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Voter-verified paper audit trail

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629:. The printed page contains both a plain text record and a simple barcode of the voter's selections. This page is the official ballot that is then fed through a scanner into a locked ballot box so that all originals are saved in case of the need for a recount or audit. The electronic record from the DRE is compared with the barcode scanner record and in case of any discrepancy, the paper ballots are used to determine the official vote, not the electronic record. The voter has the ability to proofread the ballot before it is placed into the scanner/lockbox and have it voided if there is any error, just as has always been possible with existing manual voting systems. 847:, precinct with multiple voting machines. Because both sets of records independently established the order of electronic ballots cast, they directly linked a voter's identification to his or her preference. Over 1.4 million registered voters in ten Ohio counties were affected. The situation was resolved before the next election by omitting the consecutive numbers on Authority To Vote slips from pollbook records. However, similar vulnerabilities may still exist in other states. 585: 338:. Insecure voting machine records could potentially be changed quickly without detection by the voting machine itself. Auditable paper ballots make it more difficult for voting machines to corrupt records without human intervention. Corrupt or malfunctioning voting machines might store votes other than as intended by the voter unnoticed. A VVPAT allows voters to verify their votes are cast as intended, an additional barrier to changing or destroying votes. 906:
component to a DRE machine, a jurisdiction would be required to purchase the system designed by the vendor of the DRE machine with a no bid, sole source purchase contract. That assumes the vendor has designed a component that is compatible with the DRE machine in use. The vendor may not have developed a VVPAT component that is compatible with the DRE machine in use, thus requiring the jurisdiction to purchase an entirely new
553:(0.23 percent or 11,779 votes)—the first by a Democratic presidential candidate in the state since 1992—automatically triggered a statewide audit, made possible by the new auditable paper ballot system. The audit found several human errors at the county level, netting Trump 1,274 votes. At the Trump campaign's request, this was followed by a full statewide hand recount of the paper ballots, which confirmed the result. 597: 389: 808:
printer backwards leaving a blank tape, which was not realized by voters who couldn't verify the paper trail. The Cuyahoga Election Review Panel proposed in its final report to remove the opaque doors covering the VVPAT except the ones equipped with equipment for blind voters. In general collecting and counting these printed records can be difficult.
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for an initial count or, in some cases, if the VVPAT is damaged or otherwise unreadable. In any subsequent recounts or challenges the paper, not the electronic ballot, would be used for tabulation. Whenever a paper record serves as the legal ballot, that system will be subject to the same benefits and concerns of any paper ballot system.
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maintenance and use and new elections law requirements. In the 2006 primary election in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, a study found that 9.6 percent of the VVPAT tapes were either destroyed, blank, illegible, missing, taped together or otherwise compromised. In one case the thermal paper was loaded into the
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DRE system, believes that "There's no reason voters should trust a system that doesn't have , and they shouldn't be asked to. Why on earth should have to trust me – someone with a vested interest in the project's success? A voter-verified audit trail is the only way to 'prove' the system's integrity
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In additional to providing transparency, Georgia's new VVPAT system helped counter a strong disinformation campaign by facilitating a total of three cross-confirming counts—initial vote, audit, and hand recount. This increased voter confidence, providing a reliable method to verify the results during
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at a June 2005 hearing on Voter Verification in Federal Elections "The blind cannot verify their choices by means of a piece of paper alone in a manner that is either independent or private. Nor can an individual who has a mobility disability, such as hand limitations, verify a piece of paper alone,
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An auditable system, such as that provided with VVPAT, can be used in randomized recounts to detect possible malfunction or fraud. With the VVPAT method, the paper ballot can be treated as the official ballot of record. In this scenario, the ballot is primary and the electronic records are used only
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Use of precinct-based optical scan or mark-sense tabulators instead of DREs. In this simple and cost-effective system, voters fill out paper ballots which are then counted electronically by a tabulator at the precinct, similar to the technology used to score standardized tests. Optical scan machines
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As of 2024, VVPAT systems are used in countries including the United States, India, Venezuela, the Philippines, and Bulgaria. In the U.S., 98.5 percent of registered voters live in jurisdictions offering some form of paper ballot, whether hand-marked or VVPAT. Only 1.4 percent use electronic systems
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or malfunction, and to provide a means to audit the stored electronic results. It contains the name and party affiliation of candidates for whom the vote has been cast. While VVPAT has gained in use in the United States compared with ballotless voting systems without it, hand-marked ballots are used
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Alternatively, an attacker could watch the order in which people use a particular voting system and note the order of each particular vote he is interested in. If that attacker later obtains the paper ballot records she could compare the two and compromise the privacy of the ballot. This could also
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DRE VVPAT systems that print the ballot records out in the order in which they were cast (often known as reel-to-reel systems) raise privacy issues, if the order of voting can also be recorded. VVPAT printers that cut the paper after each ballot to form individual ballots can avoid this concern. If
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Alternatively the printer could invalidate the printed record after the voter leaves and print a new fraudulent ballot. These ballots would be undetectable as invalidated ballots are quite common during elections. Also, VVPAT systems that are technically able to reverse the paper feed could be open
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Starting in 2002 with the statewide adoption of DREs and as recently as the 2016 election, the lack of a system producing auditable paper ballots would have made a recount impossible. The VVPAT system allowed officials to cross-check electronic results with paper records, confirming the accuracy of
