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Ministry of Interior and Defence

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it protection, jeopardising its sovereignty and causing instability in the region. On the other hand, a well-defended Singapore could contribute substantially towards future defence arrangements and act as a stabilising force in Southeast Asia. He also emphasised that national service would foster loyalty and national consciousness among the diverse population, supporting the development of a strong national identity.
79: 439:: The presence of Israeli military advisors was initially kept confidential to avoid triggering diplomatic sensitivities. However, during the commissioning parade of the first batch of officer cadets on 16 July 1967, Goh Keng Swee publicly acknowledged their involvement in building the SAF. This disclosure, following the Israeli victory in the 98:(Konfrontasi). Malaysia maintained its right to utilise Singapore's military installations under the terms of the separation agreement. The Malaysian regiment remained until November 1967 in spite of the return of 2 SIR in February 1967 and Singapore's requests for their withdrawal, deepening Singapore’s sense of vulnerability. 310:. Due to limited facilities and training personnel, only 10% of these individuals, often from well-educated backgrounds, were selected for full-time national service. These full-time national servicemen were required to serve between two to three years in the SAF and subsequently fulfil reserve duties until the age of 40. 630:
and its terse relations with neighbouring countries reinforced the necessity of strengthening its external defence. Due to lingering fears that some Malaysian leaders believed Singapore should be forcefully re-assimilated, tensions with Malaysia persisted. Occasional remarks from regional politicians
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The metaphor was first articulated by then-Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew in 1966, who stated that in a world where "big fish eat small fish and the small fish eat shrimp," Singapore must become a "poisonous shrimp"—small but lethal if swallowed. This concept emphasised ensuring that any aggressor would
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After the division of the MID in 1970, the SAF’s significant growth and enhanced capabilities began to contradict the premises of the "poisonous shrimp" doctrine. The successful implementation of National Service saw a substantial increase in manpower, with the SAF expanding by 433% between 1965 and
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During the second reading of the bill on 13 March 1967, the Minister for Interior and Defence Goh Keng Swee justified its necessity on the grounds of national security and nation-building. He argued that without a robust defence force, Singapore would be rendered subservient to whoever could provide
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was charged with overseeing the SAF and building its conventional military capabilities. After the split, the SAF’s role shifted predominantly towards external defence, and by the early 1970s its involvement in internal security was highly limited. While SAF units participated in internal security
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1978. The modern weaponry acquired by the SAF also enabled it to surpass the capabilities of neighbouring countries like Malaysia and Indonesia. Recognising these developments, Singapore’s defence ministry began transitioning towards the Second Generation SAF (2G SAF), with greater emphasis on
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Equipping the SAF: Singapore sought to enhance its military capabilities by acquiring advanced weaponry. Israel became a key supplier of defence equipment and technology due to the battle-tested and superior quality of Israeli weapons. Mirroring Israel’s military doctrine, the SAF procured its
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expressed his view of the communist movement as an existential danger to Singapore’s stability, emphasising the need for Singapore to safeguard itself against external and internal threats. These concerns were not unfounded, as civil unrest in Malaysia formed the precursor to race riots in
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was established in February 1966 to build the requisite military infrastructure. The Israeli team was also involved in conducting training at SAFTI, ranging from recruit training to advanced courses for platoon commanders and officers. In an unorthodox move, Goh selected
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The development of the SAF was guided by two critical documents provided by the Israeli teams: the "Brown Book", which contained chapters detailing the establishment of Singapore’s infantry and combat doctrine, and the "Blue Book", serving as a template for Singapore’s
197:(IDF) arrived discreetly in Singapore, codenamed as "Mexicans" to avoid offending the local and regional Malay-Muslim population. This partnership led to the formulation of a confidential defence plan in 1966, which involved modelling the SAF after the Israeli army’s 491:
Concurrently, Singapore received repeated threats that the Malay Ultras would cut Singapore’s water supply from Johor, a critical vulnerability given that Singapore imported a significant proportion of its freshwater from Malaysia under the
619:(MCP) remained active in staging bombings and arson attacks from 1970 to 1971, these were deemed as largely inconsequential to the government. By 1994, Singapore’s government had declared the country free from the threat of communist 456:. The doctrine implicitly acknowledged that Singapore might ultimately be overrun, aiming only to ensure that the aggressor suffered severe losses in the process. This approach risked the nation’s existence as a sovereign entity. 594:
The evolving security landscape in the late 1960s required a reorganisation of Singapore’s defence and security apparatus. On 11 August 1970, the MID was officially divided into two separate entities: MINDEF and MHA.
