927:
62:
902:
1423:, where candidates are compared in one-on-one matchups to determine relative preference. For each pair of candidates, there is a count for how many voters prefer the first candidate in the pair to the second candidate The resulting table of pairwise counts eliminates the step-by-step redistribution of votes, which is usually the cause for spoilers in other methods. This pairwise comparison means that spoilers can only occur when there is a
1598:
1707:
1653:
914:
1781:
1558:, often leads to a third-party that underperforms its poll numbers with voters wanting to make sure their least favorite candidate is not in power. Third-party campaigns are more likely to result in the candidate a third party voter least wants in the White House. Third-party candidates prefer to focus on their platform than on their impact on the frontrunners.
992:. Often times the term spoiler will be applied to candidates or situations which do not meet the full definition, typically in real-world scenarios where the introduction of a new candidate can cause voters to change their opinions, either through their campaign or merely by existing. A voting system that is not affected by spoilers is called
2869:
2702:
IRV is subject to something called the "center squeeze." A popular moderate can receive relatively few first-place votes through no fault of her own but because of vote splitting from candidates to the right and left. ... Approval voting thus appears to solve the problem of vote splitting simply and
2296:
IRV is subject to something called the "center squeeze." A popular moderate can receive relatively few first-place votes through no fault of her own but because of vote splitting from candidates to the right and left. ... Approval voting thus appears to solve the problem of vote splitting simply and
1463:
The outcome of rated voting depends on the scale used by the voter or assumed by the mechanism. If the voters use relative scales, i.e. scales that depend on what candidates are running, then the outcome can change if candidates who don't win drop out. Empirical results from panel data suggest that
1459:
are the two most prominent examples of rated voting rules. Whenever voters rate candidates independently, the rating given to one candidate does not affect the ratings given to the other candidates. Any new candidate cannot change the winner of the race without becoming the winner themselves, which
3465:
to the election if A beats B in a head-to-head majority vote. For example, although the 2000 U.S. Presidential
Election in Florida did not use ranked ballots, it is plausible (see Magee 2003) that Al Gore (A) would have won without Ralph Nader (B) in the election, and Gore would have beaten Nader
2615:
to the election if A beats B in a head-to-head majority vote. For example, although the 2000 U.S. Presidential
Election in Florida did not use ranked ballots, it is plausible (see Magee 2003) that Al Gore (A) would have won without Ralph Nader (B) in the election, and Gore would have beaten Nader
4164:
there are signs across the country that groups are trying to affect the outcome by using deceptive means β and in most cases in ways that would benefit
Republican Donald Trump. Their aim is to whittle away President Joe Biden's standing with the Democratic Party's base by offering left-leaning,
3123:
plurality-rule voting is seriously vulnerable to vote-splitting ... runoff voting ... as French history shows, it too is highly subject to vote-splitting. ... majority rule avoids such vote-splitting debacles because it allows voters to rank the candidates and candidates are compared
1331:
similar candidates causes their vote total to be split between them, placing these candidates at a disadvantage. This is most visible in elections where a minor candidate draws votes away from a major candidate with similar politics, thereby causing a strong opponent of both to win.
1391:. Compared to plurality without primaries, the elimination of weak candidates in earlier rounds reduces their effect on the final results. Regardless, spoiled elections remain relatively common when compared to other systems. As a result, instant-runoff voting still tends towards
2339:
the 'squeeze effect' that tends to reduce
Condorcet efficiency if the relative dispersion (RD) of candidates is low. This effect is particularly strong for the plurality, runoff, and Hare systems, for which the garnering of first-place votes in a large field is essential to
2046:
In the wake of the election, a poll found 54% of
Alaskans, including a third of Peltola voters, supported a repeal of RCV. Observers noted such pathologies would have occurred under Alaska's previous primary system as well, leading several to suggest Alaska adopt any one of
4037:
The perception that
Johnson and Stein 'stole' the 2016 presidential election from Clinton is widespread...Our analysis indicates that Johnson and Stein did not deprive Clinton of an Electoral College majority, nor Trump the legitimacy of winning the national popular
4135:
Republicans and
Democrats view third-party candidates as a threat to siphon critical support from their nominees, especially considering that Pennsylvania was decided by margins of tens of thousands of votes both in 2020 for Democrat Joe Biden and in 2016 for
4300:
And despite the contenders' claims that the nation deserves an alternative to two unpopular major party choices, the reality, experts say, is that these back-of-the-pack candidates may well cement the election of the candidate they least want in the White
4081:
Four years ago, the Green Party candidate played a significant role in several crucial battleground states, drawing a vote total in three of them β Wisconsin, Michigan and
Pennsylvania β that exceeded the margin between Donald J. Trump and Hillary
1464:
judgments are at least in part relative. Thus, rated methods, as used in practice, may exhibit an indirect spoiler effect caused by the interaction between the voters and the system, even if the system itself passes IIA given an absolute scale.
3621:
The Smith criterion and Smith-IIA (where IIA means "independence of irrelevant alternatives") say that weak alternatives should have no impact on the result of the elections ... the
Schulze method, as defined in section 2.2, satisfies
1122:
A man is deciding whether to order apple, blueberry, or cherry pie before settling on apple. The waitress informs him that the cherry pie is very good and a favorite of most customers. The man replies "in that case, I'll have the
3596:
The 2021 Minneapolis election for city council seat in Ward 2 contained three candidates, each of whom has a legitimate claim to be the winner, the first known example of an
American political election without a Condorcet winner
1151:, which lets any party "clone their way to victory" by running a large number of candidates. This famously forced de Borda to concede that "my system is meant only for honest men," and eventually led to its abandonment by the
1497:
A spoiler campaign in the United States is often one that cannot realistically win but can still determine the outcome by pulling support from a more competitive candidate. The two major parties in the United States, the
3714:
At best, it is contended that, for an individual, his utility function is uniquely determined up to a linear transformation ... the value of the aggregate (say a sum) are dependent on how the choice is made for each
1430:
Theoretical models suggest that somewhere between 90% and 99% of real-world elections have a Condorcet winner, and the first Condorcet cycle in a ranked American election was found in 2021. Some systems like the
1460:
would disqualify them from the definition of a spoiler. For this to hold, in some elections, some voters must use less than their full voting power despite having meaningful preferences among viable candidates.
4404:
There is a Condorcet ranking according to distance from the center, but Condorcet winner M, the most central candidate, was squeezed between the two others, got the smallest primary support, and was eliminated.
2988:
2970:
Rather, the U.S. has an unusual two-round system in which the first round winnows the field. This usually is at the intraparty level, although sometimes it is without regard to party (e.g. in Alaska and
4342:
4236:
3946:
Herron, Michael C.; Lewis, Jeffrey B. (April 24, 2006). "Did Ralph Nader spoil Al Gore's Presidential bid? A ballot-level study of Green and Reform Party voters in the 2000 Presidential election".
3301:
IRV is excellent for preventing classic spoilers-minor candidates who tip the election from one major candidate to another. It is not so good when the 'spoiler' has a real chance of winning
2110:
Strategic voting can sometimes create spoiler-like behavior, including in elections using cardinal methods. However, this does not substantially affect the general order described here.
885:
4367:
1862:
1408:
1166:
have the opposite problem: because running many similar candidates at once makes it difficult for them to win the election, these systems tend to concentrate power in the hands of
4261:
3157:
Those votes that are cast for minor party candidates are perceived as taking away pivotal votes from major party candidates. ... This phenomenon is known as the 'spoiler effect'.
1400:
569:
3267:
Candidates C and D spoiled the election for B ... With them in the running, A won, whereas without them in the running, B would have won. ... Instant runoff voting ... does
2412:
Candidates C and D spoiled the election for B ... With them in the running, A won, whereas without them in the running, B would have won. ... Instant runoff voting ... does
1192:
In some situations, a spoiler can extract concessions from other candidates by threatening to remain in the race unless they are bought off, typically with a promise of a
1530:
on battleground ballots. Democrats have helped some right-leaning third-parties gain ballot access while challenging ballot access of left-leaning third-parties like the
4627:
Clelland, Jeanne N. (2023-02-28). "Ranked Choice Voting And the Center Squeeze in the Alaska 2022 Special Election: How Might Other Voting Methods Compare?". p. 6.
