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all satisfy the IIA criterion and Pareto efficiency. Note that if new candidates are added to ballots without changing any of the ratings for existing ballots, the score of existing candidates remains unchanged, leaving the winner the same. Generalizations of
324:. There are several different variations of this axiom, which are generally equivalent under mild conditions. As a result of its importance, the axiom has been independently rediscovered in various forms across a wide variety of fields, including
421:
Morgenbesser, ordering dessert, is told by a waitress that he can choose between blueberry or apple pie. He orders apple. Soon the waitress comes back and explains cherry pie is also an option. Morgenbesser replies "In that case, I'll have
526:
introduces models that weaken or remove many assumptions of consumer rationality, including IIA. This provides greater accuracy, at the cost of making the model more complex and more difficult to falsify.
606:
show that if the voters change their rating scales depending on the candidates who are running, the outcome of cardinal voting may still be affected by the presence of non-winning candidates.
522:
shows that inserting a $ 5 medium soda between a $ 3 small and $ 5.10 large can make customers perceive the large as a better deal (because it's "only 10 cents more than the medium").
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by claiming some irrelevant circumstance must have changed when repeating the experiment. Often, the axiom is justified by arguing that any irrational agent will be
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Deterministic voting methods that behave like majority rule when there are only two candidates can be shown to fail IIA by the use of a
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486:. If agents' behavior or preferences are allowed to change depending on irrelevant circumstances, any model could be made
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Cerreia-Vioglio, Simone; Lindberg, Per Olov; Maccheroni, Fabio; Marinacci, Massimo; Rustichini, Aldo (2021-09-01).
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returns a three-way tie. If A is removed, then B becomes the sole winner, making C lose. Hence it, too, fails IIA.
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skated, whereupon she and Hughes exchanged places in the rankings. Two years later the ISU adopted
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Independence of irrelevant alternatives rules out this kind of arbitrary behavior, by stating that:
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196:
1415:"A Consistency Theory of Public Opinion and Political Choice: The Hypothesis of Menu Dependence"
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Discusses and deduces the not always recognized differences between various formulations of IIA.
777:. Regardless of the voting method and the actual votes, there are only three cases to consider:
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exchanging second and third place, even though they had already skated, due to the way the
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Making
Democracy Count: How Mathematics Improves Voting, Electoral Maps and Representation
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of behavior to ensure agents have well-defined preferences that can be used for making
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356:. It is closely tied to many of the most important theorems in these fields, including
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1127:"The Invariant Proportion of Substitution Property (IPS) of Discrete-Choice Models"
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742:(These are preferences, not votes, and thus are independent of the voting method.)
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498:, making their preferences unobservable or irrelevant to the rest of the economy.
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1529:
1419:
Studies in Public
Opinion: Attitudes, Nonattitudes, Measurement Error, and Change
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Callander, Steven; Wilson, Catherine H. (July 2006). "Context-dependent voting".
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975:'s fourth-place performance near the end of the ladies' competition resulted in
545:, independence of irrelevant alternatives is often stated as "if one candidate (
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both elect C in the scenario above, and thus fail IIA after A is removed.
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have shown that real human decisions often violate IIA. For example, the
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1317:"Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Revealed Group Preferences"
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all elect B in the scenario above, and thus fail IIA after C is removed.
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While economists must often make do with assuming IIA for reasons of
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1382:
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Ray, Paramesh (1973). "Independence from
Irrelevant Alternatives".
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system can satisfy IIA. However, Arrow's theorem does not apply to
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worked out afterwards. Two years afterwards the ISU switched to a
1589:
1584:
1189:
Sen, Amartya (July 1997). "Maximization and the Act of Choice".
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should not depend on the quality of a third, unrelated outcome
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This is sometimes explained with a short story by philosopher
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257:
955:
Elimination from postseason contention § Spoiler effect
1599:
1168:
Sen, Amartya (1994). "The
Formulation of Rational Choice".
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Limited-Dependent and
Qualitative Variables in Econometrics
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For particular voting methods, the following results hold:
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Consider a scenario in which there are three candidates
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is elected. IIA is violated because the 65% who prefer
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is elected. IIA is violated because the 60% who prefer
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is elected. IIA is violated because the 75% who prefer
1460:"Interpersonal Comparability and Social Choice Theory"
474:
In economics, the axiom is connected to the theory of
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264:which codifies the intuition that a choice between
1417:. In Saris, Willem E.; Sniderman, Paul M. (eds.).
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549:) would win an election without a new candidate (
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1421:. Princeton University Press. pp. 337–358.
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959:On two occasions the failure of IIA has led the
87:but its sources remain unclear because it lacks
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644:, and the voters' preferences are as follows:
1514:
1007:to prevent the recurrence of such paradoxes.
