110:
47:. Complete information is the concept that each player in the game is aware of the sequence, strategies, and payoffs throughout gameplay. Given this information, the players have the ability to plan accordingly based on the information to maximize their own strategies and utility at the end of the game.
117:
The extensive form can be used to visualize the concept of complete information. By definition, players know where they are as depicted by the nodes, and the final outcomes as illustrated by the utility payoffs. The players also understand the potential strategies of each player and as a result their
100:
Lastly, when complete information is unavailable (incomplete information games), these solutions turn towards
Bayesian Nash Equilibria since games with incomplete information become Bayesian games. In a game of complete information, the players' payoffs functions are common knowledge, whereas in a
189:
is a commonly given example to illustrate how the lack of certain information influences the game, without chess itself being such a game. One can readily observe all of the opponent's moves and viable strategies available to them but never ascertain which one the opponent is following until this
142:). Conversely, in games of perfect information, every player observes other players' moves, but may lack some information on others' payoffs, or on the structure of the game. A game with complete information may or may not have perfect information, and vice versa.
84:
In games that have a varying degree of complete information and game type, there are different methods available to the player to solve the game based on this information. In games with static, complete information, the approach to solve is to use
54:, players do not possess full information about their opponents. Some players possess private information, a fact that the others should take into account when forming expectations about how those players will behave. A typical example is an
133:
In a game of complete information, the structure of the game and the payoff functions of the players are commonly known but players may not see all of the moves made by other players (for instance, the initial placement of ships in
42:
is an economic situation or game in which knowledge about other market participants or players is available to all participants. The utility functions (including risk aversion), payoffs, strategies and "types" of players are thus
96:
A classic example of a dynamic game with complete information is
Stackelberg's (1934) sequential-move version of Cournot duopoly. Other examples include Leontief's (1946) monopoly-union model and Rubenstein's bargaining model.
73:
It is often assumed that the players have some statistical information about the other players, e.g. in an auction, each player knows that the valuations of the other players are drawn from some
70:
was motivated by consideration of arms control negotiations, where the players may be uncertain both of the capabilities of their opponents and of their desires and beliefs.
391:
Ian Frank, David Basin (1997), Artificial
Intelligence 100 (1998) 87-123. "Search in games with incomplete information: a case study using Bridge card play".
190:
might prove disastrous for one. Games with perfect information generally require one player to outwit the other by making them misinterpret one's decisions.
185:
is one example, where players' resources and moves are known to all, but their objectives (which routes they seek to complete) are hidden. A game of
58:: each player knows their own utility function (valuation for the item), but does not know the utility function of the other players.
17:
166:). Games with complete information generally require one player to outwit the other by forcing them to make risky assumptions.
416:
113:
In a normal extensive form, each player knows exactly where they are at in the game and what moves have been previously made.
1320:
1137:
667:
465:
956:
775:
352:
327:
302:
154:
information are card games, where each player's cards are hidden from other players but objectives are known, as in
572:
1046:
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582:
755:
1097:
510:
485:
1488:
1447:
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182:
101:
game of incomplete information at least one player is uncertain about another player's payoff function.
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760:
597:
592:
1417:
1340:
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93:
is the solution concept, which eliminates non-credible threats as potential strategies for players.
1432:
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848:
637:
455:
74:
44:
1235:
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1036:
1006:
657:
445:
343:
Osborne, M. J.; Rubinstein, A. (1994). "Chapter 11: Extensive Games with
Imperfect Information".
1462:
1442:
1422:
1371:
1041:
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750:
677:
647:
567:
495:
293:
Osborne, M. J.; Rubinstein, A. (1994). "Chapter 6: Extensive Games with
Perfect Information".
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Games of incomplete information arise frequently in social science. For instance,
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162:, if the outcomes are assumed to be binary (players can only win or lose in a
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to find viable strategies. In dynamic games with complete information,
109:
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31:
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177:
information are conceptually more difficult to imagine, such as a
1117:
1107:
785:
55:
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159:
121:
118:
own best course of action to maximize their payoffs.
126:Complete information is importantly different from
138:); there may also be a chance element (as in most
342:
292:
27:Level of information in economics and game theory
1475:
322:. Mineola N.Y.: Dover Publications. p. 19.
336:
410:
286:
417:
403:
424:
368:Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory.
108:
388:. Harvester-Wheatsheaf. (see Chapter 3)
277:
14:
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317:
398:
311:
249:
77:. In this case, the game is called a
381:. MIT Press. (see Chapter 6, sect 1)
282:. Harvester-Wheatsheaf. p. 133.
273:
271:
252:"Games with Incomplete Information"
122:Complete versus perfect information
24:
466:First-player and second-player win
243:
25:
1500:
347:. Cambridge M.A.: The MIT Press.
297:. Cambridge M.A.: The MIT Press.
