Mind–body dualism

1811:, he asks us to consider a neuroscientist, Mary, who was born, and has lived all of her life, in a black and white room with a black and white television and computer monitor where she collects all the scientific data she possibly can on the nature of colours. Jackson asserts that as soon as Mary leaves the room, she will come to have new knowledge which she did not possess before: the knowledge of the experience of colours (i.e., what they are like). Although Mary knows everything there is to know about colours from an objective, third-person perspective, she has never known, according to Jackson, what it was like to see red, orange, or green. If Mary really learns something new, it must be knowledge of something non-physical, since she already knew everything about the physical aspects of colour. 2643:(e.g. caused by automobile accidents, drug abuse, pathological diseases, etc.), it is always the case that the mental substance and/or properties of the person are significantly changed or compromised. If the mind were a completely separate substance from the brain, how could it be possible that every single time the brain is injured, the mind is also injured? Indeed, it is very frequently the case that one can even predict and explain the kind of mental or psychological deterioration or change that human beings will undergo when specific parts of their brains are damaged. So the question for the dualist to try to confront is how can all of this be explained if the mind is a separate and immaterial substance from, or if its properties are ontologically independent of, the brain. 6527:. Excerpt: "Perhaps scientists apply an unrestricted version of Occam's Razor to that portion of reality in which they are interested, namely the concrete, causal, spatiotemporal world. Or perhaps scientists apply a 'concretized' version of Occam's Razor unrestrictedly. Which is the case? The answer determines which general philosophical principle we end up with: ought we to avoid the multiplication of objects of whatever kind, or merely the multiplication of concrete objects? The distinction here is crucial for a number of central philosophical debates. Unrestricted Occam's Razor favors monism over dualism, and nominalism over platonism. By contrast, 'concretized' Occam's Razor has no bearing on these debates, since the extra entities in each case are not concrete". 6179:. Excerpt: "William Hasker (1999) goes one step further in arguing for the existence of the mind conceived as a non-composite substance which ‘emerges’ from the brain at a certain point in its development. He dubs his position ‘emergent dualism,’ and claims for it all the philosophical advantages of traditional, Cartesian substance dualism while being able to overcome a central difficulty, viz., explaining how individual brains and mental substances come to be linked in a persistent, ‘monogamous’ relationship. Here, Hasker, is using the term to express a view structurally like one (vitalism) that the British emergentists were anxious to disavow, thus proving that the term is capable of evoking all manner of ideas for metaphysicians." 1425:, the study of the soul, is his account of the ability of humans to reason and the ability of animals to perceive. In both cases, perfect copies of forms are acquired, either by direct impression of environmental forms, in the case of perception, or else by virtue of contemplation, understanding and recollection. He believed the mind can literally assume any form being contemplated or experienced, and it was unique in its ability to become a blank slate, having no essential form. As thoughts of earth are not heavy, any more than thoughts of fire are causally efficient, they provide an immaterial complement for the formless mind. 2649:, who suffered destruction of one or both frontal lobes by a projectile iron rod, is often cited as an example illustrating that the brain causes mind. Gage certainly exhibited some mental changes after his accident, suggesting a correlation between brain states and mental states. It has been noted, however, that Gage's most serious mental changes were only temporary, and that he made a reasonable social and mental recovery. The changes in question have almost always been distorted and exaggerated by scientific and popular literature, often relying on hearsay. Similar examples abound; neuroscientist 2359:

momentum is transferred to the eight ball, which then heads toward the pocket. Compare this to the situation in the brain, where one wants to say that a decision causes some neurons to fire and thus causes a body to move across the room. The intention to "cross the room now" is a mental event and, as such, it does not have physical properties such as force. If it has no force, then it would seem that it could not possibly cause any neuron to fire. However, with Dualism, an explanation is required of how something without any physical properties has physical

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there were no argument establishing the existence of the soul, one could deny its existence based on the principle of simplicity. However, various arguments have been put forth to establish its existence. These arguments demonstrate that while neuroscience can explain the mysteries of the material brain, certain significant issues, such as personal identity and free will, remain beyond the scope of neuroscience. The crux of the matter lies in the essential limitations of neuroscience and the potency of substance dualism in explaining these phenomena.

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conjunction that God had instituted, such that every instance where the cause is present will constitute an "occasion" for the effect to occur as an expression of the aforementioned power. This "occasioning" relation, however, falls short of efficient causation. In this view, it is not the case that the first event causes God to cause the second event: rather, God first caused one and then caused the other, but chose to regulate such behaviour in accordance with general laws of nature. Some of its most prominent historical exponents have been

6649: 2420:) was only in the initial stages of acceptance, but still Lewis stated the logical possibility that, if the physical world was proved to be indeterministic, this would provide an entry (interaction) point into the traditionally viewed closed system, where a scientifically described physically probable/improbable event could be philosophically described as an action of a non-physical entity on physical reality. He states, however, that none of the arguments in his book will rely on this. Although some 1547:. The thorough consistency between dogma and contemporary science was maintained here in part from a serious attendance to the principle that there can be only one truth. Consistency with science, logic, philosophy, and faith remained a high priority for centuries, and a university doctorate in theology generally included the entire science curriculum as a prerequisite. This doctrine is not universally accepted by Christians today. Many believe that one's immortal soul goes directly to 1604:, in honor of Descartes, is that the immaterial mind and the material body, while being ontologically distinct substances, causally interact. This is an idea that continues to feature prominently in many non-European philosophies. Mental events cause physical events, and vice versa. But this leads to a substantial problem for Cartesian dualism: How can an immaterial mind cause anything in a material body, and vice versa? This has often been called the "problem of interactionism." 1090: 10066: 2326:), one must explain how physical memories are created concerning consciousness. Dualism must therefore explain how consciousness affects physical reality. One of the main objections to dualistic interactionism is lack of explanation of how the material and immaterial are able to interact. Varieties of dualism according to which an immaterial mind causally affects the material body and vice versa have come under strenuous attack from different quarters, especially in the 33: 10072: 9934: 8072: 7753: 69: 10078: 10735: 2311: 9944: 8083: 1732: 10747: 7764: 83: 1667:(born 1966) who argues there is an explanatory gap between objective and subjective experience that cannot be bridged by reductionism because consciousness is, at least, logically autonomous of the physical properties upon which it supervenes. According to Chalmers, a naturalistic account of property dualism requires a new fundamental category of properties described by new laws of 2790:

ones) but instead concrete (only applies to physical objects). If one applies Occam's Razor unrestrictedly, then it recommends monism until pluralism either receives more support or is disproved. If one applies Occam's Razor only concretely, then it may not be used on abstract concepts (this route, however, has serious consequences for selecting between hypotheses

2460:, Turbayne holds that the Cartesian concepts of "substance" and "substratum" convey little if any meaning at best. He further argues that mankind's general acceptance of the mind-body dualism can be traced to an inadvertent use of deductive logic to incorporate "mechanistic" and "physicalist" metaphors from the works of both DesCartes and 661:, the migration of the soul to a new physical body. It has been considered a form of reductionism by some philosophers, since it enables the tendency to ignore very big groups of variables by its assumed association with the mind or the body, and not for its real value when it comes to explaining or predicting a studied phenomenon. 1237:. Like Malebranche and others before him, Leibniz recognized the weaknesses of Descartes' account of causal interaction taking place in a physical location in the brain. Malebranche decided that such a material basis of interaction between material and immaterial was impossible and therefore formulated his doctrine of 917:

Chutikorn has commented that "adopting Aquinas’ view of substance will provide a solution to the problem by avoiding altogether the position that man is made up of dual substances. Rather, Aquinas shows us that we can acknowledge a duality within substance itself, while maintaining its inherent substantial unity".

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when it seems possible and would make for a simpler thesis to test against scientific evidence, to explain the same events and properties in terms of one. It is a heuristic principle in science and philosophy not to assume the existence of more entities than is necessary for clear explanation and prediction.

2071:, i.e. why people exist as themselves and not as someone else, and the existence of first-personal facts, are a refutation of physicalist philosophies of consciousness. However, List also argues that this also refutes standard versions of mind-body dualism that have purely third-personal metaphysics. 873:

Aristotelians and Thomists (those philosophers whose views are derived from St.Thomas Aquinas) sometimes suggest that their hylomorphic position is no more a version of dualism than it is of materialism. But though their view is not a Cartesian form of dualism, it is clear from a consideration of how

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From here, he deduces that even if we know what has happened to every single atom inside a person's brain, we still do not know what has happened to 'them' as an identity. From here it follows that a part of our mind, or our soul, is immaterial, and, as a consequence, that mind-body dualism is true.

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An important fact is that minds perceive intra-mental states differently from sensory phenomena, and this cognitive difference results in mental and physical phenomena having seemingly disparate properties. The subjective argument holds that these properties are irreconcilable under a physical mind.

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argumentation or empirical proof. It seems to appeal to common-sense because we are surrounded by such everyday occurrences as a child's touching a hot stove (physical event) which causes him to feel pain (mental event) and then yell and scream (physical event) which causes his parents to experience

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He then cites a thought-experiment for the reader, asking what would happen if each of the two hemispheres of one person were placed inside two different people. Either, Swinburne claims, one of the two is me or neither is—and there is no way of telling which, as each will have similar memories and

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He claims that functions of the mind/soul are internal, very private experiences that are not accessible to observation by others, and therefore not accessible by science (at least not yet). We can know everything, for example, about a bat's facility for echolocation, but we will never know how the

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intellectual operations without employing material faculties, i.e. intellectual operations are immaterial, the intellect itself and the intellectual soul, must likewise be immaterial and so incorruptible. Even though the intellectual soul of man is able to subsist upon the death of the human being,

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Thomistic substance dualism is not a dualism of two separable substances. There is only one substance, though I do not identify it with the body/soul composite. Rather, I take the one substance to be the soul, and the body to be an ensouled biological and physical structure that depends on the soul

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cannot consistently be appealed to by a physicalist or materialist as a justification of mental states or events, such as the belief that dualism is false. The idea is that Occam's razor may not be as "unrestricted" as it is normally described (applying to all qualitative postulates, even abstract

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The argument from simplicity is probably the simplest and also the most common form of argument against dualism of the mental. The dualist is always faced with the question of why anyone should find it necessary to believe in the existence of two, ontologically distinct, entities (mind and brain),

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to come to know that a person whose head is bashed in with a club quickly loses his or her ability to think or have any conscious processes. Why should we not think of neurophysiological findings as giving us detailed, precise knowledge of something that human beings have always known, or at least

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By assuming a deterministic physical universe, the objection can be formulated more precisely. When a person decides to walk across a room, it is generally understood that the decision to do so, a mental event, immediately causes a group of neurons in that person's brain to fire, a physical event,

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here is a great difference between a mind and a body, because the body, by its very nature, is something divisible, whereas the mind is plainly indivisible…insofar as I am only a thing that thinks, I cannot distinguish any parts in me.… Although the whole mind seems to be united to the whole body,

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that the notion of a philosophical zombie is an incoherent, or unlikely, concept. In particular, nothing proves that an entity (e.g., a computer or robot) which would perfectly mimic human beings, and especially perfectly mimic expressions of feelings (like joy, fear, anger, ...), would not indeed

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While Aquinas defended the unity of human nature as a composite substance constituted by these two inextricable principles of form and matter, he also argued for the incorruptibility of the intellectual soul, in contrast to the corruptibility of the vegetative and sensitive animation of plants and

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events. However, all mental events also have physical descriptions. It is in terms of the latter that such events can be connected in law-like relations with other physical events. Mental predicates are irreducibly different in character (rational, holistic, and necessary) from physical predicates

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embarked upon a quest in which he called all his previous beliefs into doubt, in order to find out what he could be certain of. In so doing, he discovered that he could doubt whether he had a body (it could be that he was dreaming of it or that it was an illusion created by an evil demon), but he

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Hasker has argued that emergent dualism is consistent with neuroscientific discoveries showing the dependence of mind on brain. He likens the individual mind to a magnetic field in its qualitative difference from the physical properties that generate it and also in its ability to act on the brain

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This argument has also been criticized by Seyyed Jaaber Mousavirad, who argues that the principle of simplicity could only be applied when there is no need for an additional entity. Despite arguments indicating the need for the soul, the principle of simplicity does not apply. Therefore, if

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responds that energy conservation objections misunderstand the role of energy conservation in physics. Well understood scenarios in general relativity violate energy conservation and quantum mechanics provides precedent for causal interactions, or correlation without energy or momentum exchange.

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Chalmers' argument is that it seems plausible that such a being could exist because all that is needed is that all and only the things that the physical sciences describe and observe about a human being must be true of the zombie. None of the concepts involved in these sciences make reference to

889:. Thomistic substance dualism distinguishes itself from Cartesian substance dualism by denying that the body and soul are different substances. Instead, a person is composed of only one substance the soul whilst the body is considered an ensouled physical structure. J. P. Moreland has commented: 1918:

argues that, if predicate dualism is correct, then there are "special sciences" that are irreducible to physics. These allegedly irreducible subjects, which contain irreducible predicates, differ from hard sciences in that they are interest-relative. Here, interest-relative fields depend on the

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whether it is conscious or not. The mere logical possibility of a p-zombie demonstrates that consciousness is a natural phenomenon beyond the current unsatisfactory explanations. Chalmers states that one probably could not build a living p-zombie because living things seem to require a level of

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well understood. Take a very simple causal relation, such as when a cue ball strikes an eight ball and causes it to go into the pocket. What happens in this case is that the cue ball has a certain amount of momentum as its mass moves across the pool table with a certain velocity, and then that

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the interaction would take place. For example, burning one's finger causes pain. Apparently there is some chain of events, leading from the burning of skin, to the stimulation of nerve endings, to something happening in the peripheral nerves of one's body that lead to one's brain, to something

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If the counterpart of Frederick, Frederickus, is 70% constituted of the same physical substance as Frederick, does this mean that it is also 70% mentally identical with Frederick? Does it make sense to say that something is mentally 70% Frederick? A possible solution to this dilemma is that of

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Case studies aside, modern experiments have demonstrated that the relation between brain and mind is much more than simple correlation. By damaging, or manipulating, specific areas of the brain repeatedly under controlled conditions (e.g. in monkeys) and reliably obtaining the same results in

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happening in a particular part of one's brain, and finally resulting in the sensation of pain. But pain is not supposed to be spatially locatable. It might be responded that the pain "takes place in the brain." But evidently, the pain is in the finger. This may not be a devastating criticism.

