SCADA - Knowledge

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supervisory computer to provide live data to drive the mimic diagrams, alarm displays and trending graphs. In many installations the HMI is the graphical user interface for the operator, collects all data from external devices, creates reports, performs alarming, sends notifications, etc. Mimic diagrams consist of line graphics and schematic symbols to represent process elements, or may consist of digital photographs of the process equipment overlain with animated symbols. Supervisory operation of the plant is by means of the HMI, with operators issuing commands using mouse pointers, keyboards and touch screens. For example, a symbol of a pump can show the operator that the pump is running, and a flow meter symbol can show how much fluid it is pumping through the pipe. The operator can switch the pump off from the mimic by a mouse click or screen touch. The HMI will show the flow rate of the fluid in the pipe decrease in real time. The HMI package for a SCADA system typically includes a drawing program that the operators or system maintenance personnel use to change the way these points are represented in the interface. These representations can be as simple as an on-screen traffic light, which represents the state of an actual traffic light in the field, or as complex as a multi-projector display representing the position of all of the elevators in a skyscraper or all of the trains on a railway. A

864:. Shortly after a contractor installed a SCADA system in January 2000, system components began to function erratically. Pumps did not run when needed and alarms were not reported. More critically, sewage flooded a nearby park and contaminated an open surface-water drainage ditch and flowed 500 meters to a tidal canal. The SCADA system was directing sewage valves to open when the design protocol should have kept them closed. Initially this was believed to be a system bug. Monitoring of the system logs revealed the malfunctions were the result of cyber attacks. Investigators reported 46 separate instances of malicious outside interference before the culprit was identified. The attacks were made by a disgruntled ex-employee of the company that had installed the SCADA system. The ex-employee was hoping to be hired by the utility full-time to maintain the system. 942: 345: 871:(EMP) Attack issued a Critical Infrastructures Report which discussed the extreme vulnerability of SCADA systems to an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) event. After testing and analysis, the Commission concluded: "SCADA systems are vulnerable to EMP insult. The large numbers and widespread reliance on such systems by all of the Nation’s critical infrastructures represent a systemic threat to their continued operation following an EMP event. Additionally, the necessity to reboot, repair, or replace large numbers of geographically widely dispersed systems will considerably impede the Nation’s recovery from such an assault." 541:. The system monitors whether certain alarm conditions are satisfied, to determine when an alarm event has occurred. Once an alarm event has been detected, one or more actions are taken (such as the activation of one or more alarm indicators, and perhaps the generation of email or text messages so that management or remote SCADA operators are informed). In many cases, a SCADA operator may have to acknowledge the alarm event; this may deactivate some alarm indicators, whereas other indicators remain active until the alarm conditions are cleared. 684: 458:

on operator workstations. In smaller SCADA systems, the supervisory computer may be composed of a single PC, in which case the HMI is a part of this computer. In larger SCADA systems, the master station may include several HMIs hosted on client computers, multiple servers for data acquisition, distributed software applications, and disaster recovery sites. To increase the integrity of the system the multiple servers will often be configured in a

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market, allowing mechanical engineers, electrical engineers and technicians to configure HMIs themselves, without the need for a custom-made program written by a software programmer. The Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) connects to physical equipment. Typically, an RTU converts the electrical signals from the equipment to digital values. By converting and sending these electrical signals out to equipment the RTU can control equipment.

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because compromise or destruction of these systems would impact multiple areas of society far removed from the original compromise. For example, a blackout caused by a compromised electrical SCADA system would cause financial losses to all the customers that received electricity from that source. How security will affect legacy SCADA and new deployments remains to be seen.