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In the event an audit is performed after the election and a discrepancy is discovered between the ballot count and the audit count it is unclear which count is the authoritative count. Some jurisdictions have statutorily defined the ballot as the authoritative count leaving the role of an audit in
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points out that "Adding a paper printing device to a DRE machine naturally adds another component that can fail, run out of ink, jam or run out of paper. If DREs are alleged already to be prone to failure, adding a paper trail cannot improve that record." In Brazil in 2003, where a small number of
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For the voter, the printed record is "in a different format than the ballot, in a different place, is verified at a different time, and has a different graphical layout with different contrast and lighting parameters." In November 2003 in Wilton, CT, virtually all voters had to be prompted to find
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required the use of VVPAT technology statewide and adopted the Sequoia system. It is notable that, in Avante's design, the shield preventing the voter from taking the paper record was an afterthought, while in Sequoia's design, the paper record for successive voters were printed sequentially on a
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to actually check the paper audit before casting a ballot, which is critical to "verifying" the vote. While the option to look at the paper may provide comfort to an individual voter, the VVPAT does not serve as an effective check on malfunction or fraud unless a statistically relevant number of
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Other hurdles in the implementation of paper audit trails include the performance and authority of the audit. Paper audit systems increase the cost of electronic voting systems, can be difficult to implement, often require specialized external hardware, and can be difficult to use. In the United
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to protect against machine malfunction. However, the partial tallying of votes before the polls have closed could create a problem similar to the occurrence in American national elections where a winner is declared based on East Coast results long before polls have closed on the West Coast. In
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It can be significantly more difficult to implement a VVPAT as an after-the-fact feature. For jurisdictions currently using DRE voting machines that lack a VVPAT, implementation can be expensive to add and difficult to implement due to the specialized external hardware required. To add a VVPAT
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in favor of voting systems that use a paper ballot and disfavoring systems that use retrofitted VVPAT attachments. He has said on his personal blog that "after four years of studying the issue, I now believe that a DRE with a VVPAT is not a reasonable voting system."
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receipt that is either retained by the voter or stored within the machine. If the receipt is retained, the receipts can be manually counted and compared to the electronic vote totals in the event of a dispute. These systems have not been used in
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voting machines that print paper records stored within the machine. Such designs usually present the record to the voter behind a transparent surface to enable a voter to confirm a printed record matches the electronic ballot. The records can be
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The introduction of malicious software into a VVPAT system can cause it to intentionally misrecord the voter's selections. This attack could minimize detection by manipulating only a small percentage of the votes or for only lesser known races.
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and compared to the electronic vote totals in the event of a dispute. The solution linking electronic ballot images and the voter-verified paper record with randomly generated unique voting session identifier is covered by patents issued and
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In 1899, Joseph Gray addressed this problem with a mechanical voting machine that simultaneously recorded votes in its mechanism and punched those votes on a paper ballot that the voter could inspect before dropping it in a
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introduced a built-in-hood on top of the contrast sensor and paper roll that does not soak humidity in all VVPATs to prevent it from excess light and heat. In case of a discrepancy between the information on VVPATs and the
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have been in use for decades, and provide a voter-verified audit trail by default. Tabulators can detect overvotes at the poll so that the voter can be given the opportunity to correct a spoiled ballot.
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and James Moyer executed and publicized a proof of concept for this theory. Via a public records request, the two extracted voter identification from pollbooks, and voter preference from VVPATs, for a
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conducted before and after the election found a smaller-than-expected drop in Georgia voters' confidence (from 90% in October 2020 to 85% in January 2021) that their votes would count as intended.
1491: 360:– the voter does not have an option to review a tangible ballot to confirm the voting system accurately recorded his or her intent. In addition, an election official is unable to manually 451:, as some have called it, was refined in her Ph.D. dissertation in October 2000; in her final version, the paper record is printed behind glass so that the voter may not take it or alter it. 754:
And while VVPAT is designed to serve as a check on DRE (Direct Recording Electronic) vote recorders, it relies on the same proprietary programming and electronics to produce the audit trail.
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that includes a VVPAT component would have less implementation challenges. Some implementations of the VVPAT place a high cognitive burden on the voter and are extraordinarily error prone.
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In July 2019, after legal challenges and concerns about the security and reliability of its aging electronic voting machines, Georgia officials approved a $ 107 million contract with
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noted that a voter casting a vote on such a machine without a written record "has no knowledge through his senses that he has accomplished a result. The most that can be said, is,
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when storing votes. A paper VVPAT is readable by the human eye and voters can directly interpret their vote. Computer memory requires a device and software which is potentially
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and verify their receipt, increasing the time required to vote and the work for the pollworkers. The VVPAT adds to the complexity of voting, already a deterrent to voting.
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allow only a recount of the "stored votes". These "stored votes" might not represent the correct voter intent if the machine has been corrupted or suffered malfunction.