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The argument postulates that if, as naturalism entails, all of our thoughts are the effect of a physical cause, then we have no reason for assuming that they are also the consequent of a reasonable ground. However, knowledge is apprehended by reasoning from ground to consequent. Therefore, if

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Thomistic scholars such as Paul Chutikorn and Edward Feser have written that Aquinas was not a substance dualist. Edward Feser who has defended hylomorphic dualism has suggested that it has advantages over substance dualism such as offering a possible solution to the interaction problem. Paul

2053:, put forward an argument for mind-body dualism based upon personal identity. He states that the brain is composed of two hemispheres and a cord linking the two and that, as modern science has shown, either of these can be removed without the person losing any memories or mental capacities. 1270:

is a philosophical doctrine about causation which says that created substances cannot be efficient causes of events. Instead, all events are taken to be caused directly by God itself. The theory states that the illusion of efficient causation between mundane events arises out of a constant

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Somewhere along the way from the printer's being made up exactly of the parts and materials which actually constitute it to the printer's being made up of some different matter at, say, 20%, the question of whether this printer is the same printer becomes a matter of arbitrary convention.

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Interactionism is the view that mental states, such as beliefs and desires, causally interact with physical states. This is a position which is very appealing to common-sense intuitions, notwithstanding the fact that it is very difficult to establish its validity or correctness by way of

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considerations quite often. For example, Aristotle argues that changeless, eternal substantial form is necessarily immaterial. Because matter provides a stable substratum for a change in form, matter always has the potential to change. Thus, if given an eternity in which to do so, it

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event which causes the firing. This means that some physical energy is required to be generated against the physical laws of the deterministic universe—this is by definition a miracle and there can be no scientific explanation of (repeatable experiment performed regarding) where the

1907:, one must either believe that anyone including oneself might be a zombie, or that no one can be a zombie—following from the assertion that one's own conviction about being (or not being) a zombie is a product of the physical world and is therefore no different from anyone else's. 2118:

Through this logic, the statement "I have reason to believe naturalism is valid" is inconsistent in the same manner as "I never tell the truth." That is, to conclude its truth would eliminate the grounds from which to reach it. To summarize the argument in the book, Lewis quotes

2293:, which states that two things are the same if and only if they share all their properties. A counterargument is the idea that matter is not infinitely divisible, and thus that the mind could be identified with material things that cannot be divided, or potentially Leibnizian 656:

of the preceding level. For Aristotle, the first two souls, based on the body, perish when the living organism dies, whereas there remains an immortal and perpetual intellective part of mind. For Plato, however, the soul was not dependent on the physical body; he believed in

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is only of interest to humans themselves. The point is that having a perspective on the world is a psychological state. Therefore, the special sciences presuppose the existence of minds which can have these states. If one is to avoid ontological dualism, then the mind that

1023:, who maintain that while there is only one ontological category of substances and properties of substances (usually physical), the predicates that we use to describe mental events cannot be redescribed in terms of (or reduced to) physical predicates of natural languages. 2464:

into modern scientific hypotheses. In short, Turbayne holds that as a result of a misguided and literal interpretation of the concepts underlying mind-body dualism, mankind has fallen victim to a metaphor which has taken on the guise of an objective scientific truth.

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measures of mental state and abilities, neuroscientists have shown that the relation between damage to the brain and mental deterioration is likely causal. This conclusion is further supported by data from the effects of neuro-active chemicals (e.g., those affecting

795:, argues that there are two kinds of substances: mental and physical. Descartes states that the mental can exist outside of the body, and the body cannot think. Substance dualism is important historically for having given rise to much thought regarding the famous 2146:

If minds are wholly dependent on brains, and brains on biochemistry, and biochemistry (in the long run) on the meaningless flux of the atoms, I cannot understand how the thought of those minds should have any more significance than the sound of the wind in the

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in 1267. Like Aristotle, Aquinas held that the human being was a unified composite substance of two substantial principles: form and matter. The soul is the substantial form and so the first actuality of a material organic body with the potentiality for life.

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consciousness. However (unconscious?) robots built to simulate humans may become the first real p-zombies. Hence Chalmers half-joking calls for the need to build a "consciousness meter" to ascertain if any given entity, human or robot, is conscious or not.

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quality to them, whereas physical ones seem not to. So, for example, one may ask what a burned finger feels like, or what the blueness of the sky looks like, or what nice music sounds like. Philosophers of mind call the subjective aspects of mental events

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Another one of Descartes' illustrations. The fire displaces the skin, which pulls a tiny thread, which opens a pore in the ventricle (F) allowing the "animal spirit" to flow through a hollow tube, which inflates the muscle of the leg, causing the foot to

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Human persons are not identical to any physical body, but consist of a physical body and a non-physical substantial soul, and (b) the human soul is naturally emergent from and dependent on the structure and function of a living human brain and nervous

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Epiphenomenalism is a form of property dualism, in which it is asserted that one or more mental states do not have any influence on physical states (both ontologically and causally irreducible). It asserts that while material causes give rise to

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asserts that mind and matter are fundamentally distinct kinds of foundations. There are different types of substance dualism. Most substance dualists hold the view that the mind and body are capable of causally affecting each other, known as

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and the scientific discoveries of the 17th century reinforced the belief that the scientific method was the unique way of knowledge. Bodies were seen as biological organisms to be studied in their constituent parts (materialism) by means of

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from a dark cave, where only vague shadows of what lies beyond that prison are cast dimly upon the wall. Plato's forms are non-physical and non-mental. They exist nowhere in time or space, but neither do they exist in the mind, nor in the

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In some contexts, the decisions that a person makes can be detected up to 10 seconds in advance by means of scanning their brain activity. Subjective experiences and covert attitudes can be detected, as can mental imagery. This is strong

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VI as follows: I have a clear and distinct idea of myself as a thinking, non-extended thing, and a clear and distinct idea of body as an extended and non-thinking thing. Whatever I can conceive clearly and distinctly, God can so create.

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This part is about causation between properties and states of the thing under study, not its substances or predicates. Here a state is the set of all properties of what's being studied. Thus each state describes only one point in time.

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the human soul differs from the souls of plants and animals (at least on the Thomistic variation of hylomorphism) that the view does amount to a kind of dualism: Thomistic dualism or hylomorphic dualism, as it has variously been called.

2688:'s "emergent dualism" seek to avoid this problem. They assert that the mind is a property or substance that emerges from the appropriate arrangement of physical matter, and therefore could be affected by any rearrangement of matter. 1527:

of a rational nature). Hence, Aquinas held that "soul of St. Peter pray for us" would be more appropriate than "St. Peter pray for us", because all things connected with his person, including memories, ended with his corporeal life.

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But while my present body can thus have its partial counterpart in some possible world, my present consciousness cannot. Any present state of consciousness that I can imagine either is or is not mine. There is no question of degree

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which are contrasted with substance dualism. Hylomorphism is distinct from substance dualism as it holds the view that the immaterial (form) and material (matter) are not distinct substances and only share an efficient causality.

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states that all mental events are caused by a physical event and have no physical consequences, and that one or more mental states do not have any influence on physical states. So, the mental event of deciding to pick up a rock

680:. Hence, he was the first documented Western philosopher to formulate the mind–body problem in the form in which it exists today. However, the theory of substance dualism has many advocates in contemporary philosophy such as 1402:

wherein form and matter coexist. Ultimately however, Aristotle's aim was to perfect a theory of forms, rather than to reject it. Although Aristotle strongly rejected the independent existence Plato attributed to forms, his

1592:), regulates normal bodily functions (such as heart and liver). According to Descartes, animals only had a body and not a soul (which distinguishes humans from animals). The distinction between mind and body is argued in 2025:. Imagine a series of counterfactual cases corresponding to the examples applied to the printer. Somewhere along the way, one is no longer sure about the identity of Frederick. In this latter case, it has been claimed, 2353:

which explains the connection between the mental and the physical would therefore be a philosophical proposition as compared to a scientific theory. For example, compare such a mechanism to a physical mechanism that

961:, where it is argued that mental events are identical to physical events, however, strict law-governed causal relationships cannot describe relations of mental events. Another argument for this has been expressed by 2699:

writes that "the body is necessary for the action of the intellect, not as it's origin of action." Thus, if the body is dysfunctional, the intellect will not actualize as it intends to. According to the philosopher

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to physical objects, on the one hand, and to conscious, personal agents on the other. In the case of any material object, e.g. a printer, we can formulate a series of counterfactuals in the following manner:

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put forth an argument that the mind-body dualism codified within the Cartesian ontological system is particularly problematic on purely linguistic grounds. In Turbayne's view, Descartes' bifurcation of the

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If my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms in my brain, I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true...and hence I have no reason for supposing my brain to be composed of

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its perspective. If this is the case, then in order to perceive the physical world as psychological, the mind must have a perspective on the physical. This, in turn, presupposes the existence of mind.

1325:(fl. c. 6th century BCE) was a philosopher who first proposed the idea of mind being fundamental in the cause of change. He proposed that physical entities are static, while reason causes the change. 2057:

mental capacities to the other. In fact, Swinburne claims, even if one's mental capacities and memories are far more similar to the original person than the others' are, they still may not be him.

1057:, etc., will eventually be eliminated from both the language of science and from ordinary language because the entities to which they refer do not exist. Predicate dualists believe that so-called " 953:

Non-reductive physicalism is a form of property dualism in which it is asserted that all mental states are causally reducible to physical states. One argument for this has been made in the form of

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that all three share; a perceptive soul of pain, pleasure, and desire that only humans and other animals share; and the faculty of reason that is unique to humans only. In this view, a soul is the

5438: 3216: 3151: 1309:). Thus, not all physical actions are caused either by matter alone or by freedom alone. Some actions are purely animal in nature, while others are the result of mind's free action on matter. 942:

and physics. It asserts that when matter is organized in the appropriate way (i.e., in the way that living human bodies are organized), mental properties emerge. Hence, it is a sub-branch of

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Various (December 1994). "Accurate First Principles Calculation of Molecular Charge Distributions and Solvation Energies from Ab Initio Quantum Mechanics and Continuum Dielectric Theory".

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do not require the mind to be irreducible, and operate on the assumption that it has physical basis. In fact, it is common in science to presuppose a complex system; while fields such as

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Alterations of sociomoral judgement and glucose utilization in the frontomedial cortex induced by electrical stimulation of the subthalamic nucleus (STN) in Parkinsonian patients (2004):

843:. Emergent dualism asserts that mental substances come into existence when physical systems such as the brain reach a sufficient level of complexity. Hasker defines emergent dualism as: 1341:, as belonging to the class of philosophers who held a dualistic theory of a material and an active principle being together the origin of the universe. Similar ideas were expounded by 1715:

was published that contains arguments for and against Cartesian dualism, emergent dualism, Thomistic dualism, emergent individualism and nonreductive physicalism. Contributors include

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animals. His argument for the subsistence and incorruptibility of the intellectual soul takes its point of departure from the metaphysical principle that operation follows upon being (

1886:. The basic idea is that one can imagine, and, therefore, conceive the existence of, an apparently functioning human being/body without any conscious states being associated with it. 1570:

could not doubt whether he had a mind. This gave Descartes his first inkling that the mind and body were different things. The mind, according to Descartes, was a "thinking thing" (

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physical and mental events cause, and are caused by, one another. In reality, mental causes only have mental effects and physical causes only have physical effects. Hence, the term

6148:"Alterations of sociomoral judgement and glucose utilization in the frontomedial cortex induced by electrical stimulation of the subthalamic nucleus (STN) in Parkinsonian patients" 1779:". Nagel argued that even if we knew everything there was to know from a third-person, scientific perspective about a bat's sonar system, we still wouldn't know what it is like to 853:

that generates it. Consciousness is said to arise when the brain reaches a certain threshold level of organizational complexity and when properly organized gives rise to the soul.

4320:. trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 2d, rev. ed., 22 vols., London: Burns, Oates & Washbourne; reprinted in 5 vols., Westminster, MD: Christian Classics, 1981. 938:

Property dualism asserts that an ontological distinction lies in the differences between properties of mind and matter, and that consciousness may be ontologically irreducible to

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could have known, which is that the mind (at least in this mortal life) requires and depends on a functioning brain? We now know a lot more than we used to know about precisely

4258:"Summa Theologiae: Man who is composed of a spiritual and a corporeal substance: and in the first place, concerning what belongs to the essence of the soul (Prima Pars, Q. 75)" 1990:. It is often difficult to decompose these levels without heavy analysis and computation. Sober has also advanced philosophical arguments against the notion of irreducibility. 1515:

Aquinas does not hold that the human person is able to remain integrated at death. The separated intellectual soul is neither a man nor a human person. The intellectual soul

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Grafman, J. (2002). "The Structured Event Complex and the Human Prefrontal Cortex". In Stuss, D. T.; Knight, R. T. (eds.). Principles of Frontal Lobe Function. pp. 292–310.

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Buchman AL, Sohel M, Brown M, et al. (2001). "Verbal and visual memory improve after choline supplementation in long-term total parenteral nutrition: a pilot study".

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maintained the strong thesis that all causation was directly dependent on God, instead of holding that all causation was natural except for that between mind and body.

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Yet another reply to the interaction problem is to note that it doesn't seem that there is an interaction problem for all forms of substance dualism. For instance,

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which claim that immortal souls occupy an independent realm of existence distinct from that of the physical world. Cartesians tend to equate the soul to the mind.

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Four varieties of dualist causal interaction. The arrows indicate the direction of causations. Mental and physical states are shown in red and blue, respectively.

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argument, is that what Mary really came to know was simply the ability to recognize and identify color sensations to which she had previously not been exposed.

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The idea that even if the animal were conscious nothing would be added to the production of behavior, even in animals of the human type, was first voiced by

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and further elaborated a hierarchical arrangement, corresponding to the distinctive functions of plants, animals, and humans: a nutritive soul of growth and

6190:"Summa Theologiae: Man who is composed of a spiritual and a corporeal substance: and in the first place, concerning what belongs to the essence of the soul" 9980: 9476: 1659:

In addition to already discussed theories of dualism (particularly the Christian and Cartesian models) there are new theories in the defense of dualism.

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can an immaterial mind interact with the physical pineal gland? Because Descartes' was such a difficult theory to defend, some of his disciples, such as

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is also often associated with this more specific notion of causal interaction through the pineal gland. However, this explanation was not satisfactory:

905:'s views on matter and the soul are difficult to define in contemporary discussion but he would fit the criteria as a non-Cartesian substance dualist. 6220:

Haynes, John-Dylan; Heinze, Hans-Jochen; Brass, Marcel; Soon, Chun Siong (May 2008). "Unconscious determinants of free decisions in the human brain".

