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the facility. Over the next 10 days, approximately 10,000 medical check-ups were conducted. Dozens of emergency workers and residents who lived nearby were hospitalized and hundreds of thousands of others were forced to remain indoors for 24 hours. Testing confirmed 39 of the workers were exposed to the radiation. At least 667 workers, first-responders, and nearby residents were exposed to excess radiation as a result of the accident. Radioactive gas levels stayed high in the area even after the plant was sealed. Finally, on
October 12, it was discovered that a roof ventilation fan had been left on and it was shut down. Sometime after the incident, people in the area were asked to lend any gold they had to allow calculations of the size and range of the gamma ray burst.
289:
208:) for storage, and that day was trialling a new asphalt-waste mix, using 20% less asphalt than normal. A gradual chemical reaction inside one fresh barrel ignited the already-hot contents at 10:00 a.m. and quickly spread to several others nearby. Workers failed to properly extinguish the fire, and smoke and radiation alarms forced all personnel to evacuate the building. At 8 p.m., just as people were preparing to reenter the building, built up flammable gases ignited and exploded, breaking windows and doors, which allowed smoke and
31:
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the trial, the jury learned that a 1995 JCO safety committee had approved the use of steel buckets in the procedure. Furthermore, a widely distributed but unauthorized 1996 manual recommended the use of buckets in making the solution. A STA report indicated JCO management had permitted these hazardous practices beginning in 1993 to shortcut the conversion process, even though it was contrary to approved nuclear chemical handling procedures.
749:
technicians measured significantly higher levels of radiation than the measurement designated the maximum allowable dose (50 mSv) for
Japanese nuclear workers. Many employees of the company and local population suffered accidental radiation exposure exceeding safe levels. Over fifty plant workers tested up to 23 mSv and local residents up to 15 mSv. The incident was fatal to the two technicians, Ouchi and Shinohara.
786:, which at the time was a new form of treatment. After receiving the transplant from his sister, Ouchi initially experienced increased white blood cell counts temporarily, but succumbed to his other injuries shortly thereafter. Numerous other interventions were conducted in an attempt to arrest further decline of Ouchi's severely damaged body, including repeated use of cultured skin grafts and pharmacological interventions with
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critical mass, large amounts of high-level gamma radiation set off alarms in the building, prompting the three technicians to evacuate. All three of the workers were unaware of the impact of the accident or reporting criteria. A worker in the next building became aware of the injured employees and contacted emergency medical assistance; an ambulance escorted them to the nearest hospital. The
881:. To this day, the tensions between the need for produced power outside of nonexistent natural resources and the safety of the country's population remain. Advocacy for acute nuclear disease victims and eradication of nuclear related incidents has led to several movements across the globe promoting human welfare and environmental conservation.
852:
settled. In
September 2000 JCO agreed to pay $ 121 million in compensation to settle 6,875 claims from people exposed to radiation and affected agricultural and service businesses. All residents within 350 metres of the incident and those forced to evacuate received compensation if they agreed to not sue the company in the future.
597:
In contrast, the precipitation tank had not been designed to hold unlimited quantities of this type of solution. The designed wide cylindrical shape made it favorable to criticality. The workers bypassed the buffer tanks entirely, opting to pour the uranyl nitrate directly into the precipitation tank. An uncontrolled
482:. Due to lack of safety technology, they had to rely on the administration to keep track of the levels. This meant that there was human error involved. In addition, the regulator did not conduct routine inspections that would have caught this lack of safety technology that could have prevented the accident.
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As a response to the incidents, special laws were put in place stipulating operational safety procedures and quarterly inspection requirements. These inspections focused on the proper conduct of workers and leadership. This change mandated both safety education and quality assurance of all facilities
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The 1999 incident resulted from poor management of operation manuals, failure to qualify technicians and engineers, and improper procedures associated with handling nuclear chemicals. The lack of communication between the engineers and workers contributed to lack of reporting when the incident arose.