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was appointed as the first Minister for Interior and Defence, tasked with the critical role of building a capable defence force from the ground up. A key initiative of the MID was the integration of the
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Maximising Aggressor Costs: By raising the human and material costs of aggression to disproportionate levels, Singapore aimed to deter potential adversaries despite its limited offensive capabilities.
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opposing the separation could influence Malaysian forces stationed in Singapore to act against the newly independent state. These concerns were heightened when Malaysian troops in
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light tanks from Israel in January 1968. In a political act to assert its military prowess, Singapore made the calculated move of showcasing a mobile column of AMX-13 and
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In response to these multi-dimensional threats, the government recognised the importance of a cohesive and integrated approach to national security. On October 1965, the
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In its early years, Singapore lacked the manpower, firepower, and mobility to conduct offensive operations. To compensate for these deficiencies, it focused on:
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Defence at the Water’s Edge: The strategy focused on defending Singapore along its coastline to prevent enemy forces from establishing a foothold on the island.
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of the MID for his experience in security and intelligence. Acknowledging the lack of local defence expertise, Goh sought external advice and assistance from
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Regiment's (2 SIR) barracks at Temasek Camp was a point of contention between Singapore and neighbouring Malaysia. At the time, 2 SIR had been deployed to
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agencies. To improve Singapore's capacity in responding to riots and ethnic clashes, the government expanded the Police Reserve Units (later known as the
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Paribatra, Sukhumbhand; Samudavanija, Chai-Anan (1986). "Internal dimensions of regional security in Southeast Asia". In Ayoob, Mohammed (ed.).
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The initial focus of the MID was the rapid development of the SAF. Recognising the urgent need for a credible defence force amid the ongoing
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Loo, Bernard Fook Weng (2012). "Goh Keng Swee and the emergence of a modern SAF: The rearing of a poisonous shrimp". In Chew, Ernest (ed.).
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The division of the MID into MINDEF and MHA enabled more focused control over the internal and external spheres of Singapore's security.
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As the differences between the police force and the armed forces became more defined, the ministry was eventually split into the current
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Chew, Ernest (2012). "Introduction: Goh Keng Swee: Heroic public servant and history-maker of modern Singapore". In Chew, Ernest (ed.).
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Amid rising Malay nationalism in Malaysia, Singapore took the initiative to enhance its armoured warfare capacity by procuring 72
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for part-time national service spanning 12 years. These conscripts would serve in volunteer-dependent organisations such as the
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Loo, Bernard Fook Weng (2003). "Explaining changes in Singapore's military doctrines: Material and ideational perspectives".
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Vasu, Norman; Loo, Bernard (2015). "National security and Singapore: An assessment". In Desker, Barry; Tan, Chung B. (eds.).
230:. On 24 December 1965, the Israeli team began to supervise the establishment of the first SAF military base, designed by the 1579: 1430: 670: 144: 75:
were placed on alert, leading Singapore’s political leaders to perceive Singapore as highly vulnerable to foreign threats.
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was introduced in parliament by the Singapore government. The bill would enforce the registration of all 18-year-old male
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as the inaugural minister. The ministry was responsible for both internal and external security, controlling both the
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was linked to communist elements, raising concerns over internal subversion. At public events, former Prime Minister
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While the "poisonous shrimp" strategy served Singapore well in its infancy, its main flaw was in being inherently
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with Israel. These actions were part of the same political calculus to deter would-be aggressors in the region.
