Operation Frequent Wind

4482: 45: 3553: 4749: 5022: 3859: 4571:), but there were no missile launches. The Hanoi leadership, reckoning that completion of the evacuation would lessen the risk of American intervention, had apparently instructed General Dũng not to target the airlift itself. Members of the police in Saigon had been promised evacuation in exchange for protecting the American evacuation buses and control of the crowds in the city during the evacuation. Disgruntled ARVN troops repeatedly hit American helicopters with small arms fire throughout the evacuation, without causing serious damage. Despite receiving sporadic PAVN AAA fire, USAF and USN aircraft made no attacks on AAA or SAM sites during the evacuation. However, one USAF report states that an F-4C 4606: 4617:

April, with the shelling of Tan Son Nhut Airport subsiding, Air America began ferrying its helicopter and fixed-wing pilots from their homes in Saigon to the Air America compound at Tan Son Nhut, across the road from the DAO Compound. Air America helicopters started flying to the rooftop LZs in Saigon and either shuttled the evacuees back to the DAO Compound or flew out to the ships of TF76. By 10:30 all of Air America's fixed-wing aircraft had departed Tan Son Nhut, evacuating all non-essential personnel and as many Vietnamese evacuees as they could carry and headed for Thailand. At some point during the morning RVNAF personnel took five ICCS UH-1H Hueys and one Air America

3838: 2948: 5038: 3770:. Rather than loading as many evacuees as possible, each evacuee was required to have a seat and a seatbelt, reducing the number of passengers that could be carried on each flight to 94 in a C-141 and 75 in a C-130. But these restrictions were relaxed and eventually ignored altogether as the pace of the evacuation quickened. Armed guards were also present on each flight to prevent hijacking. American commercial and contract carriers continued to fly out of Tan Son Nhut, but with decreasing frequency. In addition, military aircraft from Australia, Indonesia, Iran, Poland, the United Kingdom, France, and other countries flew in to evacuate their embassy personnel. 3535:(RVNAF) helicopters and some fixed-wing aircraft sailed or flew out to the evacuation fleet. Helicopters began to clog ship decks and eventually, some were pushed overboard to allow others to land. Pilots of other helicopters were told to drop off their passengers and then take off and ditch in the sea, from where they would be rescued. In Operation Frequent Wind a total of 1,373 Americans and 5,595 Vietnamese and third-country nationals were evacuated by helicopter. The total number of Vietnamese evacuated by Frequent Wind or self-evacuated and ending up in the custody of the United States for processing as refugees to enter the United States totalled 138,869. 4322: 4809: 5083: 4861:

Marines), and Martin told Kean to do the best he could. At 03:00 Martin ordered Kean to move all the remaining evacuees into the parking lot LZ which was the Marines' final perimeter. At 03:27 President Gerald Ford ordered that no more than 19 additional lifts would be allowed to complete the evacuation. At 04:30 with the 19 lift limit already exceeded, Kean went to the rooftop LZ and spoke over a helicopter radio with Carey who advised that President Ford had ordered that the airlift be limited to US personnel. Kean was then ordered to withdraw his men into the chancery building and withdraw to the rooftop LZ for evacuation.

182: 128: 4785: 5107: 4962: 4625: 4977: 170: 159: 4706:"Alpha" command group, two rifle companies, and the 81 mm mortar platoon were deployed around the DAO headquarters building (the Alamo) and its adjacent landing zones. Companies E and F respectively occupied the northern and southern sections between the DAO headquarters and the DAO Annex. "Bravo" command group, consisting of two rifle companies and the 106 mm recoilless rifle platoon, assumed responsibility for security of the DAO Annex and its adjoining landing zones. Company G occupied the eastern section of the Annex, while Company H assumed control of the western section. 4657:

Hotel at 6 Chien Si Circle was declared unusable, CIA Station Chief Tom Polgar asked Oren B. Harnage, Deputy Chief of the Embassy's Air Branch to change the pickup to the Pittman Building, which was the home of the Assistant Station Chief and had an elevator shaft believed capable of supporting the weight of a Huey. Harnage boarded an Air America Huey from the Embassy's rooftop heliport and flew the short distance to the Pittman Building. Harnage leaned out of the Huey and helped approximately 15 evacuees board the Huey from the narrow helipad. The scene was famously captured on film by

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involved over 50 Marine Corps and Air Force helicopters. In the helicopter evacuation a total of 395 Americans and 4,475 Vietnamese and third-country nationals were evacuated from the DAO compound and a further 978 U.S. and 1,120 Vietnamese and third-country nationals from the embassy, giving a total of 1,373 Americans and 5,595 Vietnamese and third country nationals. In addition, Air America helicopters and RVNAF aircraft brought additional evacuees to the TF76 ships. Many of the Vietnamese evacuees were allowed to enter the United States under the