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to equip all 159 Georgia counties with new ballot-marking devices that provide a paper ballot for every vote cast (VVPAT). The upgrade was completed in time for the
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addition, the partial tallying of votes before the polls have closed may be illegal in some jurisdictions. Others have suggested that random audits of
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precincts had installed paper trails, failure of the printers delayed voters by as much as 12 hours, a figure that would be catastrophic in the U.S.
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The idea of creating a parallel paper trail for a direct-recording voting mechanism remained dormant for a century until it was rediscovered by
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Rebecca T. Mercuri, Physical verifiability of computer systems, Proc. 5th International Computer Virus and Security Conference.
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constituencies. VVPAT along with EVMs was used on a large-scale for the first time in India, in 10 assembly seats out of 40 in
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Video of voter behavior during an actual election revealed that most voters do not verify their choices by reading the VVPAT.
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the machine worked as intended, then he ... has voted." This observation remains at the center of concerns with ballotless
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Creation of an encrypted audit trail at the same time the electronic ballot is created in a DRE voting machine, a form of
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Systems that allow the voters to prove how they voted do not conform to the generally accepted definition of voting by
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One important question of VVPAT systems is regarding the time of the audit. Some have suggested that random audits of
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A manual VVPAT recount/audit is labor-intensive and expensive, and likely unaffordable to most candidates seeking it.
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Current VVPAT systems are not usable by some disabled voters. Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT) testified before the
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there are multiple voting machines it would be more difficult to match between the full voter list and the VVPATs.
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AVC Edge called the VeriVote Printer. Avante's system saw its first trial use in 2002, and in 2003, the state of
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as the number of votes entered in the Form 17C of a polling booth and the total number of votes recorded in the
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in Nagaland. The VVPAT system was introduced in 8 of 543 parliamentary constituencies as a pilot project in the
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will fade with time. Also, heat applied to the paper before or after the election can destroy the printing.
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Records printed on continuous rolls of paper is more difficult than counting standard paper ballots or even
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Another security concern is that a VVPAT could print while no voter is observing the paper trail, a form of
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Douglas W. Jones and Barbara Simons, Broken Ballots, CSLI Publications, 2012; see Section 5.5, pp. 111–115.
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The first commercial voting systems to incorporate voter verifiable paper audit trail printers were the
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and therefore provide a means by which a manual vote count can be conducted if a recount is necessary.
1965: 1239:, Vol. XIX, E.L. Freeman & Sons, Providence (1898); 732–735, quotation from the bottom of page 734. 1140: 960: 767:. Another eighteen States don't require them, but use them either statewide or in local jurisdictions. 648:. The audit trail can be accessed and compared to the electronic vote totals in the event of a dispute. 562: 417: 276: 68: 2195:
Threat to voter privacy with voter verified paper audit trail voting systems using spooled paper rolls
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Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island
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In India, in an instance VVPAT was helpful in resolving an issue pertaining to a tally of votes in
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ballots in the event of a dispute. Because of this, critics claim there is an increased chance for
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Voter-verifiable paper audit trail was first used in an election in India in September 2013 in
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Attachment of a printer to DRE voting machines that print paper records on special paper with
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The Usability of Electronic Voting Machines and How Votes Can Be Changed Without Detection
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States twenty-seven states require a paper audit trail by statute or regulation for all
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A VVPAT allows voters to verify that their vote was cast correctly, to detect possible
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Horatio Rogers, (19 R.I. 729) opinion of the Justices in re voting machine: dissent.
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to manipulated software overwriting or altering the VVPAT after the voter checks it.
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Independent Verification: Essential Action to Assure Integrity in the Voting Process
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voting machines be performed after the election or only in the event of a dispute.
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the final vote count and refuting claims by President Trump in a January 2, 2021
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Mira, Leslie, "For Brazil Voters, Machines Rule," Wired News, January 24, 2004.
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VVPAT systems can also introduce increased concern over reliability. Professor
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For jurisdictions not currently using DRE machines, the introduction of a new
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As a paper-based medium, the VVPAT offers some fundamental advantages over an
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Ariel J. Feldman; J. Alex Halderman; Edward W. Felten (September 13, 2006).
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to the vast majority of electors, who after all, own the democracy."
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Eminent Computer Scientist Criticizes ES&S "Real Time Audit Log"
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to print their paper ballot records. Ballot records printed on the
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Various technologies can be used to implement a paper audit trail.
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if that individual is required to pick up and handle the paper."
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Attachment of a printer to DRE voting machines that print an
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In 1897, responding to a question from Rhode Island Governor
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In addition, a VVPAT component may not be easily usable by
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the intense scrutiny of the 2020 election. A survey by the
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United States Senate Committee on Rules and Administration
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control unit of that booth did not tally. In June 2018,
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Secret-Ballot Receipts: True Voter-Verifiable Elections
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DRE Analysis for May 2006 Primary Cuyahoga County, Ohio
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voting systems the authority question remains unclear.
