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respectively. In both a high and low salary option, the employee will benefit more from choosing the low effort option. In a high salary path, the high effort choice yields a utility of 2 for the employee whereas in the low effort path the utility is 3. In the low salary high effort path, the employees utility will be 0 compared to the low effort choice which results in a utility of 1. Thus the employee will choose low effort regardless of the salary choice made by the employer. Moving a decision back, it is now the employers choice between high or low salary. Knowing the employee will choose low effort, the employer will also choose the option that maximises their utility. In the high salary low effort option, their utility eventuates to 0 whereas in the low salary low effort option, their utility is 1. Knowing the employee will choose the low effort option as it maximises their utility, the employer will choose low salary. This will lead to the equilibrium of low salary and low effort.
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transactions from beginning to end. In this way, the influence of expectations of both sides on the "long-term future" is excluded, and the choice of the level of effort of "employees" is completely self-conscious. According to the traditional economic view, employees will be willing to accept any wage greater than 0, and provide the minimum level of effort after receiving the salary. However, the experimental results show that employers always offer wages much higher than the minimum level, while employees almost always provide efforts much higher than the minimum level. This proves that even if there are no other supervision and punishment mechanisms, the wage level in the labor market is often higher than the market-clearing price for some "fair" and "goodwill" motives in exchange for the labor provider's initiative and loyalty. It's also an example of how social norms and reciprocity can affect human behavior even in the absence of regulation.
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were required to perform a specific task for six hours in total. Each participant would receive an hourly wage that had been previously advertised to them. The participants in each experiment were divided into two groups, one of which were informed that the actual wage they would be receiving was higher than the wage advertised to them. Each of the two experiments yielded similar results. For both experiments, the group receiving the increased wage only performed the task more efficiently in the initial stage of the task. Towards the end of the six hours, the groups yielded similar outputs and were performing at the same productivity level. While these results are inconsistent with previous laboratory finds, they endorse one feature of "reciprocal behaviour", that is, as time goes on, preferential treatment will be taken for granted, thus reducing the willingness of employees to supply labour.
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two followers, who had the option to award or not award each other with gifts. The originator received an initial amount of ÂŁ8.3, and each follower received ÂŁ11.1. The originator could offer a fixed amount of ÂŁ1.6 to a follower, while a follower could give ÂŁ1, ÂŁ2, or ÂŁ3, with a corresponding reduction in their payoff. The experiment aimed to explore the effects of gift-giving on the players' payoffs and the dynamics of reciprocity. The study found that the frequency of non-gift giving was lower than what an egoistic payoff maximization assumption would predict, with an average non-gift frequency of 69% in the studied one-shot games. However, it was still over 50% in almost all cases. The paragraph also notes that it is difficult to create models of human behavior without access to the hidden variables that determine the players' choices.
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to innocuous changes. Groups of consisting of an emploer and an employee were chosen whereby the employer chooses the wage for their employee. employees were paid for their work at a self-chosen effort level and the corresponding cost of effort for that level. one group was presented with a payoff table, detailing employee and employer wages and the other ignorant of potential payoff. Charness found that when a payoff table was included in the experiment that demarcated the relationship between wages, effort and payoff, gift exchange was sharply reduced. Charness suggests that this reduction in gift exchange could be due to the framing effect. The framing affect would reduce positive reciprocation by reducing the positive effect caused by an unexpected bonus and replacing it with a mutual understanding of the firms expectations.
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participants randomly selected into a employer or employee category. The managers would offer the workers a wage and an effort level that was required and the workers would choose to accept or decline the offer. The acceptance rate for the groups according to effort and wage were measured. The study suggested that there was little evidence for positive reciprocity and that laboratory gift exchange is highly sensitive to the parametrization of the model and the way the model is implemented. Engelmann also found that workers experienced negative reciprocity to negative wages. Engelmann suggested that gift-exchange is highly sensitive to changes in the parameters of the game (parametrization), the framing effect and anonymity. This has important consequence for empirical implementation.
86:, strike and the decline of unionization. The gift-exchange theory also incorporates a social component, where homogenous agents who are employed with an equivalent wage level will exert greater effort. This then continues to result in a higher market efficiency and higher rent than those agents receiving different wages. The first examination of this component is referred to as the fair uniform-wage hypothesis, where experiments establish the significant efficiency premium of uniform wages. However, this is not a consequential result of a stronger level or reciprocity by the agents, although the reinforcement of endorsing these options on the side of principals with uniform wages is why implementing boundaries to freedom can lead to efficiency-enhancing results.
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game as many times before were far more likely to follow the Nash equilibrium, unable to achieve the higher possible pay-offs. However, if the game is repeated more times or the players were 'partners' (worked together and knew each other better) they had far greater success at maintaining higher pay-offs in the game. This study published by the
Tinbergen Institute also concluded that âsimplerâ or smaller gifts were far more likely to be reciprocated and maintained appropriately than larger gifts that could be more appealing to exploit. Van Den Akker, Olmo R. van Assen et al. found that subjects in the gift-exchange game exhibit selfish behaviour in specific labour markets and other principal-agent environments.
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to free-riding at work can lead to employee strikes or the intervention of unions and other labor organizations to coordinate. As the employer pays a flat wage, such collective action may prompt the employer to resort to dismissal mechanisms, i.e. firing the free-riding. If unions and other labor organizations step in to coordinate, employees may face increased employment risks in the absence of success in reducing free-rider behavior. These effects may help to understand the reasons for the decline in unionization in developed economies. For example, in the US, companies adopt enterprise resource planning and applications to simplify the adjustment of wage differentiation.
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conducted in a laboratory setting, such as Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl (1993), which have presented strong evidence of the relationship between increased fixed wages and its influence in eliciting positive reciprocity from employees in the form of increased effort. However, these results have not been reflected in field studies, which have largely found no or little evidence of the relationship. Kube, Marechal, and Puppe (2012) found that in the field setting, there was no significant increase in effort after increased fixed wages. However, they did find that gifts of equivalent value that took alternative forms than fixed wages significantly increased effort.
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doesn't provide any attention to their employees) who is paying a higher wage to retain their employees. Eventually, the altruistic manager's marginal cost of attention exceeds a point where increasing the employees wage becomes a better alternative. This outcome is dependent on the employee exhibiting "neutral" or "warm" feelings towards their employer such that their expected utility increases with the attention they receive. Rather than contradict, this model supplements traditional game-exchange theory by demonstrating in a real world setting, managers have socioemotional tools at their disposal that may be preferred to a monetary gift.
