:were principally concerned with defending
908:
894:
2260:
1771:
2505:
2496:
2386:
2377:
2333:
2206:
2112:
2041:
1957:
1945:
1897:
1807:
1744:
1703:
1679:
1433:Another version—what one might call the
1263:The view that moral truths are knowable
1098:Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?
929:) is a view or family of views in moral
3561:Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals
2453:
1822:
768:Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals
3776:
2549:at Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
2543:at Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
2313:
2292:
2271:
2172:
2066:
1969:
1909:
1795:
1783:
1727:
1407:is a state of its seeming to one that
1202:
1147:, in part to the rising popularity of
2570:
2391:(6th (enlarged) ed.). Macmillan.
2324:
2194:
2183:
2142:
2123:
2032:, pp. 184–186, especially fn. 4.
1981:
1885:
1759:
1607:
1358:
1339:Rational intuition versus moral sense
1002:
992:Rational intuition versus moral sense
16:Family of views in moral epistemology
2499:Ethical Intuitionism: Re-evaluations
2352:
2295:Journal of the History of Philosophy
2241:
2187:Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy
2176:Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy
2093:
2078:
2054:
1993:
1933:
1921:
1873:
1861:
1849:
1715:
1655:
3577:Elements of the Philosophy of Right
2508:Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy
2490:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
2460:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
2427:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
2402:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
2395:
2371:Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology
1837:
1560: – Ethical theory about values
1096:gave a defense of the view in his "
1088:Intuitionism in analytic philosophy
753:Elements of the Philosophy of Right
13:
2435:Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter (2006).
2264:The Oxford Companion to Philosophy
14:
3805:
2525:
2389:Outlines of the History of Ethics
2317:Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong
2145:"Clarifying Ethical Intuitionism"
1050:
3758:
3757:
2547:A Priorism in Moral Epistemology
2222:(2) (published 2023): 365–384.
2143:Cowan, Robert (December 2015).
2087:
2047:
1199:as support for their theories.
3545:The Theory of Moral Sentiments
2915:Value monism – Value pluralism
2153:European Journal of Philosophy
2128:. Cambridge University Press.
2098:. Princeton University Press.
1620:Shafer-Landau & Cuneo 2012
1596:Shafer-Landau & Cuneo 2012
1551:Related philosophical concepts
1422:
1241:facts of morality (as held by
808:The Theory of Moral Sentiments
1:
2561:Papers defending intuitionism
2289:MacMillan Publishing Company.
1537:Books discussing intuitionism
3609:On the Genealogy of Morality
3569:Critique of Practical Reason
1293:
1117:(1903) argued famously that
783:On the Genealogy of Morality
743:Critique of Practical Reason
7:
2439:. Oxford University Press.
2246:. Oxford University Press.
1462:
1193:methodological intuitionism
1107:Prichard was influenced by
933:(and, on some definitions,
25:Ethical Intuitionism (book)
10:
3810:
3537:A Treatise of Human Nature
2596:
2506:Williams, Bernard (2011).
2501:. Oxford University Press.
2479:. Oxford University Press.
2267:. Oxford University Press.
2228:10.1007/s10790-021-09831-z
2202:. Oxford University Press.
1426:
1375:it is wrong to kill people
1314:being notable exceptions.
1237:, the view that there are
997:
813:A Treatise of Human Nature
18:
3753:
3660:
3505:
3271:
2996:
2925:
2787:
2662:
2604:
2454:Skelton, Anthony (2012).
1566: – Meta-ethical view
1255:Classical foundationalism
1171:Contemporary developments
788:The Philosophy of Freedom
2888:Universal prescriptivism
2486:"Intuitionism in Ethics"
2387:Sidgwick, Henry (1931).
2378:Sidgwick, Henry (1907).
2272:Huemer, Michael (2005).
2216:Journal of Value Inquiry
2124:Brink, David O. (1989).
1583:
1373:) or judgments (such as
1226:Inessential connotations
1123:the naturalistic fallacy
1027:against the theories of
23:defending the view, see
2677:Artificial intelligence
2373:. Blackwell Publishing.
2334:Prichard, H.A. (1912).
2006:Sinnott-Armstrong 2006a
2541:Intuitionism in Ethics
2510:. Routledge Classics.