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Forbes.com: Paper Jams a Problem for Electronic Voting
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Case study: U.S. presidential election in Georgia 2020
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United States House Committee on House Administration
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AccuVote-TSx DRE voting machine with VVPAT attachment
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in November 2020. A razor-thin margin of victory for
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Secure Electronic Registration and Voting Experiment
1570:"Poll panel to introduce paper trail for Goa polls" 2249:Hearing on Voter Verification in Federal Elections 1953: 1368:"VVPAT machine to be on demonstration for 10 days" 1736:The Center for Election Innovation & Research 1386:"VVPAT to be introduced in Jadavpur constituency" 2408: 966:2004 United States election voting controversies 942:question. Because VVPAT is a recent addition to 404:about the legality of using the newly-developed 1300:"Nagaland first to use VVPAT device for voting" 1106:Watts, Jonathan; Lopez, Virginia (2013-04-14). 2279: 2065:Security Vulnerabilities and Problems with VVP 748:check ballot summaries overlook discrepancies. 2224:"E-voting predicament: Not-so-secret ballots" 1063:"The Problem with Electronic Voting Machines" 705:2016 Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly election 574:Center for Election Innovation & Research 440:to compare the paper and mechanical records. 368:or malfunction and security experts, such as 277: 889:Current implementation of VVPAT systems use 356:– both mechanical voting machines and 2370:Brennan Center Voting Technology Initiative 2058: 1732:"Confidence in Georgia's 2020-21 Elections" 803:, many of whom are already struggling with 790: 761:direct recording electronic voting machines 2390: 2071:, Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project / 1984: 1165:"ans_9349_1277290638 | International IDEA" 1138: 1105: 727: 701:Kancheepuram (State Assembly Constituency) 691:Matt Quinn, the developer of the original 512:2013 Mizoram Legislative Assembly election 324:by a greater proportion of jurisdictions. 284: 270: 2289:Computers, Freedom and Privacy Conference 2221: 2091: 2054: 2052: 2050: 2048: 2046: 1962:"Voter-Verified Paper Record Legislation" 1318:"India devises flawless ballot mechanism" 1306:. Press Trust of India. 4 September 2013. 1276:Rebecca T. Mercuri, A better ballot box, 1083:"India devises flawless ballot mechanism" 343:direct recording electronic voting system 2132:"Problems Found in Ohio Computer Voting" 1057: 855:Also problematic is that voters are not 604:DRE voting machine with VVPAT attachment 595: 583: 387: 2129: 1931: 2409: 2402:National Committee on Voting Integrity 2043: 1799: 1755:AVANTE International Technology, Inc. 1356:. Press Trust of India. 29 April 2014. 545:The system proved critical during the 16:Method of providing feedback to voters 1632:Electronic Privacy Information Center 1139:Panganiban, Artemio V. (2016-03-27). 2222:McCullagh, Declan (20 August 2007). 2191: 2266:. Retrieved February 3, 2007, from 2130:Fessler, Pam (September 13, 2006). 1968:. December 21, 2006. Archived from 1862: 1141:"VVPAT and other electoral reforms" 981:End-to-end auditable voting systems 660:, as such proof raises the risk of 458:Vote Trakker and a retrofit to the 238:End-to-end auditable voting systems 13: 920: 732: 374:Non-document ballot voting systems 354:non-document ballot voting systems 297:Voter verifiable paper audit trail 14: 2438: 2366:, Roy G. Saltman, August 22, 2006 2345: 2002:VVPR Attack with Misprinted VVPAT 900: 614:direct-recording electronic (DRE) 540:Democratic presidential primaries 1800:Zetter, Kim (November 3, 2003). 1492:"VVPAT to Debut in B'lore South" 1248:Joseph A. Gray, Voting-machine, 929:voting machines be performed on 863: 850: 568:that the count was inaccurate. 