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problem of information asymmetry between employees and employers. When employees have access to market information about average wages, they decide whether to work hard or not by comparing their current wage with the average wage and getting a relative reciprocal from their employer. But this increases the pressure on employers and competition between them, as wages are determined by the market offer. Especially, in organizations where control is separated from ownership, the relationship between wage increases and effort cannot be observed through the relative reciprocal.
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results into real world relationships found in the labour market. The paper explored multi-level hierarchies and focused on the complex structure where âownership and control are separatedâ. The classical gift-exchange game was manipulated to mimic a trilateral relationship where the firm is controlled by a manager but owned by a shareholder. This experiment found that employees rewarded higher wages with higher effort regardless of whether the manager shared in the firmsâ profits or not.
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sub-optimal outcomes for both parties, even when cooperation is in the best interest of both players. In the gift-exchange game, the choices of all players are interdependent, and the social norms of reciprocity incentivize participants to act in ways that benefit the group as a whole. In our follow-up experiments with the gift exchange game, we found that only a few people in the real world would choose the minimum wage and minimum effort to reach the
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decision. So employers have no incentive to pay high salaries if workers know what they are choosing. If the employer pays a higher salary, it is irrational for the employee to put extra effort, since effort will reduce his or her payoff. It is also irrational for the employee to put extra effort while receiving a lower salary. Therefore, the minimum salary and the minimum effort is the equilibrium of this game.
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gift exchange in the fieldâ. The study identified a few factors that could be impacting gift exchange effectiveness such as âhabituation to the gift, fatigue, and small gift sizeâ. Accounting for these factors and subsequently implementing a field experiment to remove them, the studyâs results found no evidence to support gift exchange in the work place.
210:"fairness" or compensation, considering that they are after all the employer's money. (2) If, at almost the same income level, employees are told that the wage level is determined by the experimenter, they will think that they don't have to pay a lot of responsibility for the "loss" to the employer, so they will relatively reduce their efforts.
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The multitude of factors for this discrepancy between laboratory and field settings is the topic of much subsequent research, but it is not entirely clear. While conflicting results do degrade the reliability of the application of the gift exchange game, it is important to note that it still provides
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Moreover, Tagiew and
Ignatov (2014) have conducted an experiment at the University of Nottingham using one-shot games, where participants did not participate more than once. The study included participates of both genders, with an average age of 20. Each game involved three players, an originator and
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Some other observations noted about whether players will follow the expected nash equilibrium or were more likely to deviate and provide the gift and extra effort included, how much the game was repeated and if the players were familiar to each other. Players who were strangers or had not entered the
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The experiment of charness (2000, JEBO) wanted to explore what would happen if the benefit of high wages was not given by the employer but a random result or a third party. The results of this experiment are as follows: (1) if wages are generated randomly, employees usually give extra efforts to show
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solution for rational players predicts that employeesâ effort will be minimum for one-shot and finitely repeated interactions. The difference constitutes by the sequentiality of gift-exchange game. In the gift exchange game, the employer pays a high or low salary first and then the employee makes the
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In the game theory, the equilibrium analysis can be implemented to determine and examine strategic decisions between the players in a game. Nash equilibrium is the situation of a game where no player has an incentive to change the strategy given the strategic decision based on the other player. It is
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Many laboratory experiments support the theory of using gift exchange as an incentive mechanism. However, field evidence has resulted in conflicting effectiveness. A study conducted by
Evesteves-Sorenson and Macera (2013) aimed to investigate removing any theoretical factors that could be âdampening
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One particular non-monetary gift believed to incentivise employees is the attention they receive from their employer. In a model developed by Prof. Robert Dur, altruistic managers who signal a level of attention towards their employees can achieve the same level of output as an egoistic manager (who
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Gary
Charness, Guillaume R. Frechette, and John H. kagelâs experiment, 'How Robust is Laboratory Gift Exchange?', studied the effect of gift-exchange in the US. While they found positive reciprocity attributable to the gift-exchange effect, they also found that the gift-exchange effect is sensitive
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This game can help us to understand strikes, coordination, and dismissal in uniform wage settings. In a gift-exchange game in a multi-employee environment with collective action mechanisms, the employer offers a uniform wage. The breakdown of trust and reciprocity between employers and employees due
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Kean Siang, Ch'Ng's experiment explores the role of relative information and reciprocity in the gift-exchange game. They found that lack of enforcement was not the only reason to explain employees' reluctance to work hard, so the concept of 'relative reciprocal' was creatively introduced. There is a
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can also be used to determine the equilibrium of this game. As both players are rational, they will both work to maximise their utility. Looking at game tree shown on the right, the last decision is determined by the employee. The utilities for the employer and employee are outlined in red and blue
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Dirk
Engelmann and Andreas Ortmannâs study: âThe Robustness Of Laboratory Gift exchange: A Reconsiderationâ took a subject pool of students from economics and business courses at the University of Berlin and the Institute For Empirical Research In Economics at the University of Zurich and had
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Gneezy and List (2006, Econometrica) were two of the first economists to investigate whether similar results found in the previous laboratory experiments could be replicated in a field setting. They did so by conducting two separate experiments, each involving a number of volunteer participants who
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was conducted to observe the difference in findings that were predicted to occur when the gift-exchange game performed between one employer one employee was compared to a game performed between one employer and four employees. The results indicated the number of employees did not have a significant
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Most laboratory and field studies regarding the gift-exchange game focus on a bilateral relationship (one employee and one employer). An experiment conducted by
Maximiano, Sloof and Sonnemans (2013) focused on creating a more complex laboratory environment to allow for further extrapolation of the
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The results demonstrate the commonality for individuals to experience a feeling of duty or reciprocate actions with commensurate worth or significance. To put in other words, If the employer expects the employee to put in a higher effort when offered a higher salary it may be in the employees best
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Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993, QJE) designed a market in which "employers" and "employees" do not meet. All wages and effort and "employees" are put in different rooms for many experiments, and are told that the counterparties of each transaction are different, and both sides keep "anonymous"
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Chaudhuri, Ananish Sbai, Erwann found in a study of sex differences in trust and reciprocity in repeated gift exchange games that there were no significant gender differences in trust, and women performed better in reciprocity. However, when the experimental context was placed in a specific labor
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when strategies are involved in the decision-making between the players. However, there are key differences between the two games. The difference constitutes by the sequentiality of gift-exchange game, with the gift exchange games being based on social norms of reciprocity, where participants are