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Internally, Singapore faced threats from domestic communism and ethno-religious extremism. The opposition party
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Leininger, Vivian (2013). "Jews in Singapore: Tradition and transformation". In Goldstein, Jonathan L. (ed.).
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exercises with the police up till 1986, its primary mission became centred on countering external aggression.
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had significantly diminished internal security threats by the early 1970s. Under the purview of the MID, the
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From 'Poisonous Shrimp' to 'Porcupine': An Analysis of Singapore's Defence Posture Change in the Early 1980s
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in 1967, aiming to instil strong moral values within the armed forces. In June 1966, the first batch of 140
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Strategic Planning or Innovation Institutionalization? The Case of Singapore Armed Forces' Modernization
685:, with the Gurkha Contingent particularly valued as a neutral force for handling race-related conflicts. 639:: "Singapore lies inside ". As a result, the city-state invested consistently in strengthening the SAF. 67:
in 1965, the nation faced significant security concerns. Externally, Singapore’s leadership feared that
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Post independence, Singapore suffered security constraints due to its small geographical size, lack of
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in July 1967. To register the incoming conscripts, the Central Manpower Base (CMPB) was established.
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assumed responsibility for internal security matters, taking control of the SPF, the ISD, and other
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were effective in curtailing the operations of pro-communist and communalist elements. Although the
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Yeo, George (2019). "Reflections on Singapore–Israel relations". In Ho, Peter; Tomba, Mel (eds.).
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Lau, Albert (2018). "National service in Singapore". In Ho, Shu Huang; Ong, Graham Gerald (eds.).
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Ho, Peter (2019). "A Mexican fandango with a poisonous shrimp". In Ho, Peter; Tomba, Mel (eds.).
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suffer unacceptable losses if they attempted an invasion, thereby deterring potential attacks.
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was enlisted, leading to the formation of the 3rd and 4th Singapore Infantry Regiments (SIR).
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and other foreign delegates were in attendance. Within the same year, Singapore established
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Regional Security in the Third World: Case Studies from Southeast Asia and the Middle East
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Urban Warfare: If coastal defences were breached, the plan envisioned engaging in close
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Yong, Tan Tai (2001). "Singapore: Civil-Military Fusion". In Alagappa, Muthiah (ed.).
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However, external security concerns remained. Singapore’s historical trauma from the
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activists took place between 1967 and 1968. However, the bill passed smoothly in the
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Ho, Peter (2015). "Organising for National Security – The Singapore Experience". In
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Between Mumbai and Manila: Judaism in Asia since the founding of the State of Israel
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for women. Over a ten-year period, the plan intended to expand the army to twelve
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Luan, Ivan Ong Boon (2010). "Singapore water management policies and practices".
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Across the causeway: A multi-dimensional study of Malaysia–Singapore relations
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Thayer, Carlyle A. (2008). "Security relations". In Shiraishi, Takashi (ed.).
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Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia
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Former Parliamentary Chamber, the Arts House at the Old Parliament Singapore.
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provoked wariness, including a loaded comment by Indonesian president
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Military Innovation in Small States: Creating a Reverse Asymmetry
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Goh Keng Swee at the Opening of the School of Artillery at SAFTI
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Perspectives on the Security of Singapore: The First 50 Years
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Perspectives on the Security of Singapore: The First 50 Years
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Latif, Asad (2009). "Minister for the Interior and Defence".