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Ultimately the incident was classified as an "irradiation" not "contamination" accident under Level 4 on the
Nuclear Event Scale. This determination labeled the situation low risk outside of the facility. The technicians and workers in the facility were measured for radiation contamination. The three
864:
In April 2001 six employees, including the chief of production department at the time, pleaded guilty to a charge of negligence resulting in death. Among those arrested was
Yokokawa for his failure to supervise proper procedures. The JCO President also pleaded guilty on behalf of the company. During
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In late March 2000, the STA cancelled JCO's credentials for operation serving as the first
Japanese plant operator to be punished by law for mishandling nuclear radiation. This suit was followed by the company president's resignation. In October, six officials from JCO were charged with professional
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By mid-afternoon, the plant workers and surrounding residents were asked to evacuate. Five hours after the start of the criticality, evacuation commenced of some 161 people from 39 households within a 350-metre radius from the conversion building. Twelve hours after the incident, 300,000 surrounding
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Ouchi and
Shinohara immediately experienced pain, nausea, and difficulty breathing; both workers went to the decontamination room where Ouchi vomited. Ouchi received the largest radiation exposure, resulting in rapid difficulties with mobility, coherence, and loss of consciousness. Upon the point of
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The nuclear fuel conversion standards specified in the 1996 JCO Operating Manual dictated the proper procedures regarding dissolution of uranium oxide powder in a designated dissolution tank. The buffer tank's tall, narrow geometry was designed to hold the solution safely and to prevent criticality.
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in three years; no proper qualification and training requirements were established to prepare for the process. To save processing time, and for convenience, the team mixed the chemicals in stainless-steel buckets. The workers followed JCO operating manual guidance in this process but were unaware it
566:
In addition to these three workers who immediately felt symptoms, 56 people at the JCO plant were reported to have been exposed to the gamma, neutron, and other irradiation. In addition to the workers at the site, construction workers who were working on a job site nearby, were also reported to have
485:
The second cause of the accident was the inadequate safety culture in Japan. The company did not submit the second operation of nuclear facilities to the safety management division because they knew it would not get approved. The company spokesman explained that the company's revenue was getting low
99:
By March 2000, Japan's atomic and nuclear commissions began regular investigations of facilities, expansive education regarding proper procedures and safety culture regarding handling nuclear chemicals and waste. JCO's credentials were removed, the first
Japanese plant operator to be punished by law
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Japan relies heavily on imports for 80% of all energy requirements, due to this shortage, mounting pressures to produce self-sustaining energy sources remain. In 2014, the
Japanese government decided to establish the "Strategic Energy Plan" naming nuclear power as an important power source that can
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Over 600 plant workers, firefighters, emergency personnel and local residents were exposed to radioactivity following the incident. In
October 1999, JCO set up advisory booths to process compensation claims and inquiries of those affected. By July 2000, over 7,000 compensation claims were filed and
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Without an emergency plan or public communication from the JCO, confusion and panic followed the event. Authorities warned locals not to harvest crops or drink well water. In order to ease public concerns, officials began radiation testing of residents living approximately 6 miles (10 km) from
757:
STA and Ibaraki Prefecture began monitoring the levels of gamma immediately after they were notified of the accident. They collected samples of tap water, well water and precipitation within 10 kilometres of the site. They also took samples of vegetation, sea water, dairy products and sea products
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Masato Shinohara, 40, was transported to the same facility where he died on 27 April 2000 of multiple organ failure. He endured radical cancer treatment, numerous successful skin grafts, and a transfusion from congealed umbilical cord blood (to boost stem cell count). Despite surviving for seven
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The Management System or the system required to assure not only the quality of the product but also to assure the safety as a part of "satisfaction of interested parties", had not taken root in JCO. The licensed design of the nuclear fuel process had been continuously revised in an unauthorized
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and serious breaches of safety principles". Several human errors caused the incident, including careless material handling procedures, inexperienced technicians, inadequate supervision and obsolete safety procedures on the operating floor. The company had not had any incidents for over 15 years
533:
Pressure placed upon JCO to increase efficiency led the company to employ an illegal procedure wherein they skipped several key steps in the enrichment procedure. The technicians poured the product by hand in stainless-steel buckets directly into a precipitation tank. This process inadvertently
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in the area surrounding the reprocessing plant, but later revealed the true percent was ten times higher than initially published. Tōkai residents demanded criminal prosecution of PNC officials, reorganization of company leadership and closure of the plant itself. Following public outcry, the
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residents of the nuclear facility were told to stay indoors and cease all agricultural production. This restriction was lifted the following afternoon. Almost 15 days later, the facility instituted protection methods with sandbags and other shielding to protect from residual gamma radiation.
