Japan–China Joint Communiqué

609: 985:

mission in January 1973 and delegations representing the Promotion of International Trade (Kokubosoku). According to the Ministry of Finance, there was an 83% increase of trade between China and Japan in 1973 compared to the previous year. This can be explained by several reasons. For one, the Tanaka government of Japan made credits available for the Export-Import Bank of China. At the same time, Peking was increasing its efforts to accelerate its five-year economic plan which lasted from 1971 to 1975. It was also suggested that China felt apprehensive about Japan's potential involvement in the Soviet-proposed multi-dimensional development plan in Siberia.

25: 375: 915: 621:(a peace treaty between Japan and Taiwan), by which Japan and the Republic of China (ROC) government of Chiang Kai-shek had already established the end of World War II. Japan negotiated to emphasize the existence of a peaceful relationship between the two countries and leave the specific timing of the end of the state of war unspecified. Although Japan's standpoint on the Treaty of Taipei did not change, if diplomatic normalization between Japan and China were to be established, Japan was willing to terminate the Treaty of Taipei. 989: 1042:

Communique, which reaffirmed that Sino-Japanese security cooperation could place Japan ahead of the US. Even after the establishment of the communique that represented the normalized Sino-Japanese relations, Japan's China policy was still affected by that of the US, as Japan depended on the US for security. Additionally, Sino-Japanese trade continued to boom, and Peking continued to pressure Japan to sign a peace treaty containing the anti-hegemony language of the 1972 normalization agreement. Overall, during the

359:, "the Japanese government has no intention to conclude a bilateral treaty with the Communist regime in China", and later the Japan-ROC Peace Treaty was signed. During this time in the early 1950s, Japan was put under pressure by the US to not recognize the newly established PRC which was at war with the US in Korea, and instead recognized the government of ROC led by Chiang Kai-shek as the legitimate government of China. Tokyo then signed a peace treaty with Taipei as a proof to this close tie. 946:, in his inaugural speech on June 13, 1972, reassured citizens at a time of national diversity by confirming the stance of Nationalist China (ROC) that there were only "one conflict" (the struggle between the humanitarian rule of the Three Principles of the People and the tyrannical rule of Chinese communists), "one war" (the recovery of the mainland), "one responsibility" (the elimination of the communists), and "one outcome" (the victory of Nationalist China). 585: 219: 1016:

East Asian Relations Association on Taipei's side ("Japan" and "Taiwan" are avoided in the names of both associations). The two associations carried out functions that were normally handled by consular institutions. For example, Taipei's high-ranking civil servants accompanying commercial missions to Japan were introduced as simple experts with ordinary passports. In short, Tokyo–Taipei's relations were relegated to the private sector.

432: 800: 897:

feelings toward China after the Joint Communique was agreed upon. This was mainly because of China's withdrawal of any war compensation claims made to the Japanese people in addition to their approval of the United States–Japan Security Treaty. In 1980, the same survey was conducted on the Japanese people, which showed, 78.6% had "friendly feelings toward China" and just 14.7% did "not have friendly feelings toward China".

34: 665:(JCP) accepted the first three points without reservation. However, the LDP was hesitant to approve China's proposal, especially since the first two points suggested Japan would have to abolish their peace treaty with Taiwan. Furthermore, in addition, point 4 was beyond Japan's capacity, as they hold no sovereign power over US maritime activity in the region. Lastly, point 5 lost its relevance after 742:(The Government of Japan is deeply repentant over the damages that Japanese militarism has caused on the people of China in the past. At the same time, the Government of Japan fully recognizes the Three Principles for the Restoration of Relations submitted by the Government of the People's Republic of China. From this standpoint diplomatic normalization between China and Japan will be conducted.) 757:(The Government of Japan recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the solely lawful government of representing China) The Government of the People's Republic of China once more declares that Taiwan is an indivisible part of the territory of China. (The Government of Japan endorses, based on the Cairo Declaration, the Government of China's standpoint.) 870:

each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence. The two Governments confirm that, in conformity with the foregoing principles and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, Japan and China shall in their mutual relations settle all disputes by peaceful means and shall refrain from the use or threat of force.

410:. Prime Minister Tanaka made the restoration of relations between Japan and China an issue of priority in his agenda, hence his pursuing of the Joint Communique. This was beneficial for China as well, since it could lead to a smooth entry back into the international society and economy and could end the state of war between China and Japan. The February 1020:

billion, a drop of $ 235 million compared to 1974 but nearly double Taiwan's overall 1975 deficit of $ 611 million. Moreover, a strong sense of antagonism intensely arose and harmed Japanese businesses in Taiwan; for example, Japan Airlines soon had to take special precautions against sabotage on every flight to and from Taiwan.

906:

government had made a decision without consulting with the population first. In response to this, the Chinese government clarified the terms of the Joint Communique. They emphasized that although the Chinese government cannot demand compensation, Chinese citizens as individuals still have the right to demand compensation.

862:

The Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China have decided to establish diplomatic relations as from September 29, 1972. The two Governments have decided to take all necessary measures for the establishment and the performance of the functions of each other's embassy in

842:

The Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war, and deeply reproaches itself. Further, the Japanese side reaffirms its position that it intends to realize the normalization of relations between the two

696:

The Government of Japan fully recognizes the Three Principles for the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and China that was presented by the Government of the People's Republic of China, and also fully recognizes that the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole and

1019:

In terms of economic impacts of the communique, despite the deteriorated diplomatic relations with Japan, Taiwan's trade with many countries continued to flourish. However, in 1974, Taiwan had a $ 1.336 billion trade deficit with Japan. In the following year, the trade deficit with Japan was $ 1.101

905:

In the 1990s, criticism and dissatisfaction over the terms of the Joint Communique started to become a topic of discussion between the Chinese people. This was mainly towards the terms agreed upon regarding war reparations and compensation by the Japanese to the Chinese. Chinese people felt that the

