Military Assistance Command, Vietnam – Studies and Observations Group

654: 1067:, the largest PAVN/Viet Cong offensive thus far in the conflict, and the collapse of SOG's northern operations. Although the Tet Offensive was contained and rolled back, and significant casualties were inflicted upon the enemy, the mood of the American people and government had turned irrevocably against an open-ended commitment by the United States. For most of the year MACV-SOG's operations centered around in-country missions in support of field forces. Since the enemy had to come out from his cover and launched conventional operations, the U.S. and South Vietnam lost no opportunity in engaging them. General Westmoreland, encouraged by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, requested 200,000 more troops, under the stipulation that they would be used to conduct cross-border operations to pursue the foe. This was the logical military move at this point in the conflict, but it was already too late. In 1968, SOG recon teams conducted hundreds of missions gathering valuable intelligence but suffered 79 SF troops killed in action or missing. MACV-SOG captured three PAVN soldiers from Cambodia and one from Laos. 478: 1236:

created by placing radio-equipped air watch units within the flight paths between the launch sites and Base Areas. Within the Base Areas, lookouts were placed in trees and platforms to watch likely landing zones while the roads and trails were routinely swept by security forces. The PAVN also began to organize and develop specialized units that would both drive and then fix the teams so that they could be destroyed. By 1970, they had created a layered and effective system, and SOG recon teams found their time on the ground both shortened and more dangerous. The mauling or wiping out of entire teams began to become a more common occurrence.

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behind enemy lines in the event of an invasion by conventional forces, not conducting agent, maritime, or psychological operations. Russell expected to take over a fully functional organization and assumed that the CIA (which would maintain a representative on SOG's staff and contribute personnel to the organization) would see the military through any teething troubles. His expectations and assumptions were incorrect. The contribution of the South Vietnamese came in the form of SOG's counterpart organization (which used a plethora of titles, and was finally called the Strategic Technical Directorate ).

1328:, the long-sought incursion into Laos whose aim would be the cutting the Ho Chi Minh Trail. MACV and the South Vietnamese had been planning just such an operation as far back as August 1964, but the concept was continuously turned down due to the fallout that would have been incurred by the invasion of supposedly "neutral" Laos. The Laotian government (supported by Ambassador Sullivan and the State Department) was adamantly opposed to such an operation. On 8 February, 16,000 (later 20,000) South Vietnamese troops, backed by U.S. helicopter and air support, rolled into Laos along 1409:

elimination of the exploitation forces. For SOG, Vietnamization was finally nigh. On 1 May 1972, the unit was reduced in strength and renamed the Strategic Technical Directorate Assistance Team 158 (STDAT-158). The Ground Studies Group was disestablished and replaced by the Liaison Service Advisory Detachments. SOG's air elements stood down for redeployment, the JPRC was turned over to MACV and redesignated the Joint Casualty Resolution Center, while the psychological operations personnel and installations were turned over to either the STD or

55: 1336:. Unlike the Cambodian incursion, however, the North Vietnamese stood and fought, gradually mustering 60,000 troops. By 25 March, the South Vietnamese forces retreated. Ironically, MACV-SOG's role in the operation was only peripheral. Recon teams conducted diversionary operations prior to the invasion and helped cover the South Vietnamese withdrawal, but they were otherwise forbidden from participation in the very operation that both MACV-SOG and MACV had come to consider its 1099:

contributing factor. The unit was more concerned over Washington's continuous rejection of one of the original goals of the operation: the formation of a resistance movement by potential dissident elements in North Vietnam. Washington's stated goal in the conflict was a free and viable South Vietnam, not the overthrow of the Hanoi regime. The conundrum was what would happen had the program succeeded. The best possible outcome would have been a repeat of the ill-fated

1079: 2278: 754: 832:. The recon teams (RTs) inserted into Cambodia faced even more restrictions than those in Laos. Initially, they had to cross the border on foot, had no tactical air support (neither helicopters nor fixed wing), and were not to be provided with FAC coverage. The teams were to rely on stealth and were usually smaller in size than those that operated in Laos. 1172:, the Seventh/Thirteenth Air Force's anti-infiltration campaign in Laos. By 1969 the Ground Studies Group was running its operations from C&Cs at Da Nang for operations in southeastern Laos and at Ban Me Thuot for its Cambodian operations. That year they were joined by a new C&C at Kontum, for operations launched into the triborder region of the 546:, South Vietnam (the fishermen were told that they were, in fact, still within their homeland). The South Vietnamese crews and personnel on the island posed as members of a dissident northern communist group known as the Sacred Sword of the Patriot League (SSPL), which opposed the takeover of the Hanoi regime by politicians who supported the 459:. The American vessel was undamaged, and the U.S. claimed that one of the attacking vessels had been sunk and that the others were damaged by U.S. carrier-based aircraft. On the night of 3–4 August, three SOG vessels shelled targets on the mainland of North Vietnam. On the night of 4 August, after being joined by the destroyer 962:

accomplished. This was the origin of STRATA, the all-Vietnamese Short Term Roadwatch and Target Acquisition teams. After a slow initial start, the first agent team was recovered from the north. The following missions were plagued with difficulties, but, after additional training, the team's performance improved dramatically.

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communist military officers also within the north. Both stations were equally adamant in their condemnations of the PRC, the South and North Vietnamese regimes, and the U.S. and called for a return to traditional Vietnamese values. Straight news, without propaganda embellishment, was broadcast from South Vietnam via the

789:, near the western end of the DMZ. During this same mission, RT Arizona was completely wiped out when they were inserted directly on top of an entrenched NVA unit. Despite this loss and others incurred as wiretapping efforts continued, the wiretaps placed by SOG members provided an invaluable intelligence source. 1654:, the eponymous organization employs Studies and Observations Group operatives and assets for their own operations. The game also suggests that MACV-SOG might have been inspired by DELTA GREEN, as both organizations have similar principles: combining operatives from various military and civilian agencies for 769:, trying to balance the threats facing his nation, had allowed Hanoi to set up a presence in Cambodia. Although the extension of Laotian Highway 110 into Cambodia in the tri-border region was an improvement to its logistical system, North Vietnam was now unloading communist-flagged transports in the port of 1312:

was passed by Congress, prohibiting participation by U.S. ground forces in any future operations in either Cambodia or Laos. U.S. participation in Cambodian operations (which were already being turned over to all-Vietnamese teams) ended on 1 July 1970 and the same stipulation was to apply in Laos no

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area. By the end of 1969, SOG was authorized 394 U.S. personnel, but it is useful to compare those numbers to the actual strengths of the operational elements. There were 1,041 Army, 476 USAF, 17 USMC and seven CIA personnel assigned to those units. They were supported by 3,068 SCUs, and 5,402 South

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North Vietnamese security forces simply captured a team, turned its radio operator, and continued to broadcast as though nothing had happened. Supplies and reinforcements were requested, parachuted in to the requesting team's location, and were likewise captured. During the period 1960–1968 both the

676:

Regardless, MACV-SOG began a series of operations that would continue to grow in size and scope over the next eight years. The Laotian operations were originally run by a Command and Control (C&C) headquarters at Da Nang. The teams, usually three Americans and three to 12 indigenous mercenaries,

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and USAF aircraft) compelled both sides to maintain as low a profile as possible. Hanoi was interested in Laos due only to the necessity of keeping its supply corridor to the south open. The U.S. was involved for the opposite reason. Both routinely operated inside Laos, but both also managed to keep

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SOG's first commander, Colonel Clyde Russell, had difficulty creating an organization to fulfill his mission since, at the time, United States Special Forces were unprepared doctrinally or organizationally to carry it out. At this point the Special Forces' mission was to conduct guerrilla operations

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Some American writers on the subject (including many ex-SOG personnel) blamed the failure of the operations on the penetration of the unit by enemy spies – a claim not entirely unsupported by facts. Others, however, laid more of the blame on the operational ineptitude of SOG, which simply continued

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Charles Wilklow was dragged into a clearing covered by PAVN machine guns to be used as bait to attract a U.S. rescue mission. After four days Wilklow escaped into the jungle, was seen by a reconnaissance plane and then rescued by a Kingbee. The raid had cost 7 U.S. dead and missing, only one of the

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The security apparatus of North Vietnam had decades in which to learn to cope with not only the CIA's program, but with the unconventional and covert operations of its French predecessors. The CIA had been loath to conduct such operations in the north, since similar operations in the Soviet Union,

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was hit by flak and collided with another A-1 losing its tail and crashing into the ground killing its pilot, Lieutenant Colonel Lewis M. Robinson. The fighting continued throughout the night and the next morning it was decided to pull the force out. During the extraction two USMC UH-1E helicopter

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The U.S. military (and MACV-SOG personnel) kept tight security over knowledge of the unit's operations and existence until the early 1980s. Although there had been some small leaks by the media during the conflict, they were usually erroneous and easily dismissed. More specific was the release of

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By 1969, the North Vietnamese had also worked out their doctrine and techniques for dealing with the recon teams. Originally, the PAVN had been caught unprepared and had been forced to respond in whatever haphazard manner local commanders could organize. Soon, however, an early warning system was

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Command and Control North (CCN) at Da Nang, commanded by a lieutenant colonel, used 60 recon teams and two exploitation battalions (four companies of three platoons). Command and Control Central (CCC) at Kontum, also commanded by a lieutenant colonel, used 30 teams and one exploitation battalion.

