Exodus of Kashmiri Hindus

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neighbours. In some cases, wives and children left first, while husbands stayed behind to watch for the situation to improve; in other cases, parents sent their teenage sons away after hearing threats against them, and followed them days or weeks later. Many migrants report that they entrusted their house keys and belongings to the Muslim neighbours or servants and expected to return to their homes after a few weeks. Tens of thousands of Kashmiri Hindus left Kashmir Valley in the span of several months. There are also competing perspectives on the factors that led to the mass migration of Kashmiri Hindus during this period. Kashmiri Hindus describe migration as a forced exodus driven by Islamic fundamendalist elements in Pakistan that spilled across the Line of Control into the Kashmir Valley. They think that Kashmiri Muslims had acted as bystanders to violence by not protecting lives and properties of the vulnerable Hindu community from the militant ... The mass migration, however, was understood differently by the Muslim religious majority in Kashmir. These Kashmiri Muslims, many of whom were committed to the cause of regional independence, believed that Kashmiri Hindus betrayed them by withdrawing their support from the Kashmiri nationalist movement and turning to the government of India for protection at the moment of ... This perspective is supported by claims, articulated by some prominent separatist political leaders, that the Indian government orchestrated the mass migration of the Kashmiri Hindu community in order to have a free hand to crack down on the popular uprising. These competing perspectives gave rise to mutual feelings of suspicion and betrayal—feelings that lingered between Kashmiri Muslims and Kashmiri Hindus and became more entrenched as time continued.

4247:, pp. 20, 23: "(p. 20) What occurred in 1990 that led to so many (Kashmiri) Pandits (KPs) leaving? The situation at the time was one of open revolt. The Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) launched its armed campaign for independence from India on 31 July 1988. Two powerful bombs exploded in Srinagar and, for the rest of the year, occasional JKLF attacks saw the security situation in the Kashmir Valley deteriorate. As the violence spread, Muslim–Hindu amity in Kashmir came under strain, particularly given the initial militant targeting of Hindu officials. During the course of 1989, civil disobedience and political violence by Kashmiri Muslims gathered pace, and the Indian government imposed central governor's rule in late January 1990. Governor Malhotra Jagmohan faced a series of challenges, and the internal displacement of Pandits was but one of them. ... (p. 23) My own interviews with a number of KPs in Jammu, many of whom hold Pakistan responsible, suggest suspicions of ethnic cleansing or even genocide are wide of the mark. The two conspiracy theories already described are not evidence-based. As Sumantra Bose observes, those Rashtriya Swamy Sevak publications' claims that large numbers of Hindu shrines were destroyed and Pandits murdered are largely false, to the extent that many of the shrines remain untouched and many of the casualties remain unsubstantiated. Equally, it is important to note that some incidents did take place." 2866:(p. 109) Like the Plebiscite Front, the JKLF portrayed the Kashmir issue as a national issue and Kashmir as a multi-religious nation to which Muslims, Hindus and members of other religions belonged. While Pakistan was considered as a 'friend' of the Kashmiri nation, the purpose of the JKLF was not accession with the state but the independence of Kashmir from both India and Pakistan. In the mid-1980s, the JKLF became a significant force among (Azad) Kashmiris in Britain. Towards the end of the decade, with the support of Pakistani intelligence agencies, the JKLF extended into Indian administered Kashmir and initiated the uprising there. (p. 114) In writings about the Kashmir dispute, secular political mobilisation of Muslim Kashmiris is frequently disregarded. Even when it is mentioned it is often not taken seriously. ... The Kashmir issue is much more complex than the orthodox view on the problem concedes. It is neither simply a conflict between India and Pakistan nor an issue between religion/Islam on the one hand and secularism on the other. ... In the 1980s and early 1990s Kashmiri nationalists, especially those of the JKLF, considered Pakistan a kind of natural ally for their purposes. But when Pakistani agencies shifted their support to Islamist militants ('jihadis') in Kashmir, most nationalists were alienated from Pakistan. 2526:

and "within two years, the previously marginal JKLF emerged as the vanguard and spearhead of a popular uprising in the Kashmir Valley against Indian rule. It dominated the first three years of the insurgency (1990–92)."! Even to the present day, "most commentators agree that among Muslims in the Valley, the JKLF enjoys considerable popular support." This was especially the case in the early 1990s, when contemporary observers argued that "the predominant battle cry in Kashmir is azadi (freedom) and not a merger with Pakistan'"and that "the JKLF, a secular militant group, is by far the most popular. The support for the JKLF was clearly substantial and greater than that of its militant contemporaries. ... In the early years of the war in Kashmir, the JKLF was the center of insurgency, but I will show later in this chapter how the social-institutional weakness of the organization made it vulnerable to targeting by the Indian leadership and dissention from local units. The Hizbul Mujahideen became the most robus organization in the fight in Kashmir. While its rise to dominance occurred after 1990, its mobilization during 1989–1991 through networks of the Jamaat-e-Islami laid the basis for an integrated organization that persisted until it shifted to a vanguard structure in the early to mid-2000s.

205:(JKLF) included some high-profile ones. Occasional anti Hindu calls were made from mosques on loudspeakers asking Pandits to leave the valley. News of threatening letters created fear, though in later interviews the letters were seen to have been sparingly received. There were disparities between the accounts of the two communities, the Muslims and the Pandits. Many Kashmiri Pandits believed they were forced out of the Valley either by Pakistan and the militants it supported or the Kashmiri Muslims as a group. Many Kashmiri Muslims did not support violence against religious minorities; the departure of the Kashmiri Pandits offered an excuse for casting Kashmiri Muslims as Islamic radicals, thereby contaminating their more genuine political grievances, and offering a rationale for their surveillance and violent treatment by the Indian state. Many Muslims in the Valley believed that the then Governor, Jagmohan had encouraged the Pandits to leave so as to have a free hand in more thoroughly pursuing reprisals against Muslims. Several scholarly views chalk up the migration to genuine panic among the Pandits that stemmed as much from the religious vehemence among some of the insurgents as by the absence of guarantees for the Pandits' safety issued by the Governor. 3570:, p. 22: "There is a third possible explanation for what happened in 1990; one that acknowledges the enormity of what took place, but that examines carefully what triggered KP migration: KPs migrated en masse through legitimate fear. Given the killings of 1989 and 1990, and the ways in which rumour spread fast in the violent conditions of early 1990, might KPs have been terrified by uncertainty as much as by direct threats? There was collective unease at the situation as it unfolded. While the numbers of dead and injured were low, militant attacks between 1988 and 1990 induced panic within the Pandit community. There was widespread fear and a sense of impending trouble, fuelled by extremist propaganda on both sides. By late March 1990, the ASKPC was appealing to the administration to assist Pandits in 'shifting to Jammu'. The public rhetoric of some of the more Islamist militants in the Valley, with calls for an Islamic state, although aimed primarily at Indian rule, struck a chilling chord with KPs. This in turn sparked off an exodus, which was not actively combated by Governor Jagmohan's administration (during whose tenure, almost 90% of the departures took place)." 3718:

argued that to prevent the total disintegration of India, Kashmiri Pandits "who have been driven out of Kashmir in the past" or "who were forced to leave on account of the terrorist violence in Kashmir" should be given their own separate homeland in the Valley. The movement's slogan was "Save Kashmiri Pandits, Save Kashmir, and Save India. Kashmiri Hindus, according to its leaders, had borne the cross of Indian secularism for several decades and their presence had played a major role in the restoration of the Indian claim on Kashmir. The organization warned India that restoring any form of autonomy to the state would indirectly mean conceding the creation of an Islamic state. As historian Mridu (p. 324) Rai has argued, ironically, while "Panun Kashmir opposes demands for Aazadi as an illegitimate demand of Islamist separatists, their own territorial claims are no less separatist." The exclusionary nature of their organization was immediately visible from their maps, which depicted a Valley denuded of Muslim religious sites. As Rai argues, maps such as Panun Kashmir's are "fashioned to enable easy pleating into that of India, the status quo power in the Valley."

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conventions. They would like to be considered Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) because they believe that this designation would give them some leverage to assert their basic rights in their dealings with the Indian state. The government of India refuses to grant them IDP status because it does not want to facilitate international involvement in its internal affairs.<<Footnote 22>> According to this logic, legally classifying the displaced Kashmiri Hindus as IDPs might attract international attention, initiate third-party involvement in the conflict, and prompt international scrutiny of the government's handling of the Kashmir situation. Kashmiri Hindus are thus classified as migrants, meaning that international agencies such as the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) do not play a role in their situation. Kashmiri Hindus vehemently dispute their classification as migrants because they believe that it carries the connotation that they have left their homeland of their own will, and are able to return freely, without threat of harm.

2465:–<<Footnote 22>>: In 1995, the Kashmiri Samiti Delhi issued a petition to the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) demanding that authorities extend to the Kashmiri Pandit community facilities and rights—such as nonrefoulement, humanitarian assistance, and the right to seek asylum—on the basis of their internal displacement. The petition also demanded that the government implement the recommendations of the representative of the UN secretary-general on IDPs and invited the NHRC to meet representatives of the displaced community. The NHRC issued a notice to the state government to respond to the petition. The government, in its response to the NHRC, argued that the Kashmiri Pandits are appropriately described as "migrants" since the word favors the community's return when the situation becomes more conducive. After reviewing the petition and the government's response to it. the NHRC indicated that the Kashmiri Pandits did not meet the typical definition of IDPs in light of the government's benevolent attitude toward them. 3122:(Delhi: Suruchi Prakashan, 1991).> It claimed among many other things that at least forty Hindu temples in the Kashmir Valley had been desecrated and destroyed by Muslim militants. In February 1993 journalists from India's leading newsmagazine sallied forth from Delhi to the Valley, armed with a list of twenty-three demolished temples supplied by the national headquarters of the BJP, the movement's political party. They found that twenty-one of the twenty-three temples were intact. They reported that 'even in villages where only one or two Pandit families are left, the temples are safe . . . even in villages full of militants. The Pandit families have become custodians of the temples, encouraged by their Muslim neighbours to regularly offer prayers.' Two temples had sustained minor damage during unrest after a huge, organised Hindu nationalist mob razed a sixteenth-century mosque in the north Indian town of Ayodhya on 6 December 1992.<Footnote 39: 3556:

the army in quickly and efficiently carrying out its plan.'!" Many Kashmiri Muslims claimed to have "witnessed departing Pandits boarding vehicles organized by the state," and felt fearful about their own security. A senior Indian administrator, Wajahat Habibullah, posted in Kashmir at this critical juncture, denied the involvement of the government in a coordinated plan for Kashmiri Hindu departure. However, he emphasized that the state governor did little to stop the Pandits from leaving the Valley. Jagmohan remained adamant that he would not be able to offer protection to the Valley's widely dispersed Hindu community, and rejected Habibullah's suggestion to televise "the request of hundreds of Muslims to their Pandit compatriots not to leave the valley." Instead, the government reassured Pandits of their support in settling them in refugee camps in Jammu and paying the civil servants their salaries, if the community decided to leave

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what Kashmiris felt was a promised autonomy boiled over at last in the militancy of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, a movement devoted to political, not religious, objectives. The Hindu Pandits, a small but influential elite community who had secured a favorable position, first under the maharajas and then under the successive Congress governments, and who propagated a distinctive Kashmiri culture that linked them to India, felt under siege as the uprising gathered force. Upwards of 100,000 of them left the state during the early 1990s; their cause was quickly taken up by the Hindu right. As the government sought to locate 'suspects' and weed out Pakistani 'infiltrators', the entire population was subjected to a fierce repression. By the end of the 1990s, the Indian military presence had escalated to approximately one soldier or paramilitary policeman for every five Kashmiris, and some 30,000 people had died in the conflict.