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Asia in the New Millennium: APISA First Congress Proceedings
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Beating the Odds Together: 50 Years of Singapore–Israel Ties
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Beating the Odds Together: 50 Years of Singapore–Israel Ties
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began their training, with 117 successfully receiving their
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The Malaysian regiment's occupation of the second Singapore
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From Third World to First: The Singapore Story: 1965–2000
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In November 1965, the first group of advisors from the
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Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singapore
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without success, before securing defence support from
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International Journal of Water Resources Development
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Ministry of Community Development, Youth and Sports
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Sheridan to draft the SAF 213:by mobilising Singapore’s male population. 133: 117:was established to address these concerns. 1329: 1315: 1108: 539:The ministry was previously headed by the 447: 349: 249:Under the leadership of Brigadier-General 1451:Ministry of Social and Family Development 1204: 1001:Goh Keng Swee: A Legacy of Public Service 913: 890:Goh Keng Swee: A Legacy of Public Service 868:40 Years of National Service in Singapore 642: 589: 423:60mm and 81mm mortars, later introducing 1401:Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth 1167: 1165: 1163: 1161: 1081: 1079: 1063: 994: 992: 990: 988: 964: 962: 960: 958: 659: 498: 401: 332: 281: 236: 181: 77: 1171: 94:at Malaysia’s request to engage in the 1557: 1545:Template:Statutory boards of Singapore 946: 927: 925: 909: 907: 883: 881: 879: 877: 861: 859: 857: 855: 853: 851: 849: 847: 835: 831: 829: 827: 825: 823: 821: 819: 817: 802:. ISEAS Publishing. pp. 163–174. 797: 793: 791: 789: 787: 785: 783: 781: 779: 763: 761: 759: 757: 755: 719: 717: 715: 217:Establishment of Military Institutions 189:soldiers conducting a battalion drill. 115:Ministry of Interior and Defence (MID) 65:Singapore’s independence from Malaysia 1310: 1292:People's Defence Force is Established 1180: 1158: 1139: 1121:from the original on 29 December 2019 1076: 1057: 1030: 1015: 985: 955: 931: 541:Minister for the Interior and Defence 1248: 1109:Stolarchuk, Jewel (7 October 2018). 1036: 949:SAF and 30 Years of National Service 887: 724:Germaine Foo-Tan (7 November 2003). 671:Ministry of Home Affairs (Singapore) 317:Anti-conscription demonstrations by 1595:1970 disestablishments in Singapore 1265: 1186: 1142:Lim Kim San: A Builder of Singapore 1085: 998: 940: 922: 904: 874: 865: 844: 814: 776: 767: 752: 712: 543:, who was appointed as part of the 523:on 9 August 1969, during which the 474:United Malays National Organisation 472:In May 1969, following the loss of 147:and the British military draw-down 139:Collaboration with Foreign Advisors 32:. It was established in 1965, with 13: 1565:Government ministries of Singapore 1227: 1218: 1205:Wicaksono, William Hendro (2020). 1066:"A deep, dark, secret love affair" 968: 201:, weapons platforms and universal 14: 1606: 1590:Ministries disestablished in 1970 1285: 419:systems from Israel, such as the 397: 292:National Service (Amendment) Bill 1585:1965 establishments in Singapore 1487:Ministry of Interior and Defence 1446:Ministry of National Development 1338: 1064:Barzilai, Amnon (15 July 2004). 