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Beginning in 1966, SOG conducted prisoner snatch missions of PAVN soldiers behind enemy lines along the Hồ Chí Minh Trail. No matter the team's primary mission, capturing enemy soldiers always remained the team's secondary mission when the opportunity presented itself due to valuable intelligence

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headquarters. These included Maritime Operations (OPS-31), which continued harassment raids and support for psychological operations (via kidnapped fishermen); Airborne Operations (OPS-34), which continued to insert agent teams and supplies into the north; Psychological Operations (OPS-33), which

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helicopters of the 219th Squadron, which would remain affiliated with MACV-SOG for its entire history. The team's mission was to penetrate the target area, gather intelligence, and remain undetected as long as possible. Communication was maintained with a forward air control (FAC) aircraft, which

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Ambassador Sullivan had the task of juggling the bolstering of the inept Lao government and military, the CIA and its clandestine army, the USAF and its bombing campaign, and now the incursions of the U.S.-led reconnaissance teams of SOG. His limitations on SOG's operations (depth of penetration,

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This fiction was supported by the radio broadcasts of SOG's "Voice of the SSPL", leaflet drops, and gift kits containing pre-tuned radios which could only receive broadcasts from the unit's transmitters. SOG also broadcast "Radio Red Flag," programming purportedly directed by a group of dissident

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were signed by the belligerent powers in Paris. On 21 February, a similar accord was signed on Laos, ending the bombing of that country and instituting a cease fire. On the 29th, MACV was disestablished and remaining U.S. troops began leaving the south. On 14 August the U.S. Air Force ceased its

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President Johnson sought a way out of the commitment that he had originally escalated. Politically, this was late in coming, but Washington had finally awakened to its predicament. Johnson attempted to get Hanoi to reopen peace negotiations and the carrot he offered was the cessation of all U.S.

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On 18 October 1965, MACV-SOG conducted its first cross-border mission against target D-1, a suspected truck terminus on Laotian Route 165, 15 miles (24 km) inside Laos. The team consisted of two U.S. Special Forces soldiers and four South Vietnamese. The mission was deemed a success with 88

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area. Casualties among the Special Commando Units (SCUs – pronounced Sues), as the indigenous mercenaries were titled, were: 57 killed, 270 wounded, and 31 missing. Command and Control South (CCS) at Ban Me Thuot, also commanded by a lieutenant colonel, consisted of 30 teams and an exploitation

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Never happy with its long-term agent operations in North Vietnam, SOG decided to initiate a new program whose missions would be shorter in duration, conducted closer to South Vietnam, and carried out by smaller teams. Every effort would be expended to retrieve the teams when their missions were

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After a slow and shaky start, the unit got its operations underway. Originally, these consisted of a continuation of the CIA's agent infiltrations. Teams of South Vietnamese volunteers were parachuted into the North, but most were quickly captured. Maritime operations against the coast of North

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In late March 1971, when the 5th Special Force Group was redeployed to the U.S., the Command and Control elements were renamed Task Force Advisory Elements (TF1AE, TF2AE and TF3AE). They originally consisted of 244 U.S. and 780 indigenous personnel each, but they were quickly drawn down by the

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battalions (which were never used) divided into company-sized "Hatchet" forces which were, in turn, sub-divided into "Hornet" platoons. The commanders and non-commissioned officers of these forces were U.S. personnel, usually assigned on a temporary duty basis in "Snakebite" teams from the 1st

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organization, which had been conducting in-country recon efforts on behalf of the field forces, awaiting authorization to begin the Cambodian operations. A turf war broke out between the 5th and SOG over missions and manpower. The Joint Chiefs decided in favor of MACV-SOG, since it had already

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and by the testimony of ex-SOG personnel during congressional investigations into the bombing campaigns in Laos and Cambodia in the early 1970s. Historians interested in the unit's activities had to wait until the early 1990s, when MACV-SOG's Annexes to the annual MACV Command Histories and a

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The function of STDAT-158 was to assist the STD in a complete takeover of SOG's operations. The operational elements had already been absorbed and were expanded by the inclusion of troops from the now-disbanded South Vietnamese Special Forces. The task of the American personnel was to provide

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agents. Intelligence returns from the northern agent teams had been disappointing and more than three-quarters of the agents inserted had been captured either during or not long after their insertion. The fact that SOG had followed the CIA's failed formula for three years was not considered a

842:(JPRC) was established. The JPRC was to collect and coordinate information on POWs, escapees, and evadees, to launch missions to free U.S. and allied prisoners, and to conduct post-search and rescue (SAR) operations when all other efforts had failed. SOG provided the capability to launch 1123:

CIA and MACV-SOG dispatched 456 South Vietnamese agents to their deaths or long incarcerations in northern prisons. Hanoi continued this process year after year, learning SOG's operational methods and bending them to its purpose. In the end, it was running one of the most successful

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areas). The organization did, however, maintain its strength in U.S. personnel, who continued to conduct in-country missions. It was also continuously tasked by the JCS with maintaining forces in readiness to once again take up northern operations if called upon to do so.

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battalion. Since the use of exploitation forces was forbidden in Cambodia, these troops were utilized in securing launch sites, providing installation security, and conducting in-country missions. During the year, 454 reconnaissance operations were conducted in Cambodia.

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The American withdrawal from South Vietnam began to directly affect SOG in 1971. By early 1972 U.S. military personnel were forbidden from conducting operations in either Laos or Cambodia, its teams of mercenary SCUs continued those operations (in the newly renamed

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bombings and by the time of Sihanouk's ouster, the program had been in operation for 14 months. Lon Nol promptly ordered North Vietnamese personnel out of the country. North Vietnam responded with an invasion of the country launched at the explicit request of the

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would communicate with USAF fighter-bombers if the necessity, or the opportunity to strike lucrative targets, arose. The FAC was also the lifeline through which the team would communicate with its FOB and through which it could call for extraction if compromised.

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On the night of 30–31 July 1964, four SOG vessels shelled two islands, Hon Me and Hon Ngu, off the coast of North Vietnam. It was the first time SOG vessels had attacked North Vietnamese shore facilities by shelling from the sea. The next afternoon, the destroyer

372:...to execute an intensified program of harassment, diversion, political pressure, the capture of prisoners, physical destruction, acquisition of intelligence, generation of propaganda, and diversion of resources, against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. 1780:

was instructed not to approach closer than eight miles from the coast and four miles from offshore islands. It is instructive that similar patrols off the coast of the PRC were not allowed to approach within 15 miles of the coast or 12 miles from offshore

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later than 8 February 1971 (the only qualifications to the restrictions, in both operational areas, were in case of either POW rescue missions or aircraft crash site inspections). Although unknown to the U.S. public, many MACV-SOG veterans participated in

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would escalate with the PRC backed Khmer Rouge (also backed by the exiled Sihanouk), fighting Lon Nol's central government. Following US withdrawal from Indochina, its allies in Laos and Cambodia would collapse to the North Vietnamese backed forces.

1421:, strapped for cash and equipment in the final stand-down period, never used the STD in a strategic reconnaissance role. Instead, the STD's units were launched on in-country missions until the dissolution of their parent organization in March 1973. 368:, had no authority to conduct operations outside territorial South Vietnam. This command arrangement through SACSA also allowed tight control (up to the presidential level) of the scope and scale of the organization's operations. Its mission was: 1033:

was shot down. Another CH-46 came and extracted more of the force, but it was hit by antiaircraft fire and crashed from a height of 100 feet (30 m). The PAVN fired on the survivors in the wreckage killing many of them. One of the survivors,

2570:

U.S. Senate, Records of Senate Subcommittee on POW/MIA Affairs. Working Papers of Sedgwick Tourison, last revision, 15 March 1993. Charles E. Schamel Center for Legislative Archives, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington,

1276:, the phased withdrawal of U.S. troops that began in the previous year. He also sought to convince Hanoi that he meant business. That opportunity was provided by the overthrow of Cambodia's Prince Sihanouk by the pro-American General 1188:

During 1969 404 recon missions and 48 exploitation force operations were conducted in Laos. To give an example of the cost of such operations, during the year 20 Americans were killed, 199 wounded, and nine went missing in the

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In October, 1966, efforts were made to place wiretaps in NVA base camps using specialized CIA taps with rubber coating placed over the wire to avoid detection. The first successful wiretap was conducted by RT Colorado, led by

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In Laos, the North Vietnamese cleared their logistical corridor to the west for security reasons and increased their aid and support for the Pathet Lao. Fighting that once was seasonal became continuous and conventional. The

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MACV-SOG reconnaissance teams were also bolstered by the creation of exploitation forces, which could either support the teams in time of need, or launch their own raids against the trail. They consisted of two (later three)

585:

On 21 September 1965, the Pentagon authorized MACV-SOG to begin cross-border operations in Laos in areas contiguous to South Vietnam's western border. MACV had sought authority for the launching of such missions (Operation

523:, which may have assumed that all of these actions signaled a coordinated military escalation against them, decided to respond in what it claimed as its territorial waters. Thus, the three P-4s were ordered to attack the 1228:), controlled from Nakhon Phanom. 1969 saw the apogee of the bombing campaign, when 433,000 tons of bombs were dropped on Laos. SOG supported the effort with ground reconnaissance, sensor emplacement, wiretap, and 550:(PRC). The kidnapped fishermen were well fed and treated, but they were also subtly interrogated and indoctrinated in the message of the SSPL. After a two-week stay, the fishermen were returned to northern waters. 1300:

that began on 30 April. With intelligence on communist Base Areas in eastern Cambodia gleaned from MACV-SOG, huge stockpiles of PAVN arms, ammunition, and supplies were overrun and captured. In May, Operation

3656: 1220:, which freed up hundreds of aircraft for interdiction missions. Intelligence for the campaign was supplied by both the recon teams of MACV-SOG and by the strings of air-dropped electronic sensors of 388:(VC) insurgency in South Vietnam. Similar operations had been under the purview of the CIA, which placed agent teams in North Vietnam with airdrops and over-the-beach insertions. Under pressure from 717:

program; and Air Operations (OPS-32), which supported the others and provided logistical airlift. Training for SOG's South Vietnamese agents, naval action teams, and indigenous mercenaries (usually

1405:, launched by the PAVN on 30 March 1972, made cross-border operations irrelevant. As with Tet, all of MACV-SOG/STD's efforts were concentrated on in-country missions to support the Field Forces. 1564:, the nation's second highest award for valor. On 4 April 2001, the U.S. Army officially recognized the bravery, integrity, and devotion to duty of its covert warriors by awarding the unit a 3661: 3641: 1232:

missions. The cessation of the bombing of the north also freed the North Vietnamese to reinforce their anti-aircraft defenses of the trail system and aircraft losses rose proportionately.