242:For the same principle in social choice, see
1314:
589:methods, which can (and often do) pass IIA.
478:. Economists often invoke IIA when building
16:Axiom of decision theory and social sciences
565:should win the election." Situations where
53:Learn how and when to remove these messages
1620:Heuristics in judgment and decision-making
1521:
1507:
1413:Sniderman, Paul M.; Bullock, John (2018).
1124:
577:shows that no reasonable (non-random, non-
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230:Learn how and when to remove this message
118:Learn how and when to remove this message
1257:a51c1c0b707a028be4337c348c95c52b548db0e3
999:, the eventual gold medal winner, until
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207:of all important aspects of the article.
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1048:
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969:1995 World Figure Skating Championships
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250:Independence of irrelevant alternatives
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1366:"A canon of probabilistic rationality"
1105:Quarterly Journal of Political Science
510:or to make sure they are addressing a
203:Please consider expanding the lead to
1502:
1263:
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1016:
1315:Peters, Hans; Wakker, Peter (1991).
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609:Other methods that pass IIA include
557:is added to the ballot, then either
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1112:(3). Now Publishing Inc.: 227–254.
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1020:Social Choice and Individual Values
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34:This article has multiple issues.
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769:. The presence of this societal
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23:
1240:Menu dependence in risky choice
1010:
569:affects the outcome are called
195:may be too short to adequately
42:or discuss these issues on the
1464:The Review of Economic Studies
1406:
1357:
1125:Steenburgh, Thomas J. (2008).
1055:. Cambridge University Press.
1017:Arrow, Kenneth Joseph (1963).
447:}, introducing a third option
205:provide an accessible overview
1:
1458:Roberts, Kevin W. S. (1980).
1299:
604:Arrow's impossibility theorem
575:Arrow's impossibility theorem
480:descriptive (positive) models
408:
375:, failures of IIA (caused by
358:Arrow's impossibility theorem
1222:. Harvard University Press.
1170:The American Economic Review
469:
7:
1544:Expected utility hypothesis
1034:(5th ed.). MIT Press.
961:International Skating Union
464:
147:to comply with Knowledge's
10:
1707:
1660:Evidential decision theory
1370:Journal of Economic Theory
1275:Princeton University Press
989:pairwise-comparison method
952:
907:
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241:
1681:Electoral system criteria
1595:Principle of indifference
1557:
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1392:10.1016/j.jet.2021.105289
948:
710:35% of the voters prefer
679:40% of the voters prefer
648:25% of the voters prefer
160:may contain suggestions.
145:may need to be rewritten
73:This article includes a
1655:Emotional choice theory
1220:Rationality and Freedom
1049:Maddala, G. S. (1983).
1031:A Guide to Econometrics
1028:Kennedy, Peter (2003).
963:(ISU), which regulates
516:experimental economists
387:. Violations of IIA in
346:artificial intelligence
102:more precise citations.
1650:Causal decision theory
1615:St. Petersburg paradox
1565:Decision-matrix method
1427:10.2307/j.ctv346px8.16
1237:Saini, Ritesh (2008).
1146:10.1287/mksc.1070.0301
1023:(2nd ed.). Wiley.
926:This section is empty.
462:
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362:Balinski-Young theorem
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1630:Bayesian epistemology
1218:Sen, Amartya (2002).
856:Instant-runoff voting
847:were not a candidate.
824:were not a candidate.
801:were not a candidate.
621:Common voting methods
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1691:Social choice theory
1686:Econometric modeling
1645:Social choice theory
1549:Intertemporal choice
1118:10.1561/100.00000007
993:2002 Winter Olympics
543:social choice theory
524:Behavioral economics
502:Behavioral economics
484:testable predictions
476:revealed preferences
373:behavioral economics
366:money pump arguments
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1580:Strategic dominance
910:Luce's choice axiom
876:First-past-the-post
860:Kemeny-Young method
615:random dictatorship
451:must not result in
439:in the choice set {
415:Sidney Morgenbesser
1625:Probability theory
1277:. pp. 84–85.
991:. However, at the
985:ranked voting rule
512:well-posed problem
455:being chosen over
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75:list of references
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1436:978-0-691-18838-6
1229:978-0-674-01351-3
1134:Marketing Science
1062:978-1-107-78241-9
1041:978-0-262-61183-1
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904:Stochastic choice
897:Copeland's method
864:Minimax Condorcet
761:, and 60% prefer
330:cognitive science
297:{\displaystyle B}
277:{\displaystyle A}
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1288:. Retrieved
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1011:Bibliography
1005:score voting
997:Sarah Hughes
981:Nicole Bobek
977:Surya Bonaly
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