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Expected utility hypothesis

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3420:, a person who only cares about expected values of a gamble would pay an arbitrarily large finite amount to take this gamble. However, this experiment demonstrated that there is no upper bound on the potential rewards from very low probability events. In the hypothetical setup, a person flips a coin repeatedly. The participant's prize is determined by the number of times the coin lands on heads consecutively. For every time the coin comes up heads (1/2 probability), the participant's prize is doubled. The game ends when the participant flips the coin and it comes out tails. A player who only cares about expected value of the payoff should be willing to pay any finite amount of money to play because this entry cost will always be less than the expected, infinite, value of the game. However, in reality, people do not do this. "Only a few of the participants were willing to pay a maximum of $ 25 to enter the game because many of them were risk averse and unwilling to bet on a very small possibility at a very high price. 417:, an American statistician, derived a framework for comprehending expected utility. At that point, it was considered the first and most thorough foundation to understanding the concept. Savage's framework involved proving that expected utility could be used to make an optimal choice among several acts through seven axioms. In his book, The Foundations of Statistics, Savage integrated a normative account of decision making under risk (when probabilities are known) and under uncertainty (when probabilities are not objectively known). Savage concluded that people have neutral attitudes towards uncertainty and that observation is enough to predict the probabilities of uncertain events. A crucial methodological aspect of Savage's framework is its focus on observable choices. Cognitive processes and other psychological aspects of decision making matter only to the extent that they have directly measurable implications on choice. 272:. For example, as someone gets wealthier, an extra dollar or an additional good is perceived as less valuable. In other words, desirability related with a financial gain depends not only on the gain itself but also on the wealth of the person. Bernoulli suggested that people maximize "moral expectation" rather than expected monetary value. Bernoulli made a clear distinction between expected value and expected utility. Instead of using the weighted outcomes, he used the weighted utility multiplied by probabilities. He proved that the utility function used in real life is finite, even when its expected value is infinite. 289:
we can anticipate what choices they are going to take. In this model, he defined numerical utilities for each option to exploit the richness of the space of prices. The outcome of each preference is exclusive of each other. For example, if you study, then you can not see your friends, however you will get a good grade in your course. In this scenario, we analyze personal preferences and beliefs and will be able to predict which option a person might choose (e.g. if someone prioritizes their social life over academic results, they will go out with their friends). Assuming that the decisions of a person are
3603:, subjects tend to value "p bets" (lotteries with a high chance of winning a low prize) lower than "$ bets" (lotteries with a small chance of winning a large prize). When subjects are asked which lotteries they prefer in direct comparison, however, they frequently prefer the "p bets" over "$ bets". Many studies have examined this "preference reversal", from both an experimental (e.g., Plott & Grether, 1979) and theoretical (e.g., Holt, 1986) standpoint, indicating that this behavior can be brought into accordance with neoclassical economic theory under specific assumptions. 421:
researchers to be "the most brilliant axiomatic theory of utility ever developed". Instead of assuming the probability of an event, Savage defines it in terms of preferences over acts. Savage used the states (something a person doesn't control) to calculate the probability of an event. On the other hand, he used utility and intrinsic preferences to predict the outcome of the event. Savage assumed that each act and state are sufficient to uniquely determine an outcome. However, this assumption breaks in cases where an individual does not have enough information about the event.
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linear combination of the utilities of the outcomes, with the weights being the respective probabilities. Utility functions are also normally continuous functions. Such utility functions are also referred to as von Neumann–Morgenstern (vNM) utility functions. This is a central theme of the expected utility hypothesis in which an individual chooses not the highest expected value, but rather the highest expected utility. The expected utility maximizing individual makes decisions rationally based on the axioms of the theory.
3024: 248:, which has broad application in economics in addition to expected utility theory. He used this concept to formalize the idea that the same amount of additional money was less useful to an already-wealthy person than it would be to a poor person. The theory can also more accurately describe more realistic scenarios (where expected values are finite) than expected value alone. He proposed that a nonlinear function of utility of an outcome should be used instead of the 3467:, expected utility theory is a simplification of reality. The mathematical correctness of expected utility theory and the salience of its primitive concepts do not guarantee that expected utility theory is a reliable guide to human behavior or optimal practice. The mathematical clarity of expected utility theory has helped scientists design experiments to test its adequacy, and to distinguish systematic departures from its predictions. This has led to the field of 5810: 5799: 2653: 3437:, other desirable ends can also be included in utility such as pleasure, knowledge, friendship, etc. Originally the total utility of the consumer was the sum of independent utilities of the goods. However, the expected value theory was dropped as it was considered too static and deterministic. The classical counter example to the expected value theory (where everyone makes the same "correct" choice) is the 3019:{\displaystyle {\begin{aligned}\operatorname {E} &=\operatorname {E} -b\operatorname {E} \\&=\operatorname {E} -b\operatorname {E} -a(w-\operatorname {E} )}]\\&=\operatorname {E} -be^{-a\operatorname {E} }\operatorname {E} )}]\\&={\text{expected wealth}}-b\cdot e^{-a\cdot {\text{expected wealth}}}\cdot {\text{risk}}.\end{aligned}}} 3536:
contexts are significantly different. This is demonstrated in the contrast of individual preferences under the insurance and lottery context shows the degree of indeterminacy of the expected utility theory. Additionally, experiments have shown systematic violations and generalizations based on the results of Savage and von Neumann–Morgenstern.
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statement will be different for each person depending on intrinsic factors such as financial necessity or judgment about the company. For that reason, no state can rule out the performance of an act. Only when the state and the act are evaluated simultaneously, it becomes possible to determine an outcome with certainty.
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Additionally, he believed that outcomes must have the same utility regardless of state. For that reason, it is essential to correctly identify which statement is considered an outcome. For example, if someone says "I got the job" this affirmation is not considered an outcome, since the utility of the
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According to the empirical results there has been almost no recognition in decision theory of the distinction between the problem of justifying its theoretical claims regarding the properties of rational belief and desire. One of the main reasons is because people's basic tastes and preferences for
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is directly related to the curvature of the utility function: risk neutral individuals have linear utility functions, while risk seeking individuals have convex utility functions and risk averse individuals have concave utility functions. The degree of risk aversion can be measured by the curvature
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In other words, if an individual's behavior always satisfies the above axioms, then there is a utility function such that the individual will choose one gamble over another if and only if the expected utility of one exceeds that of the other. The expected utility of any gamble may be expressed as a
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are defined over a set of bets where each option has a different yield. Ramsey believed that we always choose decisions to receive the best expected outcome according to our personal preferences. This implies that if we are able to understand the priorities and personal preferences of an individual
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exhibits constant absolute risk aversion, and for this reason is often avoided, although it has the advantage of offering substantial mathematical tractability when asset returns are normally distributed. Note that, as per the affine transformation property alluded to above, the utility function
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The theory of subjective expected utility combines two concepts: first, a personal utility function, and second, a personal probability distribution (usually based on Bayesian probability theory). This theoretical model has been known for its clear and elegant structure and its considered by some
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are considered insufficient to predict preferences and the expected utility. Additionally, experiments have shown systematic violations and generalizations based on the results of Savage and von Neumann–Morgenstern. This is because preferences and utility functions constructed under different
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A decision that maximizes expected utility also maximizes the probability of the decision's consequences being preferable to some uncertain threshold. In the absence of uncertainty about the threshold, expected utility maximization simplifies to maximizing the probability of achieving some fixed
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is higher for low-probability events than the difference between the payout level of a particular outcome and its expected value. Bernoulli further proposed that it was not the goal of the gambler to maximize his expected gain but to instead maximize the logarithm of his gain.
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where it was demonstrated that people do not revise their degrees on belief in line with experimented probabilities and also that probabilities cannot be applied to single cases. On the other hand, in updating probability distributions using evidence, a standard method uses
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If all these axioms are satisfied, then the individual is said to be rational and the preferences can be represented by a utility function, i.e. one can assign numbers (utilities) to each outcome of the lottery such that choosing the best lottery according to the preference
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The expected utility hypothesis states an agent chooses between risky prospects by comparing expected utility values (i.e. the weighted sum of adding the respective utility values of payoffs multiplied by their probabilities). The summarised formula for expected utility is
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pertains to well-defined preferences as well. It assumes that two gambles mixed with an irrelevant third one will maintain the same order of preference as when the two are presented independently of the third one. The independence axiom is the most controversial axiom..
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Although the expected utility hypothesis is standard in economic modelling, it has been found to be violated in psychological experiments. For many years, psychologists and economic theorists have been developing new theories to explain these deficiencies. These include
485:*If and only if all the axioms are satisfied one can use the information to reduce the uncertainty about the events that are out of their control. Additionally the theorem ranks the outcome according to a utility function that reflects the personal preferences. 3400:
target. If the uncertainty is uniformly distributed, then expected utility maximization becomes expected value maximization. Intermediate cases lead to increasing risk aversion above some fixed threshold and increasing risk seeking below a fixed threshold.