1075:), but Johnson went one further by calling a halt to all northern operations, both overt and covert. This order effectively ended MACV-SOG's agent team, propaganda, and aerial operations. 303:. The unit was downsized and renamed Strategic Technical Directorate Assistance Team 158 on 1 May 1972, to support the transfer of its work to the Strategic Technical Directorate of the 360:

The Studies and Observation Group, as the unit was initially titled, was in fact controlled by the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (SACSA) and his staff at

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as a part of their logistical system, funneling men and supplies to the southernmost seat of battle. Unknown was the extent of that use. The answer shocked intelligence analysts. Prince

31: 264:; took enemy prisoners, rescued downed pilots, conducted rescue operations to retrieve prisoners of war throughout Southeast Asia, and conducted clandestine agent team activities and 1413:. The final casualty of SOG ground operations occurred on 11 October 1971 when Sergeant First Class Audley D. Mills was killed when a booby-trap he was trying to disarm detonated. 972: 653: 877:

during the year. These helicopters had been assigned to conduct operations in support of the CIA's clandestine operations in Laos and were a natural for assisting SOG in the

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pilots, carried out bombing raids in North Vietnam itself, or that a SOG agent team had been inserted into the same relative area and been detected by the North Vietnamese.

781:, a $ 100 bonus for each American, and a new Seiko watch and cash to each indigenous member. Recon teams succeeded in capturing 12 enemy soldiers in Laos during that year. 1168:

With the deflation of its northern operations (although the JCS demanded that SOG retain the capability of reinitiating them), SOG concentrated its efforts on supporting

3651: 1305:, a continuous aerial campaign against the PAVN/Viet Cong and the Khmer Rouge was initiated. SOG recon teams in Cambodia now had all the air support that they needed. 1004:

which caused numerous secondary explosions, but an aerial observer could see PAVN troops in the area immediately afterwards. A Hatchet Force was then landed by nine

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in a U.S. newspaper article, SOG decided that new cover designations were necessary for all of its operational elements. The Laotian cross-border effort was renamed

1813: Dr. Moïse's account should be compared to the official Navy version, which was essentially the one given to Congress. See Edward Marolda and Oscar Fitzgerald, 542:

conducted against North Vietnam. The unit's naval arm picked up northern fishermen during searches of coastal vessels and detained them on Cu Lao Cham Island off

3616: 777:

gained related to PAVN troop movements, size, and base locations. Teams also received rewards including free R&R trips to Taiwan or Thailand aboard a SOG

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technical support (in logistics, communications, etc.) and advice to the STD. This the unit did until its disbandment on 12 March 1973. The South Vietnamese

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Vietnamese and third-country civilian employees, leading to a total of 10,210 military personnel and civilians either assigned to or working for MACV-SOG.

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aircrews in SOG's employ. The aircraft flew agent insertions and resupply, leaflet and gift kit drops, and carried out routine logistics missions for SOG.

610:

bombing sorties flown against the terminus resulting in multiple secondary explosions, but also resulted in SOG's first casualty, Special Forces Captain

507:

Johnson's announcement of the incidents involving the destroyers did not mention that SOG vessels had been conducting operations in the same area as the

561:

These agent operations and propaganda efforts were supported by SOG's air arm, the First Flight Detachment. The unit consisted of four heavily modified

1324:

By 1971 the U.S. was steadily withdrawing from Southeast Asia. As a test of Vietnamization, Washington decided to allow the South Vietnamese to launch

3631: 647: 2815: 2785: 2639: 2819: 2789: 2643: 689:). After in-depth planning and training, a team was airlifted over the border by aircraft provided by the U.S. Marine Corps (who operated in the 346: 1146:, killing 17 Special Forces soldiers (their largest one-day loss of the war) and wounding another 125 Allied troops. Thirty-two VC were killed. 590:) since 1964 in an attempt to put boots on the ground in a reconnaissance role to observe, first hand, the enemy logistical system known as the 849:

The Air Operations Group had been augmented in September 1966 by the addition of four specially-modified MC-130E Combat Talon (deployed under

919:(DMZ) in I Corps. SOG recon teams were tasked with reconnaissance and the hand emplacement of electronic sensors both in the western DMZ ( 1561: 1317:, the Son Tay POW camp raid carried out in North Vietnam on 21 November 1970. The deputy commander of the joint rescue force was Colonel 1272:

had been seeking a negotiated settlement to the Vietnam War. In 1970, he saw an opportunity to buy time for the Saigon government during

3596: 1444: 622:, was determined that he would remain in control over decisions and operations that took place within the supposedly neutral kingdom. 364:. This arrangement was necessary since SOG needed some listing in the MACV table of organization and the fact that MACV's commander, 3591: 1424:

In January 1973, President Nixon ordered a halt to all U.S. combat operations in South Vietnam and, on the 27th of that month, the

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Hearings before the Committee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Committee on Foreign Relations,

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operations against North Vietnam north of the 20th parallel. Hanoi had only sought an end to the air campaign against the north (

471: 1642:, the third season sees the main characters reassigned to SOG in order to conduct covert operations in Vietnam and in Cambodia. 2739: 1590: 726: 412: 395:, the program, and all other agency para-military operations, was turned over to the military in the wake of the disastrous 1766:(1966–1968), Stephen Cavanaugh (1968–1970) and John Sadler (1970–1972), all of whom were U.S. Army Special Forces officers. 1119:

Eastern Europe, and the PRC had been abject failures and North Vietnam was considered an even tougher target to penetrate.

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and the commander and troops of SOG, who promptly labelled Sullivan the "Field Marshal." The ambassador responded in kind.

334: 713:

continued its "black" radio broadcasts, leaflet and gift kit drops, and running the operation at Cu Lao Cham; the revised

1463: 1458:

to MACV-SOG personnel (although they were never recognized as such). One USAF helicopter pilot, two U.S. Navy SEALs, one

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that year. Each of the C&Cs was now fielding battalion-size forces, and the number of missions rose proportionately.

938:

in the newly created Ground Studies Group (OPS-35). All operations conducted against North Vietnam were now designated

874: 389: 504:), asking for the unprecedented authority to conduct military actions in Southeast Asia without a declaration of war. 3504: 3342: 3315: 3253: 2887: 2868: 2269: 1701: 338: 1216:, which saw the rapid expansion of the bombing of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. This was made possible by the close-out of 3496:

The Secret War Against Hanoi: Kennedy's and Johnson's use of spies, saboteurs, and covert warriors in North Vietnam

1030: 866: 854: 619: 477: 1565: 839: 304: 215: 2523:

USMACV Strategic Technical Directorate Assistance Team – 158 Command History, 1 May 1972 – March 1973, pp. 15–19

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USMACV Strategic Technical Directorate Assistance Team – 158 Command History, 1 May 1972 – March 1973, pp. 15–17

1020:. The Hatchet Force was soon pinned down in the bomb craters and close air support aircraft were called in. One 3567: 3531: 3475: 3448: 3421: 3369: 3280: 3224: 3192: 3161: 3132: 3103: 3076: 3045: 3018: 2987: 2949: 2917: 2006: 1454:

One early source of information (if one read between the lines) were the citations issued for the award of the

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USMACV Strategic Technical Directorate Assistance Team – 158 Command History, 1 May 1972 – March 1973, p. 18

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to repeat a failed formula. Changes to the infiltration program (in the form of the diversionary Operation

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In reality, for MACV-SOG, the point was moot. Suspicions abounded within the organization that Operation

861:) of the First Flight Detachment already assigned to SOG. Another source of aerial support came from the 829: 634: 354: 969:, a PAVN base area located approximately 11 miles (18 km) south-southwest of Khe Sanh Combat Base ( 1686: 1329: 1009: 1001: 825: 800:

had been preparing for just such an eventuality. The 5th SF had gone so far as to create Projects B-56

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choice of targets, length of operations) led to immediate and continuous enmity between the embassy in

136: 35:

Never assigned an official crest or patch, SOG personnel adopted this unofficial self-designed insignia

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US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Strategic Technical Directorate Assistance Team 158 (1973).

1696: 1672: 1448: 1072: 598:, had begun carrying out a strategic bombardment of the logistical system in southern Laos in April ( 501: 3611: 1638: 1139: 797: 539: 452: 342: 1762: The commanders of SOG were Colonels Clyde Russell (1964–1965), Donald Blackburn (1965–1966), 606:) that had proven to be a disaster. U.S. troops were necessary and SOG was given the green light. 2762:. Records of the House Committee on Armed Services. Washington DC: US Government Printing Office. 2261:

United States Army in Vietnam Combat Operations Staying the Course October 1967 to September 1968

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were shot down as was a Kingbee. A CH-46 succeeded in extracting part of the force, then a USAF

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By the end of 1965, MACV-SOG had shaken itself out into operational groups commanded from its

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During 1966 and 1967, it became obvious to MACV that the North Vietnamese were using neutral

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The unit participated in most of the significant campaigns of the Vietnam War, including the

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bombing of Cambodia, bringing all military actions by the U.S. in Southeast Asia to an end.

1613: 1603: 1375: 1363: 1040: 1035: 824:

The first mission was launched in September and construction was begun on a new C&C at

770: 737:. Training for the U.S. personnel assigned to recon teams (RTs) was conducted at Kham Duc. 722: 686: 396: 1612:, Captain Willard is assigned to SOG and then sent after Colonel Kurtz who has taken his 496:, an aerial attack against North Vietnamese targets on 5 August. Johnson also went to the 8: 3307: 2760:

United States-Vietnam Relations 1945–1967: A Study Prepared for the Department of Defense

1729: 1649: 1547: 1425: 1418: 1344: 1245: 1135: 1124: 615: 511:

immediately before, and during, that cruise; nor did it mention that, on 1 and 2 August,

500:

that day and requested the passage of the Southeast Asia Resolution (better known as the

434: 249: 124: 3210: 3007: 2976: 2857: 2809: 2779: 2633: 1520: 1459: 1297: 1257: 1052: 1000:), believed to contain a PAVN field army headquarters. The target area was hit by nine 910: 678: 392: 292: 234: 193: 188: 474:

that both ships were under attack by unknown vessels, assumed to be North Vietnamese.