4190:(Farooq Abdullah's) efforts to establish an all-India oppositional front for more autonomy resulted, first, in his dismissal, and then, in his return to power in alliance with Congress in the rigged assembly elections of June 1987. It was these elections, and the denial of the growing support of the Muslim United Front, that triggered the uprising in the Kashmir valley from 1987 onwards. Thereafter the separatist groups (Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front and Hizbul Mujahideen) transformed decades of ethnic oppression into a generalised uprising against the Indian state. Between 1990 and 1995, 25,000 people were killed in Kashmir, almost two-thirds by Indian armed forces. Kashmirs put the figure at 50,000. In addition, 150,000 Kashmiri Hindus fled the valley to settle in the Hindu-majority region of Jammu. In 1991, Amnesty International estimated that 15,000 people were being detained in the state without trial. 47: 3611:

that transgressed the religious divide, and highlighted the importance of building bridges between communities. Pandits' experience of displacement varied depending on their class status. While the urban elite found jobs in other parts of India, lower-middle-class Hindus, especially those from rural Kashmir, suffered the most, many living in abject poverty. The local communities into which they migrated saw their presence as a burden, generating ethnic tensions between the "refugees" and the host community.' Adding to the tension, Kashmiri Hindus from the Valley, mostly Brahmans, had their own social and religious practices that differed from the Hindus of Jammu. They wanted to retain their own cultural and linguistic traditions, which made it difficult for them to assimilate into Jammu society.

3379:, p.23: "P. S. Verma echoes this; his interviews with migrant Pandits found few who had actually been personally harmed or threatened to leave the Valley (and many who had been begged to stay by their Muslim neighbours). A research study conducted by postgraduate politics students at the University of Jammu in 2001 found that 2% of KPs surveyed had received threatening letters; however, over 80% had not received any form of direct threat. Nevertheless, as Verma states, most of these migrants 'felt very much threatened in an atmosphere of unabated violence, particularly during January–February 1990 when the major exodus took place'. My own interviews with a number of KPs in Jammu, many of whom hold Pakistan responsible, suggest suspicions of ethnic cleansing or even genocide are wide of the mark." 3252:

essentially waging war against the state. Contrariwise, Pandits insist that the targets being exclusively Hindu indicated a 'communal' threat. It is only common sense that not every Pandit could have been an informer or a spy. But what is perplexing is that while the connection of numerous Pandits with the state's intelligence apparatus is denied in discussions relating to their roles in Kashmir, it is well advertised when making demands upon the state's resources in Indian law courts. The latter became an important arena for shaping Pandit narratives. ... At any rate, these testimonies freely given in Indian courts corroborate the claim of militants that at least some Pandits did act as agents of the state in Kashmir; of course, this does not offer justification for killing them.

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Kashmiris began to define themselves in Muslim terms. Pro-Muslim and pro-Pakistan sentiment became more important than secularism, and the leadership of the insurgency shifted to the Harakat and the Hizb ul-Mujahidin. To achieve its strategic objectives the Pakistani military and its intelligence services supported militant Islamist groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, who attacked Indian security forces in Jammu and Kashmir and more recently attacked civilians in India. Saudi influences, more militant forms of Islam, and the backing of the Pakistani intelligence services gave the struggle in Kashmir the aura of a jihad. The fighting escalated with the deployment of more than 500,000 Indian soldiers to suppress the resistance.

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Pandits, a small but influential elite community who had secured a favorable position, first under the maharajas and then under the successive Congress governments, and who propagated a distinctive Kashmiri culture that linked them to India, felt under siege as the uprising gathered force. Upwards of 100,000 of them left the state during the early 1990s; their cause was quickly taken up by the Hindu right. As the government sought to locate 'suspects' and weed out Pakistani 'infiltrators', the entire population was subjected to a fierce repression. By the end of the 1990s, the Indian military presence had escalated to approximately one soldier or paramilitary policeman for every five Kashmiris, and some 30,000 people had died in the conflict.

2745:(Kashmir will be independent). Other organizations, such as the Jama'at Islami and Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), supported merging with Pakistan. In 1988, Kashmiris began an armed struggle to overthrow Indian rule. Because some armed groups received assistance from Pakistan, the Indian state glossed the movement as Pakistani-sponsored "cross-border terrorism," while erasing its own extralegal actions in the region. Part of India's claim over Kashmir rests on its self-image as a pluralistic, democratic, and secular country. However, many Kashmiris feel they have never enjoyed the fruits of Indian democracy, as draconian laws have been in place for decades. Further, many see Indian rule as the latest in a long line of foreign colonial occupations. 3874:(subscription required) Quote: "Kashmir, region of the northwestern Indian subcontinent ... has been the subject of dispute between India and Pakistan since the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947. The northern and western portions are administered by Pakistan and comprise three areas: Azad Kashmir, Gilgit, and Baltistan, the last two being part of a territory called the Northern Areas. Administered by India are the southern and southeastern portions, which constitute the state of Jammu and Kashmir but are slated to be split into two union territories. China became active in the eastern area of Kashmir in the 1950s and has controlled the northeastern part of Ladakh (the easternmost portion of the region) since 1962."; (b) 2576:: An officially estimated 10,000 Kashmiri youth crossover to Pakistan for training and procurement of arms. The Hizb-ul Mujahedeen (Hizb), which is backed by Pakistan, increases its strength dramatically. ISI favours the Hizb over the secular JKLF and cuts off financing to the JKLF and in some instances, provides intelligence to India against the JKLF. In April 1991, Kashmiris hold anti-Pakistan demonstrations in Srinagar following killing of a JKLF area commander by the Hizb. In 1992, Pakistani forces arrest 500 JKLF marchers led by Amanullah Khan in Pakistan held Kashmir (PoK) to prevent a bid to cross the border. India also uses intelligence from captured militants. JKLF militancy declines. 1004:

their properties after the exodus and many are unable to go back and sell them. Their status as displaced people has adversely harmed them in the realm of education. Many Hindu families could not afford to send their children to well regarded public schools. Furthermore, many Hindus faced institutional discrimination by predominantly Muslim state bureaucrats. As a result of the inadequate ad hoc schools and colleges formed in the refugee camps, it became harder for Hindu children to access education. They suffered in higher education as well, as they could not claim admission in PG colleges of Jammu university, while getting admitted in the institutes of Kashmir valley was out of question.

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a secessionist slogan that threatened the security of the Indian state. The community felt threatened when Kashmiri Muslims under the flag of aazadi openly raised anti-India slogans. The 1989 targeted killings of Kashmiri Hindus who the insurgents believed were acting as Indian intelligence agents heightened those insecurities. In the winter of 1990, the community felt compelled to mass-migrate to Jammu, as the state governor was adamant that in the given circumstances he would not be able to offer protection to the widely dispersed Hindu community. This event created unbridgeable differences between the majority and the minority; each perceived aazadi in a different light.

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crisis"—there were rampant abuses such as unarmed protestors shot indiscriminately, arrests without trial, and the rape and torture of prisoners. Jagmohan whitewashed the security forces' role in human rights violations, laying the blame for atrocities at the feet of "terrorist forces. In February, he also dissolved the Assembly. Combined with the severe, indiscriminate harassment of the population, whereby all citizens were treated as potential suspects, the January massacre, and Jagmohan's draconian policies, support for the JKLF skyrocketed!"... However, it was JKLF, an ostensible secular, pro-independence movement, that dominated the field at the onse of the insurgency.

4073:, p. 37: According to Walter Lawrence, the British settlement commissioner deputed to Kashmir in 1889, the Hindus comprised about 5 to 6 per cent of the population of the valley, the Sikhs about 0.5 per cent and the Muslims (including the Shias) about 93 per cent. The total population, according to him, amounted to 814,214. Walter Lawrence, The Valley of Kashmir (Srinagar: Chinar Publishing House, repr. 1992), p. 284. These numbers remained relatively steady as the 1941 census of India indicated that the Muslims comprised 93.6 per cent and the Hindus about 4 per cent of the total population of the valley. Census of India, Jammu and Kashmir, 1941. 3365:

killings of prominent members of the Kashmiri Hindu community whom the JKLF insurgents believed to be Indian intelligence agents sent shivers down the spine of the minority community. Stories of Kashmiri Pandits, branded as "informers," and killed in their own homes or in their alleys, and survived by grieving wives and children, had a tremendous impact on the psyche of the minority community. Their fears were heightened as religious slogans merged with the cry for independence emerging from the mosques of Kashmir. Certain militant groups even wrote threatening letters to the Kashmiri Hindu community, asking them to leave the Valley.

501:) were allied together and won the election, However, the elections are widely believed to have been rigged in favour of the mainstream alliance and thus the government formed by Farooq Abdullah lacked legitimacy. The corruption and alleged electoral malpractices were the catalysts for an insurgency. The Kashmiri militants killed anyone who openly expressed pro-India policies. Kashmiri Hindus were targeted specifically because they were seen as presenting Indian presence in Kashmir because of their faith. Though the insurgency had been launched by JKLF, groups rose over the next few months advocating for establishment of 212:, the southern half of Jammu and Kashmir, where they lived in refugee camps, sometimes in unkempt and unclean surroundings. At the time of their exodus, very few Pandits expected their exile to last beyond a few months. As the exile lasted longer, many displaced Pandits who were in the urban elite were able to find jobs in other parts of India, but those in the lower-middle-class, especially those from rural areas languished longer in refugee camps, with some living in poverty; this generated tensions with the host communities—whose social and religious practices, although Hindu, differed from those of the 2426:

or other places in India. It is still disputed whether the Pandits' exodus was caused by actual intimidation by the (Muslim) militants or whether they were encouraged to leave by the Indian governor Jagmohan, a 'hardliner' who was deputed to Kashmir by the government in Delhi in order to counter the insurgency. Alexander Evans concludes that the Pandits left out of fear, even if not explicitly threatened by the insurgents, and that the administration did nothing to keep them in the Valley (Evans 2002). Since then the ethnography of the Kashmiri Pandits has had to be tuned into the ethnography of exile.

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elections there. The Muslim United Front would have electorally defeated the Congress Party-National Conferencecombine if the election had not been rigged. Many of the victims of this political fraud became the leaders of the Kashmir liberation (azaadi) movement. In the initial years, 1988–1992, the movement, led by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), a secular organization, seemed to have unequivocally taken a stand for the independence of J&K from the occupation of India and Pakistan. But for this stand of the JKLF, it had to bear a heavy cost in terms of human lives and sustenance

3391:, p. 61–63: "While most accounts of events in Kashmir featured militancy and demonstrations against the Indian state, few references are made to the Pandits. The slogans the Pandits refer to have never been reported or recorded officially at the time and suggest a gap between what was recorded and what the Pandits describe.... Yet conversations regarding the Pandit exodus were complicated by their insistence that the Pandits were not targeted by the Muslims. They denied hearing (p.63) the slogans, even those threatening women, from the demonstrations which the Pandits draw attention to." 4100:

over 80 per cent of all Muslims living in the Kashmir Valley. The other 20 per cent were Muslims who called themselves Sheikhs, Gujjars, Hajjams, Hanjis, Syeds, etc., all of whom presumably would have identified closely with Muslim Kashmiris, particularly if it was a binary Hindu or Muslim 'equation' or choice. These Muslims in Kashmir, of whom about 90 per cent were of the Sunni persuasion, had 'the confident perception of a majority community'. Whoever could successfully woo them would be well placed to receive their political support in the accession or any future plebiscite.