248:Independent verification systems 215:Certification of voting machines 84:Voter-verified paper audit trail 2310: 2301: 2273: 2242: 2215: 2185: 2148: 2123: 2092:Hertzberg, Steven, ed. (2006), 2085: 2027: 2011: 1995: 1925: 1903: 1889: 1875: 1856: 1836: 1818: 1802:"Aussies Do It Right: E-Voting" 1793: 1774: 1748: 1724: 1684: 1660: 1620: 1602: 1582: 1562: 1545: 1520: 1502: 1484: 1464: 1444: 1424: 1392: 1378: 1360: 1342: 1328: 1310: 1292: 1283: 1270: 1257: 1242: 1229: 184:Election Systems & Software 1205: 1181: 1157: 1132: 1099: 1075: 1051: 1028: 1003: 876: 744:Research indicates voters who 679:has testified in front of the 639:elections in the United States 579: 472:Noksen (Assembly Constituency) 1: 2280:Michael Shamos (April 2004). 1781:Today's Congressional hearing 1399:8 seats having VVPAT facility 996: 220:Independent Testing Authority 713:Election Commission of India 520:2019 Indian general election 476:2014 Indian general election 7: 2350: 2062:; Goler, Jon (April 2004), 2034:Paper Trail Manipulation II 1510:"VVPAT training in Tripura" 949: 936:direct recording electronic 927:direct recording electronic 770: 737:Common VVPAT problems are: 612:Attachment of a printer to 478:. VVPAT was implemented in 10: 2443: 2103:Election Science Institute 2018:Paper Trail Manipulation I 1966:Verified Voting Foundation 1932:Everett, Sarah P. (2007). 1716:: CS1 maint: url-status ( 1696:Georgia Secretary of State 1652:: CS1 maint: url-status ( 1628:"Curling v. Raffensperger" 1553:"AnnexureVI VVPAT Page 24" 961:Electronic voting in India 818: 563:Georgia Secretary of State 418:Rhode Island Supreme Court 394:electronic voting machines 383: 69:Optical scan voting system 2427:Electronic voting methods 2422:Electoral reform in India 1267:with added notes in 2005. 64:Electronic voting machine 2264:Senator Christopher Dodd 791:Usability and ergonomics 670:international agreements 590:Diebold Election Systems 2391:Advocacy and commentary 2262:. (2005). testimony of 1354:Business Standard India 1304:Business Standard India 1280:, Oct. 2002; pp. 46–50. 728:Challenges and concerns 536:2020 Georgia Republican 532:Dominion Voting Systems 516:2017 assembly elections 392:VVPAT used with Indian 380:with no paper record. 1941:(PhD). Rice University 605: 593: 467:single roll of paper. 397: 2136:National Public Radio 2101:, San Francisco, CA: 1826:"VVPAT saves the day" 1783:, March 7, 2007 from 1061:(November 10, 2004). 845:Delaware County, Ohio 599: 587: 391: 341:The VVPAT includes a 305:verified paper record 258:Software independence 243:Help America Vote Act 163:Software verification 158:Qualification testing 2268:Senate Rules website 2174:on 28 September 2011 1972:on December 14, 2006 1634:. September 17, 2024 1516:on November 7, 2017. 986:Vote counting system 860:voters participate. 412:, Associate Justice 89:Vote counting system 2192:Wack, John (2005), 2165:Cuyahoga County, OH 1863:Vishnoi, Anubhuti. 1698:. November 19, 2020 1265:Reposted on the web 1251:U.S. patent 620,767 672:and domestic laws. 426:DRE voting machines 396:in Indian Elections 358:DRE voting machines 31:Election technology 2362:2011-07-28 at the 2334:2018-10-17 at the 2323:2018-10-16 at the 2254:2009-02-26 at the 2038:Michael Ian Shamos 2022:Michael Ian Shamos 1885:. 25 October 2022. 1869:The Economic Times 1849:The Times of India 1757:"Patents & IP" 1614:The Economic Times 1595:The Times of India 1575:The Times of India 1477:The Times of India 1457:The Times of India 1437:The Times of India 1217:catalog.sos.ri.gov 1087:www.thenews.com.pk 971:DRE voting machine 834:voter intimidation 662:voter intimidation 606: 594: 566:Brad Raffensperger 402:Charles W. Lippitt 398: 153:Acceptance testing 74:Provisional ballot 54:DRE voting machine 2316:Warren, Stewart. 1852:. 12 August 2018. 