1550:
candidates are always controversial because almost anyone could play spoiler. This is especially true in close elections where the chances of a spoiler effect increase.
1301:, where many similar candidates can run against each other. The purpose of a primary election is to eliminate vote splitting among candidates from the same party in the
588:
3097:
1822:
Montroll was therefore preferred over Kiss by 54% of voters, over Wright by 56%, and over Smith by 60%. Had Wright not run, Montroll would have won instead of Kiss.
1506:, have regularly won 98% of all state and federal seats. The US presidential elections most consistently cited as having been spoiled by third-party candidates are
4489:
Since Begich wins both β¦ he is the Condorcet winner of the election β¦ AK election also contains a Condorcet loser: Sarah Palin. β¦ she is also a spoiler candidate
2354:"How an Ideologically Concentrated Minority Can Trump a Dispersed Majority: Nonmedian Voter Results for Plurality, Run-off, and Sequential Elimination Elections"
1363:
is when the party causes some seats to shift from one unrelated party to another, even if the new party wins no seats. This kind of spoiler effect is avoided by
1590:, despite the election results showing most voters preferred Montroll to Kiss. The results of every possible one-on-one election can be completed as follows:
2932:
4001:"Did Gary Johnson and Jill Stein Cost Hillary Clinton the Presidency? A Counterfactual Analysis of Minor Party Voting in the 2016 US Presidential Election"
3966:
3187:
a spoiler effect occurs when entry by a third-party candidate causes party A to defeat party B even though Party B would have won in a two-candidate race.
2956:(where multiparty competition is in fact nationwide). Whether the U.S. should be called 'FPTP' itself is dubious, and not only because some states (e.g.
1451:
Rated voting methods ask voters to assign each candidate a score on a scale (e.g. rating them from 0 to 10), instead of listing them from first to last.
955:
792:
1048:
are not subject to Arrow's theorem, allowing many such systems to be spoilerproof, so long as a defining assumption about voter opinions remains valid.
4697:
4291:
2948:(FPTP) elections (given no primaries), none with an assembly larger than Jamaica's (63) has a strict two-party system. These countries include the
3224:
2778:
1825:
Because all ballots were fully released, it is possible to reconstruct the winners under other voting methods. While Wright would have won under
1583:
4211:
3829:
Perot was running what is commonly referred to as a "spoiler campaign," a campaign that cannot win the election but still impacts its outcome.
20:
4667:
4058:
1174:. Under these rules, parties can help their candidates win by clearing the field of potential competitors. In the United States, this leads
2070:
1555:
1012:
are vulnerable to the spoiler effect. However, the frequency and severity of spoiler effects depends substantially on the voting method.
646:
4477:
Graham-Squire, Adam; McCune, David (2022-09-11). "A Mathematical Analysis of the 2022 Alaska Special Election for US House". p. 2.
1473:
1067:. A new party entering an election causes some seats to shift from one unrelated party to another, even if the new party wins no seats.
4343:"Third parties will affect the 2024 campaigns, but election laws written by Democrats and Republicans will prevent them from winning"
4237:"Third parties will affect the 2024 campaigns, but election laws written by Democrats and Republicans will prevent them from winning"
4149:
4120:
3395:
4095:
2148:
A spoiler effect occurs when a single party or a candidate entering an election changes the outcome to favor a different candidate.
1519:
1515:
1511:
1507:
678:
540:
535:
1093:
994:
948:
641:
27:
1566:
An unintentional spoiler is one that has a realistic chance of winning but falls short and affects the outcome of the election.
3948:
323:
4441:
Graham-Squire, Adam T.; McCune, David (2023-06-12). "An Examination of Ranked-Choice Voting in the United States, 2004β2022".
3881:
3693:
3357:
3043:
3028:
Duverger's Law of Plurality Voting: The Logic of Party Competition in Canada, India, the United Kingdom and the United States
3000:
1492:
4579:
4650:"Voting Paradoxes and Perverse Outcomes: Political Scientist Tony Gierzynski Lays Out A Case Against Instant Runoff Voting"
984:. If a major candidate is perceived to have lost an election because of a minor candidate, the minor candidate is called a
847:
98:
2382:
As with simple plurality elections, it is apparent the outcome will be highly sensitive to the distribution of candidates.
4605:
Ranked Choice Voting And the Center Squeeze in the Alaska 2022 Special Election: How Might Other Voting Methods Compare?
3811:
2879:
1523:
941:
1540:, the GOP effort to prop up possible spoiler candidates in 2024 appears more far-reaching than the Democratic effort.
4649:
3294:
3260:
3180:
3150:
2849:
2761:
2687:
2405:
2281:
2141:
842:
3200:
3564:
McCune, David; McCune, Lori (2023-05-24). "The Curious Case of the 2021 Minneapolis Ward 2 City Council Election".
3068:
1787:
1713:
1604:
1575:
1531:
1503:
1499:
1005:
980:
is a losing candidate who affects the results of an election simply by participating, a situation that is called a
832:
582:
553:
493:
4314:
4262:"US election: third party candidates can tip the balance in a tight race β here's why Robert F Kennedy Jr matters"
1544:
argues that they have almost no chance of winning the 2024 election but are often motivated by particular issues.
2924:
2723:
2060:
2048:
564:
89:
4178:
627:
691:
269:
254:
239:
4000:
1143:
Voting systems that violate independence of irrelevant alternatives are susceptible to being manipulated by
4705:
3481:"Condorcet's paradox and the likelihood of its occurrence: different perspectives on balanced preferences*"
2839:
2508:"Condorcet's paradox and the likelihood of its occurrence: different perspectives on balanced preferences*"
2430:"Condorcet's paradox and the likelihood of its occurrence: different perspectives on balanced preferences*"
1368:
1075:
505:
428:
349:
3845:
2234:
4165:
third-party alternatives who could siphon off a few thousand protest votes in close swing state contests.
1838:
1547:
1452:
1341:
1246:
1052:
870:
317:
299:
140:
1439:
have stronger spoiler resistance guarantees that limit which candidates can spoil an election without a
3903:
3374:
3007:
American elections become a two-round run-off system with a delay of several months between the rounds.
1870:
1842:
1152:
1021:
761:
744:
711:
475:
463:
433:
234:
192:
125:
4728:
4212:"GOP network props up liberal third-party candidates in key states, hoping to siphon off Harris votes"
2101:, which is equivalent to ranking all candidates and selecting the one with the most first-place votes.
4121:"Democrats get a third-party hopeful knocked off Pennsylvania ballot, as Cornel West tries to get on"
3457:. "This is a kind of stability property of Condorcet winners: you cannot dislodge a Condorcet winner
2800:
2607:. "This is a kind of stability property of Condorcet winners: you cannot dislodge a Condorcet winner
1874:
1659:
1349:
1060:
617:
610:
94:
4541:
and yet with Palin included, Instant Runoff elected the Democrat in the race, making Palin a spoiler
4503:"Split Cycle: a new Condorcet-consistent voting method independent of clones and immune to spoilers"
3314:
2896:
3816:
2944:
Finally, we should not discount the role of primaries. When we look at the range of countries with
1345:
1056:
671:
599:
451:
438:
421:
398:
376:
339:
329:
4769:
4675:
2311:"A statistical model for Condorcet efficiency based on simulation under spatial model assumptions"
1131:
have long argued for the unfairness of spoiler effects. The mathematician and political economist
880:
4150:"Kennedy and West third-party ballot drives are pushed by secretive groups and Republican donors"
3529:
3379:
797:
651:
334:
4416:
4368:"Third-party and independent candidates for president often fall short of early polling numbers"
3023:
1305:
by agreeing to run a single individual. In a two-party system, party primaries effectively turn
766:
4790:
2065:
1754:
826:
706:
636:
443:
1830:
1522:, Republican lawyers and operatives have fought to keep right-leaning third-parties like the
1481:
1384:
1266:
1163:
1029:
734:
574:
458:
264:
243:
175:
153:
4729:"Interacting double monotonicity failure with direction of impact under five voting methods"
3056:
In effect, the primary system means that the USA has a two-round runoff system of elections.