656:(CIP) in the US), there is increasing use of satellite-based communication. This has the key advantages that the infrastructure can be self-contained (not using circuits from the public telephone system), can have built-in encryption, and can be engineered to the availability and reliability required by the SCADA system operator. Earlier experiences using consumer-grade 835:, allowing an attacker to control a SCADA device by sending commands over a network. In many cases SCADA users have assumed that having a VPN offered sufficient protection, unaware that security can be trivially bypassed with physical access to SCADA-related network jacks and switches. Industrial control vendors suggest approaching SCADA security like 436: 706:. Common network services did not exist at the time SCADA was developed. Thus SCADA systems were independent systems with no connectivity to other systems. The communication protocols used were strictly proprietary at that time. The first-generation SCADA system redundancy was achieved using a back-up mainframe system connected to all the 576:(PAC) is a compact controller that combines the features and capabilities of a PC-based control system with that of a typical PLC. PACs are deployed in SCADA systems to provide RTU and PLC functions. In many electrical substation SCADA applications, "distributed RTUs" use information processors or station computers to communicate with 731:

browsers such as Google Chrome and Mozilla Firefox as the graphical user interface (GUI) for the operators HMI. This simplifies the client side installation and enables users to access the system from various platforms with web browsers such as servers, personal computers, laptops, tablets and mobile phones.

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The increased interest in SCADA vulnerabilities has resulted in vulnerability researchers discovering vulnerabilities in commercial SCADA software and more general offensive SCADA techniques presented to the general security community. In electric and gas utility SCADA systems, the vulnerability of

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SCADA systems are used to control and monitor physical processes, examples of which are transmission of electricity, transportation of gas and oil in pipelines, water distribution, traffic lights, and other systems used as the basis of modern society. The security of these SCADA systems is important

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SCADA information and command processing were distributed across multiple stations which were connected through a LAN. Information was shared in near real time. Each station was responsible for a particular task, which reduced the cost as compared to First Generation SCADA. The network protocols used

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Examples of alarm indicators include a siren, a pop-up box on a screen, or a coloured or flashing area on a screen (that might act in a similar way to the "fuel tank empty" light in a car); in each case, the role of the alarm indicator is to draw the operator's attention to the part of the system 'in

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SCADA systems that tie together decentralized facilities such as power, oil, gas pipelines, water distribution and wastewater collection systems were designed to be open, robust, and easily operated and repaired, but not necessarily secure. The move from proprietary technologies to more standardized

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The growth of the internet has led SCADA systems to implement web technologies allowing users to view data, exchange information and control processes from anywhere in the world through web SOCKET connection. The early 2000s saw the proliferation of Web SCADA systems. Web SCADA systems use internet

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Alarm conditions can be explicit—for example, an alarm point is a digital status point that has either the value NORMAL or ALARM that is calculated by a formula based on the values in other analogue and digital points—or implicit: the SCADA system might automatically monitor whether the value in an

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This is the core of the SCADA system, gathering data on the process and sending control commands to the field connected devices. It refers to the computer and software responsible for communicating with the field connection controllers, which are RTUs and PLCs, and includes the HMI software running

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strategy that leverages common IT practices. Apart from that, research has shown that the architecture of SCADA systems has several other vulnerabilities, including direct tampering with RTUs, communication links from RTUs to the control center, and IT software and databases in the control center.

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Since about 1998, virtually all major PLC manufacturers have offered integrated HMI/SCADA systems, many of them using open and non-proprietary communications protocols. Numerous specialized third-party HMI/SCADA packages, offering built-in compatibility with most major PLCs, have also entered the

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There are many threat vectors to a modern SCADA system. One is the threat of unauthorized access to the control software, whether it is human access or changes induced intentionally or accidentally by virus infections and other software threats residing on the control host machine. Another is the

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PLCs are connected to sensors and actuators in the process, and are networked to the supervisory system. In factory automation, PLCs typically have a high speed connection to the SCADA system. In remote applications, such as a large water treatment plant, PLCs may connect directly to SCADA over a

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This connects the supervisory computer system to the RTUs and PLCs, and may use industry standard or manufacturer proprietary protocols. Both RTUs and PLCs operate autonomously on the near-real time control of the process, using the last command given from the supervisory system. Failure of the

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RTUs and other automatic controller devices were developed before the advent of industry wide standards for interoperability. The result is that developers and their management created a multitude of control protocols. Among the larger vendors, there was also the incentive to create their own

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The HMI is the operator window of the supervisory system. It presents plant information to the operating personnel graphically in the form of mimic diagrams, which are a schematic representation of the plant being controlled, and alarm and event logging pages. The HMI is linked to the SCADA

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communications network does not necessarily stop the plant process controls, and on resumption of communications, the operator can continue with monitoring and control. Some critical systems will have dual redundant data highways, often cabled via diverse routes.

