901:
lives and many businesses in the central city—restaurants, cabarets, department stores, banks, and more. What were the newly unemployed waiters, bank clerks, and entertainers to do? That’s right: seek jobs in the war plants on the edge of the cities “to get the ration cards that the Nazis thoughtfully distributed to workers there.” ... he incredible destruction that the
British and air forces wreaked on Germany, with the high loss of human life, didn’t even have the intended effect of slowing Germany's war-production machine. Galbraith had to fight hard to have the report published without it being rewritten to hide the essential points. “I defended it,” he later wrote, “with a maximum of arrogance and a minimum of tact.” ... Galbraith also visited Japan, where he analyzed the effect of the use of the atom bomb. He wrote: "The bombs fell after the decision had been taken by the Japanese government to surrender. That the war had to be ended was agreed by at a meeting of key members of the Supreme War Direction Council with the Emperor on June 20, 1945, a full six weeks before the devastation of Hiroshima. The next steps took time. The Japanese government had the usual bureaucratic lags as between decision and action."'
603:
However, they also noted that production dropped by 54% during this period due to the effects of bombing: the killing, injuring and dehousing of the workers as well as the destruction of the transportation network. Further, many of the houses destroyed in the bombing contained small shops that made parts for factories, so the bombing of residential districts also destroyed this decentralized manufacturing. They noted a precipitous reduction in food availability as well, dropping from about 2,000 calories per day at the start of the war, to 1,680 for industrial workers at the height of the campaign, and less for non-essential workers. The Survey found that civilian morale dropped across the country from the bombings, not confined to areas that were bombed, but that
Japanese dedication to their Emperor prevented morale from inducing a desire to surrender. The Survey stated that Japanese leaders were partially influenced by low civilian morale, but only to the extent that it warranted concerns about maintaining the ruling class.
31:
436:. The German people entered the period of the air war well stocked with clothing and other consumer goods. "Although most consumer goods became increasingly difficult to obtain, Survey studies show that fairly adequate supplies of clothing were available for those who had been bombed out until the last stages of disorganization. Food, though strictly rationed, was in nutritionally adequate supply throughout the war. The Germans' diet had about the same calories as the British." Raids on Berlin destroyed half of German clothing industry.
910:
troops and critical supplies; and attacker of the enemy's vital strength far behind the battle line." The summary report only discussed the latter: attacks on the enemy's vital strength far behind the battle line. Grant (2008) said, "The survey began in no small part as a way to look at the major targeting controversies (rail vs. oil, and so forth) that had so often consumed the attention of top Allied planners and leaders. Its original intent was to sweep up lessons from Europe for use in the ongoing war with Japan."
1013:" (1940-41). Before "The Blitz", they may not have been happy about having their air force destroyed by the Nazis, but they were also not eager to put their lives on the line to support a hereditary aristocracy that just over 20 years earlier had wasted a substantial portion of a generation of young men in a senseless war. However, as their homes were being destroy and their neighbors killed or wounded by German bombs, ordinary British men and women did not all rabidly support Churchill's exhortation, "
921:, who was one of the "Officers" of the USSBS, wrote, "Nothing in World War II air operations was subject to such assault as open agricultural land." When Allied bombs fell in cities like central Hamburg, they destroyed many lives and often many businesses in the central city—restaurants, cabarets, department stores, banks, and more. The newly unemployed waiters, bank clerks, and entertainers took jobs in the war plants.
462:
1,000 fighters were claimed to have been shot down with a consequent loss of pilots. The survey did not identify what happened to the aircraft produced, the German "air generals" unable to explain it and it was supposed some were lost in transit or damaged on the ground with others unable to fly due to lack of fuel.By start of 1945 fighter production was curtailed due to lack of fuel for all except the new jet fighters.
2005:
892:
Many of which were hidden, some even in coffins. Three of the leaders of the
European team were replaced for the research in Japan, so the accompanying table of "Officers of the Survey" includes fifteen men. Those fifteen were selected as nonmilitary leaders, many of whom had even greater career success in supporting the development of strategic forces in the US military after the war than before.
141:. At the same time it invested in navigational aids and target marking. The total bomber force increased until the RAF was able to send 500 to 800 bombers against a single target city while still able to carry out minor raids and diversions against other areas. While in 1941 the RAF dropped about 46,000 tons of bombs, in 1944 it dropped 676,,000 tons.
888:
of the effects of our aerial attack on
Germany, to be used in connection with air attacks on Japan and to establish a basis for evaluating air power as an instrument of military strategy, for planning the future development of the United States armed forces, and for determining future economic policies with respect to the national defense."
281:
and reserves were drained. The
Ardennes offensive of December 1944 was predicated on capturing Allied fuel to sustain it. The synthetic oil plants were also a source of nitrogen for German agriculture and this was heavily cut back (at first to 50%, then 25%, then altogether) in order to release nitrates for explosive production.
498:"The achievements of Allied airpower were attained only with difficulty and great cost in men, material and effort. Its success depended on the courage, fortitude, and gallant action of the officers and men of the aircrews and commands. It depended also on a superiority in leadership, ability, and basic strength"
203:. while its teams assessed the damage that had been done targets as the allied armies took control of them. German records were analysed for information and Germans interrogated including the remaining senior officials in the Nazi regime. The survey was not able to assess the effects in Soviet controlled areas.
1558:
Henderson (2006). Galbraith's position on this were highly controversial and unpopular with many of the other
Officers of the Survey. Henderson wrote, 'Galbraith had to fight hard to have his report published without it being rewritten to hide the essential points. “I defended it,” he wrote, “with
900:
said 'Galbraith wrote wittily, “Nothing in World War II air operations was subject to such assault as open agricultural land.” ... Galbraith’s boss, George Ball ... found something equally disturbing about the firebombing of cities. The RAF’s bombing of central
Hamburg, for example, destroyed many
887:
The
Forward to the Summary Report for the Pacific War said, "The United States Strategic Bombing Survey was established by the Secretary of War on 3 November 1944, pursuant to a directive from the late President Roosevelt. It was established for the purpose of conducting an impartial and expert study
630:
In
Hiroshima (August 6, 1945), approximately 60,000 to 70,000 people were killed, and 50,000 were injured. This is out of a pre-war population of about 340,000 that had been reduced to 245,000 through evacuations. Of approximately 90,000 buildings in the city, 65,000 were rendered unusable and almost
602:
considered even this figure to be too low. In the following 10 days, a total of 31 square miles (80 km) were destroyed. The Survey notes that these attacks had little direct effect on manufacturing, with factories that were hit by bombs having less drop off in production than those that did not.
502:
But it warned that the "No greater or more dangerous mistake could be made than to assume that the same policies and practices that won the War in Europe will be sufficient to win the next one-if there be another. The results achieved in Europe will not give the answer to future problems; they should
178:
specified the importance of reducing the ability of the
Luftwaffe to influence the outcome of the cross-Channel invasion of France planned for mid-1944 by attacking the production of German fighter aircraft. Changes in tactics and availability of longer ranged fighters meant that the active Luftwaffe
550:
began the war with 381 warships of approximately 1,271,000 tons, and completed another 816 ships of 1,048,000 tons during the war. Of these, 1,744,000 tons were sunk; "625,000 tons were sunk by Navy and Marine aircraft, 375,000 tons by submarines, 183,000 tons by surface vessels, 55,000 tons by Army
255:
In attacks on urban areas incendiary bombs, were ton for ton, four to five times as destructive as high explosive. German fire defences were inadequate and in cases of fire storms ineffective. While cities were provided with very strong bunkers—resistant to direct hits—as air raid shelters there was
251:
The survey notes the effects on the German population: 3,600,000 "dwelling units", approximately 20% of total housing stock were "destroyed or heavily damaged" with an estimated 300,000 civilians killed and a further 780,000 wounded. About seven and half million were left homeless. The survey found
891:
The surveys of both the European and Pacific Wars were managed by a team of a dozen civilians, support by "300 civilians, 350 officers, and 500 enlisted men", who followed closely the advance of the Allied forces, to search for written records of German decisions before the disappeared completely.
453:
The Survey concluded that one reason German production rose in so many areas was in part that the German economy did not go on a complete war footing until late 1942 and 1943. German strategy had been focussed on short decisive campaigns with no thought to a sustained war and consequent production.
363:
production: "In 1944 the German air force is reported to have accepted a total of 39,807 aircraft of all types -- compared with 8,295 in 1939, or 15,596 in 1942 before the plants suffered any attack." According to the report, almost none of the aircraft produced in 1944 were used in combat and some
280:
position that the attacks were "catastrophic" with Speer writing on 30 June that aviation fuel was reduced by 90%.An attempt at rebuilding and dispersing production employing a workforce of 350,000 men was made but incomplete by the end of the war From May 1944 production was less than consumption
461:
German aircraft production increased as spare capacity in the industry was used, and dispersal of production increased resilience. The effective combat strength of the Luftwaffe did not increase despite the large numbers of aircraft available. In each of the three months at the start of 1944, over
173:
The Allied strategy was to win the war by a land war in Europe rather than delivering a knock out blow by airpower alone, and the bombing strategy was in support of that. Over the course of the war, the focus of the Combined Bomber Offensive changed. As Germany was reliant on imported fuel and the
156:
concentrating on particular areas of German industry but in such a way as their commanders interpreted their instructions. In 1942 and early 1943 the US 8th Air Force based in UK had limited itself to raids close to base as it built up its strength, and developed tactics. A second strategic force,
84:
The survey said of Allied airpower that it "was decisive in the war in Western Europe. Hindsight inevitably suggests that it might have been employed differently or better in some respects. Nevertheless, it was decisive. In the air, its victory was complete. At sea, its contribution, combined with
909:
The introduction to the summary report of air power in Europe noted that, "Allied air power was called upon to play many roles-partner with the Navy over the sea lanes; partner with the Army in ground battle; partner with both on the invasion beaches; reconnaissance photographer for all; mover of
646:
in the form of tunnels cut into the sides of hills. "...all the occupants back from the entrances survived, even in those tunnels almost directly under the explosion. Those not in a direct line with the entrance were uninjured. The tunnels had a capacity of roughly 100,000 persons. Had the proper
554:
The Japanese merchant fleet was likewise destroyed. They started the war with 6,000,000 tons of merchant ships over 500 tons gross weight, which was alone not sufficient to provide for the wartime economy. Another 4,100,000 tons were constructed, captured or requisitioned. However, 8,900,000 tons
440:
The German power network had not been attacked as the Allied assessment was that it was well organised and resistant to bombing, The survey found that power production and distribution was known by the Germans to be vulnerable and the survey opined that if it had been attacked it would have had a
931:
Pape (1996) studied the use of air power from the First World War into the 1990s. He concluded that air power could be effective in direct support of ground operations, but strategic bombing was a waste. Pape's conclusions were supported by a more formal quantitative analysis of a larger set of
634:
In Nagasaki (August 9, 1945), approximately 40,000 persons were killed or missing and a like number injured. This was from a population of about 285,000, which had been reduced to around 230,000 by August 1945. Of the 52,000 residential buildings in Nagasaki, 14,000 were totally destroyed and a
650:
The report also concluded that: "Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have
655:
disputed this counterfactual, stating that testimony from Japanese leaders in USSBS interrogations supported the likelihood of Japan continuing the war beyond November and December 1945. Gentile stated that survey authors chose not to publish such evidence, as it challenged their conclusions.
247:
The report, along with some 200 supporting documents, was dated 30 September 1945. However it was not publicly released until 30 October 1945. The major conclusion of the report was that strategic bombing, particularly the destruction of the oil industry and truck manufacturing, had greatly
895:
A review of a biography of Galbraith said that the survey "found that, contrary to the claims of the U.S. Air Force , "Germany’s war production rose for much of the period when American and British air attacks were at their fiercest. An obituary of Galbraith for the free market economist
325:
was never directly attacked, but production was sharply cut during the same period by elimination of its component supplies and the bombing of its power sources. By December 1944, production of trucks was reduced to 35 percent of the average for the first half of the year. After the war,
555:
were sunk, the vast majority of their fleet. Of this, "54.7 percent of this total was attributable to submarines, 16.3 percent to carrier based planes, 10.2 percent to Army land-based planes and 4.3 percent to Navy and Marine land-based planes, 9.3 percent to mines (largely dropped by
370:
production "reached its wartime peak in December 1944, when 1,854 tanks and armoured vehicles were produced. This industry continued to have relatively high production through February 1945." but the effect again may have been to cause the industry to fall short of achievable
174:
synthetic generation of fuel from coal, attacks on such facilities were ordered. While some attacks were successful, the aircraft and crew losses were far beyond what could be sustained and further attacks were limited to within range of supporting fighters In late 1943, the
136:
identified that attacks on specific targets were inaccurate due to navigational and target identification issues. Bomber Command reorganised its efforts and targeted German industrial locations in general rather than aiming for any specific factory or industry under the
537:
The survey identified that there was no civilian control of the military nor coordination between army and navy. The Japanese Army and Japanese Navy pursued their own foreign policy, independent of the government, according to their own requirements and capacities.
149:" where their many machine guns would be sufficient to drive off or bring down enemy fighters. In practice due to many factors including the weather bombing accuracy fell short - around 20% of bombs fell within the required 1000 ft of the aiming point.
426:: Bombing greatly reduced production within Germany in 1944 chiefly through damage to utilities the blast furnaces and mills depended on. The survey considered the loss was not decisive (and was overshadowed by general collapse of German economy)
248:
contributed to the success of the Allies in World War II. However, despite the overall contribution of the bombing, the survey concluded that the impact of strategic bombing could not be separated from the general collapse of Germany in 1945.
144:
The USAAF entered the strategic bombing campaign with the intention of targeting specific industrial locations and to achieve precision bombing the attacks needed to be made by daylight. Formations of bombers flew in a mutually self-defensive
454:
Up until then, factories had been on a single shift in many industries and the German economy was generally inefficient and not operating at full capacity. They also noted that women's participation in the manufacturing field remained low,
80:
In total, the reports contained 208 volumes for Europe and another 108 for the Pacific, comprising thousands of pages. The reports' conclusions were generally favorable about the contributions of Allied strategic bombing towards victory.
534:, and ship these materials to Japan for processing". They also noted the belief that high casualties would not be accepted by the U.S. democracy, and that if the initial campaigns were successful, a negotiated peace was possible.
618:
They noted that although the blast wave was of about the same pressure as that of a high-explosive bomb, the duration of the effect was longer and that brick buildings were collapsed as far as 7,300 feet (2,200 m) at
252:
that German morale deteriorated after attacks night bombing having a greater effect but although dissatisfaction with the war increased, under the German police state the will or means to oppose the leadership was absent.
627:, while traditional wood houses were about the same, while reinforced-concrete structures suffered structural damage or collapse up to 700 feet (210 m) at Hiroshima and 2,000 feet (610 m) at Nagasaki.
575:
In total, Allied aircraft dropped 656,400 tons of bombs on Japanese targets, 160,800 tons on the home islands. In Europe there were 2,770,000 tons dropped, and 1,415,745 tons on Germany specifically.
1061:). RAND failed to confirm Pape's claims; if they had reached the same conclusions as Horowitz and Reiter (2001), it might have threatened their ability to get more funds from the U.S. Air Force
276:
complex (largest of the plants) that produced a notable portion of the synthetic oil which as a result of bombing averaged an output of 9% of capacity from mid 1944 The survey reported the
506:
And concluded that "The great lesson to be learned in the battered towns of England and the ruined cities of Germany is that the best way to win a war is to prevent it from occurring."
179:
force was significantly diminished in early 1944 and the majority of the bombing offensive was directed instead against transport routes to prevent reinforcement of the defences there.
483:
Under state control, despite the attacks on them, the German people were resilient to the bombing campaign and that "power of a police state over its people cannot be underestimated."
1528:
651:
surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated." Military historian
924:
In other words, the Allies may have obtained roughly the same benefits from strategic bombing of "the enemy's vital strength far behind the battle line" as Hitler gained from
347:
railways and on waterways. Bombing from September disrupted movement of material and products. In February 1945 the Ruhr was completely isolated from supplies of coal.
128:
The strategic bombing effort against Germany had begun at the start of the war with British attacks on German naval facilities. After heavy losses in daylight raids,
961:
432:: The survey summary stated "In the early years of the war—the soft war period for Germany—civilian consumption remained high. Germans continued to try for both
495:
Importance of Allied research, technological and production improvements to achieve "superiority in both numbers and quality of crews, aircraft, and equipment"
85:
naval power, brought an end to the enemy's greatest naval threat-the U-boat; on land, it helped turn the tide overwhelmingly in favor of Allied ground forces"
492:
American intelligence on the German economy at start of war was inadequate and there was no coordination between military and other government organisations.
1986:
1832:
790:
30:
17:
92:
in positions of influence on the various committees of the survey. Only one position of some influence was given to a prominent military officer,
1017:", but they continued to work, and they took action to ensure that essential services were provided when their official leaders failed to do so.
1529:
https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/i/interrogations-japanese-officials-voli.html#no75
299:, shifted the last nitrogen from the war effort to agriculture because he believed the war was lost and next year's crops were more important.
108:'s former deputy commander of operations. While the Board was not associated with any branch of the military, it was established by General
522:
which would upset any U.S. plans in the Pacific for an estimated 18 months to 2 years. During this time, they planned to "speedily extract
256:
insufficient capacity (enough for 8 million) and casualties outside the shelters among those sheltering in basements and cellars was high.
1640:
647:
alarm been sounded, and these tunnel shelters been filled to capacity, the loss of life in Nagasaki would have been substantially lower."
152:
The 1943 Casablanca conference led to the Allied strategic bombing organisation: the USAAF would be working together with the RAF in the
104:) and that only in an advisory capacity. Anderson was the only one on the survey board who knew about procedures of strategic bombing as
455:
50:) was a written report created by a board of experts assembled to produce an impartial assessment of the effects of the Anglo-American
287:: Production fell markedly in 1944 and the arms industry shipped bombs and shells packed partly with rock salt, as Germany ran out of
612:
75:
594:
B-29s in Operation Meetinghouse. The Survey estimated that 88,000 died, while the Tokyo Fire Department estimated 97,000. Historian
1434:
956:
486:
Germany was more concerned about attack on infrastructure that supported several industries than attacks on any particular industry
397:
116:(commander of Strategic Air Forces in Europe). Failing to obtain the prominent public figure he had hoped for, Arnold settled for
2020:
1527:
Admiral Soemu Toyoda (IJN) recollection - United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific) Interrogations of Japanese Officials
1411:"Truman Library: United States Strategic Bombing Survey, July 1, 1946. Truman Papers, President's Secretary's File. Atomic Bomb"
1005:
project, which collected thousands of observations by British volunteers during World War II, concluded that the Germans gained
1956:
1155:
932:
cases by Horowitz and Reiter (2001). The claims of Galbraith, Pape (1996) and Horowitz and Reiter (2001) are controversial.
377:: "There is no evidence that the attacks on the ball-bearing industry had any measurable effect on essential war production."
214:. The Survey was tasked with producing an impartial report on the effects of the bombing against Nazi Germany, in order to:
560:
546:
The Survey received sufficient information to detail every ship used by the Japanese during the war. They noted that the
518:. The report opens with a discussion of the Japanese strategic plans, which were based on an initial victory against the
1287:
1229:
1806:
1735:
1730:
1703:
1653:
1447:
1113:
897:
401:
474:
The ability of the Allies to attack unhindered from the air meant by the last year of the war, Germany was finished.
1725:
917:
in response to strategic bombing by the Allies. Destroyed factories were quickly reconstituted in hardened sites.
587:
514:
After the European report was completed, as order by Truman in August 1945, the Survey turned its attention to the
458:. The sections of the Survey regarding the German production system remain one of the best resources on the topic.
59:
1751:
M. Horowitz; D. Reiter (1 April 2001). "When Does Aerial Bombing Work?: Quantitative Empirical Tests, 1917-1999".
1578:
M. Horowitz; D. Reiter (1 April 2001). "When Does Aerial Bombing Work?: Quantitative Empirical Tests, 1917-1999".
330:, owner of Opel, successfully sued the US government for $ 32 million in damages sustained to its German plants (
62:. After publishing the report in 1945, the Survey members then turned their attention to the war efforts against
582:
in which less than 10% of the bombs fell near their targets, Allied air forces switched to low-level night-time
1753:
1580:
1040:
966:
869:
334:
also demanded compensation from the U.S. government for "losses" due to bomb damage to its German subsidiary).
1371:
1014:
480:
Despite the attacks, Germany was able to reorganise and take measures to mitigate some effects of the attacks
93:
1266:
269:
1921:
35:
235:
794:
556:
367:
192:
153:
1218:. Connellsville, Pennsylvania. International News Service. pp. 1, 5 – via Newspapers.com.
1186:
1798:
941:
433:
1660:
identical reprint of the Summary Reports (Europe and the Pacific) of the strategic bombing surveys
986:
559:), less than 1 percent to surface gunfire and the balance of 4 percent to marine accidents." The
1627:
392:
sites): "The bombing of the launching sites being prepared for the V weapons delayed the use of
1636:
1374:
1181:
918:
744:
717:
547:
489:
Persistence of attack, it was not sufficient to attack a target once but to return to it again.
270:
Oil Plan portion of the bombing campaign against petroleum, oil, and lubrication (POL) products
138:
101:
1834:
Review of Richard Parker (2005) John Kenneth Galbraith: His life, his politics, his economics
477:
Domination of the air was necessary to allow effective strategic bombing of the German economy
1695:
635:
further 5,400 badly damaged. The vast majority of Nagasaki's industrial output was from the
859:
845:
691:
591:
564:
503:
be treated rather as signposts pointing the direction in which such answers may be found".
175:
1475:"Advocacy or Assessment?: The United States Strategic Bombing Survey of Germany and Japan"
1393:"Advocacy or Assessment?: The United States Strategic Bombing Survey of Germany and Japan"
1105:
586:
against Japanese cities. On the night of 9–10 March 1945, 16 square miles (41 km) of
8:
1667:
1628:
681:
344:
158:
117:
1972:
Advocacy or Assessment?: The United States Strategic Bombing Survey of Germany and Japan
1453:
1721:
1632:
699:
385:
381:
331:
129:
470:
In respect of the bombing campaign over Europe, the survey identified several points:
413:
1802:
1770:
1699:
1649:
1597:
1443:
1109:
1100:
Masters of the Air: America's Bomber Boys Who Fought the Air War Against Nazi Germany
913:
The survey reported that the rate of production of war materials by Germany actually
579:
531:
228:
211:
166:
97:
51:
1949:
1990:
1838:
1820:
1778:
1762:
1739:
1709:
1675:
1605:
1589:
1177:
1053:
1049:
1027:
1002:
946:
389:
188:
1970:
1960:
1925:
1812:
1098:
709:
639:
factories and steel plant, which were 58 and 78 percent destroyed, respectively.
393:
162:
109:
105:
1932:
4 vols. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1961. Official British history.
1917:. 8 vols. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948–1958. Official AAF history.
1766:
1593:
291:, a vital ingredient and methanol (another product of fuel synthesis). Finally,
210:
was part of the survey team before going on to become a significant theorist in
169:
in Mediterranean were focused on tactical operations in support of land forces.
1174:
Disasters and Mental Health: Therapeutic Principles Drawn From Disaster Studies
1036:
951:
595:
527:
429:
327:
305:
manufacturing facilities were extensively bombed. Of the top three producers,
268:"The Attack on Oil". This section of the USSBS presents the statistics for the
71:
63:
567:
also played a significant role, sinking or damaging more than 1,250,000 tons.
2014:
1849:
1774:
1687:
1601:
1442:. Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press. 1987 . p. 107.
1295:
998:
822:
757:
643:
374:
207:
1842:
1824:
1743:
1713:
1679:
1410:
1211:
1057:
313:, was completely shut down in one raid in August 1944, and never recovered.
1966:
1470:
1388:
1032:
652:
318:
314:
306:
296:
292:
277:
55:
1816:
1782:
1609:
1790:
599:
583:
515:
417:
356:
The Survey also noted a number of failed or outcomes of limited success:
310:
133:
113:
67:
1031:
928:, namely nothing -- or worse: increasing their enemies' will to resist.
241:
determine future economic policies with respect to the national defense.
132:
moved to night attacks for protection from German fighter defences. The
1474:
1392:
781:
726:
636:
409:
405:
284:
196:
146:
1859:"United States Strategic Bombing Survey Summary Report (European War)"
1009:
from their investment in bombing British civilian targets as part of "
223:
establish a basis for evaluating the importance and potentialities of
1865:"United States Strategic Bombing Survey Summary Report (Pacific War)"
1010:
989:
was created as a separate service from the USAAF on 18 September 1947
925:
620:
519:
264:
The Survey noted several successes against crucial industrial areas:
224:
89:
27:
Report on the effects of Allied strategic bombing during World War II
1995:
343:
Disruption of transportation: German transport was dependent on the
1999:
1864:
1858:
624:
442:
360:
400:, however, were not effective; V-1 was already in production near
187:
The Survey team was formed on 3 November 1944 by Secretary of War
523:
322:
288:
200:
1642:
The United States Bombing Surveys, (European War) (Pacific War)
337:
631:
all the remainder received at least light superficial damage.
611:
The Survey dedicates a separate section of the reports to the
161:
was created in the Mediterranean. Two further air forces, the
423:
302:
273:
1908:
The Effect of Bombing on Health and Medical Care In Germany.
220:
aid the upcoming campaign against the Japanese home islands,
1887:
The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German War Economy
1288:"Army Air Forces in World War II: The Secondary Campaigns"
420:
dams, though the cost was small, also had limited effect."
398:
attacks on the V-weapon experimental station at Peenemunde
317:
was decimated a month later. The third largest producer,
1906:
Morale Division, United States Strategic Bombing Survey.
1901:
The Effects of Strategic Bombing on German Transportation
1726:"John Kenneth Galbraith: A Criticism and an Appreciation"
1369:
Caldwell, Hamlin A., Jr., "Air Force Maritime Missions",
1143:
962:
Debate over the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
1987:
Works by or about United States Strategic Bombing Survey
1267:"Ford and GM Scrutinized for Alleged Nazi Collaboration"
234:
provide data for planning the future development of the
70:, including a separate section on the recent use of the
1212:"305,000 Civilians Killed in Germany By Allied Bombers"
1946:
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987.
1026:
Horowitz and Reiter's study used data compiled by the
563:
played the largest role, while naval mining by air in
1750:
1577:
1500:
Air University (1987, p. 46; p. 51 of 126 in pdf).
1180:: University of Delaware Disaster Research Center.
791:
Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs
340:(submarine) manufacturing was halted in early 1945.
38:
bombers attacking a Romanian oil refinery, May 1944
1944:The Collapse of the German War Economy, 1944–1945.
1720:
1097:
659:
1668:"The Long Arm of the US Strategic Bombing Survey"
793:, chief of the Metals and Minerals Branch of the
2012:
1996:Works by United States Strategic Bombing Survey
1903:. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1947.
1889:. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1945.
1882:. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1945.
1559:a maximum of arrogance and a minimum of tact.”'
598:estimated more than 100,000, though journalist
1851:United States Strategic Bombing Survey Reports
642:Unlike Hiroshima, Nagasaki featured extensive
551:aircraft, and 65,000 tons by various agents".
1910:Washington: Government Printing Office, 1947.
1896:Washington: Government Printing Office, 1947.
1795:Bombing to win: air power and coercion in war
1686:
1665:
1930:The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany.
1176:(Historical & Comparative;10 ed.).
1952:The Strategic Bombing of Germany, 1940–1945
1789:
1363:
570:
1571:
1154:sfn error: no target: CITEREFSummary1945 (
1030:for a study funded by the U.S. Air Force (
1892:United States Strategic Bombing Survey.
1185:
613:atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
578:After initial attacks from high-altitude
1899:United States Strategic Bombing Survey.
1885:United States Strategic Bombing Survey.
1878:United States Strategic Bombing Survey.
957:Civilian casualties of strategic bombing
854:aeronautical engineer and administrator
88:A majority of the Survey's members were
29:
1965:
1469:
1387:
1149:
904:
448:
14:
2013:
1095:
44:United States Strategic Bombing Survey
1913:Wesley F. Craven and Cate James Lea.
1481:. University of California Press: 57.
1399:. University of California Press: 70.
1282:
1280:
1264:
1209:
1171:
1167:
1165:
590:and tens of thousands were killed by
1265:Dobbs, Michael (November 30, 1998).
1230:"Air Power Called Decisive in Reich"
1915:The Army Air Forces in World War II
1894:The Defeat of the German Air Force.
1210:Music, Frances (October 30, 1945).
868:attorney, associate justice of the
830:PhD chemist, oil company executive
541:
24:
1872:
1277:
1162:
1042:Air Power as a Coercive Instrument
25:
2032:
1980:
1975:. Palo Alto: Stanford University.
1736:Foundation for Economic Education
1731:Foundation for Economic Education
1666:Rebecca Grant (1 February 2008).
1436:The United States Bombing Surveys
898:Foundation for Economic Education
623:and 8,500 feet (2,600 m) at
606:
530:, Burma, the Philippines and the
18:Strategic Bombing Survey (Europe)
2003:
1491:Air University (1987, pp. 3, 46)
1096:Miller, Donald L. (2006-10-10).
752:economist and Harvard professor
408:production had been moved to an
60:European theatre of World War II
1861:, Washington, 30 September 1945
1854:– via Hyperwar Foundation
1672:Air & Space Forces Magazine
1639:; et al. (October 1987) ,
1562:
1552:
1543:
1534:
1521:
1512:
1503:
1494:
1485:
1463:
1427:
1403:
1381:
1354:
1345:
1336:
1327:
1318:
1309:
1258:
1249:
1240:
1104:. Simon and Schuster. pp.
1020:
992:
979:
660:Survey officers and controversy
112:(chief of the USAF) along with
76:attacks on two Japanese cities.
2021:World War II strategic bombing
1937:A History of Strategic Bombing
1880:Over-All Report (European War)
1754:Journal of Conflict Resolution
1581:Journal of Conflict Resolution
1568:Harrisson (1976, esp. p. 281).
1236:. October 31, 1945. p. 8.
1222:
1203:
1194:
1134:
1125:
1089:
1080:
967:Technology during World War II
870:Supreme Court of Massachusetts
526:, oil, rubber and metals from
465:
191:in response to a directive by
13:
1:
1939:. New York: Scribner's, 1982.
1372:United States Naval Institute
1068:
588:eastern Tokyo were burned out
456:lower than during World War I
272:, particularly regarding the
123:
1294:. 2008-05-16. Archived from
1255:D'Olier et al. (1987), p.29.
1001:, one of the leaders of the
259:
7:
2002:(public domain audiobooks)
1767:10.1177/0022002701045002001
1594:10.1177/0022002701045002001
1540:D'Olier et al. (1986, p. 5)
1378:, October 1978, p. 33.
935:
725:attorney , official of the
351:
36:Consolidated B-24 Liberator
10:
2037:
509:
236:United States armed forces
195:. The headquarters was in
1867:, Washington, 1 July 1946
1479:Pacific Historical Review
1397:Pacific Historical Review
1039:; Eric V. Larson (1999),
795:Board of Economic Warfare
694:, WW I, American Legion)
561:Allied submarine campaign
368:Armoured fighting vehicle
182:
154:Combined Bomber offensive
1799:Cornell University Press
1648:, Air University Press,
1509:Review of Parker (2005).
1015:We shall never surrender
972:
942:Aerial bombing of cities
876:Walter Wilds, Secretary
789:finance director of the
765:psychologist, insurance
571:Against the home islands
384:against German dams and
364:may have been imaginary.
319:Ford's German subsidiary
1692:Living through the Bliz
1172:Fritz, Charles (1961).
987:United States Air Force
665:Officers of the Survey
380:"Secondary Campaigns" (
1459:on September 16, 2019.
