123:
peasants. The Sipahi was rewarded if he procured the settlement of vacant land, but punished if he caused the abandonment of cultivated land. Timar holders had police authority to pursue and arrest wrongdoers within their territories. However, they could not enforce penalties until they received a verdict from a local judge in accordance to imperial law. Their duties were to protect peasants and persons in their territory and to join the imperial army during campaigns. The sultan gave
Sipahis vineyards and a meadow for the needs of their families, retainers and horses. One of the main conditions imposed by the state was that a Timar holder did not own the land, as ownership was held by the Ottoman state. Another essential condition was that Timars could not be inherited but it was not uncommon for a Timar to be reassigned to a son provided they performed military service. Holding a Timar was contingent on active military service and if a Sipahi failed to participate in military service for seven years he lost his authority over the land grant. Nevertheless, a Sipahi retained his title and could be eligible for another Timar if he remained in the military class and participated in military campaigns.
99:. This system of land tenure lasted roughly from the fourteenth century through the sixteenth century. The goals of the system were necessitated by financial, state and expansionist purposes. The financial aims of the system were to relieve pressure from the Ottoman state of paying the army as well as to gain a new source of revenue for the central treasury. The expansionist aims were to increase the number of cavalry soldiers and to gradually assimilate and bring conquered countries under direct Ottoman control. The Ottoman state also desired to centralize the sultan’s authority by removing the feudal system and aristocratic elements from dominating the empire.
225:), would go out and find a vacant Timar suitable for him. It has been suggested that there was a regular rotation system so that Timar holders were dismissed after serving a defined period of tenure. This length would vary case to case. As long as the candidate participated regularly in the Sultan’s military campaigns who would be eligible for a Timar grant. This made it so competing groups formed and were motivated to fight for the Sultan’s favouritism and patronage.
211:) that mediated and resolved contradictions especially between those two non-Islamic legal traditions – local and imperial – upon which the Ottomans based their dominion 3) officials consult with local grandees and proceeded from village to village to inspect and evaluate land and other holdings 4) draw up results of the survey in a register prefaced by the
250:
held unites, or divided into shares. This growing demand also forced the
Ottoman Sultan’s to engage in further wars of conquest in neighbouring countries thus creating Timars through new surveys. This however, also increased the number of candidates for Timar grants. The solution to this crisis took two forms: more than one
122:
to collect revenues and exercise the delegated powers. They had the right to collect certain parts of the tax revenue from arable lands in certain localities in return for service to the state. They were responsible for supervising their Timar territory and the way it was cultivated and possessed by
94:
were given as compensation for annual military service, for which they received no pay. In rare circumstances women could become timar holders. However, this privilege was restricted to women who were prominent within the imperial family, or high-ranking members of the
Ottoman elite. Timars could be
170:
in 1453, the
Ottomans turned once more to the familiar policy of expansion through conquest. With the period of consolidation that followed there was a move towards total annexation and assimilation of the provinces into the Ottoman system. This meant the elimination of local dynasties and replacing
249:
for these grants in reward for participating in the growing number of campaigns. Furthermore, Timars were being offered to volunteers and members of the pre-Ottoman military class for their loyalty and service to the Sultan. In order to meet this new demand, existing Timars were turned into jointly
218:
Based on these fiscal projections, the Sultan would distribute the land and villages to the soldiers who had participated in the conquest. Initially the candidates for Timar were recommended individually to the Sultan. Upon receiving this recommendation, the Sultan commanded the provincial governor
254:
holding a single Timar and instead of receiving an entire village, Sipahis were given shares in many villages in order to make up their Timar. These solutions likely had further implications than just meeting the demands of a growing demographic. The
Ottoman government had a policy of keeping the
329:
had demanded the formation of a modern standing and professional army. Therefore, cash was needed to maintain them. Essentially, the gun was cheaper than a horse. By the early decades of the seventeenth century, much of the Timar revenue was brought into the central treasury as substitute money
107:
Within the Timar system the state gave Timar holders, including the
Sipahis, the authority to control of arable lands, vacant lands or land possessed by peasants, wastelands, fruit trees, forests or waters within the Timar territory. The Sipahis employed agents or surrogates called
131:
Due to the nature of the documentation of the early history of the
Ottomans it is very difficult to assign the Timar system a concrete date. Elements of the Timar system however can be seen to have their origins in Pre-Islamic antiquity (Ancient Middle Eastern Empires,
336:) for exemption from military service. Since they were no longer needed, when the Timar holders died off, their holdings would not be reassigned, but were brought under imperial domain. Once under direct control the vacant land would be turned into Tax Farms (
289:
holders were never precisely defined by the
Ottoman government, which caused frequent tensions between the Porte and the provinces. This tensions probably additionally contributed to the decay of the traditional timar system because it left
255:
registered Timars intact even while the number of
Sipahis grew. Furthermore, it prevented Sipahis from gaining complete and independent control over the peasants and land within a territory. The institution of
317:). With the onset of new military technologies, particularly the gun, the Sipahis, who had once made up the backbone of the Ottoman army, were becoming obsolete. The long and costly wars which the Ottoman
305:
constituted the largest single division in the
Ottoman army. Sipahis were responsible for their own expenses, including provision during the campaigns, their equipment, providing auxiliary men (
95:
small, when they would be granted by governors, or large, which then required a certificate from the Sultan, but generally the fief had an annual tax revenue value of less than 20,000
166:, these men would once again have legal title to their holdings. Over the next fifty years this system of land tenure was largely expanded and standardized. After the conquest of
78:
In the Ottoman Empire, the timar system was one in which the projected revenue of a conquered territory was distributed in the form of temporary land grants among the
237:(r. 1451–1481) reigned over the Ottoman Empire the number of candidates eligible for Timar grants had fallen substantially. There was a growing expectation among the
205:) collected available documentation about land and building ownership and local taxes 2) information is written down and codified in a narrative called (
187:, all the fiscal information about the territory would be collected and divided into Timar. The process went as follows: 1) appoint administrator (
150:
of the late Byzantine era is perhaps the immediate predecessor of the Timar system. However, it was not until the re-emergence of the empire under
997:
184:
221:
388:
1007:
1012:
307:
195:
845:
815:
774:
569:
533:
35:
916:. Erlanger Geographische Arbeiten, Sonderband 5. Erlangen, Germany: Vorstand der Fränkischen Geographischen Gesellschaft.
1002:
301:
By the end of the sixteenth century the Timar system of land tenure had begun its unrecoverable decline. In 1528, the
921:
46:. The revenues produced from the land acted as compensation for military service. A holder of a timar was known as a
486:
261:
was introduced to make burden of government officials easier by compensating losses of its high officials. An
764:
215:
that listed the names of all the towns, villages and populations, what they produced and expected revenues.
154:
in 1413 that a tenure system that was distinctly Timar was developed. Before the collapse of the empire by
162:
had granted quasi-Timar holdings to his own servants. With the reunification of the Ottoman lands under a
525:
Kurdish notables and the Ottoman state: evolving identities, competing loyalties, and shifting boundaries
179:
By the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the surveying and distribution of conquered territory among the
273:, as a temporary arrangement before they were appointed to some appropriate position. It was a kind of
971:
Reindl-Kiel, Hedda. “A Woman Timar Holder in Ankara Province during the Second of the 16th Century.”
381:
906:
Goffman, Daniel. The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2007
219:
to award the candidate with Timar in the province. The candidate then, “with the Sultan’s order” (
189:
183:
class had become a very complicated and highly bureaucratic process. In the survey, known as the
42:
between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries, with an annual tax revenue of less than 20,000
957:
Murphey, Rhoads. “Ottoman Census Methods in the Mid-Sixteenth Century: Three Case Histories.”
835:
805:
523:
424:
913:
Historical Geography of Palestine, Transjordan and Southern Syria in the Late 16th Century
593:
8:
978:
930:
917:
841:
811:
780:
770:
565:
529:
295:
491:
911:
747:
559:
20:
410:
171:
them with the Timar system and other apparatuses of provincial administration.
167:
66:
39:
991:
947:
481:, enrollment into state or ecclesiastical service, often relating to military
784:
338:
964:
Ozel, Oktay. “Limits of the Almighty: Mehmed II’s ‘Land Reform’ Revised.”
503:
441:
278:
83:
31:
342:) in order to ensure greater cash revenue for the central government.
110:
50:. If the revenues produced from the timar were from 20,000 to 100,000
404:
398:
322:
238:
234:
207:
159:
137:
47:
354:
478:
451:
375:
366:
302:
274:
270:
151:
561:
Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise to Western Power
498:
475:, system of granting state income to individuals and institutions
472:
466:
446:
281:. Instead to resolving the Porte's problems, the institutions of
257:
146:
91:
766:
An Ottoman century : the district of Jerusalem in the 1600s
201:
43:
430:
360:
318:
291:
277:
given to increasing number of members of the Ottoman elite for
266:
251:
246:
180:
163:
87:
82:(cavalrymen) and other members of the military class including
79:
56:
935:
An Economic and Social history of the Ottoman Empire 1300–1914
903:. Vol. 8, 11, 10. London: Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 1986
418:
332:
313:
155:
837:
Ottoman Century, An: The District of Jerusalem in the 1600s
769:, Albany: State University of New York Press, p. 121,
326:
242:
141:
133:
899:
Gwinn, Robert P, Charles E. Swanson, and Philip W. Goetz.
285:
introduced new, even bigger ones. The exact duties of the
269:) entrusted to some holder of senior position, or to some
973:
Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient
966:
Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient
749:
The Ottoman ayan, 1550-1812: a struggle for legitimacy
909:
752:. University of Wisconsin--Madison. pp. 98, 99.
681:
679:
677:
675:
910:Hütteroth, Wolf-Dieter; Abdulfattah, Kamal (1977).
635:
633:
631:
741:
739:
829:
827:
672:
989:
628:
454:, Sipahi cavalryman, beneficiary of a
950:. “Ottoman Land Tenure and Taxation in Syria.”
940:Inalcik, Halil. “Ottoman Methods of conquest.”
736:
421:, high Ottoman rank, usually given to governors
824:
438:Ottoman military corps, part of feudal system
984:. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006
937:. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994
665:
663:
174:
745:
833:
660:
389:Foreign purchases of real estate in Turkey
16:Feudal land granted by the Ottoman sultans
797:
720:
718:
228:
102:
990:
762:
603:
601:
557:
548:Hütteroth and Abdulfattah, 1977, p. 99
521:
351:Ottoman law & land administration
998:Land management in the Ottoman Empire
804:Somel, Selcuk Aksin (23 March 2010).
803:
715:
564:. Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group.
733:Inalcik (1994) 73; 114–115; 116–117
598:
558:Hanson, Victor Davis (2007-12-18).
542:
13:
746:Katircioglu, Nurhan Fatma (1984).
14:
1024:
869:Inalcik (1994) 115; 117; 434; 467
433:, feudal unit governed by an Agha
60:, and if they were above 100,000
1008:Types of administrative division
834:Ze'evi, Dror (1 February 2012).
807:The A to Z of the Ottoman Empire
463:Byzantine administrative system
1013:Feudalism in the Ottoman Empire
901:The New Encyclopædia Britannica
893:
881:
872:
863:
854:
810:. Scarecrow Press. p. 24.
756:
727:
706:
697:
688:
651:
642:
73:
64:, the grant would be called a
975:. 40 (1997), pp. 2007–238
619:
610:
587:
578:
551:
515:
487:Israeli land and property laws
369:, 19th-century reform movement
54:, the land grant was called a
1:
982:Early Modern Europe 1450–1789
509:
19:For the Turkish village, see
528:. SUNY Press. pp. 52–.
7:
840:. SUNY Press. p. 121.
345:
10:
1029:
961:. (1990), pp. 115–126
954:. (1979), pp. 109–124
175:Surveying and distribution
126:
86:and other servants of the
18:
1003:Turkish words and phrases
382:Ottoman Land Code of 1858
265:was a large estate (i.e.