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The reliable function of SCADA systems in our modern infrastructure may be crucial to public health and safety. As such, attacks on these systems may directly or indirectly threaten public health and safety. Such an attack has already occurred, carried out on

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and separated geographically. Several distributed architecture SCADAs running in parallel, with a single supervisor and historian, could be considered a network architecture. This allows for a more cost-effective solution in very large scale systems.

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which in turn logs into the SCADA's database and steals design and control files. The malware is also capable of changing the control system and hiding those changes. The malware was found on 14 systems, the majority of which were located in Iran.

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Similar to a distributed architecture, any complex SCADA can be reduced to the simplest components and connected through communication protocols. In the case of a networked design, the system may be spread across more than one LAN network called a

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is a software service within the HMI which accumulates time-stamped data, events, and alarms in a database which can be queried or used to populate graphic trends in the HMI. The historian is a client that requests data from a data acquisition

1152: 569:, IEC 61131-3 has minimal training requirements by virtue of resembling historic physical control arrays. This allows SCADA system engineers to perform both the design and implementation of a program to be executed on an RTU or PLC. 718:

were still not standardized. Since these protocols were proprietary, very few people beyond the developers knew enough to determine how secure a SCADA installation was. Security of the SCADA installation was usually overlooked.

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Li D, Serizawa Y, Kiuchi M. Concept design for a web-based supervisory control and data-acquisition (scada) system. In: Transmission and Distribution Conference and Exhibition 2002: Asia Pacific. IEEE/PES; Vol. 1; p.

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in function, while using multiple means of interfacing with the plant. They can control large-scale processes that can span multiple sites, and work over large distances. It is one of the most commonly-used types of

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Level 2 contains the SCADA to readings and equipment status reports that are communicated to level 2 SCADA as required. Data is then compiled and formatted in such a way that a control room operator using the HMI

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and Conitel. These communication protocols, with the exception of Modbus (Modbus has been made open by Schneider Electric), are all SCADA-vendor specific but are widely adopted and used. Standard protocols are

557:"Smart" RTUs, or standard PLCs, are capable of autonomously executing simple logic processes without involving the supervisory computer. They employ standardized control programming languages such as under, 1381:

Kovaliuk, D. O., Huza, K. M., & Kovaliuk, O. O. (2018). Development of SCADA System based on Web Technologies. International Journal of Information Engineering and Electronic Business (IJIEEB), 10(2),

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The SCADA concept was developed to be a universal means of remote-access to a variety of local control modules, which could be from different manufacturers and allowing access through standard automation

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changes, are handled through the SCADA computer system. The subordinated operations, e.g. the real-time control logic or controller calculations, are performed by networked modules connected to the field

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Abbas, H.A. and Mohamed, A.M. (2011) ‘Review in the design of web based SCADA systems based on OPC DA protocol’, International Journal of Computer Networks, February, Vol. 2, No. 6, pp.266–277, Malaysia.

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satellite is a cost-effective and secure solution that can provide backup communications and easily support core smart grid applications like SCADA, telemetry, AMI backhaul and distribution automation

605:. Some users want SCADA data to travel over their pre-established corporate networks or to share the network with other applications. The legacy of the early low-bandwidth protocols remains, though. 1768: 710:

sites and was used in the event of failure of the primary mainframe system. Some first generation SCADA systems were developed as "turn key" operations that ran on minicomputers such as the

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R. J. Robles and T. H. Kim, “Architecture for SCADA with Mobile Remote Components”, Proceedings of the 12th WSEAS International Conference on Automatic Control, Modelling & Simulation.

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R. Fan, L. Cheded and O. Toker, "Internet-based SCADA: a new approach using Java and XML," in Computing & Control Engineering Journal, vol. 16, no. 5, pp. 22-26, Oct.-Nov. 2005.

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system, using radio, GSM or satellite for communications, and being ruggedised to survive from -20C to +70C or even -40C to +85C without external heating or cooling equipment.