4761: 4992: 5095: 4737: 4773: 4725: 4579:, was patrolling between Tan Son Nhut and Bien Hoa about 16:00 when the Wild Weasel detected SAM radar emissions to the north. It immediately turned toward the threatening radar and fifteen to twenty anti-aircraft weapons opened up on it and the F-4D. The four crew members estimated they received more than 500 rounds of 23-mm, 37-mm, and 57-mm fire in the space of one minute. After receiving permission from the airborne commander, the Wild Weasel marked the three 57-mm sites with an 103: 115: 3867: 3672: 3415: 4857:, Commander of Task Force 76 had ordered that operations would cease at 23:00. Kean saw Martin to request that he contact the Oval Office to ensure that the airlift continued. Martin soon sent word back to Kean that sorties would continue to be flown. At the same time, General Carey met Admiral Whitmire to convince him to resume flights to the embassy despite pilot fatigue and poor visibility caused by darkness, fires and bad weather. 4824:

whereby the US would not have to pull out of South Vietnam and, in an effort to avert defeatism and panic he instructed Major James Kean, commanding officer of the Marine Security Guard Battalion and Ground Support Force Commander United States Embassy Compound, that he could not begin to remove the tamarind tree and other trees and shrubbery which prevented the use of the embassy parking lot as a helicopter landing zone.

3576:(ICCS), third-country nationals under contract by the U.S. government and the employees of the U.S. and their dependents (estimated at 200,000 people). In addition, the Vietnamese relatives of American citizens and senior Government of Vietnam officials and their dependents (about 600,000 people) were also identified as potential evacuees, along with Vietnamese formerly employed by the U.S. and their dependents. 4801: 140: 6158: 5878: 5843: 5702: 5636: 5384: 4591:

haze over Saigon, where visibility decreased to one mile. This meant that scattered clouds existed below their flight path while a solid layer of clouds more than two miles above their heads obscured the sun. The curtain of haze over Saigon so altered the diminished daylight that line of sight visibility was only a mile. The weather conditions deteriorated as the operation continued.

4440:

Tan Son Nhut refused to allow the last convoy of buses into the DAO Compound at about 17:45. As this was happening, a firefight between two ARVN units broke out and caught the rearmost buses in the crossfire, disabling two of the vehicles. Eventually the ARVN commander controlling the gates agreed to permit the remaining buses to enter the compound. General Carey's threat to use the

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evacuation from the DAO Compound was completed by about 19:00 after which all helicopters would be routed to the embassy; Kean was informed that operations would cease at dark. Kean advised that the LZ would be well lit and had vehicles moved around the parking lot LZ with their engines running and headlights on to illuminate the LZ. At 21:30 a CH-53 pilot informed Kean that

4686:(commander of Regimental Landing Team 4 (RLT4)) landed at the DAO Compound. During their approach to the compound, Carey and Gray got a firsthand view of the PAVN's firepower as they shelled nearby Tan Son Nhut Airport with ground, rocket, and artillery fire. They quickly established an austere command post in preparation for the arrival of the Marine 4714:

onto helicopters. With the evacuation of the landing control teams from the Annex and Alamo completed, Carey ordered the withdrawal of the ground security forces from the DAO Compound around 22:50. At 23:40 Marines destroyed the satellite terminal, the DAO Compound's last means of direct communication with the outside world. At 00:30 on 30 April,

5164:, the intelligence chief at the South Korean Embassy in Saigon. The South Korean civilians were evacuated in 1976, while General Rhee and two other diplomats were held captive until April 1980. Forty-nine Americans, including dependents, were also left behind or chose to remain in Saigon. They were evacuated to Bangkok on 1 August 1976. 4353:. C-130s leaving Tan Son Nhut reported receiving PAVN 12.7 mm and 37 mm anti-aircraft (AAA) fire, while sporadic PAVN rocket and artillery attacks also started to hit the airport and air base. C-130 flights were stopped temporarily after the air attack but resumed at 20:00 on 28 April. At 21:00 on 28 April Major General 4864:

Kean returned to the ground floor of the chancery and ordered his men to withdraw into a large semicircle at the main entrance to the chancery. Most of the Marines were inside the chancery when the crowds outside the embassy broke through the gates into the compound. The Marines closed and bolted the

4827:

By the morning of 29 April, it was estimated that approximately 10,000 people had gathered around the embassy, while some 2,500 evacuees were in the embassy and consular compounds. The crowds prevented the use of buses for transporting evacuees from the embassy to the DAO Compound for evacuation, and

4616:

As part of the evacuation plan agreed with the DAO, Air America committed 24 of its 28 available helicopters to support the evacuation and 31 pilots agreed to stay in Saigon to support the evacuation; this meant that most helicopters would have only one pilot rather than the usual two. At 08:30 on 29