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Two of the workers were working on the tank at the time of the accident; the third was in a nearby room. All three immediately reported seeing blue-white flashes. They evacuated immediately upon hearing the gamma alarms sound. After evacuating, one of the workers that was at the tank began
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rendered Ouchi completely unresponsive, the family conceded that if his heart stopped again, Ouchi should not be resuscitated again. His wife had hoped that Ouchi would at least survive until 1 January since it was the arrival of the 2000s. But his condition deteriorated into
872:
Efforts to comply with emergency preparedness procedures and international guideline requirements continued. New systems were put in place for handling a similar incident with governing legislature and institutions in an effort to prevent further situations from occurring.
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and activities associated with nuclear power generation. Starting in 2000, Japan's atomic and nuclear commissions began regular investigations of facilities, expansive education regarding proper procedures and safety culture regarding handling nuclear chemicals and waste.
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manner, and finally made vulnerable to the occurrence of a criticality event. Not only the three workers, who triggered the accident, but also the manager who allowed the last modification of the process lacked practical understanding of criticality safety.
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According to the radiation testing by the STA, Ouchi was exposed to 17 Sv of radiation, Shinohara 10 Sv, and Yokokawa received 3 Sv. The two technicians who received the higher doses, Ouchi and Shinohara, died several months later.
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Their supervisor, Yutaka Yokokawa, 54, received treatment from the National Institute of Radiological Sciences (NIRS) in Chiba, Japan. He was released three months later with minor radiation sickness. He faced negligence charges in October 2000.
693:(5 hours later) STA confirms continuing chain reactions; Tokaimura sets up headquarters for the incidents, (12 hours later) broadcasts all surrounding residents to evacuate, informs Japan's leadership and ceased all crop and water usage
521:. Next, the mixture is carefully transported to a specially-crafted buffer tank. The buffer tank containing the combined ingredients is specially designed to prevent fission activity from reaching criticality. In a precipitation tank,
504:
for Japan's power plants and research reactors. Enriching nuclear fuel requires precision and has the potential to impose extreme risks to technicians. If done improperly, the process of combining nuclear products can produce a
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when its fill level, containing about 16 kg (35 lb) of uranium, reached criticality. The hazardous level was reached after the technicians added a seventh bucket containing aqueous uranyl nitrate, enriched to 18.8%
840:
613:. At the time of the event, Ouchi had his body draped over the tank while Shinohara stood on a platform to assist in pouring the solution. Yokokawa was sitting at a desk four metres away. All three technicians observed a
235:
lack of proper supervision. Dōnen leadership failed to immediately report the fire to the Science and Technology Agency (STA). This delay was due to their own internal investigation of the fire causing hampered immediate
575:
JCO facility technicians Hisashi Ouchi, Masato Shinohara, and Yutaka Yokokawa were speeding up the last few steps of the fuel/conversion process to meet shipping requirements. It was JCO's first batch of fuel for the
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is added forming a solid product. This tank is meant to capture any remaining nuclear waste contaminants. In the final process, uranium oxide is placed in the dissolving tanks until purified, without enriching the
153:
This particular plant was made in 1988 and processed 3 tonnes of uranium per year. The uranium that was processed was enriched up to 20% U-235, which is a higher enrichment level than normal. They did this using a
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was not approved by the STA. Under correct operating procedure, uranyl nitrate would be stored inside a buffer tank and gradually pumped into the precipitation tank in 2.4 kg (5.3 lb) increments.