869:

The Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China agree to establish relations of perpetual peace and friendship between the two countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in

858:

The Government of the People's Republic of China reiterates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China. The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stance of the Government of the People's Republic of China, and it firmly maintains its stand

767:

The Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China agree to establish a permanent, friendly relationships following the Five Principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, nonintervention in domestic issues, equality and mutual

738:

China and Japan are only separated by a sea, and a perpetual and traditionally friendly relationship existed in the history between the two countries. The peoples of both countries long to correct the extremely anomalous state that existed between the two countries. The reestablishment of diplomatic

968:

loans, grants, and the transfer of technological materials. This ODA helped grow and open up the Chinese economy. Normalization also allowed for Japanese companies to pursue business in the large Chinese market, which benefited the Japanese economy. These efforts led to increased dependency on both

959:

The normalization of diplomatic relationships between China and Japan was said to have contributed greatly to the prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region and peace. Since normalization, both economic and cultural exchange started to improve. The interactions between the people of China and Japan also

779:

The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Japan will conclude individual agreements on commerce, shipping, air traffic, fisheries, weather, post, and science and technology on the basis of need and in accordance to preexisting agreements in order to develop the economic

717:

The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Japan, prior to the conclusion of a peace and friendship treaty, will conclude agreements on commerce, shipping, air traffic, weather, post, fisheries, and science and technology on the basis of need and preexistence in order to

570:

government as the sole legitimate government of China, but only as the government of Taiwan, and that Japan was ready to shift recognition to Peking. In short, Taipei's failure to remain in the UN's Security Council and the General Assembly, along with the Sino-US rapprochement, pushed the Japanese

1023:

In the 1980s and 1990s, Japanese supporters of Taiwan continued to advocate for the country's independence movement. Pro-Taiwan voices were down in the 1970s but were never totally gone. These supporters acted as check-and-balance mechanisms to prevent the Japanese government from going too far in

877:

The Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China have agreed that, with a view to solidifying and developing the relations of peace and friendship between the two countries, the two Governments will enter into negotiations for the purpose of concluding a treaty of peace

1041:

was the golden period of US–China–Japan cooperation; however, always within the context of the US–China security relationship. Sino-US relations constrained their respective policies toward third parties, especially Japan. There were suggestions that Washington might not be pleased with the Joint

1015:

After Tokyo and Peking normalized relations in 1972, there was a formal disengagement of the Japanese authorities from Taiwan. On December 26, 1972, two private associations were created to supervise bilateral exchanges between Tokyo and Taipei: the Interchange Association on Tokyo's side and the

1028:

in June 1989 temporarily ruptured Sino-Japanese relations, Beijing's intolerance of democratic ideas made democratized Taiwan more favorable in Japanese eyes. Japan-based pro-independence activists promoted Japanese popular awareness of Taiwan as an independent country. Additionally, during this

838:

Japan and China are neighboring countries, separated only by a strip of water with a long history of traditional friendship. The people of the two countries earnestly desire to put an end to the abnormal state of affairs that has hitherto existed between the two countries. The realization of the

745:

The Government of the People's Republic of China welcomes this. Although the social policies of China and Japan differ, the two countries should and can have peaceful and friendly relations. The renewed establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Japan and the development of friendly

394:

From 1950 to 1972, trade between Japan and China existed but was relatively limited. At first, trade was restricted due to events such as the Korean War, a Chinese embargo on Japan in 1958, and tensions regarding the recognition of Taiwan. Later, the 1960 "Japan-China Trade Principle" led to the

984:

In terms of economic and trade relations, many economic delegations and representatives of banks and firms of both countries subsequently visited each other. Within the first year of normalized relations, 28 Japanese Economic and Trade missions visited China. This included the Yasuhiro Nakasone

896:

A survey conducted by the Japanese Cabinet in 1978 showed that 62.1% of Japanese people who participated in the survey had "friendly feelings toward China" and 25.6% did "not have friendly feelings toward China". These survey results showed that a large proportion of the population had improved

881:

The Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China have agreed that, with a view to further promoting relations between the two countries and to expanding interchanges of people, the two Governments will, as necessary and taking account of the existing non-governmental

390:

Despite this, Japan was interested in restoring relations with China due to cultural, security, and economic interests. Japan and China have been neighboring countries for almost two thousand years and share many cultural, historic, and religious heritages. In terms of security interests, Japan

760:

The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government Japan have decided to establish diplomatic relations from September (date) 1972. In line with international law and international custom, both Governments of the respective countries will establish in each other's capitals the

562:

voted to admit the PRC and to expel the ROC. The 17 UN members during the General Assembly declared that the existence of the PRC was "a reality that could not be changed to suit the myth of a so-called Republic of China, fabricated out of a portion of Chinese territory", and that the ROC were

846:

In spite of the differences in their social systems existing between the two countries, the two countries should, and can, establish relations of peace and friendship. The normalization of relations and development of good-neighborly and friendly relations between the two countries are in the

704:

Both parties agree to treat relations between China and Japan on the basis of the Five Principles: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual nonaggression; mutual noninterference in each other's internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence. In

616:

Japan explained that they should raise the issue of the state of war between China and Japan in Clause 1. Japan explained to China that they could not accept China's interpretation of officially ending the state of war in this joint declaration. This was because China was not bound by the

344:

Cabinet lost its hope of establishing substantial relations with Peking, and instead began taking into consideration the prospect of signing a peace treaty and establishing diplomatic normalization with Taipei. Japan at the time also carried the debt of gratitude to Nationalist China, as

1075: 873:

The normalization of relations between Japan and China is not directed against any third country. Neither of the two countries should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such

771:

The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Japan declare that both countries shall not seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region, and that both countries will oppose any country or group of countries that seek to establish hegemony in this