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pilot Nikki A. Fillipi, with U.S. Marine Corps Lieutenant Robert Twigger, assigned to the DAO as the U.S. Navy liaison officer, surveyed 37 buildings in Saigon as possible landing zones (LZ), selecting 13 of them as fit for use. Workers from Pacific Architects and Engineers visited each of the 13 LZs

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ordered the flight deck crew to clear the landing area; in the process an estimated US$ 10 million worth of UH-1 Huey helicopters were pushed overboard into the South China Sea. Once the deck was clear Major Buang approached the deck, bounced once and then touched down and taxied to a halt with room

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were flown in by Air America helicopters in civilian clothes to the DAO compound to augment the 18 Marine Security Guards assigned to defend the embassy; an additional six Marines were assigned to protect Ambassador Martin. Martin had remained optimistic that a negotiated settlement could be reached

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The HMH-462 CH-53s loaded with evacuees and left the compound, they unloaded the first evacuees delivered by Operation Frequent Wind at 15:40. At about 17:30 Carey ordered the extraction of 3rd Platoon, Company C of BLT 1/9, which had been landed at the DAO Compound on 25 April to assist the Marine

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Air America helicopters continued to make rooftop pickups until after nightfall by which time navigation became increasingly difficult. Helicopters overflew the designated LZs to check no Americans had been left behind and then the last helicopters (many low on fuel) headed out to TF76, located USS

4419:

In preparation for the evacuation, the American Embassy had distributed a 15-page booklet called SAFE, short for "Standard Instruction and Advice to Civilians in an Emergency." The booklet included a map of Saigon pinpointing "assembly areas where a helicopter will pick you up." There was an insert

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At 07:00 on 29 April, Smith advised Ambassador Martin that fixed-wing evacuations should cease and that Operation Frequent Wind, the helicopter evacuation of US personnel and at-risk Vietnamese should commence. Martin refused to accept Smith's recommendation and instead insisted on visiting Tan Son

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southwest of Vũng Tàu with 30,000 sailors, their families, and other civilians on board. On the afternoon of 30 April, TF-76 moved away from the coast, picking up more refugees as they went. On 2 May, Task Force 76, carrying the Operation Frequent Wind evacuees and 44,000 seaborne evacuees and the

4848:

Inside the embassy, the evacuees had found whatever space was available inside the embassy compound and evacuees and some staff proceeded to take alcohol from the embassy's stores. From the billowing incinerator on the embassy roof floated intelligence documents and US currency, most charred; some

4839:

From 10:00 to 12:00 Kean and his Marines cut down the tamarind and other trees and moved vehicles to create an LZ in the embassy parking lot behind the chancery building. Two LZs were now available in the embassy compound, the rooftop for UH-1s and CH-46s and the new parking lot LZ for the heavier

4656:

At approximately 14:30, Air America Bell 205 serial number "N47004" landed on the roof of the Pittman Apartment Building at 22 Gia Long Street to collect a senior Vietnamese intelligence source and his family. The Pittman Building was not an approved LZ, but when the agreed pickup point at the Lee

4636:

At 11:00 the security situation at the Air America compound was deteriorating as General Carey did not wish to risk his Marines by extending his perimeter to cover the Air America compound (LZ 40), so all Air America helicopters from this time operated out of the tennis courts in the DAO Annex (LZ

4590:

Despite all the concern over these military threats, the weather presented the gravest danger. At the beginning of the operation, pilots in the first wave reported the weather as 2,000 feet (610 m) scattered, 20,000 feet (6,100 m) overcast with 15 miles (24 km) visibility, except in

4452:

It was not known whether the PAVN and/or the ARVN would try to disrupt the evacuation and so the planners had to take all possible contingencies into account to ensure the safety and success of the evacuation. The staff of 9th MAB prescribed altitudes, routes, and checkpoints for flight safety for

4439:

After the evacuation signal was given, the buses began to pick up passengers and head to the DAO Compound. The system worked so efficiently that the buses were able to make three return journeys rather than the expected one. The biggest problem occurred when the ARVN unit guarding the main gate at

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at Tan Son Nhut Air Base. The crew evacuated the burning aircraft on the taxiway and departed the airfield on another C-130 that had previously landed. This was the last USAF fixed-wing aircraft to leave Tan Son Nhut. Between 04:30 and 08:00 up to 40 artillery rounds and rockets hit around the DAO

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By 1975, the Frequent Wind plan aimed to evacuate about 8,000 U.S. citizens and third-country nationals, but it was never able to estimate the number of South Vietnamese to include. There were about 17,000 at-risk Vietnamese on embassy rolls, which, using an average of seven dependents per family,

4852:

At 17:00 the first CH-46 landed at the embassy. Between 19:00 and 21:00 on 29 April approximately 130 additional Marines from 2nd Battalion 4th Marines were lifted from the DAO Compound to reinforce perimeter security at the embassy, bringing the total number of Marines at the embassy to 175. The

4713:

At 19:30 Carey directed that the remaining elements guarding the Annex be withdrawn to DAO headquarters (the Alamo) where the last of the evacuees would await their flight. Once completed, the new defensive perimeter encompassed only LZ 36 and the Alamo. By 20:30 the last evacuees had been loaded

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grenade fire from ARVN troops but without causing any apparent damage. The second wave of 12 CH-53s from HMH-463 landed in the DAO Compound at 15:15 bringing in the rest of the BLT. A third wave of two CH-53s from HMH-463 and eight USAF CH-53Cs and two USAF HH-53s of the 40th Aerospace Rescue and

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for embassy staff. The plan for the evacuation included stationing buses and American civilian bus drivers at 28 buildings throughout metropolitan Saigon. The buses would follow one of four planned evacuation routes from downtown Saigon to the DAO Compound, each route named after a Western Trail:

3502:

if required. In the event, air support was not needed as the North Vietnamese paused for a week at the outskirts of Saigon, possibly waiting for the South Vietnamese government to collapse and avoiding a possible confrontation with the U.S. by allowing the mostly-unopposed evacuation of Americans

5167:

While the operation itself was a success, the images of the evacuation symbolized the wastefulness and ultimate futility of American involvement in Vietnam. President Ford later called it "a sad and tragic period in America's history" but argued that "you couldn't help but be very proud of those

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on the sixth floor and the Marines withdrew up the stairwells locking grill gates behind them. On the ground floor a water tanker was driven through the chancery door and the crowd began to surge up through the building toward the rooftop. The Marines on the rooftop had sealed the doors and were

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The first wave of 12 CH-53s from HMH-462 loaded with BLT 2/4's command groups "Alpha" and "Bravo", and Company F and reinforced Company H arrived in the DAO Compound at 15:06 and the marines quickly moved to reinforce the perimeter defenses. As they approached the helicopters had taken rifle and

5152:

During the fixed-wing evacuation 50,493 people (including 2,678 Vietnamese orphans) were evacuated from Tan Son Nhut. Marine pilots accumulated 1,054 flight hours and flew 682 sorties throughout Operation Frequent Wind. The evacuation of personnel from the DAO compound had lasted nine hours and

4938:

before hitting the sea. The tail rotor sheared off and embedded itself in the engine of an Air America Bell 205 that was doing a hot refueling on the helipad at the rear of the ship. The Air America pilot shut down his helicopter and left it. Moments later a RVNAF UH-1H attempted to land on the

5184:

For an operation of the size and complexity of Frequent Wind, casualties were relatively light. Marine corporals Charles McMahon and Darwin Judge, killed at the DAO compound, were the only members of US forces killed in action during the operation and they were the last US ground casualties in

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Throughout April, the "thinning out" proceeded slowly, largely because the South Vietnamese government was slow to issue papers allowing Americans to take Vietnamese dependents with them, with the result that MAC aircraft were often departing empty. Finally, on 19 April, a simple procedure was

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By 02:15 on 30 April one CH-46 and one CH-53 were landing at the embassy every 10 minutes. At this time, the embassy indicated that another 19 lifts would complete the evacuation. At that time Kean estimated that there were still some 850 non-American evacuees and 225 Americans (including the

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flown by Captain William C. Nystul and First Lieutenant Michael J. Shea crashed into the sea on its approach to the ship after having flown a night sea and air rescue mission. The two enlisted crewmen survived, but the bodies of the pilots were not recovered. The cause of the crash was never

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the embassy gates were closed to prevent the crowd from surging through. Eligible evacuees now had to make themselves known to the Marine guards or embassy staff manning the walls and were then lifted over the walls and into the embassy compound. Among those arriving at the embassy were

3523:

was intended to only be a secondary evacuation point for embassy staff, but it was soon overwhelmed with evacuees and desperate South Vietnamese. The evacuation of the embassy was completed at 07:53 on 30 April, but some Americans chose to stay or were left behind and some 400

4934:. The pilot of the stolen ICCS Huey had been told to ditch off the port quarter of the ship, but seemed reluctant to do so, flying around the ship to the starboard bow he jumped from his helicopter at a height of 40 feet (12 m). His helicopter turned and hit the side of 5319:", the Simpsons are evacuated from the American Embassy as angry Australians gather outside in a scene reminiscent of Hubert van Es's famous photo. Homer asks the helicopter pilot if they are being taken to an aircraft carrier and is told that "the closest vessel is the USS 3723:' limit of 50 U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam. The U.S. government was continuing to observe its obligations under the Accords, notwithstanding the North Vietnamese invasion. In late April, the MSG Marines were ordered to abandon Marshall Hall/Marine House, their 4673:

and shut down. All Air America flights had ceased by 21:00. With its available fleet of only 20 Hueys (3 of which were impounded, ditched or damaged at TF76), Air America had moved over 1,000 evacuees to the DAO Compound, the Embassy or out to the ships of TF76.