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as it demonstrates that self-interest maximization is not the sole determinant of economic decision-making. Rather, reciprocity is a fundamental factor that shapes individuals' behaviour in economic contexts. By simulating labor relations between an employer and employee, the game explicates that
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The experiment of Franke et al is based on a modified gift-exchange game, where workers can participate in wage setting. The results of this experiment show that when workers have the right to make wage decisions, they show a positive incentive to work harder. However, if firms want employees to
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Akerlof's model has become the topic of several experiments aimed at understanding employee motivation and behaviour, as well as the effect of fairness from employers. The results of these experiments have been mixed and are highly dependent on the experimental setting. Several studies have been
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to model reciprocacy in labor relations. The gift-exchange game simulates a labor-management relationship execution problem in the principal-agent problem in labor economics. The simplest form of the game involves two players â an employee and an employer. The employer first decides whether they
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Reciprocity is a fundamental concept within game theory that offers the idea that agents are more likely to cooperate if they believe that the cooperation will be reciprocated back. Ie. You do something for me, Iâll do something for you; a mutual gain. Within the gift exchange game, it has been
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The gift-exchange game is not only used in the workplace but can also be practiced in other areas. For example, in the field of charitable giving, when a charity first makes a gift to a potential donor as part of a donation solicitation, more generous gifts are associated with higher frequency
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Reciprocity within the gift exchange game shows how social interaction play a large role in what are considered economic decisions and is the factor that balances and maintains the stability between give and take. In recognising the important of reciprocity, employees and employers can foster
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to investigate the gift exchange theory in a natural setting. Findings found that out of roughly 10,000 solicitation letter to potential donors, one third contained no gift to accompany the call for donations, one third a small gift and one third a large gift with random assignments. The data
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aims to show how rational decisions can lead to sub-optimal outcomes for both parties, even when cooperation is in the best interest of both parties. The goal of both games is to maximize the amount of money each player receives, but in the prisoner's dilemma, rational decisions can lead to
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interests to put in a greater effort. Additionally, if the employee puts in a higher effort it may result in an increase in wage down the track. Thus indicating that the gift exchange game may have multiple equilibria, dependant on expectations, beliefs and if
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wage. According to
Akerlof's model, this is because the workerâs effort not only depends on the effort itself, wage rate if employed, and the unemployed benefit if unemployed, but also the norm for effort. Thus, to affect these norms, firms may pay more.
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exert high effort, firms need to offer high enough offers or delegate substantial decisions to employees. In practical applications, different mechanisms of co-determination might lead to very different incentive structures and performance outcomes.
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when employer offer a higher salary, employees are more inclined to reciprocate with great effort, leading to mutually beneficial outcomes. Gift exchange games have been used to study economic and social phenomena such as labor contracts,
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implemented to evaluate these situations and the decisions by the players that are made affecting each players out come. The extra effort in gift-exchange games is modelled to be a negative payoff if not compensated by salary. The
74:. If the employer pays extra salary and the employee puts in extra effort, then both players are better off than otherwise. The relationship between an investor and an investee has been investigated as the same type of a game.
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confirmed that potential donors were much more likely to donate with the relative frequency being 75% more likely to receive a donation from a large gift recipient. These results are backed by a number of similar studies from
301:. George A. Akerlof described labor contracts as "partial gift exchange". Unlike what is depicted in the simple model above, in real life, employees may exceed the minimum work required and firms may pay more than the
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A recent study in 2023 showed that in the gift-exchange game of labor relations, employees' costless and non-binding voice leads firms to reduce the actual workload in agreed contracts rather than increase wages.
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incentivized to act in ways that other players deem fair. The goal of the game is to maximize the amount of money each player receives, and to follow the expectations of the group. Although, in contrast to the
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A positive relationship between salary and effort has been observed in a large number of gift-exchange experiments performed in a laboratory setting. This behaviour obviously deviates from the equilibrium.
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two participants are faced with either cooperation or betrayal, without knowing what the other players will decide and the payoff of each possible outcome is determined by the choices of both players. The
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identified within numerous large-scale studies that the higher the gift the higher the quality levels or effort put in. An example of reciprocity due to social norms was a field study conducted by the
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should award a higher salary to the employee. The employee then decides whether to reciprocate with a higher level of effort (work harder) due to the salary increase or not. Like
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of own extra work is not considered in the payoff structure of this game. Therefore, this model rather fits labor conditions, which are less meaningful for the employees.
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Yamamori, Tetsuo; Iwata, Kazuyuki (3 February 2023). "Wage claim detracts reciprocity in labor relations: an experimental study of gift exchange games".
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Exchange in the Workplace: Addressing the Conflicting Evidence with a Careful Test".
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Franke, Jörg; Gurtoviy, Ruslan; Mertins, Vanessa (October 2016). "Workers' participation in wage setting: A gift-exchange experiment".
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Fehr, Ernst; Kirchsteiger, Georg; Riedl, Arno (1993). "Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation".
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Fehr, E.; Kirchsteiger, G.; Riedl, A. (1 May 1993). "Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation".
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The gift exchange model is used to explain workers' effort and wages provided by firms in the real world, especially
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Fehr, Ernst; GĂ€chter, Simon (May 1998). "Reciprocity and economics: The economic implications of Homo Reciprocans".
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impact on the level of effort that was chosen, with both mean effort levels increasing with wage at similar rates.
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724:"No Strategy Can Win in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Linking Game Theory and Computer Simulations"
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Berg, Joyce; Dickhaut, John; McCabe, Kevin (July 1995). "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History".
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advantageous relationships with others to contribute to more harmonious and productive relations.
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816:. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems. pp. 1913â1915.
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Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems
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The payoff matrix of the gift-exchange game has the same structure as the payoff matrix of
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Some user interaction systems use the gift-exchange game as the right gamification model.
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with minimal salary and minimal effort. Data from another experiment on 123 students from
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Charness, Gary (July 2000). "Responsibility and effort in an experimental labor market".
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539:"Is reciprocity really outcome-based? A second look at gift-exchange with random shocks"
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Tagiew, Rustam; Ignatov, Dmitry I. (2014-02-23). "Reciprocity in Gift-Exchange-Games".