248:

Established on 24 January 1964, it conducted strategic reconnaissance missions in the

3573: 3563: 3537: 3527: 3510: 3500: 3494: 3481: 3471: 3454: 3444: 3427: 3417: 3375: 3365: 3348: 3338: 3321: 3311: 3286: 3276: 3259: 3249: 3230: 3220: 3214: 3198: 3188: 3167: 3157: 3151: 3138: 3128: 3122: 3109: 3099: 3082: 3072: 3065: 3051: 3041: 3024: 3014: 2993: 2983: 2955: 2945: 2923: 2913: 2893: 2883: 2864: 2735: 2265: 2002: 1995: 1646: 1554: 1513: 1251: 1083: 677:

were launched from Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) in the border areas (originally at

626: 602:) and had received authorization to launch an all-Vietnamese recon effort (Operation 595: 591: 580: 489: 120: 646:

their operations out of sight due to Lao's supposed neutrality pursuant to the 1962

3181: 2935: 2732:

Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People's Army of Vietnam, 1954–1975

1745: 1737: 1733: 1725: 1655: 1540: 1527: 1506: 1488: 1471: 1402: 1357: 1318: 1269: 1212:

The mission of the Ground Studies Group was to support the sensor-driven Operation

1128: 915:

portion of the electronic and physical barrier system under construction along the

886: 766: 415: 325:

The Studies and Observations Group (also known as SOG, MACSOG, and MACV-SOG) was a

300: 203: 83: 3389:

SOG – MACV Studies and Observations Group (Behind Enemy Lines) (Four vols. Vol I.

2734:. Translated by Pribbenow, Merle L. Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press. 1791: A thorough description of the history of the JPRC is found in George Veith's 3243: 2939: 778: 1156:

Further information on the aerial interdiction effort in southeastern Laos:

1138:

a company from the VC R20 Battalion and a sapper platoon infiltrated MACV-SOG's

24:

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam – Studies and Observations Group (MACV-SOG)

3096:

Running Recon: A Photo Journey with SOG Special Ops Along the Ho Chi Minh Trail

2826: 2651:

US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and Observations Group (1965).

2580: 1749: 1741: 1608: 1573: 1495: 1455: 1284: 1273: 903: 748: 562: 460: 441: 308: 79: 1776: The North Vietnamese claimed a 12-mile reach for its territorial waters. 813:

successfully conducted covert cross-border operations. Operational control of

718: 3625: 3325: 3303: 3171: 2897: 2852: 2282: 1763: 1633:

being an element in the story line as well as a playable multiplayer faction.

1475: 1064: 1058: 1005: 987: 974: 698: 377: 284: 178: 60: 3577: 3541: 3514: 3458: 3379: 3352: 3290: 3263: 3234: 3202: 3142: 3113: 3055: 3028: 2997: 2959: 2927: 1835:

compiled by Steve Sherman, Houston, TX: Radix Press, 2002, pp. 16–19, 50–51.

329:, joint unconventional warfare task force created on 24 January 1964 by the 3524:

Secret Army, Secret War: Washington's Tragic Spy Operation in North Vietnam

3485: 3431: 3086: 2905: 1534: 1482: 1443:

Pentagon documentation study of the organization were declassified for the

1283:

Nixon had escalated U.S. involvement in Cambodia by authorizing the secret

1104: 1039:

missing, USMC Corporal Frank Cius, was released on 5 March 1973 as part of

730: 682: 638: 637:(PAVN) troops) and the Royal Lao armed forces (supported by the CIA-backed 611: 448: 440:

began an electronic intelligence-gathering mission along the coast, in the

361: 2796: 2771:

United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Kingdom of Laos

2766: 2559: 2555: 1831: See also interview of John Singlaub by Richard Shultz in the CD-ROM 1585: 1289: 320: 242: 157: 909:

By 1967, MACV-SOG had also been given the mission of supporting the new

747:

Further information on the communist logistical system in Cambodia:

319:

Further information on the origins of the Southeast Asian conflict:

2978:

Trial By Fire: the 1972 Easter offensive, America's last Vietnam battle

2751:

The War Against Trucks: Aerial Interdiction in Southern Laos, 1968–1972

1624: 1368:

Further information on the U.S. aerial offensive of December 1972:

838:

was not the only addition to SOG's size and missions. During 1966, the

786: 630: 326: 3606: 3657:

Military units and formations of the United States in the Vietnam War

3009:

Spies and Commandos: how America lost the secret war in North Vietnam

1293: 670: 385: 227:

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam – Studies and Observations Group

30: 3560:

Shooting at the Moon: The Story of America's Clandestine War in Laos

3441:

The Cambodian Campaign: The 1970 Offensive and America's Vietnam War

579:

Further information on the communist logistical system in Laos:

2910:

Secret Commandos: Behind Enemy Lines with the Elite Warriors of SOG

1833:

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and Observations Group

1623:

The Studies and Observations Group makes an appearance in the 2010

1617: 1333: 762: 734: 642: 516: 418:

to the unit, but these operations also fell short of expectations.

261: 2281:

This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the

2264:. Center of Military History United States Army. pp. 656–7. 1298:

a series of incursions by U.S. and South Vietnamese ground forces

1277: 1017: 594:(the Truong Son Road to the North Vietnamese). MACV, through the 543: 97: 846:

rescue missions anywhere in Southeast Asia at a moments notice.

773:

and trucking the cargo to its base areas on the eastern border.

337:(MACV). It eventually consisted primarily of personnel from the 1410: 709: 566: 130: 108: 2501:

MACV Command History 1971–72, Annex B, pp. 216, 300, & 383

1438:

documents dealing with the early days of the operation in the

16:

Vietnam War–era American multi-service special operations unit

2827:

U.S. Senate, Committee on Veteran's Affairs (February 1979).

2757: 1374:

Further information on the final PAVN offensive of 1975:

1115:), spurred by suspicions at headquarters, came only in 1967. 1078: 1026: 881:

area. When helicopter operations were finally authorized for

520: 3662:

Special operations units and formations of the United States

3642:

Military history of the United States during the Vietnam War

3300:

SOG : The Secret Wars of America's Commandos in Vietnam

2941:

Hazardous Duty: An American Soldier in the Twentieth Century

2614:

Military Assistance Command Studies and Observations Group,

1945:

MACSOG Documentation Study, Annex A to Appendix C, pp. 21–81

1474:(who had to wait until he received his award from President 796:, a cross-border recon effort in Cambodia. Both SOG and the 3468:

Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon, and the Destruction of Cambodia

3121:

Isaacs, Arnold R.; Hardy, Gordon; Brown, McAlister (1987).

1898:

MACSOG Documentation Study, Annex N to Appendix B, B–n–4–10

1308:

As a result of U.S. political reaction, on 29 December the

512: 400: 257: 1063:

For MACV and SOG, 1968 was a black year. The year saw the

792:

In April 1967, MACV-SOG was ordered to commence Operation

3362:

The Blood Road: The Ho Chi Minh Trail and the Vietnam War

1204:

area, and by the USAF helicopters of the 20th SOS in the

1162:

Further information on the electronic sensor system:

753: 2094:

MACSOG Documentation Study, Annex H to Appendix C, p. 11

538:

The last aspect of SOG's original missions consisted of

2753:. Washington DC: Air Force History and Museums Program. 1356:

Further information on the PAVN offensive of 1972:

1262:

Further information on the ARVN incursion in Laos:

233:) was a highly classified, multi-service United States 481:

2 August 1964: A North Vietnamese P-4 under fire from

411:

Vietnam resumed after the delivery of Norwegian-built

2799:

Hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

1466:

earned the nation's highest award on SOG operations:

1362:

Further information on the U.S. aerial campaign:

1321:, who had created SOG's cross-border effort in 1965. 1244:

Further information on the conflict in Cambodia:

885:, they were provided by the dedicated support of the 3647:

Military units and formations disestablished in 1972

1256:

Further information on the U.S./ARVN incursion:

1051:

Further information on the struggle in I Corps:

3607:

MACV-SOG Killed in action lists by year (e.g. 1971)

3248:. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2410:

Annex B to MACV Command History, 1970, pp. 230, 236

1853:

MACSOG Documentation Study, Appendix B, pp. 354–355

275:which precipitated increased American involvement, 3180: 3064: 3006: 2975: 2880:SOG Medic: Stories from Vietnam and Over the Fence 2856: 2831:. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 2804:. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 2797:U.S. Senate, 93rd Congress, First Session (1973). 2774:. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 2767:U.S. Senate, 91st Congress, First Session (1970). 2176:MACSOG Documentation Study, Appendix C, pp. 99–100 1994: 1560:Twenty-two other members of the unit received the 1057:Further information on the PAVN/VC offensive: 1043:. More than 40 Nùngs were also killed or missing. 889:gunships and transports of the 20th SOS (callsign 3652:Military units and formations established in 1964 3245:Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War 3209: 3178: 2934: 2033: 1992: 1821:Washington DC: U.S. Naval Historical Center, 1986 1250:Further information on the conflict in Laos: 1196:The teams were ferried into action by RVNAF H-34 1086:in Laos, photographed by a hidden SOG recon team. 965:On 2 June 1967 SOG launched an operation against 648:International Agreement on the Neutrality of Laos 3623: 3443:. Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press. 3120: 3013:. Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press. 2581:U.S. Senate, Committee on Veteran's Affairs 1979 2466: 2374: 1979:MACSOG Documentation Study, Appendix D, p. 11–15 629:that raged intermittently between the communist 2545:MACV Command History 1970, Annex B, pp. 127–137 1815:The United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict 535:were claimed to be attacked, never took place. 347:United States Marine Corps Force Reconnaissance 3035: 2840:. Washington DC: Center for Air Force History. 2730:Military History Institute of Vietnam (2002). 2560:U.S. Senate, 93rd Congress, First Session 1973 2556:U.S. Senate, 91st Congress, First Session 1970 1819:From Military Assistance to Combat, 1959–1965. 1509:(awarded on his third separate recommendation) 3526:. Annapolis Maryland: Naval Institute Press. 3179:Maitland, Terrence; McInerney, Peter (1983). 3004: 2835: 2479:MACV Command History 1971–72, Annex B, p. 337 2399:MACV Command History 1970, Annex B, pp. 24–27 2317:MACSOG Documentation Study, Appendix E, p. 50 2295:MACSOG Documentation Study, Appendix D, p. 96 2221: 2211:MACSOG Documentation Study, Appendix C, p. 79 2127: 2115: 2105:Annex G to MACV Command History, 1967, G–IV–4 2057:MACV Command History 1966, Annex M, M–III–2–2 1993:Maitland, Terrence; McInerney, Peter (1983). 1864:Annex A to MACV Command History, 1964, p. A–1 1200:and assorted U.S. Army aviation units in the 1107:, and about which the U.S. could do nothing. 2877: 2814:: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list ( 2784:: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list ( 2638:: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list ( 2600: 2490:MACV Command History 1971–72, Annex B, p. 11 2306:Annex F to MACV Command History, 1969, p. 77 2046:MACV Command History 1965, Annex N, N–VIII–8 1988: 1986: 1968:MACV Command History 1965, Annex N, N–VIII–4 1724: These officers included Major Generals 1134:On the night of 22–23 August as part of the 3637:1972 disestablishments in the United States 3062: 2163: 2068:MACV Command History 1966, Annex M, M-I–A–1 2818:) CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list ( 2788:) CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list ( 2642:) CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list ( 2328:MACV Command History, 1970, Annex B, p. 20 1997:The Vietnam Experience: A Contagion of War 1744:, USA (1969–1970), and Brigadier Generals 1445:Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs 1332:and headed for the PAVN logistical hub at 488:This second reported attack led President 421: 380:) were conducted in an effort to convince 3617:MACV-SOG "Over the Fence" Uniform Article 3465: 3407:. Ann Arbour, Michigan: Edwards Brothers. 3036:Conboy, Kenneth; Morrison, James (1995). 2425: 2362: 1983: 3632:1964 establishments in the United States 3521: 3411: 3038:Shadow War: The CIA's Secret War in Laos 2838:Interdiction in Southern Laos, 1964–1968 2420: 2414: 2245: 2233: 1712: 1576:, the home of U.S. Army Special Forces. 1094:had been penetrated by North Vietnamese 1077: 926:Due to the disclosure of the cover name 752: 725:of various tribes) was conducted at the 652: 476: 3562:. South Royalton VT: Steerforth Press. 3335:SOG: A Photo History of the Secret Wars 3332: 3297: 3005:Conboy, Kenneth; Andrade, Dale (2000). 2973: 2904: 2626:Command History 1 May 1972 – March 1973 2442: 2350: 2257: 2186: 2139: 2078: 1491:(USAF 20th Special Operations Squadron) 70:Joint unconventional warfare task force 3624: 3557: 3492: 3359: 3149: 3063:Dougan, Clark; Weiss, Stephen (1983). 2758:U.S. House of Representatives (1972). 2454: 2198: 2157: 2151: 2021: 1955: 1885: 1627:first-person shooter video game title 1268:Since his election in 1968, President 729:training center (Camp Quyet Thang) at 455:came out from Hon Me and attacked the 444:. On the afternoon of 2 August, three 3548: 3470:. New York: Washington Square Press. 3270: 3241: 3187:. Boston: Boston Publishing Company. 3127:. Boston: Boston Publishing Company. 3093: 3071:. Boston: Boston Publishing Company. 2851: 2748: 2591: 2431: 2338: 1932: 1920: 1908: 1874: 1792: 1596: 1591:Fulton surface-to-air recovery system 3438: 3386: 3337:. Boulder, Colorado: Paladin Press. 3098:. Boulder, Colorado: Paladin Press. 3040:. Boulder, Colorado: Paladin Press. 2882:. Boulder, Colorado: Paladin Press. 2878:Parnar, Joe; Dumont, Robert (2007). 2829:Medal of Honor Recipients, 1863–1978 2713: 2704: 2695: 2686: 2677: 2668: 2659: 2650: 2544: 2500: 2489: 2478: 2409: 2398: 2386: 2327: 2305: 2104: 2089: 2087: 2067: 2056: 2045: 1967: 1863: 1239: 1046: 335:Military Assistance Command, Vietnam 129:Command & Control Central (CCC) 821:was eventually handed over to SOG. 13: 3597:Presidential Unit Citation article 3219:. New York: New York Times Books. 2863:. New York: Simon & Schuster. 1801: 875:Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Navy Base 135:Command & Control South (CCS) 119:Command & Control North (CCN) 14: 3673: 3585: 3364:. New York: John Wiley and Sons. 2859:Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA 2084: 1702:North Vietnamese invasion of Laos 857:, which supplemented the C-123s ( 339:United States Army Special Forces 241:operations before and during the 2912:. New York: Simon and Schuster. 2716:Annex B, Command History 1971–72 2606:Unpublished government documents 2276: 1658:, Top Secret classification and 1149: 867:20th Special Operations Squadron 572: 384:to cease its sponsorship of the 53: 29: 2616:Documentation Study (July 1970) 2585: 2574: 2564: 2549: 2538: 2527: 2516: 2505: 2494: 2483: 2472: 2460: 2448: 2436: 2403: 2392: 2380: 2368: 2356: 2344: 2332: 2321: 2310: 2299: 2288: 2251: 2239: 2227: 2215: 2204: 2192: 2180: 2169: 2145: 2133: 2121: 2109: 2098: 2072: 2061: 2050: 2039: 2027: 2015: 1972: 1961: 1949: 1825: 1807: 1082:North Vietnamese troops on the 840:Joint Personnel Recovery Center 740: 333:as a subsidiary command of the 305:Army of the Republic of Vietnam 2982:. New York: Hippocrene Books. 2724:Published government documents 2612:Joint Chiefs of Staff (1970). 2611: 2467:Isaacs, Hardy & Brown 1987 2375:Isaacs, Hardy & Brown 1987 2316: 2294: 2210: 2175: 2093: 1978: 1944: 1938: 1926: 1914: 1902: 1897: 1891: 1879: 1868: 1857: 1852: 1846: 1785: 1770: 1756: 1718: 1432: 527:The second incident, in which 254:Democratic Republic of Vietnam 1: 2938:; McConnell, Malcolm (1991). 