4954:

were pushed overboard to make room for more helicopters to land. Other helicopters dropped off their passengers and were then ditched into the sea by their pilots, close to the ships, their pilots bailing out at the last moment to be picked up by rescue boats.

4840:

CH-53s. Air America UH-1s began ferrying evacuees from other smaller assembly points throughout the city and dropping them on the Embassy's rooftop LZ. At 15:00 the first CH-53s were sighted heading towards the DAO Compound at Tan Son Nhut. Kean contacted the

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on 12-hour shifts, increasing to 24-hour shifts the next day. Also on 1 April, Plan Alamo was implemented to defend the DAO compound and its annex so it could serve as a holding area for 1,500 evacuees for five days. By 16 April, Alamo was complete: water,

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transmitted "Tiger is out", those helicopter crews still flying thought the mission was complete, and delayed evacuating the Marines from the embassy rooftop. CH-46s evacuated the Battalion Landing Team by 07:00 and after an anxious wait a lone CH-46

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to advise them of his airlift requirements; until that time the fleet believed that all evacuees had been bussed from the embassy to the DAO Compound and that only two helicopters would be required to evacuate Martin and the Marines from the embassy.

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aircraft. The fixed-wing evacuation was terminated and Operation Frequent Wind began. During the fixed-wing evacuation 50,493 people (including 2,678 Vietnamese orphans) were evacuated from Tan Son Nhut. The evacuation took place primarily from the

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35). This move created fuel problems for Air America as they no longer had access to the fuel supplies in their compound and at least initially they were refused fuel by the ships of TF76. According to US Naval Archives, at 12:30 an Air America

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announced that no more than 2,500 Vietnamese evacuees would be allowed in the Philippines at any one time, further increasing the strain on MAC which now had to move evacuees out of Saigon and move some 5,000 evacuees from Clark Air Base on to

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and SA-7 missile threat (6,500 feet (2,000 m) for flights inbound to Saigon and 5,500 feet (1,700 m) for those outbound from Saigon to the Navy ships). These altitudes were also high enough to avoid small arms and artillery fire.

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dropped a note on the deck of the carrier. The note read "Can you move these helicopter to the other side, I can land on your runway, I can fly 1 hour more, we have enough time to move. Please rescue me. Major Buang, Wife and 5 child."

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on current plans on 12 April. Martin told them that he would not tolerate any outward signs that the United States intended to abandon South Vietnam. All planning would have to be conducted with the utmost discretion. Brigadier General

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Evacuation plans are standard for American embassies. The Saigon plan had been developed over a number of years. Originally codenamed "Talon Vise", the operation was renamed "Frequent Wind" when the original codename was compromised.

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on 21 April brought greater crowds seeking evacuation to the DAO Compound as it became apparent that South Vietnam's days were numbered. By 22 April, 20 C-141 and 20 C-130s flights a day were flying evacuees out of Tan Son Nhut to

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At the same time as the aerial evacuation, tens of thousands of South Vietnamese fled towards TF-76 aboard junks, sampans, and small craft. MSC tugs pulled barges filled with people from Saigon Port out to TF-76. A flotilla of 26

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for the first time since the 1973 ceasefire. U.S. officials decided to stop using the less maneuverable C-141s, which had been loaded with up to 316 evacuees, and use only C-130s, which had been taking off with more than 240.

4925:

During the course of the operation an unknown number of RVNAF helicopters flew out of what remained of South Vietnam to the fleet. Around 12:00 five or six RVNAF UH-1Hs and one of the stolen ICCS UH-1Hs, were circling around

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would provide medical evacuation capabilities while AH-1J SeaCobras would fly cover for the transport helicopters and for any ground units who requested support. The SeaCobras could also serve as Forward Air Controllers.

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through neighboring countries. By mid-April, contingency plans were in place and preparations were underway for a possible helicopter evacuation. As the imminent collapse of Saigon became evident, the U.S. Navy assembled

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banned commercial flights into South Vietnam. This directive was subsequently reversed; some operators had ignored it anyway. In any case this effectively marked the end of the commercial airlift from Tan Son Nhut.