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Akerlof, A. G.; Yellen, J. (1990). "The fair wage-effort hypothesis and unemployment".
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Homans, George C. (1954). "The Cash Posters: A Study of a Group of Working Girls".
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with the data showing a contrast to what is considered the nash equilibrium.
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The gift exchange game serves as a valuable lens through which to understand
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Trivers, Robert L. (March 1971). "The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism".
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Heijden, ECM; Nelissen, JHM; Potters, JJM; Verbon, HAA (26 March 2007).
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showed a rate of 69% for high salary being paid by employer in advance.
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This article is about the game-theoretic model. For the party game, see
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Kube, Sebastian; Maréchal, Michel André; Puppe, Clemens (1 June 2012).
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Akerlof, George A. (1982). "Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange".
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Charness, Gary; Fréchette, Guillaume R.; Kagel, John H. (2001-10-08).
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Revisiting Gift Exchange: Theoretical Considerations and a Field Test
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Heijden, Ecm; Nelissen, Jhm; Potters, Jjm; Verbon, Haa (April 2001).
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1948:
Maximiano, Sandra; Sloof, Randolph; Sonnemans, Joep (January 2013).
1678:
1643:
1116:
862:
404:
2980:
2480:
1600:
1477:"Gift exchange and reciprocity in competitive experimental markets"
1093:
928:
1343:
1058:
GĂ€chter, Simon; Nosenzo, Daniele; Sefton, Martin (December 2012).
625:
University of Innsbruck Working Papers in Economics and Statistics
579:
2701:
2691:
2369:
619:
G. Kocher, J. Luhan, Sutter, Martin, Wolfgang, Matthias (2012).
1395:"The robustness of laboratory gift exchange: A reconsideration"
1475:
Fehr, Ernst; Kirchsteiger, Georg; Riedl, Arno (January 1998).
102:
2470:
1737:"The Currency of Reciprocity: Gift Exchange in the Workplace"
913:"Attribution and Reciprocity in an Experimental Labor Market"
711:. -1627 (Experimental Economics and Machine Learning): 82â93.
1845:
Falk, Armin (September 2007). "Gift Exchange in the Field".
1827:
EstevesâSorenson, Constança; Macera, Rosario (August 2013).
1509:
Falk, Armin (September 2007). "Gift Exchange in the Field".
1240:
1012:
953:
Maximiano, Sandra; Sloof, Randolph; Sonnemans, Joep (2007).
808:
Damer, Steven; Gini, Maria; Rosenschein, Jeffrey S. (2019).
1950:"Gift exchange and the separation of ownership and control"
618:
537:
Davis, Brent J.; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Oexl, Regine (2017).
130:. Actions predicted by this equilibrium are colored black.
1880:
Supriyanto, Supriyanto; Fahana, Jefree (30 April 2020).
461:"Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity"
337:
1947:
952:
722:
GarcĂa, JuliĂĄn; van Veelen, Matthijs (29 August 2018).
331:
donations, resulting in more donations to the charity.
1826:
1414:
772:
322:
valuable insight into employee and employer behavior.
138:
game where all players are aware of previous actions,
1920:
1780:"Gift Exchange in the Workplace: Money or Attention?"
1474:
1102:
848:
1834:(Report). Institution for Social and Policy Studies.
1243:"Simple and complex gift exchange in the laboratory"
1057:
1015:"Simple and complex gift exchange in the laboratory"
838:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prisoner-dilemma/
807:
651:
536:
810:"The Gift Exchange Game: Managing Opponent Actions"
173:
146:
122:Idealistic representation of gift-exchange game in
1886:Lontar Komputer: Jurnal Ilmiah Teknologi Informasi
1060:"The Impact of Social Comparisons on Reciprocity*"
501:
222:market, female reciprocity performance decreased.
1734:
254:
3059:
1879:
1699:
1393:Engelmann, Dick; Ortmann, Andreas (2002-01-01).
1392:
1360:Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination
721:
1140:Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
654:Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
194:showed that only 33% of games ended up in the
1994:
1357:
1336:
1301:
699:
390:
1784:Journal of the European Economic Association
1543:
1165:Gneezy, Uri; List, John A (September 2006).
637:: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (
182:A study on 84 undergraduate students at the
883:
588:
543:Journal of the Economic Science Association
458:
2001:
1987:
1198:
1164:
695:
693:
428:
2008:
1897:
1803:
1762:
1752:
1417:"How Robust is Laboratory Gift Exchange?"
1342:
978:
749:
739:
673:
562:
486:
476:
1137:
910:
700:Tagiew, Rustam; Ignatov, Dmitry (2016).
117:
101:
62:, gift-exchange games are used to study
1664:
1586:
702:"Gift Ratios in Laboratory Experiments"
690:
89:
14:
3060:
1629:
955:"Gift Exchange in a Multi-Worker Firm"
454:
452:
325:
190:Another experiment with students from
1982:
1067:The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
1053:
1051:
1008:
1006:
948:
946:
459:Fehr, E.; GĂ€chter, S. (Summer 2000).
424:
422:
384:
338:Modification of game conditions usage
1844:
1508:
614:
612:
465:The Journal of Economic Perspectives
1777:
1199:Gneezy, Uri; List, John A. (2006).
449:
292:
24:
2050:First-player and second-player win
1667:The Quarterly Journal of Economics
1262:10.1111/j.1465-7295.2001.tb00066.x
1105:The Quarterly Journal of Economics
1048:
1034:10.1111/j.1465-7295.2001.tb00066.x
1003:
943:
851:The Quarterly Journal of Economics
787:10.1023/B:EXEC.0000026979.14590.3c
419:
25:
3084:
609:
106:Normal form of gift exchange game
2157:Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium
1899:10.24843/LKJITI.2020.v11.i01.p06
1859:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00800.x
1523:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00800.x
1220:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00707.x
1186:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00707.x
1079:10.1111/j.1467-9442.2012.01730.x
971:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02065.x
603:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2014.04.001
174:Experimental Methods and Results
147:Contrast with Prisoner's dilemma
126:. This game has only one single
1941:
1914:
1873:
1838:
1820:
1771:
1728:
1693:
1658:
1623:
1589:The Quarterly Review of Biology
1580:
1537:
1502:
1468:
1408:
1386:
1351:
1330:
1295:
1276:
1234:
1192:
1158:
1131:
904:
877:
842:
830:
801:
766:
715:
2167:Evolutionarily stable strategy
1923:Journal of Economic Psychology
1285:Journal of Economic Psychology
645:
530:
495:
393:Quarterly Journal of Economics
255:Reciprocity & Social Norms
66:for human subject research in
13:
1:
2095:Simultaneous action selection
1496:10.1016/S0014-2921(96)00051-7
1152:10.1016/s0167-2681(00)00096-2
898:10.1016/S0014-2921(97)00131-1
443:10.1016/S0313-5926(11)50007-4
377:
134:As this game is considered a
3032:List of games in game theory
2207:Quantal response equilibrium
2197:Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
2132:Bayes correlated equilibrium
1632:American Sociological Review
1316:10.1080/00779954.2011.556072
911:Charness, Gary (July 2004).
