913:
903:
81:, a set of statements is inconsistent if it contains a contradiction. The paradox then arises from the contradiction of the author's belief that all of the statements in his book are correct (1) with his belief that at least one of them is not correct (2). To resolve the paradox, one can attack either the contradiction between statements (1) and (2), or the inconsistency of their conjunction.
55:
It is customary for authors of academic books to include in the preface of their books statements such as "any errors that remain are my sole responsibility." Occasionally they go further and actually claim there are errors in the books, with statements such as "the errors that are found herein are
84:
Probabilistic perspective may restate the statements in other terms, thus resolving the paradox by making them non-contradictory. Even if the author is 99% sure each single statement in his book is true (1), there can still be so many statements in the book that the aggregate probability of some of
65:
Thus, they have good reason, from (1), to rationally believe that each statement in their book is true, while at the same time they have good reason, from (2), to rationally believe that the book contains at least one error. Thus they can rationally believe that the book both does and does not
62:(2) However, they know, having learned from experience, that, despite their best efforts, there are very likely undetected errors in their book. So they also have good reason to believe that there is at least one assertion in their book that is not true.
59:(1) Such an author has written a book that contains many assertions, and has factually checked each one carefully, submitted it to reviewers for comment, etc. Thus, they have reason to believe that each assertion they have made is true.
100:, i.e., that belief (or rational belief) in various propositions entails a belief (or rational belief) in their conjunction. Most philosophers intuitively believe the principle to be true, but some (e.g.,
97:
86:
96:
Another way to resolve the paradox is to reject the inconsistency of both (1) and (2) being true at the same time. This is done by rejecting the
349:
89:
allows the author to accept a very likely statement as true, he may rationally choose to believe in (1). Same principles may make him
32:, it presents an argument according to which it can be rational to accept mutually incompatible beliefs. While the preface paradox
497:
240:
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783:
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104:) intuitively believe it to be false. This is similar to Kyburg's solution to the
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them being false (2) is very high as well. Since the principles of
197:, pp. 232-254. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983).
250:
207:
Priest, Graham; Tanaka, Koji; Weber, Zach (24 September 1996).
314:
115:
aims to accept some contradictory statements without
36:
a claim contrary to one's belief, it is opposite to
206:
929:
193:Kyburg, H. E., "Conjunctivitis", reprinted in
234:
902:
241:
227:
930:
154:, Philos. Sci., 53 (1986), pp. 246–258
69:
248:
222:
52:The argument runs along these lines:
165:A Note on the Paradox of the Preface
13:
559:What the Tortoise Said to Achilles
44:a claim contrary to one's belief.
14:
949:
912:
911:
901:
171:, vol. 28 (1978), pages 341-344
200:
187:
174:
157:
144:
139:, Analysis 25 (1965) 205-207.
129:
1:
182:The Preface Paradox Dissolved
122:
184:, Theoria, 53(2-3), 121-140.
66:contain at least one error.
7:
169:The Philosophical Quarterly
47:
10:
954:
195:Epistemology and Inference
180:Williams, John N..(1987).
152:The Paradox of the Preface
897:
749:
578:
378:
257:
28:in 1965. Similar to the
478:Paradoxes of set theory
209:"Paraconsistent Logic"
137:Paradox of the Preface
22:paradox of the preface
113:paraconsistent logics
98:conjunction principle
844:Kavka's toxin puzzle
616:Income and fertility
24:, was introduced by
938:Epistemic paradoxes
503:Temperature paradox
426:Free choice paradox
290:Fitch's knowability
87:rational acceptance
70:Attempted solutions
879:Prisoner's dilemma
565:Heat death paradox
553:Unexpected hanging
518:Chicken or the egg
91:rationally believe
925:
924:
596:Arrow information
135:Makinson, D. C.,
945:
915:
914:
905:
904:
716:Service recovery
570:Olbers's paradox
270:Buridan's bridge
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804:Decision-making
750:Decision theory
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498:Hilbert's Hotel
431:Grelling–Nelson
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106:lottery paradox
79:deductive logic
72:
50:
38:Moore's paradox
30:lottery paradox
18:preface paradox
12:
11:
5:
951:
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721:St. Petersburg
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350:Rule-following
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275:Dream argument
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150:Lacey, A. R.,
143:
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71:
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49:
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26:David Makinson
9:
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4:
3:
2:
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849:Morton's fork
847:
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789:Buridan's ass
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762:Apportionment
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621:Downs–Thomson
619:
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538:Plato's beard
536:
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436:Kleene–Rosser
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360:Theseus' ship
358:
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320:Mere addition
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258:Philosophical
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93:also in (2).
92:
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67:
63:
60:
57:
56:mine alone."
53:
45:
43:
39:
35:
31:
27:
23:
19:
869:Preparedness
701:Productivity
681:Mandeville's
473:Opposite Day
401:Burali-Forti
396:Bhartrhari's
344:
202:
194:
189:
181:
176:
168:
164:
159:
151:
146:
136:
131:
110:
95:
83:
73:
64:
61:
58:
54:
51:
41:
33:
21:
17:
15:
799:Condorcet's
651:Giffen good
611:Competition
365:White horse
340:Omnipotence
874:Prevention
864:Parrondo's
854:Navigation
839:Inventor's
834:Hedgehog's
794:Chainstore
777:Population
772:New states
706:Prosperity
686:Mayfield's
528:Entailment
508:Barbershop
421:Epimenides
123:References
889:Willpower
884:Tolerance
859:Newcomb's
824:Fredkin's
711:Scitovsky
631:Edgeworth
626:Easterlin
591:Antitrust
488:Russell's
483:Richard's
456:Pinocchio
411:Crocodile
330:Newcomb's
300:Goodman's
295:Free will
280:Epicurean
251:paradoxes
163:New, C.,
117:exploding
111:Finally,
76:classical
34:nullifies
20:, or the
932:Category
917:Category
814:Ellsberg
666:Leontief
646:Gibson's
641:European
636:Ellsberg
606:Braess's
601:Bertrand
579:Economic
513:Catch-22
493:Socratic
335:Nihilism
305:Hedonism
265:Analysis
249:Notable
48:Overview
819:Fenno's
784:Arrow's
767:Alabama
757:Abilene
736:Tullock
691:Metzler
533:Lottery
523:Drinker
466:Yablo's
461:Quine's
416:Curry's
379:Logical
355:Sorites
345:Preface
325:Moore's
310:Liberal
285:Fiction
42:asserts
726:Thrift
696:Plenty
671:Lerner
661:Jevons
656:Icarus
586:Allais
548:Ross's
386:Barber
370:Zeno's
315:Meno's
102:Kyburg
40:which
829:Green
809:Downs
741:Value
676:Lucas
543:Raven
451:No-no
406:Court
391:Berry
907:List
731:Toil
446:Card
441:Liar
16:The
74:In
934::
167:,
119:.
108:.
561:"
557:"
242:e
235:t
228:v
211:.
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