26:"Independence of spoilers" redirects here. For the logical property in decision theory, see
3774:"Intrapersonal and Social Comparison Determinants of Happiness: A Range-Frequency Analysis"
3084:
You likely have opinions about all those candidates. And yet, you only get a say about one.
1144:
1132:
1128:
1013:
969:
865:
852:
820:
84:
2160:
8:
3979:
3850:
3485:
2945:
1420:
1353:
1261:
have different levels of vulnerability to spoilers. In general, spoilers are common with
1115:
771:
605:
258:
1518:
election is more disputed as to whether it contained spoiler candidates or not. For the
4628:
4608:
4514:
4478:
4446:
4028:
3928:
3748:
3699:
3655:
3610:
3569:
3441:
2957:
2591:
1360:
1064:
931:
802:
413:
197:
4395:
3225:"Explaining the Sainte-Lague Electoral System Proposed for the SA Legislative Council"
1285:
In cases where there are many similar candidates, spoiler effects occur most often in
4748:
4744:
4532:
4186:
4066:
4032:
4020:
3920:
3877:
3793:
3740:
3689:
3647:
3587:
3546:
3502:
3353:
3290:
3256:
3176:
3146:
3108:
3039:
2996:
2875:
2845:
2820:
2816:
2757:
2750:
2693:
2683:
2657:
2566:
2527:
2488:
2449:
2401:
2373:
2330:
2287:
2277:
2254:
2215:
2137:
1396:
1298:
1171:
1159:
1147:. Some systems are particularly infamous for their ease of manipulation, such as the
1041:
926:
837:
807:
729:
666:
500:
227:
202:
185:
53:
3932:
3466:
head-to-head. Thus, Gore should still have won with Nader included in the election."
2616:
head-to-head. Thus, Gore should still have won with Nader included in the election."
4740:
4698:"Instant run-off voting experiment ends in Burlington : Rutland Herald Online"
4524:
4456:
4012:
3957:
3912:
3785:
3579:
3538:
3494:
3345:
3031:
2961:
2812:
2647:
2639:
2558:
2519:
2480:
2441:
2365:
2322:
2246:
2205:
2197:
2094:
1850:
1834:
1826:
1551:
1536:
1440:
1392:
1380:
1324:
1310:
1306:
1302:
1286:
1270:
1262:
1258:
1186:
1182:
1175:
1037:
1025:
1017:
918:
875:
754:
468:
344:
170:
164:
146:
135:
130:
118:
79:
41:
4460:
3583:
1040:
are only rarely affected by spoilers, which are limited to rare situations called
4315:"Why A Third-Party Candidate Might Help Trump β And Spoil The Election For Biden"
4050:
3284:
3250:
3170:
3140:
2395:
2250:
2131:
1869:. The pairwise comparisonβderived from the ballot dataβshows that Begich was the
1856:
1424:
1404:
1167:
1089:
906:
739:
594:
559:
480:
391:
294:
217:
159:
37:
3874:
Third-party matters: politics, presidents, and third parties in American history
3773:
3035:
1352:
of party-list representation. STV reduces the impact of parties not meeting the
4528:
3789:
3271:
do away with the spoiler problem entirely, although it ... makes it less likely
2949:
2416:
do away with the spoiler problem entirely, although it ... makes it less likely
2098:
1793:
1768:
1735:
1689:
1642:
1432:
1388:
1364:
1320:
1316:
1071:
1033:
776:
716:
512:
381:
356:
207:
3898:
3542:
3498:
2703:
elegantly. ... Range voting solves the problems of spoilers and vote splitting
2680:
Gaming the vote : why elections aren't fair (and what we can do about it)
2643:
2562:
2523:
2484:
2445:
2297:
elegantly. ... Range voting solves the problems of spoilers and vote splitting
2274:
Gaming the vote : why elections aren't fair (and what we can do about it)
2201:
4784:
4752:
4536:
4502:
4190:
4070:
4024:
3924:
3916:
3744:
3651:
3591:
3550:
3506:
3112:
2824:
2697:
2661:
2570:
2531:
2492:
2453:
2377:
2334:
2291:
2258:
2219:
1328:
1193:
1009:
785:
485:
273:
111:
74:
49:
3524:
2627:
2546:
2468:
2185:
1032:
and TRS less so in some circumstances), and all three rules are affected by
4566:
Hence Begich was the Condorcet winner. β¦ spoiler and Condorcet loser, Palin
4338:
3703:
1846:
1541:
1477:
1456:
1436:
1274:
1242:
1045:
525:
289:
282:
212:
4653:
4016:
3797:
3683:
3480:
3142:
Why Don't Americans Vote? Causes and Consequences: Causes and Consequences
2507:
2429:
61:
4054:
3961:
2786:
Frisch Lecture Delivered to the World Congress of the Econometric Society
2233:
Borodin, Allan; Lev, Omer; Shah, Nisarg; Strangway, Tyrone (2024-04-01).
1866:
1579:
1527:
1148:
1099:
403:
361:
304:
249:
3899:"Ralph Nader's Campaign Strategy in the 2000 U.S. Presidential Election"
3339:
3286:
Gaming the Vote: Why Elections Aren't Fair (and What We Can Do About It)
2718:
2310:
1809:
Montroll β defeats all candidates below, including Kiss (4,064 to 3,476)
901:
3752:
3659:
3349:
3172:
Hiring and Firing Public Officials: Rethinking the Purpose of Elections
2652:
2353:
2326:
2210:
1815:
Wright β defeats all candidates below, including Smith (3,971 to 3,793)
4059:"How Republicans Are Trying to Use the Green Party to Their Advantage"
3728:
3635:
1812:
Kiss β defeats all candidates below, including Wright (4,313 to 4,061)
1356:
whose votes could have shaped the outcome of which parties won seats.
4633:
4580:"The "Correct" Winner is Squeezed Out in the Alaska Special Election"
4483:
3403:
2075:
371:
366:
4554:
2369:
4613:
4519:
4451:
3984:
3720:
3615:
3574:
3446:
2923:
Santucci, Jack; Shugart, Matthew; Latner, Michael S. (2023-10-16).
2596:
1865:, Nick Begich was defeated in the first round by spoiler candidate
1652:
1587:
973:
622:
3435:
2585:
1818:
Smith β defeats Simpson (5,570 to 721) and the write-in candidates
1706:
1597:
4671:
1110:, should not depend on the quality of a third, unrelated outcome
408:
3252:
Mathematics of Social Choice: Voting, Compensation, and Division
2397:
Mathematics of Social Choice: Voting, Compensation, and Division
1387:
can still experience spoilers in each round by a process called
4179:"To Beat Trump, Democrats Seek to Help Anti-Abortion Candidate"
3407:
3396:"Why candidates are withdrawing from Alaska's general election"
2953:
2352:
McGann, Anthony J.; Koetzle, William; Grofman, Bernard (2002).
913:
3609:
Schulze, Markus (2018-03-15). "The Schulze Method of Voting".
1857:
2022 Alaska's at-large congressional district special election
1554:, especially prevalent during high stakes elections with high
1427:, where there is no single candidate preferred to all others.
3727:
Stadt, Huib van de; Kapteyn, Arie; Geer, Sara van de (1985).
3670:
If f satisfies U, I, P, and CNC then there exists a dictator.
2965:
2673:
2671:
1780:
4770:"Third-party voters face a tough choice in a tight election"
21:
Elimination from postseason contention Β§ Spoiler effect
4555:"A simple Condorcet voting method for Final Four elections"
2752:
Fair Representation: Meeting the Ideal of One Man, One Vote
3812:"The Spoiled Election: Independents and the 2024 Election"
2668:
2265:
4774:
4292:"The Promise and the Perils of the Third-Party Candidate"
3411:
1135:
was the first to study the spoiler effect, in the 1780s.
1102:
choice which says that a decision between two outcomes,
4049:
2779:"Individual and social welfare: a Bayesian perspective"
2232:
988:
candidate and the major candidate is said to have been
3771:
3636:"Interpersonal Comparability and Social Choice Theory"
3024:"The United States: A Case of Duvergerian Equilibrium"
3022:
Bowler, Shaun; Grofman, Bernard; Blais, AndrΓ© (2009),
2868:
McLean, Iain; Urken, Arnold B.; Hewitt, Fiona (1995).
