284:
430:
Reliability and State management: IKEv2 uses sequence numbers and acknowledgments to provide reliability and mandates some error processing logistics and shared state management. IKE could end up in a dead state due to the lack of such reliability measures, where both parties were expecting the other
206:
User-space daemons have easy access to mass storage containing configuration information, such as the IPsec endpoint addresses, keys and certificates, as required. Kernel modules, on the other hand, can process packets efficiently and with minimum overhead—which is important for performance reasons.
261:
Originally, IKE had numerous configuration options but lacked a general facility for automatic negotiation of a well-known default case that is universally implemented. Consequently, both sides of an IKE had to exactly agree on the type of security association they wanted to create –
225:
key, information identifying the IP endpoints and ports that are to be protected, as well as what type of IPsec tunnel has been created. The IPsec stack, in turn, intercepts the relevant IP packets if and where appropriate and performs encryption/decryption as required. Implementations vary on how
762:
state that breaking a 1024-bit Diffie–Hellman group would break 66% of VPN servers, 18% of the top million HTTPS domains, and 26% of SSH servers, which the researchers claim is consistent with the leaks. This claim was refuted in 2015 by both Eyal Ronen and
262:
option by option – or a connection could not be established. Further complications arose from the fact that in many implementations the debug output was difficult to interpret, if there was any facility to produce diagnostic output at all.
478:
HostA -------------------------------------------------- HostB |HDR(A,0),sai1,kei,Ni--------------------------> | | <----------------------------HDR(A,0),N(cookie)| |HDR(A,0),N(cookie),sai1,kei,Ni----------------> | |
694:
There are a number of implementations of IKEv2 and some of the companies dealing in IPsec certification and interoperability testing are starting to hold workshops for testing as well as updated certification requirements to deal with IKEv2 testing.
441:(DoS) attack resilience: IKEv2 does not perform much processing until it determines if the requester actually exists. This addressed some of the DoS problems suffered by IKE which would perform a lot of expensive cryptographic processing from
246:(shared secret), signatures, or public key encryption. Phase 1 operates in either Main Mode or Aggressive Mode. Main Mode protects the identity of the peers and the hash of the shared key by encrypting them; Aggressive Mode does not.
269:
being a case in point), giving rise to different IKE implementations not being able to create an agreed-upon security association at all for many combinations of options, however correctly configured they might appear at either end.
414:
Fewer cryptographic mechanisms: IKEv2 uses cryptographic mechanisms to protect its packets that are very similar to what IPsec ESP uses to protect the IPsec packets. This led to simpler implementations and certifications for
241:
algorithm to generate a shared secret key to encrypt further IKE communications. This negotiation results in one single bi-directional ISAKMP security association. The authentication can be performed using either
411:
Simple message exchange: IKEv2 has one four-message initial exchange mechanism where IKE provided eight distinctly different initial exchange mechanisms, each one of which had slight advantages and disadvantages.
520:
The IETF ipsecme working group has standardized a number of extensions, with the goal of modernizing the IKEv2 protocol and adapting it better to high volume, production environments. These extensions include:
784:
between the offered configurations, with both IKEv1 and IKEv2. This can be avoided by careful segregation of client systems onto multiple service access points with stricter configurations.
590:: improving IKE/IPsec-level protocol synchronization between a cluster of IPsec endpoints and a peer, to reduce the probability of dropped connections after a failover event (RFC
787:
Both versions of the IKE standard are susceptible to an offline dictionary attack when a low entropy password is used. For the IKEv1 this is true for main mode and aggressive mode.
160:
combined these two documents plus additional clarifications into the updated IKEv2, published in
September 2010. A later update upgraded the document from Proposed Standard to
59:
1379:
669:
implementations provide an IKE daemon which can configure (i.e., establish SAs) to the KLIPS or XFRM/NETKEY kernel-based IPsec stacks. XFRM/NETKEY is the
253:. The negotiation results in a minimum of two unidirectional security associations (one inbound and one outbound). Phase 2 operates only in Quick Mode.
1265:; Springall, Drew; Thomé, Emmanuel; Valenta, Luke; VanderSloot, Benjamin; Wustrow, Eric; Zanella-Béguelin, Santiago; Zimmermann, Paul (October 2015).