919:John Kenneth Galbraith
835:Dr. Louis R. Thompson
770:Frank A. McNamee, Jr.
745:John Kenneth Galbraith
676:career prior to 1945
548:Imperial Japanese Navy
412:. The breaking of the
165:in Western Europe and
139:Area Bombing directive
102:Air War Plans Division
39:
1942:Alfred Mierzejewski.
1696:William Collins, Sons
1549:O'Dier et al. (1987).
1415:www.trumanlibrary.org
100:(who had been in the
33:
905:More recent research
860:Charles Codman Cabot
846:Theodore Paul Wright
673:Europe (e) Japan (p)
592:U.S. Army Air Forces
565:Operation Starvation
449:On German production
227:as an instrument of
176:Pointblank directive
1724:(1 December 2006).
1271:The Washington Post
1120:masters of the air.
666:
193:President Roosevelt
1959:2012-07-16 at the
1722:David R. Henderson
1633:Henry C. Alexander
1234:The New York Times
1200:USSBS (Europe) p 3
801:Robert P. Russell
700:Henry C. Alexander
664:
584:incendiary attacks
386:Operation Crossbow
382:Operation Chastise
332:Ford Motor Company
130:RAF Bomber Command
40:
1518:Henderson (2006).
1216:The Daily Courier
885:
884:
811:Fred Searls, Jr.
580:precision bombing
532:Dutch East Indies
441:severe effect on
410:underground plant
396:appreciably. The
229:military strategy
212:disaster research
167:Twelfth Air Force
98:Orvil A. Anderson
52:strategic bombing
16:(Redirected from
2028:
2007:
2006:
1991:Internet Archive
1976:
1967:Gentile, Gian P.
1950:Alan J. Levine,
1855:
1845:
1828:
1786:
1747:
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1683:
1662:
1647:
1629:Franklin D'Olier
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1498:
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1471:Gentile, Gian P.
1467:
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1460:
1458:
1452:. Archived from
1441:
1431:
1425:
1424:
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1421:
1407:
1401:
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1389:Gentile, Gian P.
1385:
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1060:
1050:RAND Corporation
1047:
1028:RAND Corporation
1024:
1018:
1003:Mass-Observation
996:
990:
983:
947:Area bombardment
823:Monroe E. Spaght
734:Harry L. Bowman
702:, Vice-Chairman
682:Franklin D'Olier
667:
663:
542:Against shipping
516:Pacific campaign
206:The sociologist
118:Franklin D'Olier
21:
2036:
2035:
2031:
2030:
2029:
2027:
2026:
2025:
2011:
2010:
2004:
1983:
1961:Wayback Machine
1926:Noble Frankland
1922:Charles Webster
1875:
1873:Further reading
1870:
1848:
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710:House of Morgan
662:
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434:guns and butter
354:
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172:
163:Ninth Air Force
126:
106:Jimmy Doolittle
28:
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1351:USSBS pp37-40
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1298:on 2008-05-16
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1478:
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1454:the original
1435:
1429:
1418:. Retrieved
1414:
1405:
1396:
1383:
1370:
1365:
1356:
1347:
1342:USSBS p19-20
1338:
1329:
1324:USSBS p34-35
1320:
1315:USSBS p27-28
1311:
1300:. Retrieved
1296:the original
1291:
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1233:
1224:
1215:
1205:
1196:
1173:
1150:Summary 1945
1145:
1136:
1127:
1119:
1099:
1091:
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1033:Daniel Byman
1022:
1006:
994:
981:
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908:
894:
890:
886:
862:, Secretary
848:, Directors
653:Gian Gentile
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513:
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501:
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315:Daimler-Benz
297:Nazi economy
293:Albert Speer
278:Nazi Germany
263:
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205:
186:
171:
151:
143:
127:
87:
83:
79:
56:Nazi Germany
47:
43:
41:
1791:Robert Pape
1637:George Ball
1375:Proceedings
690:insurance (
684:, Chairman
600:Mark Selden
466:Conclusions
371:production"
311:Brandenburg
134:Butt report
114:Carl Spaatz
72:atomic bomb
68:Pacific War
66:during the
58:during the
1843:Q114796388
1825:Q107458786
1744:Q114796509
1714:Q114816028
1680:Q114784725
1420:2017-11-13
1360:USSBS p 41
1302:2024-02-19
1246:USSBS p 21
1152:, Forward.
1069:References
1058:Q114832489
817:geologist
727:Lend Lease
692:Prudential
637:Mitsubishi
345:Reichsbahn
285:Ammunition
197:Teddington
147:combat box
124:Background
110:Hap Arnold
1783:Q29303332
1775:0022-0027
1610:Q29303332
1602:0022-0027
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520:U.S. Navy
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260:Successes
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