728:Frontiers in Robotics and AI
431:Economic Analysis and Policy
32:White elephant gift exchange
7:
2501:Optional prisoner's dilemma
2227:Self-confirming equilibrium
1957:Games and Economic Behavior
1796:10.1162/JEEA.2009.7.2-3.550
1304:New Zealand Economic Papers
504:Games and Economic Behavior
350:
241:
41:also commonly known as the
10:
3089:
2966:Principal variation search
2682:Aumann's agreement theorem
2345:Strategy-stealing argument
2252:Trembling hand equilibrium
2182:Markov perfect equilibrium
2177:Mertens-stable equilibrium
1935:10.1016/j.joep.2016.07.002
1372:10.1007/s11403-023-00378-9
917:Journal of Labor Economics
812:. In Elkind, Edith (ed.).
666:10.1016/j.jebo.2008.01.004
29:
3002:Combinatorial game theory
2989:
2948:
2730:
2674:
2661:Princess and monster game
2456:
2358:
2260:
2212:Quasi-perfect equilibrium
2137:Bayesian Nash equilibrium
2118:
2017:
1969:10.1016/j.geb.2012.07.004
1558:10.1007/s10683-013-9372-x
709:CEUR Workshop Proceedings
555:10.1007/s40881-017-0041-2
3073:Game theory game classes
3017:Evolutionary game theory
2750:Antoine Augustin Cournot
2636:Guess 2/3 of the average
2433:Strictly determined game
2222:Satisfaction equilibrium
2040:Escalation of commitment
1741:American Economic Review
1484:European Economic Review
886:European Economic Review
741:10.3389/frobt.2018.00102
591:European Economic Review
299:involuntary unemployment
275:University of Nottingham
200:University of Nottingham
3022:Glossary of game theory
2621:Stackelberg competition
2242:Strong Nash equilibrium
267:University of Amsterdam
184:University of Amsterdam
45:, is a common economic
3047:Tragedy of the commons
3027:List of game theorists
3007:Confrontation analysis
2717:SpragueâGrundy theorem
2232:Sequential equilibrium
2152:Correlated equilibrium
1754:10.1257/aer.102.4.1644
1714:10.1287/mnsc.2017.2801
1546:Experimental Economics
1456:Cite journal requires
775:Experimental Economics
516:10.1006/game.1995.1027
131:
107:
3068:Non-cooperative games
2820:Jean-François Mertens
121:
110:Like in trust games,
105:
43:gift exchange dilemma
2949:Search optimizations
2825:Jennifer Tour Chayes
2712:Revelation principle
2707:Purification theorem
2646:Nash bargaining game
2611:Bertrand competition
2596:El Farol Bar problem
2561:Electronic mail game
2526:Lewis signaling game
2065:Hierarchy of beliefs
1778:Dur, Robert (2009).
959:The Economic Journal
478:10.1257/jep.14.3.159
90:Equilibrium analysis
2997:Bounded rationality
2616:Cournot competition
2566:Rock paper scissors
2541:Battle of the sexes
2531:Volunteer's dilemma
2403:Perfect information
2330:Dominant strategies
2162:Epsilon-equilibrium
2045:Extensive-form game
1425:10.2139/ssrn.292854
488:20.500.11850/146582
326:Other fields usages
140:backwards induction
136:perfect information
84:market transactions
39:gift-exchange game,
27:Type of game theory
2976:Paranoid algorithm
2956:Alphaâbeta pruning
2835:John Maynard Smith
2666:Rendezvous problem
2506:Traveler's dilemma
2496:Gift-exchange game
2491:Prisoner's dilemma
2408:Large Poisson game
2375:Bargaining problem
2275:Backward induction
2247:Subgame perfection
2202:Proper equilibrium
1702:Management Science
965:(522): 1025â1050.
362:Prisoner's dilemma
283:social preferences
271:Tilburg University
192:Tilburg University
163:prisoner's dilemma
158:prisoner's dilemma
153:Prisoner's dilemma
132:
108:
18:Gift-exchange Game
3055:
3054:
2961:Aspiration window
2930:Suzanne Scotchmer
2885:Oskar Morgenstern
2780:Donald B. Gillies
2722:Zermelo's theorem
2651:Induction puzzles
2606:Fair cake-cutting
2581:Public goods game
2511:Coordination game
2385:Intransitive game
2310:Forward induction
2192:Pareto efficiency
2172:Gibbs equilibrium
2142:Berge equilibrium
2090:Simultaneous game
1419:. Rochester, NY.
823:978-1-4503-6309-9
262:University of Bon
68:social psychology
16:(Redirected from
3080:
3042:Topological game
3037:No-win situation
2935:Thomas Schelling
2915:Robert B. Wilson
2875:Merrill M. Flood
2845:John von Neumann
2755:Ariel Rubinstein
2740:Albert W. Tucker
2591:War of attrition
2551:Matching pennies
2325:Pairing strategy
2187:Nash equilibrium
2110:Mechanism design
2075:Normal-form game
2030:Cooperative game
2003:
1996:
1989:
1980:
1979:
1973:
1972:
1954:
1945:
1939:
1938:
1918:
1912:
1911:
1901:
1877:
1871:
1870:
1853:(5): 1501â1511.
1842:
1836:
1835:
1833:
1824:
1818:
1817:
1807:
1790:(2/3): 550â560.
1775:
1769:
1768:
1766:
1756:
1747:(4): 1644â1662.
1732:
1726:
1725:
1708:(9): 3971â4470.