563:"unlawful authorities" that remained there only because of the permanent presence of the US Armed Forces. PRC, therefore, assumed the ROC's place in the General Assembly as well as its place as one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. 555:, Washington lost its grip on the UN and could no longer sustain the moratorium. Thus, the Chinese representation issue was considered as an "important question" which required a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly for a resolution to pass. 922:

Before the announcement of the communique, there were signs of public anxiety toward expanded US–Sino relations. PM Tanaka's trip to Peking (September 25–30) was greeted with anger. Taipei delayed the mission of Tanaka's special envoy,

963:

From 1979 onwards, Japan started offering Official Development Assistance (ODA) to China. This was done with numerous projects, such as energy development, infrastructure development, and environmental protection, using low-interest

311:

from World War II. In addition, it concluded various administrative agreements between the two countries in trade, fisheries, aviation, and navigation, amongst others. The document firmly maintains its stance under Article 8 of the

976:

wrestlers toured China in April 1973, and in the same month China dispatched 55 members for a goodwill mission in Japan. A Chinese cultural delegation visited Japan in June 1973 to view Chinese art treasures which belonged to the

1046:, the triangular US-China-Japan relations continued to prevail. However, under the influence of the US, Peking "lacked the leverage to persuade Japan to adopt a China policy fundamentally different from that of the US". 843:

countries from the stand of fully understanding 'the three principles for the restoration of relations" put forward by the Government of the People's Republic of China. The Chinese side expresses its welcome for this.

700:

Both parties declare that the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Japan conforms to the long-term wishes of their respective citizens and that it is in line with the benefit of the peoples of the

290:(ROC) in Taiwan. The document produced nine articles in a joint statement, showing compromises on previously ambiguous principles enunciated by both sides. Of these, four points are particularly worthy of attention: 775:

The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government Japan have agreed to conclude a treaty of peace and friendship in order to develop the peaceful and friendly relations between the peoples of both

833:

on the question of normalizing relations between Japan and China, as well as other problems and matters of interest between the two countries. In the end, they agreed to issue the following Joint Communique:

1953: 839:

aspiration of the two peoples for the termination of the state of war and the normalization of relations between Japan and China will add a new page to the annals of relations between the two countries.

746:

neighbor relations is not only in line with the fundamental interest of the citizens of both countries, but is also useful for the relaxation of tensions in Asia and for the protection of world peace.

866:

The Government of the People's Republic of China declares that, in the interest of the friendship between the Chinese and the Japanese peoples, it renounces its demand for war reparations from Japan.

689:

The outline proposal in which the Foreign Minister of Japan, Masayoshi Ōhira, and Foreign Minister of China, Ji Pengfei, agreed upon for the Japan–China Joint Declaration can be seen as follows:

939:, he was greeted with rare mass demonstrations. His picture was neither on TV nor in the press, in contrast with the wide coverage of another concurrent visitor, the Mayor of Seoul. 1012:" more clearly and timely in 1971, PM Tanaka would not have been so keen on normalizing relations with Beijing in 1972 and Taipei would have avoided severing relations with Tokyo. 708:

Both parties declare that neither China nor Japan will seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and will oppose any country or group of countries that seek hegemony in this manner.

714:

For the sake of the friendship between the peoples of China and Japan, the Government of the People's Republic of China abandons its right to demand war reparations from Japan.

996:

Although Japan and China's economic relationship has remained largely stable, other issues have caused friction within their relationship, such as historical problems and the

633:

party visited Beijing and announced in a joint statement with the China–Japan Friendship Association that there were five preconditions for relations between Japan and China:

307:

The document ended the "abnormal relations between Japan and China", recognized the People's Republic of China as the "sole government of China", and renounced any claim for

711:

Both parties agree to conclude a treaty of peace and friendship that is based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence after the establishment of diplomatic relations.

1207: 852:

The abnormal state of affairs that has hitherto existed between Japan and the People's Republic of China is terminated on the date on which this Joint Communique is issued.

532:

removed travel and trading barriers, as well as proposed a more serious dialogue with Peking due to Cold War politics and the US–Soviet situation. Secondly, in 1971, the

764:

For the sake of friendly relations between the peoples of China and Japan, the Government of the People's Republic of China renounces its claims for war reparations.

705:

accordance with the Five Principles, disputes between China and Japan will be resolved through peaceful dialogue and without the use of force or the threat of force.

1163:

YUAN, Chengyi (2013-06-01). "The re-examination of Chiang Kai-shek's returning virtue for malice policy towards Japan after the victory of the Anti-Japanese War".

1925:

Hiroshi, Nakanishi; Curtis, Gerald L.; Matake, Kamiya; Jia, Qingguo; Oksenberg, Michel; Zhang, Tuosheng; Ross, Robert S.; Yoshihide, Soeya; Zhang, Baijia (2002).

539:

From 1945 until 1971, Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist regime occupied the so-called "China seat" as an original member and one of the five permanent members of the

2031: 1086: 571:

government towards achieving normalization with Peking through establishing the Joint Communique and ultimately severing diplomatic relations with the ROC.

449: 402:" in 1971, Chinese businesses became more attractive for the Japanese economy than previously. Eventually, Prime Minister Sato resigned, which led to the 496: 657:

and did not represent anything new to what China had long been asking of Japan. In fact, these proposals date back to 1953. Dissenting members in the

468: 818:. Accompanying PM Tanaka were Minister for Foreign Affairs Masayoshi Ōhira, Chief Cabinet Secretary Susumu Nikaido, and other government officials. 882:

arrangements, enter into negotiations for the purpose of concluding agreements concerning such matters as trade, shipping, aviation, and fisheries.

761:

embassies and other establishments necessary to carry out their functions. In addition, they agree to exchange ambassadors as quickly as possible.