1413:. DNA. 2014-04-27 976:Electronic Voting 627:security features 408:direct-recording 313:electronic voting 294: 293: 168:Usability testing 59:Electronic voting 2434: 2339: 2338:. June 21, 2006. 2314: 2308: 2305: 2299: 2298: 2296: 2295: 2286: 2277: 2271: 2246: 2240: 2239: 2237: 2235: 2219: 2213: 2212: 2211: 2209: 2200: 2189: 2183: 2182: 2181: 2179: 2173: 2162: 2152: 2146: 2145: 2143: 2142: 2127: 2121: 2120: 2119: 2117: 2111: 2105:, archived from 2100: 2089: 2083: 2082: 2081: 2079: 2070: 2056: 2041: 2031: 2025: 2015: 2009: 1999: 1993: 1988: 1982: 1981: 1979: 1977: 1957: 1951: 1950: 1948: 1946: 1940: 1929: 1923: 1922: 1920: 1918: 1907: 1901: 1900: 1893: 1887: 1886: 1879: 1873: 1872: 1860: 1854: 1853: 1840: 1834: 1833: 1822: 1816: 1815: 1813: 1812: 1797: 1791: 1778: 1772: 1771: 1769: 1768: 1759:. Archived from 1752: 1746: 1745: 1743: 1742: 1728: 1722: 1721: 1715: 1707: 1705: 1703: 1688: 1682: 1681: 1680: 1679: 1664: 1658: 1657: 1651: 1643: 1641: 1639: 1624: 1618: 1617: 1606: 1600: 1599: 1586: 1580: 1579: 1566: 1560: 1559: 1557: 1549: 1543: 1542: 1540: 1539: 1524: 1518: 1517: 1512:. Archived from 1506: 1500: 1499: 1494:. Archived from 1488: 1482: 1481: 1480:. 17 April 2014. 1468: 1462: 1461: 1460:. 28 April 2014. 1448: 1442: 1441: 1428: 1422: 1421: 1419: 1418: 1407: 1401: 1396: 1390: 1389: 1382: 1376: 1375: 1364: 1358: 1357: 1346: 1340: 1339: 1332: 1326: 1325: 1320:. Archived from 1314: 1308: 1307: 1296: 1290: 1287: 1281: 1274: 1268: 1261: 1255: 1253: 1246: 1240: 1233: 1227: 1226: 1224: 1223: 1209: 1203: 1202: 1200: 1199: 1185: 1179: 1178: 1176: 1175: 1161: 1155: 1154: 1152: 1151: 1136: 1130: 1129: 1127: 1126: 1103: 1097: 1096: 1094: 1093: 1079: 1073: 1072: 1070: 1069: 1055: 1049: 1048: 1042: 1032: 1026: 1025: 1023: 1022: 1007: 891:thermal printers 619:manually counted 547:general election 332:recording medium 286: 279: 272: 19: 18: 2442: 2441: 2437: 2436: 2435: 2433: 2432: 2431: 2417:Electoral fraud 2407: 2406: 2397:Verified Voting 2393: 2364:Wayback Machine 2353: 2348: 2343: 2342: 2336:Wayback Machine 2325:Wayback Machine 2315: 2311: 2306: 2302: 2293: 2291: 2284: 2278: 2274: 2256:Wayback Machine 2247: 2243: 2233: 2231: 2220: 2216: 2207: 2205: 2198: 2190: 2186: 2177: 2175: 2171: 2160: 2154: 2153: 2149: 2140: 2138: 2128: 2124: 2115: 2113: 2112:on 5 March 2016 2109: 2098: 2090: 2086: 2077: 2075: 2068: 2057: 2044: 2040:October 5, 2005 2032: 2028: 2024:October 5, 2005 2016: 2012: 2008:October 2, 2003 2000: 1996: 1989: 1985: 1975: 1973: 1960: 1958: 1954: 1944: 1942: 1938: 1930: 1926: 1916: 1914: 1909: 1908: 1904: 1895: 1894: 1890: 1881: 1880: 1876: 1861: 1857: 1842: 1841: 1837: 1824: 1823: 1819: 1810: 1808: 1798: 1794: 1779: 1775: 1766: 1764: 1753: 1749: 1740: 1738: 1730: 1729: 1725: 1709: 1708: 1701: 1699: 1690: 1689: 1685: 1677: 1675: 1666: 1665: 1661: 1645: 1644: 1637: 1635: 1626: 1625: 1621: 1610:"What is VVPAT" 1608: 1607: 1603: 1588: 1587: 1583: 1568: 1567: 1563: 1555: 1551: 1550: 1546: 1537: 1535: 1526: 1525: 1521: 1508: 1507: 1503: 1498:on May 3, 2014. 1490: 1489: 1485: 1470: 1469: 1465: 1450: 1449: 1445: 1440:. 7 April 2014. 1430: 1429: 1425: 1416: 1414: 1409: 1408: 1404: 1397: 1393: 1388:. 2 April 2014. 1384: 1383: 1379: 1374:. 4 April 2014. 1366: 1365: 1361: 1348: 1347: 1343: 1334: 1333: 1329: 1316: 1315: 1311: 1298: 1297: 1293: 1288: 1284: 1275: 1271: 1262: 1258: 1249: 1247: 1243: 1234: 1230: 1221: 1219: 1211: 1210: 1206: 1197: 1195: 1193:Verified Voting 1187: 1186: 1182: 1173: 1171: 1163: 1162: 1158: 1149: 1147: 1137: 1133: 1124: 1122: 1104: 1100: 1091: 1089: 1081: 1080: 1076: 1067: 1065: 1059:Schneier, Bruce 1056: 1052: 1040: 1034:See page 3 of: 1033: 1029: 1020: 1018: 1009: 1008: 1004: 999: 952: 923: 921:Legal questions 903: 879: 866: 853: 821: 793: 781:ballot stuffing 773: 763:used in public 735: 733:Common problems 730: 582: 528: 492:Chennai Central 488:Bangalore South 445:Rebecca Mercuri 386: 366:electoral fraud 329:electronic-only 290: 207:Related aspects 194:Dominion Voting 189:Hart InterCivic 44:Absentee ballot 17: 12: 11: 5: 2440: 2430: 2429: 2424: 2419: 2405: 2404: 2399: 2392: 2389: 2388: 2387: 2372: 2367: 2352: 2349: 2347: 2346:External links 2344: 2341: 2340: 2309: 2300: 2272: 2241: 2214: 2184: 2147: 2122: 2084: 2042: 2026: 2010: 1994: 1983: 1952: 1924: 1902: 1888: 1874: 1855: 1835: 1832:. 