91:
It was determined that the accidents were due to inadequate regulatory oversight, lack of appropriate safety culture and inadequate worker training and qualification. After these two accidents, a series of
801:
At the wishes of his family, doctors repeatedly revived Ouchi when his heart stopped, even though it had become clear that the radiation damage to his body was too extensive to be survived. After one such
215:
The incident exposed 37 nearby personnel to trace amounts of radiation in what the government's Science and Technology Agency declared the country's worst-yet nuclear accident, which was rated a 3 on the
475:. Two of the three technicians mixing fuel lost their lives. The incident was caused by lack of regulatory supervision, inadequate safety culture and improper technician training and education.
271:
224:
40 kilometres (25 miles) south-west of the plant. Aerial views over the nuclear processing plant building showed a damaged roof from the fire and explosion allowing continued external
555:. The worker passed out, then regained consciousness 70 minutes later. The three workers were then transferred to the hospital, who confirmed that they were exposed to high doses of
478:
The first cause that contributed to the accident was the lack of regulatory oversight. The overhead failed to install a criticality accident alarm and they were not included in the
782:
and was placed in a special radiation ward to limit the risk of contracting an infection. Doctors attempted to restore some functionality to Ouchi's immune system by administering
1290:
Akashi, M.; Aoki, H.; Endo, A.; Fujimoto, K.; Homma, T.; Kukita, Y.; Matsubara, J.; Mennerdahl, D.; Nariai, H.; Sumita, K.; Tanabe, F.; Tanaka, S.; Yamaguchi, Y.; Zombori, P.
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which, in turn, produces radiation. In order to enrich the uranium fuel, a specific chemical purification procedure is required. The steps included feeding small batches of
636:
The next morning, workers ended the nuclear chain reaction by draining water from the surrounding cooling jacket installed on the precipitation tank. The water served as a
126:
The village of Tōkai's location (approximately seventy miles from Tokyo) and available land space made it ideal for nuclear power production, so a series of experimental
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and so they felt they had no choice, but to open a new factory. They knew it wouldn't get approved so they did it without telling the safety management division.
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for mishandling nuclear radiation. This was followed by the company president's resignation and six officials being charged with professional negligence.
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safely stabilize and produce the energy supply and demand of the country. This event contributed to antinuclear activist movements against production of
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939:
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Had the company corrected the errors after the 1997 incident, the 1999 incident would have been considerably less devastating or may not have happened.
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months, he was eventually unable to fight off radiation-exacerbated infections and internal bleeding, and succumbed to fatal lung and kidney failure.
1897:
1862:"Report on the preliminary fact finding mission following the accident at the nuclear fuel processing facility in Tokaimura, Japan (9.5 MB)"
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for testing. They found low levels of radioactivity in some of the vegetation, but they did not find any in the dairy products, water or sea.
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1459:
1040:
1329:
342:
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notice regulatory and nuclear industry overconfidence, and governance failures may equally apply to the Tokaimura nuclear accident.
155:
2595:
889:
The 1999 accident is mentioned, along with a flashback scene of a hospital visit to Hisashi Ouchi, in the 2023 Japanese miniseries
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1519:
Report on the preliminary fact finding mission following the accident at the nuclear fuel processing facility in Tokaimura, Japan
1195:
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2010:
1932:
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138: – were built here. Over time, dozens of companies and government institutes were established nearby to provide
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Road blocks implemented; shelter in place lifted but schools closed all day; water drainage initiated to stop chain reaction.
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PNC management mandated two workers to falsely report the chronological events leading to the facility evacuation in order to
2000:
795:
679:
Criticality event occurred, setting off radiation monitors and alarms; evacuation begins and employees exposed to radiation
621:) and gamma radiation alarms sounded. Over the next several hours the fission reaction produced continuous chain reactions.
463:, a subsidiary of Sumitomo Metal Mining Company. It was the worst civilian nuclear radiation accident in Japan prior to the
459:) occurred approximately four miles away from the PNC facility on 30 September 1999, at a fuel enrichment plant operated by
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811:, exacerbated by the repeated incidents of heart failure. He died on 21 December 1999 following his final cardiac arrest.