559: 475: 1091: 649:

the legitimate rights of the People's Republic in all United Nations organizations must be restored and the representatives of Taiwan expelled.

1768: 1926: 2026: 812: 482: 637:

there is only one China, and the government of the People's Republic is the sole legitimate government representing the Chinese people;

464: 754:

On the date of the announcement of the joint declaration, the state of war between the People's Republic of China and Japan will end.

829:

PM Tanaka and FM Ōhira had an earnest and frank exchange of views with Premier Zhou Enlai and Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs

418:, also played a role. The surprising Sino-American rapprochement boosted the possibility of a communique between China and Japan. 863:

their respective capitals in accordance with international law and practice, and to exchange ambassadors as speedily as possible.

608: 391:

wanted to restore its relations with China in order to set the tone for a peaceful diplomatic relationship after years of war.

367:

Before normalization from 1952 to 1972, Japan only had diplomatic relations with Taiwan and not China. Although Prime Minister

1936: 1408: 855:

The Government of Japan recognizes that Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China.

411: 2041: 2036: 489: 2056: 515: 278:

was signed on September 29, 1972, in Beijing. The communique established and normalized diplomatic relations between

261: 658: 528:

1971 witnessed an erosion of Taiwan's international position and a shift in Japan–ROC–PRC relations. Firstly, the

1080: 552: 540: 533: 228: 1025: 931:, an infamous episode in the difficult course of Sino–Japanese relations. When Shiina met with new ROC Premier 453: 403: 239: 65: 739:

relations between China and Japan will open a new page for the history of relations between the two countries.

371:

was in support of Taiwan, he regarded China as a threat, in keeping with the United States' policy on China.

1296:

Wang, Qingxin Ken (2000). "Taiwan in Japan's Relations with China and the United States after the Cold War".

1253:

Wang, Qingxin Ken (2000). "Taiwan in Japan's Relations with China and the United States after the Cold War".

847:

interests of the two peoples and will contribute to the relaxation of tension in Asia and peace in the world.

79: 666: 630: 566:

After the UN General Assembly vote on Peking and Taipei, it was hinted that Japan no longer recognized the

1742: 1070: 529: 1640:"MOFA: Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China" 2021: 1065: 1060: 1043: 333: 693:

The state of war between Japan and the People's Republic of China ends on the date of the declaration.

1786: 1055: 1544: 749:

The Governments of both countries have reached the following agreements through friendly discussion:

1779: 662: 395:

growth in selective trade that became more regularized after diplomatic relations resumed in 1972.

190: 137:

zong1 waa4 jan4 men4 gong6 wo4 gwok3 zing3 fu2 jyu3 jat6 bun2 zing3 fu2 dik1 lyun4 hap6 sing1 ming4

2006:"Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China" 997: 978: 819: 442: 1879: 276:

Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China

2051: 2046: 914: 232: 1518:"Woodrow Wilson Center Digital Archive. Nuclear Proliferation International History Project". 415: 1639: 1531: 646:

the United States must withdraw all its armed forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits area;

2005: 1024:

improving Japan–China relations at the expense of sacrificing Taiwan's interests. After the

547:

against Communist China (PRC). However, due to decolonization and the admission of numerous

355:) and repatriated all the Japanese troops. As a result, on 25 April 1952, according to the 297:

the statement that Japan "understands and respects stance" that Taiwan is part of the PRC;

24: 1615: 1448: 243: 8: 2061: 1561:

Hsiao, Gene T. (1974). "The Sino-Japanese Rapprochement: A Relationship of Ambivalence".

1523: 374: 313: 1989: 1981: 1907: 1860: 1723: 1688: 1594: 1586: 1497: 1368: 1321: 1278: 1235: 1188: 1145: 780:

and cultural relations between the two countries and to expand the exchange of people.

598: 1993: 1973: 1932: 1899: 1852: 1817: 1727: 1680: 1598: 1578: 1489: 1404: 1360: 1313: 1270: 1239: 1227: 1192: 1180: 1137: 924: 734:

The governments of Japan and China agreed upon a draft Joint declaration as follows:

287: 1965: 1891: 1844: 1809: 1743:"1972 System" to "Strategic Mutual Benefits" - Japan's Foreign Policy toward China" 1715: 1672: 1570: 1519: 1481: 1396: 1352: 1305: 1262: 1219: 1172: 1129: 1009: 988: 943: 932: 618: 544: 356: 102: 1954:"International Bargaining and Domestic Politics: U.S.-China Relations since 1972" 1449:"EXCERPT OF MAO ZEDONG'S CONVERSATION WITH JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER KAKUEI TANAKA" 1176: 928: 567: 346: 341: 308: 1880:"Taiwan's Foreign Policy in the 1970s: A Case Study of Adaptation and Viability" 1424: 1719: 1813: 1574: 1223: 2015: 1977: 1903: 1856: 1821: 1684: 1582: 1493: 1364: 1317: 1274: 1231: 1184: 1141: 808: 407: 383: 286:(PRC), resulted in the severing of official relations between Japan and the 1400: 1008:

Had Chiang Kai-shek managed to keep the UN "China seat" by abandoning his "

965: 936: 640:

Taiwan is a province of China and an inalienable part of Chinese territory;

584: 109: 799: 548: 399: 368: 1120:

Kim, Hong N. (1975). "Sino-Japanese Relations since the Rapprochement".

1029:

period, the booming of tourism and mainstream media returned to Taiwan.

1985: 1911: 1864: 1692: 1501: 1372: 1340: 1325: 1282: 1149: 830: 823: 815: 654: 602: 456: in this section. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. 379: 337: 1590: 116:

Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Zhèngfǔ yǔ Rìběn Zhèngfǔ de Liánhé Shēngmíng

1472:

Appleton, Sheldon L. (1972). "Taiwan: The Year It Finally Happened".

1391:

Fuchs, Eckhardt; Kasahara, Tokushi; Saaler, Sven, eds. (2017-12-04).