581:17 August 1967 – 10 August 1970 306:(PDF), Vigilante Corps, and the 278:Introduction of National Service 145:Indonesia–Malaysia confrontation 96:Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation 18:Ministry of Interior and Defence 1509:Monetary Authority of Singapore 1199: 1133: 1102: 734:Singaporean Ministry of Defence 653:Ministry of Defence (Singapore) 635:to second Minister for Defence 569:9 August 1965 – 16 August 1967 478:1969 Malaysian general election 468:Responding to Regional Tensions 358: 338:The "Poisonous Shrimp" Doctrine 1570:Ministries established in 1965 1461:Ministry of Trade and Industry 1219:Ng, Patrick Shih Yuen (2005). 870:. World Scientific Publishing. 599:Shift Towards External Defence 494:1961 and 1962 Water Agreements 205:system, with the exception of 1: 1026:. Croom Helm. pp. 79–95. 918:. De Gruyter. pp. 53–70. 705: 698:of vehicles belonging to the 519:armoured vehicles during its 327:full-time national servicemen 1297:MID Commemorative Exhibition 772:. Harper Collins Publishers. 611:(ISD) and its employment of 609:Internal Security Department 534: 486:1969 race riots of Singapore 7: 1580:Internal affairs ministries 1421:Ministry of Foreign Affairs 696:vehicle registration plates 664:Singapore Gurkha Contingent 529:formal diplomatic relations 406:Soltam M-71 155mm howitzer. 10: 1611: 1242:10.1142/9789814689342_0017 1096:10.1142/9789811214691_0004 1009:10.1142/9789814390767_0006 979:10.1142/9789811214691_0005 947:Chiang, Ming Shun (1997). 898:10.1142/9789814390767_0001 58: 1540: 1517: 1499: 1474: 1383: 1374: 1351: 1259:10.1515/9780804779234-017 1051:10.1080/07900620903392190 808:10.1355/9789812307842-011 689: 290:On 27 February 1967, the 232:Israeli Engineering Corps 134:Building the Armed Forces 55:(MHA) on 11 August 1970. 1431:Ministry of Home Affairs 736:(MINDEF). Archived from 525:Malaysian Prime Minister 437:Psychological Deterrence 110:multi-ethnic Singapore. 53:Ministry of Home Affairs 1391:Prime Minister's Office 1345:Government of Singapore 932:Raska, Michael (2016). 617:Malayan Communist Party 448:Criticism and Evolution 350:Origins of the Doctrine 30:Government of Singapore 1361:President of Singapore 768:Lee, Kuan Yew (2000). 700:Singapore Armed Forces 665: 643:Organisational Changes 590:Dissolution and Legacy 508: 407: 304:People’s Defence Force 287: 246: 190: 128:Singapore Armed Forces 124:Singapore Police Force 83: 82:Barisan Sosialis Logo. 1519:Sovereign wealth fund 1466:Ministry of Transport 1411:Ministry of Education 1356:Politics of Singapore 1232:; Tan, Chung (eds.). 663: 502: 464:and forward defence. 405: 333:Early Defence Posture 323:People’s Action Party 285: 240: 195:Israel Defence Forces 185: 161:non-aligned countries 81: 1441:Ministry of Manpower 1366:Cabinet of Singapore 1269:(7 September 2002). 840:. Allen & Unwin. 836:Huxley, Tim (2000). 679:Police Tactical Unit 613:anti-subversion laws 545:Cabinet of Singapore 462:offensive preemption 386:Battle of Stalingrad 308:Special Constabulary 241:SAFTI was opened at 1416:Ministry of Finance 1406:Ministry of Defence 628:Japanese occupation 521:National Day Parade 505:National Day Parade 300:permanent residents 157:Permanent Secretary 49:Ministry of Defence 1575:Defence ministries 1426:Ministry of Health 666: 603:Singapore’s rapid 509: 408: 296:Singapore citizens 288: 247: 228:intelligence units 191: 84: 1552: 1551: 1495: 1494: 1191:. pp. 27–30. 702:, bearing "MID". 