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2005:
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Hisashi Ouchi, 35, was transported and treated at the University of Tokyo Hospital for 83 days. Ouchi suffered serious
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1982:
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Health checks conducted on all residents, measuring radiation; schools reopened and government press conferences held
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for 667 people and the deaths of two workers. Most of the technicians had to go to hospital with serious injuries.
17:
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1951:
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54:. The first accident occurred on 11 March 1997, producing an explosion after an experimental batch of solidified
593:, to the tank. The solution added to the tank was almost seven times the legal mass limit specified by the STA.
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facility closed until reopening in November 2000 when it was reinstated as a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant.
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1992:
640:. A boric acid solution was added to the precipitation tank to reduce all contents to sub-critical levels;
335:
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and prolonged radioactivity exposure. Dōnen facility officials initially reported a 20 percent increase of
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negligence derived from failure to properly train technicians and knowingly subverting safety procedures.
131:
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1977:
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577:
1072:"Why is Nuclear Energy Necessary in Japan? – The Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan (FEPC)"
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of 2011. The incident exposed the surrounding population to hazardous nuclear radiation after the
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facilities. Nearly one-third of Tōkai's population rely upon nuclear industry-related employment.
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237:
147:
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1906:
1401:
Ryan, Michael (1 September 2001). "The Tokaimura Nuclear Accident: A Tragedy of Human Errors".
908:
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Ryan, Michael (1 November 2001). "The Tokaimura Nuclear Accident: A Tragedy of Human Errors".
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2020:
1723:
Ryan, Michael (25 June 2001). "The Tokaimura Nuclear Accident: A Tragedy of Human Errors".
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to most of his body, experienced severe damage to his internal organs, and had a near-zero
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378:
73:
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contaminated the fuel reprocessing building and immediately outside the nuclear facility.
8:
1942:
1487:
Akashi, M.; Aoki, H.; Endo, A.; Fujimoto, K.; Homma, T.; Kukita, Y.; Zombori, P. (2000).
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workers arrived and escorted other plant workers outside of the facility's muster zones.
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for an experimental reactor. The incident spanned approximately 20 hours and resulted in
1615:
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225:
143:
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47:
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841:
National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission
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According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the cause of the accidents were "
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220:. A week after the event, meteorological officials detected unusually high levels of
62:
1743:
798:, without any measurable success. In which during that time Ouchi's flesh tore off.
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775:
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1540:"JCO employees plead guilty to negligence in deaths at Japanese nuclear facility"
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criticized the delay that allowed radiation to continue to impact local areas.
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of 2011, after which nuclear electricity production fell into sharp decline.
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1489:"Lessons Learned From the JCO Nuclear Criticality Accident in Japan in 1999"
1292:"Lessons learned from the JCO Nuclear Criticality Accident in Japan in 1999"
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1706:
81:
1742:
Street Journal, Peter LandersStaff Reporter of The Wall (1 October 1999).
1426:"Japan criticality accident - the accident at Tokaimura and its aftermath"
180:
bituminisation facility. It is sometimes referred to as the Dōnen accident
30:
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552:
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making company employees complacent in their daily responsibilities.
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count. Without a functioning immune system, Ouchi was vulnerable to
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232:
119:, providing approximately 30% of Japan's electricity up until the
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2323:
940:"Tokaimura Criticality Accident 1999 - World Nuclear Association"
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fuel. This served as the first step in producing nuclear reactor
468:
221:
205:
93:
1247:"Explosion at PNC Tokai reprocessing plant | Wise International"
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3 workers: Hisashi Ouchi, Masato Shinohara and Yutaka Yokokawa
1166:
The Japan Handbook: Regional Handbooks of Economic Development
601:
began immediately. The resulting nuclear fission chain became
1665:"Japan's worst nuclear accident leaves two fighting for life"
641:
513:
powder into a designated dissolving tank in order to produce
51:
1008:"Tokaimura Criticality Accident - World Nuclear Association"
980:"Tokaimura Criticality Accident - World Nuclear Association"
196:, 'Dōnen' being an abbreviation of PNC's full Japanese name
65:
bituminisation facility. Over twenty people were exposed to
60:
Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (PNC)
1460:"The Tokaimura Accident: Nuclear Energy and Reactor Safety"
1041:"The Tokaimura Accident: Nuclear Energy and Reactor Safety"
921:, meant to be the successor to the Tokai Reprocessing Plant
42:
refer to two nuclear related incidents near the village of
96:
were filed and new safety measures were put into effect.