2576:, or in the unlikely case in which the utility function has a quadratic form. However, David E. Bell proposed a measure of risk which follows naturally from a certain class of von Neumann–Morgenstern utility functions. Let utility of wealth be given by 3130:
For general utility functions, however, expected utility analysis does not permit the expression of preferences to be separated into two parameters with one representing the expected value of the variable in question and the other representing its risk.
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approaches to probability treat it as a degree of belief and thus they do not draw a distinction between risk and a wider concept of uncertainty: they deny the existence of Knightian uncertainty. They would model uncertain probabilities with
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Other critics argue applying expected utility to economic and policy decisions, has engendered inappropriate valuations, particularly in scenarios in which monetary units are used to scale the utility of nonmonetary outcomes, such as deaths.
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Starting with studies such as Lichtenstein & Slovic (1971), it was discovered that subjects sometimes exhibit signs of preference reversals with regard to their certainty equivalents of different lotteries. Specifically, when eliciting
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In the early days of the calculus of probability, classic utilitarians believed that the option which has the greatest utility will produce more pleasure or happiness for the agent and therefore must be chosen. The main problem with the
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In empirical applications, a number of violations of expected utility theory have been shown to be systematic and these falsifications have deepened understanding of how people actually decide.
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and its expected value are always negative: what matters for preference ordering is which of two gambles gives the higher expected utility, not the numerical values of those expected utilities.
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in which case the right side of this equation has a finite number of terms; or there could be an infinite set of discrete values, in which case the right side has an infinite number of terms.
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is not an adequate measure of the risk aversion of a utility function. Instead, it needs to be normalized. This leads to the definition of the Arrow–Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion:
293:, according to this theorem, we should be able to know the beliefs and utilities from a person just by looking at the choices they make (which is wrong). Ramsey defines a proposition as " 3433:
is that there might not be a unique correct way to quantify utility or to identify the best trade-offs. For example, some of the trade-offs may be intangible or qualitative. Rather than
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was originally suggested by Bernoulli (see above). It has relative risk aversion constant and equal to one, and is still sometimes assumed in economic analyses. The utility function
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Subjects changed their beliefs faster by conditioning on evidence (Bayes's theorem) than by using informal reasoning, according to a classic study by the psychologist Ward Edwards:
244:(involving infinite expected values) in 1713, prompting two Swiss mathematicians to develop expected utility theory as a solution. Bernoulli's paper was the first formalization of 1381: 437:(Savage, 1954) A preference < satisfies P1–P7 if and only if there is a finitely additive probability measure P and a function u : C → R such that for every pair of acts 1949: 434: 1997: 1905: 1864: 2634: 2058: 1648: 2026: 1816: 1594: 971: 905: 879: 853: 645: 619: 1691: 1445: 2313: 1763: 1727: 1508: 3115:
allowing different people to disagree about the degree of risk associated with any given portfolio. Individuals sharing a given risk measure (based on given value of
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illustrates that decision making based on expected value of monetary payoffs lead to absurd conclusions. When a probability distribution function has an infinite
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There are three components in the psychology field that are seen as crucial to the development of a more accurate descriptive theory of decision under risks.
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Psychologists have discovered systematic violations of probability calculations and behavior by humans. This have been evidenced with examples such as the
297:" when two possible outcomes have an equal value. In other words, if the probability can be defined in terms of a preference, each proposition should have 3883: 3523:" because they can depend on the way the problem is presented, not on the actual costs, rewards, or probabilities involved. Particular theories include 2131: 3519:
theories to account for instances where people's choices deviate from those predicted by expected utility theory. These deviations are described as "
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Lindley DV (September 1973). "The foundations of statistics (second edition), by Leonard J. Savage. Pp xv, 310. £1·75. 1972 (Dover/Constable)".
2401: 3586:, i.e. where the uncertain probabilities are modelled as distributions whose parameters are themselves drawn from a higher-level distribution ( 3736: 507:
A consequence is the description of all that is relevant to the decision maker's utility (e.g. monetary rewards, psychological factors, etc)
4825:(1964). "Foresight: its Logical Laws, Its Subjective Sources (translation of the 1937 article in French". In Kyburg HE, Smokler HE (eds.). 4795:(September 1989). "Probabilism: A Critical Essay on the Theory of Probability and on the Value of Science (translation of 1931 article)". 1511: 536: 525: 495:
The specification of every aspect of the decision problem at hand or "A description of the world leaving no relevant aspect undescribed."
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Owen J, Rabinovitch R (1983). "On the class of elliptical distributions and their applications to the theory of portfolio choice".
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may occur. Thus one must make assumptions about the probabilities, but then the expected values of various decisions can be very
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expresses the utility of each respective payoff. Graphically the curvature of the u function captures the agent's risk attitude.
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The class of constant relative risk aversion utility functions contains three categories. Bernoulli's utility function
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assumes that, as an individual decides according to the completeness axiom, the individual also decides consistently.
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to the assumptions. This is particularly a problem when the expectation is dominated by rare extreme events, as in a
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has suggested that humans change their beliefs faster when using Bayesian methods than when using informal judgment.
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which showed empirically, how preferences of individuals are inconsistent among the same choices, depending on the
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to uncertainty of probability of outcomes, either not depending on probabilities of outcomes and only requiring
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is cardinal, in that implied behavior would be altered by a non-linear monotonic transformation of utility, the
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introduced the Ramsey's Representation Theorem. This representation theorem for expected utility assumed that
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Chamberlain G (1983). "A characterization of the distributions that imply mean-variance utility functions".
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assumes that an individual has well defined preferences and can always decide between any two alternatives.
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Lichtenstein S, Slovic P (1971). "Reversals of preference between bids and choices in gambling decisions".
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preferences. The expected utility hypothesis imposes limitations on the utility function and makes utility
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In practice there will be many situations where the probabilities are unknown, and one is operating under
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Phillips LD, Edwards W (October 2008). "Chapter 6: Conservatism in a simple probability inference task (
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is ordinal because any monotonic increasing transformation of expected utility gives the same behavior.
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Schoemaker PJ (1982). "The Expected Utility Model: Its Variants, Purposes, Evidence and Limitations".
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decision maker: completeness; transitivity; independence of irrelevant alternatives; and continuity.
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Often people refer to "risk" in the sense of a potentially quantifiable entity. In the context of
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Daniel Bernoulli drew attention to psychological and behavioral components behind the individual's
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Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences
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Grether DM, Plott CR (1979). "Economic Theory of Choice and the Preference Reversal Phenomenon".
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Briggs RA (2019). "Normative Theories of Rational Choice: Expected Utility". In Zalta EN (ed.).
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Schoemaker PJ (1980). "Experiments on Decisions under Risk: The Expected Utility Hypothesis.".
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amounts to choosing the lottery with the highest expected utility. This result is called the
414: 3396:) functions, where ARA(w) is constant. They are often used in economics for simplification. 2345: 6011: 5970: 5874: 5725: 5645: 5577: 5492: 5386: 5322: 5110: 3651: 3646: 3600: 3578: 3552: 2568:
is used as a risk measure for portfolio return; however, this is only valid if returns are
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Edwards W (1968). "Conservatism in Human Information Processing". In Kleinmuntz, B (ed.).
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Aspects of the Theory of Risk Bearing Reprinted in Essays in the Theory of Risk Bearing
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Pfanzagl J, Baumann V, Huber H (1968). "Events, Utility and Subjective Probability".
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losses cannot be represented with utility as they change under different scenarios.
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Oberhelman DD (June 2001). Zalta EN (ed.). "Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy".
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can take on any of a continuous range of values, the expected utility is given by
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Edwards W (1982). "Conservatism in Human Information Processing (excerpted)". In
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Bell DE (December 1988). "One-switch utility functions and a measure of risk".
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Pratt JW (January–April 1964). "Risk aversion in the small and in the large".
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Castagnoli and LiCalzi, 1996; Bordley and LiCalzi, 2000; Bordley and Kirkwood
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in which the individual is then indifferent between this mix and the lottery
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The von Neumann–Morgenstern formulation is important in the application of
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Arrow KJ (1963). "Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care".
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is its probability. There could be either a finite set of possible values
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where the left side is the subjective valuation of the gamble as a whole,
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Borch K (January 1969). "A note on uncertainty and indifference curves".
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maximize utility, meaning the subjective desirability of their actions.
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The expected utility theory takes into account that individuals may be
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of utility functions having hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA).
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to economics because it was developed shortly after the Hicks–Allen "
4811:(1937). "La Prévision: ses lois logiques, ses sources subjectives". 4721:
Experiments on Decisions under Risk: The Expected Utility Hypothesis
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Arrow KJ (1965). "The theory of risk aversion". In Saatio YJ (ed.).
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An act is a finite-valued function that maps states to consequences.
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in order to be indifferent between both options. Ramsey shows that
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Holt C (1986). "Preference Reversals and the Independence Axiom".