249:
During IKE phase two, the IKE peers use the secure channel established in Phase 1 to negotiate
Security Associations on behalf of other services like
1329:
Bhargavan, Karthikeyan; Brzuska, Christina; Fournet, CĂ©dric; Kohlweiss, Markulf; Zanella-BĂ©guelin, Santiago; Green, Matthew (January 2016).
528:: the ability to resume a failed IKE/IPsec "session" after a failure, without the need to go through the entire IKE setup process (RFC
691:
A number of network equipment vendors have created their own IKE daemons (and IPsec implementations), or license a stack from one another.
767:
in their paper "Critical Review of
Imperfect Forward Secrecy" and by Paul Wouters of Libreswan in a 2015 article "66% of VPN's [
548:: special tagging of ESP packets that are authenticated but not encrypted, with the goal of making it easier for middleboxes (such as
758:
indicate that IKE is being exploited in an unknown manner to decrypt IPsec traffic, as is ISAKMP. The researchers who discovered the
811:
424:
71:
435:) were developed but not standardized. This meant that different implementations of work-arounds were not always compatible.
226:
the interception of the packets is done—for example, some use virtual devices, others take a slice out of the firewall, etc.
17:
567:
401:
397:
349:
and other extensions that are in common use. IKEv2 combines these in one RFC as well as making improvements to support for
487:(the responder) is experiencing large amounts of half-open IKE connections, it will send an unencrypted reply message of
1169:
563:
1420:
324:
538:: redirection of incoming IKE requests, allowing for simple load-balancing between multiple IKE endpoints (RFC
1504:
1356:
221:(SA) on both sides. The negotiated key material is then given to the IPsec stack. For instance, this could be an
1315:
885:
855:
681:
238:
95:
75:
1387:
1261:
Adrian, David; Bhargavan, Karthikeyan; Durumeric, Zakir; Gaudry, Pierrick; Green, Matthew; Halderman, J. Alex;
801:
677:
222:
86:
are derived. In addition, a security policy for every peer which will connect must be manually maintained.
1410:
391:
354:
337:
The IKEv2 protocol was described in
Appendix A of RFC 4306 in 2005. The following issues were addressed:
192:
566:-only (i.e., certificate-less) authentication of both of the IKE peers; the goal is to allow for modern
511:. This is to ensure that the initiator is really capable of handling an IKE response from the responder.
265:
The IKE specifications were open to a significant degree of interpretation, bordering on design faults (
179:(ISOC), has maintained the copyrights of these standards as freely available to the Internet community.
759:
549:
345:(RFCs): The specifications for IKE were covered in at least three RFCs, more if one takes into account
306:
1484:
685:
196:
1449:
1297:
1157:
1148:"RFC 4306: Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol", Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), p 38-40
1139:"RFC 4306 Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol", Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), p. 11,33
777:
467:
455:
302:
214:
packets, usually on port 500, and generally requires 4–6 packets with 2–3 round trips to create an
237:
IKE phase one's purpose is to establish a secure authenticated communication channel by using the
816:
776:
IPsec VPN configurations which allow for negotiation of multiple configurations are subject to
631:
387:
211:
364:
Standard
Mobility support: There is a standard extension for IKEv2 named (MOBIKE) (see also,
653:
There are several open source implementations of IPsec with associated IKE capabilities. On
580:: minimizing the time until an IKE peer detects that its opposite peer has crashed (RFC
358:
342:
1130:"RFC 2409 The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)", Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), p. 10-16
383:
369:
1091:
1057:
1023:
989:
955:
922:
218:
99:
47:
8:
1266:
620:
612:
442:
432:
294:
266:
1121:"RFC 2409 The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)", Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), p. 6
1112:"RFC 2409 The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)", Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), p. 5
390:(UDP port 4500) enables these protocols to pass through a device or firewall performing
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188:
83:
67:
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200:
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859:
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781:
427:(FIPS), which require each cryptographic implementation to be separately validated.
176:
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55:
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130:
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defined the
Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP).
120:
110:
1499:
1348:
1262:
243:
1349:"Authentication Vulnerabilities in IKE and Xauth with Weak Pre-Shared Secrets"
1242:
623:. The ISAKMP/IKE implementation was jointly developed by Cisco and Microsoft.
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616:
405:
379:
350:
346:
79:
1173:
98:(IETF) originally defined IKE in November 1998 in a series of publications (
1467:
RFC 2407 Internet
Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP)
727:
670:
604:
1274:. 22nd ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS ’15).