2836:Van Staaveren, Jacob (1993). 2707:Annex B, Command History 1970 2698:Annex F, Command History 1969 2689:Annex F, Command History 1968 2680:Annex G, Command History 1967 2671:Annex M, Command History 1966 2662:Annex N, Command History 1965 2653:Annex A, Command History 1964 2623: 2533: 2522: 2511: 2034:Singlaub & McConnell 1991 2001:. Boston Publishing Company. 1579: 1351: 695:Republic of Vietnam Air Force 314: 3602:Archive of MACV SOG Homepage 3499:. New York: Harper Collins. 1840: 1707: 1292:following negotiations with 1144:Marble Mountain Air Facility 1101:Hungarian revolution of 1956 923:) and in southeastern Laos. 366:General William Westmoreland 237:unit which conducted covert 44:24 January 1964 – 1 May 1972 7: 3522:Tourison, Sedgwick (1995). 3493:Shultz, Richard H. (1999). 3466:Shawcross, William (1979). 3412:Schemmer, Benjamin (1976). 3213:; VanDeMark, Brian (1995). 2846:Memoirs and autobiographies 2457:, pp. 198–302, 306–314 2024:, pp. 214–215, 226–228 1827: 1809: 1682:Special Activities Division 1678:Central Intelligence Agency 1666: 1562:Distinguished Service Cross 1142:, a compound just south of 853:) aircraft, officially the 355:Central Intelligence Agency 10: 3678: 3612:Viet Nam Bibliography: SOG 3156:. New York: Viking Press. 2944:. New York: Summit Books. 2749:Nalty, Bernard C. (2005). 1787: 1772: 1758: 1720: 1687:CIA activities in Cambodia 1566:Presidential Unit Citation 1523:(5th Special Forces Group) 1373: 1367: 1361: 1355: 1261: 1255: 1249: 1243: 1161: 1155: 1056: 1050: 1010:United States Marine Corps 950:psychological operations, 855:15th Air Commando Squadron 746: 578: 548:People's Republic of China 425: 318: 216:Presidential Unit Citation 3549:Veith, George J. (1998). 3333:Plaster, John L. (2000). 3298:Plaster, John L. (1997). 2729: 2601:General and cited sources 2389:, pp. 36–37, 61, 166 2222:Conboy & Andrade 2000 2128:Conboy & Andrade 2000 1449:Vietnam War POW/MIA issue 1176:and the northern area of 1073:Operation Rolling Thunder 934:and it was combined with 865:helicopters of D-Flight, 502:Gulf of Tonkin Resolution 211: 152: 144: 104: 93: 74: 66: 48: 40: 28: 23: 3275:. Novato, CA: Presidio. 3271:Nolan, Keith W. (1986). 3150:Karnow, Stanley (1983). 1296:. Nixon then authorized 1140:Forward Operating Base 4 902:Special Forces Group on 873:), which had arrived at 798:5th Special Forces Group 664:Area of Operations, 1969 635:People's Army of Vietnam 558:, another SOG creation. 540:psychological operations 343:United States Navy SEALs 266:psychological operations 2714:—— (1972). 2705:—— (1971). 2696:—— (1970). 2687:—— (1969). 2678:—— (1968). 2669:—— (1967). 2660:—— (1966). 2164:Dougan & Weiss 1983 1630:Call of Duty: Black Ops 1546:Engineman Second Class 1370:Operation Linebacker II 1310:Cooper-Church Amendment 1158:Operation Commando Hunt 1127:operations of the post- 808:, units based on SOG's 620:U.S. Ambassador to Laos 614:in a helicopter crash. 428:Gulf of Tonkin Incident 422:Gulf of Tonkin Incident 351:United States Air Force 289:Operation Commando Hunt 273:Gulf of Tonkin incident 184:Operation Commando Hunt 164:Gulf of Tonkin incident 3558:Warner, Roger (1996). 2974:Andrade, Dale (1995). 2258:Villard, Erik (2017). 1794:Code-Name BRIGHTLIGHT. 1748:, USA (1970–1971) and 1692:CIA activities in Laos 1550:(Navy SEAL), STDAT-158 1230:bomb damage assessment 1087: 954:agent operations, and 863:CH-3 Jolly Green Giant 758: 693:area) or by dedicated 665: 498:United States Congress 494:Operation Pierce Arrow 485: 374: 239:unconventional warfare 3551:Code-Name BRIGHTLIGHT 3391:Historical Evolution; 3360:Prados, John (1998). 3242:Moïse, Edwin (1996). 3094:Greco, Frank (2004). 1713:Explanatory footnotes 1697:Hughes–Ryan Amendment 1673:Case–Church Amendment 1660:plausible deniability 1568:during a ceremony at 1553:Sergeant First Class 1505:Sergeant First Class 1326:Operation Lam Son 719 1315:Operation Ivory Coast 1264:Operation Lam Son 719 1222:Operation Igloo White 1164:Operation Igloo White 1081: 869:(20th SOS) (callsign 757:MACV–SOG Organization 756: 656: 600:Operation Steel Tiger 480: 453:Vietnam People's Navy 370: 331:Joint Chiefs of Staff 297:Operation Lam Son 719 281:Operation Tiger Hound 277:Operation Steel Tiger 252:(South Vietnam), the 199:Operation Lam Son 719 174:Operation Tiger Hound 169:Operation Steel Tiger 88:psychological warfare 3416:. Harper & Row. 3387:Saal, Harve (1990). 3308:Simon & Schuster 3067:Nineteen Sixty-Eight 2628:. Saigon: STDAT-158. 1732:, USAF (1964–1966), 1728:, USMC (1962–1964), 1604:Francis Ford Coppola 1376:Ho Chi Minh Campaign 1364:Operation Linebacker 1319:Arthur "Bull" Simons 1180:, which was renamed 1041:Operation Homecoming 1036:Sergeant first class 397:Bay of Pigs Invasion 390:Secretary of Defense 3439:Shaw, John (2005). 3211:McNamara, Robert S. 2801:Bombing in Cambodia 2445:, pp. 317–324. 1958:, pp. 148–154. 1752:, USAF (1971–1973). 1740:, USA (1967–1969), 1736:, USA (1966–1967), 1651:Fall of DELTA GREEN 1548:Michael E. Thornton 1426:Paris Peace Accords 1419:Joint General Staff 1345:Cambodian Civil War 1246:Cambodian Civil War 1136:Phase III Offensive 1125:counterintelligence 984: / 946:maritime missions, 616:William H. Sullivan 567:Nationalist Chinese 515:aircraft, flown by 250:Republic of Vietnam 125:Phu Bai Combat Base 3304:New York, New York 3183:A Contagion of War 3153:Vietnam, A History 2718:. Saigon: MACVSOG. 2709:. Saigon: MACVSOG. 2700:. Saigon: MACVSOG. 2691:. Saigon: MACVSOG. 2682:. Saigon: MACVSOG. 2673:. Saigon: MACVSOG. 2664:. Saigon: MACVSOG. 2655:. Saigon: MACVSOG. 2365:, pp. 112–127 2353:, pp. 187–191 2248:, pp. 331–340 2236:, pp. 100–101 2189:, pp. 221–222 2166:, pp. 136–141 2154:, pp. 549–551 2130:, pp. 187–196 2118:, pp. 255–283 2116:Van Staaveren 1993 1935:, pp. 106–142 1597:In popular culture 1521:Franklin D. Miller 1447:' hearings on the 1258:Cambodian Campaign 1224:(the successor to 1088: 1053:Battle of Khe Sanh 917:Demilitarized Zone 759: 666: 565:aircraft flown by 486: 393:Robert S. McNamara 376:These operations ( 293:Cambodian Campaign 235:special operations 194:Operation Tailwind 189:Cambodian campaign 3553:. New York: Dell. 2968:Secondary sources 2936:Singlaub, John K. 2741:978-0-7006-1175-1 1656:covert operations 1647:role-playing game 1636:On the TV series 1555:Fred W. Zabitosky 1539:First Lieutenant 1514:John J. Kedenburg 1494:First Lieutenant 1487:First Lieutenant 1252:Laotian Civil War 1240:Laos and Cambodia 1103:, crushed by the 1084:Ho Chi Minh trail 1047:Black year – 1968 988:16.32°N 106.678°E 942:. These included 830:Central Highlands 627:Laotian Civil War 596:Seventh Air Force 592:Ho Chi Minh Trail 581:Ho Chi Minh Trail 490:Lyndon B. Johnson 416:Fast Patrol Boats 256:(North Vietnam), 221: 220: 3669: 3581: 3554: 3545: 3518: 3489: 3462: 3435: 3408: 3383: 3356: 3329: 3294: 3267: 3238: 3206: 3186: 3175: 3146: 3117: 3090: 3070: 3059: 3032: 3012: 3001: 2981: 2963: 2931: 2906:Plaster, John L. 2901: 2874: 2862: 2841: 2832: 2823: 2813: 2805: 2793: 2783: 2775: 2763: 2754: 2745: 2719: 2710: 2701: 2692: 2683: 2674: 2665: 2656: 2647: 2637: 2629: 2620: 2595: 2589: 2583: 2578: 2572: 2568: 2562: 2553: 2547: 2542: 2536: 2531: 2525: 2520: 2514: 2509: 2503: 2498: 2492: 2487: 2481: 2476: 2470: 2469:, pp. 87–88 2464: 2458: 2452: 2446: 2440: 2434: 2429: 2423: 2418: 2412: 2407: 2401: 2396: 2390: 2384: 2378: 2372: 2366: 2360: 2354: 2348: 2342: 2336: 2330: 2325: 2319: 2314: 2308: 2303: 2297: 2292: 2286: 2280: 2279: 2275: 2255: 2249: 2243: 2237: 2231: 2225: 2224:, pp. 80–84 2219: 2213: 2208: 2202: 2201:, pp. 95–99 2196: 2190: 2184: 2178: 2173: 2167: 2161: 2155: 2149: 2143: 2142:, pp. 71–76 2137: 2131: 2125: 2119: 2113: 2107: 2102: 2096: 2091: 2082: 2081:, pp. 38–40 2076: 2070: 2065: 2059: 2054: 