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living in camps, especially those who are still languishing in those established in and around Jammu. Unwelcomed by their host communities, entirely deprived of privacy and basic amenities, many succumbed to depression, ageing-related diseases, and a sense of desperate helplessness. Needless to say, there were some who fared better – those with wealth and older connections – but for those many others with none of these advantages, it was as being plunged with no safety net. Ever since 1990, Indian politicians promised much and delivered next to nothing for the camp-dwellers.

193:. Although their numbers of dead and injured were low, the Pandits, who believed that Kashmir's culture was tied to India's, experienced fear and panic set off by targeted killings of some members of their community—including high-profile officials among their ranks—and public calls for independence among the insurgents. The accompanying rumours and uncertainty together with the absence of guarantees for their safety by the state government might have been the latent causes of the exodus. The descriptions of the violence as "genocide" or "ethnic cleansing" in some 3751:

land of their ancestors" with "full dignity, security and assured livelihood" (Bharatiya Janata Party 2014, 8). The recurring call for separate security zones for Kashmiri Pandits reveals the extent to which notions of security have become Hinduized in Kashmir. Community leaders of small but vocal and politically positioned groups such as Panun Kashmir, headquartered in Delhi and Bombay, have all along demanded a separate homeland for Kashmiri Pandits, carved out of the existing state of J&K. The BJP's return to power has reenergized such groups.

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resolution. A number of protestors are killed after the police fires at them. A number of prominent Kashmiris are killed by militants, among whom Pandits form a substantial number. Pandits begin to be forced out of the Kashmir valley. The rise of new militant groups, some warnings in anonymous posters and some unexplained killings of innocent members of the community, contribute to an atmosphere of insecurity for the Kashmiri Pandits. Estimated 140,000 Hindus, including the entire Kashmiri Pandit community, flee the valley in March.

4285:.Kashmiri Pandit Sangharsh Samiti (KPSS), a civil society group in Kashmir that looks after the affairs of the remaining Pandits, notes that there are currently 3,400 Pandits in Kashmir. Others have placed the number at around 2,700. Rejecting estimates of the death of between 3,000 and 4,000 Pandits as propaganda, the KPSS believes that 650 Pandits were killed in the Kashmir Valley over the past 20 years. Many of these were on a JKNLF hit list for assassination of pro-India leaders and Pandits believed to be intelligence agents. 3089:, pp. 19–37, 23: "My own interviews with a number of KPs in Jammu, many of whom hold Pakistan responsible, suggest suspicions of ethnic cleansing or even genocide are wide of the mark. The two conspiracy theories already described are not evidence based. As Sumantra Bose observes, those Rashtriya Swayam Sevak publications’ claims that large numbers of Hindu shrines were destroyed and Pandits murdered are largely false, to the extent that many of the shrines remain untouched and many of the casualties remain unsubstantiated." 3780:(page 370) This competitive aspect in asserting victimhood and dismissing suffering of other communities seems to undercut discussions. Muslims may deny Pandit assertions and Pandits may deny Muslim aspirations. Once political posturing is suspended, blame is withheld and dominant theories are kept aside, perhaps an understanding can be reached—an understanding that the displacement of the Kashmiri Pandits is marked by a sense of what Nishita Trisal (2020) refers to as an incomprehensible 'sense of loss and erasure.' 2040:, p. 20(p. 19) The present article is structured as follows. First, it tries to explain what happened to KPs in 1990 and beyond. (p. 20) Examining the fall-out of the mass migration, it then looks at the extremist politics that followed, before concluding with an assessment of the contemporary situation. (p. 22) There is a third possible explanation for what happened in 1990; one that acknowledges the enormity of what took place, but that examines carefully what triggered KP migration: KPs migrated 3403:, p. 20: "Most KPs believe that they were forced out of the Kashmir Valley; whether by Pakistan and the militant groups it backed, or by Kashmiri Muslims as a community. Representing the latter variant, Pyarelal Kaul contends that the Pandit departure was a clear case of communal intimidation by Muslims, designed to expel Hindus from the Valley. Mosques 'were used as warning centres. Threatening the Hindus and conveying to them what terrorists and many Muslims of Kashmir wanted to achieve.'" 1764:, p. 20: "In early 1990, large numbers of KPs began leaving the Kashmir Valley. Over 100,000 left in a few months; some 160,000 in total have left the Kashmir Valley since. Not all KPs have left; but a mere handful remain today. Most of the original 1990 migrants left for Jammu, where they lived in squalid refugee camps, to begin with, but, by 1997, most had moved on, either to proper homes in Jammu or to cities elsewhere in India. Conditions in the refugee camps were, and still are, grim." 1662:

for neighbouring Jammu, Delhi, and other parts of India and the world. One immediate impetus for this departure in such dramatically large numbers was the inauguration in 1989 of a popularly backed armed Kashmiri insurgency against Indian rule. This insurrection drew support mostly from the Valley's Muslim population. By 2011, the numbers of Pandits remaining in the Valley had dwindled to between 2,700 and 3,400, according to different estimates. An insignificant number have returned.

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Kashmir liberation front in Shalimar the Clown seems to embody what the postcolonial theorist Homi K. Bhabha calls subaltern secularism (Bhabha 1996). For the secular nationalism of the Jammu and Kashmir liberation front (JKLF) is precisely subaltern in the sense that it reflects the view of the Kashmiri people rather than the elite, a people 'of no more than five million souls, landlocked, preindustrial, resource rich but cash poor, perched thousands of feet up in the mountains'

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were living in cramped prefabricated sheds or in rented accommodation. He also said that 4,000 posts have been lying vacant since 2010 and alleged that the BJP government was repeating the same rhetoric and was not serious about helping them. The apathy on the part of the government and the sufferings of the Kashmiri Hindus have been highlighted in a play titled 'Kaash Kashmir'. Such efforts or claims have lacked political will as journalist Rahul Pandita writes in a memoir.

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community felt threatened when Kashmiri Muslims under the flag of aazadi openly raised anti-India slogans. The 1989 targeted killings of Kashmiri Hindus who the insurgents believed were acting as Indian intelligence agents heightened those insecurities. In the winter of 1990, the community felt compelled to mass-migrate to Jammu, as the state governor was adamant that in the given circumstances he would not be able to offer protection to the widely dispersed Hindu community.

225:'s election platform. Although discussions between the Pandits and the Muslims have been hampered by the insistence on the part of each of their deprivation, and a rejection of the other's suffering, the Pandits who have left Kashmir have felt separated and obliterated. Kashmiri Pandits in exile have written autobiographical memoirs, novels, and poetry to record their experiences and to understand them. 19 January is observed by the Kashmiri Hindu communities as 8152: 2889:

experience in militancy and greater resources. At this point, the JKLF's secular ideology and its popularity became an obstacle in their path to complete control of the insurgency. In 1992, Pakistan arrested more than 500 JKLF members, including Amanullah Khan, a JKLF leader in PoK. It is alleged that Pakistan also provided intelligence on JKLF members to the Indian military, which led to the JKLF members being either arrested or killed.

4130:, p. 318 Quote: "Since a majority of the landlords were Hindu, the (land) reforms (of 1950) led to a mass exodus of Hindus from the state. ... The unsettled nature of Kashmir's accession to India, coupled with the threat of economic and social decline in the face of the land reforms, led to increasing insecurity among the Hindus in Jammu, and among Kashmiri Pandits, 20 per cent of whom had emigrated from the Valley by 1950." 2198:, p. 318 Quote: "Since a majority of the landlords were Hindu, the (land) reforms (of 1950) led to a mass exodus of Hindus from the state. ... The unsettled nature of Kashmir's accession to India, coupled with the threat of economic and social decline in the face of the land reforms, led to increasing insecurity among the Hindus in Jammu, and among Kashmiri Pandits, 20 per cent of whom had emigrated from the Valley by 1950." 3525:. Their stories of departure are deeply contested; while many in Kashmir view their departure from Kashmir as Governor Jagmohan Malhotra' grand design to exterminate Muslims once Kashmir's Hindu minority had fled the valley, many Kashmiri Pandits track the onset of Kashmir's armed rebellion in 1989 to a new brand of Islamic extremism, which in their view posed a grave threat to Kashmir's Hindu minority (Duschinski 2008). 1442:

militants silencing dissenters in their own community. The number of Hindus killed would have been greater if most of them had not migrated to camps in Jammu and Delhi. Some left after losing kith and kin to Islamic militants, others after receiving death threats, but most departed in utter panic between January and March 1990—simply to preempt death. Of the more than 150,000 Hindus, only a few are left in the valley.

2967:, pp. 19–37, 23: "While the numbers of dead and injured were low, militant attacks between 1988 and 1990 induced panic within the Pandit community. There was widespread fear and a sense of impending trouble, fuelled by extremist propaganda on both sides. By late March 1990, the ASKPC (All India Kashmiri Pandit Conference) was appealing to the administration to assist Pandits in ‘shifting to Jammu’." 3273:

sentenced the JKLF pioneer Maqbool Butt to death in 1968 (the execution was carried out in 1984). As the Valley descended into mayhem in early 1990, Lassa Koul, the Pandit director of the Srinagar station of India's state-run television, was killed on 13 February 1990 by JKLF gunmen. The murders of such high-profile members of the community may have spread a wave of fear among Pandits at large.

2256:, p. 274The Hindu Pandits, a small but influential elite community who had secured a favourable position, first under the maharajas, and then under the successive Congress regimes, and proponents of a distinctive Kashmiri culture that linked them to India, felt under siege as the uprising gathered force. Of a population of some 140,000, perhaps 100,000 Pandits fled the state after 1990 4235:, p. 274: "The Hindu Pandits, a small but influential elite community who had secured a favourable position, first under the maharajas, and then under the successive Congress regimes, and proponents of a distinctive Kashmiri culture that linked them to India, felt under siege as the uprising gathered force. Of a population of some 140,000, perhaps 100,000 Pandits fled the state after 1990" 3046:

dead and injured were low, militant attacks between 1988 and 1990 induced panic within the Pandit community. There was widespread fear and a sense of impending trouble, fuelled by extremist propaganda on both sides. By late March 1990, the ASKPC (All India Kashmiri Pandit Conference) was appealing to the administration to assist Pandits in ‘shifting to Jammu’."

1945:(New Delhi: Ministry of Home Affairs, March 1998). Between 1988 and 1991, the government claims 228 Hindu civilians were killed. Even if the bulk of government officials and politicians killed over the same period were Hindus and this is added, this figure would increase by a further maximum of 160. Hence the figure of 700 appears deeply unreliable." 3986:

percent Muslim, and the remainder, Hindu. The Muslims of Jammu would later be ethnically cleansed in 1947, making Hindus the majority. The Kashmir Valley was majority Muslim (over 90 percent) and also had a small but significant Pandit, or Kashmiri Hindu, community (around 5 percent), as well as a smaller percentage of Sikhs. (page 5)

2711:

government sought to locate 'suspects' and weed out Pakistani 'infiltrators', the entire population was subjected to a fierce repression. By the end of the 1990s, the Indian military presence had escalated to approximately one soldier or paramilitary policeman for every five Kashmiris, and some 30,000 people had died in the conflict.