2558:, and can be explained by either physical or mental causes alone. An overdetermined event is fully accounted for by multiple causes at once. However, 3695: 3454: 3559: 2933:. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1968. Books II-III, translated by D.W. Hamlyn, Clarendon Aristotle Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1241:, stating that the interactions were really caused by the intervention of God on each individual occasion. Leibniz's idea is that God has created a 10556: 6599: 6056: 3671: 2983:"When mind is set free from its present conditions it appears as just what it is and nothing more: this alone is immortal and eternal." (5, 430a22) 1229:

Psychophysical parallelism is a very unusual view about the interaction between mental and physical events which was most prominently, and perhaps

973:. He has acknowledged that "to many people" his views and those of property dualists look a lot alike, but he thinks the comparison is misleading. 6352:

Dehaene, Stanislas; Naccache, Lionel (April 2001). "Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: basic evidence and a workspace framework".

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as distinct and immaterial substances of which the objects and other phenomena that we perceive in the world are nothing more than mere shadows.

3969: 2203:: firstly, the "modal argument," or the "clear and distinct perception argument," and secondly the "indivisibility" or "divisibility" argument. 6306: 2349:

the interaction takes place, where in dualism "the mind" is assumed to be non-physical and by definition outside of the realm of science. The

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dualism makes dual commitments about the nature of existence as it relates to mind and matter, and can be divided into three different types:

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dualism doesn't obviously face any issue with regards to interaction, for in this view the soul and the body are related as form and matter.

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as it establishes that the mind could continue to exist without the body, rather than that the unaltered body could exist without the mind.

8119: 1671:; the challenge being analogous to that of understanding electricity based on the mechanistic and Newtonian models of materialism prior to 569: 10802: 3924: 1510:), i.e., the activity of a thing reveals the mode of being and existence it depends upon. Since the intellectual soul exercises its own 950:

rubric is itself a matter of dispute. There are different versions of property dualism, some of which claim independent categorisation.

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ascriptions, is an ineliminable part of the enterprise of describing, explaining, and understanding human mental states and behavior.

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have both supported the argument, although Feser and Moreland think that it must be carefully reformulated in order to be effective.

1072:, according to which there can be no strict psychophysical laws which connect mental and physical events under their descriptions as 10777: 9973: 5797: 3797: 3732: 3501: 2546:

applies only to closed systems. However, physicalists object that no evidence exists for the causal non-closure of the human body.

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are distinct and separable. Thus, it encompasses a set of views about the relationship between mind and matter, as well as between

6659: 668:(1641), who holds that the mind is a nonphysical—and therefore, non-spatial—substance. Descartes clearly identified the mind with 8793: 4955:

Pyykko, Pekka (22 October 2010). "A suggested periodic table up to Z ≤ 172, based on Dirac–Fock calculations on atoms and ions".

2154: 1608: 10571: 4338: 9461: 2506:. In particular, if some external source of energy is responsible for the interactions, then this would violate the law of the 2330:. Critics of dualism have often asked how something totally immaterial can affect something totally material—this is the basic 1822:. Also, he notes that Mary might say "wow," and as a mental state affecting the physical, this clashed with his former view of 1164:. The physical causes are in principle reducible to fundamental physics, and therefore mental causes are eliminated using this 5592:

The University of Rochester Department of Philosophy- Berkley Essay Prize Competition - History of the Prize Colin Turbayne's

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nevertheless, were a foot or an arm or any other bodily part amputated, I know that nothing would be taken away from the mind…

1584:. This "thing" was the essence of himself, that which doubts, believes, hopes, and thinks. The body, "the thing that exists" ( 203: 10772: 9797: 8760: 8720: 8075: 7598: 6766: 6609: 6588: 6568:. A controversial perspective on the use and possible overuse of the Mind–Body split and its application in medical practice. 6548: 5847: 5706: 5546: 5465: 4737: 4630: 4580: 4555: 4489: 5536: 5520: 9757: 9446: 8843: 7698: 7618: 2542:

of energy, without altering its quantity. The second possibility is to deny that the human body is causally closed, as the

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which argues that mental states do not play a role in physical states. Jackson argues that there are two kinds of dualism:

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tendencies at two different times, and in each case was found to have tumors growing in a particular part of his brain.

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which ultimately results in his walking across the room. The problem is that if there is something totally non-physical

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argument. She showed that an argument could be valid and ground-consequent even if its propositions were generated via

1788: 6612:. An historical account of mind body dualism and a comprehensive conceptual and an empirical critique of the position. 1903:

experience them, thus having similar states of consciousness to what a real human would have. It is argued that under

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that assumes there is second, non-corporeal form of reality. In this form, body and soul are two different substances.

10792: 5134: 4363: 4257: 4085: 4064: 3828: 2670: 1000:, etc., such mental phenomena themselves cause nothing further: they are causal dead-ends. This can be contrasted to 17: 6551:. History making volume with first comprehensive model of dualism-interactionism, that is also empirically testable. 6090: 3893: 1787:

are consequent of the same neurological processes that engender the bat's mind, and will be fully understood as the

10797: 9859: 9747: 9486: 8755: 8112: 5969: 3198: 562: 536: 5407: 10511: 10330: 9865: 9852: 8943: 7548: 5891: 5378: 4845:"Quantum Monte Carlo computations of phase stability, equations of state, and elasticity of high-pressure silica" 4790:"From computational quantum chemistry to computational biology: experiments and computations are (full) partners" 3337: 3133: 2551:

However, this does not mean the mind spends energy and, despite that, it still doesn't exclude the supernatural.

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Macmillan, Malcolm B. (2014). "Phineas Gage". Encyclopedia of the Neurological Sciences. Academic Press. p. 383.

2741: 1543:, the souls of the departed will be reunited with their bodies as a whole person (substance) and witness to the 827:(reductionism). Mind–body dualism remained the biomedical paradigm and model for the following three centuries. 9947: 9871: 9511: 8629: 8562: 7787: 4198: 2721:

the mind depends on the body, at least prior to death, is surely not something discovered in the 20th century".

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In his essay "Is Theology Poetry?", Lewis himself summarises the argument in a similar fashion when he writes:

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suggests that the ontological distinction lies in the differences between properties of mind and matter (as in

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Givens, Terryl L. (2012). "Reviewed Work: A Brief History of the Soul by Stewart Goetz, Charles Taliaferro".

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Another reply is that the interaction taking place in the human body may not be described by "billiard ball"

2107:; Lewis called the argument "The Cardinal Difficulty of Naturalism", which was the title of chapter three of 2013:

This printer could have been made of 95% of what it is actually made of and 5% vacuum-tube transistors, etc..

1883: 1776: 1016: 958: 141: 10030: 4193:. McKeon, Richard (Richard Peter). New York: Modern Library. pp. 696 (Metaphysics, Book 1, Chapter 3). 10812: 9898: 9315: 9048: 8395: 8169: 8030: 7733: 6839: 2980:"For whereas the sensitive faculty is not found apart from the body, the intellect is separate." (4, 429b3) 2452:" is more properly characterized as a prime example of a "category mistake" which is often associated with 840: 531: 6652: 3714: 9904: 9831: 9819: 8963: 8786: 8745: 8105: 8051: 7608: 6086: 2538:

provide two possible replies to the above objections. The first reply is that the mind may influence the

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Gallagher, S. 2006. "Where's the action? Epiphenomenalism and the problem of free will". pp. 109–124 in

1639:, proposed a different explanation: That all mind–body interactions required the direct intervention of 10719: 10596: 9878: 9713: 9678: 9573: 9390: 8883: 8494: 8484: 7713: 7179: 6794: 6263:

Haynes, John-Dylan; Rees, Geraint (July 2006). "Decoding mental states from brain activity in humans".

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Kotowicz, Z. (2007). "The strange case of Phineas Gage". History of the Human Sciences. 20 (1): 115–31.

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involved in these mental events. And the claim is that qualia cannot be reduced to anything physical.

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Lena, M. L. (2010). "Rehabilitating Phineas Gage". Neuropsychological Rehabilitation. 20 (5): 641–58.

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Imagine the case of a person, Frederick, who has a counterpart born from the same egg and a slightly

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consciousness or other mental phenomena, and any physical entity can be described scientifically via

1409: 969:. His view is that although mental states are ontologically irreducible to physical states, they are 773: 712: 283: 5154: 3263: 3140:

2, translated by J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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1994. Books VII-VIII trans. D. Bostock, Clarendon Aristotle Series, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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1971. Books IV-VI, trans. C. A. Kirwan, Clarendon Aristotle Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press;

1437:, most active in Late Antiquity, claimed that the physical and the spiritual are both emanations of 10223: 10045: 10020: 9521: 9038: 8728: 8086: 7950: 7723: 7658: 6313: 1322: 160: 2955:

1976. Books XIII–XIV trans. J. Annas, Clarendon Aristotle Series, Oxford: Oxford University Press;

1305:, there is a distinction between actions done by desire and those performed by reason in liberty ( 10827: 10782: 9997: 9838: 9732: 9456: 9436: 9410: 9325: 8848: 8602: 8427: 7588: 7518: 7399: 7184: 6864: 6556: 4673:"Quantum Physics in Neuroscience and Psychology: A Neurophysical Model of Mind-Brain Interaction" 2944: 2115:

naturalism were true, there would be no way of knowing it (or anything else), except by a fluke.

1242: 1038: 511: 434: 182: 7975: 6595:. Introducing dualism as being interactive and distinct from the substance dualism of Descartes. 5624:

Wilson, D. L. 1999. "Mind-brain interaction and the violation of physical laws." pp. 185–200 in

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Descartes himself struggled to come up with a feasible answer to this problem. In his letter to

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Hershenov, David B; Taylor, Adam P. (2014). "Split brains: no headache for the soul theorist".

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during the academic year 1265–1266. By 1268 Aquinas had written at least the first book of the

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in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Glassen argued that, because it is not a physical entity,

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This printer could have been made of some other kind of plastics and vacuum-tube transistors.

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Sober, Elliott (December 1999). "The Multiple Realizability Argument against Reductionism".

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The argument from physics is closely related to the argument from causal interaction. Many

2180: 2080: 2068: 1975: 1851: 1660: 1620: 1493:, the translation of which from the Greek was completed by Aquinas' Dominican associate at 1453: 1374: 943: 607: 474: 355: 336: 222: 9251: 6010:(September 2008). "Phineas Gage – Unravelling the myth". The Psychologist. 21 (9): 828–31. 1839: 1004:, on the other hand, in which mental causes can produce material effects, and vice versa. 8: 10606: 10526: 10395: 10139: 10093: 10050: 9618: 9531: 9180: 9008: 8828: 8379: 8209: 8000: 7538: 7374: 7339: 7319: 7274: 7089: 7079: 7049: 6576: 6176: 5437:, Whitehead Psychology Nexus Studies II. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. 4411: 3733:"J. P. Moreland & Scott B. Rae, Body and Soul: Human Nature and the Crisis in Ethics" 3040: 2833: 2756: 2617: 2585: 2392: 2172: 1923:

is one such science; it completely depends on and presupposes the existence of the mind.

1827: 1643:. According to these philosophers, the appropriate states of mind and body were only the 1636: 1498: 1378: 1284: 611: 595: 541: 345: 300: 254: 187: 167: 118: 103: 10450: 7254: 5931: 5793: 4968: 4870: 4805: 3072: 1392:). It remained unclear however, even to Aristotle, exactly what Plato intended by that. 10739: 10694: 10653: 10648: 10541: 10375: 10355: 10285: 10164: 10144: 9918: 9885: 9688: 9668: 9643: 9638: 9583: 9302: 8923: 8893: 8732: 8607: 8457: 8128: 8010: 7985: 7728: 7718: 7488: 7478: 6982: 6894: 6541:

Complementarity of Mind and Body: Realizing the Dream of Descartes, Einstein and Eccles

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Process Approaches to Consciousness in Psychology, Neuroscience, and Philosophy of Mind

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have pointed out that if physical phenomena fully determine behavioral events, then by

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and consciousness researchers have argued that any action of a nonphysical mind on the

2380: 2294: 2164: 2040: 1939: 1871: 1861: 1804: 1799: 1720: 1716: 1373:, i.e. they are ideal universals, by which we are able to understand the world. In his 785: 689: 583: 459: 365: 325: 320: 305: 295: 288: 239: 234: 212: 150: 9114: 6554:

Bracken, Patrick, and Philip Thomas. 2002. "Time to move beyond the mind–body split."

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Jaswal, L (2005). "Isolating disparate challenges to Hodgson's account of free will".

5641:, edited by B. Libet, A. Freeman, and K. Sutherland. Thorverton, UK: Imprint Academic. 5628:, edited by B. Libet, A. Freeman, and K. Sutherland. Thorverton, UK: Imprint Academic. 4396: 2097:

have developed an argument for dualism dubbed the "argument from reason". They credit

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does not subscribe that, sees body and soul as forming a whole and states that at the

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Pyykko, Pekka (21 July 2012). "The Physics behind Chemistry and the Periodic Table".

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Another reply is akin to parallelism—Mills holds that behavioral events are causally

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One argument against dualism is with regard to causal interaction. If consciousness (

2046: 1955: 1818:. He notes that Mary obtains knowledge not of color, but of a new intramental state, 1398:

argued at length against many aspects of Plato's forms, creating his own doctrine of

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have theorized that such indeterminacy may apply at the macroscopic scale. However,

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first characterized the problem of qualia for physicalistic monism in his article, "

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Aristotelian hylomorphic dualism also has many similarities with Thomistic dualism.

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Tegmark, Max (April 2000). "Importance of quantum decoherence in brain processes".

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However, there is a second problem about the interaction. Namely, the question of

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energy for the firing came from. Such interactions would violate the fundamental

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Baker, Lynne Rudder (2002). "Reviewed Work: The Emergent Self William Hasker".

3279: 2776: 2696: 2685: 2650: 2559: 2515: 2263: 2090: 2086: 2064: 1983: 1875: 1835: 1808: 1664: 1571: 1377:, Plato likens the achievement of philosophical understanding to emerging into 902: 898: 882: 862: 836: 685: 658: 454: 6565: 6503: 6468: 6433: 5299: 4446: 4127: 3422: 10766: 10616: 10471: 10415: 10370: 10250: 10192: 10106: 10055: 10040: 9608: 9266: 9256: 9246: 9236: 9170: 9155: 9150: 9145: 9109: 9104: 9099: 9084: 9043: 8938: 8802: 8694: 8619: 8572: 8489: 8479: 8384: 8339: 8334: 8309: 8284: 8274: 8254: 8179: 8025: 7920: 7895: 7708: 7434: 7384: 7349: 7329: 7309: 6874: 6722: 6713: 6681: 6669: 6648: 6061: 5939: 5776: 5725: 5701: 5524:

Shook, John. 2005 p. 2451 Biography of Colin Murray Turbayne on Google Books

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asserts that mind and matter are fundamentally distinct kinds of foundations.