927:, so that it coincided with the 41st anniversary of the September 18 784:

The sections in parentheses are as appears in the original document.

123: 1969: 1895: 1848: 1676: 1485: 1356: 1309: 1266: 1133: 560:

October 25, 1971, the United Nations General Assembly led by Albania

431: 1800:

Mengin, Françoise (1997-03-01). "Taiwan's non-official diplomacy".

1386: 1384: 1382: 1038: 588:

Masayoshi Ōhira, Foreign Minister and later Prime Minister of Japan

130: 807:

From September 25 to September 30, 1972, Japanese Prime Minister

1379: 1032: 197:

Nippon-koku Seifu to Chūkajinmin-kyōwakoku Seifu no Kyōdō Seimei

33: 718:

promote the human exchange the economic and cultural relations.

329: 1706:

Liu, William H. (2016-07-26). "Taiwan After Chiang Kai-shek".

643:

the "Japan-Chiang Treaty " is illegal and must be abrogated;

283: 279: 153: 973: 167: 1928:

The Golden Age of the U.S.-China-Japan Triangle, 1972-1989

1835:

Jacobs, J. Bruce (1973). "Taiwan 1972: Political Season".

1663:

Jacobs, J. Bruce (1973). "Taiwan 1972: Political Season".

135: 349:

made the announcement of "returning virtue for malice" (

629:

In 1971, a Japanese delegation of politicians from the

1924: 1087:

Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and China

350: 294:

the desire for a peace treaty between Japan and China;

195: 942:

In response to the situation, Chiang Kai-shek's son,

672: 114: 918:

Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-Kuo in 1948

612:

Ji Pengfei (right), former Foreign Minister of China

303:

Japan's reversal of relations with China and Taiwan.