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RTUs connect to sensors and actuators in the process, and are networked to the supervisory computer system. RTUs have embedded control capabilities and often conform to the

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SCADA protocols are designed to be very compact. Many are designed to send information only when the master station polls the RTU. Typical legacy SCADA protocols include

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is also frequently used for large systems such as railways and power stations. The remote management or monitoring function of a SCADA system is often referred to as

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wireless link, or more commonly, utilise an RTU for the communications management. PLCs are specifically designed for control and were the founding platform for the

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However, SCADA systems may have security vulnerabilities, so the systems should be evaluated to identify risks and solutions implemented to mitigate those risks.

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access for secure connectivity. Consequently, the security of some SCADA-based systems has come into question as they are seen as potentially vulnerable to

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programming languages. For economical reasons, PLCs are often used for remote sites where there is a large I/O count, rather than utilising an RTU alone.

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Many vendors of SCADA and control products have begun to address the risks posed by unauthorized access by developing lines of specialized industrial

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or a variety of other languages. Remote locations often have little or no local infrastructure so it is not uncommon to find RTUs running off a small

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Level 2 contains the supervisory computers, which collate information from processor nodes on the system, and provide the operator control screens.

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Level 3 is the production control level, which does not directly control the process, but is concerned with monitoring production and targets.

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Giani, A.; Sastry, S.; Johansson, H.; Sandberg, H. (2009). "The VIKING project: An initiative on resilient control of power networks".

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Qiu B, Gooi HB. Web-based scada display systems (wsds) for access via internet. Power Systems, IEEE Transactions on 2000;15(2):681–686.

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The key attribute of a SCADA system is its ability to perform a supervisory operation over a variety of other proprietary devices.

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released a vulnerability advisory warning that unauthenticated users could download sensitive configuration information including

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An example of efforts by vendor groups to standardize automation protocols is the OPC-UA (formerly "OLE for process control" now

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threat of packet access to the network segments hosting SCADA devices. In many cases, the control protocol lacks any form of

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The lack of concern about security and authentication in the design, deployment and operation of some existing SCADA networks

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Liu, Y.; Ning, P.; Reiter, MK. (May 2011). "False Data Injection Attacks against State Estimation in Electric Power Grids".

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J. M. Lynch, “An Internet Based SCADA System”, BSc Project Report, University of Southern Queensland, Queensland, Oct. 2005

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Emerging Technologies in Wireless Ad-hoc Networks: Applications and Future Development: Applications and Future Development

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Both large and small systems can be built using the SCADA concept. These systems can range from just tens to thousands of

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Level 1 contains the industrialized input/output (I/O) modules, and their associated distributed electronic processors.

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and open solutions together with the increased number of connections between SCADA systems, office networks and the

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Abbas, H.A. (2014). Future SCADA challenges and the promising solution: the agent-based SCADA. IJCIS, 10, 307-333.

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the large installed base of wired and wireless serial communications links is addressed in some cases by applying

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Level 0 contains the field devices such as flow and temperature sensors, and final control elements, such as

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solutions for TCP/IP-based SCADA networks as well as external SCADA monitoring and recording equipment. The

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Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack

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formation providing continuous control and monitoring in the event of a server malfunction or breakdown.

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The operator interfaces which enable monitoring and the issuing of process commands, such as controller

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which dealt with an imagined large-scale cyber attack on SCADA and the United States' electrical grid.

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SCADA systems have traditionally used combinations of radio and direct wired connections, although

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were poor. Modern carrier-class systems provide the quality of service required for SCADA.

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The belief that SCADA networks are secure because they are disconnected from the Internet

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supervision of machines and processes. It also covers sensors and other devices, such as

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can be used in conjunction with SCADA simulators to perform various 'what-if' analyses.

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Typical SCADA mimic shown as an animation. For process plants, these are based upon the

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The RTUs could, for instance, be targets of deception attacks injecting false data or

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analogue point lies outside high and low- limit values associated with that point.

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reported the first detection of malware that attacks SCADA systems (Siemens'

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In April 2008, the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from

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The belief that SCADA networks are secure because they are physically secured

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Example of SCADA used in office environment to remotely monitor a process

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Control system architecture for supervision of machines and processes

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malware (trojan) which affects the visualization system WinCC SCADA.

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through the use of specialized protocols and proprietary interfaces

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More complex SCADA animation showing control of four batch cookers

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OFFICE OF THE MANAGER NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMctober 2004.