2363:The Right and the Good
2356:The Right and the Good
2030:Sinnott-Armstrong 2006
2018:Sinnott-Armstrong 2006
1564:Ethical non-naturalism
1544:The Right and the Good
1510:Harold Arthur Prichard
1417:
1249:Ethical non-naturalism
1218:is often considered a
955:reflective equilibrium
3601:The Methods of Ethics
2839:Divine command theory
2834:Ideal observer theory
2380:The Methods of Ethics
2353:Ross, W. D. (2002) .
2314:Mackie, J.L. (1977).
2307:10.1353/hph.1996.0070
2278:. Palgrave Macmillan.
2094:Audi, Robert (2004).
1876:, pp. 19–20, 30.
1396:
1284:psychological faculty
1181:The Good in the Right
1140:most specific cases.
1080:would coin the term "
942:intuitionism implies
394:Social responsibility
321:Intellectual humility
3718:Political philosophy
2563:– by Michael Huemer.
2554:Ethical Intuitionism
2532:Ethical intuitionism
2456:"William David Ross"
2398:"William David Ross"
2325:Moore, G.E. (1993).
2285:The Abolition of Man
2282:Lewis, C.S. (1943).
2275:Ethical Intuitionism
1185:Ethical Intuitionism
1082:deontological ethics
923:Ethical intuitionism
738:Beyond Good and Evil
3688:Evolutionary ethics
3649:Reasons and Persons
3625:A Theory of Justice
2779:Uncertain sentience
1730:, pp. 579–582.
1718:, pp. 147–149.
1682:, pp. 224–226.
1530:Frances Power Cobbe
1203:Definitional issues
1197:thought experiments
803:A Theory of Justice
773:The Moral Landscape
35:Part of a series on
3683:Ethics in religion
3678:Descriptive ethics
3513:Nicomachean Ethics
2418:"Moral Skepticism"
2396:Simpson, David L.
2359:. Clarendon Press.
2244:Sorting Out Ethics
2242:Hare, R.M (1997).
2166:10.1111/ejop.12031
1692:Stratton-Lake 2013
1668:Stratton-Lake 2013
1644:Stratton-Lake 2013
1632:Stratton-Lake 2014
1576:Moral sense theory
1558:Axiological ethics
1429:Moral sense theory
1359:Rational intuition
1353:moral sense theory
1161:ethical naturalism
1145:logical positivism
1133:prima facie duties
1003:Early intuitionism
978:moral sense theory
927:moral intuitionism
843:Ethics in religion
778:Nicomachean Ethics
3771:
3770:
3738:Social philosophy
3723:Population ethics
3713:Philosophy of law
3693:History of ethics
3176:Political freedom
2853:Euthyphro dilemma
2644:Suffering-focused
2437:Moral Skepticisms
2210:(27 April 2021).
1485:Francis Hutcheson
1371:don't kill people
1037:Francis Hutcheson
1025:moral objectivism
918:
917:
863:Social philosophy
848:History of ethics
733:Animal Liberation
563:Suffering-focused
3801:
3794:Ethical theories
3761:
3760:
3708:Moral psychology
3653:
3645:
3637:
3633:Practical Ethics
3629:
3621:
3617:Principia Ethica
3613:
3605:
3597:
3589:
3581:
3573:
3565:
3557:
3549:
3541:
3533:
3525:
3521:Ethics (Spinoza)
3517:
3156:Moral imperative
2614:Consequentialism
2591:
2584:
2577:
2568:
2567:
2521:
2502:
2493:
2480:
2471:
2469:
2467:
2450:
2431:
2422:Zalta, Edward N.
2412:
2410:
2408:
2392:
2383:
2374:
2360:
2349:
2330:
2327:Principia Ethica
2321:
2310:
2279:
2268:
2257:
2238:
2236:
2234:
2203:
2191:
2180:
2169:
2160:(4): 1097–1116.