2801:"Independence of irrelevant alternatives before Arrow"
3999:
Devine, Christopher J.; Kopko, Kyle C. (2021-09-01).
3729:"The Relativity of Utility: Evidence from Panel Data"
3201:"Third party candidates shouldn't get their hopes up"
2922:
2682:. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. pp. 168, 197, 234.
2276:. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. pp. 168, 197, 234.
2130:
Heckelman, Jac C.; Miller, Nicholas R. (2015-12-18).
4727:
Felsenthal, Dan S.; Tideman, Nicolaus (2014-01-01).
2677:
2351:
2271:
4476:
4472:
4470:
4440:
3876:. Santa Barbara, Calif: Praeger. pp. 153β154.
3772:Richard H.; Diener, Ed; Wedell, Douglas H. (1989).
3525:"On the empirical relevance of Condorcet's paradox"
2547:"On the empirical relevance of Condorcet's paradox"
2469:"On the empirical relevance of Condorcet's paradox"
1845:, would have won if the ballots were counted using
1569:
1319:is the most common cause of spoiler effects in the
1063:of party-list representation, where it is called a
3021:
2749:
1297:In the United States, vote splitting is common in
1051:Spoiler effects can also occur in some methods of
4726:
3939:
2987:Gallagher, Michael; Mitchell, Paul (2005-09-15).
2986:
2867:
2628:"Reflections on Arrow's theorem and voting rules"
2186:"Reflections on Arrow's theorem and voting rules"
1561:
4782:
4501:Holliday, Wesley H.; Pacuit, Eric (2023-10-01).
4467:
3726:
3434:Holliday, Wesley H.; Pacuit, Eric (2023-02-11),
3139:King, Bridgett A.; Hale, Kathleen (2016-07-11).
2584:Holliday, Wesley H.; Pacuit, Eric (2023-02-11),
1805:This leads to an overall preference ranking of:
1586:in the second round, leading to the election of
1526:off of swing state ballots while working to get
1414:
1327:systems. In these systems, the presence of many
1185:, where the top-two candidates are nominated by
2748:Balinski, Michel L.; Young, H. Peyton (2001) .
2129:
4690:
4500:
4209:
3433:
2583:
2302:
1335:
1138:
3338:VoliΔ, Ismar (2024-04-02). "Duverger's law".
2925:"Toward a Different Kind of Party Government"
2747:
949:
4389:
4387:
4093:
3778:Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
3563:
3030:, New York, NY: Springer, pp. 135β146,
2982:
2980:
2071:Independence of Smith-dominated alternatives
4285:
4283:
4281:
4210:Slodysko, Brian; Merica, Dan (2024-09-01).
3998:
3945:
3429:
3427:
2918:
2916:
1407:into dropping out to avoid a repeat of the
1399:. A notable example of this can be seen in
3522:
3282:
2544:
2466:
1887:Pairwise comparison matrix by vote totals
1474:List of elections involving vote splitting
1273:, and mathematically impossible with most
1070:This kind of spoiler effect is avoided by
956:
942:
16:Losing candidate affecting election result
4632:
4612:
4518:
4482:
4450:
4393:
4384:
4176:
3839:
3837:
3614:
3573:
3445:
3096:Sen, Amartya; Maskin, Eric (2017-06-08).
3095:
3017:
3015:
2977:
2844:. Springer Science & Business Media.
2651:
2595:
2577:
2387:
2209:
1576:Burlington, Vermont's second IRV election
1403:, where party elites pressured candidate
1028:are highly sensitive to spoilers (though
4652:. Vermont Daily Briefing. Archived from
4626:
4620:
4602:
4584:League of Women Voters of Boulder County
4552:
4365:
4289:
4278:
4147:
4043:
3688:. Yale University Press. p. 10β11.
3478:
3424:
3372:
3242:
3138:
3089:
2913:
2505:
2427:
1419:Spoiler effects rarely occur when using
1346:single transferable vote (STV or RCV-PR)
1057:single transferable vote (STV or RCV-PR)
4660:
4312:
3977:
3633:
3608:
3602:
3312:
3248:
3168:
3162:
3134:
3132:
2894:
2393:
2308:
1095:independence of irrelevant alternatives
28:Independence of irrelevant alternatives
4783:
4647:
4553:Holliday, Wesley H. (March 13, 2024).
4337:
4234:
3949:Quarterly Journal of Political Science
3896:
3843:
3834:
3733:The Review of Economics and Statistics
3675:
3518:
3516:
3474:
3472:
3012:
2863:
2861:
2841:The Theory of Committees and Elections
2798:
2743:
2741:
2713:
2711:
2625:
2460:
2421:
2183:
1340:Spoiler effects are usually lesser in
1199:
995:independent of irrelevant alternatives
4577:
4434:
3871:
3867:
3865:
3681:
3393:
3344:. Princeton University Press. Ch. 2.
3337:
3198:
2837:
2358:American Journal of Political Science
1493:Electoral fusion in the United States
4259:
4170:
4118:
3627:
3557:
3373:Strassel, Kimberly A. (2024-08-27).
3129:
2792:
2770:
2756:. New Haven: Yale University Press.
2538:
2499:
2133:Handbook of Social Choice and Voting
1038:Majority-rule (or Condorcet) methods
4141:
4087:
3956:(3). Now Publishing Inc.: 205β226.
3897:Burden, Barry C. (September 2005).
3890:
3685:Social Choice and Individual Values
3513:
3479:Gehrlein, William V. (2002-03-01).
3469:
3331:
3315:"We need more (and better) parties"
3306:
3098:"A Better Way to Choose Presidents"
3069:"Top 5 Ways Plurality Voting Fails"
2897:"We need more (and better) parties"
2888:
2858:
2831:
2738:
2708:
2506:Gehrlein, William V. (2002-03-01).
2428:Gehrlein, William V. (2002-03-01).
1467:
1280:
19:For the same effect in sports, see
13:
4641:
4603:Clelland, Jeanne N. (2023-02-28),
4290:Milligan, Susan (March 22, 2024).
4177:Schleifer, Theodore (2024-08-29).
3992:
3971:
3862:
3804:
3283:Poundstone, William (2009-02-17).
2776:
2626:Miller, Nicholas R. (2019-04-01).
2619:
2184:Miller, Nicholas R. (2019-04-01).
2177:
1379:Plurality-runoff methods like the
1292:
60:
14:
4802:
4763:
4648:Baruth, Philip (March 12, 2009).
4057:; Corasaniti, Nick (2020-09-22).
3523:Van Deemen, Adrian (2014-03-01).
3375:"Ranked Choice May Die in Alaska"
3249:Borgers, Christoph (2010-01-01).
2993:The Politics of Electoral Systems
2545:Van Deemen, Adrian (2014-03-01).
2467:Van Deemen, Adrian (2014-03-01).
2394:Borgers, Christoph (2010-01-01).
2153:
1374:
4745:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.08.001
4704:. April 27, 2010. Archived from
4394:Stensholt, Eivind (2015-10-07).
4313:Skelley, Geoffrey (2023-07-13).
4094:Schreckinger, Ben (2017-06-20).
3175:. Oxford University Press, USA.
2874:. University of Michigan Press.
2097:, ranked voting systems include
1863:Alaska's first-ever IRV election
1779:
1705:
1651:
1596:
1570:2009 Burlington mayoral election
1486:
925:
912:
900:
848:McKelveyβSchofield chaos theorem
494:Semi-proportional representation
126:First preference plurality (FPP)
4720:
4674:. March 2, 2010. Archived from
4596:
4571:
4546:
4494:
4421:The Center for Election Science
4409:
4359:
4331:
4306:
4253:
4235:Burden, Barry C. (2024-04-30).
4228:
4203:
4112:
3978:Roberts, Joel (July 27, 2004).
3846:"Giving Minor Parties a Chance"
3765:
3566:The College Mathematics Journal
3387:
3366:
3276:
3217:
3192:
3073:The Center for Election Science
3061:
2989:"The American Electoral System"
2935:from the original on 2024-07-16
2724:The Center for Election Science
2165:The Center for Election Science
2104:
2061:Comparison of electoral systems
1446:
1194:high-ranking political position
4668:"Burlington voters repeal IRV"
4396:"What Happened in Burlington?"