669: 649: 637: 4879: 4208: 3767:"Not Properly a Person: The Rational Soul and 'Thomistic Substance Dualism'" 3405: 10689: 10531: 10476: 10149: 9762: 9708: 9033: 8908: 8858: 8649: 8639: 8634: 8597: 8547: 8344: 8324: 8314: 8244: 8164: 8046: 7980: 7915: 7905: 7688: 7454: 7389: 7279: 7189: 7039: 6909: 6819: 6799: 6615:

Sperry, R. W. 1980. "Mind-brain interaction: Mentalism, yes; dualism, no."

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Prinz, Wolfgang (January 1992). "Why don't we perceive our brain states?".

4265: 4151: 3592: 3440: 3360:"The Origin of the Soul in Light of Twinning, Cloning, and Frozen Etnbryos" 3232: 3167: 2838: 2692: 2646: 2640: 2503: 2461: 2453: 2445: 2399:, where all mind–body interactions require the direct intervention of God. 2327: 2267: 1857: 1772: 1612: 1576: 1473: 1442: 1434: 1399: 1165: 939: 886: 866: 820: 677: 645: 406: 350: 41: 6634: 5169:"Philosophy Homepage | Department of Philosophy | UNC Charlotte" 835:

Emergent dualism is a type of substance dualism that has been defended by

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by Colin Murray Turbayne on Carleton Digital Collections at carleton.edu

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Glassen, Peter (1976). "J. J. C. Smart, Materialism and Occam's Razor".

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to be indeterminate, in others this event is defined as deterministic.

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Dennett, Daniel (1995). "The unimagined preposterousness of zombies".