4027:

they served as an administrative, bureaucratic class under the various rulers and were better educated and more privileged in obtaining employment than Kashmiri Muslims. After 1947, many Kashmiri Pandit bureaucrats were closely aligned with India's national project in Kashmir (pages 280–281)

4161:

The rhetoric of aazadi did not hold the same appeal for the minority community. The rise of insurgency in the region created a difficult situation for the Kashmiri Hindu community, which had always taken pride in their Indian identity. Self-determination was not only seen as a communal demand, but as

3894:

C. E Bosworth, University of Manchester Quote: "KASHMIR, kash'mer, the northernmost region of the Indian subcontinent, administered partly by India, partly by Pakistan, and partly by China. The region has been the subject of a bitter dispute between India and Pakistan since they became independent in

3750:

Since the mid-1990s, Kashmiri Pandits have become caught up in the nationalist movement more so than before, as the idea of return to homeland constitutes one of the main points in Modis BJP mandate. The manifesto emphasizes the BJP's long-standing commitment to the return of Kashmiri Pandits to "the

2710:

The imposition of leaders chosen by the centre, with the manipulation of local elections, and the denial of what Kashmiris felt was a promised autonomy boiled over at last in the militancy of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, a movement devoted to political, not religious, objectives. ...As the

2425:

Since the time of Madan's fieldwork. the situation of the Kashmiri Pandits has changed dramatically. Instead of 5 per cent, they now make up less than 2 per cent of the Valley's population. After the beginning of the insurgency, in early 1990, most of the Pandit families left Kashmir for Jammu, Delhi

2402:

Children born in Kashmir since 1989 have not heard that song of symbiosis. Just as the young Pandits in the refugee camps have only their parents' memories to portray the homes they felt forced to leave, so, too, do young Kashmir Valley Muslims have only stories and photograph albums as proof of how

1702:

1625:

When the Kashmir insurgency began, roughly 130,000 to 140,000 Kashmiri Pandits, who are Hindus, lived in Kashmir Valley. By early 1990, in the face of some targeted anti-Pandit attacks and rising overall violence in the region, approximately 100,000 Pandits had fled the valley, many of them ending up

1441:

India's response has been more brutal than ever before. The government's efforts to roll back the insurgency and the militants' armed resolve to "liberate" Kashmir have produced daily deaths. The Muslims constitute a majority of those killed, primarily by India's armed forces but also by armed Muslim

1358:

Beginning in January 1990, such large numbers of Kashmiri Pandits – the community of Hindus native to the valley of Kashmir – left their homeland and so precipitously that some have termed their departure an exodus. Indeed, within a few months, nearly 100,000 of the 140,000- strong community had left

1231:

Kashmiri Pandits are not considered "refugees" as they have not crossed an international border. Many Pandits would like to be considered Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), but the Indian government has denied them that status, fearing international involvement in Kashmir, which it considers to be

1039:

As of 2016, a total of 1,800 Kashmiri Hindu youths have returned to the Valley since the announcing of Rs. 1,168-crore package in 2008 by the UPA government. However, R.K. Bhat, president of Youth All India Kashmiri Samaj criticised the package to be a mere eyewash and claimed that most of the youths

515:

and establishment of an Islamic Caliphate. Liquidation of central government officials, Hindus, liberal and nationalist intellectuals, social and cultural activists was described as necessary to rid the valley of un-Islamic elements. The relations among the mainstream parties and Islamist groups were

477:

following communal riots in south Kashmir, and led to Governor's rule in the state. The political fight was hence being portrayed as a conflict between "Hindu" New Delhi (Central Government), and its efforts to impose its will in the state, and "Muslim" Kashmir, represented by political Islamists and

277:

antecedents and the predominant goal of political independence, led the uprising but did not abjure violence. In early 1990, the vast majority of Kashmiri Hindus fled the valley in a mass-migration. More of them left in the following years so that, by 2011, only around 3,000 families remained. 30 or

268:

In 1989 a persisting insurgency began in Kashmir. It was fed by Kashmiri dissatisfaction with India's federal government over rigging an assembly election in 1987 and disavowing a promise of greater autonomy. The dissatisfaction overflowed into an ill-defined uprising against the Indian state. The

4026:

is the term used for Kashmiri Hindus, who are upper-caste Brahmins that follow a regionally specific form of Shaivism (known as Kashmiri Shaivism). As a religious minority, Pandits remained under 5 percent of the total population of the Valley during Dogra rule and declined after 1947. Historically,

3948:

Before India's and Pakistan's independence from Britain in 1947, the territory of Jammu and Kashmir (hereinafter referred to only as Kashmir) was one of the 562 "princely states": entities that enjoyed a high degree of autonomy but swore fealty to the British Raj. The territory had three provinces:

3717:

Some Kashmiri Pandits adopted a radical approach and organized the "Panun Kashmir" (Our Own Kashmir) movement, demanding a homeland carved out from the Valley. Panun Kashmir claimed that the entire Valley had originally been inhabited by Hindus, giving them a right to it in the present. The movement

3643:

According to the Indian home ministry's annual report for 2009–10, 20 years after the exodus, there were 57,863 Pandit refugee families, of whom 37,285 resided in Jammu, 19,338 in Delhi, and 1,240 in other parts of the country. Countless writers have described the miserable conditions of the Pandits

3555:

In this violent and unstable atmosphere, rumors spread that the exodus of Kashmiri Hindus was the machinations of the state governor who planned to use unrestrained force to suppress Kashmiri Muslim resistance and thus viewed the presence of the Kashmiri Hindus in the neighborhoods as a hindrance to

3045:

through legitimate fear. Given the killings of 1989 and 1990, and the ways in which rumour spread fast in the violent conditions of early 1990, might KPs have been terrified by uncertainty as much as by direct threats? There was collective unease at the situation as it unfolded. While the numbers of

2820:

The exception in this case, which is also the largest group among the nationalists, is the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). The JKLF claims to adhere to the vision of a secular independent Kashmir. ... The JKLF committed to an independent but secular Kashmir, is willing to take the Hindus

2502:

In 1989 and the early 1990s a popularly backed armed insurgency was orchestrated by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, which called for a secular and sovereign Kashmir. Kashmiri cultural and linguistic identity appeared to be more potent than Islamic aspirations or pro-Pakistan sentiment in the

2354:

The third migration from rural-urban areas of one place to urban areas of other places involved people who felt compelled to migrate due to political, religious, ethnic, and other such factors. The migration of ... Kashmiri Pandits from Kashmir to different parts of JK state and India in 1990–91 fit

1661:

1274:

Alexander Evans estimates 228 Pandit civilian fatalities, or 388 if the deaths of officials are included, but considers the higher figure of 700 to be gravely undependable The 20-year Hindu civilian fatalities following 1990 have been reported by scholars quoting Kashmiri Pandit organizations within

1003:

Kashmiri Hindus continue to fight for their return to the valley and many of them live as refugees. The exiled community had hoped to return after the situation improved. Most have not done so because the situation in the Valley remains unstable and they fear a risk to their lives. Most of them lost

200:

The reasons for this migration are vigorously contested. In 1989–1990, as calls by Kashmiri Muslims for independence from India gathered pace, many Kashmiri Pandits, who viewed self-determination to be anti-national, felt under pressure. The killings in the 1990s of a number of Pandit officials, may

4220:

The year 1989 marked the beginning of a continuing insurgency, fuelled by covert support from Pakistan. The uprising had its origins in Kashmiri frustration at the state's treatment by Delhi. The imposition of leaders chosen by the centre, with the manipulation of local elections, and the denial of

3985:

By the last British census before Partition, in 1941, Muslims constituted the majority of the entire princely state and were nearly 77 percent of the total population. Hindus comprised just over 20 percent of the total population. The Dogras' native region of Jammu had a population that was over 60

3686:

The Pandits' situation was further complicated by the indifference of Indian political parties, especially the Congress and the 1989-90 National Front government.' Kashmiri Pandits perceived themselves as "true patriots" who had "sacrificed greatly for their devotion to the Indian nation." As such,

3364:

The polarized political positions that the two communities had adopted since 1947 reached a breaking point in the new political climate of the 1990s, when Kashmiri Muslims openly invoked anti-India slogans and demanded aazadi. As the new valorization of armed resistance gripped the region, targeted

3218:

The Counter-narrative of Aazadi: Kashmiri Hindus and Displacement of the Homeland (p. 320) The minority Hindu community of the Valley, which had always presented itself as a group of true Indian patriots wedded to their Indian identity, now found itself in an extreme dilemma as the tehreek-i-aazadi

3187:

Among those who stayed on is Sanjay Tickoo who heads the Kashmiri Pandit Sangharsh Samiti (Committee for the Kashmiri Pandits' Struggle). He had experienced the same threats as the Pandits who left. Yet, though admitting 'intimidation and violence' directed at Pandits and four massacres since 1990,

2600:

Consistent with the concept of Kashmiriyat, the JKLF was essentially a secular organization that aspired to the establishment of an independent Kashmir where both Muslims and Hindus would be welcome. This ideal is anathema to Pakistan-based fundamentalists as well as to Afghan and Arab fighters who

2525:

The early years of JKLF activity, especially in 1988, involved coordinated, publicly symbolic strikes carried out by a relatively small number of fighters. Central control processes at this point were handled by the four original organizers. Crackdowns by the Indian government spurred mobilization,

2128:

Despite witnessing a prolonged spell of insurgency including a few incidents of selective killings, Jammu was still considered to be a relatively safe refuge by the Hindu community of Kashmir, the Pandits. As a minuscule Hindu minority community in the Muslim-majority Kashmir (around 3 per cent of

1479:

1011:

following the killing of Burhan Wani, transit camps housing Kashmir Hindus in Kashmir were attacked by mobs. About 200–300 Kashmiri Hindu employees fled the transit camps during night time on 12 July due to the attacks, and held protests against the government for attacks on their camp and demanded

952:

Militancy in Kashmir increased after the exodus, and militants targeted properties of Kashmiri Hindus. Indian Home Ministry data records 1,406 Hindu civilian fatalities from 1991 to 2005. Jammu and Kashmir government stated that 219 members of the Hindu Pandit community had been killed between 1989

688:

personnel, Squadron Leader Ravi Khanna, Corporal D.B. Singh, Corporal Uday Shankar and Airman Azad Ahmad were killed and 10 other IAF personal were injured, while they were waiting at Rawalpora bus stand for their vehicle to pick them up in the morning. Altogether around 40 rounds were fired by the

261:. These Muslims had the self-assured awareness of a predominant community; their support was considered consequential in a determination of Kashmir's future. By 1950, in the face of Kashmir's princely ruler's unresolved accession to India, the land reforms planned by the incoming administration of 3610:

Interestingly, themes of omission, anger, and betrayal are absent from the narratives of those Kashmiri Pandits who stayed in the Valley and refused to (p. 323) migrate. Even though life was extremely difficult without the support of their own community, their stories emphasize human relationships

3251:

An important element in the recollections of many Pandits is the effect the killing in the early 1990s of a number of Pandit officials had in shaking their sense of security. Various groups of militants claim that their targets were Indian government 'agents' and so, in eliminating them, they were

3074:

In the winter of 1990, the community felt compelled to mass-migrate to Jammu, as the state governor was adamant that in the given circumstances he would not be able to offer protection to the widely dispersed Hindu community. This event created unbridgeable differences between the majority and the

2950:

However, two factors undermined the sense of security and safety of the pandit community in Kashmir. First, the governor hinted that the safety and security of the Hindu community could not be guaranteed. Second, the fanatical religious zeal of some of the insurgent groups instilled fear among the

2775:

Fortunately for ISI, another option emerged from quite unexpected direction: the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Frong (JKLF). A creature of its times, the JKLF was guided by a secular, nationalistic ideology, which emphasized the independenc of Kashmir above union with Pakistan or India. This fact

2680:

By the mid-1980s, however, trust between Delhi and local leaders had again broken down, and Kashmiris began a fully fledged armed insurgency led by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front calling for an independent and secular Kashmir. As the military struggle went on, Muslim—Hindu antagonism rose;

2309:

1556:

4099:

Based on figures in the 1941 Census, Muslims living in the Kashmir Valley comprised a third of all J&K-ites, 44 per cent of the state's entire Muslim population, and 94 per cent of the Kashmir Valley's population. More specifically, people 'describing themselves as Kashmiri Muslims' comprised