20 May 2016. 1817: 1792: 1773: 1747: 1723: 1683: 1659: 1619: 1601: 1598:. 20 May 2019. 1581: 1561: 1544: 1519: 1501: 1483: 1463: 1443: 1423: 1402: 1391: 1377: 1359: 1341: 1327: 1324:on 2014-01-03. 1309: 1291: 1282: 1269: 1256: 1241: 1228: 1204: 1180: 1156: 1131: 1098: 1074: 1050: 1027: 1001: 1000: 998: 995: 994: 993: 991:Voting machine 988: 983: 978: 973: 968: 963: 958: 951: 948: 922: 919: 902: 901:Implementation 899: 883:Michael Shamos 878: 875: 865: 862: 852: 849: 820: 817: 792: 789: 772: 769: 756: 755: 752: 749: 742: 734: 731: 729: 726: 654: 653: 649: 646:witness system 642: 630: 623: 581: 578: 527: 524: 449:Mercuri method 414:Horatio Rogers 410:voting machine 385: 382: 370:Bruce Schneier 321:election fraud 292: 291: 289: 288: 281: 274: 266: 263: 262: 261: 260: 255: 250: 245: 240: 235: 234: 233: 228: 223: 209: 208: 204: 203: 202: 201: 196: 191: 186: 178: 177: 173: 172: 171: 170: 165: 160: 155: 147: 146: 142: 141: 140: 139: 130: 125: 119:Precinct count 116: 111: 99: 98: 94: 93: 92: 91: 86: 81: 79:Voting machine 76: 71: 66: 61: 56: 51: 46: 38: 37: 33: 32: 28: 27: 15: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 2439: 2428: 2425: 2423: 2420: 2418: 2415: 2414: 2412: 2403: 2400: 2398: 2395: 2394: 2386: 2382: 2378: 2377: 2373: 2371: 2368: 2365: 2361: 2358: 2355: 2354: 2337: 2333: 2330: 2326: 2322: 2319: 2313: 2304: 2290: 2283: 2276: 2269: 2265: 2261: 2257: 2253: 2250: 2245: 2229: 2225: 2218: 2204: 2197: 2196: 2188: 2170: 2166: 2159: 2158: 2151: 2137: 2133: 2126: 2108: 2104: 2097: 2096: 2088: 2074: 2067: 2066: 2061: 2055: 2053: 2051: 2049: 2047: 2039: 2035: 2030: 2023: 2019: 2014: 2007: 2006:David L. Dill 2003: 1998: 1992: 1987: 1971: 1967: 1963: 1956: 1937: 1936: 1928: 1912: 1906: 1898: 1892: 1884: 1878: 1870: 1866: 1859: 1851: 1850: 1845: 1839: 1831: 1827: 1821: 1807: 1803: 1796: 1790: 1786: 1782: 1777: 1763:on 2008-05-03 1762: 1758: 1751: 1737: 1733: 1727: 1719: 1713: 1702:September 17, 1697: 1693: 1687: 1673: 1669: 1663: 1655: 1649: 1638:September 17, 1633: 1629: 1623: 1615: 1611: 1605: 1597: 1596: 1591: 1585: 1577: 1576: 1571: 1565: 1554: 1548: 1533: 1529: 1523: 1515: 1511: 1505: 1497: 1493: 1487: 1479: 1478: 1473: 1467: 1459: 1458: 1453: 1447: 1439: 1438: 1433: 1427: 1412: 1406: 1400: 1395: 1387: 1381: 1373: 1369: 1363: 1355: 1351: 1345: 1337: 1331: 1323: 1319: 1313: 1305: 1301: 1295: 1286: 1279: 1278:IEEE Spectrum 1273: 1266: 1260: 1252: 1245: 1238: 1232: 1218: 1214: 1208: 1194: 1190: 1184: 1170: 1166: 1160: 1146: 1142: 1135: 1121: 1117: 1113: 1109: 1102: 1088: 1084: 1078: 1064: 1060: 1054: 1046: 1039: 1031: 1016: 1012: 1006: 1002: 992: 989: 987: 984: 982: 979: 977: 974: 972: 969: 967: 964: 962: 959: 957: 954: 953: 947: 945: 944:direct record 939: 937: 932: 928: 918: 916: 915:voting system 911: 909: 908:voting system 898: 896: 895:thermal paper 892: 887: 884: 874: 871: 864:Accessibility 861: 858: 851:Effectiveness 848: 846: 842: 837: 835: 831: 825: 816: 814: 809: 806: 802: 797: 788: 784: 782: 777: 768: 766: 762: 753: 750: 747: 743: 740: 739: 738: 725: 723: 719: 714: 710: 706: 702: 697: 694: 689: 685: 682: 678: 673: 671: 667: 663: 659: 658:secret ballot 650: 647: 643: 640: 635: 631: 628: 624: 620: 615: 611: 610: 609: 603: 598: 591: 586: 577: 575: 569: 567: 564: 560: 554: 552: 548: 543: 541: 537: 533: 523: 521: 517: 513: 509: 505: 501: 497: 493: 489: 485: 481: 477: 473: 468: 465: 461: 457: 452: 450: 446: 441: 439: 435: 429: 427: 423: 419: 415: 411: 407: 403: 395: 390: 381: 377: 375: 371: 367: 363: 359: 355: 350: 348: 344: 339: 337: 333: 330: 325: 322: 318: 314: 310: 306: 302: 298: 287: 282: 280: 275: 273: 268: 267: 265: 