4575:"Rationality, the Bayesian standpoint, and the Monty-Hall problem" 4025:, Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 1–36, 2009-01-21, 3622:
Better understanding of the psychologically relevant outcome space
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Vind K (February 2000). "von Neumann Morgenstern preferences".
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Essays in Mathematical Economics In Honor of Oskar Morgenstern
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Savage LJ (March 1951). "The Theory of Statistical Decision".
47:, builds this postulate to model aggregate social behaviour. 5472: 5354: 5334: 4904:
Pfanzagl J (1967). "Subjective Probability Derived from the
4107:(Third ed.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 3378:{\displaystyle {\mathit {RRA}}(w)=-{\frac {wu''(w)}{u'(w)}}} 3259:{\displaystyle {\mathit {ARA}}(w)=-{\frac {u''(w)}{u'(w)}},} 5925: 5629: 3760:
Conte, Anna; Hey, John D.; Moffatt, Peter G. (2011-05-01).
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Axiom (Independence of irrelevant alternatives): For every
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Aase KK (January 2001). "On the St. Petersburg Paradox".
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The Foundations of Mathematics and other Logical Essays
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A Science of Decision Making:The Legacy of Ward Edwards
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in economic theory. However, while in this context the
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The Arrow–Pratt measure of relative risk aversion is:
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has relative risk aversion equal to 1. The functions
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gives exactly the same preferences orderings as does
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von Neumann–Morgenstern utility representation theorem
4406:"Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk" 3392:) functions, where RRA(w) is constant, and the CARA ( 3301: 3275: 3182: 3098: 3035: 2656: 2585: 2536: 2503: 2404: 2381: 2348: 2321: 2285: 2254: 2134: 2100: 2080: 2034: 2008: 1960: 1913: 1875: 1830: 1777: 1735: 1699: 1660: 1605: 1555: 1545:
Examples of von Neumann–Morgenstern utility functions
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revolution" of the 1930s, and it revived the idea of
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affects a person's utility takes on one of a set of
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A psychologically richer theory of the determinants
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Special classes of utility functions are the CRRA (
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Savage's subjective expected utility representation
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Ramsey-theoretic approach to subjective probability
5089:"The time resolution of the St Petersburg paradox" 4920: 4757: 4623: 4100: 3817:Expected Utility Hypotheses and the Allais Paradox 3377: 3281: 3258: 3153:and show diminishing marginal wealth utility. The 3107: 3084: 3018: 2628: 2545: 2518: 2486: 2387: 2364: 2334: 2307: 2267: 2237: 2113: 2086: 2052: 2020: 1991: 1943: 1899: 1858: 1810: 1757: 1721: 1685: 1642: 1588: 1502: 1477: 1439: 1395: 1375: 1343: 1323: 1293: 1273: 1253: 1233: 1213: 1193: 1173: 1153: 1133: 1100: 1062: 1042: 965: 939: 899: 873: 847: 821: 801: 763: 743: 723: 703: 683: 663: 639: 613: 587: 567: 428: 397: 204:(though still not comparable across individuals). 181: 154: 134: 107: 5020:Aase KK (2001). "On the St. Petersburg Paradox". 4497:Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases 4060:"Attitudes to Uncertainty in a Strategic Setting" 1241:, then there should be a possible combination of 5998: 4057: 4863:Selected Economic Writings of Oskar Morgenstern 4503: 4403: 4179: 3945:Journal of the American Statistical Association 3759: 2069: 4950:The psychology of judgment and decision making 4831:. Vol. 7. New York: Wiley. pp. 1–68. 3884:"Ramsey and the Ethically Neutral Proposition" 2556:Measuring risk in the expected utility context 268:and proposed that the utility of wealth has a 5840: 5173: 4879: 4865:. New York University Press. pp. 65–70. 3938: 3936: 3460:of the choices, i.e. how they are presented. 3403: 3161:Since the risk attitudes are unchanged under 1115:assumes that when there are three lotteries ( 539:of the expected utility theory that define a 4660: 3737:"Expected Utility Theory | Encyclopedia.com" 3594:Preference reversals over uncertain outcomes 2639:for individual-specific positive parameters 488:The key ingredients in Savage's theory are: 4893:Memoirs of the National Academy of Sciences 4853: 4152: 3814: 3575:), or being less sensitive to assumptions. 1729:; thus it is irrelevant that the values of 1043:{\displaystyle tA+(1-t)C\succeq tB+(1-t)C,} 142:is the probability that outcome indexed by 5946:Heuristics in judgment and decision-making 5847: 5833: 5180: 5166: 5147: 5058:Hacking I (1980). "Strange Expectations". 4982: 4837: 4821: 4807: 4791: 4718: 4376: 4053: 4051: 4049: 3933: 232: 5130: 5104: 5009:Decision-Making: An Experimental Approach 4760:Foundations of Rational Choice Under Risk 4645: 4600: 4590: 4075: 4058:Li Z, Loomes G, Pogrebna G (2017-05-01). 2474: 4903: 4572: 4512:. Oxford University Press. p. 536. 4021:"1. Foundations of probability theory", 3507: 398:{\displaystyle P(E)=(1-U(m))(U(b)-U(w))} 5057: 5051:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 4927:. Princeton University Press. pp.  4482: 4476:Formal Representation of Human Judgment 4473: 4046: 3977: 3847: 913:Independence of irrelevant alternatives 651:This means that the individual prefers 526:Von Neumann–Morgenstern utility theorem 520:Von Neumann–Morgenstern utility theorem 108:{\displaystyle U(p)=\sum u(x_{k})p_{k}} 5999: 5086: 5048: 4956: 4357: 4099:von Neumann J, Morgenstern O (1953) . 3942: 3903: 3559:. Alternative decision techniques are 5828: 5161: 4944: 4778: 4755: 4533: 4531: 4270: 4241: 4117: 4103:Theory of Games and Economic Behavior 3762:"Mixture models of choice under risk" 2647:. Then expected utility is given by 2028:have relative risk aversion equal to 1907:have relative risk aversion equal to 501:A set of states identified by someone 196:Standard utility functions represent 5019: 4962:"Chapter VII: Truth and Probability" 4813:Annales de l'Institut Henri PoincarĂ© 4689: 4537: 4447:"Expected utility | decision theory" 4314: 4214: 3810: 3808: 3806: 5854: 5150:Experiments on Decisions under Risk 4889:"On Small Differences in Sensation" 4764:. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 4364:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 3881: 3819:. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. 1376:{\displaystyle A\succeq B\succeq C} 13: 5736:Microfoundations of macroeconomics 5187: 4748: 4712: 4626:Journal of Experimental Psychology 4528: 4506:Journal of Experimental Psychology 4370: 4308: 4264: 4235: 3869:10.1111/j.1746-8361.2004.tb00320.x 3606: 3304: 3185: 3065: 3036: 2933: 2904: 2887: 2855: 2822: 2792: 2772: 2751: 2713: 2692: 2661: 2445: 2440: 2405: 2135: 1944:{\displaystyle 1-\alpha \in (0,1)} 531:The von Neumann–Morgenstern axioms 14: 6038: 4828:Studies in Subjective Probability 4540:Journal of Mathematical Economics 3850:"Ramsey's Representation Theorem" 3803: 1992:{\displaystyle u(w)=-w^{\alpha }} 5809: 5808: 5797: 3815:Allais M, Hagen O, eds. (1979). 3479:Conservatism in updating beliefs 3134: 2574:jointly elliptically distributed 1900:{\displaystyle \alpha \in (0,1)} 1859:{\displaystyle u(w)=w^{\alpha }} 783:Axiom (Transitivity): For every 555:Axiom (Completeness): For every 227: 23:is a foundational assumption in 4683: 4654: 4617: 4566: 4463: 4439: 4397: 4358:Martin, Robert (16 June 2008). 4351: 4299: 4208: 4173: 4146: 4111: 4092: 3697:Rank-dependent expected utility 3529:rank-dependent expected utility 3394:constant absolute risk aversion 3390:constant relative risk aversion 2629:{\displaystyle u(w)=w-be^{-aw}} 2053:{\displaystyle 1-\alpha >1.} 429:Savage's representation theorem 214:rank-dependent expected utility 5022:Scandinavian Actuarial Journal 4985:Journal of Economic Literature 4404:Kahneman D, Tversky A (1979). 4317:Scandinavian Actuarial Journal 4023:Interpretations of Probability 4014: 3971: 3957:10.1080/01621459.1951.10500768 3897: 3891:Australian National University 3875: 3841: 3753: 3729: 3369: 3363: 3350: 3344: 3321: 3315: 3247: 3241: 3228: 3222: 3202: 3196: 3079: 3074: 3056: 3042: 2953: 2948: 2945: 2939: 2924: 2910: 2899: 2893: 2867: 2861: 2842: 2837: 2834: 2828: 2813: 2804: 2798: 2778: 2763: 2757: 2738: 2719: 2704: 2698: 2682: 2679: 2673: 2667: 2595: 2589: 2513: 2507: 2471: 2465: 2459: 2453: 2426: 2423: 2417: 2411: 2302: 2289: 2226: 2213: 2191: 2178: 2156: 2153: 2147: 2141: 1970: 1964: 1938: 1926: 1894: 1882: 1840: 1834: 1805: 1799: 1787: 1781: 1615: 1609: 1583: 1577: 1565: 1559: 1472: 1460: 1431: 1419: 1095: 1083: 1031: 1019: 1001: 989: 392: 389: 383: 374: 368: 362: 359: 356: 350: 338: 332: 326: 252:of an outcome, accounting for 92: 79: 67: 61: 1: 4861:". In Andrew Schotter (ed.). 4857:(1976). "Some Reflections on 4552:10.1016/s0304-4068(99)00004-x 4499:. Cambridge University Press. 3781:10.1016/j.jeconom.2009.10.011 3723: 1643:{\displaystyle u(w)=-e^{-aw}} 1161:) and the individual prefers 435:Savage representation theorem 4360:"The St. Petersburg Paradox" 4167:10.1016/0022-0531(83)90129-1 3662:Generalized expected utility 3517:generalized expected utility 3423: 2528:probability density function 2070:Formula for expected utility 2021:{\displaystyle \alpha <0} 1811:{\displaystyle u(w)=\log(w)} 1589:{\displaystyle u(w)=\log(w)} 1050:must hold for every lottery 731:, or is indifferent between 270:diminishing marginal utility 7: 5870:Expected utility hypothesis 5681:Civil engineering economics 5666:Statistical decision theory 5306:Income elasticity of demand 3712:Subjective expected utility 3629: 21:expected utility hypothesis 10: 6043: 5986:Evidential decision theory 5316:Price elasticity of supply 5311:Price elasticity of demand 5301:Cross elasticity of demand 5034:10.1080/034612301750077356 4940:. Wiley. pp. 195–220. 4391:10.1108/rr.2001.15.6.9.311 4329:10.1080/034612301750077356 4155:Journal of Economic Theory 4120:Review of Economic Studies 3717:Two-moment decision models 3533:cumulative prospect theory 3404:The St. Petersburg paradox 3138: 966:{\displaystyle A\succeq B} 900:{\displaystyle A\succeq C} 874:{\displaystyle B\succeq C} 848:{\displaystyle A\succeq B} 640:{\displaystyle A\preceq B} 614:{\displaystyle A\succeq B} 523: 218:cumulative prospect theory 189:is realized, and function 5921:Principle of indifference 5883: 5862: 5792: 5759: 5638: 5195: 5013:Stanford University Press 4729:10.1007/978-94-017-5040-0 4573:Baratgin J (2015-08-11). 3992:10.1017/s0025557200132589 3825:10.1007/978-94-015-7629-1 3158:of the utility function. 3029:Thus the risk measure is 1686:{\displaystyle K-e^{-aw}} 1539:expected utility function 1440:{\displaystyle pA+(1-p)C} 5372:Income–consumption curve 4781:American Economic Review 4693:American Economic Review 4664:American Economic Review 4592:10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01168 4256:: CS1 maint: location ( 3980:The Mathematical Gazette 3904:Briggs RA (2014-08-08). 3557:long-tailed distribution 3452:in 1979 presented their 3169:, the second derivative 2308:{\displaystyle u(x_{i})} 1758:{\displaystyle -e^{-aw}} 1722:{\displaystyle -e^{-aw}} 1503:{\displaystyle \succeq } 1403:is equally preferred to 1305:Axiom (Continuity): Let 5981:Emotional choice theory 5706:Industrial organization 4579:Frontiers in Psychology 4451:Encyclopedia Britannica 4229:10.1287/mnsc.34.12.1416 4031:10.1515/9783110213195.1 3769:Journal of Econometrics 3490:conditional probability 266:decision-making process 233:Bernoulli's formulation 5976:Causal decision theory 5941:St. Petersburg paradox 5891:Decision-matrix method 5123:10.1098/rsta.2011.0065 4719:Schoemaker PJ (1980). 