2888:

The JKLF, with its indigenous roots, had insider credentials and its secular ideology appealed to a population that had learned to equate ethnic nationalism with Sheikh Abdullah's version of Kashmiriyat. After the insurgency was in full swing, the Islamist groups made progress with their superior

2843:

Decades of misrule and repression in Indian-held Kashmir had led to a popular and armed uprising in 1989. In its initial stages, the uprising was dominated by the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), a secular movement that demanded Kashmir's independence from Indian rule. The Indian government

2550:

The Kashmir question, centered on the right to national self-determination, cannot be dealt with here, but to cut a long story short, the last nail that the Indian political establishment hammered into the coffin of liberal-political democracy in Kashmir was the rigging of the 1987 state assembly

1098:

does not allow those living in India outside Jammu and Kashmir to freely settle in the state and become its citizens. Sanjay Tickoo, president of Kashmiri Pandit Sangharsh Samiti (KPSS), says that the 'Article 370' affair is different from the issue of exodus of Kashmiri Hindus and both should be

1082:

noted that 808 Hindus families, comprising 3,445 people, were still living in the Valley and that financial and other incentives put in place to encourage others to return there had been unsuccessful. The employment package was also extended to Hindus who did not migrate out of the valley with an

3492:

Soon after Jammu and Kashmir became a disturbed area in 1990, the change registered in the landscape. Armed forces occupied protected forests, temples, orchards, and gardens. Cricket grounds became desiccated ovals in the middle of the city. Historical sites became interrogation centers; cinemas

3154:

The dominant politics of Jammu representing 'Hindus' as a homogeneous block includes Padits in the wider 'Hindu' category. It often uses extremely aggressive terms such as 'genocide' or 'ethnic cleansing' to explain their migration and places them in opposition to Kashmiri Muslims. The BJP has

2090:

The rise of insurgency in the region created a difficult situation for the Kashmiri Hindu community, which had always taken pride in their Indian identity. Self-determination was not only seen as a communal demand but as a secessionist slogan that threatened the security of the Indian state. The

1410:

Although various political stakeholders dispute the number of Kashmiri Pandits who left the Valley at that time, Alexander Evans estimates on the basis of census data and demographic figures that over 1,00,000 left in a few months in early 1990, while 1,60,000 in total left the Valley during the

1241:

Kashmiri Pandits are not considered "refugees" as they have not crossed an international border. Many would like to be considered Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), but the Indian government has denied them that status, fearing international involvement in Kashmir, which it considers to be its

558:

in Jammu and Kashmir, in front of several eyewitnesses. This instilled fear in the Kashmiri Hindus especially as Taploo's killers were never caught which also emboldened the terrorists. The Hindus felt that they were not safe in the valley and could be targeted any time. The killings of Kashmiri

221:("Our own Kashmir"), which has asked for a separate homeland for Kashmiri Hindus in the Valley but has opposed autonomy for Kashmir on the grounds that it would promote the formation of an Islamic state. The return to the homeland in Kashmir also constitutes one of the main points of the ruling 216:

Pandits—and rendered assimilation more difficult. Many displaced Pandits in the camps succumbed to emotional depression and a sense of helplessness. The cause of the Kashmiri Pandits was quickly championed by right-wing Hindu groups in India, which also preyed on their insecurities and further

3272:

JKLF's series of targeted assassinations that began in August 1989 (see Chapter 1) included a number of prominent Pandits. Tika Lal Taploo, the president of the Hindu nationalist BJP's Kashmir Valley unit, was killed in September 1989, followed in November by Neelkanth Ganjoo, the judge who had

2103:

The mass migration of Kashmiri Hindus from Kashmir Valley began in November 1989 and accelerated in the following months. Every family has its departure story. Many families simply packed their belongings into their cars and left under cover of night, without words of farewell to friends and

1593:

Some Pandits constituted a privileged class under the princely state (1846–1947). When insurrection engulfed the Valley in early 1990, approximately 120,000 Pandits lived in the Valley, making up about 3 per cent of the Valley's population. In February–March 1990, the bulk of the Pandits (about

1331:

680:

took place in Srinagar, in which the Indian security forces had opened fire on protesters, leading to the death of at least 50 people, and likely over 100. These events led to chaos. Lawlessness took over the valley and the crowd with slogans and guns started roaming around the streets. News of

4843:

Election rigging got India into trouble in Jammu & Kashmir, its only Muslim majority state, but it will take more than one relatively fair election to get India out. Kashmiris took up arms against the Indian government after the state's 1987 elections, widely regarded as a stitch-up by the

2623:

Yet if General Kachhwaha's military campaign of terror against Kashmiri Muslims in the Valley of Kashmir gives the lie to Nehru's legacy of secularism and tolerance by exposing the hegemonic and military power of India's Hindu majority, Rushdie's account of the secular nationalism of the Jammu

472:

in February 1986, although no Hindu was killed, many houses and other properties belonging to Hindus were looted, burnt or damaged. An investigation of Anantnag riots revealed that members of the 'secular parties' in the state, rather than the Islamists, had played a key role in organising the

2644:

More than the relatively simple denial of civil and political rights that characterized the Kashmiri government for more than four decades, the events of 1990, when Governor Jagmohan and the Indian government stepped up their counterinsurgency efforts, developed into a pronounced human rights

2379:

The grandfather recalled that the state officials, too, had warned the Pandits that 'not every house could be protected from militants.' In the interest of protecting the family from harm and having reached the 'threshold of tolerance and constant mental abuse inflicted by the militants," the

1531:

1990: In January BJP strongman Jagmohan is reappointed Governor. Farooq Abdullah resigns. A large number of unarmed protesters are killed in firing by the Indian troops in separate incidents. 400,000 Kashmiris march to the UN Military Observers Group to demand implementation of the plebiscite

2446:

Another key point of contention is the community's status as migrants. Kashmiri Hindus are not considered refugees because they have not crossed an international border to seek sanctuary in another country. This means that they are not covered by a well-defined body of international laws and

516:

generally poor and often hostile. The JKLF had also utilized Islamic formulations in its mobilization strategies and public discourse, using Islam and independence interchangeably. It demanded equal rights for everyone, however this had a distinct Islamic flavour as it sought to establish an

443:

and Mohinuddin Salati, to gain some legitimacy through religious sentiments. This gave political space to Islamists who previously lost overwhelmingly in the 1983 state elections. In 1986, Shah decided to construct a mosque within the premises of an ancient Hindu temple inside the New Civil

333:

of Kashmir began in the 1980s when Sheikh Abdullah's government changed the names of about 300 places to Islamic names. Sheikh also started delivering communal speeches in mosques that were similar to his confrontational pro-independence speeches in the 1930s. Additionally, he referred to

582:

in July 1984. Abdullah had earlier declared that he would resign if Jagmohan was made the Governor. However, the Central government went ahead and appointed him as Governor. In response, Abdullah resigned on 18 January 1990, and Jagmohan suggested the dissolution of the State Assembly.

2224:

the Valley over a few weeks in February–March 1990 to the southern Indian J&K city of Jammu and further afield to cities such as Delhi. ... The large-scale flight of Kashmiri Pandits during the first months of the insurrection is a controversial episode of the post-1989 Kashmir

2129:

Kashmir's population), they felt more vulnerable and noticeable as insurgency peaked in Kashmir. Lawlessness, uncertainty, political turmoil along with a few target killings of Pandits led to the migration of almost the entire community from the Valley to other parts of the country

1221:

Oxford English Dictionary Online defines exodus as – "The departure or going out, usually of a body of persons from a country for the purpose of settling elsewhere. Cf. 'emigration n. 2': The departure of persons from one country, usually their native land, to settle permanently in

668:

as a sign of Islamic rule. Shops, factories, temples and homes of Kashmiri Hindus were burned or destroyed. Threatening posters were posted on doors of Hindus asking them to leave Kashmir immediately. During the middle of the night of 18 and 19 January, a blackout took place in the

1043:

In an interview with NDTV on 19 January, Farooq Abdullah created controversy when he stated that the onus was on Kashmiri Hindus to come back themselves and nobody would beg them to do so. His comments were met with disagreement and criticism by Kashmiri Hindu authors Neeru Kaul,

943:

Many Kashmiri Pandit women were kidnapped, raped and murdered, throughout the time of exodus. The local organisation of Hindus in Kashmir, Kashmiri Pandit Sangharsh Samiti (KPSS), after carrying out a survey in 2008 and 2009, estimated 357 Hindus were killed in Kashmir in 1990.

1012:

that all Kashmiri Hindus employees in Kashmir valley be evacuated immediately. Over 1300 government employees belonging to the community had fled the region during the unrest. Posters threatening the Hindus to leave Kashmir or be killed were also put up near transit camps in

2503:

Vale of Kashmir. In time, however, the balance of firepower among the rebels shifted to the Hizbul Mujahideen, which received more support from Pakistan. The Indian state deployed more than 550,000 armed personnel in the early 1990s to severely repress the Kashmir movement.

3582:, p. 23: "Once it became clear that the government could not protect senior KP officials—and would pay their salaries in absentia—many other KPs in state employment decided to move. At the outset, few of these migrants expected their exile to last more than a few months." 3687:

they saw the inability of the state to provide support in exile as a moral failure and a betrayal. This vacuum was filled by Hindu rightist groups, who, while advocating for Kashmiri Pandits, preyed on their insecurities and further alienated them from Kashmiri Muslims.

1902:

By the middle of the year some eighty persons had been killed ..., and the fear ... had its effect from the very first killings. Beginning in February, the pandits began streaming out of the valley, and by June some 58,000 families had relocated to camps in Jammu and

1027:

refused its plea. They have also demanded the creation of a "special crimes tribunal" to look into the ethnic cleansing and crimes committed. They also demanded a one time compensation for displaced Kashmiri Hindus who are not able to apply for government jobs.

3431:

Although Kashmiri Muslims did not support violence against religious minorities, the exodus of Kashmiri Pandits (who are Hindus) and their unresolved status continues to be a pain often "weaponized" by the Indian state to cast Kashmiris Muslims as Islamic

3219:

threatened their security. The community felt safer as a part of Hindu-majority India, as it feared political domination in Muslim-majority Kashmir. It had thus often opposed Kashmiri Muslim calls for self-determination, equating this with anti-nationalism.

1594:

90,000–100,000 people) left the Valley for safety amid incidents of intimidation and sporadic killings of prominent members of the community by Kashmiri Muslim militants; most moved to the southern, Hindu-majority Indian J&K city of Jammu or to Delhi.

1332:

463:

where Kashmiri Hindus were targeted by the Kashmiri Muslims. Many incidents were reported in various areas where Kashmiri Hindus were killed and their properties and temples damaged or destroyed. The worst hit areas were mainly in South Kashmir and

145:

Indian Home Ministry data records 217 Hindus civilians fatalities during the four-year period, 1988 to 1991; another scholar estimates 228 Pandit civilian fatalities. Government of Jammu and Kashmir recorded 219 Pandit fatalities between 1989 and

3026:

The community felt threatened when Kashmiri Muslims under the flag of aazadi openly raised anti-India slogans. The 1989 targeted killings of Kashmiri Hindus who the insurgents believed were acting as Indian intelligence agents heightened those

5088: 1868:

On 15 March 1990, by which time the Pandit exodus from the Valley was substantially complete, the All-India Kashmiri Pandit Conference, a community organisation, stated that thirty-two Pandits had been killed by militants since the previous

278:

32 Kashmiri Pandits had been killed by insurgents by mid-March 1990 when the exodus was largely complete, according to some scholars. Indian Home Ministry data records 217 Hindu civilian fatalities during the four-year period, 1988 to 1991.