4148:Slodysko, Brian (2024-07-16).
3640:The Review of Economic Studies
3169:Buchler, Justin (2011-04-20).
2345:
2226:
2123:
2087:
1562:Notable unintentional spoilers
1098:is a fundamental principle of
1026:winnowing or primary elections
886:Harsanyi's utilitarian theorem
843:Moulin's impossibility theorem
808:Conflicting majorities paradox
1:
4461:10.1080/00344893.2023.2221689
4366:DeSilver, Drew (2024-06-27).
3980:"Nader to crash Dems' party?"
3739:(2). The MIT Press: 179β187.
3634:Roberts, Kevin W. S. (1980).
3584:10.1080/07468342.2023.2212548
3289:. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
2678:Poundstone, William. (2013).
2272:Poundstone, William. (2013).
2116:
1833:, and would have won under a
1415:Tournament (Condorcet) voting
1395:through the process known as
1083:
1006:Arrow's impossibility theorem
712:Frustrated majorities paradox
4733:Mathematical Social Sciences
4578:Ogren, Marcus (2022-10-03).
3394:Early, Wesley (2024-09-05).
2817:10.1016/0165-4896(95)00784-J
2805:Mathematical Social Sciences
2251:10.1016/j.artint.2024.104095
1843:majority-preferred candidate
1344:, especially when using the
1158:Vote-splitting systems like
881:Condorcet dominance theorems
821:Social and collective choice
7:
4260:Gift, Thomas (2024-01-11).
3313:Drutman, Lee (2024-09-12).
3036:10.1007/978-0-387-09720-6_9
2995:. OUP Oxford. p. 192.
2895:Drutman, Lee (2024-09-12).
2799:McLean, Iain (1995-10-01).
2235:"Primarily about primaries"
2136:. Edward Elgar Publishing.
2054:
1839:nonpartisan blanket primary
1457:score (highest mean) voting
1342:proportional representation
1336:Proportional representation
1205:Susceptibility to spoilers
1139:Manipulation by politicians
1118:illustrates this principle:
1053:proportional representation
547:By mechanism of combination
318:Proportional representation
10:
4807:
4529:10.1007/s11127-023-01042-3
3904:American Politics Research
3844:Masket, Seth (Fall 2023).
3790:10.1037/0022-3514.56.3.317
3682:Arrow, Kenneth J. (2012).
3461:by adding a new candidate
3199:Craig, Andy (2023-10-15).
2960:) hold runoffs or use the
2611:by adding a new candidate
1520:2024 presidential election
1490:
1471:
1153:French Academy of Sciences
1014:Ranked-choice voting (RCV)
745:Multiple districts paradox
476:Fractional approval voting
464:Interactive representation
25:
18:
4119:Levy, Marc (2024-08-21).
3872:Green, Donald J. (2010).
3543:10.1007/s11127-013-0133-3
2871:Classics of Social Choice
2644:10.1007/s11127-018-0524-6
2563:10.1007/s11127-013-0133-3
2485:10.1007/s11127-013-0133-3
2202:10.1007/s11127-018-0524-6
1957:Pairwise as a percentage
1873:while Palin was both the
1799:
1774:
1741:
1350:largest remainders method
1178:systems to behave like a
1061:largest remainders method
1022:first-past-the-post (FPP)
1010:rank-based voting systems
692:Paradoxes and pathologies
541:Mixed-member proportional
536:Mixed-member majoritarian
531:By results of combination
422:Approval-based committees
4772:(September 22, 2024) by
4296:US News and World Report
4096:"Jill Stein Isn't Sorry"
3917:10.1177/1532673x04272431
3817:Harvard Political Review
3105:New York Review of Books
2309:Merrill, Samuel (1985).
2081:
1267:plurality-runoff methods
871:Condorcet's jury theorem
672:Double simultaneous vote
647:Ruralβurban proportional
642:Dual-member proportional
604:
593:
560:Parallel (superposition)
452:Fractional social choice
439:Expanding approvals rule
268:
253:
238:
169:
158:
134:
3530:Public Choice (journal)
3499:10.1023/A:1015551010381
3380:The Wall Street Journal
2838:Black, Duncan (1987) .
2524:10.1023/A:1015551010381
2446:10.1023/A:1015551010381
2239:Artificial Intelligence
2051:without this behavior.
1129:social choice theorists
798:Tyranny of the majority
575:Fusion (majority bonus)
392:Quota-remainder methods
4417:"IRV and Core Support"
3341:Making Democracy Count
2066:Independence of clones
1841:. Montroll, being the
1556:political polarization
1125:
1018:two-round system (TRS)
932:Mathematics portal
838:Majority impossibility
827:Impossibility theorems
623:Negative vote transfer
444:Method of equal shares
65:
4017:10.1515/for-2021-0011
1582:knocked out Democrat
1482:Single-issue politics
1409:spoiled 2022 election
1369:proportional approval
1265:, somewhat common in
1120:
1076:proportional approval
735:Best-is-worst paradox
724:Pathological response
459:Direct representation
112:Single-winner methods
64:
3962:10.1561/100.00005039
2719:"The Spoiler Effect"
2161:"The Spoiler Effect"
2049:several alternatives
1744:Spoiler for Montroll
1421:tournament solutions
1275:rated voting methods
1271:majoritarian methods
1164:ranked-choice voting
1145:strategic nomination
1133:Nicolas de Condorcet
1046:Rated voting systems
1036:and vote splitting.
970:social choice theory
919:Economics portal
866:Median voter theorem
85:Comparative politics
4372:Pew Research Center
3486:Theory and Decision
3400:Alaska Public Media
3319:Undercurrent Events
2946:first-past-the-post
2901:Undercurrent Events
2512:Theory and Decision
2434:Theory and Decision
1958:
1888:
1881:
1534:. According to the
1354:electoral threshold
1206:
1200:By electoral system
1116:Sidney Morgenbesser
1114:. A famous joke by
907:Politics portal
618:Vote linkage system
589:Seat linkage system
176:Ranked-choice (RCV)
4183:The New York Times
4063:The New York Times
3350:10.2307/jj.7492228
2327:10.1007/bf00127534
1956:
1886:
1880:
1524:Constitution Party
1401:Alaska's 2024 race
1234:Condorcet Methods
1204:
1172:political machines
803:Discursive dilemma
762:Lesser evil voting
637:Supermixed systems
340:Largest remainders
198:Round-robin voting
66:
4702:Rutlandherald.com
4656:on July 26, 2011.
4400:Discussion Papers
4100:POLITICO Magazine
3883:978-0-313-36591-1
3695:978-0-300-17931-6
3359:978-0-691-24882-0
3045:978-0-387-09720-6
3002:978-0-19-153151-4
2929:Protect Democracy
2044:
2043:
2040:
2039:
1952:
1951:
1837:or a traditional
1829:, Kiss won under
1803:
1802:
1635:4064 (Montroll) β
1627:4597 (Montroll) β
1619:4570 (Montroll) β
1611:6262 (Montroll) β
1361:new party paradox
1259:electoral systems
1255:
1254:
1218:Plurality voting
1210:Electoral system
1065:new party paradox
1020:, and especially
966:
965:
853:Gibbard's theorem
793:Dominance paradox
730:Perverse response
434:Phragmen's method
300:Majority judgment
228:Positional voting
186:Condorcet methods
54:electoral systems
4798:
4757:
4756:
4724:
4718:
4717:
4715:
4713:
4708:on March 4, 2016
4694:
4688:
4687:
4685:
4683:
4678:on April 9, 2016
4664:
4658:
4657:
4645:
4639:
4638:
4636:
4624:
4618:
4617:
4616:
4600:
4594:
4593:
4591:
4590:
4575:
4569:
4568:
4563:
4561:
4550:
4544:
4543:
4522:
4498:
4492:
4491:
4486:
4474:
4465:
4464:
4454:
4438:
4432:
4431:
4429:
4427:
4413:
4407:
4406:
4391:
4382:
4381:
4379:
4378:
4363:
4357:
4356:
4354:
4353:
4347:The Conversation
4339:Burden, Barry C.