268:
104:
573:Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium
52:game with incomplete information
370:Volume 139. New York, WW Norton
61:
583:Evolutionarily stable strategy
320:Games, Theory and Applications
13:
1:
511:Simultaneous action selection
236:
1448:List of games in game theory
623:Quantal response equilibrium
613:Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
548:Bayes correlated equilibrium
7:
917:Optional prisoner's dilemma
643:Self-confirming equilibrium
194:
10:
1505:
1382:Principal variation search
1098:Aumann's agreement theorem
761:Strategy-stealing argument
668:Trembling hand equilibrium
598:Markov perfect equilibrium
593:Mertens-stable equilibrium
1418:Combinatorial game theory
1405:
1364:
1146:
1090:
1077:Princess and monster game
872:
774:
676:
628:Quasi-perfect equilibrium
553:Bayesian Nash equilibrium
534:
433:
1433:Evolutionary game theory
1166:Antoine Augustin Cournot
1052:Guess 2/3 of the average
849:Strictly determined game
638:Satisfaction equilibrium
456:Escalation of commitment
278:Gibbons, Robert (1992).
250:Levin, Jonathan (2002).
75:probability distribution
1438:Glossary of game theory
1037:Stackelberg competition
658:Strong Nash equilibrium
386:A primer in game theory
345:A Course in Game Theory
295:A Course in Game Theory
280:A Primer in Game Theory
169:Examples of games with
146:Examples of games with
1463:Tragedy of the commons
1443:List of game theorists
1423:Confrontation analysis
1133:Sprague–Grundy theorem
648:Sequential equilibrium
568:Correlated equilibrium
318:Thomas, L. C. (2003).
114:
18:Incomplete information
1236:Jean-François Mertens
112:
1365:Search optimizations
1241:Jennifer Tour Chayes
1128:Revelation principle
1123:Purification theorem
1062:Nash bargaining game
1027:Bertrand competition
1012:El Farol Bar problem
977:Electronic mail game
942:Lewis signaling game
481:Hierarchy of beliefs
40:complete information
1489:Perfect competition
1413:Bounded rationality
1032:Cournot competition
982:Rock paper scissors
957:Battle of the sexes
947:Volunteer's dilemma
819:Perfect information
746:Dominant strategies
578:Epsilon-equilibrium
461:Extensive-form game
384:Gibbons, R. (1992)
128:perfect information
1392:Paranoid algorithm
1372:Alpha–beta pruning
1251:John Maynard Smith
1082:Rendezvous problem
922:Traveler's dilemma
912:Gift-exchange game
907:Prisoner's dilemma
824:Large Poisson game
791:Bargaining problem
691:Backward induction
663:Subgame perfection
618:Proper equilibrium
373:Fudenberg, D. and
366:Watson, J. (2015)
206:Handicap principle
115:
91:backward induction
1471:
1470:
1377:Aspiration window
1346:Suzanne Scotchmer
1301:Oskar Morgenstern
1196:Donald B. Gillies
1138:Zermelo's theorem
1067:Induction puzzles
1022:Fair cake-cutting
997:Public goods game
927:Coordination game
801:Intransitive game
726:Forward induction
608:Pareto efficiency
588:Gibbs equilibrium
558:Berge equilibrium
506:Simultaneous game
181:. The board game
16:(Redirected from
1496:
1458:Topological game
1453:No-win situation
1351:Thomas Schelling
1331:Robert B. Wilson
1291:Merrill M. Flood
1261:John von Neumann
1171:Ariel Rubinstein
1156:Albert W. Tucker
1007:War of attrition
967:Matching pennies
741:Pairing strategy
603:Nash equilibrium
526:Mechanism design
491:Normal-form game
446:Cooperative game
419:
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87:Nash equilibrium
50:Inversely, in a
45:common knowledge
21:
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1499:
1498:
1497:
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1493:
1474:
1473:
1472:
1467:
1401:
1387:max^n algorithm
1360:
1356:William Vickrey
1316:Reinhard Selten
1271:Kenneth Binmore
1186:David K. Levine
1181:Daniel Kahneman
1148:
1142:
1118:Negamax theorem
1108:Minimax theorem
1086:
1047:Diner's dilemma
902:All-pay auction
868:
854:Stochastic game
806:Mean-field game
777:
770:
736:Markov strategy
672:
538:
530:
501:Sequential game
486:Information set
471:Game complexity
441:Congestion game
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156:contract bridge
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11:
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1362:
1361:
1359:
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1338:
1333:
1328:
1323:
1321:Robert Axelrod
1318:
1313:
1308:
1303:
1298:
1296:Olga Bondareva
1293:
1288:
1286:Melvin Dresher
1283:
1278:
1276:Leonid Hurwicz
1273:
1268:
1263:
1258:
1253:
1248:
1243:
1238:
1233:
1228:
1223:
1218:
1213:
1211:Harold W. Kuhn
1208:
1203:
1201:Drew Fudenberg
1198:
1193:
1191:David M. Kreps
1188:
1183:
1178:
1176:Claude Shannon
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1168:
1163:
1158:
1152:
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1144:
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1125:
1120:
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1113:Nash's theorem
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1004:
999:
994:
989:
984:
979:
974:
972:Ultimatum game
969:
964:
959:
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952:Dollar auction
949:
944:
939:
937:Centipede game
934:
929:
924:
919:
914:
909:
904:
899:
894:
892:Infinite chess
889:
884:
878:
876:
870:
869:
867:
866:
861:
859:Symmetric game
856:
851:
846:
844:Signaling game
841:
839:Screening game
836:
831:
829:Potential game
826:
821:
816:
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793:
788:
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780:
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771:
769:
768:
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756:Mixed strategy
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633:Risk dominance
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476:Graphical game