2149:
2139:
2120:
2109:
2082:
2076:
2070:
2064:
2058:
2057:, pp. 33–36
2051:
2045:
2039:
2033:
2027:
2021:
2015:
2009:
2003:
1997:
1991:
1985:
1979:
1973:
1967:
1961:
1955:
1949:
1943:
1937:
1931:
1925:
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1659:
1653:
1647:
1641:
1635:
1629:
1623:
1617:
1611:
1605:
1599:
1593:
1304:normative ethics
1215:Principia Ethica
1189:normative ethics
1165:Bernard Williams
1114:Principia Ethica
910:
903:
896:
858:Moral psychology
798:Principia Ethica
793:Practical Ethics
763:Ethics (Spinoza)
362:Moral imperative
326:Is–ought problem
179:Transcognitivism
43:
32:
31:
3809:
3808:
3804:
3803:
3802:
3800:
3799:
3798:
3774:
3773:
3772:
3767:
3749:
3656:
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3643:
3635:
3627:
3619:
3611:
3603:
3595:
3587:
3579:
3571:
3563:
3555:
3547:
3539:
3531:
3523:
3515:
3501:
3274:
3267:
3191:Self-discipline
3151:Moral hierarchy
3099:Problem of evil
3044:Double standard
3034:Culture of life
2992:
2921:
2868:Non-cognitivism
2783:
2658:
2600:
2595:
2528:
2518:
2465:
2463:
2447:
2406:
2404:
2254:
2232:
2230:
2208:Franklin, James
2147:
2136:
2106:
2090:
2085:
2077:
2073:
2065:
2061:
2052:
2048:
2040:
2036:
2028:
2024:
2016:
2012:
2004:
2000:
1992:
1988:
1980:
1976:
1968:
1964:
1956:
1952:
1944:
1940:
1932:
1928:
1920:
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1638:
1630:
1626:
1618:
1614:
1606:
1602:
1594:
1590:
1586:
1581:
1570:Moral blindness
1553:
1548:
1539:
1534:
1490:William Whewell
1470:
1465:
1455:understand the
1449:aesthetic sense
1431:
1425:
1361:
1341:
1320:
1296:
1228:
1220:locus classicus
1205:
1173:
1153:C. L. Stevenson
1090:
1053:
1005:
1000:
939:foundationalism
914:
868:
867:
833:
832:
823:
822:
723:
722:
713:
712:
583:
582:
573:
572:
468:
467:
458:
457:
389:Self-discipline
356:Moral hierarchy
299:Problem of evil
249:Double standard
239:Culture of life
204:
203:
194:
193:
122:Non-cognitivism
77:
76:
67:
41:
28:
17:
12:
11:
5:
3807:
3797:
3796:
3791:
3786:
3769:
3768:
3766:
3765:
3754:
3751:
3750:
3748:
3747:
3740:
3735:
3733:Secular ethics
3730:
3728:Rehabilitation
3725:
3720:
3715:
3710:
3705:
3700:
3695:
3690:
3685:
3680:
3675:
3670:
3664:
3662:
3658:
3657:
3655:
3654:
3646:
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3630:
3622:
3614:
3606:
3598:
3593:Utilitarianism
3590:
3582:
3574:
3566:
3558:
3550:
3542:
3534:
3526:
3518:
3509:
3507:
3503:
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3314:
3309:
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3299:
3294:
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3260:
3255:
3250:
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3208:
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3138:
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3026:
3021:
3016:
3011:
3006:
3000:
2998:
2994:
2993:
2991:
2990:
2985:
2980:
2975:
2970:
2965:
2960:
2955:
2953:Existentialist
2950:
2945:
2940:
2935:
2929:
2927:
2923:
2922:
2920:
2919:
2918:
2917:
2907:
2902:
2897:
2892:
2891:
2890:
2885:
2880:
2875:
2865:
2860:
2855:
2850:
2848:Constructivism
2845:
2844:
2843:
2842:
2841:
2836:
2826:
2825:
2824:
2822:Non-naturalism
2819:
2804:
2799:
2793:
2791:
2785:
2784:
2782:
2781:
2776:
2771:
2766:
2761:
2756:
2751:
2746:
2741:
2736:
2731:
2726:
2721:
2716:
2715:
2714:
2704:
2699:
2694:
2689:
2684:
2679:
2674:
2668:
2666:
2660:
2659:
2657:
2656:
2651:
2649:Utilitarianism
2646:
2641:
2636:
2631:
2626:
2621:
2616:
2610:
2608:
2602:
2601:
2594:
2593:
2586:
2579:
2571:
2565:
2564:
2558:
2550:
2544:
2538:
2527:
2526:External links
2524:
2523:
2522:
2517:978-0415610148
2516:
2503:
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2472:
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2239:
2204:
2192:
2181:
2170:
2140:
2134:
2121:
2110:
2104:
2089:
2086:
2084:
2083:
2071:
2059:
2046:
2034:
2022:
2010:
1998:
1986:
1984:, p. 109.