1390: 597:On September 26–27, 1972, Japan's Foreign Minister 826:met Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka on September 27. 653:These principles were approved by Chinese premier 605:met to negotiate a proposal for the declaration. 1776:European Association of Taiwan Studies Conference 2013: 1345:Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 1092:List of war apology statements issued by Japan 172: 158: 1513: 1511: 1037:From 1972 to 1978, some have argued that the 1033:US–China–Japan relations after the communique 803:Kakuei Tanaka, former Prime Minister of Japan 722: 661:(LDP), opposition parties, and the left-wing 362: 324: 84: 70: 1341:"China-Japan Trade and Investment Relations" 859:under Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation. 1208:"Taiwan in Japan's Security Considerations" 2032:Treaties of the People's Republic of China 1769:"Taiwan's break with Japan: 1972 Revisted" 1508: 886: 421: 242:. Please do not remove this message until 1205: 972:In terms of cultural exchanges, Japanese 813:Premier of the People's Republic of China 516:Learn how and when to remove this message 262:Learn how and when to remove this message 2008:The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 1471: 987: 913: 798: 607: 583: 373: 319: 238:Relevant discussion may be found on the 1877: 1740: 1425:"Michael Schaller: Working Paper No. 2" 2014: 1834: 1799: 1766: 1662: 1338: 1003: 954: 574: 174:にほんこくせいふとちゅうかじんみんきょうわこくせいふのきょうどうせいめい 1610: 1608: 1560: 1556: 1554: 1076:Japan-China Joint Declaration of 1998 811:visited the PRC at the invitation of 340:, the Japanese government during the 300:an Asia-Pacific anti-hegemony clause; 1951: 1524:10.1163/2468-1733_shafr_sim010030016 1295: 1252: 1162: 1115: 1113: 1111: 1109: 1107: 579: 536:voted to admit the PRC into the UN. 454:adding citations to reliable sources 425: 412:1972 visit by Richard Nixon to China 212: 2027:Foreign relations of Post-war Japan 1705: 1119: 677: 543:under the auspices of the US and a 406:and next cabinet of Prime Minister 352:uramini mukuiruni tokuwo motte suru 16:1972 treaty between Japan and China 13: 1734: 1605: 1551: 787: 768:benefit, and peaceful coexistence. 673:Negotiations between Japan and PRC 14: 2073: 1393:A New Modern History of East Asia 1165:Journal of Modern Chinese History 1104: 378:Chinese Communist Party chairman 42:Joint Communiqué of PRC and Japan 430: 217: 32: 23: 1945: 1918: 1871: 1828: 1793: 1760: 1699: 1656: 1632: 1620:digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org 1616:"Wilson Center Digital Archive" 1465: 1453:digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org 1081:Official development assistance 992:Disputed Senkaku-Diaoyu Islands 534:United Nations General Assembly 441:needs additional citations for 136: 1767:Kijima, Joji (18 April 2004). 1741:Kokubun, Ryosei (March 2017). 1441: 1417: 1332: 1289: 1246: 1199: 1156: 465:"Japan–China Joint Communiqué" 196: 115: 85: 71: 1: 1097: 1931:. Harvard Univ Asia Center. 1177:10.1080/17535654.2013.780734 949: 51:Japan–China Joint Communiqué 7: 1878:Bellows, Thomas J. (1976). 1071:Foreign relations of Taiwan 1049: 979:Japanese Imperial Household 697:lawful government of China. 601:and PRC's Foreign Minister 351: 244:conditions to do so are met 10: 2078: 2042:Treaties concluded in 1972 1802:Diplomacy & Statecraft 1785:on 2020-02-05 – via 1720:10.1177/000944557501100304 1066:Foreign relations of Japan 1061:Foreign relations of China 891: 723:Draft of joint declaration 386:(right), February 21, 1972 363:Japan's relations with PRC 325:Japan's relations with ROC 284:People's Republic of China 1814:10.1080/09592299708406036 1787:SOAS University of London 1575:10.1017/S0305741000010961 1224:10.1017/S0009443901000079 1206:Yoshihide, Soeya (2001). 336:from 1895 to 1945. After 207: 189: 184: 180: 173: 166: 159: 152: 147: 129: 122: 108: 101: 96: 92: 78: 64: 59: 55: 50: 1952:Ross, Robert S. (1986). 1750:Nihon No Gaiko Dai 4 Kan 900: 659:Liberal Democratic Party 592: 66:Traditional Chinese 1339:Morino, Tomozo (1991). 887:Reactions of the public 820:Chinese Communist Party 422:UN's recognition of PRC 80:Simplified Chinese 1539:Cite journal requires 1401:10.14220/9783737007085 998:Senkaku-Diaoyu Islands 993: 919: 909: 804: 624: 613: 589: 387: 382:receives US President 2037:China–Japan relations 1056:China–Japan relations 1044:Carter administration 991: 917: 802: 663:Japan Communist Party 611: 587: 377: 320:Before the communique 2057:China–Japan treaties 1778:: 13. Archived from 530:Nixon administration 450:improve this article 398:After the economic " 160:日本国政府と中華人民共和国政府の共同声明 1563:The China Quarterly 1212:The China Quarterly 1004:Japan–ROC relations 955:Japan–PRC relations 935:and Vice President 667:China joined the UN 575:Terms of communique 416:Shanghai Communiqué 314:Potsdam Declaration 231:of this article is 86:中华人民共和国政府与日本政府的联合声明 72:中華人民共和國政府與日本政府的聯合聲明 1429:nsarchive2.gwu.edu 1026:Tiananmen Massacre 994: 920: 805: 614: 590: 388: 2022:Treaties of Japan 1938:978-0-674-00960-8 1410:978-3-8471-0708-8 925:Etsusaburo