2048: 2043: 2037: 2031: 2025: 2019: 2013: 2012: 2000: 1990: 1981: 1976: 1970: 1965: 1959: 1953: 1947: 1942: 1936: 1930: 1924: 1923:, pp. 67–68 1918: 1912: 1911:, pp. 73–93 1906: 1900: 1895: 1889: 1888:, pp. 42–48 1883: 1877: 1872: 1866: 1861: 1855: 1850: 1836: 1822: 1797: 1782: 1767: 1753: 1746:Donald Blackburn 1738:William E. DePuy 1734:William R. Peers 1730:Rollen H. Anthis 1726:Victor H. Krulak 1645:In the tabletop 1541:George K. Sisler 1528:Thomas R. Norris 1507:Robert L. Howard 1489:James P. Fleming 1472:Roy P. Benavidez 1462:medic, and nine 1403:Easter Offensive 1358:Easter Offensive 1270:Richard M. Nixon 1129:Second World War 999: 998: 996: 995: 994: 989: 985: 982: 981: 980: 977: 767:Norodom Sihanouk 641:army of General 556:Voice of Freedom 353:(USAF), and the 301:Easter Offensive 204:Easter Offensive 59: 57: 56: 33: 21: 20: 3677: 3676: 3672: 3671: 3670: 3668: 3667: 3666: 3622: 3621: 3588: 3570: 3534: 3507: 3478: 3451: 3424: 3372: 3345: 3318: 3283: 3256: 3227: 3195: 3164: 3135: 3106: 3079: 3048: 3021: 2990: 2952: 2920: 2890: 2871: 2807: 2806: 2777: 2776: 2742: 2631: 2630: 2603: 2598: 2590: 2586: 2579: 2575: 2569: 2565: 2554: 2550: 2543: 2539: 2532: 2528: 2521: 2517: 2510: 2506: 2499: 2495: 2488: 2484: 2477: 2473: 2465: 2461: 2453: 2449: 2441: 2437: 2430: 2426: 2419: 2415: 2408: 2404: 2397: 2393: 2385: 2381: 2373: 2369: 2361: 2357: 2349: 2345: 2337: 2333: 2326: 2322: 2315: 2311: 2304: 2300: 2293: 2289: 2277: 2272: 2256: 2252: 2244: 2240: 2232: 2228: 2220: 2216: 2209: 2205: 2197: 2193: 2185: 2181: 2174: 2170: 2162: 2158: 2150: 2146: 2138: 2134: 2126: 2122: 2114: 2110: 2103: 2099: 2092: 2085: 2077: 2073: 2066: 2062: 2055: 2051: 2044: 2040: 2032: 2028: 2020: 2016: 2009: 1991: 1984: 1977: 1973: 1966: 1962: 1954: 1950: 1943: 1939: 1931: 1927: 1919: 1915: 1907: 1903: 1896: 1892: 1884: 1880: 1873: 1869: 1862: 1858: 1851: 1847: 1843: 1804: 1802:Reference notes 1715: 1710: 1669: 1599: 1582: 1519:Staff Sergeant 1481:Staff Sergeant 1470:Staff Sergeant 1440:Pentagon Papers 1435: 1378: 1372: 1366: 1360: 1354: 1266: 1260: 1254: 1248: 1242: 1218:Rolling Thunder 1166: 1160: 1154: 1061: 1055: 1049: 992: 990: 986: 983: 978: 975: 973: 971: 970: 787:Sgt. Ted Braden 779:C-130 Blackbird 751: 745: 733:, southeast of 583: 577: 430: 424: 323: 317: 307:as part of the 224: 113: 112: 54: 52: 36: 17: 12: 11: 5: 3675: 3665: 3664: 3659: 3654: 3649: 3644: 3639: 3634: 3620: 3619: 3614: 3609: 3604: 3599: 3594: 3587: 3586:External links 3584: 3583: 3582: 3568: 3555: 3546: 3532: 3519: 3505: 3490: 3476: 3463: 3449: 3436: 3422: 3409: 3384: 3370: 3357: 3343: 3330: 3316: 3295: 3281: 3268: 3254: 3239: 3225: 3207: 3193: 3176: 3162: 3147: 3133: 3118: 3104: 3091: 3077: 3060: 3046: 3033: 3019: 3002: 2988: 2965: 2964: 2950: 2932: 2918: 2902: 2888: 2875: 2869: 2853:Colby, William 2843: 2842: 2833: 2824: 2794: 2764: 2755: 2746: 2740: 2721: 2720: 2711: 2702: 2693: 2684: 2675: 2666: 2657: 2648: 2621: 2602: 2599: 2597: 2596: 2584: 2573: 2563: 2548: 2537: 2526: 2515: 2504: 2493: 2482: 2471: 2459: 2447: 2435: 2424: 2413: 2402: 2391: 2379: 2367: 2363:Shawcross 1979 2355: 2343: 2331: 2320: 2309: 2298: 2287: 2270: 2250: 2238: 2226: 2214: 2203: 2191: 2179: 2168: 2156: 2144: 2132: 2120: 2108: 2097: 2083: 2071: 2060: 2049: 2038: 2026: 2014: 2007: 1982: 1971: 1960: 1948: 1937: 1925: 1913: 1901: 1890: 1878: 1867: 1856: 1844: 1842: 1839: 1838: 1837: 1823: 1803: 1800: 1799: 1798: 1783: 1768: 1754: 1750:Leroy J. Manor 1742:John F. Freund 1714: 1711: 1709: 1706: 1705: 1704: 1699: 1694: 1689: 1684: 1675: 1668: 1665: 1664: 1663: 1643: 1634: 1621: 1609:Apocalypse Now 1598: 1595: 1594: 1593: 1588: 1581: 1578: 1574:North Carolina 1558: 1557: 1551: 1544: 1537: 1531: 1524: 1517: 1510: 1503: 1496:Loren D. Hagen 1492: 1485: 1479: 1456:Medal of Honor 1434: 1431: 1353: 1350: 1338:raison d'etre. 1285:Operation Menu 1274:Vietnamization 1241: 1238: 1153: 1148: 1048: 1045: 1025:gunships from 993:16.32; 106.678 958:air missions. 749:Sihanouk Trail 744: 739: 633:(supported by 576: 571: 563:C-123 Provider 442:Gulf of Tonkin 426:Main article: 423: 420: 378:OPLAN 34-Alpha 316: 313: 309:Vietnamization 222: 219: 218: 213: 209: 208: 207: 206: 201: 196: 191: 186: 181: 176: 171: 166: 154: 150: 149: 146: 142: 141: 140: 139: 133: 127: 106: 102: 101: 95: 91: 90: 80:reconnaissance 76: 72: 71: 68: 64: 63: 50: 46: 45: 42: 38: 37: 34: 26: 25: 15: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 3674: 3663: 3660: 3658: 3655: 3653: 3650: 3648: 3645: 3643: 3640: 3638: 3635: 3633: 3630: 3629: 3627: 3618: 3615: 3613: 3610: 3608: 3605: 3603: 3600: 3598: 3595: 3593: 3590: 3589: 3579: 3575: 3571: 3565: 3561: 3556: 3552: 3547: 3543: 3539: 3535: 3529: 3525: 3520: 3516: 3512: 3508: 3506:0-06-019454-5 3502: 3498: 3497: 3491: 3487: 3483: 3479: 3473: 3469: 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2839: 2834: 2830: 2825: 2821: 2817: 2811: 2803: 2800: 2795: 2791: 2787: 2781: 2773: 2770: 2765: 2761: 2756: 2752: 2747: 2743: 2737: 2733: 2728: 2727: 2726: 2725: 2717: 2712: 2708: 2703: 2699: 2694: 2690: 2685: 2681: 2676: 2672: 2667: 2663: 2658: 2654: 2649: 2645: 2641: 2635: 2627: 2622: 2618: 2615: 2610: 2609: 2608: 2607: 2593: 2588: 2582: 2577: 2567: 2561: 2557: 2552: 2546: 2541: 2535: 2530: 2524: 2519: 2513: 2508: 2502: 2497: 2491: 2486: 2480: 2475: 2468: 2463: 2456: 2451: 2444: 2439: 2433: 2428: 2422: 2421:Schemmer 1976 2417: 2411: 2406: 2400: 2395: 2388: 2383: 2376: 2371: 2364: 2359: 2352: 2347: 2341:, p. 138 2340: 2335: 2329: 2324: 2318: 2313: 2307: 2302: 2296: 2291: 2284: 2283:public domain 2273: 2271:9780160942808 2267: 2263: 2262: 2254: 2247: 2246:Tourison 1995 2242: 2235: 2234:Tourison 1995 2230: 2223: 2218: 2212: 2207: 2200: 2195: 2188: 2183: 2177: 2172: 2165: 2160: 2153: 2148: 2141: 2136: 2129: 2124: 2117: 2112: 2106: 2101: 2095: 2090: 2088: 2080: 2075: 2069: 2064: 2058: 2053: 2047: 2042: 2036:, p. 311 2035: 2030: 2023: 2018: 2010: 2004: 1999: 1998: 1989: 1987: 1980: 1975: 1969: 1964: 1957: 1952: 1946: 1941: 1934: 1929: 1922: 1917: 1910: 1905: 1899: 1894: 1887: 1882: 1876: 1871: 1865: 1860: 1854: 1849: 1845: 1834: 1830: 1829: 1824: 1820: 1816: 1812: 1811: 1806: 1805: 1796: 1795: 1790: 1789: 1784: 1779: 1775: 1774: 1769: 1765: 1764:John Singlaub 1761: 1760: 1755: 1751: 1747: 1743: 1739: 1735: 1731: 1727: 1723: 1722: 1717: 1716: 1703: 1700: 1698: 1695: 1693: 1690: 1688: 1685: 1683: 1679: 1676: 1674: 1671: 1670: 1661: 1657: 1653: 1652: 1648: 1644: 1641: 1640: 1635: 1632: 1631: 1626: 1622: 1619: 1615: 1611: 1610: 1605: 1601: 1600: 1592: 1589: 1587: 1584: 1583: 1577: 1575: 1571: 1567: 1563: 1556: 1552: 1549: 1545: 1542: 1538: 1536: 1532: 1529: 1525: 1522: 1518: 1515: 1512:Specialist 5 1511: 1508: 1504: 1501: 1497: 1493: 1490: 1486: 1484: 1480: 1477: 1476:Ronald Reagan 1473: 1469: 1468: 1467: 1465: 1461: 1457: 1452: 1450: 1446: 1441: 1430: 1427: 1422: 1420: 1414: 1412: 1406: 1404: 1399: 1396: 1392: 1388: 1384: 1377: 1371: 1365: 1359: 1349: 1346: 1340: 1339: 1335: 1331: 1327: 1322: 1320: 1316: 1311: 1306: 1304: 1299: 1295: 1291: 1286: 1281: 1279: 1275: 1271: 1265: 1259: 1253: 1247: 1237: 1233: 1231: 1227: 1226:Muscle Shoals 1223: 1219: 1215: 1214:Commando Hunt 1210: 1207: 1203: 1199: 1194: 1191: 1185: 1183: 1179: 1175: 1171: 1170:Commando Hunt 1165: 1159: 1152: 1151:Commando Hunt 1147: 1145: 1141: 1137: 1132: 1130: 1126: 1120: 1116: 1114: 1108: 1106: 1102: 1097: 1093: 1085: 1080: 1076: 1074: 1068: 1066: 1065:Tet Offensive 1060: 1059:Tet Offensive 1054: 1044: 1042: 1037: 1032: 1028: 1023: 1022:A-1 Skyraider 1019: 1015: 1011: 1007: 1006:H-34 Kingbees 1003: 997: 968: 963: 959: 957: 953: 949: 945: 941: 937: 933: 929: 928:Shining Brass 924: 922: 918: 914: 913: 912:Muscle Shoals 907: 905: 900: 894: 892: 891:Green Hornets 888: 884: 880: 879:Shining Brass 876: 872: 