1697:
1691:
1690:
1662:
1656:
1655:
1627:
1621:
1620:
1584:
1578:
1577:
1541:
1535:
1534:
1517:(5): 1501â1511.
1506:
1500:
1499:
1481:
1472:
1466:
1465:
1459:
1454:
1452:
1444:
1412:
1406:
1405:
1399:
1390:
1384:
1383:
1355:
1349:
1348:
1346:
1334:
1328:
1327:
1299:
1293:
1292:
1280:
1274:
1273:
1250:Economic Inquiry
1247:
1238:
1232:
1231:
1214:(5): 1365â1384.
1205:
1196:
1190:
1189:
1180:(5): 1365â1384.
1171:
1162:
1156:
1155:
1135:
1129:
1128:
1100:
1091:
1090:
1073:(4): 1346â1367.
1064:
1055:
1046:
1045:
1022:Economic Inquiry
1019:
1010:
1001:
1000:
982:
950:
941:
940:
908:
902:
901:
892:(3â5): 845â859.
881:
875:
874:
846:
840:
834:
828:
827:
805:
799:
798:
770:
764:
763:
753:
743:
719:
713:
712:
706:
697:
688:
687:
677:
660:(3â4): 671â677.
649:
643:
642:
636:
628:
616:
607:
606:
586:
577:
576:
566:
534:
528:
527:
499:
493:
492:
490:
480:
456:
447:
446:
426:
417:
416:
388:
293:Work Field usage
196:Nash equilibrium
168:Nash equilibrium
128:Nash equilibrium
21:
3088:
3087:
3083:
3082:
3081:
3079:
3078:
3077:
3058:
3057:
3056:
3051:
2985:
2971:max^n algorithm
2944:
2940:William Vickrey
2900:Reinhard Selten
2855:Kenneth Binmore
2770:David K. Levine
2765:Daniel Kahneman
2732:
2726:
2702:Negamax theorem
2692:Minimax theorem
2670:
2631:Diner's dilemma
2486:All-pay auction
2452:
2438:Stochastic game
2390:Mean-field game
2361:
2354:
2320:Markov strategy
2256:
2122:
2114:
2085:Sequential game
2070:Information set
2055:Game complexity
2025:Congestion game
2013:
2007:
1977:
1976:
1952:
1946:
1942:
1919:
1915:
1878:
1874:
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1821:
1776:
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1733:
1729:
1698:
1694:
1679:10.2307/1885099
1663:
1659:
1644:10.2307/2087919
1628:
1624:
1585:
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1542:
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1507:
1503:
1479:
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1413:
1409:
1397:
1391:
1387:
1356:
1352:
1335:
1331:
1300:
1296:
1282:
1281:
1277:
1245:
1239:
1235:
1203:
1197:
1193:
1169:
1163:
1159:
1136:
1132:
1117:10.2307/2118338
1101:
1094:
1062:
1056:
1049:
1017:
1011:
1004:
951:
944:
909:
905:
882:
878:
863:10.2307/2118338
847:
843:
835:
831:
824:
806:
802:
771:
767:
720:
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704:
698:
691:
650:
646:
630:
629:
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610:
587:
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535:
531:
500:
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457:
450:
427:
420:
405:10.2307/2937787
389:
385:
380:
372:Efficiency wage
353:
340:
328:
303:market-clearing
295:
285:are two-sided.
257:
244:
176:
149:
92:
79:economic theory
35:
28:
23:
22:
15:
12:
11:
5:
3086:
3076:
3075:
3070:
3053:
3052:
3050:
3049:
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3039:
3034:
3029:
3024:
3019:
3014:
3009:
3004:
2999:
2993:
2991:
2987:
2986:
2984:
2983:
2978:
2973:
2968:
2963:
2958:
2952:
2950:
2946:
2945:
2943:
2942:
2937:
2932:
2927:
2922:
2917:
2912:
2907:
2905:Robert Axelrod
2902:
2897:
2892:
2887:
2882:
2880:Olga Bondareva
2877:
2872:
2870:Melvin Dresher
2867:
2862:
2860:Leonid Hurwicz
2857:
2852:
2847:
2842:
2837:
2832:
2827:
2822:
2817:
2812:
2807:
2802:
2797:
2795:Harold W. Kuhn
2792:
2787:
2785:Drew Fudenberg
2782:
2777:
2775:David M. Kreps
2772:
2767:
2762:
2760:Claude Shannon
2757:
2752:
2747:
2742:
2736:
2734:
2728:
2727:
2725:
2724:
2719:
2714:
2709:
2704:
2699:
2697:Nash's theorem
2694:
2689:
2684:
2678:
2676:
2672:
2671:
2669:
2668:
2663:
2658:
2653:
2648:
2643:
2638:
2633:
2628:
2623:
2618:
2613:
2608:
2603:
2598:
2593:
2588:
2583:
2578:
2573:
2568:
2563:
2558:
2556:Ultimatum game
2553:
2548:
2543:
2538:
2536:Dollar auction
2533:
2528:
2523:
2521:Centipede game
2518:
2513:
2508:
2503:
2498:
2493:
2488:
2483:
2478:
2476:Infinite chess
2473:
2468:
2462:
2460:
2454:
2453:
2451:
2450:
2445:
2443:Symmetric game
2440:
2435:
2430:
2428:Signaling game
2425:
2423:Screening game
2420:
2415:
2413:Potential game
2410:
2405:
2400:
2392:
2387:
2382:
2377:
2372:
2366:
2364:
2356:
2355:
2353:
2352:
2347:
2342:
2340:Mixed strategy
2337:
2332:
2327:
2322:
2317:
2312:
2307:
2302:
2297:
2292:
2287:
2282:
2277:
2272:
2266:
2264:
2258:
2257:
2255:
2254:
2249:
2244:
2239:
2234:
2229:
2224:
2219:
2217:Risk dominance
2214:
2209:
2204:
2199:
2194:
2189:
2184:
2179:
2174:
2169:
2164:
2159:
2154:
2149:
2144:
2139:
2134:
2128:
2126:
2116:
2115:
2113:
2112:
2107:
2102:
2097:
2092:
2087:
2082:
2077:
2072:
2067:
2062:
2060:Graphical game
2057:
2052:
2047:
2042:
2037:
2032:
2027:
2021:
2019:
2015:
2014:
2006:
2005:
1998:
1991:
1983:
1975:
1974:
1940:
1913:
1872:
1837:
1819:
1770:
1727:
1692:
1673:(4): 543â569.