1974:
1962:
1950:
1938:
1926:
1914:
1902:
1900:, p. 104.
1890:
1888:, p. 601.
1878:
1866:
1854:
1842:
1827:
1812:
1800:
1798:, p. 587.
1788:
1776:
1772:Honderich 2005
1764:
1749:
1732:
1720:
1708:
1706:, p. 271.
1696:
1684:
1672:
1670:, p. 339.
1660:
1648:
1646:, p. 337.
1636:
1624:
1612:
1600:
1598:, p. 385.
1587:
1585:
1582:
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1579:
1573:
1567:
1561:
1554:
1552:
1549:
1547:
1546:
1540:
1538:
1535:
1533:
1532:
1527:
1522:
1517:
1512:
1507:
1505:Michael Huemer
1502:
1497:
1495:Henry Sidgwick
1492:
1487:
1482:
1477:
1471:
1469:
1466:
1464:
1461:
1427:Main article:
1424:
1421:
1392:Michael Huemer
1360:
1357:
1340:
1337:
1319:
1316:
1308:Henry Sidgwick
1295:
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1224:
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1201:
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1169:
1089:
1086:
1074:utilitarianism
1066:utilitarianism
1061:Henry Sidgwick
1057:utilitarianism
1052:
1051:Henry Sidgwick
1049:
1017:Ralph Cudworth
1009:Thomas Aquinas
1004:
1001:
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818:Utilitarianism
815:
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785:
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758:Ethics (Moore)
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508:Existentialist
505:
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469:
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189:Utilitarianism
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55:
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37:
36:
21:Michael Huemer
15:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
3806:
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3602:
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3480:
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3358:
3355:
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3338:
3335:
3333:
3330:
3328:
3325:
3323:
3320:
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3313:
3310:
3308:
3305:
3303:
3300:
3298:
3295:
3293:
3290:
3288:
3285:
3283:
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3279:
3277:
3275:
3270:
3264:
3261:
3259:
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3209:
3207:
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3172:
3169:
3167:
3164:
3162:
3159:
3157:
3154:
3152:
3149:
3147:
3146:Moral courage
3144:
3142:
3139:
3137:
3134:
3132:
3129:
3127:
3124:
3122:
3119:
3117:
3114:
3112:
3109:
3107:
3104:
3100:
3097:
3095:
3092:
3090:
3087:
3086:
3085:
3084:Good and evil
3082:
3080:
3077:
3075:
3072:
3070:
3069:Family values
3067:
3065:
3062:
3060:
3057:
3055:
3052:
3050:
3047:
3045:
3042:
3040:
3037:
3035:
3032:
3030:
3027:
3025:
3022:
3020:
3017:
3015:
3012:
3010:
3007:
3005:
3002:
3001:
2999:
2995:
2989:
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2979:
2976:
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2911:
2908:
2906:
2903:
2901:
2898:
2896:
2893:
2889:
2886:
2884:
2883:Quasi-realism
2881:
2879:
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2871:
2870:
2869:
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2859:
2856:
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2800:
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2732:
2730:
2727:
2725:
2722:
2720:
2717:
2713:
2710:
2709:
2708:
2707:Environmental
2705:
2703:
2700:
2698:
2695:
2693:
2690:
2688:
2685:
2683:
2680:
2678:
2675:
2673:
2670:
2669:
2667:
2665:
2661:
2655:
2652:
2650:
2647:
2645:
2642:
2640:
2637:
2635:
2632:
2630:
2629:Particularism
2627:
2625:
2622:
2620:
2617:
2615:
2612:
2611:
2609:
2607:
2603:
2599:
2592:
2587:
2585:
2580:
2578:
2573:
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2446:9780199786121
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2135:9780511624612
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2107:
2105:9780691114347
2101:
2097:
2092:
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2080:
2075:
2068:
2063:
2056:
2050:
2043:
2042:Franklin 2021
2038:
2031:
2026:
2019:
2014:
2007:
2002:
1995:
1990:
1983:
1978:
1972:, p. 38.
1971:
1966:
1959:
1958:Williams 2011
1954:
1947:
1946:Sturgeon 2002
1942:
1935:
1930:
1924:, p. 15.
1923:
1918:
1911:
1906:
1899:
1898:Williams 2011
1894:
1887:
1882:
1875:
1870:
1864:, p. 30.