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SCADA systems have evolved through four generations as follows:

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A SCADA system usually consists of the following main elements:

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http://www.empcommission.org/docs/A2473-EMP_Commission-7MB.pdf

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2009 2nd International Symposium on Resilient Control Systems

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Security Hardened Remote Terminal Units for SCADA Networks

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Security Hardened Remote Terminal Units for SCADA Networks

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In particular, security researchers are concerned about:

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United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT)

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BBC NEWS | Technology | Spies 'infiltrate US power grid'

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Functional levels of a manufacturing control operation

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encryption rather than replacing all existing nodes.

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standard for programming and support automation via

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ACM Transactions on Information and System Security

1090: 1009:Facility processes, including buildings, airports, 691:'s Training Manual 5-601 covers "SCADA Systems for 537:An important part of most SCADA implementations is 400:, to allow trending and other analytical auditing. 303:, which interface with process plant or machinery. 1788:"Substation Communications: Enabler of Automation" 812:The belief that SCADA systems have the benefit of 673:Open Platform Communications Unified Architecture 1964: 1184:. NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM. Archived from 1147:. Utility Automation & Engineering T&D. 982:processes may be public or private, and include 549:alarm' so that appropriate action can be taken. 702:Early SCADA system computing was done by large 650:North American Electric Reliability Corporation 1924:SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 1871:"Siemens: Stuxnet worm hit industrial systems" 1151:(8). Tulsa, OK: PennWell. Four. Archived from 1899:. National Geographic Channel. Archived from 1646: 1119:"Introduction to Industrial Control Networks" 664:protocol to "lock in" their customer base. A 583: 257: 1735: 1558:"SCADA system makers pushed toward security" 1555: 1495: 1349: 1347: 1345: 1259: 1111: 986:and distribution, wastewater collection and 1597: 1403:Instrumentation Reference Book, 4th Edition 1316:: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list ( 1209:: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list ( 678: 372:Level 4 is the production scheduling level. 1677: 1671: 1405:. USA: Butterworth-Heinemann. p. 27. 1019:heating, ventilation, and air conditioning 901:In June 2010, anti-virus security company 744:has made them more vulnerable to types of 648:With increasing security demands (such as 264: 250: 1785: 1342: 1291: 1126:IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutorials 1073: 1292:UJVAROSI1, Alexandru (2 November 2016). 1132: 1091:Aquino-Santos, Raul (30 November 2010). 940: 682: 593:Communication infrastructure and methods 434: 422: 343: 281:supervisory control and data acquisition 49:of all important aspects of the article. 