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Nhut to survey the situation for himself. At 10:00 Martin confirmed Smith's assessment and at 10:48 he contacted Washington to recommend Option 4, the helicopter evacuation. Finally at 10:51 the order was given by

5825: 4748: 6620: 4784: 5495: 6680: 3704:, commander of the 9th MAB, flew to Saigon the next day to see Martin; he later said, "The visit was cold, non-productive and appeared to be an irritant to the Ambassador". Thirteen Marines from the 3599:

meant that the number requiring evacuation was 119,000. Taken with other categories of Vietnamese, the number quickly passed 200,000. The Frequent Wind plan set out four possible evacuation options:

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By late April, Air America helicopters were flying several daily shuttles from TF76 to the DAO Compound to enable the 9th MAB to conduct evacuation preparations at the DAO without exceeding the

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By late March, the embassy began to reduce the number of U.S. citizens in Vietnam by encouraging dependents and non-essential personnel to leave the country by commercial flights and on

2903: 5277:, took the iconic photo of Operation Frequent Wind of an Air America UH-1 on a rooftop picking up Vietnamese evacuees. The building in the photo was the Pittman Apartment building at 3755:

aircraft, which were still bringing in emergency military supplies. In late March, two or three of these MAC aircraft were arriving each day and were used to evacuate civilians and

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During the demolition of the embassy, the metal staircase leading from the rooftop to the helipad was removed and sent back to the United States, where it is now on display at the

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Security Guard. Between 19:00 and 21:00 Carey transferred 3 platoons (130 men) of BLT 2/4 into the embassy compound to provide additional security and assistance for the embassy.

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The evacuation proceeded without interference from the PAVN. Aircraft flying air cover for the evacuation reported being tracked with surface to air radar in the vicinity of

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The two major evacuation points chosen for Operation Frequent Wind were the DAO Compound next to Tan Son Nhut Airport for American and Vietnamese civilian evacuees, and the

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the operation. To avert mid-air collisions, the planners chose altitudes which would provide separation of traffic and also a capability to see and avoid the enemy's AAA,

2908: 2898: 2893: 2888: 2883: 2878: 2873: 2868: 2863: 2858: 5806: 7067: 3708:(MSG) detachment were deployed to the DAO Compound on 13 April to replace eight Marine guards who had been providing security after they were withdrawn from the closed 3572:

that a maximum of 1.7 million people had been identified as possible evacuees and that these included: American citizens and their relatives, the diplomatic corps, the

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missile and took evasive action to escape the tracers coming in. Then the F-4D was cleared to destroy the 57 mm battery and did so with two CBU-71 and two CBU-58

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in Thailand were also overhead for the duration of the helicopter evacuation. A C-130 Airborne Command and Control controlled all US air operations over land. USAF

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In the event that the PAVN or ARVN shot down a helicopter or a mechanical malfunction forced one to make an emergency landing in hostile territory, two orbiting

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Evacuation plans already existed as a standard procedure for American embassies. At the beginning of March, fixed-wing aircraft began evacuating civilians from

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and C-130s departed for Thailand while UH-1s took off in search of the ships of TF-76. Some RVNAF aircraft stayed to continue to fight the advancing PAVN. One

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employees. It has often been misidentified as the US Embassy. Hubert van Es' photo is frequently used in political cartoons commenting on US foreign policy.

3443: 6672: 4930:. The RVNAF pilots had been instructed after dropping off their passengers to ditch their helicopters and they would then be picked up by one of the ship's 3583:) were certain that the South Vietnamese government would collapse, the U.S. government underestimated the speed of the North Vietnamese advance during the 6798: 3688:

helicopter's skids. President Ford, in an address to the American public on 11 April, promised to evacuate Vietnamese civilians of various categories. The

3213: 3203: 1482: 1472: 5492: 4411:, commander of the RVNAF and 30 of his staff arrived at the DAO compound demanding evacuation, signifying the complete loss of RVNAF command and control. 6711: 6140: 5514: 3573: 3759:. On 4 April, a C-5A aircraft carrying 250 Vietnamese orphans and their escorts suffered explosive decompression over the sea near Vũng Tàu and made a 389: 3070: 289: 230: 3656: 3516: 6022: 5722: 4900:

arrived to evacuate Kean and the ten remaining men of the Marine Security Guards, this last helicopter took off at 07:53 on 30 April and landed on

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Planning for the evacuation of the Americans and their South Vietnamese allies from South Vietnam had begun before April 1975. When U.S. President

3193: 863: 6955: 6646: 6349: 5161: 1487: 3664:, petroleum, oil, and lubricants had been stockpiled; backup electricity generators had been installed; sanitary facilities were completed; and 3153: 379: 240: 7092: 6457: 5154: 5006: 4804:

Aerial view of the US Embassy, Saigon, showing chancery building (left), parking lot (center) and Consulate compound and French Embassy (top)

4718:, having been previously placed in selected buildings, ignited as two CH-53s left the DAO parking lot carrying the last elements of BLT 2/4. 4420:

page which read: "Note evacuational signal. Do not disclose to other personnel. When the evacuation is ordered, the code will be read out on

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missile. At 07:00 the AC-119 was firing on PAVN to the east of Tan Son Nhut when it too was hit by an SA-7 and fell in flames to the ground.