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(2003). 3073:"Reductionism in Biology" 2945:Metaphysics (Metaphysica) 2738:Neuroscience of free will 2535:New Catholic Encyclopedia 2378:, framed a new ontology ( 2301:Arguments against dualism 2286:The argument relies upon 2247: 2240: 2235: 2228: 2223: 2216: 2211: 2173:physical cause and effect 1911:Special sciences argument 1654: 713:non-reductive physicalism 284:Middle Eastern philosophy 10793:Concepts in epistemology 9522:Artificial consciousness 9039:William Kingdon Clifford 7724:Philosophy of psychology 7659:Simulacra and Simulation 6598:Spenard, Michael. 2011. 5999:Matter and Consciousness 5940:10.1103/PhysRevE.61.4194 5325:. Accessed 31 July 2020. 5098:List, Christian (2023). 5053:The Identity of the Self 4615:Dennett, Daniel (1991). 4571:Chalmers, David (2010). 4546:Chalmers, David (1997). 4518:O'Hear, Anthony (2003). 4484:. Little, Brown and Co. 4055:Davidson, Donald. 1980. 3892:Chutikorn, Paul (2018). 3796:Stump, Eleonore (1995). 3618:Gasparov, Ignor (2013). 3594:Against Emergent Dualism 3358:Moreland, J. P. (2010). 2763:Argument from simplicity 1838:and others also provide 1551:upon death of the body. 1537:resurrection of the body 1485:Sententia Libri De anima 1476:, the forerunner of the 1323:Hermotimus of Clazomenae 1318:Ancient Greek philosophy 1245:such that it only seems 1039:eliminative materialists 799:. It is compatible with 718: 10798:Concepts in metaphysics 10224:Theological voluntarism 9839:Consciousness Explained 9758:Stream of consciousness 9733:Secondary consciousness 9457:Global workspace theory 9442:Dynamic core hypothesis 9437:Attention schema theory 9411:Revisionary materialism 9326:Eliminative materialism 8849:Charles Augustus Strong 8428:Eliminative materialism 7589:Critique of Pure Reason 6557:British Medical Journal 6089:, hosts. 22 May 2011. " 5608:The Carleton Miscellany 5567:Foundations of Language 4880:10.1073/pnas.0912130107 4618:Consciousness Explained 4481:Consciousness Explained 3591:Rickabaugh, Brandon L. 3558:Spackman, John (2013). 3406:10.4103/0973-1229.77436 2518:of the physical world. 2337:First, it is not clear 2275:indivisibility argument 2027:overlap of constitution 1741:The subjective argument 1243:pre-established harmony 1180:in the explanation for 10740:Catholicism portal 9893:The Emperor's New Mind 9699:Problem of other minds 9634:Introspection illusion 9467:Holonomic brain theory 8824:Alfred North Whitehead 8680:Propositional attitude 8675:Problem of other minds 8583:Hypostatic abstraction 7180:Type–token distinction 7008:Hypostatic abstraction 6790:Abstract object theory 6738:2 October 2018 at the 6585:The Promise of Dualism 6152:Genman Medical Science 5896:The Self and Its Brain 5752:Murphy, Nancy (2009). 5723:, vol. 5, pp. 422 ff, 5190:Sayer, George (2005). 4843:Various (April 2010). 4689:10.1098/rstb.2004.1598 4504:Jackson, Frank. 1977. 4278:Torrell, op. cit., 162 3915:Feser, Edward (2020). 3827:Stango, Marco (2017). 3694:Feser, Edward (2006). 3233:10.5840/ipq20231114214 3168:10.5840/ipq20231114214 3004:Oxford Classical Texts 2926:On the Soul (De anima) 2813:Mentalism (psychology) 2746:Thought identification 2723: 2596:, where the degree of 2544:conservation of energy 2508:conservation of energy 2483:conservation of energy 2432:Argument from language 2426:wave function collapse 2372:Alfred North Whitehead 2315: 2284: 2161: 2140: 1737: 1586: 1575: 1407:do agree with Plato's 1358:formulated his famous 1307:categorical imperative 1160:together, but only by 1094: 1063:propositional attitude 910:Thomistic hylomorphism 896: 876: 850: 507:Aesthetic philosophers 49: 10752:Philosophy portal 10567:Infused righteousness 9694:Primary consciousness 9579:Divided consciousness 9482:Multiple drafts model 8984:Maurice Merleau-Ponty 8751:Philosophers category 8655:Mental representation 8418:Biological naturalism 8305:Maurice Merleau-Ponty 8280:Frank Cameron Jackson 7835:Non-Cartesian dualism 7769:Philosophy portal 7649:Being and Nothingness 7065:Mental representation 6653:Consciousness Studies 5972:. 17 September 2016. 5721:Catholic Encyclopedia 5511:7 (1965):171, note 3. 5377:. 27 February 2017. " 5296:Kuhn, Robert Lawrence 5008:Philosophy of Science 4465:The View From Nowhere 4014:." Archived from the 3960:Stoke, David (2017). 3864:Roczniki Filozoficzne 3720:on 27 September 2024. 3387:Mehta, Neeta (2011). 3189:Calef, Scott (2024). 2706: 2469:Argument from physics 2437:Colin Murray Turbayne 2313: 2279: 2144: 2125: 1734: 1727:Arguments for dualism 1580:), and an immaterial 1508:agiture sequitur esse 1092: 967:biological naturalism 891: 871: 845: 808:Copernican Revolution 88:Philosophy portal 35: 10700:Doctor of the Church 10582:Ontological argument 9846:Cosmic Consciousness 9684:Philosophical zombie 9624:Higher consciousness 9517:Animal consciousness 9321:Double-aspect theory 8854:Christopher Peacocke 8433:Emergent materialism 8016:William Homan Thorpe 7976:Martine Nida-Rümelin 7941:Edward Francis Kelly 7694:Feminist metaphysics 6319:on 21 September 2011 5692:, London: Routledge. 5639:The Volitional Brain 5626:The Volitional Brain 5612:The Myth of Metaphor 5594:The Myth of Metaphor 5355:Calef, Scott. n.d. " 5235:. Prometheus Books. 5179:on 20 December 2008. 5157:on 20 December 2008. 5086:The Existence of God 5072:. Oxford: Blackwell. 4076:Fodor, Jerry. 1968. 4018:on 10 December 2006. 3771:Faith and Philosophy 2890:. Oxford: Blackwell. 2849:Vertiginous question 2828:Bipartite (theology) 2181:argument from reason 2081:Argument from reason 2075:Argument from reason 2069:vertiginous question 2051:The Existence of God 1976:quantum field theory 1938:weather patterns or 1852:Philosophical zombie 1661:Naturalistic dualism 1454:Saint Thomas Aquinas 1421:Part of Aristotle's 1375:allegory of the cave 1371:universalia ante res 1233:truly, advocated by 1191:(1745), and then by 944:emergent materialism 636:'s view of multiple 532:Philosophers of mind 27:Philosophical theory 10813:Metaphysics of mind 10527:Divine illumination 10183:Augustinian realism 10051:Theological virtues 9990:Catholic philosophy 9619:Heterophenomenology 9532:Attentional control 9181:Lawrence Weiskrantz 9009:Patricia Churchland 8844:Brian O'Shaughnessy 8829:Arthur Schopenhauer 8630:Language of thought 8380:Ludwig Wittgenstein 8210:Patricia Churchland 8001:Jeffrey M. Schwartz 7539:Daneshnameh-ye Alai 7050:Linguistic modality 6222:Nature Neuroscience 5932:2000PhRvE..61.4194T 5898:. Berlin: Springer. 5454:Lewis, C.S (1947). 5305:Closer to the Truth 5219:The Socratic Digest 5173:philosophy.uncc.edu 5064:Shoemaker, S., and 4969:2011PCCP...13..161P 4871:2010PNAS..107.9519D 4806:2004PhBio...1P..23M 4767:10.1021/ja00105a030 4761:(26): 11875–11882. 4683:(1458): 1309–1327. 4268:on 19 January 2012. 4156:Nicolas Malebranche 3876:10.18290/rf21691-10 3627:Forum Philosophicum 3601:. Wiley-Blackwell. 3338:"Cartesian dualism" 2834:The Concept of Mind 2757:cognitive processes 2618:quantum decoherence 2586:classical mechanics 2393:Nicolas Malebranche 2208: 2187:Cartesian arguments 2167:'s response to his 1846:The zombie argument 1761:There is something 1673:Maxwell's equations 1637:Nicolas Malebranche 1499:William of Moerbeke 1466:studium provinciale 1285:Nicolas Malebranche 1209:subjective argument 1061:," with all of its 901:has suggested that 542:Women in philosophy 272:Indigenous American 55:Part of a series on 10695:Islamic philosophy 10649:Trademark argument 10542:Formal distinction 10492:Augustinian values 10165:Analytical Thomism 10145:Christian humanism 9919:Wider than the Sky 9886:The Conscious Mind 9689:Philosophy of mind 9669:Neurophenomenology 9644:Locked-in syndrome 9639:Knowledge argument 9303:Philosophy of mind 8924:George Henry Lewes 8894:Douglas Hofstadter 8458:Neurophenomenology 8129:Philosophy of mind 8011:Charles Taliaferro 7986:Daniel N. Robinson 7729:Philosophy of self 7719:Philosophy of mind 6983:Embodied cognition 6895:Scientific realism 6692:"Dualism and Mind" 6399:. MIT. p. 4. 6210:34 (2005): 333-34. 6069:2015-04-12 at the 5690:Descartes' Dualism 5441:2015-04-08 at the 5082:Swinburne, Richard 4977:10.1039/C0CP01575J 4548:The Conscious Mind 4240:The Neo-Platonists 4221:Sextus Empiricus, 4189:Aristotle (2001). 3579:10.1111/phc3.12009 3567:Philosophy Compass 3191:"Dualism and Mind" 2942:Aristotle. 1924. 2923:Aristotle. 1907. 2753:empirical evidence 2381:process philosophy 2316: 2206: 2165:Elizabeth Anscombe 2133:J. B. S. Haldane, 2041:open individualism 1878:over the issue of 1872:thought experiment 1862:Knowledge argument 1805:thought experiment 1800:knowledge argument 1738: 1721:Lynne Rudder Baker 1717:Charles Taliaferro 1619:, between the two 1095: 971:causally reducible 894:for its existence. 869:has written that: 786:Charles Taliaferro 690:Charles Taliaferro 684:, William Hasker, 584:philosophy of mind 235:Eastern philosophy 50: 10760: 10759: 10675:Catholic theology 10622:Seven deadly sins 10592:Peripatetic axiom 10502:Cartesian dualism 10237: 10236: 10203:Scotistic realism 10160:Neo-scholasticism 9956: 9955: 9654:Mind–body problem 9604:Flash suppression 9564:Cartesian theater 9549:Binocular rivalry 9495: 9494: 9361:Mind–body dualism 9290: 9289: 9277:Victor J. Stenger 9252:Erwin Schrödinger 9206:Stanislas Dehaene 9186:Michael Gazzaniga 9070:Donald D. Hoffman 8954:John Polkinghorne 8934:Gottfried Leibniz 8769: 8768: 8665:Mind–body problem 8563:Cognitive closure 8527:Substance dualism 8145:G. E. M. Anscombe 8095: 8094: 8006:Richard Swinburne 7991:Howard D. Roelofs 7946:Charles Landesman 7871:Robert F. Almeder 7855:Thomistic dualism 7850:Substance dualism 7840:Predicate dualism 7825:Cartesian dualism 7811:Mind–body dualism 7777: 7776: 6956:Category of being 6925:Truthmaker theory 6610:978-0-578-08288-2 6549:978-1-61668-203-3 5849:978-0-902308-79-4 5548:978-1-84714-470-6 5467:978-0-688-17369-2 5460:. HarperCollins. 5070:Personal Identity 5066:Richard Swinburne 5051:Madell, G. 1981. 4926:10.1021/cr200042e 4855:(21): 9519–9524. 4739:978-0-13-066997-1 4632:978-0-316-18065-8 4582:978-0-19-531110-5 4557:978-0-19-511789-9 4491:978-0-316-18065-8 4352:Spong, John Selby 4331:"Apostles' Creed" 4262:www.newadvent.org 4238:Whittaker, 1901, 3917:"Soul Proprietor" 3646:Religious Studies 3023:Apologia Socratis 2775:in a debate with 2663:neurotransmitters 2590:quantum mechanics 2414:quantum mechanics 2376:David Ray Griffin 2252: 2251: 2047:Richard Swinburne 1956:cognitive science 1703:of the same body. 1691:substance dualism 1625:Cartesian dualism 1602:Cartesian dualism 1277:Louis de la Forge 1178:overdetermination 1027:Predicate dualism 1013:Predicate dualism 1008:Predicate dualism 857:Thomistic dualism 797:mind–body problem 782:Richard Swinburne 765:Substance dualism 752:Predicate dualism 732:Substance dualism 701:Substance dualism 682:Richard Swinburne 624:mind–body problem 588:mind–body dualism 580: 579: 388: 387: 18:Mind-body dualism 16:(Redirected from 10835: 10750: 10749: 10748: 10738: 10737: 10562:Homo unius libri 10507:Cogito, ergo sum 10497:Cardinal virtues 10198:Moderate realism 10090: 10089: 10080: 10079: 10074: 10073: 10068: 10067: 10006:Cardinal virtues 9983: 9976: 9969: 9960: 9959: 9946: 9945: 9936: 9935: 9778:Unconscious mind 9406:Reflexive monism 9401:Property dualism 9376:New mysterianism 9336:Epiphenomenalism 9316:Computationalism 9311:Anomalous monism 9299: 9298: 9191:Michael Graziano 9161:Francisco Varela 9065:Carl Gustav Jung 9029:Thomas Metzinger 8999:Martin Heidegger 8979:Kenneth M. Sayre 8839:Bertrand Russell 8814: 8813: 8796: 8789: 8782: 8773: 8772: 8517:Representational 8512:Property dualism 8505:Type physicalism 8470:New mysterianism 8438:Epiphenomenalism 8260:Martin Heidegger 8122: 8115: 8108: 8099: 8098: 8085: 8084: 8074: 8073: 7911:Richard Fumerton 7901:C. Stephen Evans 7876:Mario Beauregard 7845:Property dualism 7830:Emergent dualism 7804: 7797: 7790: 7781: 7780: 7767: 7766: 7765: 7755: 7754: 7664: 7654: 7644: 7634: 7624: 7614: 7604: 7594: 7584: 7574: 7564: 7554: 7544: 7534: 7524: 7514: 7504: 7494: 7484: 7160:Substantial form 6972:Cogito, ergo sum 6915:Substance theory 6769: 6762: 6755: 6746: 6745: 6701: 6651: 6577:Descartes' Error 6572:Damasio, Antonio 6528: 6522: 6516: 6515: 6487: 6481: 6480: 6463:(205): 382–385. 6452: 6446: 6445: 6428:(197): 349–352. 6417: 6411: 6410: 6392: 6386: 6385: 6349: 6343: 6342: 6336: 6328: 6326: 6324: 6318: 6312:. Archived from 6311: 6303: 6297: 6296: 6260: 6254: 6253: 6217: 6211: 6204:C. 