1640: 1084: 1067: 894:devices that employ authentication and 1965: 1138: 552: 407:, which contains data elements called 45:Please consider expanding the lead to 1921: 1812: 1400: 1240:"A Brief History of SCADA/EMS (2015)" 1237: 339: 1580:"Industrial Security Best Practices" 291:, networked data communications and 18: 1425: 884:International Society of Automation 856:Council's sewage control system in 13: 1683:Critical infrastructure protection 654:critical infrastructure protection 574:programmable automation controller 429:piping and instrumentation diagram 14: 1999: 1944: 1139:Bergan, Christian (August 2011). 1045: – Computer network protocol 526: 1538:D. Maynor and R. Graham (2006). 85: 23: 1915: 1889: 1863: 1834: 1806: 1779: 1761: 1723:(Report). April 2008. p. 9 1572: 1549: 1531: 1470: 1445: 1419: 1394: 1385: 1375: 1365: 1356: 1333: 1324: 1285: 37:may be too short to adequately 1813:Mills, Elinor (21 July 2010). 1250: 1231: 1217: 1170: 748:that are relatively common in 494:Programmable logic controllers 403:SCADA systems typically use a 378:programmable logic controllers 301:programmable logic controllers 47:provide an accessible overview 1: 1556:Robert Lemos (26 July 2006). 1060: 724:process control network (PCN) 418: 396:, often built on a commodity 186:Information and communication 1951:UK SCADA security guidelines 1294:"EVOLUTION OF SCADA SYSTEMS" 1097:. IGI Global. pp. 43–. 929:released a docudrama titled 896:Advanced Encryption Standard 767:system utilizing a standard 666:list of automation protocols 506:Communication infrastructure 7: 1786:KEMA, Inc (November 2006). 1691:10.1007/978-0-387-75462-8_6 1080:. University of Louisville. 1036: 1017:. They monitor and control 996:electric power transmission 734: 329:distributed control systems 10: 2004: 1616:10.1109/ISRCS.2009.5251361 1225:"SCADA Systems april 2014" 1145:Electric Light & Power 814:security through obscurity 584:PLC commercial integration 530: 398:database management system 334:industrial control systems 1922:Boyer, Stuart A. (2010). 846:denial-of-service attacks 771:leveraging access to the 578:digital protective relays 293:graphical user interfaces 1610:. IEEE. pp. 31–35. 794:practices and requiring 679:Architecture development 287:architecture comprising 1657:10.1145/1952982.1952995 1510:Rosa Tang, berkeley.edu 936: 513:Human-machine interface 390:Human Machine Interface 130:Industrial technologies 1271:. 2008. pp. 12–. 946: 833:cryptographic security 696: 623:IEC 60870-5-101 or 104 484:function block diagram 447: 432: 349: 1585:. Rockwell Automation 992:oil and gas pipelines 944: 869:Electromagnetic Pulse 686: 531:Further information: 470:Remote terminal units 454:Supervisory computers 445: 426: 382:remote terminal units 376:Level 1 contains the 347: 94:Manufacturing methods 1401:Boyes, Walt (2011). 958:Industrial processes 837:Information Security 762:Inductive Automation 708:Remote Terminal Unit 1978:Control engineering 1897:"American Blackout" 1306:on 28 October 2021. 927:National Geographic 782:vulnerability in a 776:Embedded Web server 553:PLC/RTU programming 122:Agile manufacturing 1794:on 3 November 2007 1775:on 7 January 2009. 1743:"Security for all" 1426:Siggins, Morgana. 1246:on 11 August 2015. 1074:Jeff Hieb (2008). 1027:energy consumption 947: 697: 689:United States Army 668:is compiled here. 643:Network simulation 448: 433: 350: 340:Control operations 117:Lean manufacturing 1933:978-1-936007-09-7 1700:978-0-387-75461-1 1625:978-1-4244-4853-1 1519:on 13 August 2012 1412:978-0-7506-8308-1 1278:978-0-549-54831-7 1104:978-1-60960-029-7 931:American Blackout 750:computer security 443: 274: 273: 64: 63: 1995: 1938: 1937: 1919: 1913: 1912: 1910: 1908: 1903:on 13 March 2015 1893: 1887: 1886: 1884: 1882: 1873:. 