3921:Cite journal requires 3439:St. Petersburg Paradox 3410:St. Petersburg paradox 3379: 3283: 3260: 3163:affine transformations 3109: 3086: 3020: 2630: 2562:mean-variance analysis 2547: 2520: 2488: 2389: 2366: 2365:{\displaystyle x_{i},} 2336: 2315:is its valuation, and 2309: 2269: 2239: 2115: 2088: 2054: 2022: 1993: 1945: 1901: 1860: 1812: 1759: 1723: 1687: 1644: 1590: 1504: 1479: 1441: 1397: 1377: 1345: 1325: 1295: 1275: 1255: 1235: 1215: 1195: 1175: 1155: 1135: 1102: 1064: 1044: 967: 941: 901: 875: 849: 823: 803: 765: 745: 725: 705: 685: 665: 641: 615: 589: 569: 399: 242:St. Petersburg paradox 183: 156: 136: 109: 41:Rational choice theory 25:mathematical economics 6017:Motivational theories 5956:Bayesian epistemology 5676:Engineering economics 5271:Cost–benefit analysis 5060:Philosophy of Science 4938:Theory of Measurement 4843:Theory of Probability 3677:Lottery (probability) 3601:certainty equivalents 3545:Knightian uncertainty 3515:has produced several 3508:Irrational deviations 3431:expected value theory 3380: 3284: 3261: 3125:Entropic risk measure 3110: 3087: 3021: 2631: 2548: 2521: 2489: 2390: 2367: 2337: 2335:{\displaystyle p_{i}} 2310: 2279:th possible outcome, 2270: 2268:{\displaystyle x_{i}} 2240: 2116: 2114:{\displaystyle x_{i}} 2089: 2055: 2023: 1994: 1951:. And the functions 1946: 1902: 1861: 1813: 1760: 1724: 1688: 1645: 1591: 1549:The utility function 1505: 1480: 1478:{\displaystyle p\in } 1442: 1398: 1378: 1346: 1326: 1296: 1276: 1256: 1236: 1216: 1196: 1176: 1156: 1136: 1103: 1101:{\displaystyle t\in } 1065: 1045: 968: 942: 902: 876: 850: 824: 804: 766: 746: 726: 706: 686: 666: 642: 616: 590: 570: 415:Leonard Jimmie Savage 400: 184: 182:{\displaystyle x_{k}} 157: 137: 135:{\displaystyle p_{k}} 110: 35:. It postulates that 5971:Social choice theory 5875:Intertemporal choice 5493:Price discrimination 5387:Intertemporal choice 4064:The Economic Journal 3741:www.encyclopedia.com 3652:Behavioral economics 3647:Bayesian probability 3299: 3273: 3180: 3096: 3033: 2654: 2583: 2570:normally distributed 2534: 2519:{\displaystyle f(x)} 2501: 2402: 2379: 2346: 2319: 2283: 2252: 2132: 2098: 2078: 2032: 2006: 1958: 1911: 1873: 1828: 1775: 1733: 1697: 1658: 1603: 1553: 1494: 1451: 1407: 1387: 1355: 1335: 1309: 1285: 1265: 1245: 1225: 1205: 1185: 1165: 1145: 1119: 1074: 1054: 977: 951: 925: 885: 859: 833: 813: 787: 755: 735: 715: 695: 675: 655: 625: 599: 579: 559: 320: 166: 146: 119: 55: 16:Concept in economics 5906:Strategic dominance 5804:Business portal 5741:Operations research 5568:Substitution effect 5115:2011RSPTA.369.4913P 5099:(1956): 4913–4931. 3619:effect (psychology) 3584:hierarchical models 3496:. An experiment on 3435:monetary incentives 2449: 1324:{\displaystyle A,B} 1134:{\displaystyle A,B} 940:{\displaystyle A,B} 802:{\displaystyle A,B} 222:bounded rationality 43:, a cornerstone of 5951:Probability theory 5382:Indifference curve 5350:Goods and services 5291:Economies of scope 5286:Economies of scale 5087:Peters O (2011) . 4849:. New York: Wiley. 4217:Management Science 4182:Journal of Finance 4077:10.1111/ecoj.12486 3848:Bradley R (2004). 3707:Risk in psychology 3687:Priority heuristic 3667:Indifference price 3642:Ambiguity aversion 3513:Behavioral finance 3485:Monty Hall problem 3469:behavioral finance 3465:mathematical model 3375: 3279: 3256: 3108:{\displaystyle a,} 3105: 3082: 3016: 3014: 2626: 2546:{\displaystyle x.} 2543: 2516: 2484: 2432: 2385: 2362: 2332: 2305: 2265: 2235: 2111: 2084: 2050: 2018: 1989: 1941: 1897: 1856: 1808: 1755: 1719: 1683: 1640: 1586: 1500: 1475: 1437: 1393: 1373: 1351:be lotteries with 1341: 1321: 1291: 1271: 1251: 1231: 1211: 1191: 1171: 1151: 1131: 1098: 1060: 1040: 963: 937: 897: 871: 845: 819: 799: 761: 741: 721: 701: 681: 661: 637: 611: 585: 565: 395: 238:Nicolaus Bernoulli 179: 152: 132: 105: 6022:Optimal decisions 5994: 5993: 5822: 5821: 5784:Political economy 5583:Supply and demand 5463:Pareto efficiency 4872:978-0-8147-7771-8 4771:978-0-19-823303-9 4738:978-94-017-5042-4 4519:978-0-19-532298-9 4379:Reference Reviews 4040:978-3-11-021319-5 3834:978-90-481-8354-8 3565:scenario analysis 3414:Nicolas Bernoulli 3373: 3282:{\displaystyle w} 3251: 3007: 2997: 2969: 2388:{\displaystyle x} 2087:{\displaystyle x} 1396:{\displaystyle B} 1344:{\displaystyle C} 1294:{\displaystyle B} 1274:{\displaystyle C} 1254:{\displaystyle A} 1234:{\displaystyle C} 1214:{\displaystyle B} 1194:{\displaystyle B} 1174:{\displaystyle A} 1154:{\displaystyle C} 1063:{\displaystyle C} 973:, the preference 822:{\displaystyle C} 764:{\displaystyle B} 744:{\displaystyle A} 724:{\displaystyle A} 704:{\displaystyle B} 684:{\displaystyle B} 664:{\displaystyle A} 588:{\displaystyle B} 568:{\displaystyle A} 295:ethically neutral 155:{\displaystyle k} 6034: 6027:Expected utility 5936:Ellsberg paradox 5901:Expected utility 5849: 5842: 5835: 5826: 5825: 5812: 5811: 5802: 5801: 5544:Returns to scale 5402:Market structure 5182: 5175: 5168: 5159: 5158: 5153: 5144: 5134: 5108: 5083: 5054: 5045: 5016: 4992: 4979: 4977: 4971:. Archived from 4966: 4953: 4941: 4932: 4926: 4900: 4876: 4850: 4845:. Translated by 4832: 4816: 4804: 4788: 4775: 4763: 4756:Anand P (1993). 4743: 4742: 4716: 4710: 4709: 4687: 4681: 4680: 4658: 4652: 4651: 4649: 4638:10.1037/h0031207 4621: 4615: 4614: 4604: 4594: 4570: 4564: 4563: 4535: 4526: 4523: 4500: 4479: 4467: 4461: 4460: 4458: 4457: 4443: 4437: 4436: 4410: 4401: 4395: 4394: 4374: 4368: 4367: 4355: 4349: 4348: 4312: 4306: 4303: 4297: 4296: 4279:(1/2): 122–136. 4268: 4262: 4261: 4255: 4247: 4239: 4233: 4232: 4212: 4206: 4205: 4177: 4171: 4170: 4150: 4144: 4143: 4115: 4109: 4108: 4106: 4096: 4090: 4089: 4079: 4070:(601): 809–826. 4055: 4044: 4043: 4018: 4012: 4011: 3986:(401): 220–221. 3975: 3969: 3968: 3940: 3931: 3930: 3924: 3919: 3917: 3909: 3901: 3895: 3894: 3888: 3879: 3873: 3872: 3854: 3845: 3839: 3838: 3812: 3801: 3800: 3766: 3757: 3751: 3750: 3748: 3747: 3733: 3682:Marginal utility 3617:decision framing 3543:. In economics, 3384: 3382: 3381: 3376: 3374: 3372: 3362: 3353: 3343: 3331: 3314: 3313: 3288: 3286: 3285: 3280: 3265: 3263: 3262: 3257: 3252: 3250: 3240: 3231: 3221: 3212: 3195: 3194: 3114: 3112: 3111: 3106: 3091: 3089: 3088: 3083: 3078: 3077: 3025: 3023: 3022: 3017: 3015: 3008: 3005: 3000: 2999: 2998: 2995: 2970: 2967: 2959: 2952: 2951: 2903: 2902: 2848: 2841: 2840: 2744: 2737: 2736: 2635: 2633: 2632: 2627: 2625: 2624: 2552: 2550: 2549: 2544: 2525: 2523: 2522: 2517: 2493: 2491: 2490: 2485: 2448: 2443: 2394: 2392: 2391: 2386: 2371: 2369: 2368: 2363: 2358: 2357: 2341: 2339: 2338: 2333: 2331: 2330: 2314: 2312: 2311: 2306: 2301: 2300: 2274: 2272: 2271: 2266: 2264: 2263: 2244: 2242: 2241: 2236: 2225: 2224: 2206: 2205: 2190: 2189: 2171: 2170: 2120: 2118: 2117: 2112: 2110: 2109: 2093: 2091: 2090: 2085: 2074:When the entity 2059: 2057: 2056: 2051: 2027: 2025: 2024: 2019: 1998: 1996: 1995: 1990: 1988: 1987: 1950: 1948: 1947: 1942: 1906: 1904: 1903: 1898: 1865: 1863: 1862: 1857: 1855: 1854: 1817: 1815: 1814: 1809: 1764: 1762: 1761: 1756: 1754: 1753: 1728: 1726: 1725: 1720: 1718: 1717: 1692: 1690: 1689: 1684: 1682: 1681: 1649: 1647: 1646: 1641: 1639: 1638: 1595: 1593: 1592: 1587: 1535:utility function 1531:cardinal utility 1509: 1507: 1506: 1501: 1484: 1482: 1481: 1476: 1446: 1444: 1443: 1438: 1402: 1400: 1399: 1394: 1382: 1380: 1379: 1374: 1350: 1348: 1347: 1342: 1330: 1328: 1327: 1322: 1300: 1298: 1297: 1292: 1280: 1278: 