3949:

the Kashmir Valley, the most populated area, Jammu, and Ladakh. The Kashmir Valley is approximately 95 percent Sunni Muslim, while Jammu is split between Hindus and Muslims, and Ladakh is largely divided between Shi'a Muslims and Buddhists.

201:

have shaken the community's sense of security, although it is thought some Pandits—by virtue of their evidence given later in Indian courts—may have acted as agents of the Indian state. The Pandits killed in targeted assassinations by the

6134: 3763:

Datta, Ankur (2023), "The Blank Space Between Nationalisms: Locating the Kashmiri Pandits in Liberal and Hindu Nationalist Politics in Relation to Kashmir and India", in Duschinski, Haley; Bhan, Mona; Robinson, Cabeiri deBergh (eds.),

2247:

Between 1990 and 1995, 25,000 people were killed in Kashmir, almost two-thirds by Indian armed forces. Kashmiris put the figure at 50,000. In addition, 150,000 Kashmiri Hindus fled the valley to settle in the Hindu-majority region of

1793:

Between 1990 and 1995, 25,000 people were killed in Kashmir, almost two-thirds by Indian armed forces. Kashmirs put the figure at 50,000. In addition, 150,000 Kashmiri Hindus fled the valley to settle in the Hindu-majority region of

1067:, had threatened of attacking the "Hindu composite townships" which were meant to be built for the rehabilitation of the non-Muslim community. In a 6-minute long video clip, Wani described the rehabilitation scheme as resembling 6604: 2995:

2776:

alone meant that JKLF was not going to be a good match for ISI's long-term goal of a united Kashmir under the Pakistan banner. Still, in lieu of any viable alternative, the JKLF was the best short-term expedient for ISI plans.

1075:. Kashmiri Hindus residing in the Valley also mourned Burhan Wani's death. Burhan Wani's self-styled successor in the Hizbul Mujahideen, Zakir Rashid Bhat, also asked the Kashmiri Hindus to return and ensured them protection. 6222: 4259:, p. 19: "Most Kashmiri Pandits living in the Kashmir Valley left in 1990 as militant violence engulfed the state. Some 95% of the 160,000–170,000 community left in what is often described as a case of ethnic cleansing." 3493:

became military bunkers. Counterinsurgency tactics, such as sieges, crackdowns, and cordon-and-search operations, transformed village after village. Checkpoints, roadblocks, and identity checks became everyday realities.

1056:(retd.). He also said that during his tenure as Chief Minister in 1996, he had asked them to return but they refused to do so. He reiterated his comments on 23 January and said that the time had come for them to return. 3333:

Anti-Hindu announcements in neighbourhood mosques, such as, 'Kashmir kiske liye? Mussalman ke liye' (Kashmir is for whom? For the Muslim), resulted in a large, almost total exodus of most of the Valley's Hindu (Pandit)

1383:

The Counter-narrative of Aazadi: Kashmiri Hindus and Displacement of the Homeland (p. 320) In March 1990, the majority of Kashmiri Hindus left the Valley for "refugee" camps in and outside the Hindu-dominated region of

651:

republished the same warning. The newspaper did not claim ownership of the statement and subsequently issued a clarification. Walls were pasted with posters with threatening messages to all Kashmiris to strictly follow

2161:...the everyday modes of relating that existed between Kashmiri Pandits and Muslims in the period leading up to the "Migration," as the Pandit departures have come to be called among Kashmiris, both Pandit and Muslim. 1251:

According to several scholars, approximately 90,000–100,000 Pandits of an estimated population of 120,000–140,000 left in early 1990. Other scholars have suggested a higher figure of approximately 150,000 for the

448:'. People of Jammu took to streets to protest against this decision, which led to a Hindu-Muslim clash. In February 1986, Shah on his return to Kashmir valley retaliated and incited the Kashmiri Muslims by saying 178:. Of a total Pandit population of 120,000–140,000 some 90,000–100,000 left the valley or felt compelled to leave by the middle of 1990, by which time about 30–80 of them are said to have been killed by militants. 6126: 957:

were killed by insurgents from 1990 to 2011 with 75% of them being killed during the first year of the Kashmiri insurgency, and that during the last 20 years, about 650 Hindus have been killed in the valley.

6559: 6373: 689:

terrorists, apparently from 2 to 3 automatic weapons and one semi-automatic pistol. The Jammu and Kashmir Armed Police post located nearby, with 7 armed constables and one head constable, did not react.

393:

mobilized the rapidly-growing anti-Indian sentiments amongst the Kashmiri population; the year of 1984 saw a pronounced rise in terrorist violence in Kashmir. Following the execution of JKLF militant

3303:

Some other slogans were clearly directed against pro-India Kashmiri Pandits. ... by the end of January 1990, loudspeakers in Srinagar mosques were broadcasting slogans like 'Kafiron Kashmir chhod do

473:

violence to gain political mileage through religious sentiments. Shah called in the army to curb the violence, but it had little effect. His government was dismissed on 12 March 1986, by Governor

1059:

The issue of separate townships for Kashmiri Hindus has been a source of contention in the Kashmir valley, with Islamists, separatists, as well as mainstream political parties, all opposing it.

6534: 907: 3810:

Several displaced Kashmiri Pandits wrote autobiographies, novels, and poetry to record their experiences of violence and give their community an outlet to make sense of their forced "exile."

432:, who had support from Indira Gandhi, replaced his brother-in-law Farooq Abdullah and assumed the role of chief minister after Abdullah was dismissed, in what was termed a "political coup". 5460: 2332:

This is because many Pandits have left Kashmir, or felt compelled by militants' violence and antipathy against them to leave, since Muslim Kashmiris began their anti-India uprising in 1988

2190:: (p. 178) The onset of the armed phase of the freedom struggle in 1989 was a chaotic and turbulent time in Kashmir (Bose, 2003). Kashmiri Pandits felt an increasing sense of vulnerability 401:

broke out in the region, where large numbers of Kashmiri youth participated in widespread anti-India demonstrations and consequently faced heavy-handed reprisals by state security forces.

6242: 32: 6596: 3462:

These developments subverted the popular nature of the insurgency, tarnishing the very real political grievances that underlay it with the brush of criminality and Islamic radicalism.

3118:

In 1991 the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the movement's parent organisation, published a book titled Genocide of Hindus in Kashmir.<Footnote 38: Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh,

2798:

The first wave of militancy from 1988 through to 1991 was very much an urban, middle-class affair dominated by the secular, pro-independence Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF).

241:

region that has been the subject of a dispute between India and Pakistan from 1947, has been administered by India from approximately the same time. Before 1947, during the period of

6026: 3155:

appropriated the miseries of Pandits to expand their 'Hindu' constituency and projects them as victims who have been driven out from their homeland by militants and Kashmiri Muslims.

7611: 6753: 6286: 5812: 5621: 5583: 6618: 436: 4454: 5793: 6717: 953:

and 2004 and none thereafter. The local organisation of Hindus in Kashmir, Kashmir Pandit Sangharsh Samiti (KPSS) after carrying out a survey in 2008 and 2009, said that 399

578:

as the governor of the state. Abdullah resented Jagmohan who had been appointed as the governor earlier in April 1984 as well and had recommended Abdullah's dismissal to

8391: 6327: 550:(JKLF) began a separatist insurgency for secession of Kashmir from India. The group targeted a Kashmiri Hindu for the first time on 14 September 1989, when they killed 2066:

In the early 1990s the Kashmiri Hindus, known as the Pandits (a 100,000 to 140,000 strong community), migrated en masse from Kashmir to Jammu, Delhi, and other places.

900: 6365: 2951:

Hindus of the valley. By early March, according to one estimate, more than forty thousand Hindu inhabitants of the valley had fled to the comparative safety of Jammu.

1747:... when the violence surged in early 1990, more than 100,000 Hindus of the valley—known as Kashmiri Pandits—fled their homes, with at least 30 killed in the process. 1509:... when the violence surged in early 1990, more than 100,000 Hindus of the valley—known as Kashmiri Pandits—fled their homes, with at least 30 killed in the process. 7671: 6514: 3840: 2844:

deployed the army and brutally suppressed the uprising. The Pakistani security establishment at first supported the JKLF and then began to seek more pliable allies.

2044:

through legitimate fear. (p. 24) While decennial growth rates rose between 1961 and 2001, the same period saw a degree of migration of KPs from Jammu & Kashmir.

5853: 656:

which included abidance by the Islamic dress code, a prohibition on alcohol, cinemas, and video parlors and strict restrictions on women. Unknown masked men with

265:, and the threat of socio-economic decline, a large number of Pandits—whose elite owned over 30% of the arable land in the Valley—moved to other parts of India. 8463: 992:

passed a resolution to recognise 14 September 2007, as Martyrs Day to acknowledge ethnic cleansing and campaigns of terror inflicted on non-Muslim minorities of

6551: 8386: 7878: 7271: 7130: 5089:"4th Nov 1989, When Justice Neelkanth Ganjoo was brutally killed in broad daylight by JKLF terrorists, 30 Yrs of planned and organized secessionist-terrorism" 127:

90,000–100,000 Pandits of an estimated population of 120,000–140,000 fled the Valley between January and March 1990, according to several scholarly estimates.

8396: 7806: 7659: 4993: 1087:

in October 2017. The Indian Government has taken up the issue of education of the displaced students from Kashmir, and helped them get admissions in various

893: 8381: 7750: 856: 482: 4989: 4423: 420:

and his father, so that sentiments there could "be known first hand", although few people believed him. There were also allegations that he had allowed

8335: 8308: 8303: 8276: 6699: 1023:

An organisation called Roots of Kashmir filed a petition in 2017 to reopen 215 cases of more than 700 alleged murders of Kashmiri Hindus, however the

7683: 5530: 3922:

Quote: "Jammu and Kashmir: Territory in northwestern India, subject to a dispute between India and Pakistan. It has borders with Pakistan and China."

6531: 936:

On 4 June, Girija Tickoo, a Kashmiri Hindu teacher was gang raped by terrorists, who ripped her abdomen and chopped her body into two pieces with a

8212: 7169: 5125: 1099:

dealt with separately. He remarks that, linking both the affairs is an "utterly insensitive way to deal with a highly sensitive and emotive issue"

7197: 6496: 6347: 6148: 5452: 6477: 5221: 2926:

In December 1989, an indigenous, ethno-religious insurgency erupted in the Indian-controlled portion of the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir.

8084: 7557: 7551: 7351: 6071: 3822: 2872:

Sharma, Deepti (2015), "The Kashmir insurgency: multiple actors, divergent interests, institutionalized conflict", in Chima, Jugdeep S. (ed.),

871: 6439: 6392: 6252: 4616: 7854: 7770: 7738: 7545: 2601:

care far less about Kashmiri self-determination than they do about establishing Pakistani rule and creating an Islamic caliphate in Srinagar.

2135:

Bhan, Mona; Misri, Deepti; Zia, Ather (2020), "Relating Otherwise: Forging Critical Solidarities Across the Kashmiri Pandit-Muslim Divide.",

6266: 7818: 7765: 7760: 7755: 5195: 4956: 2634:, Fort Bragg: United States Army Special Operations Command and The Johns Hopkins University/Applied Physics Laboratory, pp. 455–456, 46: 6582: 5145: 1960: 142:

30–80 Kashmiri Pandits had been killed by insurgents by mid-year 1990 when the exodus was largely complete, according to several scholars.

8072: 7587: 6090: 5802: 5602: 5669: 4798:

The blatant corruption and rigging of the March 1987 election in Kashmir by Rajiv Gandhi's government was the catalyst for the rebellion

8187: 7884: 7256: 7158: 5776: 5323: 5032: 673:

where electricity was cut except in mosques which broadcast divisive and inflammatory messages, asking for a purge of Kashmiri Hindus.