Shiina 580:Initial proposals 526: 525: 518: 500: 414:, leading to the 288:Republic of China 272: 271: 264: 211: 210: 203: 202: 143: 142: 103:Standard Mandarin 2069: 1998: 1997: 1949: 1943: 1942: 1922: 1916: 1915: 1875: 1869: 1868: 1832: 1826: 1825: 1797: 1791: 1790: 1784: 1773: 1764: 1758: 1757: 1747: 1738: 1732: 1731: 1703: 1697: 1696: 1660: 1654: 1653: 1651: 1650: 1636: 1630: 1629: 1627: 1626: 1612: 1603: 1602: 1558: 1549: 1548: 1542: 1537: 1535: 1527: 1515: 1506: 1505: 1469: 1463: 1462: 1460: 1459: 1445: 1439: 1438: 1436: 1435: 1421: 1415: 1414: 1388: 1377: 1376: 1336: 1330: 1329: 1293: 1287: 1286: 1250: 1244: 1243: 1203: 1197: 1196: 1160: 1154: 1153: 1117: 1010:One China policy 944:Chiang Ching-kuo 933:Chiang Ching-kuo 796: 731: 686: 678:Outline proposal 619:Treaty of Taipei 553:General Assembly 541:Security Council 521: 514: 510: 507: 501: 499: 458: 434: 426: 354: 267: 260: 256: 253: 247: 221: 220: 213: 199: 198: 182: 181: 176: 175: 162: 161: 139: 138: 118: 117: 94: 93: 88: 87: 74: 73: 48: 47: 36: 27: 2077: 2076: 2072: 2071: 2070: 2068: 2067: 2066: 2012: 2011: 2002: 2001: 1970:10.2307/2010238 1950: 1946: 1939: 1923: 1919: 1896:10.2307/2643160 1876: 1872: 1849:10.2307/2642996 1833: 1829: 1798: 1794: 1782: 1771: 1765: 1761: 1745: 1739: 1735: 1704: 1700: 1677:10.2307/2642996 1661: 1657: 1648: 1646: 1638: 1637: 1633: 1624: 1622: 1614: 1613: 1606: 1569:(57): 101–123. 1559: 1552: 1540: 1538: 1529: 1528: 1517: 1516: 1509: 1486:10.2307/2642917 1470: 1466: 1457: 1455: 1447: 1446: 1442: 1433: 1431: 1423: 1422: 1418: 1411: 1389: 1380: 1357:10.2307/1173880 1337: 1333: 1310:10.2307/2672024 1298:Pacific Affairs 1294: 1290: 1267:10.2307/2672024 1255:Pacific Affairs 1251: 1247: 1204: 1200: 1161: 1157: 1134:10.2307/2643340 1118: 1105: 1100: 1052: 1035: 1006: 957: 952: 929:Mukden Incident 912: 903: 894: 889: 878:and friendship. 792: 790: 788:Final agreement 727: 725: 682: 680: 675: 627: 599:Masayoshi Ōhira 595: 582: 577: 568:Chiang Kai-shek 522: 511: 505: 502: 459: 457: 447: 435: 424: 365: 347:Chiang Kai-shek 327: 322: 309:war reparations 268: 257: 251: 248: 237: 222: 218: 46: 45: 44: 43: 39: 38: 37: 29: 28: 17: 12: 11: 5: 2075: 2065: 2064: 2059: 2054: 2049: 2044: 2039: 2034: 2029: 2024: 2010: 2009: 2000: 1999: 1964:(2): 255–287. 1958:World Politics 1944: 1937: 1917: 1890:(7): 593–610. 1870: 1843:(1): 102–112. 1827: 1808:(1): 228–248. 1792: 1759: 1733: 1698: 1671:(1): 102–112. 1655: 1644:www.mofa.go.jp 1631: 1604: 1550: 1541:|journal= 1507: 1464: 1440: 1416: 1409: 1378: 1331: 1304:(3): 353–373. 1288: 1261:(3): 353–373. 1245: 1198: 1155: 1128:(7): 559–573. 1102: 1101: 1099: 1096: 1095: 1094: 1089: 1084: 1078: 1073: 1068: 1063: 1058: 1051: 1048: 1034: 1031: 1005: 1002: 956: 953: 951: 948: 911: 908: 902: 899: 893: 890: 888: 885: 884: 883: 879: 875: 871: 867: 864: 860: 856: 853: 849: 848: 844: 840: 789: 786: 782: 781: 777: 773: 769: 765: 762: 758: 755: 751: 750: 747: 743: 740: 724: 721: 720: 719: 715: 712: 709: 706: 702: 698: 694: 679: 676: 674: 671: 651: 650: 647: 644: 641: 638: 626: 623: 594: 591: 581: 578: 576: 573: 551:states to the 524: 523: 506:September 2020 438: 436: 429: 423: 420: 364: 361: 357:Yoshida Letter 338:the Korean War 326: 323: 321: 318: 305: 304: 301: 298: 295: 270: 269: 225: 223: 216: 209: 208: 205: 204: 201: 200: 193: 187: 186: 185:Transcriptions 178: 177: 170: 164: 163: 156: 150: 149: 145: 144: 141: 140: 133: 127: 126: 124:Yue: Cantonese 120: 119: 112: 106: 105: 99: 98: 97:Transcriptions 90: 89: 82: 76: 75: 68: 62: 61: 57: 56: 53: 52: 41: 40: 31: 30: 22: 21: 20: 19: 18: 15: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 2074: 2063: 2060: 2058: 2055: 2053: 2052:1972 in China 2050: 2048: 2047:1972 in Japan 2045: 2043: 2040: 2038: 2035: 2033: 2030: 2028: 2025: 2023: 2020: 2019: 2017: 2007: 2004: 2003: 1995: 1991: 1987: 1983: 1979: 1975: 1971: 1967: 1963: 1959: 1955: 1948: 1940: 1934: 1930: 1929: 1921: 1913: 1909: 1905: 1901: 1897: 1893: 1889: 1885: 1881: 1874: 1866: 1862: 1858: 1854: 1850: 1846: 1842: 1838: 1831: 1823: 1819: 1815: 1811: 1807: 1803: 1796: 1788: 1781: 1777: 1770: 1763: 1755: 1751: 1744: 1737: 1729: 1725: 1721: 1717: 1713: 1709: 1702: 1694: 1690: 1686: 1682: 1678: 1674: 1670: 1666: 1659: 1645: 1641: 1635: 1621: 1617: 1611: 1609: 1600: 1596: 1592: 1588: 1584: 1580: 1576: 1572: 1568: 1564: 1557: 1555: 1546: 1533: 1525: 1521: 1514: 1512: 1503: 1499: 1495: 1491: 1487: 1483: 1479: 1475: 1468: 1454: 1450: 1444: 1430: 1426: 1420: 1412: 1406: 1402: 1398: 1394: 1387: 1385: 1383: 1374: 1370: 1366: 1362: 1358: 1354: 1350: 1346: 1342: 1335: 1327: 1323: 1319: 1315: 1311: 1307: 1303: 1299: 1292: 1284: 1280: 1276: 1272: 1268: 1264: 1260: 1256: 1249: 1241: 1237: 1233: 1229: 1225: 1221: 1217: 1213: 1209: 1202: 1194: 1190: 1186: 1182: 1178: 1174: 1170: 1166: 1159: 1151: 1147: 1143: 1139: 1135: 1131: 1127: 1123: 1116: 1114: 1112: 1110: 1108: 1103: 1093: 1090: 1088: 1085: 1082: 1079: 1077: 1074: 1072: 1069: 1067: 1064: 1062: 1059: 1057: 1054: 1053: 1047: 1045: 1040: 1030: 1027: 1021: 1017: 1013: 1011: 1001: 999: 990: 986: 982: 980: 975: 970: 967: 961: 947: 945: 