3223: 1477: 411: 6768: 7102: 6598: 6734: 4991: 4724: 3482:. More than 7,000 people were evacuated by helicopter from various points in Saigon. The airlift resulted in a number of enduring images. 4357:, the Defense Attaché, informed the evacuation control center that 60 C-130 flights would come in on 29 April to evacuate 10,000 people. 4175:

The Marine evacuation contingent, the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade (Task Group 79.1), consisted of three Battalion Landing Teams (BLT);

4038: 3519:, beginning around 14:00 on the afternoon of 29 April, and ending that night with only limited small arms damage to the helicopters. The 5082: 5072:

to spare. Major Buang became the first RVNAF fixed-wing pilot to ever land on a carrier. A second Cessna O-1 was also recovered by USS

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each carrying 15-man, quick-reaction "Sparrow Hawk" teams of Marines from 1st Platoon, Company A, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, from USS

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Minutes of President Gerald Ford's National Security Council meeting on 9 April 1975 when evacuation plans were extensively discussed

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Tens of thousands of Vietnamese evacuated themselves by sea or air. With the collapse of South Vietnam, numerous boats and ships,

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to commence Option 4; due to confusion in the chain of command, Carey did not receive the execute order until 12:15. At 08:00

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Some 400 evacuees were left behind at the embassy including over 100 South Korean citizens; among them was Brigadier General

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at 204 Hong Thap Tu Street (now 204 Nguyen Thi Minh Khai Street), and move into the recreation area in the embassy compound.

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With the cause of the crash still unknown, the C-5 fleet was grounded and the MAC airlift was reduced to using C-141s and

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to discourage the crowd from trying to break through. Sporadic gunfire from around the embassy passed over the rooftop.

4473:, were ready to land and provide security enabling a search and rescue helicopter to pick up the crew. In addition, two 7087: 7077: 5246: 5211: 4939:

helipad, locked rotors with the Air America Bell, almost pushing it overboard. A stolen Air America Bell 204 landed on

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gunship had spent the night of 28/29 April dropping flares and firing on the approaching PAVN. At dawn on 29 April two

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time". Japanese journalists, concerned that they would not recognize the tune, had to get someone to sing it to them.

3692:(9th MAB), which was to supply helicopters and a security force for the evacuation, sent a delegation to consult with 2303: 6318: 6134: 6104: 6079: 5662: 5444: 5416: 5222: 3825: 2436: 2288: 264: 6820: 6248: 5094: 4395:

began patrolling the perimeter of Tan Son Nhut at 2,500 feet (760 m) until one was shot down, presumably by an

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Aerial reconnaissance photos of the destroyed DAO Headquarters building with Air America Compound in the foreground

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Decent Interval: An Insider's Account of Saigon's Indecent End Told by the CIA's Chief Strategy Analyst in Vietnam

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later recalled the arrival of helicopters at the embassy while the song was playing over the radio as a "bizarre

3817: 3588: 2024: 1907: 1381: 1223: 294: 6790: 4760: 3858: 6703: 4462: 978: 932: 257: 6595:"Gerald R. Ford's Remarks at the Opening of the Ford Museum's Saigon Staircase Exhibit, Grand Rapids Michigan" 6121: 5511: 4408: 384: 6044: 4605: 3774:

implemented that cleared up the paperwork jam and the number of evacuees dramatically increased. The fall of

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At 03:30 on 29 April a PAVN rocket hit Guardpost 1 at the DAO Compound, instantly killing Marine Corporals

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Option 2: Evacuation by military airlift from Tan Son Nhut and other South Vietnamese airports as required

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Honorable Exit: How a Few Brave Americans Risked All to Save Our Vietnamese Allies at the End of the War

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has acknowledged that the musical was inspired by pictures of the evacuation. Hugh van Es believed that

4808: 4649:; however, contemporary reports state and photos show that Marshal Kỳ piloted his own UH-1H Huey to USS 4321: 3779: 2408: 6951: 5392: 5274: 4587:, neutralizing the site, 10 miles (16 km) northeast of Saigon, without damage to either aircraft. 2650: 2353: 2348: 2012: 1975: 1680: 1620: 1559: 1499: 5808:

U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Bitter End, 1973–1975 (Marine Corps Vietnam Operational Histories Series)

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Although American officials at the highest levels of the intelligence community (e.g. CIA Director

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misappropriated his photo and considered legal action against the show but decided against it.

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attack aircraft, and would provide continuous fighter cover the evacuation route including by

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helicopter gunships flying overhead may have played a role in the ARVN commander's decision.