1277: 1272: 1260: 1258: 1257: 1252: 1240: 1238: 1237: 1232: 1220: 1218: 1217: 1212: 1200: 1198: 1197: 1192: 1180: 1178: 1177: 1172: 1160: 1158: 1157: 1152: 1140: 1138: 1137: 1132: 1107: 1105: 1104: 1099: 1069: 1067: 1066: 1061: 1049: 1047: 1046: 1041: 972: 970: 969: 964: 946: 944: 943: 938: 906: 904: 903: 898: 880: 878: 877: 872: 854: 852: 851: 846: 828: 826: 825: 820: 808: 806: 805: 800: 770: 768: 767: 762: 750: 748: 747: 742: 730: 728: 727: 722: 710: 708: 707: 702: 690: 688: 687: 682: 670: 668: 667: 662: 646: 644: 643: 638: 620: 618: 617: 612: 594: 592: 591: 586: 574: 572: 571: 566: 404: 402: 401: 396: 312: 310: 309: 306: 303: 246:marginal utility 188: 186: 185: 180: 178: 177: 161: 159: 158: 153: 141: 139: 138: 133: 131: 130: 114: 112: 111: 106: 104: 103: 91: 90: 6042: 6041: 6037: 6036: 6035: 6033: 6032: 6031: 6007:Belief revision 5997: 5996: 5995: 5990: 5896:Decision matrix 5879: 5858: 5856:Decision theory 5853: 5823: 5818: 5796: 5788: 5755: 5634: 5276:Deadweight loss 5213:Consumer choice 5191: 5186: 5156: 4975: 4964: 4873: 4772: 4751: 4749:Further reading 4746: 4739: 4717: 4713: 4688: 4684: 4659: 4655: 4622: 4618: 4571: 4567: 4536: 4529: 4520: 4485:Daniel Kahneman 4470: 4468: 4464: 4455: 4453: 4445: 4444: 4440: 4425:10.2307/1914185 4408: 4402: 4398: 4375: 4371: 4356: 4352: 4313: 4309: 4304: 4300: 4285:10.2307/1913738 4269: 4265: 4249: 4248: 4240: 4236: 4223:(12): 1416–24. 4213: 4209: 4194:10.2307/2328079 4178: 4174: 4151: 4147: 4132:10.2307/2296336 4116: 4112: 4097: 4093: 4056: 4047: 4041: 4020: 4019: 4015: 3976: 3972: 3941: 3934: 3922: 3920: 3911: 3910: 3902: 3898: 3886: 3880: 3876: 3852: 3846: 3842: 3835: 3813: 3804: 3764: 3758: 3754: 3745: 3743: 3735: 3734: 3730: 3726: 3721: 3692:Prospect theory 3657:Decision theory 3632: 3609: 3607:Recommendations 3596: 3525:prospect theory 3510: 3498:belief revision 3481: 3454:prospect theory 3446:Daniel Kahneman 3426: 3406: 3355: 3354: 3336: 3332: 3330: 3303: 3302: 3300: 3297: 3296: 3274: 3271: 3270: 3233: 3232: 3214: 3213: 3211: 3184: 3183: 3181: 3178: 3177: 3143: 3137: 3097: 3094: 3093: 3049: 3045: 3034: 3031: 3030: 3013: 3012: 3004: 2996:expected wealth 2994: 2984: 2980: 2968:expected wealth 2966: 2957: 2956: 2917: 2913: 2880: 2876: 2846: 2845: 2785: 2781: 2742: 2741: 2726: 2722: 2685: 2657: 2655: 2652: 2651: 2614: 2610: 2584: 2581: 2580: 2558: 2535: 2532: 2531: 2502: 2499: 2498: 2444: 2436: 2403: 2400: 2399: 2380: 2377: 2376: 2353: 2349: 2347: 2344: 2343: 2326: 2322: 2320: 2317: 2316: 2296: 2292: 2284: 2281: 2280: 2259: 2255: 2253: 2250: 2249: 2220: 2216: 2201: 2197: 2185: 2181: 2166: 2162: 2133: 2130: 2129: 2123:discrete values 2105: 2101: 2099: 2096: 2095: 2079: 2076: 2075: 2072: 2033: 2030: 2029: 2007: 2004: 2003: 1983: 1979: 1959: 1956: 1955: 1912: 1909: 1908: 1874: 1871: 1870: 1850: 1846: 1829: 1826: 1825: 1776: 1773: 1772: 1743: 1739: 1734: 1731: 1730: 1707: 1703: 1698: 1695: 1694: 1671: 1667: 1659: 1656: 1655: 1628: 1624: 1604: 1601: 1600: 1554: 1551: 1550: 1547: 1495: 1492: 1491: 1452: 1449: 1448: 1408: 1405: 1404: 1388: 1385: 1384: 1356: 1353: 1352: 1336: 1333: 1332: 1310: 1307: 1306: 1286: 1283: 1282: 1266: 1263: 1262: 1246: 1243: 1242: 1226: 1223: 1222: 1206: 1203: 1202: 1186: 1183: 1182: 1166: 1163: 1162: 1146: 1143: 1142: 1120: 1117: 1116: 1075: 1072: 1071: 1055: 1052: 1051: 978: 975: 974: 952: 949: 948: 926: 923: 922: 886: 883: 882: 860: 857: 856: 834: 831: 830: 814: 811: 810: 788: 785: 784: 756: 753: 752: 736: 733: 732: 716: 713: 712: 696: 693: 692: 676: 673: 672: 656: 653: 652: 626: 623: 622: 600: 597: 596: 580: 577: 576: 560: 557: 556: 533: 528: 522: 431: 411: 321: 318: 317: 307: 304: 301: 300: 298: 278: 235: 230: 210:prospect theory 173: 169: 167: 164: 163: 147: 144: 143: 126: 122: 120: 117: 116: 99: 95: 86: 82: 56: 53: 52: 37:rational agents 29:decision making 17: 12: 11: 5: 6040: 6030: 6029: 6024: 6019: 6014: 6009: 5992: 5991: 5989: 5988: 5983: 5978: 5973: 5968: 5963: 5958: 5953: 5948: 5943: 5938: 5933: 5931:Allais paradox 5928: 5923: 5918: 5913: 5908: 5903: 5898: 5893: 5887: 5885: 5881: 5880: 5878: 5877: 5872: 5866: 5864: 5860: 5859: 5852: 5851: 5844: 5837: 5829: 5820: 5819: 5817: 5816: 5806: 5793: 5790: 5789: 5787: 5786: 5781: 5779:Macroeconomics 5776: 5775: 5774: 5763: 5761: 5757: 5756: 5754: 5753: 5748: 5743: 5738: 5733: 5728: 5723: 5718: 5713: 5708: 5703: 5698: 5693: 5688: 5683: 5678: 5673: 5668: 5663: 5658: 5653: 5648: 5642: 5640: 5636: 5635: 5633: 5632: 5627: 5626: 5625: 5620: 5610: 5605: 5604: 5603: 5594: 5580: 5575: 5570: 5565: 5556: 5551: 5546: 5541: 5536: 5531: 5526: 5521: 5516: 5515: 5514: 5509: 5500: 5495: 5490: 5485: 5480: 5478:Price controls 5470: 5465: 5460: 5459: 5458: 5453: 5448: 5443: 5442: 5441: 5436: 5426: 5421: 5420: 5419: 5414: 5399: 5397:Market failure 5394: 5389: 5384: 5379: 5374: 5369: 5364: 5363: 5362: 5357: 5347: 5342: 5337: 5332: 5331: 5330: 5320: 5319: 5318: 5313: 5308: 5303: 5293: 5288: 5283: 5278: 5273: 5268: 5267: 5266: 5261: 5256: 5251: 5250: 5249: 5239: 5234: 5224: 5215: 5210: 5205: 5199: 5197: 5193: 5192: 5189:Microeconomics 5185: 5184: 5177: 5170: 5162: 5155: 5154: 5145: 5084: 5072:10.1086/288956 5066:(4): 562–567. 5055: 5046: 5017: 4993: 4980: 4978:on 2006-10-14. 4954: 4942: 4933: 4913:Utility Theory 4901: 4877: 4871: 4851: 4834: 4833: 4818: 4817: 4805: 4789: 4776: 4770: 4752: 4750: 4747: 4745: 4744: 4737: 4711: 4700:(3): 508–515. 4682: 4671:(4): 623–638. 4653: 4616: 4565: 4546:(1): 109–122. 4527: 4525: 4524: 4518: 4501: 4480: 4462: 4438: 4419:(2): 263–292. 4396: 4369: 4350: 4307: 4298: 4263: 4234: 4207: 4188:(3): 745–752. 4172: 4161:(1): 185–201. 4145: 4110: 4091: 4045: 4039: 4013: 3970: 3951:(253): 55–67. 3932: 3923:|journal= 3896: 3874: 3863:(4): 483–498. 