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Haldane 1824:epiphenomenalism 1697:property dualism 1684:epiphenomenalism 1591: 1535:doctrine of the 1348:In the dialogue 1329:places him with 1327:Sextus Empiricus 1133:Epiphenomenalism 1128:Epiphenomenalism 1122:Epiphenomenalism 1070:anomalous monism 1035:Predicate monism 1031:predicate monism 983:Epiphenomenalism 977:Epiphenomenalism 955:anomalous monism 948:property dualism 934:Property dualism 928:Property dualism 831:Emergent dualism 740:Property dualism 709:property dualism 646:hylomorphic form 572: 565: 558: 277:Aztec philosophy 156:Ancient Egyptian 138: 137: 90: 86: 85: 84: 71: 52: 51: 21: 10843: 10842: 10838: 10837: 10836: 10834: 10833: 10832: 10763: 10762: 10761: 10756: 10746: 10744: 10732: 10724: 10685:Aristotelianism 10663: 10512:Dehellenization 10460: 10233: 10229:Foundationalism 10207: 10169: 10126: 10081: 10077: 10075: 10071: 10069: 10065: 10060: 10046:Social teaching 9992: 9987: 9957: 9952: 9924: 9807: 9783:Unconsciousness 9594:Explanatory gap 9544:Binding problem 9491: 9425: 9286: 9272:Susan Blackmore 9225: 9216:Stuart Hameroff 9136:Antonio Damasio 9119: 9115:Wolfgang Köhler 9053: 9014:Paul Churchland 8919:George Berkeley 8889:Donald Davidson 8805: 8800: 8770: 8765: 8737: 8704: 8650:Mental property 8543:Abstract object 8531: 8401: 8355:Wilfrid Sellars 8230:Donald Davidson 8215:Paul Churchland 8175:George Berkeley 8131: 8126: 8096: 8091: 8061: 8035: 7996:Howard Robinson 7961:Geoffrey Madell 7881:Frank B. Dilley 7859: 7813: 7808: 7778: 7773: 7763: 7761: 7743: 7667: 7662: 7652: 7642: 7632: 7622: 7612: 7602: 7592: 7582: 7572: 7562: 7552: 7542: 7532: 7522: 7512: 7509:De rerum natura 7502: 7492: 7482: 7466: 7206: 7110:Physical object 6946:Abstract object 6934: 6920:Theory of forms 6855:Meaning of life 6778: 6773: 6740:Wayback Machine 6690: 6644: 6560:325:1433–1434. 6536: 6534:Further reading 6531: 6523: 6519: 6498:(223): 95–101. 6488: 6484: 6453: 6449: 6418: 6414: 6407: 6393: 6389: 6350: 6346: 6330: 6329: 6322: 6320: 6316: 6309: 6307:"Archived copy" 6305: 6304: 6300: 6277:10.1038/nrn1931 6261: 6257: 6234:10.1038/nn.2112 6218: 6214: 6202: 6198: 6188: 6187: 6183: 6175: 6171: 6161: 6159: 6146: 6142: 6138: 6107: 6103: 6081: 6077: 6071:Wayback Machine 6054: 6050: 6045: 6041: 6036: 6032: 6027: 6023: 6018: 6014: 6009: 6005: 5993: 5989: 5979: 5977: 5968: 5967: 5963: 5906: 5902: 5888:Popper, Karl R. 5886: 5882: 5875: 5861: 5857: 5850: 5836: 5832: 5817: 5813: 5803: 5801: 5792: 5791: 5787: 5775: 5771: 5764: 5750: 5746: 5735: 5733: 5724: 5718: 5714: 5700: 5696: 5687: 5683: 5668: 5664: 5649: 5645: 5636: 5632: 5623: 5619: 5605: 5601: 5590: 5586: 5563: 5556: 5549: 5533: 5529: 5519: 5515: 5504: 5500: 5490: 5488: 5480: 5479: 5475: 5468: 5452: 5448: 5443:Wayback Machine 5427: 5423: 5413: 5411: 5398: 5397: 5393: 5373: 5369: 5354: 5350: 5333: 5329: 5323:Possible Worlds 5316: 5312: 5298:, host. 2009. 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Zalta 3097: 3084: 3071: 3070: 3066: 2997: 2990: 2986: 2969: 2965: 2961: 2941: 2937: 2922: 2915: 2901: 2894: 2878: 2861: 2857: 2808:Explanatory gap 2804: 2794:the abstract). 2765: 2748: 2734:Neurophilosophy 2728: 2710:neurophysiology 2691:Writing in the 2679: 2637:Paul Churchland 2633: 2564:Paul Churchland 2524: 2504:laws of physics 2471: 2434: 2389:Arnold Geulincx 2369: 2308: 2303: 2260:Alvin Plantinga 2256:zombie argument 2195: 2189: 2177:Richard Carrier 2160: 2151: 2139: 2135:Possible Worlds 2132: 2095:Alvin Plantinga 2083: 2077: 1996: 1916:Howard Robinson 1913: 1868:zombie argument 1864: 1854: 1848: 1743: 1729: 1657: 1633:Arnold Geulincx 1557: 1470:Dominican Order 1431: 1360:Theory of Forms 1320: 1315: 1299: 1293: 1281:Arnold Geulincx 1265: 1259: 1227: 1221: 1130: 1124: 1110: 1104: 1087: 1059:folk psychology 1017:Donald Davidson 1010: 985: 979: 959:Donald Davidson 936: 930: 859: 833: 762: 721: 676:as the seat of 576: 547: 546: 512:Epistemologists 502: 501: 490: 489: 426: 402: 401: 390: 389: 135: 134: 123: 82: 80: 79: 28: 23: 22: 15: 12: 11: 5: 10841: 10831: 10830: 10828:Theory of mind 10825: 10823:René Descartes 10820: 10815: 10810: 10805: 10800: 10795: 10790: 10785: 10783:Baruch Spinoza 10780: 10775: 10758: 10757: 10755: 10754: 10742: 10729: 10726: 10725: 10723: 10722: 10717: 10712: 10707: 10702: 10697: 10692: 10687: 10682: 10677: 10671: 10669: 10665: 10664: 10662: 10661: 10656: 10651: 10646: 10645: 10644: 10639: 10629: 10624: 10619: 10614: 10609: 10604: 10599: 10594: 10589: 10587:Pascal's wager 10584: 10579: 10574: 10569: 10564: 10559: 10554: 10549: 10547:Guardian angel 10544: 10539: 10534: 10529: 10524: 10519: 10514: 10509: 10504: 10499: 10494: 10489: 10484: 10479: 10474: 10468: 10466: 10462: 10461: 10459: 10458: 10453: 10448: 10443: 10438: 10433: 10428: 10423: 10418: 10413: 10408: 10403: 10398: 10393: 10388: 10383: 10378: 10373: 10368: 10363: 10358: 10353: 10348: 10343: 10338: 10333: 10328: 10323: 10318: 10313: 10308: 10303: 10298: 10293: 10288: 10283: 10278: 10273: 10268: 10263: 10258: 10253: 10247: 10245: 10239: 10238: 10235: 10234: 10232: 10231: 10226: 10221: 10215: 10213: 10209: 10208: 10206: 10205: 10200: 10195: 10190: 10185: 10179: 10177: 10171: 10170: 10168: 10167: 10162: 10157: 10152: 10147: 10142: 10136: 10134: 10128: 10127: 10125: 10124: 10119: 10114: 10109: 10104: 10102:Augustinianism 10098: 10096: 10087: 10083: 10082: 10063: 10061: 10059: 10058: 10053: 10048: 10043: 10038: 10033: 10028: 10023: 10018: 10013: 10011:Divine command 10008: 10002: 10000: 9994: 9993: 9986: 9985: 9978: 9971: 9963: 9954: 9953: 9951: 9950: 9940: 9929: 9926: 9925: 9923: 9922: 9915: 9908: 9901: 9896: 9889: 9882: 9875: 9868: 9863: 9856: 9849: 9842: 9835: 9828: 9823: 9815: 9813: 9809: 9808: 9806: 9805: 9800: 9795: 9793:Visual masking 9790: 9785: 9780: 9775: 9770: 9765: 9760: 9755: 9750: 9745: 9743:Sentiocentrism 9740: 9735: 9730: 9729: 9728: 9716: 9711: 9706: 9701: 9696: 9691: 9686: 9681: 9676: 9671: 9666: 9661: 9656: 9651: 9646: 9641: 9636: 9631: 9626: 9621: 9616: 9611: 9606: 9601: 9596: 9591: 9586: 9581: 9576: 9571: 9566: 9561: 9556: 9551: 9546: 9541: 9536: 9535: 9534: 9524: 9519: 9514: 9509: 9503: 9501: 9497: 9496: 9493: 9492: 9490: 9489: 9484: 9479: 9474: 9469: 9464: 9459: 9454: 9449: 9444: 9439: 9433: 9431: 9427: 9426: 9424: 9423: 9418: 9413: 9408: 9403: 9398: 9393: 9388: 9383: 9378: 9373: 9371:Neutral monism 9368: 9363: 9358: 9353: 9351:Interactionism 9348: 9343: 9338: 9333: 9328: 9323: 9318: 9313: 9307: 9305: 9296: 9292: 9291: 9288: 9287: 9285: 9284: 9282:Wolfgang Pauli 9279: 9274: 9269: 9264: 9259: 9254: 9249: 9244: 9239: 9233: 9231: 9227: 9226: 9224: 9223: 9218: 9213: 9211:Steven Laureys 9208: 9203: 9198: 9196:Patrick Wilken 9193: 9188: 9183: 9178: 9173: 9168: 9166:Gerald Edelman 9163: 9158: 9153: 9148: 9143: 9141:Benjamin Libet 9138: 9133: 9127: 9125: 9121: 9120: 9118: 9117: 9112: 9107: 9102: 9097: 9095:Max Wertheimer 9092: 9087: 9082: 9080:Gustav Fechner 9077: 9075:Franz Brentano 9072: 9067: 9061: 9059: 9055: 9054: 9052: 9051: 9049:William Seager 9046: 9041: 9036: 9031: 9026: 9024:René Descartes 9021: 9016: 9011: 9006: 9001: 8996: 8991: 8986: 8981: 8976: 8974:Keith Frankish 8971: 8966: 8961: 8956: 8951: 8946: 8941: 8936: 8931: 8926: 8921: 8916: 8914:Galen Strawson 8911: 8906: 8901: 8899:Edmund Husserl 8896: 8891: 8886: 8881: 8879:David Papineau 8876: 8871: 8869:David Chalmers 8866: 8864:Daniel Dennett 8861: 8856: 8851: 8846: 8841: 8836: 8834:Baruch Spinoza 8831: 8826: 8820: 8818: 8811: 8807: 8806: 8799: 8798: 8791: 8784: 8776: 8767: 8766: 8764: 8763: 8758: 8753: 8748: 8742: 8739: 8738: 8736: 8735: 8718: 8712: 8710: 8706: 8705: 8703: 8702: 8697: 8692: 8687: 8682: 8677: 8672: 8667: 8662: 8657: 8652: 8647: 8645:Mental process 8642: 8637: 8632: 8627: 8622: 8617: 8615:Intentionality 8612: 8611: 8610: 8605: 8595: 8590: 8585: 8580: 8575: 8570: 8565: 8560: 8555: 8550: 8545: 8539: 8537: 8533: 8532: 8530: 8529: 8524: 8519: 8514: 8509: 8508: 8507: 8497: 8492: 8487: 8482: 8477: 8472: 8467: 8465:Neutral monism 8462: 8461: 8460: 8450: 8448:Interactionism 8445: 8440: 8435: 8430: 8425: 8420: 8415: 8409: 8407: 8403: 8402: 8400: 8399: 8392: 8387: 8382: 8377: 8372: 8367: 8362: 8360:Baruch Spinoza 8357: 8352: 8347: 8342: 8337: 8332: 8327: 8322: 8317: 8312: 8307: 8302: 8297: 8292: 8287: 8282: 8277: 8272: 8270:Edmund Husserl 8267: 8262: 8257: 8252: 8247: 8242: 8240:René Descartes 8237: 8235:Daniel Dennett 8232: 8227: 8222: 8217: 8212: 8207: 8205:David Chalmers 8202: 8197: 8192: 8190:Franz Brentano 8187: 8182: 8177: 8172: 8170:Alexander Bain 8167: 8162: 8160:Thomas Aquinas 8157: 8152: 8147: 8141: 8139: 8133: 8132: 8125: 8124: 8117: 8110: 8102: 8093: 8092: 8090: 8089: 8079: 8066: 8063: 8062: 8060: 8059: 8057:Interactionism 8054: 8049: 8043: 8041: 8037: 8036: 8034: 8033: 8031:Dean Zimmerman 8028: 8023: 8018: 8013: 8008: 8003: 7998: 7993: 7988: 7983: 7978: 7973: 7971:Denyse O'Leary 7968: 7966:J. P. Moreland 7963: 7958: 7956:David. H. Lund 7953: 7948: 7943: 7938: 7936:Michael Huemer 7933: 7931:William Hasker 7928: 7923: 7918: 7913: 7908: 7903: 7898: 7893: 7891:René Descartes 7888: 7883: 7878: 7873: 7867: 7865: 7861: 7860: 7858: 7857: 7852: 7847: 7842: 7837: 7832: 7827: 7821: 7819: 7815: 7814: 7807: 7806: 7799: 7792: 7784: 7775: 7774: 7772: 7771: 7759: 7748: 7745: 7744: 7742: 7741: 7736: 7731: 7726: 7721: 7716: 7711: 7706: 7701: 7696: 7691: 7686: 7681: 7675: 7673: 7672:Related topics 7669: 7668: 7666: 7665: 7655: 7645: 7639:Being and Time 7635: 7625: 7615: 7605: 7595: 7585: 7575: 7565: 7555: 7545: 7535: 7525: 7515: 7505: 7495: 7485: 7474: 7472: 7468: 7467: 7465: 7464: 7457: 7452: 7447: 7442: 7437: 7432: 7427: 7422: 7417: 7412: 7407: 7402: 7397: 7392: 7387: 7382: 7377: 7372: 7367: 7362: 7357: 7352: 7347: 7342: 7337: 7332: 7327: 7322: 7317: 7312: 7307: 7302: 7297: 7292: 7287: 7282: 7277: 7272: 7267: 7262: 7257: 7252: 7247: 7242: 7237: 7232: 7227: 7222: 7216: 7214: 7212:Metaphysicians 7208: 7207: 7205: 7204: 7197: 7192: 7187: 7182: 7177: 7172: 7167: 7162: 7157: 7152: 7147: 7142: 7137: 7132: 7127: 7122: 7117: 7112: 7107: 7102: 7097: 7092: 7087: 7082: 7077: 7072: 7067: 7062: 7057: 7052: 7047: 7042: 7037: 7032: 7031: 7030: 7020: 7015: 7010: 7005: 7000: 6995: 6990: 6985: 6980: 6975: 6968: 6966:Causal closure 6963: 6958: 6953: 6948: 6942: 6940: 6936: 6935: 6933: 6932: 6927: 6922: 6917: 6912: 6907: 6902: 6897: 6892: 6887: 6882: 6877: 6872: 6867: 6862: 6857: 6852: 6847: 6842: 6840:Libertarianism 6837: 6832: 6827: 6825:Existentialism 6822: 6817: 6812: 6807: 6802: 6797: 6792: 6786: 6784: 6780: 6779: 6772: 6771: 6764: 6757: 6749: 6743: 6742: 6730: 6725: 6720: 6711: 6702: 6688: 6678: 6666: 6656: 6643: 6642:External links 6640: 6639: 6638: 6621:5(2):195–206. 6613: 6596: 6581: 6569: 6552: 6535: 6532: 6530: 6529: 6517: 6482: 6447: 6412: 6406:978-0262541312 6405: 6387: 6344: 6298: 6271:(7): 523–534. 6255: 6228:(5): 543–545. 6212: 6196: 6181: 6169: 6136: 6101: 6075: 6048: 6039: 6030: 6021: 6012: 6003: 5987: 5961: 5900: 5892:John C. Eccles 5880: 5874:978-0262530743 5873: 5855: 5848: 5830: 5811: 5785: 5777:Collins, Robin 5769: 5763:978-3642032042 5762: 5744: 5712: 5702:Lycan, William 5694: 5681: 5662: 5643: 5630: 5617: 5599: 5584: 5573:(3): 282–284. 5554: 5547: 5527: 5513: 5498: 5473: 5466: 5446: 5421: 5391: 5367: 5348: 5327: 5310: 5288: 5266: 5248: 5242:978-1591025313 5241: 5223: 5221:, No. 4 (1948) 5211: 5205:978-1581347395 5204: 5182: 5160: 5138: 5112: 5090: 5074: 5057: 5041: 5020:10.1086/392754 5014:(4): 542–564. 4998: 4963:(1): 161–168. 4947: 4920:(1): 371–384. 4904: 4835: 4780: 4745: 4738: 4728:Brown (2003). 4720: 4663: 4657:978-0262660587 4656: 4638: 4631: 4607: 4588: 4581: 4563: 4556: 4538: 4525: 4510: 4497: 4490: 4470: 4452: 4425: 4402: 4391:(1): 753–758. 4368: 4344: 4322: 4307: 4298: 4289: 4280: 4271: 4244: 4231: 4214: 4199: 4181: 4168: 4141: 4103: 4090: 4069: 4045: 4020: 3997: 3975: 3952: 3930: 3907: 3881: 3870:(1): 103–117. 3850: 3819: 3808:(4): 505–531. 3788: 3777:(2): 186–204. 3754: 3743:(1): 112–116. 3723: 3710:978-1851684786 3709: 3677: 3652:(4): 487–503. 3636: 3610: 3607:978-1119375265 3584: 3547: 3544:978-1119375265 3523: 3487: 3476:(3): 734–736. 3460: 3399:(1): 202–209. 3376: 3347: 3329: 3312: 3301:(3): 656–658. 