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221:Signaling game
218:
216:Screening game
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183:Ticket to Ride
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105:Extensive form
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2:
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1406:Miscellaneous
1404:
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1357:
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1344:
1342:
1341:Samuel Bowles
1339:
1337:
1336:Roger Myerson
1334:
1332:
1329:
1327:
1326:Robert Aumann
1324:
1322:
1319:
1317:
1314:
1312:
1309:
1307:
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1302:
1299:
1297:
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1292:
1289:
1287:
1284:
1282:
1281:Lloyd Shapley
1279:
1277:
1274:
1272:
1269:
1267:
1266:Kenneth Arrow
1264:
1262:
1259:
1257:
1254:
1252:
1249:
1247:
1246:John Harsanyi
1244:
1242:
1239:
1237:
1234:
1232:
1229:
1227:
1224:
1222:
1219:
1217:
1216:Herbert Simon
1214:
1212:
1209:
1207:
1204:
1202:
1199:
1197:
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1192:
1189:
1187:
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1177:
1174:
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1089:
1083:
1080:
1078:
1075:
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1068:
1065:
1063:
1060:
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1055:
1053:
1050:
1048:
1045:
1043:
1040:
1038:
1035:
1033:
1030:
1028:
1025:
1023:
1020:
1018:
1017:Fair division
1015:
1013:
1010:
1008:
1005:
1003:
1000:
998:
995:
993:
992:Dictator game
990:
988:
985:
983:
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975:
973:
970:
968:
965:
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960:
958:
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938:
935:
933:
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928:
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923:
920:
918:
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913:
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908:
905:
903:
900:
898:
895:
893:
890:
888:
885:
883:
880:
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877:
875:
871:
865:
864:Zero-sum game
862:
860:
857:
855:
852:
850:
847:
845:
842:
840:
837:
835:
834:Repeated game
832:
830:
827:
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822:
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802:
799:
797:
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787:
784:
783:
781:
779:
773:
767:
764:
762:
759:
757:
754:
752:
751:Pure strategy
749:
747:
744:
742:
739:
737:
734:
732:
729:
727:
724:
722:
719:
717:
714:
712:
711:De-escalation
709:
707:
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692:
689:
687:
684:
683:
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675:
669:
666:
664:
661:
659:
656:
654:
653:Shapley value
651:
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634:
631:
629:
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624:
621:
619:
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571:
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561:
559:
556:
554:
551:
549:
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541:
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533:
527:
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522:
521:Succinct game
519:
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354:0-262-65040-1
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329:0-486-43237-8
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304:0-262-65040-1
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211:Market impact
209:
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202:
201:Bayesian game
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184:
180:
179:Bayesian game
176:
172:
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165:
164:zero-sum game
161:
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143:
141:
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131:
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119:
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98:
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88:
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80:
79:Bayesian game
76:
71:
69:
68:John Harsanyi
59:
57:
53:
48:
46:
41:
37:
33:
19:
1311:Peyton Young
1306:Paul Milgrom
1221:Hervé Moulin
1161:Amos Tversky
1103:Folk theorem
814:-player game
811:
731:Grim trigger
385:
378:
367:
344:
338:
319:
313:
294:
288:
279:
258:. Retrieved
245:
174:
170:
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147:
132:
125:
116:
99:
95:
83:
72:
65:
62:Applications
51:
49:
39:
29:
1484:Game theory
1428:Coopetition
1231:Jean Tirole
1226:John Conway
1206:Eric Maskin
1002:Blotto game
987:Pirate game
796:Global game
766:Tit for tat
696:Bid shading
686:Appeasement
536:Equilibrium
516:Solved game
451:Determinacy
434:Definitions
427:game theory
379:Game Theory
36:game theory
1478:Categories
1072:Trust game
1057:Kuhn poker
721:Escalation
716:Deterrence
706:Cheap talk
678:Strategies
496:Preference
425:Topics of
375:Tirole, J.
237:References
231:Trash-talk
226:Small talk
171:incomplete
140:card games
136:Battleship
1256:John Nash
962:Stag hunt
701:Collusion
260:25 August
148:imperfect
32:economics
1397:Lazy SMP
1091:Theorems
1042:Deadlock
897:Checkers
778:of games
540:concepts
195:See also
152:complete
1149:figures
932:Chicken
786:Auction
776:Classes
377:(1993)
175:perfect
56:auction
351:
326:
301:
887:Chess
874:Games
255:(PDF)
187:chess
160:poker
563:Core
349:ISBN
324:ISBN
299:ISBN
262:2016
173:but
158:and
150:but
34:and
1147:Key
30:In
1480::
882:Go
270:^
130:.
81:.
38:,
812:n
418:e
411:t
404:v
357:.
332:.
307:.
264:.
20:)
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