4335:
4329:
4328:
4326:
4325:
4310:
4304:
4303:
4287:
4276:
4275:
4273:
4272:
4266:The Conversation
4257:
4251:
4250:
4248:
4247:
4241:The Conversation
4232:
4226:
4225:
4223:
4222:
4207:
4201:
4200:
4198:
4197:
4174:
4168:
4167:
4161:
4160:
4145:
4139:
4138:
4132:
4131:
4116:
4110:
4109:
4107:
4106:
4091:
4085:
4084:
4078:
4077:
4051:Haberman, Maggie
4047:
4041:
4040:
3996:
3990:
3989:
3975:
3969:
3965:
3943:
3937:
3936:
3894:
3888:
3887:
3869:
3860:
3859:
3841:
3832:
3831:
3826:
3825:
3820:. April 18, 2024
3808:
3802:
3801:
3769:
3763:
3762:
3760:
3759:
3724:
3718:
3717:
3711:
3710:
3679:
3673:
3672:
3667:
3666:
3646:(2). : 421β439.
3631:
3625:
3624:
3618:
3606:
3600:
3599:
3577:
3561:
3555:
3554:
3520:
3511:
3510:
3476:
3467:
3456:
3455:
3454:
3449:
3431:
3422:
3421:
3419:
3418:
3391:
3385:
3384:
3370:
3364:
3363:
3335:
3329:
3328:
3326:
3325:
3310:
3304:
3303:
3280:
3274:
3273:
3246:
3240:
3239:
3237:
3236:
3221:
3215:
3214:
3212:
3211:
3196:
3190:
3189:
3166:
3160:
3159:
3136:
3127:
3126:
3120:
3119:
3102:
3093:
3087:
3086:
3081:
3080:
3065:
3059:
3058:
3053:
3052:
3019:
3010:
3009:
2984:
2975:
2974:
2962:alternative vote
2941:
2940:
2920:
2911:
2910:
2908:
2907:
2892:
2886:
2885:
2865:
2856:
2855:
2835:
2829:
2828:
2796:
2790:
2789:
2783:
2774:
2768:
2767:
2755:
2745:
2736:
2735:
2733:
2732:
2715:
2706:
2705:
2675:
2666:
2665:
2655:
2623:
2617:
2606:
2605:
2604:
2599:
2581:
2575:
2574:
2542:
2536:
2535:
2503:
2497:
2496:
2464:
2458:
2457:
2425:
2419:
2418:
2391:
2385:
2384:
2349:
2343:
2342:
2306:
2300:
2299:
2269:
2263:
2262:
2230:
2224:
2223:
2213:
2181:
2175:
2174:
2172:
2171:
2157:
2151:
2150:
2127:
2111:
2108:
2102:
2095:election science
2091:
1959:
1955:
1889:
1885:
1882:
1879:
1871:Condorcet winner
1851:Condorcet method
1783:
1709:
1655:
1600:
1593:
1592:
1552:Strategic voting
1537:Associated Press
1504:Democratic Party
1500:Republican Party
1468:Spoiler campaign
1441:Condorcet winner
1381:two-round system
1325:two-round runoff
1311:two-round system
1307:plurality voting
1303:general election
1287:plurality voting
1281:Plurality voting
1263:plurality voting
1207:
1203:
1183:two-round system
1176:plurality voting
1127:Politicians and
958:
951:
944:
930:
929:
917:
916:
905:
904:
860:Positive results
755:Strategic voting
652:Majority jackpot
609:
598:
469:Liquid democracy
345:National remnant
335:Highest averages
272:
257:
242:
174:
165:Alternative vote
163:
147:Partisan primary
139:
80:Mechanism design
33:
32:
4806:
4805:
4801:
4800:
4799:
4797:
4796:
4795:
4781:
4780:
4766:
4761:
4760:
4725:
4721:
4711:
4709:
4696:
4695:
4691:
4681:
4679:
4666:
4665:
4661:
4646:
4642:
4625:
4621:
4601:
4597:
4588:
4586:
4576:
4572:
4559:
4557:
4551:
4547:
4499:
4495:
4475:
4468:
4439:
4435:
4425:
4423:
4415:
4414:
4410:
4392:
4385:
4376:
4374:
4364:
4360:
4351:
4349:
4336:
4332:
4323:
4321:
4319:FiveThirtyEight
4311:
4307:
4288:
4279:
4270:
4268:
4258:
4254:
4245:
4243:
4233:
4229:
4220:
4218:
4208:
4204:
4195:
4193:
4175:
4171:
4158:
4156:
4146:
4142:
4129:
4127:
4117:
4113:
4104:
4102:
4092:
4088:
4075:
4073:
4048:
4044:
3997:
3993:
3976:
3972:
3944:
3940:
3895:
3891:
3884:
3870:
3863:
3842:
3835:
3823:
3821:
3810:
3809:
3805:
3770:
3766:
3757:
3755:
3725:
3721:
3708:
3706:
3696:
3680:
3676:
3664:
3662:
3632:
3628:
3607:
3603:
3562:
3558:
3521:
3514:
3477:
3470:
3452:
3450:
3432:
3425:
3416:
3414:
3392:
3388:
3371:
3367:
3360:
3336:
3332:
3323:
3321:
3311:
3307:
3297:
3281:
3277:
3263:
3247:
3243:
3234:
3232:
3223:
3222:
3218:
3209:
3207:
3197:
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3183:
3167:
3163:
3153:
3137:
3130:
3117:
3115:
3100:
3094:
3090:
3078:
3076:
3067:
3066:
3062:
3050:
3048:
3046:
3020:
3013:
3003:
2985:
2978:
2938:
2936:
2921:
2914:
2905:
2903:
2893:
2889:
2882:
2866:
2859:
2852:
2836:
2832:
2797:
2793:
2781:
2777:Pearce, David.
2775:
2771:
2764:
2746:
2739:
2730:
2728:
2717:
2716:
2709:
2690:
2676:
2669:
2624:
2620:
2602:
2600:
2582:
2578:
2543:
2539:
2504:
2500:
2465:
2461:
2426:
2422:
2408:
2392:
2388:
2370:10.2307/3088418
2350:
2346:
2307:
2303:
2284:
2270:
2266:
2231:
2227:
2182:
2178:
2169:
2167:
2159:
2158:
2154:
2144:
2128:
2124:
2119:
2114:
2109:
2105:
2092:
2088:
2084:
2057:
1877:and a spoiler:
1875:Condorcet loser
1859:
1786:James Simpson (
1728:3971 (Wright) β
1723:1310 (Simpson)
1720:5270 (Wright) β
1603:Andy Montroll (
1572:
1564:
1495:
1489:
1484:
1470:
1449:
1425:Condorcet cycle
1417:
1405:Nancy Dahlstrom
1377:
1365:divisor methods
1338:
1295:
1293:Winner-take-all
1283:
1226:Runoffs or RCV
1213:Spoiler effect
1202:
1187:party primaries
1141:
1090:decision theory
1086:
1072:divisor methods
1008:shows that all
962:
924:
923:
911:
899:
891:
890:
857:
833:Arrow's theorem
823:
813:
812:
781:
751:
740:No-show paradox
721:
707:Cloning paradox
697:Spoiler effects
694:
684:
683:
658:
545:
528:
518:
517:
490:
481:Maximal lottery
448:
429:Thiele's method
418:
388:
320:
310:
309:
295:Approval voting
283:Cardinal voting
279:
224:
218:Maximal lottery
182:
114:
104:
31:
24:
17:
12:
11:
5:
4804:
4794:
4793:
4779:
4778:
4765:
4764:External links
4762:
4759:
4758:
4719:
4689:
4659:
4640:
4619:
4595:
4570:
4545:
4493:
4466:
4443:Representation
4433:
4408:
4383:
4358:
4341:(2024-04-30).
4330:
4305:
4277:
4252:
4227:
4202:
4169:
4140:
4111:
4086:
4042:
4011:(2): 173β201.
3991:
3970:
3938:
3911:(5): 672β699.
3889:
3882:
3861:
3833:
3803:
3784:(3): 317β325.
3764:
3719:
3694:
3674:
3626:
3601:
3556:
3537:(3): 311β330.
3512:
3493:(2): 171β199.