753:
66:
certificates for authentication ‒ either pre-shared or distributed using
881:
RFC 4322: Opportunistic
Encryption using the Internet Key Exchange (IKE)
1330:
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705:
666:
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420:
431:
to initiate an action - which never eventuated. Work arounds (such as
1086:
1052:
1018:
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950:
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893:
879:
864:
849:
711:
658:
627:
113:
defined the
Internet IP Security Domain of Interpretation for ISAKMP.
717:
662:
1158:
Internet Key
Exchange: Internet Protocol Security (IPsec): Technet
941:
Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP)
851:
RFC 3129: Requirements for Kerberized Internet Negotiation of Keys
698:
The following open source implementations of IKEv2 are available:
1108:
1106:
1104:
734:
1328:
1074:
Kaufman, C.; Hoffman, P.; Nir, Y.; Eronen, P. (September 2010).
1275:
1268:
Imperfect Forward Secrecy: How Diffie-Hellman Fails in Practice
1194:
215:
1260:
1101:
806:
654:
373:
250:
63:
51:
908:
The Internet IP Security Domain of Interpretation for ISAKMP
1479:
RFC 7296: Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)
769:
747:
673:
native IPsec implementation available as of version 2.6.
1412:
The Dangers of Key Reuse: Practical Attacks on IPsec IKE
603:
IKE is supported as part of the IPsec implementation in
1073:
1244:
Fielded Capability: End-to-end VPN SPIN9 Design Review
1005:
835:
The Internet Key Exchange (IKE), RFC 2409, §1 Abstract
507:
request with that cookie value in a notify payload to
368:) used to support mobility and multihoming for it and
144:
updated IKE to version two (IKEv2) in December 2005.
877:
688:
much easier. OCF has recently been ported to Linux.
479:<--------------------------HDR(A,B),SAr1,ker,Nr|
229:IKEv1 consists of two phases: phase 1 and phase 2.
1043:IKEv2 Clarifications and Implementation Guidelines
404:protocol as used in Internet telephony protocol,
1491:
1331:"Downgrade Resilience in Key-Exchange Protocols"
1380:"Great Cipher, But Where Did You Get That Key"
1298:"Critical Review of Imperfect Forward Secrecy"
878:Richardson, M.; Redelmeier, D.H. (June 2001),
495:(the initiator) with a notify message of type
1322:
1039:
187:Most IPsec implementations consist of an IKE
152:clarified some open details in October 2006.
1170:"Using IPSec in Windows 2000 and XP, Part 1"
751:
305:. There might be a discussion about this on
102:) known as RFC 2407, RFC 2408 and RFC 2409:
1295:
843:
841:
829:
376:can be used by mobile and multihomed users.
680:also implements IPsec, IKE daemon via the
372:(ESP). By use of this extension IKEv2 and
273:
1296:Ronen, Eyal; Shamir, Adi (October 2015).
1085:
1051:
1017:
983:
949:
916:
863:
325:Learn how and when to remove this message
175:The parent organization of the IETF, the
133:defined the Internet Key Exchange (IKE).
1481:, Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
1475:, Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
1473:RFC 2409 The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)
1469:, Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
1040:Eronen, P.; Hoffman, P. (October 2006).
1006:C. Kaufman (Microsoft) (December 2005).
871:
838:
1313:
812:Kerberized Internet Negotiation of Keys
425:Federal Information Processing Standard
14:
1492:
1408:
1377:
1077:Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol
1009:Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol
971:
847:
515:
1346:
1316:"66% of VPN's are not in fact broken"
400:(SCTP) support: IKEv2 allows for the
474:, the scenario would look like this:
398:Stream Control Transmission Protocol
277:
256:
54:protocol suite. IKE builds upon the
46:) is the protocol used to set up a
24:
1250:, NSA via 'Der Spiegel', p. 5
750:presentations released in 2014 by
741:
634:partially support IKEv2 (RFC
598:
25:
1516:
1460:
1359:from the original on 10 June 2002
1219:"iked(8) - OpenBSD manual pages"
552:) to analyze the flow (RFC
282:
1402:
1371:
1340:
1307:
1289:
1254:
1235:
1211:
1187:
1162:
1151:
1142:
1133:
1124:
1115:
975:The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)
886:Internet Engineering Task Force
856:Internet Engineering Task Force
773:] are not in fact broken".
682:OpenBSD Cryptographic Framework
678:Berkeley Software Distributions
382:: The encapsulation of IKE and
232:
182:
96:Internet Engineering Task Force
1409:Felsch, Dennis (August 2018).