1657:
1638:(6): 724â733.
1622:
1601:10.1086/406755
1579:
1552:(3): 347â370.
1536:
1501:
1467:
1458:|journal=
1407:
1385:
1366:(3): 573â597.
1350:
1329:
1310:(1â2): 81â95.
1294:
1275:
1256:(2): 280â297.
1233:
1191:
1157:
1146:(3): 375â384.
1130:
1111:(2): 437â459.
1092:
1047:
1028:(2): 280â297.
1002:
942:
929:10.1086/383111
923:(3): 665â688.
903:
876:
857:(2): 437â459.
841:
829:
822:
800:
781:(2): 189â205.
765:
714:
689:
644:
608:
578:
549:(2): 149â160.
529:
510:(1): 122â142.
494:
471:(3): 159â181.
448:
418:
399:(2): 255â283.
382:
381:
379:
376:
375:
374:
369:
367:Ultimatum game
364:
359:
352:
349:
339:
336:
327:
324:
294:
291:
256:
253:
243:
240:
175:
172:
148:
145:
124:extensive form
112:game-theoretic
91:
88:
51:George Akerlof
49:introduced by
26:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
3085:
3074:
3071:
3069:
3066:
3065:
3063:
3048:
3045:
3043:
3040:
3038:
3035:
3033:
3030:
3028:
3025:
3023:
3020:
3018:
3015:
3013:
3010:
3008:
3005:
3003:
3000:
2998:
2995:
2994:
2992:
2990:Miscellaneous
2988:
2982:
2979:
2977:
2974:
2972:
2969:
2967:
2964:
2962:
2959:
2957:
2954:
2953:
2951:
2947:
2941:
2938:
2936:
2933:
2931:
2928:
2926:
2925:Samuel Bowles
2923:
2921:
2920:Roger Myerson
2918:
2916:
2913:
2911:
2910:Robert Aumann
2908:
2906:
2903:
2901:
2898:
2896:
2893:
2891:
2888:
2886:
2883:
2881:
2878:
2876:
2873:
2871:
2868:
2866:
2865:Lloyd Shapley
2863:
2861:
2858:
2856:
2853:
2851:
2850:Kenneth Arrow
2848:
2846:
2843:
2841:
2838:
2836:
2833:
2831:
2830:John Harsanyi
2828:
2826:
2823:
2821:
2818:
2816:
2813:
2811:
2808:
2806:
2803:
2801:
2800:Herbert Simon
2798:
2796:
2793:
2791:
2788:
2786:
2783:
2781:
2778:
2776:
2773:
2771:
2768:
2766:
2763:
2761:
2758:
2756:
2753:
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2748:
2746:
2743:
2741:
2738:
2737:
2735:
2729:
2723:
2720:
2718:
2715:
2713:
2710:
2708:
2705:
2703:
2700:
2698:
2695:
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2690:
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2683:
2680:
2679:
2677:
2673:
2667:
2664:
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2639:
2637:
2634:
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2629:
2627:
2624:
2622:
2619:
2617:
2614:
2612:
2609:
2607:
2604:
2602:
2601:Fair division
2599:
2597:
2594:
2592:
2589:
2587:
2584:
2582:
2579:
2577:
2576:Dictator game
2574:
2572:
2569:
2567:
2564:
2562:
2559:
2557:
2554:
2552:
2549:
2547:
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2527:
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2509:
2507:
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2502:
2499:
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2479:
2477:
2474:
2472:
2469:
2467:
2464:
2463:
2461:
2459:
2455:
2449:
2448:Zero-sum game
2446:
2444:
2441:
2439:
2436:
2434:
2431:
2429:
2426:
2424:
2421:
2419:
2418:Repeated game
2416:
2414:
2411:
2409:
2406:
2404:
2401:
2399:
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2388:
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2367:
2365:
2363:
2357:
2351:
2348:
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2343:
2341:
2338:
2336:
2335:Pure strategy
2333:
2331:
2328:
2326:
2323:
2321:
2318:
2316:
2313:
2311:
2308:
2306:
2303:
2301:
2298:
2296:
2295:De-escalation
2293:
2291:
2288:
2286:
2283:
2281:
2278:
2276:
2273:
2271:
2268:
2267:
2265:
2263:
2259:
2253:
2250:
2248:
2245:
2243:
2240:
2238:
2237:Shapley value
2235:
2233:
2230:
2228:
2225:
2223:
2220:
2218:
2215:
2213:
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2208:
2205:
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2198:
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2135:
2133:
2130:
2129:
2127:
2125:
2121:
2117:
2111:
2108:
2106:
2105:Succinct game
2103:
2101:
2098:
2096:
2093:
2091:
2088:
2086:
2083:
2081:
2078:
2076:
2073:
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2068:
2066:
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2028:
2026:
2023:
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2020:
2016:
2012:
2004:
1999:
1997:
1992:
1990:
1985:
1984:
1981:
1970:
1966:
1962:
1958:
1951:
1944:
1936:
1932:
1928:
1924:
1917:
1909:
1905:
1900:
1895:
1891:
1887:
1883:
1876:
1868:
1864:
1860:
1856:
1852:
1848:
1841:
1830:
1823:
1815:
1811:
1806:
1801:
1797:
1793:
1789:
1785:
1781:
1774:
1765:
1760:
1755:
1750:
1746:
1742:
1738:
1731:
1723:
1719:
1715:
1711:
1707:
1703:
1696:
1688:
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1676:
1672:
1668:
1661:
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1649:
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1637:
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1618:
1614:
1610:
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1602:
1598:
1594:
1590:
1583:
1575:
1571:
1567:
1563:
1559:
1555:
1551:
1547:
1540:
1532:
1528:
1524:
1520:
1516:
1512:
1505:
1497:
1493:
1489:
1485:
1478:
1471:
1463:
1450:
1442:
1438:
1434:
1430:
1426:
1422:
1418:
1411:
1403:
1396:
1389:
1381:
1377:
1373:
1369:
1365:
1361:
1354:
1345:
1340:
1333:
1325:
1321:
1317:
1313:
1309:
1305:
1298:
1290:
1286:
1279:
1271:
1267:
1263:
1259:
1255:
1251:
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1237:
1229:
1225:
1221:
1217:
1213:
1209:
1202:
1195:
1187:
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1179:
1175:
1168:
1161:
1153:
1149:
1145:
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1134:
1126:
1122:
1118:
1114:
1110:
1106:
1099:
1097:
1088:
1084:
1080:
1076:
1072:
1068:
1061:
1054:
1052:
1043:
1039:
1035:
1031:
1027:
1023:
1016:
1009:
1007:
998:
994:
990:
986:
981:
976:
972:
968:
964:
960:
956:
949:
947:
938:
934:
930:
926:
922:
918:
914:
907:
899:
895:
891:
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880:
872:
868:
864:
860:
856:
852:
845:
839:
833:
825:
819:
815:
811:
804:
796:
792:
788:
784:
780:
776:
769:
761:
757:
752:
747:
742:
737:
733:
729:
725:
718:
710:
703:
696:
694:
685:
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676:
671:
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663:
659:
655:
648:
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634:
626:
622:
615:
613:
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570:
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548:
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521:
517:
513:
509:
505:
498:
489:
484:
479:
474:
470:
466:
462:
455:
453:
444:
440:
437:(1): 99â108.