6458: 5011: 8371: 8298: 8272: 8262: 7890: 7707: 5785: 1275:

the Kashmir valley to be 650, the tally including those who were suspected by the militants to have been Indian intelligence agents.

8753: 4897: 2741:

In 1988, the JKLF, an organization with secular, leftist roots, waged a guerrilla war against Indian armed forces with the slogan

697:

in particular, were allegedly involved in the killings. Incidents like these further expedited the exodus of Hindus from Kashmir.

8743: 8293: 6181: 509:) on Islamist groups proclaimed the Islamicisation of socio-political and economic set-up, merger with Pakistan, unification of 90: 8706: 7617: 4743: 7665: 5438: 681:

violent incidents kept coming and many of the Hindus who survived the night saved their lives by traveling out of the valley.

8579: 7866: 7330: 7261: 7108: 7060: 7040: 7017: 6996: 6933: 6873: 6852: 6832: 6809: 6108: 5837: 5515: 4791: 4762: 4541: 4092: 3941: 3916: 3888: 3773: 3455: 3326: 3147: 3111: 2881: 2859: 2813: 2791: 2760: 2703: 2673: 2616: 2566: 2518: 2418: 2395: 2347: 2325: 2282: 1895: 1861: 1695: 1618: 1586: 1524: 1472: 1324: 1036:

The Indian Government has tried to rehabilitate the Hindus and the separatists have also invited the Hindus back to Kashmir.

494: 493:, with a manifesto to work for Islamic unity and against political interference from the centre. The two mainstrain parties ( 7914: 6306: 4722: 197:

publications or among suspicions voiced by some exiled Pandits are widely considered inaccurate and aggressive by scholars.

4752: 4556:

Sikand, Yoginder (1 July 2002). "The Emergence and Development of the Jama'at-i-Islami of Jammu and Kashmir (1940s–1990)".

4475: 3188:

he rejects as 'propaganda' stories of genocide or mass murder that Pandit organizations outside the Valley have circulated.

2543: 6421: 435:

G. M. Shah's administration, which did not have people's mandate, turned to Islamists and opponents of India, notably the

8763: 8758: 8427: 8237: 8010: 7872: 7190: 5845: 586:

Most of the Kashmiri Hindus left Kashmir valley and moved to other parts of India, particularly to the refugee camps in

8701: 8691: 8584: 8401: 6955: 5351: 4332: 270: 246: 202: 7159:"Kashmiri Pandits offered three choices by Radical Islamists (Book Excerpt: Kashmir: Its Aborigines and their Exodus)" 8643: 8453: 8229: 7794: 7775: 7087: 6681: 6206: 6008: 5987: 5966: 5940: 5893: 5872: 5755: 5713: 5692: 5650: 5380: 5313: 5293: 5272: 5055: 4907: 4880: 4705: 4645: 4512: 4485: 4407: 4359: 4278: 4213: 4183: 4154: 4048: 4007: 3970: 3803: 3743: 3710: 3679: 3636: 3603: 3548: 3518: 3485: 3424: 3357: 3296: 3244: 3211: 3180: 3067: 3019: 2988: 2943: 2919: 2836: 2726: 2593: 2495: 2372: 2302: 2240: 2220:

As insurrection gripped the Kashmir Valley in early 1990, the bulk – about 100,000 people – of the Pandit population

2180: 2121: 2083: 2059: 1786: 1740: 1654: 1549: 1502: 1426: 1403: 1376: 1351: 1095: 965:, a political group representing the Hindus who fled Kashmir, was formed. In late 1991, the organisation adopted the 831: 821: 629: 6637:"Non-migrant KPs get benefits of PM package – Jammu Kashmir Latest News | Tourism | Breaking News J&K" 8681: 8217: 8207: 7848: 4349: 1724: 1486: 923:

On 2 February, Satish Tikoo, a young Hindu social worker was murdered near his own house in Habba Kadal, Srinagar.

257:

in censuses from 1889 to 1941; the remaining 94% to 96% were Kashmir valley's Muslims, overwhelmingly followers of

4985: 2698:, Cambridge Concise Histories (3 ed.), Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 308–309, 1690:, Cambridge Concise Histories (3 ed.), Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 308–309, 1071:. However, Burhan Wani welcomed the Kashmiri Hindus to return and promised to guard them. He also promised a safe 643:

released a message, threatening all Hindus to leave Kashmir immediately, sourcing it to the militant organization

8664: 8126: 8096: 7226: 4431: 1184: 1079: 541: 298: 2409:

Sokefeld, Martin (2013), "Jammu and Kashmir: Dispute and diversity", in Berger, Peter; Heidemann, Frank (eds.),

8669: 8529: 8180: 8114: 7812: 7183: 5567: 1189: 704: 690: 547: 409: 306: 7236: 6647: 6033: 5904: 8768: 8473: 8323: 8132: 8108: 7896: 7695: 5622:"TADA court frames charges against separatist Yasin Malik, 6 others for killing 4 IAF personnel 30 years ago" 4654: 861: 2557:

Kumar, Radha; Puri, Ellora (2009), "Jammu and Kashmir: Frameworks for a Settlement", in Kumar, Radha (ed.),

2277:, The New Cambridge History of India (2 ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 222–223, 1908: 1515:

Kumar, Radha; Puri, Ellora (2009), "Jammu and Kashmir: Frameworks for a Settlement", in Kumar, Radha (ed.),

8559: 8422: 8267: 8022: 7920: 7744: 6696: 4832: 2850:

Sokefeld, Martin (2012), "Secularism and the Kashmir dispute", in Bubandt, Nils; van Beek, Martijn (eds.),

876: 618: 217:

alienated them from Kashmiri Muslims. Some displaced Kashmiri Pandits have formed an organization called

83: 7946: 5534: 253:, Kashmiri Pandits, or Kashmiri Hindus, had stably constituted between 4% and 6% of the population of the 8748: 8630: 8564: 7371: 6636: 1094:

Some consider the now-abrogated Article 370 as a roadblock in the resettlement of Kashmiri Hindus as the

989: 776: 318: 76: 7960: 2874:

Ethnic Subnationalist Insurgencies in South Asia: Identiies, interests and challenges to state authority

8717: 8498: 8488: 8247: 8242: 6988: 6196: 7926: 6155: 3859: 2852:

Varieties of Secularism in Asia: Anthropological Explorations of Religion, Politics, and the Spiritual

8738: 8173: 8054: 8030: 7842: 7647: 7629: 7623: 7581: 7278: 7246: 6247: 5213: 4351:

The Politics of Counterterrorism in India: Strategic Intelligence and National Security in South Asia

993: 846: 766: 290: 6388: 5724: 5703: 5070: 4455:"Kashmir Conflict: A Study of What Led to the Insurgency in Kashmir Valley & Proposed Solutions" 297:, states that it was met with hostility among the people of Kashmir and laid the groundwork for the 8696: 8674: 8458: 7860: 7444: 7419: 7361: 7241: 7210: 6311: 1114: 851: 761: 756: 498: 282: 6407: 181:

During the period of substantial migration, the insurgency was being led by a group calling for a

8618: 8137: 7641: 7563: 2169:"'Survival Is Now Our Politics': Kashmiri Pandit Community Identity and the Politics of Homeland" 1421:, Critical Essays on Warfare in South Asia, 1947 to the Present, London and New York: Routledge, 1392:"'Survival Is Now Our Politics': Kashmiri Pandit Community Identity and the Politics of Homeland" 781: 486: 390: 302: 8612: 8478: 8468: 8406: 8090: 8066: 7782: 7366: 7339: 7310: 7305: 7231: 6574: 5187: 3906: 3265: 2213: 1970: 1024: 836: 816: 811: 806: 796: 661: 555: 532:. The pro-separatist political practices at times deviated from their stated secular position. 440: 222: 27: 7050: 7030: 6943: 6921: 6671: 6657: 6043: 5977: 5958: 5914: 5640: 5505: 5492: 5477: 5417: 5402: 5334: 5283: 5171: 5045: 4858:

Questioning Causality: Scientific Explorations of Cause and Consequence Across Social Contexts

4820:

It is widely believed that the elections of 1987 were rigged in favour of Mr Abdullah's party.

4695: 4664: 4529: 3876: 3445: 3232: 2533: 2168: 1923: 1391: 8569: 8513: 8351: 8318: 8060: 7719: 7504: 7469: 7439: 7288: 7206: 6287:"Jammu & Kashmir: BJP panel to meet Kashmiri Pandit employees as protest enters 12th day" 5998: 5930: 5883: 5862: 5557: 5370: 5303: 5262: 4502: 4395: 4322: 3731: 3624: 3506: 3475: 3414: 3168: 2909: 2583: 2362: 2049: 1851: 1642: 1339: 730: 712: 633: 567: 398: 370: 294: 6307:"Terror group Lashkar-e-Islam threatens Kashmiri pandits asking them to leave or get killed" 5766: 5106: 4856:

Rothbart, Daniel; Rajput, Sudha G. (2016). "15". In Rom Harré; Fathali M. Moghaddam (eds.).

2111: 8589: 8554: 8503: 8448: 8361: 8042: 7978: 7788: 7599: 7484: 7389: 7320: 7283: 7175: 6223:"Amarnath pilgrims stranded after vehicular traffic suspended along Jammu-Srinagar highway" 2006:

Official records suggest that 219 Kashmiri Pandits had been killed by militants since 1989.

1064: 930: 841: 801: 791: 429: 1824: 329:

to foster religious unity within their nation, and the communalization aided their cause.

8: 8508: 8356: 8330: 7954: 7934: 7689: 7575: 7519: 7489: 7454: 7344: 2753:

Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate: Covert action and internal operations

1144: 1068: 1008: 735: 490: 362: 343: 6967:(2008), "Kashmir, Kashmiris, Kashmiriyat: An Introductory Essay", in Rao, Aparna (ed.), 2459:

Duschinski, Haley (2014), "Community Identity of Kashmiri Hindus in the United States",

2440:

Duschinski, Haley (2014), "Community Identity of Kashmiri Hindus in the United States",

2097:

Duschinski, Haley (2014), "Community Identity of Kashmiri Hindus in the United States",

1232:

its internal affair. The Indian government considers Kashmiri Pandits to be 'migrants.'

8711: 8574: 8534: 8483: 8048: 7972: 7966: 7524: 7494: 7479: 7356: 6964: 6908: 6291: 6227: 5807: 5150: 4691: 4581: 2784:

Kashmir's Right to Secede: A Critical Examination of Contemporary Theories of Secession

2687: 2152: 1997: 1828: 1679: 1174: 1149: 1088: 771: 740: 566:

who at that time was the Chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian home minister

469: 460: 421: 378: 374: 175: 4269:

Braithwaite, John; D'Costa, Bina (2018), "Recognizing cascades in India and Kashmir",

2611:, New British Fiction, Houndmills and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 143–144, 130:

Other scholars have suggested a higher figure of approximately 150,000 for the exodus.