3295:Church History 3285: 3254: 3204: 3181: 3142: 3117: 3082: 3064: 2988: 2985: 2984: 2981: 2977: 2963: 2960: 2959: 2956: 2953: 2949: 2935: 2913: 2892: 2858: 2856: 2853: 2852: 2851: 2846: 2841: 2830: 2825: 2820: 2815: 2810: 2803: 2800: 2777:J. J. C. Smart 2764: 2761: 2727: 2724: 2697:Thomas Aquinas 2686:William Hasker 2678: 2675: 2651:David Eagleman 2632: 2629: 2608:and physicist 2560:J. J. C. Smart 2556:overdetermined 2523: 2520: 2516:causal closure 2470: 2467: 2433: 2430: 2416:(and physical 2368: 2365: 2307: 2304: 2302: 2299: 2264:J. P. Moreland 2250: 2249: 2245: 2244: 2238: 2237: 2233: 2232: 2226: 2225: 2221: 2220: 2214: 2213: 2191:Main article: 2188: 2185: 2149: 2130: 2091:William Hasker 2087:Victor Reppert 2079:Main article: 2076: 2073: 2065:Christian List 2049:, in his book 2036: 2035: 2015: 2014: 2011: 2008: 1995: 1992: 1940:human behavior 1936:meteorological 1912: 1909: 1876:David Chalmers 1870:is based on a 1850:Main article: 1847: 1844: 1836:Daniel Dennett 1763:that it's like 1742: 1739: 1728: 1725: 1705: 1704: 1694: 1665:David Chalmers 1656: 1653: 1649:occasionalists 1567:René Descartes 1556: 1553: 1430: 1427: 1319: 1316: 1314: 1311: 1295:Main article: 1292: 1289: 1261:Main article: 1258: 1255: 1223:Main article: 1220: 1217: 1176:, there is no 1126:Main article: 1123: 1120: 1106:Main article: 1103: 1102:Interactionism 1100: 1086: 1083: 1009: 1006: 1002:interactionism 981:Main article: 978: 975: 932:Main article: 929: 926: 903:Thomas Aquinas 899:Eleonore Stump 883:J. P. Moreland 863:Thomas Aquinas 858: 855: 841:Dean Zimmerman 837:William Hasker 832: 829: 793:René Descartes 770:interactionism 761: 758: 757: 756: 748: 736: 720: 717: 686:J. P. Moreland 666:René Descartes 659:metempsychosis 598:, or that the 594:phenomena are 578: 577: 575: 574: 567: 560: 552: 549: 548: 545: 544: 539: 534: 529: 527:Metaphysicians 524: 519: 514: 509: 503: 497: 496: 495: 492: 491: 488: 487: 482: 477: 472: 467: 462: 457: 455:Metaphilosophy 452: 447: 442: 437: 432: 425: 424: 419: 414: 409: 403: 397: 396: 395: 392: 391: 386: 385: 384: 383: 378: 373: 368: 363: 358: 353: 348: 340: 339: 333: 332: 331: 330: 329: 328: 323: 318: 313: 308: 303: 293: 292: 291: 281: 280: 279: 269: 268: 267: 262: 257: 252: 247: 242: 232: 231: 230: 225: 220: 207: 206: 200: 199: 198: 197: 196: 195: 190: 180: 175: 170: 165: 164: 163: 158: 145: 144: 136: 130: 129: 128: 125: 124: 122: 121: 116: 111: 106: 101: 96: 91: 76: 73: 72: 64: 63: 57: 56: 38:René Descartes 26: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 10840: 10829: 10826: 10824: 10821: 10819: 10816: 10814: 10811: 10809: 10808:Consciousness 10806: 10804: 10801: 10799: 10796: 10794: 10791: 10789: 10786: 10784: 10781: 10779: 10776: 10774: 10771: 10770: 10768: 10753: 10743: 10741: 10736: 10731: 10730: 10727: 10721: 10720:Phenomenology 10718: 10716: 10713: 10711: 10708: 10706: 10703: 10701: 10698: 10696: 10693: 10691: 10688: 10686: 10683: 10681: 10678: 10676: 10673: 10672: 10670: 10666: 10660: 10657: 10655: 10652: 10650: 10647: 10643: 10640: 10638: 10635: 10634: 10633: 10630: 10628: 10625: 10623: 10620: 10618: 10617:Rota Fortunae 10615: 10613: 10610: 10608: 10605: 10603: 10600: 10598: 10595: 10593: 10590: 10588: 10585: 10583: 10580: 10578: 10577:Occam's razor 10575: 10573: 10570: 10568: 10565: 10563: 10560: 10558: 10557:Head of a pin 10555: 10553: 10550: 10548: 10545: 10543: 10540: 10538: 10535: 10533: 10530: 10528: 10525: 10523: 10520: 10518: 10515: 10513: 10510: 10508: 10505: 10503: 10500: 10498: 10495: 10493: 10490: 10488: 10485: 10483: 10480: 10478: 10475: 10473: 10472:Actus Essendi 10470: 10469: 10467: 10463: 10457: 10454: 10452: 10449: 10447: 10444: 10442: 10439: 10437: 10434: 10432: 10429: 10427: 10424: 10422: 10419: 10417: 10414: 10412: 10409: 10407: 10404: 10402: 10399: 10397: 10394: 10392: 10389: 10387: 10384: 10382: 10379: 10377: 10374: 10372: 10369: 10367: 10364: 10362: 10359: 10357: 10354: 10352: 10349: 10347: 10344: 10342: 10339: 10337: 10334: 10332: 10329: 10327: 10324: 10322: 10319: 10317: 10314: 10312: 10309: 10307: 10306:Chateaubriand 10304: 10302: 10299: 10297: 10294: 10292: 10289: 10287: 10284: 10282: 10279: 10277: 10274: 10272: 10269: 10267: 10264: 10262: 10259: 10257: 10254: 10252: 10249: 10248: 10246: 10244: 10240: 10230: 10227: 10225: 10222: 10220: 10217: 10216: 10214: 10210: 10204: 10201: 10199: 10196: 10194: 10193:Conceptualism 10191: 10189: 10186: 10184: 10181: 10180: 10178: 10176: 10172: 10166: 10163: 10161: 10158: 10156: 10153: 10151: 10148: 10146: 10143: 10141: 10138: 10137: 10135: 10133: 10129: 10123: 10120: 10118: 10115: 10113: 10110: 10108: 10107:Scholasticism 10105: 10103: 10100: 10099: 10097: 10095: 10091: 10088: 10084: 10057: 10056:Virtue ethics 10054: 10052: 10049: 10047: 10044: 10042: 10041:Seven virtues 10039: 10037: 10034: 10032: 10029: 10027: 10024: 10022: 10019: 10017: 10014: 10012: 10009: 10007: 10004: 10003: 10001: 9999: 9995: 9991: 9984: 9979: 9977: 9972: 9970: 9965: 9964: 9961: 9949: 9941: 9939: 9931: 9930: 9927: 9921: 9920: 9916: 9913: 9909: 9907: 9906: 9902: 9900: 9897: 9895: 9894: 9890: 9888: 9887: 9883: 9881: 9880: 9876: 9874: 9873: 9869: 9867: 9864: 9862: 9861: 9857: 9855: 9854: 9850: 9848: 9847: 9843: 9841: 9840: 9836: 9834: 9833: 9829: 9827: 9824: 9822: 9821: 9817: 9816: 9814: 9810: 9804: 9801: 9799: 9796: 9794: 9791: 9789: 9786: 9784: 9781: 9779: 9776: 9774: 9771: 9769: 9766: 9764: 9761: 9759: 9756: 9754: 9751: 9749: 9746: 9744: 9741: 9739: 9736: 9734: 9731: 9727: 9726: 9722: 9721: 9720: 9717: 9715: 9712: 9710: 9707: 9705: 9702: 9700: 9697: 9695: 9692: 9690: 9687: 9685: 9682: 9680: 9679:Phenomenology 9677: 9675: 9672: 9670: 9667: 9665: 9662: 9660: 9657: 9655: 9652: 9650: 9647: 9645: 9642: 9640: 9637: 9635: 9632: 9630: 9627: 9625: 9622: 9620: 9617: 9615: 9612: 9610: 9609:Hallucination 9607: 9605: 9602: 9600: 9597: 9595: 9592: 9590: 9587: 9585: 9582: 9580: 9577: 9575: 9572: 9570: 9567: 9565: 9562: 9560: 9557: 9555: 9552: 9550: 9547: 9545: 9542: 9540: 9537: 9533: 9530: 9529: 9528: 9525: 9523: 9520: 9518: 9515: 9513: 9510: 9508: 9505: 9504: 9502: 9498: 9488: 9485: 9483: 9480: 9478: 9475: 9473: 9470: 9468: 9465: 9463: 9460: 9458: 9455: 9453: 9450: 9448: 9445: 9443: 9440: 9438: 9435: 9434: 9432: 9428: 9422: 9419: 9417: 9414: 9412: 9409: 9407: 9404: 9402: 9399: 9397: 9394: 9392: 9389: 9387: 9384: 9382: 9379: 9377: 9374: 9372: 9369: 9367: 9364: 9362: 9359: 9357: 9354: 9352: 9349: 9347: 9344: 9342: 9341:Functionalism 9339: 9337: 9334: 9332: 9329: 9327: 9324: 9322: 9319: 9317: 9314: 9312: 9309: 9308: 9306: 9304: 9300: 9297: 9293: 9283: 9280: 9278: 9275: 9273: 9270: 9268: 9267:Roger Penrose 9265: 9263: 9260: 9258: 9257:Marvin Minsky 9255: 9253: 9250: 9248: 9247:Eugene Wigner 9245: 9243: 9240: 9238: 9237:Annaka Harris 9235: 9234: 9232: 9228: 9222: 9219: 9217: 9214: 9212: 9209: 9207: 9204: 9202: 9199: 9197: 9194: 9192: 9189: 9187: 9184: 9182: 9179: 9177: 9174: 9172: 9171:Giulio Tononi 9169: 9167: 9164: 9162: 9159: 9157: 9156:Francis Crick 9154: 9152: 9151:Christof Koch 9149: 9147: 9146:Bernard Baars 9144: 9142: 9139: 9137: 9134: 9132: 9129: 9128: 9126: 9122: 9116: 9113: 9111: 9110:William James 9108: 9106: 9105:Wilhelm Wundt 9103: 9101: 9100:Sigmund Freud 9098: 9096: 9093: 9091: 9088: 9086: 9085:Julian Jaynes 9083: 9081: 9078: 9076: 9073: 9071: 9068: 9066: 9063: 9062: 9060: 9056: 9050: 9047: 9045: 9044:William Lycan 9042: 9040: 9037: 9035: 9032: 9030: 9027: 9025: 9022: 9020: 9017: 9015: 9012: 9010: 9007: 9005: 9002: 9000: 8997: 8995: 8992: 8990: 8987: 8985: 8982: 8980: 8977: 8975: 8972: 8970: 8967: 8965: 8964:Joseph Levine 8962: 8960: 8957: 8955: 8952: 8950: 8947: 8945: 8942: 8940: 8939:Immanuel Kant 8937: 8935: 8932: 8930: 8927: 8925: 8922: 8920: 8917: 8915: 8912: 8910: 8907: 8905: 8904:Frank Jackson 8902: 8900: 8897: 8895: 8892: 8890: 8887: 8885: 8882: 8880: 8877: 8875: 8872: 8870: 8867: 8865: 8862: 8860: 8857: 8855: 8852: 8850: 8847: 8845: 8842: 8840: 8837: 8835: 8832: 8830: 8827: 8825: 8822: 8821: 8819: 8815: 8812: 8808: 8804: 8803:Consciousness 8797: 8792: 8790: 8785: 8783: 8778: 8777: 8774: 8762: 8759: 8757: 8754: 8752: 8749: 8747: 8744: 8743: 8740: 8734: 8730: 8726: 8722: 8719: 8717: 8714: 8713: 8711: 8707: 8701: 8698: 8696: 8695:Understanding 8693: 8691: 8688: 8686: 8683: 8681: 8678: 8676: 8673: 8671: 8668: 8666: 8663: 8661: 8658: 8656: 8653: 8651: 8648: 8646: 8643: 8641: 8638: 8636: 8633: 8631: 8628: 8626: 8623: 8621: 8620:Introspection 8618: 8616: 8613: 8609: 8606: 8604: 8601: 8600: 8599: 8596: 8594: 8591: 8589: 8586: 8584: 8581: 8579: 8576: 8574: 8573:Consciousness 8571: 8569: 8566: 8564: 8561: 8559: 8556: 8554: 8551: 8549: 8546: 8544: 8541: 8540: 8538: 8534: 8528: 8525: 8523: 8520: 8518: 8515: 8513: 8510: 8506: 8503: 8502: 8501: 8498: 8496: 8495:Phenomenology 8493: 8491: 8490:Phenomenalism 8488: 8486: 8483: 8481: 8480:Occasionalism 8478: 8476: 8473: 8471: 8468: 8466: 8463: 8459: 8456: 8455: 8454: 8453:Naïve realism 8451: 8449: 8446: 8444: 8443:Functionalism 8441: 8439: 8436: 8434: 8431: 8429: 8426: 8424: 8421: 8419: 8416: 8414: 8411: 8410: 8408: 8404: 8398: 8397: 8393: 8391: 8388: 8386: 8385:Stephen Yablo 8383: 8381: 8378: 8376: 8373: 8371: 8368: 8366: 8363: 8361: 8358: 8356: 8353: 8351: 8348: 8346: 8343: 8341: 8340:Richard Rorty 8338: 8336: 8335:Hilary Putnam 8333: 8331: 8328: 8326: 8323: 8321: 8318: 8316: 8313: 8311: 8310:Marvin Minsky 8308: 8306: 8303: 8301: 8298: 8296: 8293: 8291: 8288: 8286: 8285:Immanuel Kant 8283: 8281: 8278: 8276: 8275:William James 8273: 8271: 8268: 8266: 8263: 8261: 8258: 8256: 8253: 8251: 8248: 8246: 8243: 8241: 8238: 8236: 8233: 8231: 8228: 8226: 8223: 8221: 8218: 8216: 8213: 8211: 8208: 8206: 8203: 8201: 8198: 8196: 8193: 8191: 8188: 8186: 8183: 8181: 8180:Henri Bergson 8178: 8176: 8173: 8171: 8168: 8166: 8163: 8161: 8158: 8156: 8153: 8151: 8148: 8146: 8143: 8142: 8140: 8138: 8134: 8130: 8123: 8118: 8116: 8111: 8109: 8104: 8103: 8100: 8088: 8080: 8078: 8077: 8068: 8067: 8064: 8058: 8055: 8053: 8050: 8048: 8045: 8044: 8042: 8038: 8032: 8029: 8027: 8026:Keith Yandell 8024: 8022: 8019: 8017: 8014: 8012: 8009: 8007: 8004: 8002: 7999: 7997: 7994: 7992: 7989: 7987: 7984: 7982: 7979: 7977: 7974: 7972: 7969: 7967: 7964: 7962: 7959: 7957: 7954: 7952: 7949: 7947: 7944: 7942: 7939: 7937: 7934: 7932: 7929: 7927: 7924: 7922: 7921:Stewart Goetz 7919: 7917: 7914: 7912: 7909: 7907: 7904: 7902: 7899: 7897: 7896:Michael Egnor 7894: 7892: 7889: 7887: 7884: 7882: 7879: 7877: 7874: 7872: 7869: 7868: 7866: 7862: 7856: 7853: 7851: 7848: 7846: 7843: 7841: 7838: 7836: 7833: 7831: 7828: 7826: 7823: 7822: 7820: 7816: 7812: 7805: 7800: 7798: 7793: 7791: 7786: 7785: 7782: 7770: 7760: 7758: 7750: 7749: 7746: 7740: 7737: 7735: 7732: 7730: 7727: 7725: 7722: 7720: 7717: 7715: 7714:Phenomenology 7712: 7710: 7707: 7705: 7702: 7700: 7697: 7695: 7692: 7690: 7687: 7685: 7682: 7680: 7677: 7676: 7674: 7670: 7661: 7660: 7656: 7651: 7650: 7646: 7641: 7640: 7636: 7631: 7630: 7626: 7621: 7620: 7616: 7611: 7610: 7606: 7601: 7600: 7596: 7591: 7590: 7586: 7581: 7580: 7576: 7571: 7570: 7566: 7561: 7560: 7556: 7551: 7550: 7546: 7541: 7540: 7536: 7531: 7530: 7526: 7521: 7520: 7516: 7511: 7510: 7506: 7501: 7500: 7496: 7491: 7490: 7486: 7481: 7480: 7476: 7475: 7473: 7471:Notable works 7469: 7463: 7462: 7458: 7456: 7453: 7451: 7448: 7446: 7443: 7441: 7438: 7436: 7433: 7431: 7428: 7426: 7423: 7421: 7418: 7416: 7413: 7411: 7408: 7406: 7403: 7401: 7398: 7396: 7393: 7391: 7388: 7386: 7383: 7381: 7378: 7376: 7373: 7371: 7368: 7366: 7363: 7361: 7358: 7356: 7353: 7351: 7348: 7346: 7343: 7341: 7338: 7336: 7333: 7331: 7328: 7326: 7323: 7321: 7318: 7316: 7313: 7311: 7308: 7306: 7303: 7301: 7298: 7296: 7293: 7291: 7288: 7286: 7283: 7281: 7278: 7276: 7273: 7271: 7268: 7266: 7263: 7261: 7258: 7256: 7253: 7251: 7248: 7246: 7243: 7241: 7238: 7236: 7233: 7231: 7228: 7226: 7223: 7221: 7218: 7217: 7215: 7213: 7209: 7203: 7202: 7198: 7196: 7193: 7191: 7188: 7186: 7183: 7181: 7178: 7176: 7173: 7171: 7168: 7166: 7163: 7161: 7158: 7156: 7153: 7151: 7148: 7146: 7143: 7141: 7138: 7136: 7133: 7131: 7128: 7126: 7123: 7121: 7118: 7116: 7113: 7111: 7108: 7106: 7103: 7101: 7098: 7096: 7093: 7091: 7088: 7086: 7083: 7081: 7078: 7076: 7073: 7071: 7068: 7066: 7063: 7061: 7058: 7056: 7053: 7051: 7048: 7046: 7043: 7041: 7038: 7036: 7033: 7029: 7026: 7025: 7024: 7021: 7019: 7016: 7014: 7011: 7009: 7006: 7004: 7001: 6999: 6996: 6994: 6991: 6989: 6986: 6984: 6981: 6979: 6976: 6974: 6973: 6969: 6967: 6964: 6962: 6959: 6957: 6954: 6952: 6949: 6947: 6944: 6943: 6941: 6937: 6931: 6928: 6926: 6923: 6921: 6918: 6916: 6913: 6911: 6908: 6906: 6903: 6901: 6898: 6896: 6893: 6891: 6888: 6886: 6883: 6881: 6878: 6876: 6875:Phenomenalism 6873: 6871: 6868: 6866: 6863: 6861: 6858: 6856: 6853: 6851: 6848: 6846: 6843: 6841: 6838: 6836: 6833: 6831: 6828: 6826: 6823: 6821: 6818: 6816: 6813: 6811: 6808: 6806: 6803: 6801: 6798: 6796: 6795:Action theory 6793: 6791: 6788: 6787: 6785: 6781: 6777: 6770: 6765: 6763: 6758: 6756: 6751: 6750: 6747: 6741: 6737: 6734: 6731: 6729: 6726: 6724: 6721: 6719: 6715: 6712: 6710: 6706: 6703: 6699: 6698: 6693: 6689: 6687: 6683: 6679: 6677: 6676: 6671: 6667: 6665: 6661: 6657: 6654: 6650: 6646: 6645: 6636: 6632: 6628: 6624: 6620: 6619: 6614: 6611: 6607: 6603: 6602: 6597: 6594: 6590: 6586: 6582: 6579: 6578: 6573: 6570: 6567: 6563: 6559: 6558: 6553: 6550: 6546: 6542: 6538: 6537: 6526: 6521: 6513: 6509: 6505: 6501: 6497: 6493: 6486: 6478: 6474: 6470: 6466: 6462: 6458: 6451: 6443: 6439: 6435: 6431: 6427: 6423: 6416: 6408: 6402: 6398: 6391: 6383: 6379: 6375: 6371: 6367: 6363: 6360:(1–2): 1–37. 