683:Gurkha Contingent 675:homeland security 587: 586: 199:military doctrine 51:(MINDEF) and the 1602: 1532:Temasek Holdings 1381: 1380: 1343: 1342: 1331: 1324: 1317: 1308: 1307: 1282: 1280: 1278: 1262: 1245: 1224: 1215: 1213: 1193: 1192: 1184: 1178: 1177: 1169: 1156: 1155: 1137: 1131: 1130: 1128: 1126: 1106: 1100: 1099: 1083: 1074: 1073: 1061: 1055: 1054: 1034: 1028: 1027: 1019: 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995: 993: 991: 989: 980: 976: 972: 965: 963: 961: 959: 950: 943: 935: 928: 926: 917: 910: 908: 899: 895: 891: 884: 882: 880: 878: 869: 862: 860: 858: 856: 854: 852: 850: 848: 839: 832: 830: 828: 826: 824: 822: 820: 818: 809: 805: 801: 794: 792: 790: 788: 786: 784: 782: 780: 771: 764: 762: 760: 758: 756: 739: 735: 731: 727: 720: 718: 716: 711: 703: 701: 697: 684: 680: 676: 672: 668: 667: 662: 654: 650: 649: 648: 640: 638: 637:Teo Chee Hean 634: 629: 624: 622: 618: 614: 610: 606: 596: 583: 580: 578: 575: 574: 571: 568: 566: 565:Goh Keng Swee 563: 562: 558: 555: 552: 551: 548: 546: 542: 532: 530: 526: 522: 518: 514: 506: 501: 497: 495: 489: 487: 483: 479: 475: 465: 463: 457: 455: 442: 438: 435: 434: 430: 426: 422: 418: 413: 412: 411: 404: 392: 391: 387: 383: 379: 378: 374: 373: 367: 356: 347: 345: 330: 328: 324: 320: 315: 311: 309: 305: 301: 297: 293: 284: 275: 273: 269: 265: 261: 260:Jesuit priest 256: 252: 251:Kirpa Ram Vij 244: 239: 235: 233: 229: 225: 214: 212: 208: 204: 200: 196: 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Retrieved 1264: 1250: 1247: 1233: 1226: 1220: 1217: 1207: 1203: 1200:Bibliography 1188: 1182: 1173: 1141: 1135: 1123:. Retrieved 1114: 1104: 1087: 1069: 1059: 1045:(1): 65–80. 1042: 1038: 1032: 1023: 1017: 1000: 970: 948: 942: 936:. Routledge. 933: 915: 889: 867: 837: 799: 769: 742:. Retrieved 738:the original 729: 693: 646: 633:B.J. Habibie 625: 602: 593: 540: 538: 510: 490: 471: 458: 451: 409: 382:urban combat 359:Key Elements 353: 341: 316: 312: 289: 248: 220: 203:conscription 192: 149:East of Suez 142: 114: 112: 107:Lee Kuan Yew 100: 85: 69:Malay Ultras 62: 46: 42:armed forces 38:police force 21: 17: 15: 577:Lim Kim San 441:Six-Day War 272:commissions 169:Switzerland 1559:Categories 1543:See also: 1376:Ministries 706:References 681:) and the 621:insurgency 503:Singapore 211:battalions 63:Following 535:Ministers 454:defeatist 417:artillery 415:earliest 319:left-wing 1119:Archived 553:Minister 507:in 1968. 88:Infantry 40:and the 26:ministry 24:) was a 1384:Current 1125:26 July 1070:Haaretz 744:16 July 59:History 28:of the 1475:Former 1148:  690:Legacy 513:AMX-13 421:Soltam 363:": --> 253:, the 177:Israel 171:, and 1212:(PDF) 559:Ref. 556:Term 429:160mm 425:155mm 173:Egypt 165:India 163:like 155:, as 92:Sabah 73:Johor 1279:2024 1146:ISBN 1127:2020 746:2011 669:The 651:The 517:V200 427:and 365:edit 298:and 226:and 16:The 1527:GIC 1255:doi 1238:doi 1092:doi 1047:doi 1005:doi 975:doi 894:doi 804:doi 234:. 187:IDF 179:. 22:MID 1561:: 1160:^ 1117:. 1113:. 1078:^ 1068:. 1043:26 1041:. 987:^ 957:^ 924:^ 906:^ 876:^ 846:^ 816:^ 778:^ 754:^ 732:. 728:. 714:^ 623:. 547:. 496:. 167:, 44:. 1330:e 1323:t 1316:v 1281:. 1261:. 1257:: 1244:. 1240:: 1154:. 1129:. 1098:. 1094:: 1072:. 1053:. 1049:: 1011:. 1007:: 981:. 977:: 900:. 896:: 810:. 806:: 748:. 369:] 245:. 20:(

Index

ministry
Government of Singapore
Goh Keng Swee
police force
armed forces
Ministry of Defence
Ministry of Home Affairs
Singapore’s independence from Malaysia
Malay Ultras
Johor

Infantry
Sabah
Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation
Barisan Sosialis
Lee Kuan Yew
Goh Keng Swee
Singapore Police Force
Singapore Armed Forces
Indonesia–Malaysia confrontation
East of Suez
Special Branch
Permanent Secretary
non-aligned countries
India
Switzerland
Egypt
Israel

IDF

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