1863:
1858:
1852:, p. 29.
1851:
1846:
1839:
1834:
1832:
1824:
1819:
1817:
1809:
1808:Prichard 1912
1804:
1797:
1792:
1785:
1780:
1773:
1768:
1761:
1756:
1754:
1746:
1745:Borchert 2006
1741:
1739:
1737:
1729:
1724:
1717:
1712:
1705:
1704:Sidgwick 1931
1700:
1693:
1688:
1681:
1680:Sidgwick 1931
1676:
1669:
1664:
1657:
1652:
1645:
1640:
1633:
1628:
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1609:
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1508:
1506:
1503:
1501:
1498:
1496:
1493:
1491:
1488:
1486:
1483:
1481:
1480:Richard Price
1478:
1476:
1475:Samuel Clarke
1473:
1472:
1460:
1458:
1454:
1450:
1445:
1439:
1436:
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1372:
1368:
1367:
1356:
1354:
1350:
1345:
1336:
1334:
1329:
1324:
1318:"Intuitivism"
1315:
1313:
1309:
1305:
1301:
1300:deontological
1291:
1289:
1288:Richard Price
1285:
1280:
1278:
1274:
1267:by intuition.
1266:
1262:
1259:
1256:
1253:
1250:
1247:
1244:
1240:
1236:
1235:Moral realism
1233:
1232:
1231:
1223:
1221:
1217:
1216:
1211:
1200:
1198:
1194:
1191:often accept
1190:
1186:
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1126:
1124:
1120:
1116:
1115:
1110:
1105:
1103:
1099:
1095:
1094:H.A. Prichard
1085:
1083:
1079:
1075:
1071:
1067:
1062:
1058:
1048:
1046:
1042:
1041:Immanuel Kant
1038:
1034:
1033:Richard Price
1030:
1029:Thomas Hobbes
1026:
1022:
1021:Samuel Clarke
1018:
1014:
1010:
995:
993:
989:
988:
983:
979:
974:
970:
968:
963:
958:
956:
952:
947:
945:
940:
936:
932:
928:
925:(also called
924:
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891:
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771:
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709:
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631:
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541:
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365:
363:
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357:
354:
352:
351:Moral courage
349:
347:
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342:
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334:
332:
329:
327:
324:
322:
319:
317:
314:
312:
309:
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297:
295:
292:
290:
287:
286:
285:
284:Good and evil
282:
280:
277:
275:
272:
270:
269:Family values
267:
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260:
257:
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155:
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148:
145:
144:
143:
140:
138:
135:
133:
132:Perspectivism
130:
128:
127:Particularism
125:
123:
120:
118:
115:
113:
110:
108:
105:
103:
100:
98:
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88:
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71:
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64:
61:
59:
56:
54:
51:
50:
48:
47:
44:
39:
38:
34:
33:
30:
26:
22:
3789:Intuitionism
3742:
3698:Human rights
3641:After Virtue
3367:Schopenhauer
3141:Moral agency
3014:Common sense
2910:Universalism
2878:Expressivism
2858:Intuitionism
2857:
2829:Subjectivism
2774:Terraforming
2749:Professional
2553:
2507:
2498:
2489:
2476:
2464:. Retrieved
2459:
2436:
2425:
2405:. Retrieved
2401:
2388:
2382:. Macmillan.
2379:
2370:
2355:
2345:
2339:
2326:
2315:
2298:
2294:
2283:
2273:
2263:
2243:
2231:. Retrieved
2219:
2215:
2199:
2190:. Routledge.
2186:
2179:. Routledge.
2175:
2157:
2151:
2125:
2119:. Macmillan.
2115:
2095:
2088:Bibliography
2074:
2062:
2053:For example
2049:
2037:
2025:
2013:
2001:
1989:
1977:
1965:
1953:
1941:
1929:
1917:
1905:
1893:
1881:
1869:
1857:
1845:
1823:Skelton 2012
1803:
1791:
1779:
1767:
1723:
1711:
1699:
1687:
1675:
1663:
1658:, p. 5.