868: 864: 860: 856: 852: 847: 845: 841: 837: 833: 831: 827: 822: 820: 816: 811: 810:Shining Brass 807: 803: 799: 795: 790: 788: 782: 780: 774: 772: 771:Sihanoukville 768: 764: 755: 750: 743: 738: 736: 732: 728: 727:ARVN Airborne 724: 720: 716: 715:Shining Brass 711: 706: 703: 700: 696: 692: 688: 684: 680: 674: 672: 663: 659: 658:Shining Brass 655: 651: 649: 644: 640: 636: 632: 628: 623: 621: 617: 613: 607: 605: 601: 597: 593: 589: 588:Shining Brass 582: 575: 574:Shining Brass 570: 568: 564: 559: 557: 551: 549: 545: 541: 536: 534: 530: 526: 522: 518: 514: 510: 505: 503: 499: 495: 491: 484: 479: 475: 473: 469: 465: 464: 458: 454: 450: 449:torpedo boats 447: 443: 439: 438: 429: 419: 417: 414: 413:"Nasty" Class 408: 404: 402: 399:operation in 398: 394: 391: 387: 383: 382:North Vietnam 379: 373: 369: 367: 363: 358: 356: 352: 348: 344: 340: 336: 332: 328: 322: 312: 310: 306: 302: 298: 294: 290: 286: 285:Tet Offensive 282: 278: 274: 269: 267: 263: 259: 255: 251: 246: 244: 240: 236: 232: 228: 223:Military unit 217: 214: 210: 205: 202: 200: 197: 195: 192: 190: 187: 185: 182: 180: 179:Tet Offensive 177: 175: 172: 170: 167: 165: 162: 161: 160: 159: 155: 151: 147: 143: 138: 134: 132: 128: 126: 122: 118: 117: 116: 115:Detachments: 110: 107: 103: 99: 96: 92: 89: 85: 84:covert action 81: 77: 73: 69: 65: 62: 61:United States 51: 47: 43: 39: 32: 27: 22: 19: 3559: 3550: 3523: 3495: 3467: 3440: 3413: 3404: 3400: 3396: 3392: 3388: 3361: 3334: 3299: 3272: 3244: 3215: 3182: 3152: 3124:Pawns of War 3123: 3095: 3066: 3037: 3008: 2977: 2967: 2966: 2940: 2909: 2879: 2858: 2845: 2844: 2837: 2828: 2802: 2798: 2772: 2768: 2759: 2750: 2731: 2723: 2722: 2715: 2706: 2697: 2688: 2679: 2670: 2661: 2652: 2625: 2617: 2613: 2605: 2604: 2594:, p. 51 2587: 2576: 2566: 2551: 2540: 2529: 2518: 2507: 2496: 2485: 2474: 2462: 2450: 2443:Plaster 1997 2438: 2427: 2416: 2405: 2394: 2382: 2377:, p. 89 2370: 2358: 2351:Plaster 2000 2346: 2334: 2323: 2312: 2301: 2290: 2260: 2253: 2241: 2229: 2217: 2206: 2194: 2187:Plaster 1997 2182: 2171: 2159: 2147: 2140:Plaster 2004 2135: 2123: 2111: 2100: 2079:Plaster 2000 2074: 2063: 2052: 2041: 2029: 2017: 1996: 1974: 1963: 1951: 1940: 1928: 1916: 1904: 1893: 1881: 1870: 1859: 1848: 1832: 1826: 1818: 1814: 1808: 1793: 1786: 1777: 1771: 1757: 1719: 1650: 1639:Tour of Duty 1637: 1628: 1607: 1559: 1543:(posthumous) 1535:Gary M. Rose 1516:(posthumous) 1502:), CCN/TF1AE 1483:Jon Cavaiani 1464:Green Berets 1453: 1439: 1436: 1423: 1415: 1407: 1400: 1394: 1390: 1387:Prairie Fire 1386: 1382: 1379: 1341: 1337: 1323: 1307: 1303:Freedom Deal 1302: 1282: 1267: 1234: 1225: 1217: 1213: 1211: 1205: 1202:Prairie Fire 1201: 1197: 1195: 1190:Prairie Fire 1189: 1186: 1181: 1178:Daniel Boone 1177: 1174:Prairie Fire 1173: 1169: 1167: 1150: 1133: 1121: 1117: 1112: 1109: 1105:Soviet Union 1095: 1091: 1089: 1069: 1062: 966: 964: 960: 955: 951: 947: 943: 939: 936:Daniel Boone 935: 932:Prairie Fire 931: 927: 925: 921:Nickel Steel 920: 911: 908: 898: 895: 890: 883:Daniel Boone 882: 878: 871:Pony Express 870: 858: 851:Combat Spear 850: 848: 843: 836:Daniel Boone 835: 834: 826:Ban Me Thuot 823: 818: 814: 809: 805: 801: 794:Daniel Boone 793: 791: 783: 775: 760: 742:Daniel Boone 741: 714: 707: 701: 675: 667: 662:Prairie Fire 661: 657: 624: 612:Larry Thorne 608: 604:Leaping Lena 603: 587: 584: 573: 560: 555: 552: 537: 532: 528: 524: 508: 506: 487: 482: 470:reported to 467: 462: 456: 436: 431: 409: 405: 375: 371: 362:the Pentagon 359: 324: 270: 247: 230: 226: 225: 156: 137:Ban Me Thuot 114: 18: 3403:Appendices. 2455:Warner 1996 2199:Shultz 1999 2152:Karnow 1983 2022:Shultz 1999 1956:Shultz 1999 1886:Shultz 1999 1616:force into 1586:McGuire rig 1530:(Navy SEAL) 1526:Lieutenant 1433:Recognition 1395:Salem House 1290:Khmer Rouge 1206:Salem House 1182:Salem House 1031:F-4 Phantom 991: / 979:106°40′41″E 967:Oscar Eight 844:Brightlight 723:Montagnards 321:Vietnam War 243:Vietnam War 212:Decorations 158:Vietnam War 153:Engagements 148:SOG, MACSOG 145:Nickname(s) 105:Garrison/HQ 3626:Categories 3569:1883642361 3533:1557508186 3477:0671230700 3450:0700614052 3423:0060138025 3395:Locations; 3371:0471254657 3282:0891412476 3226:0812925238 3194:0939526050 3163:0140145338 3134:0939526247 3105:1581604262 3078:0939526069 3047:0873648250 3020:0700611479 2989:0781802865 2951:0671705164 2919:0684856735 2592:Moïse 1996 2432:Nolan 1986 2339:Nalty 2005 2008:0939526050 1933:Moïse 1996 1921:Moïse 1996 1909:Moïse 1996 1875:Colby 1978 1817:, Vol. 2: 1625:Activision 1614:Montagnard 1580:Technology 1570:Fort Bragg 1500:posthumous 1352:Withdrawal 1092:Timberwork 976:16°19′12″N 952:Timberwork 859:Heavy Hook 731:Long Thành 631:Pathet Lao 533:Turner Joy 492:to launch 472:Washington 463:Turner Joy 327:top secret 315:Foundation 299:, and the 78:Strategic 3397:Vol. III 3326:777435955 3273:Into Laos 3172:236058254 2898:239277869 2810:cite book 2780:cite book 2634:cite book 2387:Shaw 2005 1841:Citations 1708:Footnotes 1533:Sergeant 1460:U.S. Army 1294:Nuon Chea 1008:and five 828:, in the 804:and B-50 671:Vientiane 461:USS 446:P 4-class 435:USS 386:Viet Cong 121:Quảng Trị 3592:MACV SOG 3578:42881425 3542:32469154 3515:42061189 3459:59098863 3414:The Raid 3401:Vol. IV 3399:Legends; 3393:Vol. II 3380:59490721 3353:44584774 3291:13581560 3264:34477141 3235:31375622 3203:10103256 3143:17278419 3114:56793871 3056:32753940 3029:42061137 2998:30778306 2960:23583308 2928:54537114 2908:(2004). 2855:(1978). 1781:islands. 1667:See also 1618:Cambodia 1606:'s film 1391:Thot Not 1383:Phu Dung 1334:Tchepone 1198:Kingbees 1131:period. 1096:dich van 899:Haymaker 763:Cambodia 735:Bien Hoa 697:(RVNAF) 687:Khe Sanh 679:Kham Duc 643:Vang Pao 311:effort. 262:Cambodia 231:MACV-SOG 3486:4569931 3432:2330976 3087:9905799 1330:Route 9 1278:Lon Nol 1018:HMM-165 1012:(USMC) 956:Midriff 948:Humidor 944:Plowman 940:Footboy 904:Okinawa 702:Kingbee 691:I Corps 544:Da Nang 525:Maddox. 513:Laotian 483:Maddox. 451:of the 357:(CIA). 98:Brigade 49:Country 3576: 3566: 3540: 3530: 3513: 3503: 3484: 3474: 3457: 3447: 3430: 3420: 3378: 3368: 3351: 3341: 3324: 3314: 3289: 3279: 3262: 3252: 3233: 3223: 3201: 3191: 3170: 3160: 3141: 3131: 3112: 3102: 3085: 3075: 3054: 3044: 3027: 3017: 2996: 2986: 2958: 2948: 2926: 2916: 2896: 2886: 2867: 2738: 2268: 2005: 1778:Maddox 1411:JUSPAO 1014:CH-46s 710:Saigon 685:, and 683:Kontum 529:Maddox 509:Maddox 468:Maddox 457:Maddox 437:Maddox 349:, the 345:, the 341:, the 291:, the 283:, the 260:, and 131:Kontum 109:Saigon 58: 41:Active 1113:Forae 1027:VMO-3 1016:from 1002:B-52s 819:Omega 815:Sigma 806:Omega 802:Sigma 639:Hmong 521:Hanoi 3574:OCLC 3564:ISBN 3538:OCLC 3528:ISBN 3511:OCLC 3501:ISBN 3482:OCLC 3472:ISBN 3455:OCLC 3445:ISBN 3428:OCLC 3418:ISBN 3376:OCLC 3366:ISBN 3349:OCLC 3339:ISBN 3322:OCLC 3312:ISBN 3287:OCLC 3277:ISBN 3260:OCLC 3250:ISBN 3231:OCLC 3221:ISBN 3199:OCLC 3189:ISBN 3168:OCLC 3158:ISBN 3139:OCLC 3129:ISBN 3110:OCLC 3100:ISBN 3083:OCLC 3073:ISBN 3052:OCLC 3042:ISBN 3025:OCLC 3015:ISBN 2994:OCLC 2984:ISBN 2956:OCLC 2946:ISBN 2924:OCLC 2914:ISBN 2894:OCLC 2884:ISBN 2865:ISBN 2820:link 2816:link 2790:link 2786:link 2736:ISBN 2644:link 2640:link 2266:ISBN 2003:ISBN 1401:The 1389:and 887:Huey 817:and 719:Nùng 699:H-34 625:The 531:and 517:Thai 401:Cuba 258:Laos 111:(HQ) 94:Size 75:Role 67:Type 2571:DC. 1680:'s 1602:In 893:). 721:or 245:. 3628:: 3572:. 3536:. 3509:. 3480:. 3453:. 3426:. 3374:. 3347:. 3320:. 3310:. 3306:: 3302:. 3285:. 3258:. 3229:. 3197:. 3166:. 3137:. 3108:. 3081:. 3050:. 3023:. 2992:. 2954:. 2922:. 2892:. 2812:}} 2808:{{ 2782:}} 2778:{{ 2636:}} 2632:{{ 2558:; 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Knowledge

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam – Studies and Observations Group

Index