4371:, was destroyed by a 122 mm rocket while taxiing to pick up refugees after offloading a 4158: 3934: 3705: 3680: 3584: 3507: 3243: 2776: 2762: 2750: 2622: 2608: 2563: 2542: 2505: 2415: 2363: 2313: 2225: 2216: 2189: 2087: 2065: 2005: 1989: 1954: 1940: 1823: 1755: 1659: 1641: 1627: 1571: 1533: 1504: 1316: 1209: 1183: 1057: 1025: 958: 918: 895: 713: 666: 659: 572: 558: 459: 4950:

So many RVNAF helicopters landed on the TF76 ships that some 45 UH-1 Hueys and at least one

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With the fall of Saigon imminent, between 18 and 24 April the U.S. Navy assembled ships off

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was the final phase in the evacuation of American civilians and "at-risk" Vietnamese from

8: 5723:"Air America: Played a Crucial Part of the Emergency Helicopter Evacuation of Saigon p.1" 5056: 4910: 4829: 4013: 3947: 3910: 3720: 3540: 3163: 3130: 2832: 2549: 2526: 2477: 2373: 2335: 2258: 2031: 1802: 1769: 1526: 1387: 1309: 1286: 1273: 1108: 1013: 822: 701: 680: 652: 625: 507: 349: 337: 332: 5281:(now 22 Lý Tự Trọng Street), which was used as a residence by various embassy, CIA, and 2576: 362: 7041: 6343: 5371: 5361: 5316: 5278: 5262: 5143: 5139: 4742:

9th MAB post-operation map of the DAO Compound and Air America Compound with LZs marked

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Map showing the disposition of U.S. Navy ships at the start of Operation Frequent Wind

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not. An embassy official said that more than five million dollars were being burned.

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contributed to the crisis of confidence that affected America throughout the 1970s.

4379:

At dawn the RVNAF began to haphazardly depart Tan Son Nhut Air Base as A-37s, F-5s,

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USAF Southeast Asia Monograph Series Volume IV Monograph 6: Last Flight from Saigon

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and eight destroyer types for naval gunfire, escort, and area defense, including:

6886: 6852: 6364: 6245:"Major James H, Kean SSN/0802 USMC, After Action Report 17 April-7 May 1975 p. 3" 6049: 5902:. US Naval Institute – Naval History & Heritage Command. 29 April 2010. 5518: 5499: 4715: 4169: 3805: 3665: 3617: 3569: 2983: 2636: 2208: 1729: 1577: 1359: 1337: 1246: 1216: 1136: 1019: 1006: 999: 968: 727: 578: 500: 5294:

depicts events leading up to, and during Operation Frequent Wind, with the main

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Special Collections and Archives, The UC Irvine Libraries, Irvine, California.

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With Option 4, the helicopter evacuation would be expected to be similar to

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RVN Navy group set sail for reception centers in the Philippines and Guam.

4871: 4854: 4584: 4502: 4346: 4210:(MSC) ships were assembled and these carried out seaborne evacuations from 4101: 3841: 3604: 6890: 6338:. Chief of Naval Operations and Naval Air Systems Command. pp. 32–33. 4645:, Madame Kỳ, Dorothy Martin (wife of Ambassador Martin) and others on USS 3866: 6824: 6244: 5298:(Chris and Kim) becoming separated as a result of the evacuation. Writer 5295: 5290: 5234: 5189:

and ditched at sea, the two crew members were rescued by a boat from USS

5185:

Vietnam. A Marine AH-1J SeaCobra ran out of fuel while searching for USS

5168:

pilots and others who were conducting the evacuation". Nixon's pledge of

4572: 4429: 4380: 4211: 4141: 3808:. President Thiệu and his family left Tan Son Nhut on 25 April on a USAF 3801: 3792: 3561: 3499: 3479: 3041: 246: 36: 7042:

Guide to the Khanh Van Thi Nguyen Narrative on Operation Frequent Wind.

6272:"Last U.S. Marines to leave Saigon describe chaos of Vietnam War's end" 6123:

The Air Force in Southeast Asia The end of U.S. involvement 1973 – 1975

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Last Men Out: The True Story of America's Heroic Final Hours in Vietnam

5335: 5330: 3955: 3752: 3671: 3628: 3478:. It was carried out on 29–30 April 1975, during the last days of the 6432:"Former South Korean diplomat reconciles with his Vietnamese captors" 5238: 5173: 4914: 4612:

refugees arrive on a U.S. Navy vessel during Operation Frequent Wind.

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Tears before the Rain: An Oral History of the Fall of South Vietnam

4618: 4109: 1894: 6486:. WGBH Media Library & Archives. 29 April 1982. Archived from 4754:

A Marine provides security as helicopters land at the DAO Compound

4325:

RVNAF C-130A burns at Tan Son Nhut after rocket attack on 29 April

3787:, some 1,000 miles away in the Philippines. On 23 April President 6161: