Unconventional warfare (United States)

48: 2649:. While SF have missions other than UW, UW can more impact when they can create a much larger force of guerrillas rather than trying to do everything themselves. An effective SF commander had the attitude, "Hey, we're all in this together with our Kurdish counterparts,"... Our commander and his counterpart ... were very close and like-minded, to the point that they would show up together for JSOTF coordination and planning meetings ... In fact, I would say that what they were seeing was genuine rapport and a real camaraderie. In our sector, the Kurds had a standing order not to allow any Americans to get killed, and thus they surrounded our ODAs during combat." 2361:, SF teams worked with the Kuwaiti resistance. When they can direct, using long-distance secure communications, air and missile strikes on targets, the guerrillas need not risk their limited resources in raids and ambushes. While U.S. special operations doctrine had conceived of guiding strikes, that was seen as being done directly by SF specialists. The evolving model would have SF UW trainers teach the guerrillas how to guide strikes against targets. Separating the means of destruction from the guerrillas not only makes them safer, but avoids the problem of "blowback" if the guerrillas later turn against the U.S. 2606:, may have a role in establishing policy for the UW operation, which is under the direct command of a joint organization made up of U.S. and government in exile personnel. Personnel qualified in the UW mission provided the NCA and UCC commanders with "a flexible, highly trained military force ready for small-scale, complex, high-risk missions inside hostile states. Throughout its history, SF's core purpose has been unconventional warfare (UW) and although light infantry and paramilitary units may employ UW tactics, SOF remain the only doctrinally trained UW experts". 2285:

objective is to inflict casualties and damage on the enemy rather than seize or defend terrain; these operations are characterized by the extensive use of surprise and the emphasis on the avoidance of casualties. The term ... includes organized and directed passive resistance, espionage, assassination, sabotage and propaganda, and, in some cases, ordinary combat. Guerilla warfare is normally carried on by irregular, or partisan forces; however, regular forces that have been cut off behind enemy lines or infiltrated into the enemy rear areas may use guerilla tactics.

3115:, fastened next to a trail, and with a taut wire attached to the activating lever of the grenade. Stepping on the wire would pull out the safety ring and start the detonation sequence of the grenade. SF policy does not clearly address this type of device, or those made completely from local materials and having no automatic disarming features. The U.S. Rules of Engagement might ban such devices, but, especially in urban or jungle areas where the guerrillas are not constantly observed, the ban might not be enforced. 2524:, which exploits grievances to influence or overthrow a government believed repressive by the supporters of the UW force. US doctrine assumes there will usually be a government in exile with which the UW plan can be developed. UW leaders must never forget that they are extending politics with military means, and that, in a guerrilla situation, their military means are limited. Successful UW always recognizes that its essence is political, not simply military. No warfare should ignore 2744: 2715: 3138: 2536:

goals such as "military successor defeat, a change in hostile strategy or tactics, or fluctuating levels of US support. They must know who the friendly and hostile decision makers are, what their objectives and strategies are, and how they interact. They must influence friendly decision makers to ensure they understand the implications of SO mission requirements and the consequences of not adequately supporting them."

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humanitarian concern. U.S. policy commits to stop using manufactured mines, which do not automatically disarm, by 2010 "with exception for use for mine action/demining training and research purposes. The US no longer uses non-detectable land mines of any type", although these restrictions all apply to mines manufactured by the United States. The use of improvised mines and boobytraps, however, is a continuing issue.

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for taking prisoners for intelligence exploitation, and destroying installations. Both for attacking strong points at a distance, and for destroying reinforced structures, SF may use missiles, typically derived from antitank weapons. When the raiding force can access the key target, they often use explosives, manually placed so that a small amount can do maximum damage.

3265:(JTRS) Inter/Intra Team Radio (JITR) are easily portable, secure and flexible, but capture of such a unit, in the early phases of an operation, confirms U.S. involvement. Tactical radios used internally by the UW force are even more vulnerable to capture. When U.S. involvement is known, however, the latest technology is routinely used. 3077:

noncombatant, there is a very real risk to civilians, and continues to be in areas of the world where there has been much guerrilla warfare. The United States has not ratified the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, known informally as the

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to damaging their petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL) system. If POL is deemed the critical target system, other attacks support the attacks on POL. If an attack on a barracks will draw away soldiers that otherwise might guard POL resources, such an attack is both diversionary and supportive of the main attack on a critical resource.

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American diplomats and an appropriate level of SF organization. An SF battalion, subordinate to a Group, may command all SF operations in a medium-sized country, or a region of a larger one, from a forward operating base (FOB). Company-level headquarters called "advanced operating bases" (AOB) supplement FOB capabilities.

3340: 2260:. While not trained in UW, Fertig, along with other U.S. and Filipino leaders, eventually created guerrilla forces fighting the Japanese, forces that numbered in the tens of thousands. A few experienced soldiers' ability to train and lead a quite large resistance was a guiding principle of the formation of 3126:, when the term is used properly, are highly skilled riflemen that use specialized weapons and tactics to attack specific personnel and equipment far outside normal rifle range. SF sniper training is separate from the training of snipers assigned to conventional units; the USSOCOM sniper school is at 2948:

No target should be attacked without a specific reason for doing so; the selected targets should be part of neutralizing a system of targets. For example, if it is known that the enemy has limited supplies of fuel, attacks against tanker trucks, pipelines, refineries, and storage farms all contribute

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SF produced intelligence for their own operations, for their supported regional command, and national-level authorities. "Arriving in their operational areas, SF cultivated relationships with local leaders citizens of the area, much as in the Balkans." Their mission was neither pure UW nor pure FID,

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against the Soviets, but in a role of supporting rather than leading the local personnel. They did not need to create an underground and an auxiliary, and often supported the guerrillas from outside the area of operations. Parts of the Afghan resistance, supported by SF and CIA elements, later became

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Guerilla Warfare is defined. As operations carried out by small independent forces, generally in the rear of the enemy, with the objective of harassing, delaying, and disrupting the enemy's military operations. The term is sometimes limited to the military operations and tactics of small forces whose

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The UW mission assumes that U.S. forces will work with troops in another country and possibly with other allies and is always multinational. Depending on the particular situation, their role may vary from pure training to leading a joint force in combat. Over more than fifty years, roles and missions

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SF teams must take great care, especially in failed or failing states with crumbling infrastructure, not to enable dissidents to create hardship for the general population. An excellent example, which reflects societal characteristics that might not be obvious to Americans, is sabotaging an airfield

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and subversion are means to reduce the military, political, economic, or morale strengths of an opponent. They differ in that sabotage involves physical damage or damage to information systems, while subversion relies more on changing the behavior of personnel trusted by the opponent. Before the act

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Mining and sniping support both raids and ambushes. In a raid, mines may be laid near the enemy reaction force barracks. Snipers can take out critical equipment (e.g., floodlights, radars, artillery) or commanders as the raid begins. Both methods can discourage pursuit while the raid or ambush force

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Army Special Operations Task Force (ARSOTF) describes an Army command, with an SF or ranger core plus attachments, that deals with specific operations in a UCC. It is typically based on an SF group or ranger regiment. Since countries are assigned to UCCs, the government in exile will work with both

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Direct effects of the COE include personnel and training changes resulting from the increased emphasis on ... intelligence and information technologies for SF to operate effectively in the joint, multinational, and interagency environment. Indirect effects of the COE include increases in command and

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Since a guerrilla force expects to have the population become increasingly loyal to it, there is an obvious psychological problem with leaving an area with active explosive devices. Especially when a guerrilla force has limited supplies, there is tactical utility to improvising devices, which could

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A common use of mines in guerrilla warfare, however, would be to emplace them behind a retreating guerrilla force, so the pursuit force would trigger them. Modern mines disarm themselves after a period of time, but the majority of both purpose-built and improvised mines do not and present the chief

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Certain targets, such as bridges, historically could be attacked only by manually placed explosives. With the advent of precision-guided munitions, the destructive part of the raid may involve the SF unit controlling air strikes. Air strikes, however, are practical only when U.S. involvement is not

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are short-duration attacks on objectives, with the specific understanding that the attacking force will withdraw quickly after achieving the mission objective, or finding they are confronting forces too strong to handle. UW raids can be simply to disrupt an enemy force, to capture usable equipment,

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Title 10 United States Code, Section 167, vests the SOCOM commander with the responsibility and the authority for the development and acquisition of SO-peculiar equipment, materiel, supplies and services—items needed for SO activities; for which there is no service-common requirement; or which the

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SF commands, at battalion and above, have service detachments, tailored to specific missions. The SF support detachment has the responsibility for delivering supplies to the UW units in the field, by means specific to the situation, ranging from clandestine parachuting to armed conventional convoy

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In a more modern context, sabotage may be one of many ways to attack a given enemy target system. If, for example, the POL target system is targeted, tank farms and refineries could be raided, or pipelines and tanker trucks ambushed or attacked with mines. These will be very evident to the enemy,

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Interdiction is the basic UW combat activity, which uses a variety of tactics to "drain the hostile power's morale and resources, disrupt its administration, and maintain the civilian population's morale and will to resist." UW attacks should be unpredictable, but widely dispersed and occasionally

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There may be multiple joint task forces (JTFs) in a theater, which contain both regular and special operations forces under a JTF commander. Alternatively, the geographic combatant commander can authorize the theater special operations command (SOC) to establish JSOTFs for pure special operations,

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e need to be prepared to fight a different war. This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin, war by guerilla, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of combat, by infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy

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The U.S. doctrine for special operations emphasizes that commanders cannot dominate a politicomilitary environment in the same way in which a conventional force can exert "battlefield dominance." UW is conceptually at a strategic level, and its commanders must constantly remain aware of political

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control. Whether the mission is called counterguerrilla, counterinsurgency, or foreign internal defense, it involves assisting a friendly government—the "foreign" in FID—to defend against guerrillas acting inside its borders. FID can also involve training a foreign government to deal with a future

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headquarters was afloat), the JSOTF headquarters may be afloat. Using advanced communications, the formal headquarters may stay in the United States, with a "forward" command post in the area of operations. Both of these choices can help deal with situations where it might be awkward for the host

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Intelligence operation pioneered during Special Forces operations in Bosnia and Kosovo continued their evolution during Afghanistan and Iraq. "Analysis of the operations conducted by Special Forces from the Balkans to OEF and OIF demonstrate a distinct trend away from the traditional "top-driven"

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UW forces have intelligence capability for their own targeting, but also are major sources of intelligence to the commands they support, and to the national level of the United States and the supported government in exile. This is a two-way process; the higher headquarters can provide appropriate

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Note that dotted lines run from the underground and auxiliary to Navy and Air special operations units under the UCC Special Operations commander. These indicate that resupply might be brought in by sea or air, and the UW force will use other than the guerrilla force to receive them. Indeed, the

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provides "SO-peculiar support to SOF units worldwide." An example of SO-peculiar support would be providing Soviet-bloc ammunition if the guerrillas already have weapons that need it. The UCC commander, however, has overall responsibility for all joint support in his theater. The JSOTF logistics

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Sensitive intelligence sources and methods may not be shared, although the information learned through these sources and methods will be shared. This is not a U.S.-only rule; while the U.S. may not share the details of technical methods such as SIGINT, the guerrilla government may have extremely

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In the organization chart, there is a dotted line to the UCC air command, which normally controls both Air Force and Navy aircraft in the region, and may have air assets based in the U.S. detailed to them. The military staff of the guerrilla government might, assuming U.S. involvement is known,

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If a saboteur were able to gain access to that tank farm, or fuel tanks of vehicles and aircraft, and add a chemical that slowly damaged engines, that agent could be far away by the time the enemy determines what had happened. Carefully planned sabotage can be one of the safest tactics for a UW

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Those operatives established helicopter landing zones for follow-on SOF, and guide SF operational detachments "A" -- who arrived with their arsenal of laser target designators to enable U.S. aircraft to strike Taliban positions -- to the enemy. These CIA officers were inserted ahead of the SOF

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In guerrilla warfare, a great number of casualties are caused by mines and other destructive devices that are triggered by some mechanical interaction between a person and the detonation mechanism of the device. Since such devices rarely have a means of distinguishing between a combatant and a

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If the infiltrating party is to be met by local supporters, there must be pre-agreed recognition signals. Should the infiltrators not be able to find their local contacts, they should have a variety of backup plans, ranging from establishing a clandestine base and waiting for contact, or to be

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Where a raid goes to the enemy and attacks, an ambush waits for enemy forces to come to it, and then engages in combat. A well-planned ambush can have the element of surprise, possibly achieve temporary local superiority, fight from cover, and have preplanned withdrawal routes to avoid being

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A stable country will no longer have autonomous guerrillas. The guerrilla force may form the nucleus of a new military, come under the control of the new national government, or go back to civilian life. It is essential that these experienced soldiers support, not oppose, the new government.

2797:, who agreed to accept SF teams that would train and fight with the Afghan resistance. CIA personnel had been in Afghanistan, in noncombat roles, certainly as early as 1999, and had created relationships that could not have been established under the military roles and missions of the time. 3231:

Subversion is formally defined as "action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a regime." In an insurgency, it will almost certainly be carried out by members of the underground or auxiliary, who have gained the trust of the enemy.

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In the organizational chart, the pink horizontal lines show multinational relationships; in practice, at least some of those pink lines will actually represent multinational headquarters operations. The lower the organization level, the more likely a multinational headquarters will exist.

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While establishment of a designated JSOA for SOF to conduct independent operations assists in the ease of control of SO and the prevention of fratricide, the JFC should always evaluate the value of isolating SOF against the greater benefit of integrating SOF into the overall campaign

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A U.S. Joint Special Operations Task Force is "joint" in the sense that it contains components from different branches of the U.S. military. The JSOTF may also include personnel, perhaps on exchange assignments, from countries with which the U.S. has especially close relationships.

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national-level intelligence and guidance on targeting, while the UW forces can conduct intelligence collection. The local forces have language and cultural skills to blend with an enemy while conducting reconnaissance. Underground and auxiliary forces can clandestinely emplace

2776:, and other organizations establish contacts with sympathizers in the target country. A wide range of psychological operations techniques are used to increase the likelihood that citizens of the target country will be sympathetic. Such operations can range from overt (i.e., " 2751:

An SF UW campaign is now defined to have seven steps, ending in combat and demobilization. Changing concepts in UW, however, may change the model so that the UW force avoids entering the main combat phase, but carries out critical support operations with the steps before it.

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The ability to create or support resistance forces expands the range of options available to national leadership, filling a niche intermediate between diplomacy and all-out warfare. As the Cold War began, the focus was on Europe, but it began to expand. Faced the reality of

3092:, the device is not considered a mine within the context of the Ottawa Treaty. Such devices often are used to initiate combat in an ambush, combining surprise with an intense burst of fragments. U.S. policy states that a directional mine of this type may be emplaced if: 2856:

Citizen soldiers of the guerrilla force, underground and auxiliary are trained and equipped for their intended roles. SF personnel, possibly supplemented with communications and security experts in the AO, as well as support organizations outside the country, create the

3182:

When sabotage takes place, it may be covert rather than clandestine, in that the enemy knows he has been hurt, but may not know who hurt him. In the more subtle examples of sabotage, however, the enemy may not suspect deliberate action caused an aircraft to crash.

2373:, the SF teams with the Afghans provided the precision targeting information to air units, but did not operate in a SR mode, separate from the local force. The SR targeting function was performed, but in a UW support context rather than a separate U.S. operation. 2792:

Small units or individuals, typically from SF or CIA, make clandestine contact with leaders in the AO, and gain agreement that SF teams will be welcomed. For example, in Afghanistan in 2001, CIA paramilitary personnel made the initial contact with leaders of the

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told Robert E. Kelley "Unconventional warfare is not a viable mission for Special Forces. The only reason you train for unconventional warfare is because it is the best vehicle for maintaining your Special Forces skill set." Kelley also cites the October 1997

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or other special operations intelligence resources. The UW unit, however, will almost certainly identify and prioritize targets on its own. One relevant U.S. doctrine is identified by the CARVER mnemonic, although CARVER tends to emphasize air, artillery,

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Criticality: How important the target is, in a strategic context. The effect its destruction will have on other elements of the target system. If it is more important to have real-time surveillance of the target (e.g., a road junction) than its physical

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Recognizability: Make sure the target can be recognized clearly, by SR and attack forces, under the prevailing weather, light, and in its terrain. If there are critical points within the target, they also must be recognizable by the means of destruction

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Where the saboteur might contaminate aircraft fuel, the aircraft could be put out of service by a clerk committing subversion, by delaying or losing maintenance orders, resupply of fuel or munitions, or "misrouting" an order for the aircraft to attack.

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instead of engaging him and these are the challenges that will be before us in the next decade if freedom is to be saved, a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind of military training.

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Unconventional Warfare consists of activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow an occupying power or government by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary or guerrilla force in a denied

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Sometimes, the resistance organization already controls part of the AO. Still, there usually will be some liaison personnel that can meet with the regional U.S. planners. If the UW operation is planned to support conventional operations (e.g., the

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request a U.S. air strike on some target that the guerrillas cannot destroy, or perhaps even reach. Such strikes are not a panacea, as an air strike with civilian casualties will turn the essential political dynamic against the guerrilla force.

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Employment of subversion and sabotage needs to be made a priority, and updated. The update should emphasize that direct access and violent means may not be necessary if, for example, communications and computers can be disrupted by remote

2884:(i.e., mines and boobytraps). Sabotage, such as placing an explosive charge under a railroad track, is easier to hide than a raid on the train. If there is aerial bombing of targets, it can be used as a cover for sabotage activities. 2805:

because of their ability to get on the ground quickly, their language skills and knowledge of the terrain, and their existing contacts with anti-Taliban groups. At the same time, U.S. military forces continued to flow quickly into

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The U.S. defines sabotage as "an act or acts with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of a country by willfully injuring or destroying, or attempting to injure or destroy, any national defense or war

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against a target previously struck, so the enemy must disperse their forces. Even in a guerrilla context, the dispersion of hostile forces may become so great that the guerrillas can temporarily gain a local superiority of force.

2992:, reception of personnel and equipment arriving clandestinely, medical services, finance, etc. This support organization can be urban or rural. Especially in urban warfare, the guerrilla force and underground may be integrated. 2687:(UCC), and the UW force will be part of the special operations organization subordinate to that command. There may be rare circumstances in which the SF operation is controlled at national level, with USSOCOM retaining command. 3021:

Recuperability: When the target is destroyed by fire support or direct action, in the case of DA missions, ascertain if the enemy can repair, replace, or bypass it quickly, with minimum resources. If so, it may not be a viable

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actually trained and led a guerrilla force. They did so in Laos, but, in Afghanistan and elsewhere, they supported an existing rebel force. For example, UW missions were sometimes initiated by paramilitary personnel of the

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Intelligence activities in a UW environment should be the first area addressed: Schoomaker's global scout role. This can fit into existing UW doctrine if it is understood the resistance may never need to engage in direct

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In the combat phase, the guerrilla force increases the tempo of operations, in a manner consistent with its own safety and security, until the government falls or the guerrilla force links up with conventional forces.

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Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, and the Arabian Sea, while the CIA continued to increase its activity in the region, adding logistics hubs, communication sites, and command and control centers and capabilities.

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At the operational level, the UW force, prepares the battlefield for other units and conducts operations on conditions favorable to it. SF must constantly be ready to adapt, and to use the political insights of

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intelligence, gathered and evaluated at higher command levels and disseminated to lower units, to a "bottom-driven" intelligence system based upon collection and exploitation of information at the user level.

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in the fifties and early sixties, the major problem was not to create guerrilla units, but to fight existing Laotian and Vietnamese guerrilla forces. To them it seemed logical that soldiers trained to

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techniques), delivery by naval special operations vessels or from submarines, by out-of-uniform infiltration from a neighboring country, sub-surface infiltration utilizing closed circuit dive gear (

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To interdict enemy operations, the resistance can use direct combat means such as raids and ambushes. They can also use methods less risky to their security, such as mining or long-range sniping.

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was that Vietnamese allies could see only SIGINT information that had a SECRET or lower classification, and that did not carry the additional restriction "handle through COMINT channels only".

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All levels of SF operational detachment have some intelligence collection and analysis capability. Where appropriate, SF has two standing types of teams for intelligence augmentation, one for

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to Europe, was in expectation of a Soviet attack on Western Europe. SF would help organize, train, and lead resistance movements to such an invasion. A 1951 doctrine for UW, still called

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might learn of activities simply by detecting an unexpected radio signal. Couriers and personal meetings are resistant to SIGINT, but also have problems of maintaining physical security.

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Security may dictate that the JSOTF not be on the ground of one of the countries within the geographic region. Especially when the JSOTF has a significant naval component (e.g., while a

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Major target systems vulnerable to UW interdiction operations include railway, highway, waterway, airway, communication, power, water supply, fuel supply, and air defense systems.

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Effect: Beyond pure military effect, what the political, economic, legal, and psychological effects of destroying the target are, and How the attack would affect local civilians.

2119:(SF), as opposed to the usage in most other countries, where "special forces" refers to the range of unit types that the U.S. calls "special operations forces" controlled by the 2402:

as saying "Dissident elements are the key to UW mission potential in any region. As long as there are dissidents, there will be UW potential to support U.S. national interest."

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Accessibility: Ascertain whether an SR team can reach or sense the target, keep it under surveillance for the appropriate time, and then exfiltrate after the target is struck.

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Sabotage is usually carried out clandestinely by the underground or auxiliary, but it can be carried out by the guerrilla force, under the cover of a combat operation.

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When an explosive device is triggered only by the action of a member of the guerrilla force after identifying a legal target, as with the command-detonated mode of the

3999: 3766: 3704: 2917:, which attempts to meet a conventional force under conditions that optimize the UW force's strengths; UW forces avoid combat when conditions are unfavorable to them. 2957:

In SF doctrine, an operational UW force, made up of U.S. and local personnel, has three general components, although they may not all be part of a specific mission:

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unit that formed the first overt assistance force, and made contact with various clans whose cooperation was needed. Such contact falls into the early parts of the

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officer (J-4) is responsible for using the extraordinary procurement mechanisms legislatively authorized for USSOCOM, and making sure they are used appropriately.

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of sabotage or subversion is executed, preparations for the act must be kept under tight security control. Only a small information leak could defeat the attack.

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that engages in direct combat with enemy forces. Depending on the situation, this force may be full-time or part-time, and often stays hidden when not in combat.

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Kelley concluded that UW remains a viable mission, but the doctrine for it, as of 2000, is outdated. It has been relatively rare that U.S. forces, since World

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United States Code, Title 10, Armed Forces. Subtitle A, General Military Law. Part I, Organization and general military powers. Chapter 6, Combatant commands.

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is a serious concern, since the special operation may be highly classified, such that the other components are not aware of the UW operation or its location.

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Interview of D. Jones, assistant operations officer, 3rd Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group, (FOB 103), operating in the Kurdish areas of Iraq in 2002-2003

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When time, geographic, and/or resource constraints are imposed on the theater support infrastructure, USSOCOM may deploy organic assets in support of SOF.

2429:, such information collection is not now listed as a basic SF mission. Kelley suggests that the SF UW doctrine be revised to include just such activity: 2920:

Since UW and other special operations may precede operations by other military components (e.g., regular ground forces, air and missile attacks, etc.),

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to describe the role that Special Forces have in "preparing the battlefield" before regular forces enter it. While the later stages of UN operations in

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The basic mechanism for deconfliction is establishing a joint special operations area (JSOA), defined by the overall joint force commander (JFC).

4090: 3898: 2988:; whose activities should remain clandestine. Its functions include supply, transportation, acquisition or manufacture of weapons, recruiting, 2456:

Complete the revision of UW doctrine to take a more modern view of guerrilla warfare, in contrast with the current model that emphasizes World

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to be used by hidden units. In this phase and later phases, SF medical personnel often work to improve the health of their sympathizers.

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Forces that have reached this level have significant intelligence collection, sabotage and subversion, and fire direction capabilities.

2089:. Unconventional warfare is essentially support provided by the military to a foreign insurgency or resistance. The legal definition of 2587: 3813: 2869:

The operation increases recruiting, and may begin clandestine intelligence collection and subversion, and possibly some hit-and-run

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Hanyok, Robert J. (2002), "Chapter 3 - "To Die in the South": SIGINT, the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and the Infiltration Problem, 1968",

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control, combat support, and combat service support assets required to conduct multiple, sustained special operations globally.

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was given that mission. The White Star mission in Laos was initially covert, and used Special Forces and other personnel under

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Rarely, however, did the U.S. create a guerrilla force. Far more often, the U.S. supported an existing national organization.

2394: 4008: 3775: 3713: 3663:, U.S. Army Operational Leadership Experiences Project/Combat Studies Institute; Records of the Combat Arms Research Library 2560:, a very different problem than the original UW concept of leading resistance movements after a Soviet invasion of Europe. 4091:"Materiel Deliverer: Ensuring the Acquisition Process Meets Warfighter Requirements (interview with COL N. Lee S. Price)" 1779: 47: 2666:

The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue."

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In the 1970s, until the NCA withdrew them as part of its "tilt" to Iraq, SF supported Kurdish resistance to Iraq under

2221:. The main strength of these movements came not from U.S., but local personnel. U.S. "behind the lines" units such as 1974: 1752: 362: 4001:

Joint Publication 3-05.1: Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations

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Joint Publication 3-05.1: Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations

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Joint Publication 3-05.1: Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations

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is the military term for avoiding fratricide, and it is the responsibility of the JSOTF commander, who must balance

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A variety of organizations, including United States personnel, conducted UW missions. Many of the operations in the

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Supplies may be provided by the host nation or private companies within it, if such acquisition is consistent with

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guerrillas might make a diversionary attack to draw attention from the logistics or other vulnerable operation.

2225:, in modern doctrine, were not conducting UW but DA and SR. The idea extended to resistance against an expected 3746: 2591: 2571: 2550: 2242: 1615: 2817:

SF operational detachments enter the AO, by clandestine means, such as parachuting at night (especially using

2780:") radio and television broadcasts, to clandestine material purporting to be issued by the opposition (i.e., " 3597:

Unconventional Warfare as a Strategic Foreign Policy Tool: the Clinton Administration in Iraq and Afghanistan

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Vulnerability: Find out if SR (including DA) and supporting units have the capability to destroy the target.

2532:

and other nonviolent means may be as potent as an ambush, in advancing the political goals of the UW force.

2249:, which usually were composed of three soldiers, one from the U.S., one from the U.K., and one from France. 3937: 3858: 2332:, carried out SR missions against infiltrators from the North, directing air strikes and assessing damage. 2193:; other USSOCOM units or other U.S. government activities may be the specialists in these secondary areas. 1969: 668: 428: 3739:"All Means Necessary" - Employing CIA Operatives in a Warfighting Role Alongside Special Operations Forces 4136: 3262: 3127: 2881: 2773: 2556:

gave the first public endorsement to special forces, as a means of countering communist expansion in the

2546: 2470: 2321: 1979: 1166: 963: 834: 372: 2485:

and other infiltration paths. Increasingly, SF personnel took on other missions, principally SR and DA.

4126: 2418: 2414: 2067: 1443: 4102: 4131: 3910: 3557: 3381: 2978:

functions. Covert functions include sabotage and psychological warfare. Clandestine missions include

2718:

Organization chart showing relationships between U.S. forces and nation whose citizens are guerrillas

2684: 2583: 2273: 2256:, soon allied with Filipino forces, and who declined to follow Japanese orders to surrender, such as 1553: 1061: 405: 279: 113: 4141: 4049: 3376: 3007: 2699: 2529: 2142: 2130: 2112: 2004: 1871: 1418: 1111: 924: 772: 3204:

and the resistance could be damaged if some of their combat teams are captured and interrogated.

2858: 2182: 1957: 1939: 1695: 1254: 1176: 1121: 1001: 714: 377: 256: 3608: 3455:

U.S. Army Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Doctrine: Engine of Change or Relic of the Past?

3160:

M107/M88, a bolt-action rifle that is the standard sniper rifle for U.S. Navy special operations

2707:

nation, or the nation hosting the government in exile, to have a U.S. headquarters on its soil.

2528:'s dictum that "war is the extension of politics with the addition of other means". Subversion, 3634:

Unconventional Warfare in the Contemporary Operational Environment: Transforming Special Forces

3356:

SOCOM commander deems as critically urgent for the immediate accomplishment of an SO activity.

3255: 3002: 2979: 2703: 2474: 2439: 2426: 2222: 2166: 2136: 2046: 1824: 1799: 1521: 1433: 1306: 1181: 777: 754: 180: 79: 2488:

In 1990–91, the UW mission supported intelligence collection, sabotage, and subversion by the

2272:

After World War II, the original SF mission of UW, as shown in the first SF deployment of the

3995: 3875: 3762: 3700: 3477: 3099:

The Claymores are located in the immediate proximity of the military unit that emplaced them.

2975: 2154: 1413: 1346: 1299: 948: 911: 874: 792: 744: 628: 438: 231: 135: 4050:"Supporting special operations forces - Inside logistics: exploring the heart of logistics" 3360: 3297: 2989: 2760:

Much of the early steps may take place in a safe area outside the AO, where SF, as well as

2646: 1804: 1706: 1563: 1558: 1376: 1341: 1076: 891: 749: 685: 539: 509: 86: 2727:

started a preplanned series of attacks on German transportation about 48 hours before the

8: 3822: 3363:

and mission-specific requirements. This function is centralized under the JSOTF J-4, but

3301: 3082: 2929: 2731:), UW control may be passed to SF officers attached to the supported conventional force. 2525: 2390: 1655: 1640: 1516: 1403: 1381: 1356: 1316: 1226: 1036: 936: 886: 653: 643: 608: 400: 390: 140: 64: 4032: 3490: 2914: 2246: 1989: 1844: 1764: 1685: 1630: 1605: 1526: 1472: 1438: 1369: 1286: 1196: 1101: 1046: 931: 896: 849: 724: 695: 648: 586: 561: 395: 189: 108: 3815:

Joint Publication 3-05.5: Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures

2880:

Another covert operational technique, which may be used during this phase, is placing

3459: 3102:

The area is monitored by military personnel to ensure civilians stay out of the area.

2932:(OPSEC) against the need for other components to know where they may operate freely. 2794: 2728: 2724: 2659: 2493: 2482: 2450: 2370: 2277: 2174: 2148: 2086: 2025: 1934: 1881: 1784: 1774: 1769: 1739: 1722: 1717: 1690: 1635: 1336: 1326: 1321: 1311: 1231: 1221: 1216: 1191: 1161: 1051: 1021: 1016: 1006: 996: 986: 901: 854: 824: 663: 456: 433: 367: 3952: 2453:. A support, rather than leadership, role has not been formulated in SF UW doctrine. 1994: 3971: 3152:

M24 7.62 mm sniper weapon system, based on the commercial Remington M700 rifle

2801:

CIA paramilitary operatives entered Afghanistan on 26 September 2001 ahead of U.S.

2781: 2777: 2206: 1999: 1964: 1896: 1789: 1727: 1620: 1548: 1541: 1398: 1331: 1281: 1271: 1146: 1066: 1026: 1011: 973: 958: 829: 814: 767: 675: 633: 576: 571: 529: 352: 329: 221: 145: 74: 57: 3881:

Joint Publication 3-15: Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations

3277: 3052: 2877:

that have a high probability of success and a low risk of compromising security.

2870: 2553: 2210: 1809: 1794: 1712: 1668: 1610: 1266: 1261: 1151: 1141: 1056: 1031: 968: 809: 739: 729: 581: 566: 489: 461: 251: 246: 226: 69: 3879: 3281: 3268:

As a consequence, SF communications specialists must be competent with old but

2341: 2257: 1984: 1732: 1156: 1116: 1094: 1081: 1071: 1041: 953: 906: 709: 700: 591: 544: 524: 514: 484: 451: 339: 296: 261: 236: 103: 36: 3578: 3550:

From Bosnia to Baghdad: The Evolution of US Army Special Forces From 1995-2004

2844:

Early in an insurgency, electronic communications should be avoided, as enemy

2477:. Eventually, these UW forces came back under U.S. Army control. Later in the 4115: 3798:

Department of the Army (20 April 1990), "Chapter 9, Unconventional Warfare",

3401: 3364: 3145:

In most circumstances, SF snipers use the same rifles as other Army snipers:

3078: 2921: 2631:

were not always organized to make the best use of SF-collected intelligence.

2305: 2064: 1831: 1819: 1675: 1595: 1511: 1494: 1351: 1206: 1186: 864: 859: 839: 819: 734: 705: 680: 556: 534: 519: 494: 334: 241: 199: 194: 91: 3548: 2111:

when they were formed in 1952; they now have additional missions, including

3339: 3131: 3112: 2826: 2512:. Current doctrine allows both; there may need to be a change of emphasis. 2226: 2218: 2190: 2178: 2018: 1944: 1924: 1919: 1814: 1759: 1393: 1388: 1211: 1126: 869: 603: 504: 301: 185: 3737: 3681: 3157:.50 caliber for ranges over 1 kilometer, especially for materiel targets: 2295: 2127:

unconventional warfare (United States Department of Defense doctrine) (UW)

3463: 3313: 3269: 2557: 2478: 2253: 2217:

as well as numerous European national resistance against the invasion by

2214: 2115:(FID). In the United States, "special forces" refers specifically to the 1929: 1680: 1645: 1484: 1171: 1136: 844: 787: 690: 474: 175: 170: 2695:

based on area of operations or type of operation (e.g., UW versus FID).

2209:

resistance movements assisted by U.S. personnel, especially against the

3677: 3273: 3259: 2671: 2521: 2345: 2050: 1886: 1856: 1578: 942: 4068:"Service Detachment in Afghanistan Supports Special Operations Forces" 3973:

Spartans in Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War, 1945-1975

3328: 2822: 2743: 2173:

SF may be given other missions including warfare and support, combat

1876: 1700: 1650: 1600: 1590: 1585: 1450: 1241: 1236: 1201: 638: 324: 291: 160: 2714: 2481:, SF-led units conducted offensive actions against opponents on the 2473:, sometimes with SF personnel on clandestine detail to the CIA. See 3200:, premises, or utilities, to include human and natural resources." 3197: 3175: 2186: 2070: 1891: 1866: 1499: 1131: 1106: 719: 274: 216: 128: 3215:

that provides a widely used commodity that must be fresh, such as

3137: 2683:

In most cases, the AO will be within the scope of a U.S. regional

2267: 3332: 3220: 2765: 2446: 2410: 1901: 1861: 1625: 1459: 1455: 797: 782: 658: 319: 314: 284: 203: 165: 3515:

Field Manual 31-21, Organization and Conduct of Guerilla Warfare

3331:

for all U.S. special operations come from two lines of command:

3530:

Department of the Army (20 April 1990), "Chapter 1, Overview",

3367:

personnel may provide the actual interface to local providers.

3293: 3123: 2971: 2874: 2845: 2832: 2662:

theorists whose ideology might be quite different from theirs:

2620: 2616: 2489: 2358: 1408: 804: 621: 357: 4031:"Section 165 Combatant commands: administration and support", 2445:

SF units already have assisted insurgencies as diverse as the

2197:

have continued to evolve, based on the history of operations.

3680:(1967), "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War", 3483:

Joint Publication 3-05: Doctrine for Joint Special Operations

2377:

but the intelligence preparation featured in the fifth step,

2328:

Later in Southeast Asia, SF personnel, often assigned to the

879: 415: 410: 2982:

and helping key personnel escape from the area of operation.

2123:(USSOCOM). SF units are tasked with seven primary missions: 3216: 2818: 2678: 2539: 2301: 2290:

1951 version of U.S. Army guerrilla warfare manual cited in

155: 150: 3979:, Center for Cryptologic History, National Security Agency 3800:

Field Manual 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces Operations

3532:

Field Manual 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces Operations

3071: 2836:

U.S. Air Force parajumpers in support of SF in Afghanistan

28: 3686:, vol. I, Foreign Languages Press, pp. 179–254 3254:

Communications security is critical. New Special Forces

2102: 3556:, Thesis, Master of Arts in National Security Affairs, 3163:

M82A1, a semiautomatic rifle used by conventional units

2296:

1960s model of dealing with wars of national liberation

4072:

United States Army Quartermaster Professional Bulletin

3950: 3797: 3703:(19 December 2001), "Chapter II, JSOTF Organization", 3529: 3512: 2413:

suffered from overly ambitious goals resulting in the

3998:(19 December 2001), "Chapter VII, Logistic Support", 3994: 3874: 3811: 3761: 3699: 3476: 2508:

by insurgents, and less one of direct combat through

2312:

guerrillas would have a deep understanding of how to

3287: 2598:). Other national-level organizations, such as the 2252:

The earliest US soldiers involved in UW were in the

2640: 2629:

Intelligence organizations at higher command levels

2497: 4048:Condon, Travis E; Patterson, Kirk A. (Fall 2003), 2492:. UW had a major role, in 2001, of supporting the 3451: 2609: 4113: 3990: 3988: 3986: 3757: 3755: 3695: 3693: 3589: 3587: 3001:Detailed targeting may be conducted by separate 2425:, without moving into combat phases. Other than 4047: 3944: 2952: 2738: 2268:1950s model of resistance to invasion of Europe 3765:(19 December 2001), "Chapter IV, Operations", 3603:, Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy Thesis, 3525: 3523: 2384: 4082: 4041: 3983: 3890: 3838: 3752: 3690: 3584: 3542: 3540: 2369:In the 2001 joint operations with the Afghan 2026: 4122:United States Department of Defense doctrine 3954:FM 3-05.102 Army Special Forces Intelligence 3917: 3791: 3447: 3445: 3443: 3441: 3272:radio communications, including those using 3672: 3670: 3594:Linnington, Abigail T. (18 February 2004), 3579:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cKoIESw1tdM 3520: 3506: 3096:They are not left out longer than 72 hours. 2405:Gen. Schoomaker, however, did use the term 3593: 3537: 3312:sensitive information sources. During the 3235: 3169: 3149:7.62 mm for ranges under 1 kilometer 2652: 2509: 2344:. In the 1980s, SF worked with the Afghan 2033: 2019: 4088: 3870: 3868: 3729: 3647: 3438: 2496:in Afghanistan. UW experience is more of 4065: 4024: 3923: 3896: 3805: 3667: 3605:The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy 3422: 3420: 3418: 3416: 3387:Psychological operations (United States) 3338: 3136: 3039: 2831: 2742: 2713: 2679:Relationships with theater-level command 2540:Relationships with U.S. National Command 2161:psychological operations (United States) 2121:United States Special Operations Command 2055:United States Special Operations Command 992:List of military strategies and concepts 3963: 3844: 3640:, School of Advanced Military Studies, 3546: 3513:Department of the Army (October 1951), 3392:TM 31-210 Improvised Munitions Handbook 3072:Mining and improvised explosive devices 2582:Operational SF personnel assigned to a 2515: 4114: 3969: 3865: 3624: 3547:Ramirez, Armando J. (September 2004), 3141:Sniper team: note shooter and observer 3130:, while the general Army school is at 2590:(NCA) of the United States (i.e., the 2422: 3735: 3470: 3413: 3047: 2395:Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 2357:Following the 1990 Iraqi invasion of 2107:UW was the first mission assigned to 2103:U.S. Department of Defense UW mission 3951:Department of the Army (July 2001), 3897:McCarter, Mickey (21 October 2004), 3653: 3452:Kelley, Robert E. (7 January 2000), 2520:Unconventional warfare is a form of 2300:When American advisors were sent to 4089:McKaughan, Jeff (31 January 2007), 3676: 3630: 3081:. It does promulgate policies and 2393:, then USSOCOM commander and later 2085:) is one of the core activities of 13: 3924:Baddeley, Adam (21 October 2004), 2787: 2596:United States Secretary of Defense 2498:support to intelligence collection 2335: 2245:(ETO) were multinational, such as 14: 4153: 3642:Command and General Staff College 3577:. Retrieved March 13, 2023, from 3397:United States Army Special Forces 3288:Intelligence support to UW forces 3249: 3240: 3090:M18A1 Claymore antipersonnel mine 2770:United States Department of State 2604:Director of National Intelligence 2600:United States Department of State 2379:Buildup, of the operational model 2262:United States Army Special Forces 2117:United States Army Special Forces 2109:United States Army Special Forces 2059:United States Army Special Forces 3845:Gourley, Scott (27 April 2007), 2641:SF, UW, and force multiplication 2586:(UCC) or USSOCOM reports to the 46: 4066:McDaniel, Arvie (Summer 2003), 4059: 3736:Stone, Kathryn (7 April 2003), 2851: 2812: 2501: 2236: 16:United States military doctrine 4054:Air Force Journal of Logistics 3812:Joint Chiefs of Staff (1993), 3683:Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung 3654:Cool, John (9 November 2005), 3563: 2755: 2623:technical collection devices. 2610:UW as a source of intelligence 2592:President of the United States 2572:United States Military Academy 2460:leadership of rural partisans. 2400:Army Special Forces Vision XXI 2243:European Theater of Operations 1: 4095:Special Operations Technology 3930:Special Operations Technology 3903:Special Operations Technology 3851:Special Operations Technology 3407: 3306:Support Operations Team-Alpha 3304:. The SF SIGINT unit is the 3226: 2899: 2890: 2841:recovered by their own side. 2505: 2330:Studies and Observation Group 2177:(CSAR), security assistance, 3631:Ott, Paul A. (14 May 2002), 3571:Gus Chiggins, Old Prospector 3323: 2996: 2953:Basic field operations model 2882:improvised explosive devices 2739:Seven-step operational model 2378: 7: 3370: 3263:Joint Tactical Radio System 3190: 2774:Central Intelligence Agency 2570:John F. Kennedy, speech at 2547:wars of national liberation 2471:Central Intelligence Agency 2385:Evolution of the UW mission 2325:internal guerrilla threat. 2322:Central Intelligence Agency 1490:Military–industrial complex 964:Operational manoeuvre group 10: 4158: 3118: 2908: 2864: 2588:National Command Authority 2419:United States Marine Corps 2200: 2044: 3558:Naval Postgraduate School 3382:Fourth generation warfare 2685:Unified Combatant Command 2584:Unified Combatant Command 2549:from the mid-fifties on, 2274:10th Special Forces Group 2227:Soviet invasion of Europe 2205:The idea of UW came from 1554:Loss-of-strength gradient 406:Combat information center 3377:Foreign internal defense 2762:psychological operations 2530:psychological operations 2417:, SF teams preceded the 2364: 2352: 2131:foreign internal defense 2113:foreign internal defense 1872:Military science fiction 1357:Technology and equipment 773:List of military tactics 3256:software-defined radios 3236:Support to the UW force 3170:Sabotage and subversion 2859:clandestine cell system 2747:Stages of UW operations 2653:Operational model of UW 2191:counter-drug operations 2183:humanitarian assistance 1940:Wartime sexual violence 1696:Full-spectrum dominance 1507:Supply-chain management 3926:"JITR Takes the Stage" 3344: 3142: 3003:special reconnaissance 2980:intelligence gathering 2942: 2837: 2810: 2748: 2719: 2704:Operation Prime Chance 2676: 2638: 2577: 2475:CIA activities in Laos 2440:information operations 2427:special reconnaissance 2293: 2167:information operations 2137:special reconnaissance 2100: 2076:unconventional warfare 2047:Unconventional warfare 1852:Awards and decorations 1825:Peace through strength 1800:Low-intensity conflict 1434:Conscientious objector 1307:Area of responsibility 3996:Joint Chiefs of Staff 3876:Joint Chiefs of Staff 3763:Joint Chiefs of Staff 3701:Joint Chiefs of Staff 3478:Joint Chiefs of Staff 3342: 3140: 3040:Means of interdiction 2937: 2835: 2799: 2746: 2717: 2664: 2633: 2562: 2282: 2280:at that point, was: 2155:counter-proliferation 2095: 439:Torpedo data computer 429:Ship gun fire-control 3480:(17 December 2003), 3361:operational security 3352:crossing to the AO. 3298:secure communication 3276:or field-improvised 2990:counter-intelligence 2516:Strategic role of UW 2423:UW operational model 2349:hostile to the U.S. 1970:Military occupations 1805:Military engineering 1707:Unrestricted Warfare 1564:Force multiplication 457:Military manoeuvrers 4105:on October 11, 2007 4101:(1), archived from 3940:on October 26, 2007 3936:(7), archived from 3913:on October 12, 2007 3909:(7), archived from 3861:on October 26, 2007 3857:(3), archived from 3316:, for example, the 3302:counterintelligence 3083:rules of engagement 3008:direct action raids 2930:operations security 2526:Carl von Clausewitz 2490:Kuwaiti underground 2415:Battle of Mogadishu 2391:Peter J. Schoomaker 2223:Merrill's Marauders 2213:'s invasion of the 1656:Penal military unit 1641:Rules of engagement 1317:Command and control 937:Operations research 401:Director (military) 391:Fire-control system 141:Command and control 22:Part of a series on 4137:Military doctrines 3345: 3329:Logistical support 3143: 3111:be as simple as a 3048:Raids and ambushes 2915:asymmetric warfare 2838: 2749: 2720: 2700:direct action (DA) 2510:raids and ambushes 1765:Counter-insurgency 1686:Command of the sea 1631:Jewish laws on war 1606:Geneva Conventions 1142:Divide and conquer 932:Military operation 897:Tactical objective 396:Fire-control radar 373:Electronic-warfare 4127:Military strategy 3878:(26 April 2007), 3569:YouTube. (2018). 3460:Naval War College 3429:PUBLIC LAW 114–92 3318:general U.S. rule 2795:Northern Alliance 2729:Normandy Invasion 2725:French Resistance 2660:guerrilla warfare 2647:force multipliers 2494:Northern Alliance 2483:Ho Chi Minh Trail 2451:Northern Alliance 2371:Northern Alliance 2278:guerrilla warfare 2175:search and rescue 2149:counter-terrorism 2087:irregular warfare 2043: 2042: 1935:Horses in warfare 1882:Anti-war movement 1785:Gunboat diplomacy 1775:Disaster response 1723:Philosophy of war 1718:Principles of war 1691:Deterrence theory 1636:Right of conquest 1559:Lanchester's laws 1327:Principles of war 1017:Counter-offensive 997:Military campaign 902:Target saturation 825:Counterinsurgency 434:Gun data computer 368:Close air support 330:Aircraft carriers 4149: 4132:Military science 4107: 4106: 4086: 4080: 4079: 4074:, archived from 4063: 4057: 4056: 4045: 4039: 4038: 4037:, 1 October 1986 4028: 4022: 4021: 4020: 4019: 4013: 4007:, archived from 4006: 3992: 3981: 3980: 3978: 3967: 3961: 3960: 3959: 3948: 3942: 3941: 3921: 3915: 3914: 3894: 3888: 3887: 3886: 3872: 3863: 3862: 3847:"Bunker Busters" 3842: 3836: 3835: 3834: 3833: 3827: 3821:, archived from 3820: 3809: 3803: 3802: 3795: 3789: 3788: 3787: 3786: 3780: 3774:, archived from 3773: 3759: 3750: 3749: 3747:Army War College 3744: 3733: 3727: 3726: 3725: 3724: 3718: 3712:, archived from 3711: 3697: 3688: 3687: 3674: 3665: 3664: 3662: 3651: 3645: 3644: 3639: 3628: 3622: 3621: 3620: 3619: 3613: 3607:, archived from 3602: 3591: 3582: 3567: 3561: 3560: 3555: 3544: 3535: 3534: 3527: 3518: 3517: 3510: 3504: 3503: 3502: 3501: 3495: 3489:, archived from 3488: 3474: 3468: 3467: 3466:on March 5, 2016 3462:, archived from 3449: 3436: 3435: 3434: 3424: 3010:rather than UW: 2782:black propaganda 2778:white propaganda 2674: 2575: 2467: 2459: 2291: 2232: 2229:following World 2207:Second World War 2035: 2028: 2021: 1790:Humanitarian aid 1728:Security dilemma 1549:Power projection 1332:Economy of force 1312:Chain of command 1027:Defence in depth 1012:Commerce raiding 830:Defeat in detail 146:Defense ministry 50: 41: 40: 31: 19: 18: 4157: 4156: 4152: 4151: 4150: 4148: 4147: 4146: 4142:Warfare by type 4112: 4111: 4110: 4087: 4083: 4078:on July 2, 2007 4064: 4060: 4046: 4042: 4030: 4029: 4025: 4017: 4015: 4011: 4004: 3993: 3984: 3976: 3968: 3964: 3957: 3949: 3945: 3922: 3918: 3895: 3891: 3884: 3873: 3866: 3843: 3839: 3831: 3829: 3825: 3818: 3810: 3806: 3796: 3792: 3784: 3782: 3778: 3771: 3760: 3753: 3742: 3734: 3730: 3722: 3720: 3716: 3709: 3698: 3691: 3675: 3668: 3660: 3652: 3648: 3637: 3629: 3625: 3617: 3615: 3611: 3600: 3592: 3585: 3568: 3564: 3553: 3545: 3538: 3528: 3521: 3511: 3507: 3499: 3497: 3493: 3486: 3475: 3471: 3450: 3439: 3432: 3426: 3425: 3414: 3410: 3373: 3326: 3290: 3252: 3243: 3238: 3229: 3193: 3172: 3121: 3085:for their use. 3074: 3050: 3042: 2999: 2970:; a mixture of 2962:guerrilla force 2955: 2911: 2902: 2893: 2867: 2854: 2815: 2790: 2788:Initial contact 2764:personnel from 2758: 2741: 2681: 2675: 2670: 2655: 2643: 2612: 2576: 2569: 2554:John F. Kennedy 2542: 2518: 2465: 2457: 2387: 2367: 2355: 2338: 2336:1970s and 1980s 2316:guerrillas, so 2298: 2292: 2289: 2270: 2239: 2230: 2211:Empire of Japan 2203: 2185:, humanitarian 2105: 2061: 2045:Main articles: 2039: 2010: 2009: 1960: 1950: 1949: 1915: 1907: 1906: 1847: 1837: 1836: 1810:Multilateralism 1795:Law enforcement 1755: 1745: 1744: 1713:Just war theory 1671: 1661: 1660: 1611:Geneva Protocol 1581: 1571: 1570: 1544: 1534: 1533: 1475: 1465: 1464: 1372: 1362: 1361: 1302: 1292: 1291: 1257: 1247: 1246: 1177:Network-centric 1097: 1087: 1086: 989: 979: 978: 927: 917: 916: 865:Rapid dominance 770: 760: 759: 715:Electromagnetic 624: 614: 613: 600: 553: 501: 477: 467: 466: 462:Combat training 443: 420: 386:Combat systems: 382: 344: 340:Auxiliary ships 306: 266: 208: 131: 121: 120: 60: 34: 33: 32: 27: 17: 12: 11: 5: 4155: 4145: 4144: 4139: 4134: 4129: 4124: 4109: 4108: 4081: 4058: 4040: 4023: 3982: 3962: 3943: 3916: 3889: 3864: 3837: 3804: 3790: 3751: 3728: 3689: 3666: 3646: 3623: 3583: 3562: 3536: 3519: 3505: 3469: 3437: 3411: 3409: 3406: 3405: 3404: 3399: 3394: 3389: 3384: 3379: 3372: 3369: 3325: 3322: 3289: 3286: 3282:high frequency 3258:, such as the 3251: 3250:Communications 3248: 3242: 3241:Strike support 3239: 3237: 3234: 3228: 3225: 3192: 3189: 3171: 3168: 3167: 3166: 3165: 3164: 3161: 3155: 3154: 3153: 3120: 3117: 3104: 3103: 3100: 3097: 3073: 3070: 3049: 3046: 3041: 3038: 3034: 3033: 3029: 3026: 3023: 3019: 3016: 2998: 2995: 2994: 2993: 2983: 2965: 2954: 2951: 2910: 2907: 2901: 2898: 2892: 2889: 2866: 2863: 2853: 2850: 2814: 2811: 2789: 2786: 2757: 2754: 2740: 2737: 2680: 2677: 2668: 2654: 2651: 2642: 2639: 2611: 2608: 2567: 2541: 2538: 2517: 2514: 2462: 2461: 2454: 2443: 2435: 2389:In 1998, Gen. 2386: 2383: 2366: 2363: 2354: 2351: 2342:Saddam Hussein 2337: 2334: 2318:Special Forces 2297: 2294: 2287: 2269: 2266: 2258:Wendell Fertig 2247:Jedburgh teams 2238: 2235: 2202: 2199: 2171: 2170: 2164: 2158: 2152: 2146: 2140: 2134: 2128: 2104: 2101: 2041: 2040: 2038: 2037: 2030: 2023: 2015: 2012: 2011: 2008: 2007: 2002: 1997: 1992: 1987: 1982: 1977: 1975:Military terms 1972: 1967: 1961: 1956: 1955: 1952: 1951: 1948: 1947: 1942: 1937: 1932: 1927: 1922: 1916: 1913: 1912: 1909: 1908: 1905: 1904: 1899: 1894: 1889: 1884: 1879: 1874: 1869: 1864: 1859: 1854: 1848: 1843: 1842: 1839: 1838: 1835: 1834: 1829: 1828: 1827: 1822: 1812: 1807: 1802: 1797: 1792: 1787: 1782: 1777: 1772: 1767: 1762: 1756: 1751: 1750: 1747: 1746: 1743: 1742: 1737: 1736: 1735: 1733:Tripwire force 1725: 1720: 1715: 1710: 1703: 1698: 1693: 1688: 1683: 1678: 1672: 1667: 1666: 1663: 1662: 1659: 1658: 1653: 1648: 1643: 1638: 1633: 1628: 1623: 1618: 1613: 1608: 1603: 1598: 1593: 1588: 1582: 1577: 1576: 1573: 1572: 1569: 1568: 1567: 1566: 1556: 1551: 1545: 1540: 1539: 1536: 1535: 1532: 1531: 1530: 1529: 1524: 1519: 1509: 1504: 1503: 1502: 1497: 1487: 1482: 1476: 1471: 1470: 1467: 1466: 1463: 1462: 1453: 1448: 1447: 1446: 1436: 1431: 1426: 1421: 1416: 1411: 1406: 1401: 1396: 1391: 1386: 1385: 1384: 1373: 1368: 1367: 1364: 1363: 1360: 1359: 1354: 1349: 1344: 1339: 1334: 1329: 1324: 1319: 1314: 1309: 1303: 1298: 1297: 1294: 1293: 1290: 1289: 1284: 1279: 1274: 1269: 1264: 1258: 1255:Administrative 1253: 1252: 1249: 1248: 1245: 1244: 1239: 1234: 1229: 1224: 1219: 1214: 1209: 1204: 1199: 1194: 1189: 1184: 1182:New generation 1179: 1174: 1169: 1164: 1159: 1157:Fleet in being 1154: 1149: 1144: 1139: 1134: 1129: 1124: 1119: 1114: 1109: 1104: 1098: 1095:Grand strategy 1093: 1092: 1089: 1088: 1085: 1084: 1082:Scorched earth 1079: 1074: 1069: 1064: 1059: 1054: 1049: 1044: 1039: 1034: 1029: 1024: 1019: 1014: 1009: 1004: 999: 990: 985: 984: 981: 980: 977: 976: 971: 966: 961: 956: 954:Deep operation 951: 946: 939: 934: 928: 923: 922: 919: 918: 915: 914: 909: 904: 899: 894: 889: 884: 883: 882: 872: 867: 862: 857: 852: 847: 842: 837: 832: 827: 822: 817: 812: 807: 802: 801: 800: 795: 790: 780: 771: 766: 765: 762: 761: 758: 757: 755:Unconventional 752: 747: 742: 737: 732: 727: 722: 717: 712: 703: 701:Disinformation 698: 693: 688: 683: 678: 673: 672: 671: 666: 656: 651: 646: 641: 636: 631: 625: 620: 619: 616: 615: 612: 611: 606: 599: 598: 597: 596: 595: 594: 584: 579: 574: 569: 564: 552: 551: 550: 549: 548: 547: 537: 532: 527: 522: 517: 512: 500: 499: 498: 497: 492: 487: 478: 473: 472: 469: 468: 465: 464: 459: 454: 452:Basic training 449: 442: 441: 436: 431: 426: 419: 418: 413: 408: 403: 398: 393: 388: 381: 380: 378:Reconnaissance 375: 370: 365: 360: 355: 350: 343: 342: 337: 332: 327: 322: 317: 312: 305: 304: 299: 297:Special forces 294: 289: 288: 287: 277: 272: 265: 264: 259: 254: 249: 244: 239: 234: 229: 224: 219: 214: 207: 206: 197: 192: 183: 178: 173: 168: 163: 158: 153: 148: 143: 138: 132: 127: 126: 123: 122: 119: 118: 117: 116: 111: 101: 100: 99: 94: 84: 83: 82: 75:Post-classical 72: 67: 61: 56: 55: 52: 51: 43: 42: 24: 23: 15: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 4154: 4143: 4140: 4138: 4135: 4133: 4130: 4128: 4125: 4123: 4120: 4119: 4117: 4104: 4100: 4096: 4092: 4085: 4077: 4073: 4069: 4062: 4055: 4051: 4044: 4036: 4035: 4027: 4014:on 2009-02-07 4010: 4003: 4002: 3997: 3991: 3989: 3987: 3975: 3974: 3966: 3956: 3955: 3947: 3939: 3935: 3931: 3927: 3920: 3912: 3908: 3904: 3900: 3893: 3883: 3882: 3877: 3871: 3869: 3860: 3856: 3852: 3848: 3841: 3828:on 2008-02-27 3824: 3817: 3816: 3808: 3801: 3794: 3781:on 2009-02-07 3777: 3770: 3769: 3764: 3758: 3756: 3748: 3741: 3740: 3732: 3719:on 2009-02-07 3715: 3708: 3707: 3702: 3696: 3694: 3685: 3684: 3679: 3678:Mao, Tse-tung 3673: 3671: 3659: 3658: 3650: 3643: 3636: 3635: 3627: 3614:on 2009-11-02 3610: 3606: 3599: 3598: 3590: 3588: 3580: 3576: 3572: 3566: 3559: 3552: 3551: 3543: 3541: 3533: 3526: 3524: 3516: 3509: 3496:on 7 May 2008 3492: 3485: 3484: 3479: 3473: 3465: 3461: 3457: 3456: 3448: 3446: 3444: 3442: 3431: 3430: 3423: 3421: 3419: 3417: 3412: 3403: 3402:War on Terror 3400: 3398: 3395: 3393: 3390: 3388: 3385: 3383: 3380: 3378: 3375: 3374: 3368: 3366: 3365:civil affairs 3362: 3357: 3353: 3349: 3341: 3337: 3334: 3330: 3321: 3319: 3315: 3309: 3307: 3303: 3299: 3295: 3285: 3283: 3279: 3275: 3271: 3266: 3264: 3261: 3257: 3247: 3233: 3224: 3222: 3218: 3212: 3209: 3205: 3201: 3199: 3188: 3184: 3180: 3177: 3162: 3159: 3158: 3156: 3151: 3150: 3148: 3147: 3146: 3139: 3135: 3133: 3129: 3125: 3116: 3114: 3108: 3101: 3098: 3095: 3094: 3093: 3091: 3086: 3084: 3080: 3079:Ottawa Treaty 3069: 3065: 3061: 3057: 3054: 3045: 3037: 3030: 3027: 3024: 3020: 3017: 3013: 3012: 3011: 3009: 3004: 2991: 2987: 2984: 2981: 2977: 2973: 2969: 2966: 2963: 2960: 2959: 2958: 2950: 2946: 2941: 2936: 2933: 2931: 2927: 2926:Deconfliction 2923: 2922:friendly fire 2918: 2916: 2906: 2897: 2888: 2885: 2883: 2878: 2876: 2872: 2862: 2860: 2849: 2847: 2842: 2834: 2830: 2828: 2824: 2820: 2809: 2806: 2802: 2798: 2796: 2785: 2783: 2779: 2775: 2771: 2767: 2763: 2753: 2745: 2736: 2732: 2730: 2726: 2716: 2712: 2708: 2705: 2701: 2696: 2692: 2688: 2686: 2673: 2667: 2663: 2661: 2650: 2648: 2645:SF units are 2637: 2632: 2630: 2624: 2622: 2618: 2607: 2605: 2601: 2597: 2593: 2589: 2585: 2580: 2573: 2566: 2561: 2559: 2555: 2552: 2548: 2537: 2533: 2531: 2527: 2523: 2513: 2511: 2507: 2503: 2499: 2495: 2491: 2486: 2484: 2480: 2476: 2472: 2455: 2452: 2448: 2444: 2441: 2436: 2432: 2431: 2430: 2428: 2424: 2420: 2416: 2412: 2408: 2407:global scouts 2403: 2401: 2396: 2392: 2382: 2380: 2374: 2372: 2362: 2360: 2350: 2347: 2343: 2333: 2331: 2326: 2323: 2319: 2315: 2311: 2307: 2306:South Vietnam 2303: 2286: 2281: 2279: 2275: 2265: 2263: 2259: 2255: 2250: 2248: 2244: 2234: 2228: 2224: 2220: 2216: 2212: 2208: 2198: 2194: 2192: 2188: 2184: 2180: 2176: 2168: 2165: 2162: 2159: 2156: 2153: 2150: 2147: 2144: 2143:direct action 2141: 2138: 2135: 2132: 2129: 2126: 2125: 2124: 2122: 2118: 2114: 2110: 2099: 2094: 2092: 2088: 2084: 2083: 2079:(abbreviated 2078: 2077: 2072: 2069: 2066: 2060: 2056: 2052: 2048: 2036: 2031: 2029: 2024: 2022: 2017: 2016: 2014: 2013: 2006: 2003: 2001: 1998: 1996: 1993: 1991: 1988: 1986: 1983: 1981: 1978: 1976: 1973: 1971: 1968: 1966: 1963: 1962: 1959: 1954: 1953: 1946: 1943: 1941: 1938: 1936: 1933: 1931: 1928: 1926: 1923: 1921: 1918: 1917: 1911: 1910: 1903: 1900: 1898: 1895: 1893: 1890: 1888: 1885: 1883: 1880: 1878: 1875: 1873: 1870: 1868: 1865: 1863: 1862:Warrior caste 1860: 1858: 1855: 1853: 1850: 1849: 1846: 1841: 1840: 1833: 1832:Show of force 1830: 1826: 1823: 1821: 1820:Peacebuilding 1818: 1817: 1816: 1813: 1811: 1808: 1806: 1803: 1801: 1798: 1796: 1793: 1791: 1788: 1786: 1783: 1781: 1778: 1776: 1773: 1771: 1768: 1766: 1763: 1761: 1758: 1757: 1754: 1749: 1748: 1741: 1738: 1734: 1731: 1730: 1729: 1726: 1724: 1721: 1719: 1716: 1714: 1711: 1709: 1708: 1704: 1702: 1699: 1697: 1694: 1692: 1689: 1687: 1684: 1682: 1679: 1677: 1676:Air supremacy 1674: 1673: 1670: 1665: 1664: 1657: 1654: 1652: 1649: 1647: 1644: 1642: 1639: 1637: 1634: 1632: 1629: 1627: 1624: 1622: 1619: 1617: 1616:Islamic rules 1614: 1612: 1609: 1607: 1604: 1602: 1599: 1597: 1596:Court-martial 1594: 1592: 1589: 1587: 1584: 1583: 1580: 1575: 1574: 1565: 1562: 1561: 1560: 1557: 1555: 1552: 1550: 1547: 1546: 1543: 1538: 1537: 1528: 1525: 1523: 1520: 1518: 1515: 1514: 1513: 1510: 1508: 1505: 1501: 1498: 1496: 1495:Arms industry 1493: 1492: 1491: 1488: 1486: 1483: 1481: 1478: 1477: 1474: 1469: 1468: 1461: 1457: 1454: 1452: 1449: 1445: 1442: 1441: 1440: 1437: 1435: 1432: 1430: 1427: 1425: 1422: 1420: 1417: 1415: 1412: 1410: 1407: 1405: 1402: 1400: 1397: 1395: 1392: 1390: 1387: 1383: 1380: 1379: 1378: 1375: 1374: 1371: 1366: 1365: 1358: 1355: 1353: 1350: 1348: 1345: 1343: 1340: 1338: 1335: 1333: 1330: 1328: 1325: 1323: 1320: 1318: 1315: 1313: 1310: 1308: 1305: 1304: 1301: 1296: 1295: 1288: 1285: 1283: 1280: 1278: 1275: 1273: 1270: 1268: 1265: 1263: 1260: 1259: 1256: 1251: 1250: 1243: 1240: 1238: 1235: 1233: 1230: 1228: 1225: 1223: 1220: 1218: 1215: 1213: 1210: 1208: 1205: 1203: 1200: 1198: 1195: 1193: 1190: 1188: 1185: 1183: 1180: 1178: 1175: 1173: 1170: 1168: 1165: 1163: 1160: 1158: 1155: 1153: 1150: 1148: 1145: 1143: 1140: 1138: 1135: 1133: 1130: 1128: 1125: 1123: 1120: 1118: 1115: 1113: 1112:Broken-backed 1110: 1108: 1105: 1103: 1100: 1099: 1096: 1091: 1090: 1083: 1080: 1078: 1075: 1073: 1070: 1068: 1065: 1063: 1060: 1058: 1055: 1053: 1050: 1048: 1045: 1043: 1040: 1038: 1035: 1033: 1030: 1028: 1025: 1023: 1020: 1018: 1015: 1013: 1010: 1008: 1005: 1003: 1000: 998: 995: 994: 993: 988: 983: 982: 975: 972: 970: 967: 965: 962: 960: 957: 955: 952: 950: 949:Expeditionary 947: 945: 944: 940: 938: 935: 933: 930: 929: 926: 921: 920: 913: 910: 908: 905: 903: 900: 898: 895: 893: 890: 888: 885: 881: 878: 877: 876: 873: 871: 868: 866: 863: 861: 858: 856: 853: 851: 848: 846: 843: 841: 838: 836: 833: 831: 828: 826: 823: 821: 820:Counterattack 818: 816: 813: 811: 808: 806: 803: 799: 796: 794: 791: 789: 786: 785: 784: 781: 779: 776: 775: 774: 769: 764: 763: 756: 753: 751: 748: 746: 745:Psychological 743: 741: 738: 736: 733: 731: 728: 726: 723: 721: 718: 716: 713: 711: 707: 704: 702: 699: 697: 694: 692: 689: 687: 684: 682: 681:Combined arms 679: 677: 674: 670: 667: 665: 662: 661: 660: 657: 655: 652: 650: 647: 645: 642: 640: 637: 635: 632: 630: 627: 626: 623: 618: 617: 610: 607: 605: 602: 601: 593: 590: 589: 588: 585: 583: 580: 578: 575: 573: 570: 568: 565: 563: 560: 559: 558: 555: 554: 546: 543: 542: 541: 538: 536: 533: 531: 528: 526: 523: 521: 520:Fortification 518: 516: 513: 511: 508: 507: 506: 503: 502: 496: 493: 491: 488: 486: 483: 482: 480: 479: 476: 471: 470: 463: 460: 458: 455: 453: 450: 448: 445: 444: 440: 437: 435: 432: 430: 427: 425: 422: 421: 417: 414: 412: 409: 407: 404: 402: 399: 397: 394: 392: 389: 387: 384: 383: 379: 376: 374: 371: 369: 366: 364: 361: 359: 356: 354: 351: 349: 346: 345: 341: 338: 336: 335:Landing craft 333: 331: 328: 326: 323: 321: 318: 316: 313: 311: 308: 307: 303: 300: 298: 295: 293: 290: 286: 283: 282: 281: 278: 276: 273: 271: 268: 267: 263: 260: 258: 255: 253: 250: 248: 245: 243: 240: 238: 235: 233: 230: 228: 225: 223: 220: 218: 215: 213: 210: 209: 205: 201: 200:Standing army 198: 196: 193: 191: 187: 184: 182: 179: 177: 174: 172: 169: 167: 164: 162: 159: 157: 154: 152: 149: 147: 144: 142: 139: 137: 134: 133: 130: 125: 124: 115: 112: 110: 107: 106: 105: 102: 98: 95: 93: 92:pike and shot 90: 89: 88: 85: 81: 78: 77: 76: 73: 71: 68: 66: 63: 62: 59: 54: 53: 49: 45: 44: 38: 30: 26: 25: 21: 20: 4103:the original 4098: 4094: 4084: 4076:the original 4071: 4061: 4053: 4043: 4033: 4026: 4016:, retrieved 4009:the original 4000: 3972: 3965: 3953: 3946: 3938:the original 3933: 3929: 3919: 3911:the original 3906: 3902: 3892: 3880: 3859:the original 3854: 3850: 3840: 3830:, retrieved 3823:the original 3814: 3807: 3799: 3793: 3783:, retrieved 3776:the original 3767: 3738: 3731: 3721:, retrieved 3714:the original 3705: 3682: 3656: 3649: 3633: 3626: 3616:, retrieved 3609:the original 3596: 3574: 3570: 3565: 3549: 3531: 3514: 3508: 3498:, retrieved 3491:the original 3482: 3472: 3464:the original 3454: 3428: 3358: 3354: 3350: 3346: 3327: 3310: 3300:and one for 3291: 3284:(HF) range. 3267: 3253: 3244: 3230: 3213: 3210: 3206: 3202: 3194: 3185: 3181: 3173: 3144: 3132:Fort Benning 3122: 3113:hand grenade 3109: 3105: 3087: 3075: 3066: 3062: 3058: 3051: 3043: 3035: 3015:destruction. 3000: 2985: 2967: 2961: 2956: 2947: 2943: 2938: 2934: 2925: 2919: 2912: 2903: 2894: 2886: 2879: 2868: 2855: 2852:Organization 2843: 2839: 2827:combat diver 2816: 2813:Infiltration 2807: 2803: 2800: 2791: 2759: 2750: 2733: 2721: 2709: 2697: 2693: 2689: 2682: 2665: 2656: 2644: 2634: 2625: 2613: 2581: 2578: 2563: 2543: 2534: 2519: 2487: 2463: 2458:War II-style 2406: 2404: 2399: 2388: 2375: 2368: 2356: 2339: 2327: 2313: 2309: 2299: 2283: 2271: 2251: 2240: 2237:World War II 2219:Nazi Germany 2204: 2195: 2179:peacekeeping 2172: 2106: 2096: 2090: 2081: 2080: 2075: 2074: 2062: 1945:Fifth column 1925:War resister 1920:Women in war 1815:Peacekeeping 1760:Arms control 1705: 1394:Mobilization 1389:Conscription 1347:Intelligence 1300:Organization 941: 870:Encirclement 750:Radiological 686:Conventional 540:Subterranean 447:Development: 446: 423: 385: 347: 310:Naval units: 309: 302:Signal corps 269: 232:Intelligence 212:Specialties: 211: 136:Organization 87:Early modern 3314:Vietnam War 3068:withdraws. 3064:encircled. 2976:clandestine 2968:underground 2756:Preparation 2558:third world 2479:Vietnam War 2254:Philippines 2215:Philippines 1930:War studies 1753:Non-warfare 1681:Appeasement 1646:Martial law 1485:War economy 1424:Transgender 1377:Recruitment 1137:Containment 1022:Culminating 1002:Anti-access 925:Operational 845:Envelopment 788:Air assault 669:Air cavalry 629:Air defence 609:Information 510:Cold-region 475:Battlespace 424:Historical: 270:Land units: 176:Space force 171:Coast guard 104:Late modern 65:Prehistoric 4116:Categories 4018:2008-04-26 3899:"Big guns" 3832:2007-11-13 3785:2008-04-26 3723:2008-04-26 3618:2008-04-27 3500:2008-04-27 3408:References 3274:Morse Code 3260:AN/PRC-148 3227:Subversion 3128:Fort Bragg 2900:Transition 2891:Employment 2672:Mao Zedong 2522:insurgency 2502:subversion 2346:Mujahideen 2051:Insurgency 1990:War crimes 1980:Operations 1887:Foot drill 1857:Battle cry 1770:deterrence 1429:Harassment 1404:Specialism 1227:Technology 1222:Succession 1167:Liberation 1102:Asymmetric 1037:Empty fort 943:Blitzkrieg 912:Withdrawal 875:Investment 654:Camouflage 649:Biological 587:Underwater 562:Amphibious 481:Aerospace 348:Air units: 325:Submarines 114:fourth-gen 109:industrial 97:napoleonic 3324:Logistics 2997:Targeting 2986:auxiliary 2702:mission, 2551:President 2264:in 1952. 1877:War novel 1780:Grey-zone 1740:War games 1701:Overmatch 1651:War crime 1601:Desertion 1591:Ceasefire 1586:Armistice 1473:Logistics 1451:Mercenary 1439:Volunteer 1370:Personnel 1342:Engineers 1287:Sociology 1242:World war 1237:Total war 1217:Strategic 1207:Religious 1192:Political 1187:Perpetual 1162:Irregular 1077:Offensive 1052:Defensive 1047:Deception 1007:Attrition 855:Guerrilla 850:Formation 793:Airbridge 725:Loitering 639:Artillery 292:Artillery 227:Engineers 190:Irregular 161:Air force 3371:See also 3278:antennas 3270:deniable 3198:materiel 3191:Sabotage 3176:sabotage 3060:hidden. 2875:ambushes 2829:), etc. 2669:— 2594:and the 2568:— 2506:sabotage 2288:— 2187:demining 2071:doctrine 2068:military 1892:War song 1867:War film 1500:Materiel 1419:Children 1399:Training 1337:Medicine 1322:Doctrine 1277:Training 1212:Resource 1197:Princely 1147:Economic 1132:Conquest 1127:Colonial 1122:Cold war 1107:Blockade 987:Strategy 959:Maneuver 720:Infantry 676:Chemical 530:Mountain 490:Airborne 353:Fighters 320:Warships 275:Infantry 217:Rifleman 181:Reserves 129:Military 3745:, U.S. 3575:YouTube 3458:, U.S. 3333:USSOCOM 3280:in the 3221:Somalia 3208:force. 3124:Snipers 3119:Sniping 3022:target. 2909:Tactics 2865:Buildup 2766:USSOCOM 2602:or the 2466:War II, 2447:Contras 2434:combat. 2411:Somalia 2231:War II. 2201:History 2163:(PSYOP) 2005:Writers 2000:Weapons 1965:Battles 1914:Related 1902:Wargame 1897:Uniform 1845:Culture 1626:Perfidy 1621:Justice 1542:Science 1527:Outpost 1480:History 1460:Warrior 1456:Soldier 1444:foreign 1382:counter 1282:Service 1232:Theater 1172:Limited 1152:Endemic 1067:Nuclear 835:Foxhole 810:Cavalry 798:Airdrop 783:Airlift 768:Tactics 740:Nuclear 730:Missile 659:Cavalry 644:Barrage 622:Weapons 582:Surface 363:Command 358:Bombers 315:Frogman 285:Cavalry 242:Medical 204:Militia 186:Regular 166:Marines 80:castles 70:Ancient 58:History 37:outline 3294:SIGINT 2972:covert 2913:UW is 2846:SIGINT 2772:, the 2768:, the 2621:MASINT 2617:SIGINT 2574:, 1962 2359:Kuwait 2057:, and 1985:Sieges 1669:Theory 1409:Morale 1267:Policy 1262:Branch 1042:Mosaic 1032:Fabian 974:Covert 907:Trench 892:Screen 815:Charge 805:Battle 778:Aerial 696:Denial 664:Horses 592:Seabed 545:Tunnel 525:Jungle 515:Desert 485:Aerial 252:Diving 247:Police 4012:(PDF) 4005:(PDF) 3977:(PDF) 3958:(PDF) 3885:(PDF) 3826:(PDF) 3819:(PDF) 3779:(PDF) 3772:(PDF) 3743:(PDF) 3717:(PDF) 3710:(PDF) 3661:(PDF) 3638:(PDF) 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Unconventional warfare (United States)

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