940: 938: 934: 930: 926: 916: 907: 898: 880: 876: 872: 868: 865: 861: 857: 854: 851: 850: 845: 841: 837: 836: 835: 832: 827: 825: 821: 817: 814: 810: 809:Kakuei Tanaka 801: 797: 795: 785: 778: 774: 770: 766: 763: 759: 756: 753: 752: 748: 744: 741: 737: 736: 735: 732: 730: 716: 713: 710: 707: 703: 699: 695: 692: 691: 690: 687: 685: 670: 668: 664: 660: 656: 648: 645: 642: 639: 636: 635: 634: 632: 622: 620: 610: 606: 604: 600: 586: 572: 569: 564: 561: 556: 554: 550: 546: 542: 537: 535: 531: 520: 517: 509: 498: 495: 491: 488: 484: 481: 477: 474: 470: 467: – 466: 462: 461:Find sources: 455: 451: 445: 444: 439:This section 437: 433: 428: 427: 419: 417: 413: 409: 408:Kakuei Tanaka 405: 401: 396: 392: 385: 384:Richard Nixon 381: 376: 372: 370: 360: 358: 353: 348: 343: 339: 335: 334:Japanese rule 331: 317: 315: 310: 302: 299: 296: 293: 292: 291: 289: 285: 281: 277: 266: 263: 255: 245: 241: 235: 234: 230: 224: 215: 214: 206: 194: 192: 188: 183: 179: 171: 169: 165: 157: 155: 151: 148:Japanese name 146: 134: 132: 128: 125: 121: 113: 111: 107: 104: 100: 95: 91: 83: 81: 77: 69: 67: 63: 58: 54: 49: 35: 26: 1961: 1957: 1947: 1927: 1920: 1887: 1884:Asian Survey 1883: 1873: 1840: 1837:Asian Survey 1836: 1830: 1805: 1801: 1795: 1780:the original 1775: 1762: 1753: 1749: 1736: 1714:(3): 33–50. 1711: 1708:China Report 1707: 1701: 1668: 1665:Asian Survey 1664: 1658: 1647:. Retrieved 1643: 1634: 1623:. Retrieved 1619: 1566: 1562: 1532:cite journal 1480:(1): 32–37. 1477: 1474:Asian Survey 1473: 1467: 1456:. Retrieved 1452: 1443: 1432:. Retrieved 1428: 1419: 1392: 1351:(2): 87–94. 1348: 1344: 1334: 1301: 1297: 1291: 1258: 1254: 1248: 1215: 1211: 1201: 1171:(1): 35–48. 1168: 1164: 1158: 1125: 1122:Asian Survey 1121: 1036: 1022: 1018: 1014: 1007: 995: 983: 971: 962: 958: 941: 937:Yen Chia-kan 921: 904: 895: 828: 806: 793: 791: 783: 733: 728: 726: 688: 683: 681: 652: 628: 615: 596: 565: 557: 538: 527: 512: 503: 493: 486: 479: 472: 460: 448:Please help 443:verification 440: 397: 393: 389: 366: 328: 306: 275: 273: 258: 249: 227: 191:Romanization 110:Hanyu Pinyin 60:Chinese name 1218:: 130–146. 549:Third World 400:Nixon shock 369:Eisaku Sato 2062:Zhou Enlai 2016:Categories 1756:: 111–142. 1649:2020-02-06 1625:2020-02-06 1458:2021-09-15 1434:2021-09-15 1098:References 960:improved. 831:Ji Pengfei 824:Mao Zedong 816:Zhou Enlai 776:countries. 655:Zhou Enlai 603:Ji Pengfei 545:moratorium 476:newspapers 380:Mao Zedong 332:was under 252:April 2022 229:neutrality 1994:153491476 1978:1086-3338 1904:0004-4687 1857:0004-4687 1822:0959-2296 1728:153699407 1685:0004-4687 1599:154847154 1583:0305-7410 1494:0004-4687 1365:0065-0684 1318:0030-851X 1275:0030-851X 1240:154299453 1232:1468-2648 1193:144958541 1185:1753-5654 1142:0004-4687 1000:dispute. 950:Aftermath 874:hegemony. 822:chairman 669:in 1971. 240:talk page 1050:See also 1039:Cold War 404:election 282:and the 233:disputed 131:Jyutping 1986:2010238 1912:2643160 1865:2642996 1693:2642996 1502:2642917 1373:1173880 1326:2672024 1283:2672024 1150:2643340 969:sides. 772:manner. 631:Komeito 490:scholar 342:Yoshida 1992: 1984: 1976: 1935: 1910: 1902: 1863: 1855: 1820: 1726: 1691: 1683: 1597: 1591:652231 1589: 1581: 1500: 1492: 1407: 1371: 1363: 1324: 1316: 1281: 1273: 1238: 1230: 1191: 1183: 1148: 1140: 794:Source 729:Source 701:world. 684:Source 492: 485: 478: 471: 463: 330:Taiwan 1990:S2CID 1982:JSTOR 1908:JSTOR 1861:JSTOR 1783:(PDF) 1772:(PDF) 1746:(PDF) 1724:S2CID 1689:JSTOR 1595:S2CID 1587:JSTOR 1498:JSTOR 1369:JSTOR 1322:JSTOR 1279:JSTOR 1236:S2CID 1189:S2CID 1146:JSTOR 1083:(ODA) 892:Japan 593:Japan 497:JSTOR 483:books 280:Japan 154:Kanji 1974:ISSN 1933:ISBN 1900:ISSN 1853:ISSN 1818:ISSN 1681:ISSN 1579:ISSN 1545:help 1490:ISSN 1405:ISBN 1361:ISSN 1314:ISSN 1271:ISSN 1228:ISSN 1181:ISSN 1138:ISSN 974:Sumo 469:news 274:The 226:The 168:Kana 1966:doi 1892:doi 1845:doi 1810:doi 1716:doi 1673:doi 1571:doi 1520:doi 1482:doi 1397:doi 1353:doi 1306:doi 1263:doi 1220:doi 1216:165 1173:doi 1130:doi 966:yen 910:ROC 901:PRC 625:PRC 558:On 452:by 2018:: 1988:. 1980:. 1972:. 1962:38 1960:. 1956:. 1906:. 1898:. 1888:16 1886:. 1882:. 1859:. 1851:. 1841:13 1839:. 1816:. 1804:. 1774:. 1752:. 1748:. 1722:. 1712:11 1710:. 1687:. 1679:. 1669:13 1667:. 1642:. 1618:. 1607:^ 1593:. 1585:. 1577:. 1567:57 1565:. 1553:^ 1536:: 1534:}} 1530:{{ 1510:^ 1496:. 1488:. 1478:12 1476:. 1451:. 1427:. 1403:. 1395:. 1381:^ 1367:. 1359:. 1349:38 1347:. 1343:. 1320:. 1312:. 1302:73 1300:. 1277:. 1269:. 1259:73 1257:. 1234:. 1226:. 1214:. 1210:. 1187:. 1179:. 1167:. 1144:. 1136:. 1126:15 1124:. 1106:^ 981:. 316:. 1996:. 1968:: 1941:. 1914:. 1894:: 1867:. 1847:: 1824:. 1812:: 1806:8 1789:. 1754:4 1730:. 1718:: 1695:. 1675:: 1652:. 1628:. 1601:. 1573:: 1547:) 1543:( 1526:. 1522:: 1504:. 1484:: 1461:. 1437:. 1413:. 1399:: 1375:. 1355:: 1328:. 1308:: 1285:. 1265:: 1242:. 1222:: 1195:. 1175:: 1169:7 1152:. 1132:: 519:) 513:( 508:) 504:( 494:· 487:· 480:· 473:· 446:. 265:) 259:( 254:) 250:( 246:. 236:.

Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.

Knowledge

Japan–China Joint Communiqué

Index