8539: 8102: 7830: 7732: 7605: 7449: 7399: 7394: 7104: 7083: 7056: 7036: 7013: 6992: 6980: 6951: 6929: 6922:"Interrogating the Ordinary: Everyday Politics and the Struggle for Azadi in Kashmir" 6912: 6900: 6869: 6848: 6828: 6805: 6763: 6754:"'The Kashmir Files' movie review: A disturbing take which grips and gripes in turns" 6727: 6677: 6202: 6173: 6027:"25 Years After Islamists Drove Out Hindus, Kashmiris Debate Repatriation Incentives" 6004: 5983: 5962: 5951: 5936: 5889: 5868: 5751: 5709: 5688: 5646: 5563: 5511: 5376: 5347: 5309: 5289: 5268: 5051: 4903: 4876: 4787: 4758: 4701: 4641: 4585: 4573: 4537: 4508: 4481: 4403: 4355: 4328: 4274: 4209: 4179: 4150: 4088: 4044: 4013: 4003: 3976: 3966: 3937: 3912: 3884: 3799: 3769: 3739: 3706: 3675: 3632: 3599: 3544: 3514: 3481: 3451: 3420: 3353: 3322: 3292: 3240: 3207: 3176: 3143: 3140:

Rethinking Conflict at the Margins: Dalits and Borderland Hindus in Jammu and Kashmir

3107: 3063: 3015: 2984: 2939: 2915: 2877: 2855: 2832: 2809: 2787: 2766: 2756: 2732: 2722: 2699: 2691: 2669: 2635: 2612: 2589: 2562: 2539: 2514: 2491: 2414: 2391: 2368: 2343: 2321: 2298: 2278: 2236: 2176: 2156: 2117: 2113:

Rethinking Conflict at the Margins: Dalits and Borderland Hindus in Jammu and Kashmir

2079: 2055: 1891: 1857: 1782: 1736: 1691: 1683: 1650: 1614: 1582: 1545: 1520: 1498: 1468: 1432: 1422: 1399: 1372: 1347: 1320: 1242:

internal affairs. The Indian government considers Kashmiri Pandits to be 'migrants.'

1157: 1060: 926:

On 13 February, Lassa Kaul, Station Director of Srinagar Doordarshan, was shot dead.

881: 677: 644: 529: 517: 194: 6149:"Senate Joint Resolution 23 – 75th OREGON LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY—2009 Regular Session" 4811: 4735: 8686: 8637: 8549: 8252: 8196: 8120: 8036: 8016: 7836: 7499: 7424: 7251: 6892: 5771: 5430: 4565: 2364:

Internal Displacement and Conflict: The Kashmiri Pandits in Comparative Perspective

2144: 1129: 1053: 1045: 974: 685: 614: 382: 365:

were largely unsuccessful until the late-1980s. The American- and Pakistani-backed

6883:

Evans, Alexander (2002). "A departure from history: Kashmiri Pandits, 1990–2001".

5829: 5241: 4376: 3732:"Introduction. 'Rebels of the Streets': Violence, Protest, and Freedom in Kashmir" 3507:"Introduction. 'Rebels of the Streets': Violence, Protest, and Freedom in Kashmir" 416:, he shared a platform with the JKLF. Abdullah asserted that he went on behalf of 8624: 8544: 8493: 8432: 8376: 8366: 8313: 8156: 8078: 7984: 7908: 7902: 7635: 7569: 7434: 7429: 7315: 7098: 7077: 6976: 6863: 6842: 6822: 6799: 6703: 6538: 6532:

BJP protests Burhan Wani's warning of action against Sainik, Hindu colonies in LC

6332: 5745: 5682: 5341: 5130: 4781: 4635: 4203: 4178:, New Approaches to Asian History, Cambridge University Press, pp. 136–137, 4144: 3793: 3700: 3669: 3593: 3538: 3347: 3316: 3286: 3201: 3057: 3009: 2978: 2933: 2292: 2235:, New Approaches to Asian History, Cambridge University Press, pp. 136–137, 2073: 1885: 1781:, New Approaches to Asian History, Cambridge University Press, pp. 136–137, 1728: 1539: 1490: 1366: 1162: 1017: 982: 970: 954: 599: 563: 551: 405: 381:

against the Indian government became sources of inspiration for large numbers of

335: 313:. Since the mid-1970s, communalist rhetoric was being exploited in the state for 286: 262: 6896: 6127:"Separate homeland would satisfy aspirations of Kashmiri Pandits: Panun Kashmir" 4396:"Rehabilitation and reintegration: India's policy approach in Jammu and Kashmir" 4002:, South Asia in Motion series, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 3965:, South Asia in Motion series, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2938:, Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Cambridge University Press, pp. 107–108, 7824: 7713: 7701: 7514: 7293: 7266: 6718:"'Shikara' movie review: Vidhu Vinod Chopra's film is too simplistic and tepid" 6091:"Kashmiri Pandits: Why we never fled Kashmir – Kashmir: The forgotten conflict" 1261:

Still another estimates it to be 190,000 of a total population of 200,000. The

1208:

Still another estimates it to be 190,000 of a total population of 200,000. The

1072: 1049: 920:

Several intelligence operatives were assassinated, over the course of January.

866: 670: 665: 587: 425: 413: 254: 250: 209: 167: 72: 52: 4569: 4400:

Terrorist Deradicalisation in Global Contexts: Success, Failure and Continuity

51:

Political map of the disputed Kashmir region, showing the Indian-administered

8732: 8004: 7990: 7800: 7529: 7509: 7404: 7145: 7026: 6904: 6818: 6767: 6731: 6597:"Burhan Wani's successor requests Kashmiri Pandits to return, assures safety" 4837: 4783:

The Making of Terrorism in Pakistan: Historical and Social Roots of Extremism

4754:

The Making of Terrorism in Pakistan: Historical and Social Roots of Extremism

4577: 4477:

The Making of Terrorism in Pakistan: Historical and Social Roots of Extremism

4059:

Kashmiri Hindu Pandits living in KV 76,171 (number); 5.20 (%) KV population.

3631:, Routledge Contemporary South Asia Series, Routledge, pp. 91–115, 106, 3239:, Routledge Contemporary South Asia Series, Routledge, pp. 91–115, 106, 3175:, Routledge Contemporary South Asia Series, Routledge, pp. 91–115, 106, 3099: 2639: 1847: 1649:, Routledge Contemporary South Asia Series, Routledge, pp. 91–115, 106, 1574: 1346:, Routledge Contemporary South Asia Series, Routledge, pp. 91–115, 106, 1312: 1179: 1126:

A Long Dream of Home – The persecution, exile and exodus of Kashmiri Pandits

1119: 997: 978: 962: 653: 417: 218: 190: 105: 92: 23: 3625:"Narratives from exile: Kashmiri Pandits and their construction of the past" 3233:"Narratives from exile: Kashmiri Pandits and their construction of the past" 3169:"Narratives from exile: Kashmiri Pandits and their construction of the past" 3142:, Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 123–124, 1643:"Narratives from exile: Kashmiri Pandits and their construction of the past" 1340:"Narratives from exile: Kashmiri Pandits and their construction of the past" 444:

Secretariat area in Jammu to be made available to the Muslim employees for '

55:

or Vale of Kashmir from which a large proportion of Hindus have migrated out

7325: 7300: 7079:

A Long Dream of Home: The persecution, exile and exodus of Kashmiri Pandits

7052:

Languages of Belonging: Islam, Regional Identity, and the Making of Kashmir

6497:"Onus on Kashmiri Pandits To Return, No One Will Beg Them: Farooq Abdullah" 2483: 2051:

Resisting Disappearnce: Military Occupation and Women's Activism in Kashmir

1262: 1209: 657: 622: 579: 394: 366: 361:

The ISI's initial attempts to sow widespread unrest in Kashmir against the

330: 310: 7032:

India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir, 1947–2004

2148: 1091:

and major educational institutions & universities across the country.

7593: 7409: 6801:

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Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects: Islam, Rights, and the History of Kashmir

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On 25 January, the Rawalpora shooting incident took place, wherein four

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Encyclopedia of the United Nations and International Agreements: G to M

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The Valley of Kashmir: The Making and Unmaking of a Composite Culture?

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Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II, 1962–2009

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agreed to measures previously undertaken by the central government in

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Deadly Impasse: Indo-Pakistani Relations at the Dawn of a New Century

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Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia

1519:, New Delhi, Los Angeles and London: SAGE Publications, p. 292, 1465:

Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia

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On Uncertain Ground: Displaced Kashmiri Pandits in Jammu and Kashmir

6515:"KPS seeks Centre's intervention on Kashmiri Pandits township issue" 2827:

Chandrani, Yogesh; Kumar, Radha (2003), "South Asia: Introduction",

2175:, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 172–198, 178–179, 412:

during this time became an embarrassment, where according to JKLF's

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Negotiation Peace in Deeply Divided Societies: A Set of Simulations

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Negotiation Peace in Deeply Divided Societies: A Set of Simulations

607: 575: 474: 386: 314: 186: 6440:"When will we finally return home, ask displaced Kashmiri Pandits" 5453:"24 years on, nothing has changed for the exiled Kashmiri Pandits" 4271:

Cacades of violence:War, Crime and Peacebuilding Across South Asia

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Cacades of violence:War, Crime and Peacebuilding Across South Asia

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Cacades of violence:War, Crime and Peacebuilding Across South Asia

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On 21 January, two days after Jagmohan took over as governor, the

6366:"Panun Kashmir reiterates demand for separate homeland in valley" 1013: 408:, charged him with losing control of the situation. His visit to 274: 238: 213: 182: 171: 4723:"How Mufti Mohammad Sayeed Shaped The 1987 Elections In Kashmir" 3658:, p. 274: "Their cause was quickly taken up by the Hindu right." 2461:

Emerging Voices: Experiences of Underrepresented Asian Americans

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Emerging Voices: Experiences of Underrepresented Asian Americans

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Emerging Voices: Experiences of Underrepresented Asian Americans

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A Concise History of Modern India (Cambridge Concise Histories)

6844:

Transforming India: Challenges to the World's Largest Democracy

6328:"Posters warn Kashmiri Pandits to leave Valley or 'face death'" 5491:, Minakshi Watts, "The Day I became a tourist in my own home", 3616: 2831:, New York and Oxford: Columbia University Press, p. 396, 2585:

From Bullets to Ballots: Violent Muslim Movements in Transition

2513:, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, pp. 73–76, 2511:

Networks of Rebellion: Explaing Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse

1929: 1631: 525: 506: 465: 428:, although these were never proved to be true. On 2 July 1984, 326: 163: 7170:

Kashmiri pandits: The forgotten minority (Aired: October 2004)

3841:"Kashmiri Pandits recreate "exodus" through Jan 19 exhibition" 2854:, London and New York: Routledge, pp. 101–120, 109, 114, 2388:

In the Valley of Mist: Kashmir: One Family in a Changing World

7726: 7012:, Princeton University Press/Permanent Black. Pp. xii, 335., 6619:"Hizbul Mujahideen Asks Kashmiri Pandits to Return to Valley" 5324:"Kashmiri Pandits offered three choices by Radical Islamists" 5188:"On 'Holocaust' day, Kashmiris seek probe into Pandit exodus" 4087:, Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 106–108, 4057:

All Muslims in KV 1,369,620 (number), 93.55 (%) KV population

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Our Moon Has Blood Clots: A Memoir of a Lost Home in Kashmir

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Perspectives On Kashmir: The Roots of Conflict in South Asia

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Hindus, including many prominent ones, instilled more fear.

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Colonizing Kashmir: State-building under Indian Occupation

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Kashmir at the Crossroads, Inside a 21st-Century Conflict.

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Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War

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Kashmir at the Crossroads: Inside a 21st-century conflict

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Kashmir at the Crossroads, Inside a 21st-Century Conflict

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Kashmir at the Crossroads: Inside a 21st-century conflict

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Unconventional Warfare in South Asia, 1947 to the Present

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Kashmir at the Crossroads: Inside a 21st-century conflict

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J&K Migrants (Special Drive) Recruitment Rules, 2009

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2001 Jammu and Kashmir legislative assembly car bombing

6944:"Kashmiri Visions of Freedom: The Past and the Present" 5305:

Home Away from Home: Inland Movement of People in India

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