6359: 6355: 6348: 6340: 6334: 6315: 6308: 6302: 6294: 6290: 6286: 6282: 6278: 6274: 6270: 6266: 6259: 6251: 6247: 6243: 6239: 6235: 6231: 6227: 6223: 6216: 6209: 6205: 6200: 6191: 6185: 6178: 6173: 6157: 6153: 6149: 6145: 6140: 6132: 6128: 6124: 6120: 6116: 6112: 6105: 6098: 6097: 6092: 6088: 6087:David Edmonds 6084: 6079: 6072: 6068: 6064: 6063: 6062:New Scientist 6058: 6052: 6043: 6034: 6025: 6016: 6007: 6000: 5996: 5991: 5975: 5971: 5965: 5957: 5953: 5949: 5945: 5941: 5937: 5933: 5929: 5924: 5919: 5915: 5911: 5904: 5897: 5893: 5889: 5884: 5876: 5870: 5867:. MIT Press. 5866: 5859: 5851: 5845: 5841: 5834: 5826: 5822: 5815: 5799: 5795: 5789: 5782: 5778: 5773: 5765: 5759: 5755: 5748: 5731: 5727: 5722: 5716: 5709: 5708: 5703: 5698: 5691: 5685: 5677: 5673: 5666: 5658: 5654: 5647: 5640: 5634: 5627: 5621: 5615: 5613: 5609: 5603: 5597: 5595: 5588: 5580: 5576: 5572: 5568: 5561: 5559: 5550: 5544: 5540: 5539: 5531: 5525: 5523: 5517: 5510: 5509: 5502: 5487: 5483: 5477: 5469: 5463: 5459: 5458: 5450: 5444: 5440: 5436: 5435: 5430: 5429:Weber, Michel 5425: 5409: 5405: 5401: 5395: 5388: 5384: 5380: 5376: 5375:Feser, Edward 5371: 5364: 5363: 5358: 5352: 5345: 5341: 5337: 5331: 5324: 5320: 5314: 5307: 5306: 5301: 5297: 5292: 5285: 5284: 5279: 5275: 5270: 5262: 5258: 5252: 5244: 5238: 5234: 5227: 5220: 5215: 5207: 5201: 5196: 5195: 5186: 5178: 5174: 5170: 5164: 5156: 5152: 5148: 5142: 5136: 5135:0-8308-2732-3 5132: 5128: 5124: 5119: 5117: 5101: 5094: 5087: 5083: 5078: 5071: 5067: 5061: 5054: 5048: 5046: 5037: 5033: 5029: 5025: 5021: 5017: 5013: 5009: 5002: 4994: 4990: 4986: 4982: 4978: 4974: 4970: 4966: 4962: 4958: 4951: 4943: 4939: 4935: 4931: 4927: 4923: 4919: 4915: 4908: 4900: 4896: 4891: 4886: 4881: 4876: 4872: 4868: 4863: 4858: 4854: 4850: 4846: 4839: 4831: 4827: 4823: 4819: 4815: 4811: 4807: 4803: 4799: 4795: 4791: 4784: 4776: 4772: 4768: 4764: 4760: 4756: 4749: 4741: 4735: 4731: 4724: 4716: 4712: 4707: 4702: 4698: 4694: 4690: 4686: 4682: 4678: 4674: 4667: 4659: 4653: 4649: 4642: 4634: 4628: 4624: 4620: 4619: 4611: 4603: 4599: 4592: 4584: 4578: 4574: 4567: 4559: 4553: 4549: 4542: 4535: 4529: 4521: 4514: 4507: 4501: 4493: 4487: 4483: 4482: 4474: 4467: 4466: 4461: 4460:Nagel, Thomas 4456: 4448: 4444: 4440: 4436: 4429: 4422:(2): 414–418. 4421: 4417: 4413: 4406: 4398: 4394: 4390: 4386: 4382: 4375: 4373: 4365: 4364:0-06-067546-2 4361: 4357: 4353: 4348: 4340: 4336: 4332: 4326: 4319: 4316: 4311: 4302: 4293: 4284: 4275: 4267: 4263: 4259: 4253: 4251: 4249: 4241: 4235: 4228: 4224: 4218: 4210: 4206: 4202: 4196: 4192: 4185: 4178: 4172: 4165: 4161: 4157: 4153: 4152:Schmaltz, Tad 4148: 4146: 4137: 4133: 4129: 4125: 4121: 4117: 4110: 4108: 4100: 4094: 4087: 4086:0-07-021412-3 4083: 4079: 4073: 4066: 4065:0-19-924627-0 4062: 4058: 4052: 4050: 4042: 4038: 4033: 4031: 4029: 4027: 4025: 4017: 4013: 4009: 4004: 4002: 3993: 3989: 3985: 3979: 3971: 3967: 3963: 3956: 3948: 3944: 3940: 3934: 3926: 3922: 3918: 3911: 3903: 3899: 3895: 3888: 3886: 3877: 3873: 3869: 3865: 3861: 3854: 3846: 3842: 3838: 3834: 3830: 3823: 3815: 3811: 3807: 3803: 3799: 3792: 3784: 3780: 3776: 3772: 3768: 3761: 3759: 3750: 3746: 3742: 3738: 3734: 3727: 3716: 3712: 3706: 3699: 3698: 3690: 3688: 3686: 3684: 3682: 3673: 3667: 3659: 3655: 3651: 3647: 3640: 3633:(1): 109–123. 3632: 3628: 3621: 3614: 3608: 3604: 3600: 3596: 3595: 3588: 3580: 3576: 3572: 3568: 3561: 3554: 3552: 3545: 3541: 3537: 3533: 3527: 3519: 3515: 3511: 3507: 3503: 3496: 3494: 3492: 3483: 3479: 3475: 3471: 3464: 3456: 3450: 3442: 3438: 3433: 3428: 3424: 3420: 3416: 3412: 3407: 3402: 3398: 3394: 3390: 3383: 3381: 3372: 3368: 3361: 3354: 3352: 3343: 3339: 3333: 3326: 3322: 3316: 3308: 3304: 3300: 3296: 3289: 3281: 3277: 3273: 3269: 3265: 3258: 3250: 3246: 3242: 3238: 3234: 3230: 3226: 3222: 3218: 3211: 3209: 3200: 3196: 3192: 3185: 3177: 3173: 3169: 3165: 3161: 3157: 3153: 3146: 3139: 3135: 3131: 3126: 3124: 3122: 3114: 3110: 3109: 3104: 3100: 3095: 3093: 3091: 3089: 3087: 3078: 3074: 3068: 3061: 3060: 3055: 3054: 3049: 3048: 3043: 3042: 3037: 3036: 3031: 3030: 3025: 3024: 3019: 3018: 3013: 3009: 3005: 3001: 2995: 2993: 2982: 2979: 2978: 2975: 2974: 2967: 2957: 2954: 2951: 2950: 2947: 2946: 2939: 2932: 2928: 2927: 2920: 2918: 2910: 2906: 2899: 2897: 2889: 2888:S. Guttenplan 2885: 2881: 2876: 2874: 2872: 2870: 2868: 2866: 2864: 2859: 2850: 2847: 2845: 2842: 2840: 2836: 2835: 2831: 2829: 2826: 2824: 2821: 2819: 2816: 2814: 2811: 2809: 2806: 2805: 2799: 2795: 2793: 2788: 2787:Occam's razor 2784: 2783: 2778: 2774: 2773:Peter Glassen 2769: 2760: 2758: 2754: 2747: 2743: 2739: 2735: 2730: 2722: 2720: 2716: 2711: 2705: 2703: 2702:Stephen Evans 2698: 2694: 2689: 2687: 2683: 2674: 2672: 2668: 2664: 2658: 2656: 2652: 2648: 2644: 2642: 2638: 2628: 2626: 2621: 2619: 2615: 2611: 2607: 2603: 2599: 2595: 2594:indeterminate 2591: 2587: 2582: 2580: 2576: 2571: 2569: 2568:Occam's razor 2565: 2561: 2557: 2552: 2549: 2548:Robin Collins 2545: 2541: 2537: 2536: 2531: 2530: 2519: 2517: 2513: 2509: 2505: 2501: 2496: 2492: 2486: 2484: 2480: 2476: 2466: 2463: 2459: 2455: 2451: 2447: 2443: 2438: 2429: 2427: 2423: 2419: 2418:indeterminism 2415: 2411: 2410: 2405: 2400: 2398: 2397:occasionalism 2394: 2390: 2385: 2383: 2382: 2377: 2373: 2364: 2362: 2357: 2352: 2348: 2343: 2340: 2335: 2333: 2329: 2325: 2321: 2312: 2298: 2296: 2292: 2289: 2283: 2278: 2276: 2271: 2269: 2265: 2261: 2257: 2246: 2243: 2239: 2234: 2231: 2227: 2222: 2219: 2215: 2210: 2204: 2202: 2201: 2194: 2184: 2182: 2178: 2174: 2170: 2166: 2157: 2156: 2152:C. S. Lewis, 2148: 2143: 2136: 2129: 2124: 2122: 2116: 2112: 2110: 2106: 2105: 2100: 2096: 2092: 2088: 2082: 2072: 2070: 2066: 2062: 2058: 2054: 2052: 2048: 2044: 2042: 2032: 2031: 2030: 2028: 2024: 2019: 2012: 2009: 2006: 2005: 2004: 2001: 1991: 1989: 1985: 1981: 1977: 1973: 1969: 1965: 1961: 1957: 1952: 1950: 1946: 1941: 1937: 1933: 1929: 1924: 1922: 1917: 1908: 1906: 1901: 1896: 1893: 1887: 1885: 1881: 1877: 1873: 1869: 1863: 1859: 1853: 1843: 1841: 1837: 1833: 1829: 1825: 1821: 1817: 1812: 1810: 1806: 1802: 1801: 1796: 1795:Frank Jackson 1792: 1790: 1786: 1782: 1778: 1774: 1770: 1768: 1764: 1760: 1758: 1752: 1747: 1733: 1724: 1722: 1718: 1714: 1709: 1702: 1698: 1695: 1692: 1689: 1688: 1687: 1685: 1681: 1680:Frank Jackson 1676: 1674: 1670: 1669:supervenience 1666: 1662: 1652: 1650: 1646: 1642: 1638: 1634: 1630: 1626: 1622: 1618: 1614: 1610: 1605: 1603: 1598: 1595: 1590: 1589: 1583: 1579: 1578: 1573: 1568: 1564: 1563: 1552: 1550: 1546: 1542: 1541:second coming 1538: 1534: 1529: 1526: 1522: 1518: 1513: 1509: 1503: 1500: 1496: 1492: 1491: 1486: 1482: 1481: 1475: 1471: 1467: 1463: 1459: 1455: 1450: 1448: 1447:scholasticism 1444: 1440: 1436: 1426: 1424: 1419: 1417: 1412: 1411: 1406: 1401: 1397: 1393: 1391: 1390: 1385: 1380: 1376: 1372: 1368: 1363: 1361: 1357: 1353: 1352: 1346: 1344: 1340: 1336: 1332: 1328: 1324: 1310: 1308: 1304: 1303:Immanuel Kant 1298: 1288: 1286: 1282: 1278: 1274: 1269: 1268:Occasionalism 1264: 1263:Occasionalism 1257:Occasionalism 1254: 1252: 1248: 1244: 1240: 1239:occasionalism 1236: 1232: 1226: 1216: 1214: 1210: 1206: 1202: 1198: 1194: 1190: 1185: 1183: 1179: 1175: 1171: 1167: 1163: 1159: 1155: 1151: 1147: 1143: 1139: 1134: 1129: 1119: 1116: 1109: 1099: 1091: 1082: 1079: 1075: 1071: 1066: 1064: 1060: 1056: 1052: 1048: 1044: 1040: 1036: 1032: 1028: 1024: 1022: 1018: 1014: 1005: 1003: 999: 995: 991: 984: 974: 972: 968: 964: 960: 957:expressed by 956: 951: 949: 945: 941: 935: 925: 923: 922:Michael Egnor 918: 914: 911: 906: 904: 900: 895: 890: 888: 884: 880: 875: 870: 868: 864: 854: 849: 844: 842: 838: 828: 826: 822: 818: 814: 809: 804: 802: 798: 794: 789: 787: 783: 779: 778:Stewart Goetz 775: 771: 766: 754: 753: 749: 746: 742: 741: 737: 734: 733: 729: 728: 727: 725: 716: 714: 710: 706: 702: 698: 693: 691: 688:, E. J. Low, 687: 683: 679: 675: 671: 670:consciousness 667: 662: 660: 655: 651: 647: 643: 639: 635: 631: 627: 625: 621: 617: 613: 609: 605: 601: 597: 593: 589: 585: 573: 568: 566: 561: 559: 554: 553: 551: 550: 543: 540: 538: 535: 533: 530: 528: 525: 523: 520: 518: 515: 513: 510: 508: 505: 504: 500: 494: 493: 486: 483: 481: 478: 476: 473: 471: 470:Phenomenology 468: 466: 463: 461: 458: 456: 453: 451: 448: 446: 443: 441: 438: 436: 433: 431: 428: 427: 423: 420: 418: 415: 413: 410: 408: 405: 404: 400: 394: 393: 382: 379: 377: 374: 372: 369: 367: 364: 362: 359: 357: 354: 352: 349: 347: 344: 343: 342: 341: 338: 335: 334: 327: 324: 322: 319: 317: 314: 312: 309: 307: 304: 302: 299: 298: 297: 294: 290: 287: 286: 285: 282: 278: 275: 274: 273: 270: 266: 263: 261: 258: 256: 253: 251: 248: 246: 243: 241: 238: 237: 236: 233: 229: 226: 224: 221: 219: 216: 215: 214: 211: 210: 209: 208: 205: 202: 201: 194: 191: 189: 186: 185: 184: 181: 179: 176: 174: 171: 169: 166: 162: 161:Ancient Greek 159: 157: 154: 153: 152: 149: 148: 147: 146: 143: 140: 139: 133: 127: 126: 120: 117: 115: 112: 110: 107: 105: 102: 100: 97: 95: 92: 89: 78: 77: 75: 74: 70: 66: 65: 62: 59: 58: 54: 53: 47: 43: 39: 34: 30: 19: 10788:Cartesianism 10690:Neoplatonism 10612:Ressentiment 10607:Quinque viae 10572:Memento mori 10532:Double truth 10501: 10477:Actus primus 10243:Philosophers 10150:Cartesianism 9917: 9903: 9891: 9884: 9877: 9870: 9858: 9851: 9844: 9837: 9830: 9818: 9763:Subconscious 9723: 9709:Quantum mind 9360: 9201:Roger Sperry 9176:Karl Pribram 9124:Neuroscience 9034:Thomas Nagel 8909:Fred Dretske 8884:David Pearce 8859:Colin McGinn 8731: / 8727: / 8723: / 8640:Mental image 8635:Mental event 8598:Intelligence 8548:Chinese room 8422: 8394: 8345:Gilbert Ryle 8325:Derek Parfit 8315:Thomas Nagel 8245:Fred Dretske 8165:J. 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Broad 8021:Peter Unger 7886:John Beloff 7519:Metaphysics 7503:(c. 200 BC) 7493:(c. 350 BC) 7483:(c. 350 BC) 7370:Collingwood 7275:Malebranche 7023:Information 6951:Anima mundi 6930:Type theory 6885:Physicalism 6850:Materialism 6805:Determinism 6776:Metaphysics 6162:8 September 5678:(1): 38–59. 5659:(1): 43–46. 5491:16 November 5414:15 November 5105:3 September 4800:(4): 23–6. 4441:(1): 1–20. 4175:Aristotle. 4164:E. N. Zalta 4122:: 251–271. 3839:: 145–158. 2970:Aristotle, 2931:R. D. Hicks 2880:Hart, W. D. 2614:Max Tegmark 2610:Henry Stapp 2606:John Eccles 2602:Karl Popper 2598:determinism 2579:dark matter 2575:dark energy 2450:res extensa 2404:C. S. Lewis 2395:is that of 2200:Meditations 2099:C. S. Lewis 1905:physicalism 1828:David Lewis 1816:physicalism 1809:Mary's room 1807:, known as 1623:. 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Hart 7579:Monadology 7513:(c. 80 BC) 7220:Parmenides 7105:Perception 7003:Experience 6890:Relativism 6865:Naturalism 6815:Enactivism 6709:PhilPapers 6593:0957404433 6492:Philosophy 6457:Philosophy 6422:Philosophy 6099:(podcast). 5827:: 105–117. 5276:. 2016. " 4794:Phys. Biol 4604:: 322–326. 4223:adv. Math. 4200:0375757996 4154:. 2017. " 4010:. 2002. " 3943:Thomistica 3898:Thomistica 3423:8663197050 3373:(1): 1–12. 3132:. 1984. " 3105:" (rev.). 3101:. 2016. 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8593:Identity 8536:Concepts 8406:Theories 8390:Zhuangzi 8320:Alva Noë 8076:Category 7864:Dualists 7757:Category 7679:Axiology 7533:(c. 270) 7461:more ... 7415:Anscombe 7410:Strawson 7405:Davidson 7300:Berkeley 7240:Plotinus 7201:more ... 7140:Relation 7120:Property 7095:Ontology 7018:Identity 6939:Concepts 6870:Nihilism 6835:Idealism 6783:Theories 6736:Archived 6574:. 1994. 6374:11164022 6333:cite web 6293:16025026 6285:16791142 6242:18408715 6156:Archived 6131:11190987 6067:Archived 5997:. 1988. 5980:24 April 5974:Archived 5956:17140058 5948:11088215 5894:. 1977. 5798:Archived 5730:Archived 5579:25000234 5457:Miracles 5439:Archived 5408:Archived 5125:. 2003. 5084:. 1979. 5068:. 1984. 5036:54883322 4993:31590563 4985:20967377 4942:46487006 4934:21774555 4899:20457932 4830:24333007 4822:16204832 4775:10518482 4715:16147524 4697:30041344 4462:. 1986. 4354:. 1994. 4339:Archived 4227:ad Phys. 4209:46634018 4016:original 3992:Archived 3990:. 2021. 3970:Archived 3947:Archived 3945:. 2023. 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