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For example, 746:network attacks 737: 681: 595: 586: 555: 535: 529: 435: 421: 342: 270: 220:Process control 112:Flow production 60: 54: 51: 44: 32:This article's 28: 17: 12: 11: 5: 2001: 1991: 1990: 1988:Electric power 1985: 1980: 1975: 1959: 1958: 1953: 1946: 1945:External links 1943: 1940: 1939: 1932: 1914: 1888: 1877:on 25 May 2012 1862: 1848:. 21 July 2010 1833: 1805: 1778: 1760: 1734: 1706: 1699: 1670: 1639: 1624: 1596: 1571: 1548: 1530: 1494: 1469: 1444: 1418: 1411: 1393: 1384: 1374: 1364: 1355: 1341: 1332: 1323: 1284: 1277: 1258: 1249: 1230: 1216: 1169: 1131: 1110: 1103: 1083: 1065: 1064: 1062: 1059: 1058: 1057: 1051: 1046: 1038: 1035: 1031: 1030: 1015:space stations 1007: 980:Infrastructure 977: 938: 935: 913:and uses four 854:Maroochy Shire 824: 823: 820: 817: 810: 786:InBatchClient 736: 733: 680: 677: 594: 591: 585: 582: 554: 551: 539:alarm handling 528: 527:Alarm handling 525: 524: 523: 514: 511: 507: 504: 496: 491: 472: 467: 460:dual-redundant 455: 420: 417: 374: 373: 370: 367: 364: 361: 358:control valves 341: 338: 285:control system 272: 271: 269: 268: 261: 254: 246: 243: 242: 241: 240: 235: 230: 222: 221: 217: 216: 215: 214: 211: 206: 201: 196: 188: 187: 183: 182: 181: 180: 175: 170: 165: 160: 155: 150: 145: 140: 132: 131: 127: 126: 125: 124: 119: 114: 109: 107:Job production 104: 96: 95: 91: 90: 82: 81: 75: 74: 73:of articles on 62: 61: 41:the key points 31: 29: 22: 15: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 2000: 1989: 1986: 1984: 1981: 1979: 1976: 1974: 1971: 1970: 1968: 1961: 1957: 1954: 1952: 1949: 1948: 1935: 1929: 1925: 1918: 1902: 1898: 1892: 1876: 1872: 1866: 1859: 1847: 1843: 1837: 1822: 1821: 1816: 1809: 1793: 1789: 1782: 1774: 1770: 1764: 1748: 1744: 1738: 1719: 1715: 1710: 1702: 1696: 1692: 1688: 1684: 1680: 1674: 1666: 1662: 1658: 1654: 1650: 1643: 1635: 1631: 1627: 1621: 1617: 1613: 1609: 1608: 1600: 1581: 1575: 1559: 1552: 1541: 1534: 1515: 1511: 1504: 1498: 1479: 1473: 1454: 1448: 1433: 1429: 1422: 1414: 1408: 1404: 1397: 1388: 1378: 1368: 1359: 1350: 1348: 1346: 1336: 1327: 1319: 1313: 1302: 1295: 1288: 1280: 1274: 1270: 1269: 1262: 1253: 1245: 1241: 1234: 1226: 1220: 1212: 1206: 1187: 1180: 1173: 1166: 1154: 1150: 1146: 1142: 1135: 1127: 1120: 1114: 1106: 1100: 1096: 1095: 1087: 1079: 1078: 1070: 1066: 1055: 1052: 1050: 1047: 1044: 1041: 1040: 1034: 1028: 1024: 1020: 1016: 1012: 1008: 1005: 1001: 997: 993: 989: 985: 981: 978: 975: 971: 967: 963: 962:manufacturing 959: 956: 955: 954: 952: 951:control loops 943: 934: 932: 928: 923: 920: 917:to install a 916: 912: 908: 904: 899: 897: 893: 887: 885: 881: 877: 872: 870: 865: 863: 859: 855: 849: 847: 842: 838: 834: 828: 821: 818: 815: 811: 808: 807: 806: 803: 801: 800:cyber attacks 797: 793: 789: 785: 781: 777: 774: 770: 766: 763: 759: 755: 751: 747: 743: 732: 728: 725: 719: 715: 713: 709: 705: 704:minicomputers 700: 694: 690: 685: 676: 674: 669: 667: 661: 659: 655: 651: 646: 644: 640: 636: 632: 628: 624: 619: 615: 611: 606: 604: 600: 590: 581: 579: 575: 570: 568: 564: 560: 550: 546: 542: 540: 534: 520: 515: 512: 508: 505: 502: 497: 495: 492: 489: 485: 481: 477: 473: 471: 468: 465: 461: 456: 453: 452: 451: 430: 425: 416: 414: 410: 406: 401: 399: 395: 391: 385: 383: 379: 371: 368: 365: 362: 359: 355: 354: 353: 346: 337: 335: 330: 326: 320: 318: 314: 309: 304: 302: 298: 294: 290: 286: 282: 278: 267: 262: 260: 255: 253: 248: 247: 245: 244: 239: 236: 234: 231: 229: 226: 225: 224: 223: 219: 218: 212: 210: 207: 205: 202: 200: 197: 195: 192: 191: 190: 189: 185: 184: 179: 176: 174: 171: 169: 166: 164: 161: 159: 156: 154: 151: 149: 146: 144: 141: 139: 136: 135: 134: 133: 129: 128: 123: 120: 118: 115: 113: 110: 108: 105: 103: 100: 99: 98: 97: 93: 92: 88: 84: 83: 80: 77: 76: 72: 68: 67: 58: 48: 42: 40: 35: 30: 26: 21: 20: 1960: 1923: 1917: 1905:. 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