436:
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423:
414:
410:
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104:
100:
98:
87:
85:
80:
75:
73:
69:
65:
61:
56:
52:
48:
44:
40:
33:
19:
2895:Peyton Young
2890:Paul Milgrom
2805:Hervé Moulin
2745:Amos Tversky
2687:Folk theorem
2495:
2398:-player game
2395:
2315:Grim trigger
1963:(1): 41â60.
1960:
1956:
1943:
1926:
1922:
1916:
1889:
1885:
1875:
1850:
1847:Econometrica
1846:
1840:
1822:
1787:
1783:
1773:
1744:
1740:
1730:
1705:
1701:
1695:
1670:
1666:
1660:
1635:
1631:
1625:
1595:(1): 35â57.
1592:
1588:
1582:
1549:
1545:
1539:
1514:
1511:Econometrica
1510:
1504:
1487:
1483:
1470:
1449:cite journal
1410:
1401:
1388:
1363:
1359:
1353:
1332:
1307:
1303:
1297:
1288:
1284:
1278:
1253:
1249:
1236:
1211:
1208:Econometrica
1207:
1194:
1177:
1174:Econometrica
1173:
1160:
1143:
1139:
1133:
1108:
1104:
1070:
1066:
1025:
1021:
962:
958:
920:
916:
906:
889:
885:
879:
854:
850:
844:
832:
813:
803:
778:
774:
768:
731:
727:
717:
708:
657:
653:
647:
633:cite journal
624:
594:
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546:
542:
532:
507:
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468:
464:
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430:
396:
392:
386:
345:
341:
333:
329:
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316:
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296:
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245:
236:
232:
228:
224:
220:
216:
212:
208:
204:
189:
181:
177:
150:
133:
109:
93:
76:
55:Janet Yellen
42:
38:
36:
3012:Coopetition
2815:Jean Tirole
2810:John Conway
2790:Eric Maskin
2586:Blotto game
2571:Pirate game
2380:Global game
2350:Tit for tat
2280:Bid shading
2270:Appeasement
2120:Equilibrium
2100:Solved game
2035:Determinacy
2018:Definitions
2011:game theory
1929:: 151â162.
1805:10419/26541
1764:10419/45629
1490:(1): 1â34.
980:10419/86245
597:: 145â158.
97:IKEA effect
64:reciprocity
60:trust games
3062:Categories
2656:Trust game
2641:Kuhn poker
2305:Escalation
2300:Deterrence
2290:Cheap talk
2262:Strategies
2080:Preference
2009:Topics of
1574:1555370108
675:10161/6324
378:References
357:Trust game
2840:John Nash
2546:Stag hunt
2285:Collusion
1908:237509941
1892:(1): 57.
1609:0033-5770
1566:254467677
1380:256593027
1344:1402.5593
1324:144025994
524:144827131
72:economics
2981:Lazy SMP
2675:Theorems
2626:Deadlock
2481:Checkers
2362:of games
2124:concepts
1867:11340103
1814:40282772
1722:27617458
1617:19027999
1570:ProQuest
1531:11340103
1433:16908983
1402:Abstract
1270:13371057
1042:13371057
997:56388626
795:16908983
760:33500981
684:14043040
573:31998602
351:See also
242:Critique
2733:figures
2516:Chicken
2370:Auction
2360:Classes
1687:1885099
1652:2087919
1291:. 2020.
1228:3805928
1125:2118338
989:4625542
937:7530325
871:2118338
751:7805755
734:: 102.
564:6956943
413:2937787
1906:
1865:
1812:
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682:
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561:
522:
411:
2471:Chess
2458:Games
1953:(PDF)
1904:S2CID
1863:S2CID
1832:(PDF)
1810:JSTOR
1718:S2CID
1683:JSTOR
1648:JSTOR
1613:S2CID
1562:S2CID
1527:S2CID
1480:(PDF)
1429:S2CID
1398:(PDF)
1376:S2CID
1339:arXiv
1320:S2CID
1266:S2CID
1246:(PDF)
1224:JSTOR
1204:(PDF)
1170:(PDF)
1121:JSTOR
1083:S2CID
1063:(PDF)
1038:S2CID
1018:(PDF)
993:S2CID
985:JSTOR
933:S2CID
867:JSTOR
791:S2CID
705:(PDF)
680:S2CID
520:S2CID
409:JSTOR
2147:Core
1605:ISSN
1462:help
1437:SSRN
818:ISBN
756:PMID
639:link
569:PMID
273:and
70:and
53:and
47:game
37:The
2731:Key
1965:doi
1931:doi
1894:doi
1855:doi
1800:hdl
1792:doi
1759:hdl
1749:doi
1745:102
1710:doi
1675:doi
1640:doi
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1421:doi
1368:doi
1312:doi
1258:doi
1216:doi
1182:doi
1148:doi
1113:doi
1109:108
1075:doi
1071:114
1030:doi
975:hdl
967:doi
963:117
925:doi
894:doi
859:doi
855:108
783:doi
746:PMC
736:doi
670:hdl
662:doi
599:doi
559:PMC
551:doi
512:doi
483:hdl
473:doi
439:doi
401:doi
397:105
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2466:Go
1961:77
1959:.
1955:.
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