968:. 42 (1999), pp. 226–246
193:– accompanied by clerk (
979:Wiesner-Hanks, Merry E.
492:Torrens title in Israel
372:Land ownership systems
363:, land and tax registry
522:Özoğlu, Hakan (2004).
763:Zeʼevi, Dror (1996),
425:Agha (Ottoman Empire)
199:) and regional judge
469:, senior officialdom
229:Problems and decline
103:Power and conditions
944:. 2 (1954): 103–129
241:soldiers and other
724:Inalcik (1994) 116
703:Inalcik (1954) 106
685:Inalcik (1994) 115
639:Inalcik (1994) 114
321:waged against the
140:, and pre-Islamic
878:Inalcik (1994) 73
860:Inalcik (1994) 90
847:978-1-4384-2475-0
817:978-1-4617-3176-4
776:978-0-585-04345-6
648:Inalcik (1994) 74
616:Wiesner-Hanks, 73
571:978-0-307-42518-8
535:978-0-7914-5993-5
294:out of the clear
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584:Reindl-Kiel, 208
582:
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546:
540:
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519:
395:Ottoman sultans
296:chain of command
1028:
1027:
1023:
1022:
1021:
1019:
1018:
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959:Studia Islamica
952:Studia Islamica
942:Studia Islamica
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24:
21:Timar, Pasinler
17:
12:
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5:
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948:Lewis, Bernard
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411:Abdul Hamid II
408:
402:
401:(c. 1360–1403)
393:
392:
391:
386:
385:
384:
379:
370:
364:
358:
347:
344:
311:) and valets (
230:
227:
176:
173:
168:Constantinople
128:
125:
104:
101:
75:
72:
40:Ottoman Empire
15:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
1025:
1014:
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923:3-920405-41-2
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357:, code of law
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894:Bibliography
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788:, retrieved
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233:By the time
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194:
188:
185:Tapu-tahrirs
178:
145:
130:
119:
115:
109:
106:
96:
77:
74:Timar system
65:
61:
55:
51:
27:
25:
790:29 December
712:Goffman, 77
504:Land reform
442:Janissaries
413:(1876–1909)
407:(1432–1481)
279:tax farming
84:Janissaries
992:Categories
887:Lewis, 122
694:Lewis, 112
669:Lewis, 118
625:Lewis, 117
510:References
458: fief
427:, or lord
222:eli-emirlu
32:land grant
657:Ozel, 230
607:Ozel, 234
405:Mehmed II
399:Bayezid I
339:muqata'ah
323:Habsburgs
239:Janissary
235:Mehmed II
213:Kanunname
208:Kanunname
158:in 1402,
138:Byzantium
785:42854785
479:Strateia
452:Timariot
378:/Chiflik
376:Chiftlik
367:Tanzimat
346:See also
327:Iranians
303:Timariot
275:appanage
271:margrave
152:Mehmed I
92:prebends
90:. These
48:timariot
594:Ottoman
499:Fiefdom
473:Pronoia
467:Dynatoi
447:Sipahis
319:Sultans
292:sipahis
287:arpalik
283:arpalik
263:arpalik
258:arpalik
245:of the
160:Bayezid
147:Pronoia
127:Origins
120:voyvoda
111:Kethüda
80:Sipahis
38:of the
36:sultans
34:by the
920:
844:
814:
783:
773:
568:
532:
431:Agaluk
361:Defter
355:Düstur
308:cebelu
267:sanjak
252:Sipahi
247:Sultan
181:Sipahi
164:Sultan
88:sultan
57:zeamet
30:was a
456:timar
419:Pasha
333:bedel
314:gulam
196:katip
156:Timur
118:, or
116:Vekil
97:akçes
62:akçes
52:akçes
44:akçes
28:timar
918:ISBN
842:ISBN
812:ISBN
792:2011
781:OCLC
771:ISBN
566:ISBN
530:ISBN
325:and
243:Kuls
202:kadı
190:emin
142:Iran
134:Rome
67:hass
144:).
994::
933:.
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