3468:
3423:
3386:
3365:
3358:
3330:
3305:
3295:
3275:
3261:
3241:
3216:
3191:
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3161:
3151:
3128:
3088:
3060:
3044:
3011:
3001:
2976:
2950:United Kingdom
2912:
2887:
2881:978-0472104505
2880:
2857:
2850:
2830:
2811:(2): 107β126.
2791:
2769:
2762:
2737:
2707:
2688:
2667:
2638:(1): 113β124.
2618:
2576:
2557:(3): 311β330.
2537:
2518:(2): 171β199.
2498:
2479:(3): 311β330.
2459:
2440:(2): 171β199.
2420:
2406:
2386:
2364:(1): 134β147.
2344:
2321:(2): 389β403.
2301:
2282:
2264:
2225:
2196:(1): 113β124.
2176:
2152:
2142:
2121:
2120:
2118:
2115:
2113:
2112:
2103:
2099:plurality rule
2085:
2083:
2080:
2079:
2078:
2073:
2068:
2063:
2056:
2053:
2042:
2041:
2038:
2037:
2034:
2031:
2026:
2023:
2017:
2016:
2013:
2010:
2005:
2002:
1996:
1995:
1992:
1989:
1984:
1981:
1975:
1974:
1971:
1968:
1965:
1963:
1953:
1950:
1949:
1946:
1943:
1940:
1936:
1935:
1930:
1927:
1924:
1920:
1919:
1914:
1909:
1906:
1902:
1901:
1898:
1895:
1892:
1858:
1855:
1849:(or any other
1835:two-round vote
1820:
1819:
1816:
1813:
1810:
1801:
1800:
1798:
1791:
1784:
1776:
1775:
1773:
1766:
1764:721 (Simpson)
1761:5570 (Smith) β
1758:
1751:
1748:
1747:
1740:
1733:
1725:
1717:
1710:
1702:
1701:
1694:
1687:
1685:4061 (Wright)
1679:
1671:
1669:844 (Simpson)
1663:
1656:
1648:
1647:
1640:
1632:
1630:3664 (Wright)
1624:
1616:
1614:591 (Simpson)
1608:
1601:
1571:
1568:
1563:
1560:
1488:
1485:
1469:
1466:
1453:Highest median
1448:
1445:
1433:Schulze method
1416:
1413:
1397:Duverger's law
1393:two-party rule
1389:center squeeze
1376:
1375:Runoff systems
1373:
1337:
1334:
1321:plurality vote
1317:Vote splitting
1294:
1291:
1282:
1279:
1253:
1252:
1249:
1239:
1238:
1235:
1231:
1230:
1227:
1223:
1222:
1219:
1215:
1214:
1211:
1201:
1198:
1140:
1137:
1085:
1082:
1055:, such as the
1034:center-squeeze
982:spoiler effect
964:
963:
961:
960:
953:
946:
938:
935:
934:
922:
921:
909:
896:
893:
892:
889:
888:
883:
878:
873:
868:
856:
855:
850:
845:
840:
835:
824:
819:
818:
815:
814:
811:
810:
805:
800:
795:
780:
779:
777:Turkey-raising
774:
769:
764:
750:
749:
748:
747:
737:
732:
720:
719:
717:Center squeeze
714:
709:
704:
702:Spoiler effect
695:
690:
689:
686:
685:
682:
681:
676:
675:
674:
661:By ballot type
657:
656:
655:
654:
649:
644:
634:
633:
632:
631:
630:
625:
615:
614:
613:
602:
579:
578:
577:
572:
567:
562:
544:
543:
538:
529:
524:
523:
520:
519:
516:
515:
513:Limited voting
510:
509:
508:
489:
488:
483:
478:
473:
472:
471:
466:
447:
446:
441:
436:
431:
417:
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406:
401:
387:
386:
385:
384:
382:Localized list
379:
374:
369:
364:
354:
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352:
350:Biproportional
347:
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247:
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220:
215:
210:
205:
195:
181:
180:
179:
178:
167:
154:Instant-runoff
151:
150:
149:
141:Jungle primary
128:
117:Single vote -
115:
110:
109:
106:
105:
103:
102:
92:
87:
82:
77:
71:
68:
67:
57:
56:
46:
45:
15:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
4803:
4792:
4791:Voting theory
4789:
4788:
4786:
4777:
4776:
4771:
4768:
4767:
4754:
4750:
4746:
4742:
4738:
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4703:
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4635:
4630:
4623:
4615:
4610:
4606:
4599:
4585:
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4574:
4567:
4556:
4549:
4542:
4538:
4534:
4530:
4526:
4521:
4516:
4512:
4508:
4507:Public Choice
4504:
4497:
4490:
4485:
4480:
4473:
4471:
4462:
4458:
4453:
4448:
4444:
4437:
4422:
4418:
4412:
4405:
4401:
4397:
4390:
4388:
4373:
4369:
4362:
4348:
4344:
4340:
4334:
4320:
4316:
4309:
4302:
4297:
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4286:
4284:
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4267:
4263:
4256:
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4238:
4231:
4217:
4213:
4206:
4192:
4188:
4184:
4180:
4173:
4166:
4155:
4151:
4144:
4137:
4126:
4122:
4115:
4101:
4097:
4090:
4083:
4072:
4068:
4064:
4060:
4056:
4052:
4046:
4039:
4034:
4030:
4026:
4022:
4018:
4014:
4010:
4006:
4002:
3995:
3987:
3986:
3981:
3974:
3968:
3963:
3959:
3955:
3951:
3950:
3942:
3934:
3930:
3926:
3922:
3918:
3914:
3910:
3906:
3905:
3900:
3893:
3885:
3879:
3875:
3868:
3866:
3857:
3853:
3852:
3847:
3840:
3838:
3830:
3819:
3818:
3813:
3807:
3799:
3795:
3791:
3787:
3783:
3779:
3775:
3768:
3754:
3750:
3746:
3742:
3738:
3734:
3730:
3723:
3716:
3705:
3701:
3697:
3691:
3687:
3686:
3678:
3671:
3661:
3657:
3653:
3649:
3645:
3641:
3637:
3630:
3623:
3617:
3612:
3605:
3598:
3593:
3589:
3585:
3581:
3576:
3571:
3567:
3560:
3552:
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3492:
3488:
3487:
3482:
3475:
3473:
3464:
3460:
3448:
3443:
3439:
3438:
3437:Stable Voting
3430:
3428:
3413:
3409:
3405:
3401:
3397:
3390:
3382:
3381:
3376:
3369:
3361:
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3296:9781429957649
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3262:9780898716955
3258:
3254:
3253:
3245:
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3206:
3202:
3195:
3188:
3184:
3182:9780199759965
3178:
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3165:
3158:
3154:
3152:9781440841163
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2891:
2883:
2877:
2873:
2872:
2864:
2862:
2853:
2851:9780898381894
2847:
2843:
2842:
2834:
2826:
2822:
2818:
2814:
2810:
2806:
2802:
2795:
2787:
2780:
2773:
2765:
2763:0-300-02724-9
2759:
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2753:
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2725:
2720:
2714:
2712:
2704:
2699:
2695:
2691:
2689:9781429957649
2685:
2681:
2674:
2672:
2663:
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2654:
2649:
2645:
2641:
2637:
2633:
2632:Public Choice
2629:
2622:
2614:
2610:
2598:
2593:
2589:
2588:
2587:Stable Voting
2580:
2572:
2568:
2564:
2560:
2556:
2552:
2551:Public Choice
2548:
2541:
2533:
2529:
2525:
2521:
2517:
2513:
2509:
2502:
2494:
2490:
2486:
2482:
2478:
2474:
2473:Public Choice
2470:
2463:
2455:
2451:
2447:
2443:
2439:
2435:
2431:
2424:
2417:
2415:
2409:
2407:9780898716955
2403:
2399:
2398:
2390:
2383:
2379:
2375:
2371:
2367:
2363:
2359:
2355:
2348:
2341:
2336:
2332:
2328:
2324:
2320:
2316:
2315:Public Choice
2312:
2305:
2298:
2293:
2289:
2285:
2283:9781429957649
2279:
2275:
2268:
2260:
2256:
2252:
2248:
2244:
2240:
2236:
2229:
2221:
2217:
2212:
2207:
2203:
2199:
2195:
2191:
2190:Public Choice
2187:
2180:
2166:
2162:
2156:
2149:
2145:
2143:9781783470730
2139:
2135:
2134:
2126:
2122:
2107:
2100:
2096:
2090:
2086:
2077:
2074:
2072:
2069:
2067:
2064:
2062:
2059:
2058:
2052:
2050:
2035:
2032:
2030:
2027:
2024:
2022:
2019:
2018:
2014:
2011:
2009:
2006:
2003:
2001:
1998:
1997:
1993:
1990:
1988:
1985:
1982:
1980:
1977:
1976:
1972:
1969:
1966:
1964:
1961:
1960:
1954:
1947:
1944:
1941:
1938:
1937:
1934:
1931:
1928:
1925:
1922:
1921:
1918:
1915:
1913:
1910:
1907:
1904:
1903:
1899:
1896:
1893:
1891:
1890:
1884:
1883:
1878:
1876:
1872:
1868:
1864:
1854:
1852:
1848:
1844:
1840:
1836:
1832:
1828:
1823:
1817:
1814:
1811:
1808:
1807:
1806:
1797:
1796:
1792:
1789:
1785:
1782:
1778:
1777:
1772:
1771:
1767:
1765:
1762:
1759:
1756:
1752:
1750:
1749:
1746:
1745:
1739:
1738:
1734:
1732:
1731:3793 (Smith)
1729:
1726:
1724:
1721:
1718:
1715:
1712:Kurt Wright (
1711:
1708:
1704:
1703:
1700:
1699:
1695:
1693:
1692:
1688:
1686:
1683:
1682:4313 (Kiss) β
1680:
1678:
1677:3576 (Smith)
1675:
1674:3944 (Kiss) β
1672:
1670:
1667:
1666:5514 (Kiss) β
1664:
1661:
1657:
1654:
1650:
1649:
1646:
1645:
1641:
1639:
1636:
1633:
1631:
1628:
1625:
1623:
1622:2997 (Smith)
1620:
1617:
1615:
1612:
1609:
1606:
1602:
1599:
1595:
1594:
1591:
1589:
1585:
1584:Andy Montroll
1581:
1577:
1567:
1559:
1557:
1553:
1549:
1545:
1543:
1539:
1538:
1533:
1529:
1525:
1521:
1517:
1513:
1509:
1505:
1501:
1494:
1487:United States
1483:
1479:
1475:
1465:
1461:
1458:
1454:
1444:
1442:
1438:
1434:
1428:
1426:
1422:
1412:
1410:
1406:
1402:
1398:
1394:
1390:
1386:
1382:
1372:
1370:
1366:
1362:
1357:
1355:
1351:
1347:
1343:
1333:
1330:
1329:ideologically
1326:
1322:
1318:
1314:
1312:
1308:
1304:
1300:
1290:
1288:
1278:
1276:
1272:
1268:
1264:
1260:
1250:
1248:
1244:
1241:
1240:
1236:
1233:
1232:
1228:
1225:
1224:
1220:
1217:
1216:
1212:
1209:
1208:
1197:
1195:
1190:
1188:
1184:
1181:
1177:
1173:
1169:
1165:
1161:
1156:
1154:
1150:
1146:
1136:
1134:
1130:
1124:
1119:
1117:
1113:
1109:
1105:
1101:
1097:
1096:
1091:
1081:
1080:
1077:
1073:
1069:
1066:
1062:
1058:
1054:
1049:
1047:
1043:
1039:
1035:
1031:
1027:
1023:
1019:
1015:
1011:
1007:
1003:
1001:
997:
996:
991:
987:
983:
979:
975:
971:
959:
954:
952:
947:
945:
940:
939:
937:
936:
933:
928:
920:
915:
910:
908:
903:
898:
897:
895:
894:
887:
884:
882:
879:
877:
876:May's theorem
874:
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1542:Barry Burden
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1437:ranked pairs
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290:Score voting
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213:Ranked pairs
184:
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116:
4513:(1): 1β62.
4426:December 4,
3715:individual.
3704:j.ctt1nqb90
2653:11603/20937
2211:11603/20937
1867:Sarah Palin
1753:Dan Smith (
1580:Kurt Wright
1548:Third party
1532:Green Party
1528:Cornel West
1149:Borda count
1123:blueberry."
1042:cyclic ties
667:Single vote
570:Conditional
565:Coexistence
414:Quota Borda
404:Schulze STV
362:Closed list
305:STAR voting
250:Borda count
4614:2303.00108
4589:2024-03-24
4520:2004.02350
4452:2301.12075
4377:2024-08-28
4352:2024-08-28
4324:2024-08-28
4271:2024-08-27
4246:2024-08-28
4221:2024-09-06
4196:2024-08-30
4159:2024-08-25
4130:2024-08-28
4105:2023-06-07
4076:2024-08-28
3824:2024-08-24
3758:2024-04-28
3709:2024-09-25
3665:2024-09-25
3622:Smith-IIA.
3616:1804.02973
3575:2111.09846
3453:2024-03-11
3447:2108.00542
3417:2024-09-20
3324:2024-09-19
3235:2024-09-27
3210:2024-09-27
3205:Reason.com
3118:2019-07-20
3079:2017-10-07
3051:2024-08-31
2939:2024-07-16
2906:2024-09-19
2731:2017-01-29
2603:2024-03-11
2597:2108.00542
2245:: 104095.
2170:2024-03-03
2117:References
2036:vs. 48.5%
2015:vs. 38.6%
1994:vs. 47.4%
1698:RCV winner
1658:Bob Kiss (
1578:, spoiler
1491:See also:
1472:See also:
1257:Different
1160:choose-one
1084:Motivation
772:Truncation
501:Cumulative
324:Party-list
99:By country
90:Comparison
4753:0165-4896
4739:: 57β66.
4682:March 28,
4560:March 23,
4537:1573-7101
4191:0362-4331
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4025:1540-8884
4005:The Forum
3925:1532-673X
3851:Democracy
3745:0034-6535
3652:0034-6527
3592:0746-8342
3551:1573-7101
3507:1573-7187
3404:Anchorage
3113:0028-7504
2825:0165-4896
2698:872601019
2662:1573-7101
2571:1573-7101
2532:1573-7187
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2454:1573-7187
2378:0092-5853
2335:0048-5829
2292:872601019
2259:0004-3702
2220:1573-7101
2076:Sortition
1827:plurality
1299:primaries
679:Dual-vote
372:Panachage
367:Open list
357:List type
235:Plurality
131:Two-round
119:plurality
42:Economics
4785:Category
4712:April 1,
4672:Wcax.com
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4082:Clinton.
3985:CBS News
3933:43919948
3255:. SIAM.
3229:ABC News
3124:pairwise
2933:Archived
2400:. SIAM.
2055:See also
1923:Peltola
1897:Peltola
1795:0/4 Wins
1770:1/4 Wins
1737:2/4 Wins
1691:3/4 Wins
1644:4/4 Wins
1588:Bob Kiss
1348:and the
1180:de facto
1100:rational
1059:and the
1024:without
974:politics
399:Hare STV
38:Politics
36:A joint
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4154:AP News
4125:AP News
3798:2926632
3753:1924716
3660:2297002
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2958:Georgia
2340:winning
2021:Peltola
1987:Peltola
1970:Winner
1962:Winner
1945:86,197
1942:63,666
1926:79,486
1917:101,438
1905:Begich
1894:Begich
1309:into a
1247:Medians
1229:Medium
1168:parties
990:spoiled
986:spoiler
978:spoiler
409:CPO-STV
259:Baldwin
208:Schulze
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1973:Loser
1967:Loser
1939:Palin
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1912:88,126
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1016:, the
274:Coombs
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3929:S2CID
3749:JSTOR
3700:JSTOR
3656:JSTOR
3611:arXiv
3570:arXiv
3442:arXiv
3101:(PDF)
2966:Maine
2782:(PDF)
2592:arXiv
2082:Notes
2029:Palin
2008:Palin
1251:None
1243:Score
1221:High
611:'MMP'
600:'AMS'
4749:ISSN
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