1651:
1639:
1627:
1615:
1603:
1591:
1456:
1453:analogically
1448:
1440:
1432:
1418:
1412:
1408:
1404:
1401:intellectual
1400:
1397:
1387:
1383:self-evident
1381:
1379:
1374:
1370:
1364:
1362:
1348:
1346:
1342:
1327:
1325:
1321:
1302:position in
1297:
1281:
1270:
1264:
1229:
1219:
1213:
1206:
1192:
1184:
1180:
1174:
1142:
1136:
1127:
1118:
1112:
1106:
1101:
1091:
1073:
1070:intuitionism
1069:
1065:
1054:
1006:
985:
982:self-evident
975:
971:
966:
959:
948:
931:epistemology
926:
922:
921:
919:
728:After Virtue
688:Schopenhauer
503:Evolutionary
346:Moral agency
219:Common sense
184:Universalism
169:Subjectivism
147:Anti-realism
137:Projectivism
107:Intuitionism
106:
102:Error theory
97:Epicureanism
87:Confucianism
29:
3516:(c. 322 BC)
3382:Kierkegaard
3201:Stewardship
2978:Rousseauian
2895:Rationalism
2807:Cognitivism
2754:Programming
2729:Meat eating
2702:Engineering
2196:Deigh, John
2069:, p. .
2067:Huemer 2005
2020:, p. .
1970:Mackie 1977
1960:, p. .
1936:, p. .
1910:Huemer 2005
1796:Louden 1996
1784:Craig 1996b
1728:Louden 1996
1525:C. S. Lewis
1520:Robert Audi
1500:G. E. Moore
1457:moral sense
1444:color-blind
1423:Moral sense
1333:coherentism
1243:Mark Platts
1177:Robert Audi
1013:John Balguy
951:coherentist
944:cognitivism
935:metaphysics
638:Kierkegaard
558:Situational
498:Descriptive
478:Axiological
404:Stewardship
159:Rousseauism
3784:Metaethics
3778:Categories
3412:Bonhoeffer
3121:Immorality
3064:Eudaimonia
3024:Conscience
3019:Compassion
2905:Skepticism
2900:Relativism
2817:Naturalism
2797:Absolutism
2769:Technology
2619:Deontology
2536:PhilPapers
2466:12 January
2407:12 January
2320:. Penguin.
1982:Brink 1989
1886:Deigh 2013
1760:Craig 1996
1608:Cowan 2015
1515:W. D. Ross
1435:empiricist
1312:G.E. Moore
1277:W. D. Ross
1273:G.E. Moore
1210:G.E. Moore
1149:naturalism
1129:W. D. Ross
1109:G.E. Moore
1078:C.D. Broad
1045:R. M. Hare
967:intuitions
962:intuitions
883:navigation
879:philosophy
873:This is a
538:Population
372:Immorality
264:Eudaimonia
229:Conscience
224:Compassion
154:Relativism
92:Deontology
82:Absolutism
3673:Casuistry
3585:Either/Or
3492:Korsgaard
3487:Azurmendi
3452:MacIntyre
3392:Nietzsche
3322:Augustine
3317:Confucius
3297:Aristotle
3273:Ethicists
3231:Intrinsic
3196:Suffering
3106:Happiness
3079:Free will
3059:Etiquette
3004:Authority
2948:Epicurean
2943:Confucian
2938:Christian
2873:Emotivism
2697:Discourse
2634:Pragmatic
2606:Normative
2079:Ross 1930
2055:Audi 2004
1994:Audi 2004
1934:Audi 2004
1922:Audi 2004
1874:Ross 1930
1862:Ross 1930
1850:Ross 1930
1716:Hare 1997
1656:Audi 2004
1294:Pluralism
1239:objective
1157:emotivism
969:as such.
937:). It is
875:subseries
838:Casuistry
748:Either/Or
663:Nietzsche
648:MacIntyre
613:Confucius
598:Augustine
593:Aristotle
581:Ethicists
543:Pragmatic
533:Normative
493:Christian
429:Intrinsic
399:Suffering
306:Happiness
279:Free will
259:Etiquette
209:Authority
3763:Category
3703:Ideology
3668:Axiology
3497:Nussbaum
3447:Frankena
3442:Anscombe
3432:Williams
3387:Sidgwick
3307:Valluvar
3302:Diogenes
3287:Socrates
3211:Theodicy
3206:Sympathy
3171:Pacifism
3161:Morality
3074:Fidelity
3054:Equality
3009:Autonomy
2997:Concepts
2958:Feminist
2933:Buddhist
2863:Nihilism
2802:Axiology
2759:Research
2692:Computer
2687:Business
1463:See also
1366:a priori
1349:a priori
1137:absolute
1119:goodness
1111:, whose
1059:, until
987:a priori
853:Ideology
693:Sidgwick
668:Nussbaum
513:Feminist
483:Buddhist
446:Cardinal
414:Theodicy
409:Sympathy
367:Morality
274:Fidelity
214:Autonomy
202:Concepts
164:Stoicism
117:Nihilism
112:Moralism
58:Category
3661:Related
3407:Tillich
3372:Bentham
3347:Spinoza
3342:Aquinas
3327:Mencius
3241:Western
3216:Torture
3181:Precept
3136:Loyalty
3131:Liberty
3126:Justice
3039:Dignity
3029:Consent
2973:Kantian
2963:Islamic
2926:Schools
2812:Realism
2744:Nursing
2739:Medical
2724:Machine
2664:Applied
2424:(ed.).