264: 259: 256: 254: 251: 249: 246: 244: 241: 239: 236: 232: 229: 227: 224: 221: 218: 217: 216: 213: 212: 211: 210: 206: 205: 200: 197: 195: 192: 190: 187: 185: 182: 181: 180: 179: 176:Manufacturers 175: 174: 169: 166: 164: 161: 159: 156: 154: 151: 150: 149: 148: 144: 143: 138: 134: 133:Residual vote 131: 129: 126: 124: 120: 117: 115: 112: 110: 106: 105:Central count 103: 102: 101: 100: 96: 95: 90: 87: 85: 82: 80: 77: 75: 72: 70: 67: 65: 62: 60: 57: 55: 52: 50: 47: 45: 42: 41: 40: 39: 35: 34: 30: 29: 25: 21: 20: 2375: 2318:VoteTrustUSA 2312: 2303: 2292:. Retrieved 2288: 2275: 2244: 2232:. Retrieved 2227: 2217: 2206:, retrieved 2194: 2187: 2176:, retrieved 2169:the original 2157:Final Report 2156: 2150: 2139:. Retrieved 2125: 2114:, retrieved 2107:the original 2094: 2087: 2076:, retrieved 2064: 2036:, Professor 2029: 2020:, Professor 2013: 1997: 1986: 1976:December 22, 1974:. Retrieved 1970:the original 1955: 1943:. Retrieved 1934: 1927: 1915:. Retrieved 1905: 1891: 1877: 1868: 1858: 1847: 1838: 1829: 1820: 1809:. Retrieved 1805: 1795: 1776: 1765:. Retrieved 1761:the original 1750: 1739:. Retrieved 1735: 1726: 1700:. Retrieved 1695: 1686: 1676:, retrieved 1674:, 2024-09-02 1671: 1662: 1636:. Retrieved 1631: 1622: 1613: 1604: 1593: 1584: 1573: 1564: 1547: 1536:. Retrieved 1534:. 2013-11-24 1531: 1522: 1514:the original 1504: 1496:the original 1486: 1475: 1466: 1455: 1446: 1435: 1426: 1415:. Retrieved 1405: 1394: 1380: 1371: 1362: 1353: 1344: 1330: 1322:the original 1312: 1303: 1294: 1285: 1272: 1259: 1244: 1231: 1220:. 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Retrieved 1017:. 2022-07-10 1014: 1005: 940: 931:Election Day 924: 912: 904: 888: 880: 867: 856: 854: 838: 830:vote selling 826: 822: 810: 801:poll-workers 798: 794: 785: 778: 774: 757: 745: 736: 698: 690: 686: 674: 666:vote selling 655: 607: 570: 555: 544: 529: 469: 453: 442: 430: 421: 399: 378: 351: 340: 326: 316: 308: 304: 300: 296: 295: 136: 122: 108: 83: 2385:David Chaum 2060:Selker, Ted 877:Reliability 841:Jim Cropcho 813:punch cards 580:Application 504:Patna Sahib 484:Gandhinagar 336:proprietary 97:Terminology 2411:Categories 2294:2007-02-03 2260:109th Cong 2141:2007-02-04 1811:2011-08-17 1806:Wired News 1767:2008-06-21 1741:2024-09-17 1678:2024-09-15 1538:2013-12-09 1417:2014-04-27 1222:2024-09-15 1198:2024-09-15 1189:"Verifier" 1174:2024-09-15 1150:2024-09-15 1125:2024-09-15 1092:2024-09-15 1068:2006-12-22 1021:2022-12-09 997:References 693:Australian 675:Professor 559:phone call 434:ballot box 199:Smartmatic 36:Technology 2234:17 August 2228:CNET News 2208:17 August 2178:17 August 2116:17 August 2078:17 August 1830:The Hindu 1785:Avi Rubin 1672:Knowledge 1532:The Hindu 1372:The Hindu 1120:0261-3077 1045:J Halderm 1015:Governing 956:Totaliser 839:In 2007, 765:elections 677:Avi Rubin 634:encrypted 551:Joe Biden 406:McTammany 128:Undervote 2360:Archived 2351:Research 2332:Archived 2321:Archived 2252:Archived 1712:cite web 1648:cite web 950:See also 857:required 828:lead to 771:Security 622:pending. 602:ES&S 496:Jadavpur 137:drop-off 114:Overvote 24:a series 22:Part of 1945:June 3, 1917:June 3, 819:Privacy 508:Mizoram 480:Lucknow 460:Sequoia 428:today. 416:of the 384:History 362:recount 145:Testing 2381:mirror 2230:. 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Index

a series
Absentee ballot
Chad
DRE voting machine
Electronic voting
Electronic voting machine
Optical scan voting system
Provisional ballot
Voting machine
Voter-verified paper audit trail
Vote counting system
Central count
Overvote
Precinct count
Undervote
Residual vote
Acceptance testing
Qualification testing
Software verification
Usability testing
Election Systems & Software
Hart InterCivic
Dominion Voting
Smartmatic
Certification of voting machines
Independent Testing Authority
NVLAP
VVSG
End-to-end auditable voting systems
Help America Vote Act

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