3840: 3833: 3802: 3752: 3727: 3725: 3722: 3720: 3719: 3714: 3709: 3704: 3699: 3694: 3689: 3684: 3679: 3674: 3669: 3664: 3659: 3654: 3649: 3644: 3639: 3637:Allais paradox 3633: 3631: 3628: 3627: 3626: 3623: 3620: 3608: 3605: 3595: 3592: 3573:minimax regret 3509: 3506: 3480: 3477: 3425: 3422: 3418:expected value 3405: 3402: 3386: 3385: 3371: 3368: 3365: 3361: 3358: 3352: 3349: 3346: 3342: 3339: 3335: 3329: 3326: 3323: 3320: 3317: 3312: 3309: 3306: 3278: 3267: 3266: 3255: 3249: 3246: 3243: 3239: 3236: 3230: 3227: 3224: 3220: 3217: 3210: 3207: 3204: 3201: 3198: 3193: 3190: 3187: 3139:Main article: 3136: 3133: 3104: 3101: 3081: 3076: 3073: 3070: 3067: 3064: 3061: 3058: 3055: 3052: 3048: 3044: 3041: 3038: 3027: 3026: 3011: 3003: 2993: 2990: 2987: 2983: 2979: 2976: 2973: 2965: 2962: 2960: 2958: 2955: 2950: 2947: 2944: 2941: 2938: 2935: 2932: 2929: 2926: 2923: 2920: 2916: 2912: 2909: 2906: 2901: 2898: 2895: 2892: 2889: 2886: 2883: 2879: 2875: 2872: 2869: 2866: 2863: 2860: 2857: 2854: 2851: 2849: 2847: 2844: 2839: 2836: 2833: 2830: 2827: 2824: 2821: 2818: 2815: 2812: 2809: 2806: 2803: 2800: 2797: 2794: 2791: 2788: 2784: 2780: 2777: 2774: 2771: 2768: 2765: 2762: 2759: 2756: 2753: 2750: 2747: 2745: 2743: 2740: 2735: 2732: 2729: 2725: 2721: 2718: 2715: 2712: 2709: 2706: 2703: 2700: 2697: 2694: 2691: 2688: 2686: 2684: 2681: 2678: 2675: 2672: 2669: 2666: 2663: 2660: 2659: 2637: 2636: 2623: 2620: 2617: 2613: 2609: 2606: 2603: 2600: 2597: 2594: 2591: 2588: 2557: 2554: 2542: 2539: 2515: 2512: 2509: 2506: 2495: 2494: 2483: 2480: 2477: 2473: 2470: 2467: 2464: 2461: 2458: 2455: 2452: 2447: 2442: 2439: 2435: 2431: 2428: 2425: 2422: 2419: 2416: 2413: 2410: 2407: 2384: 2361: 2356: 2352: 2329: 2325: 2304: 2299: 2295: 2291: 2288: 2262: 2258: 2246: 2245: 2234: 2231: 2228: 2223: 2219: 2215: 2212: 2209: 2204: 2200: 2196: 2193: 2188: 2184: 2180: 2177: 2174: 2169: 2165: 2161: 2158: 2155: 2152: 2149: 2146: 2143: 2140: 2137: 2108: 2104: 2083: 2071: 2068: 2064:the discussion 2049: 2046: 2043: 2040: 2037: 2017: 2014: 2011: 2000: 1999: 1986: 1982: 1978: 1975: 1972: 1969: 1966: 1963: 1940: 1937: 1934: 1931: 1928: 1925: 1922: 1919: 1916: 1896: 1893: 1890: 1887: 1884: 1881: 1878: 1867: 1866: 1853: 1849: 1845: 1842: 1839: 1836: 1833: 1819: 1818: 1807: 1804: 1801: 1798: 1795: 1792: 1789: 1786: 1783: 1780: 1752: 1749: 1746: 1742: 1738: 1716: 1713: 1710: 1706: 1702: 1680: 1677: 1674: 1670: 1666: 1663: 1651: 1650: 1637: 1634: 1631: 1627: 1623: 1620: 1617: 1614: 1611: 1608: 1585: 1582: 1579: 1576: 1573: 1570: 1567: 1564: 1561: 1558: 1546: 1543: 1499: 1487: 1486: 1474: 1471: 1468: 1465: 1462: 1459: 1456: 1436: 1433: 1430: 1427: 1424: 1421: 1418: 1415: 1412: 1392: 1372: 1369: 1366: 1363: 1360: 1340: 1320: 1317: 1314: 1290: 1270: 1250: 1230: 1210: 1190: 1170: 1150: 1130: 1127: 1124: 1110: 1109: 1097: 1094: 1091: 1088: 1085: 1082: 1079: 1059: 1039: 1036: 1033: 1030: 1027: 1024: 1021: 1018: 1015: 1012: 1009: 1006: 1003: 1000: 997: 994: 991: 988: 985: 982: 962: 959: 956: 936: 933: 930: 909: 908: 896: 893: 890: 870: 867: 864: 844: 841: 838: 818: 798: 795: 792: 760: 740: 720: 700: 680: 660: 649: 648: 636: 633: 630: 610: 607: 604: 584: 564: 532: 529: 524:Main article: 521: 518: 517: 516: 508: 502: 496: 430: 427: 413:In the 1950s, 410: 407: 406: 405: 394: 391: 388: 385: 382: 379: 376: 373: 370: 367: 364: 361: 358: 355: 352: 349: 346: 343: 340: 337: 334: 331: 328: 325: 277: 274: 250:expected value 240:described the 234: 231: 229: 226: 176: 172: 151: 129: 125: 102: 98: 94: 89: 85: 81: 78: 75: 72: 69: 66: 63: 60: 45:microeconomics 15: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 6039: 6028: 6025: 6023: 6020: 6018: 6015: 6013: 6010: 6008: 6005: 6004: 6002: 5987: 5984: 5982: 5979: 5977: 5974: 5972: 5969: 5967: 5964: 5962: 5961:Risk aversion 5959: 5957: 5954: 5952: 5949: 5947: 5944: 5942: 5939: 5937: 5934: 5932: 5929: 5927: 5924: 5922: 5919: 5917: 5914: 5912: 5909: 5907: 5904: 5902: 5899: 5897: 5894: 5892: 5889: 5888: 5886: 5882: 5876: 5873: 5871: 5868: 5867: 5865: 5861: 5857: 5850: 5845: 5843: 5838: 5836: 5831: 5830: 5827: 5815: 5807: 5805: 5800: 5795: 5794: 5791: 5785: 5782: 5780: 5777: 5773: 5770: 5769: 5768: 5765: 5764: 5762: 5758: 5752: 5749: 5747: 5744: 5742: 5739: 5737: 5734: 5732: 5729: 5727: 5724: 5722: 5719: 5717: 5714: 5712: 5711:Institutional 5709: 5707: 5704: 5702: 5699: 5697: 5694: 5692: 5689: 5687: 5684: 5682: 5679: 5677: 5674: 5672: 5669: 5667: 5664: 5662: 5659: 5657: 5656:Computational 5654: 5652: 5649: 5647: 5644: 5643: 5641: 5637: 5631: 5628: 5624: 5621: 5619: 5616: 5615: 5614: 5611: 5609: 5606: 5602: 5601:Law of supply 5598: 5595: 5593: 5592:Law of demand 5589: 5586: 5585: 5584: 5581: 5579: 5578:Social choice 5576: 5574: 5571: 5569: 5566: 5564: 5563:Excess supply 5560: 5557: 5555: 5552: 5550: 5549:Risk aversion 5547: 5545: 5542: 5540: 5537: 5535: 5532: 5530: 5527: 5525: 5522: 5520: 5517: 5513: 5510: 5508: 5504: 5501: 5499: 5496: 5494: 5491: 5489: 5486: 5484: 5483:Price ceiling 5481: 5479: 5476: 5475: 5474: 5471: 5469: 5466: 5464: 5461: 5457: 5454: 5452: 5449: 5447: 5444: 5440: 5439:Complementary 5437: 5435: 5432: 5431: 5430: 5427: 5425: 5422: 5418: 5415: 5413: 5410: 5409: 5408: 5405: 5404: 5403: 5400: 5398: 5395: 5393: 5390: 5388: 5385: 5383: 5380: 5378: 5375: 5373: 5370: 5368: 5365: 5361: 5358: 5356: 5353: 5352: 5351: 5348: 5346: 5343: 5341: 5338: 5336: 5333: 5329: 5326: 5325: 5324: 5321: 5317: 5314: 5312: 5309: 5307: 5304: 5302: 5299: 5298: 5297: 5294: 5292: 5289: 5287: 5284: 5282: 5279: 5277: 5274: 5272: 5269: 5265: 5262: 5260: 5257: 5255: 5252: 5248: 5245: 5244: 5243: 5240: 5238: 5235: 5233: 5230: 5229: 5228: 5225: 5223: 5222:non-convexity 5219: 5216: 5214: 5211: 5209: 5206: 5204: 5201: 5200: 5198: 5194: 5190: 5183: 5178: 5176: 5171: 5169: 5164: 5163: 5160: 5151: 5146: 5142: 5138: 5133: 5128: 5124: 5120: 5116: 5112: 5107: 5102: 5098: 5094: 5090: 5085: 5081: 5077: 5073: 5069: 5065: 5061: 5056: 5052: 5047: 5043: 5039: 5035: 5031: 5027: 5023: 5018: 5014: 5010: 5006: 5002: 4998: 4994: 4990: 4986: 4981: 4974: 4970: 4963: 4959: 4955: 4951: 4947: 4943: 4939: 4934: 4930: 4925: 4924: 4918: 4917:Martin Shubik 4914: 4911: 4907: 4902: 4898: 4894: 4890: 4886: 4882: 4878: 4874: 4868: 4864: 4860: 4856: 4855:Morgenstern O 4852: 4848: 4844: 4840: 4836: 4835: 4830: 4829: 4824: 4820: 4819: 4814: 4810: 4806: 4802: 4798: 4794: 4790: 4786: 4782: 4777: 4773: 4767: 4762: 4761: 4754: 4753: 4740: 4734: 4730: 4726: 4722: 4715: 4707: 4703: 4699: 4695: 4694: 4686: 4678: 4674: 4670: 4666: 4665: 4657: 4648: 4643: 4639: 4635: 4631: 4627: 4620: 4612: 4608: 4603: 4598: 4593: 4588: 4584: 4580: 4576: 4569: 4561: 4557: 4553: 4549: 4545: 4541: 4534: 4532: 4521: 4515: 4511: 4507: 4502: 4498: 4494: 4490: 4486: 4481: 4477: 4472: 4471: 4466: 4452: 4448: 4442: 4434: 4430: 4426: 4422: 4418: 4414: 4407: 4400: 4392: 4388: 4384: 4380: 4373: 4365: 4361: 4354: 4346: 4342: 4338: 4334: 4330: 4326: 4322: 4318: 4311: 4302: 4294: 4290: 4286: 4282: 4278: 4274: 4267: 4259: 4253: 4245: 4238: 4230: 4226: 4222: 4218: 4211: 4203: 4199: 4195: 4191: 4187: 4183: 4176: 4168: 4164: 4160: 4156: 4149: 4141: 4137: 4133: 4129: 4125: 4121: 4114: 4105: 4104: 4095: 4087: 4083: 4078: 4073: 4069: 4065: 4061: 4054: 4052: 4050: 4042: 4036: 4032: 4028: 4024: 4017: 4009: 4005: 4001: 3997: 3993: 3989: 3985: 3981: 3974: 3966: 3962: 3958: 3954: 3950: 3946: 3939: 3937: 3928: 3915: 3907: 3900: 