2361:, s.a.
2233:30 June
1996:, Ch.1.
1838:Simpson
998:History
831:Related
703:Spinoza
603:Bentham
588:Aquinas
553:Secular
518:Islamic
473:Applied
466:Domains
441:Virtues
341:Loyalty
336:Liberty
331:Justice
244:Dignity
234:Consent
142:Realism
75:Schools
53:Outline
3652:(1984)
3644:(1981)
3636:(1979)
3628:(1971)
3620:(1903)
3612:(1887)
3604:(1874)
3596:(1861)
3588:(1843)
3580:(1820)
3572:(1788)
3564:(1785)
3556:(1780)
3548:(1759)
3540:(1740)
3532:(1726)
3524:(1677)
3482:Taylor
3467:Parfit
3462:Singer
3437:Mackie
3312:Cicero
3253:Virtue
3186:Rights
3111:Honour
2968:Jewish
2764:Sexual
2672:Animal
2654:Virtue
2598:Ethics
2514:
2443:
2250:
2132:
2102:
1019:, and
708:Taylor
698:Singer
673:Parfit
653:Mackie
608:Cicero
568:Virtue
523:Jewish
424:Values
384:Rights
360:
311:Honour
174:Taoism
42:Ethics
3744:Index
3506:Works
3477:Adams
3472:Nagel
3427:Dewey
3422:Rawls
3402:Barth
3397:Moore
3362:Hegel
3337:Xunzi
3292:Plato
3282:Laozi
3263:Wrong
3236:Japan
3226:Value
3221:Trust
3116:Ideal
2983:Stoic
2734:Media
2719:Legal
2420:. In
2365:on WP
2148:(PDF)
1584:Notes
1388:seems
721:Works
683:Rawls
678:Plato
658:Moore
643:Laozi
623:Hegel
436:Vices
419:Trust
379:Norms
316:Ideal
63:Index
3457:Hare
3417:Foot
3377:Mill
3357:Kant
3352:Hume
3332:Mozi
3248:Vice
3166:Norm
3094:Evil
3089:Good
3049:Duty
2789:Meta
2712:Land
2639:Role
2624:Care
2512:ISBN
2468:2021
2441:ISBN
2409:2021
2341:Mind
2248:ISBN
2235:2021
2130:ISBN
2100:ISBN
1328:not
1310:and
1275:and
1265:only
1102:good
1072:and
633:Kant
628:Hume
618:Foot
548:Role
528:Meta
488:Care
294:Evil
289:Good
254:Duty
3258:Vow
2988:Tao
2682:Bio
2534:at
2303:doi
2224:doi
2162:doi
1355:).
1212:'s
1155:'s
984:or
877:on
453:Vow
3780::
2488:.
2458:.
2400:.
2346:21
2344:.
2338:.
2299:34
2297:.
2220:57
2218:.
2214:.
2158:23
2156:.
2150:.
1830:^
1815:^
1752:^
1735:^
1245:).
1015:,
957:.
946:.
2590:e
2583:t
2576:v
2520:.
2492:.
2470:.
2449:.
2430:.
2411:.
2348:.
2309:.
2305::
2287:.
2256:.
2237:.
2226::
2168:.
2164::
2138:.
2108:.
2081:.
2044:.
2008:.
1948:.
1912:.
1840:.
1825:.
1810:.
1786:.
1774:.
1762:.
1747:.
1694:.
1634:.
1622:.
1610:.
1413:p
1409:p
1405:p
909:e
902:t
895:v
885:.
27:.
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