1347:Pliam, John (2 October 1999).
1314:Wouters, Paul (October 2015).
1067:
1033:
999:
965:
932:
899:
802:Group Domain of Interpretation
684:(OCF), which makes supporting
638:) as well as MOBIKE (RFC
370:Encapsulating Security Payload
13:
1:
1378:McGrew, David (5 July 2011).
822:
570:methods to be used (RFC
568:password-based authentication
1485:Overview of IKE (from Cisco)
588:High availability extensions
7:
790:
550:intrusion detection systems
355:Network Address Translation
239:Diffie–Hellman key exchange
76:Diffie–Hellman key exchange
10:
1521:
686:cryptographic accelerators
199:that processes the actual
195:and an IPsec stack in the
89:
560:Mutual EAP authentication
1353:Johns Hopkins University
848:Thomas, M. (June 2001),
546:IPsec traffic visibility
456:Security Parameter Index
1505:Cryptographic protocols
646:feature (also known as
274:Improvements with IKEv2
817:Key-agreement protocol
752:
632:Windows Server 2008 R2
526:IKE session resumption
388:User Datagram Protocol
210:The IKE protocol uses
578:Quick crash detection
361:traversal in general.
343:Requests for Comments
80:shared session secret
32:Internet Key Exchange
18:Internet key exchange
295:confusing or unclear
219:security association
100:Request for Comments
48:security association
621:Windows Server 2008
613:Windows Server 2003
516:Protocol extensions
433:Dead-Peer-Detection
303:clarify the section
267:Dead Peer Detection
499:, and will expect
84:cryptographic keys
782:downgrade attacks
439:Denial of Service
335:
334:
327:
257:Problems with IKE
172:in October 2014.
162:Internet Standard
70:(preferably with
27:Internet protocol
16:(Redirected from
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1386:. Archived from
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417:Common Criteria
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56:Oakley protocol
38:, versioned as
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1461:External links
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1446:|website=
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1390:on 9 July 2011
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244:pre-shared key
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30:In computing,
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1176:on 2008-10-12
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380:NAT traversal
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351:NAT traversal
348:
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301:Please help
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183:Architecture
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1428:11 February
1394:11 February
1195:"OpenIKEv2"
754:Der Spiegel
505:IKE_SA_INIT
503:to send an
489:IKE_SA_INIT
357:(NAT)) and
82:from which
62:. IKE uses
1494:Categories
1384:Cisco Blog
1363:5 February
1228:2023-06-21
1204:2023-06-21
1180:2009-12-24
823:References
765:Adi Shamir
706:strongSwan
702:OpenIKEv2,
667:strongSwan
626:Microsoft
609:Windows XP
450:Supposing
445:locations.
421:FIPS 140-2
297:to readers
193:user space
74:) ‒ and a
1448:ignored (
1438:cite book
726:from the
712:Libreswan
659:Libreswan
648:Agile VPN
628:Windows 7
458:(SPI) of
203:packets.
1357:Archived
791:See also
737:project.
718:Openswan
663:Openswan
359:firewall
1281:15 June
780:-based
746:Leaked
735:OpenBSD
466:has an
443:spoofed
408:(VoIP).
293:may be
90:History
1419:
1276:Denver
1199:GitHub
724:Racoon
497:COOKIE
454:has a
341:Fewer
216:ISAKMP
197:kernel
189:daemon
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807:IPsec
671:Linux
655:Linux
509:HostB
501:HostA
493:HostA
485:HostB
464:HostB
452:HostA
374:IPsec
366:IPsec
251:IPsec
64:X.509
52:IPsec
44:IKEv2
40:IKEv1
1450:help
1430:2020
1417:ISBN
1396:2020
1365:2020
1283:2016
1095:5996
1061:4718
1027:4306
993:2409
959:2408
926:2407
778:MITM
676:The
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419:and
402:SCTP
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58:and
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1092:RFC
1082:doi
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1024:RFC
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990:RFC
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956:RFC
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923:RFC
913:doi
890:doi
860:doi
770:sic
748:NSA
650:).
564:EAP
491:to
483:If
470:of
468:SPI
392:NAT
386:in
384:ESP
223:AES
212:UDP
166:RFC
154:RFC
146:RFC
138:RFC
127:RFC
117:RFC
107:RFC
68:DNS
36:IKE
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