3892: 3885: 3878: 3870: 3866: 3862: 3858: 3851: 3844: 3836: 3830: 3826: 3822: 3818: 3811: 3809: 3807: 3798: 3794: 3790: 3786: 3782: 3778: 3774: 3770: 3763: 3756: 3742: 3738: 3732: 3728: 3718: 3715: 3713: 3710: 3708: 3705: 3703: 3702:Risk aversion 3700: 3698: 3695: 3693: 3690: 3688: 3685: 3683: 3680: 3678: 3675: 3673: 3672:Loss function 3670: 3668: 3665: 3663: 3660: 3658: 3655: 3653: 3650: 3648: 3645: 3643: 3640: 3638: 3635: 3634: 3624: 3621: 3618: 3614: 3613: 3612: 3604: 3602: 3591: 3589: 3585: 3580: 3576: 3574: 3570: 3566: 3562: 3558: 3554: 3550: 3546: 3542: 3537: 3534: 3530: 3526: 3522: 3518: 3514: 3505: 3501: 3499: 3495: 3494:rule of Bayes 3492:, namely the 3491: 3486: 3476: 3472: 3470: 3466: 3461: 3459: 3455: 3451: 3447: 3442: 3440: 3436: 3432: 3421: 3419: 3415: 3412:presented by 3411: 3401: 3397: 3395: 3391: 3366: 3359: 3356: 3347: 3340: 3337: 3333: 3327: 3324: 3318: 3295: 3294: 3293: 3290: 3276: 3253: 3244: 3237: 3234: 3225: 3218: 3215: 3208: 3205: 3199: 3176: 3175: 3174: 3172: 3168: 3164: 3159: 3156: 3155:risk attitude 3152: 3148: 3142: 3141:Risk aversion 3135:Risk aversion 3132: 3128: 3126: 3122: 3118: 3102: 3099: 3071: 3068: 3062: 3059: 3053: 3050: 3046: 3039: 3009: 3001: 2991: 2988: 2985: 2981: 2977: 2974: 2971: 2963: 2961: 2942: 2936: 2930: 2927: 2921: 2918: 2914: 2907: 2896: 2890: 2884: 2881: 2877: 2873: 2870: 2864: 2858: 2852: 2850: 2831: 2825: 2819: 2816: 2810: 2807: 2801: 2795: 2789: 2786: 2782: 2775: 2769: 2766: 2760: 2754: 2748: 2746: 2733: 2730: 2727: 2723: 2716: 2710: 2707: 2701: 2695: 2689: 2687: 2676: 2670: 2664: 2650: 2649: 2648: 2646: 2642: 2621: 2618: 2615: 2611: 2607: 2604: 2601: 2598: 2592: 2586: 2579: 2578: 2577: 2575: 2572:or otherwise 2571: 2567: 2563: 2553: 2540: 2537: 2529: 2510: 2504: 2481: 2478: 2475: 2468: 2462: 2456: 2450: 2437: 2433: 2429: 2420: 2414: 2408: 2398: 2397: 2396: 2382: 2373: 2359: 2354: 2350: 2327: 2323: 2297: 2293: 2286: 2278: 2260: 2256: 2232: 2229: 2221: 2217: 2210: 2207: 2202: 2198: 2194: 2186: 2182: 2175: 2172: 2167: 2163: 2159: 2150: 2144: 2138: 2128: 2127: 2126: 2124: 2106: 2102: 2081: 2067: 2065: 2060: 2047: 2044: 2041: 2038: 2035: 2015: 2012: 2009: 1984: 1980: 1976: 1973: 1967: 1961: 1954: 1953: 1952: 1935: 1932: 1929: 1923: 1920: 1917: 1914: 1891: 1888: 1885: 1879: 1876: 1851: 1847: 1843: 1837: 1831: 1824: 1823: 1822: 1802: 1796: 1793: 1790: 1784: 1778: 1771: 1770: 1769: 1766: 1750: 1747: 1744: 1740: 1736: 1714: 1711: 1708: 1704: 1700: 1678: 1675: 1672: 1668: 1664: 1661: 1635: 1632: 1629: 1625: 1621: 1618: 1612: 1606: 1599: 1598: 1597: 1580: 1574: 1571: 1568: 1562: 1556: 1542: 1540: 1536: 1532: 1528: 1524: 1519: 1515: 1513: 1497: 1469: 1466: 1463: 1457: 1454: 1434: 1428: 1425: 1422: 1416: 1413: 1410: 1390: 1370: 1367: 1364: 1361: 1358: 1338: 1318: 1315: 1312: 1304: 1303: 1302: 1288: 1268: 1248: 1228: 1208: 1188: 1168: 1148: 1128: 1125: 1122: 1114: 1092: 1089: 1086: 1080: 1077: 1057: 1037: 1034: 1028: 1025: 1022: 1016: 1013: 1010: 1007: 1004: 998: 995: 992: 986: 983: 980: 960: 957: 954: 934: 931: 928: 920: 919: 918: 915: 914: 894: 891: 888: 881:we must have 868: 865: 862: 842: 839: 836: 816: 796: 793: 790: 782: 781: 780: 778: 777: 772: 758: 738: 718: 698: 678: 658: 634: 631: 628: 608: 605: 602: 582: 562: 554: 553: 552: 550: 549: 544: 542: 538: 527: 514: 513: 509: 506: 505:Consequences: 503: 500: 497: 494: 491: 490: 489: 486: 484: 480: 476: 472: 468: 464: 460: 456: 452: 448: 444: 440: 436: 426: 422: 418: 416: 386: 380: 377: 371: 365: 353: 347: 344: 341: 335: 329: 323: 316: 315: 314: 296: 292: 287: 283: 273: 271: 267: 262: 259: 255: 254:risk aversion 251: 247: 243: 239: 228:Justification 225: 223: 219: 215: 211: 205: 203: 199: 194: 192: 174: 170: 149: 127: 123: 100: 96: 87: 83: 76: 73: 70: 64: 58: 48: 46: 42: 38: 34: 30: 26: 22: 5869: 5746:Optimization 5731:Mathematical 5691:Experimental 5686:Evolutionary 5671:Econometrics 5617: 5529:Public goods 5503:Price system 5498:Price signal 5412:Monopolistic 5281:Distribution 5196:Major topics 5149: 5096: 5092: 5063: 5059: 5050: 5028:(1): 69–78. 5025: 5021: 5008: 4988: 4984: 4973:the original 4968: 4949: 4937: 4922: 4896: 4892: 4862: 4842: 4839:de Finetti B 4827: 4823:de Finetti B 4812: 4809:de Finetti B 4800: 4796: 4793:de Finetti B 4784: 4780: 4759: 4720: 4714: 4697: 4691: 4685: 4668: 4662: 4656: 4632:(1): 46–55. 4629: 4625: 4619: 4582: 4578: 4568: 4543: 4539: 4509: 4505: 4496: 4493:Amos Tversky 4475: 4465: 4454:. Retrieved 4450: 4441: 4416: 4413:Econometrica 4412: 4399: 4382: 4378: 4372: 4363: 4353: 4323:(1): 69–78. 4320: 4316: 4310: 4301: 4276: 4273:Econometrica 4272: 4266: 4243: 4237: 4220: 4216: 4210: 4185: 4181: 4175: 4158: 4154: 4148: 4123: 4119: 4113: 4102: 4094: 4067: 4063: 4022: 4016: 3983: 3979: 3973: 3948: 3944: 3914:cite journal 3899: 3890: 3877: 3860: 3856: 3843: 3816: 3775:(1): 79–88. 3772: 3768: 3755: 3744:. Retrieved 3740: 3731: 3610: 3597: 3577: 3538: 3511: 3502: 3482: 3473: 3462: 3450:Amos Tversky 3443: 3427: 3407: 3398: 3387: 3291: 3268: 3170: 3166: 3160: 3144: 3129: 3120: 3116: 3028: 2644: 2640: 2638: 2559: 2496: 2374: 2276: 2247: 2094:whose value 2073: 2061: 2001: 1868: 1820: 1767: 1652: 1548: 1538: 1534: 1520: 1516: 1488: 1112: 1111: 911: 910: 776:Transitivity 775: 773: 650: 548:Completeness 547: 545: 540: 534: 511: 510: 504: 498: 492: 487: 482: 478: 474: 470: 466: 462: 458: 454: 450: 446: 442: 438: 432: 423: 419: 412: 282:Frank Ramsey 279: 263: 258:risk premium 256:, where the 236: 206: 195: 190: 162:with payoff 49: 20: 18: 6012:Game theory 5966:Game theory 5696:Game theory 5661:Development 5608:Uncertainty 5488:Price floor 5468:Preferences 5407:Competition 5377:Information 5340:Externality 5323:Equilibrium 5264:Transaction 5242:Opportunity 5203:Aggregation 4910:von Neumann 4906:Morgenstern 4489:Paul Slovic 3882:Elliott E. 3588:hyperpriors 3541:uncertainty 3289:is wealth. 3147:risk-averse 3123:. 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Index

mathematical economics
decision making
uncertainty
rational agents
Rational choice theory
microeconomics
ordinal
cardinal
prospect theory
rank-dependent expected utility
cumulative prospect theory
bounded rationality
Nicolaus Bernoulli
St. Petersburg paradox
marginal utility
expected value
risk aversion
risk premium
decision-making process
diminishing marginal utility
Frank Ramsey
preferences
rational
ethically neutral
Leonard Jimmie Savage
Savage representation theorem
Von Neumann–Morgenstern utility theorem
four axioms
Completeness
Transitivity

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