1533:
1531:
1529:
1527:
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142:, experimentation, manufacturing, and fuel fabrication,
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on 30 September 1999 due to improper handling of liquid
34:
Tokai Nuclear Plant, Japan's first nuclear power station
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172:
On 11 March 1997, the village of Tōkai's first serious
454:
168:
Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation
76:
at a separate fuel reprocessing facility belonging to
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480:
National Plan for the Prevention of Nuclear Disasters
530:, in a wet-process technology specialized by Japan.
1330:"NRC Review of the Tokai-Mura Criticality Accident"
1196:"Japan's record of nuclear cover-ups and accidents"
1744:"Nuclear Accident in Tokai Is Among Japan's Worst"
1467:National Center for Case Study Teaching in Science
1289:
1221:"Tokai nuclear fuel plant reopens after 1997 fire"
1048:National Center for Case Study Teaching in Science
1847:Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2018
822:
439:The second, more serious Tōkai nuclear accident (
134: – the country's first commercial
2587:
1097:"Japan: Nuclear share of electricity generation"
584:At around 10:35, the precipitation tank reached
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538:level incident triggering uncontrolled nuclear
189:
1780:"Japanese Nuclear Accident Timeline of Events"
1741:
1639:"Scientists Fear Wider Risk in Japan Accident"
183:
161:
1891:
1111:"Nuclear Workers Appeared Unaware of Dangers"
1264:
1057:on 19 August 2019 – via Science Cases.
1871:. International Atomic Energy Agency. 1999.
1905:
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784:peripheral blood stem cell transplantation
407:Level 4 (accident with local consequences)
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859:
761:
111:was an important energy alternative for
29:
27:1997 and 1999 Tōkai nuclear plant events
2291:Japanese Atomic Energy Commission(JAEC)
1820:"Arrests Over Japan's Nuclear Accident"
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839:Comments within the 2012 Report by the
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696:Tokaimura City and National Leadership
78:Japan Nuclear Fuel Conversion Co. (JCO)
14:
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578:Jōyō experimental fast breeder reactor
198:Dōryokuro Kakunenryō Kaihatsu Jigyōdan
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1521:(1st ed., Vol. 1, pp. 32–34). Vienna.
1498:. International Atomic Energy Agency.
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847:Victim compensation and plant closure
796:granulocyte colony-stimulating factor
212:to escape into the surrounding area.
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1400:
1303:. International Atomic Energy Agency
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1002:
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571:Nuclear criticality event chronology
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1725:Journal of College Science Teaching
1581:Journal of College Science Teaching
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1403:Journal of College Science Teaching
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117:limit dependence on imported energy
24:
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1300:International Atomic Energy Agency
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914:Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster
465:Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster
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200:. The site encased and solidified
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2360:Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA)
2296:Nuclear Regulation Authority(NRA)
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997:
218:International Nuclear Event Scale
2567:
2556:
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2382:Japan Electric Association(JEA)
2193:prototype fast (breeder) reactor
1818:Lies, Elaine (11 October 2000).
1805:"日本東海村核泄漏 男廠工受核輻射 83天內急速潰爛畫面極震撼"
1194:Iovino, Peter Aldhous and Zena.
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2596:Nuclear accidents and incidents
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1637:Efron, Sonni (8 October 1999).
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310:Location of Tōkai-mura in Japan
1538:Smith, Sandy (24 April 2001).
1458:Ryan, Michael (25 June 2001).
1103:
1089:
932:
823:Contributors to both accidents
13:
1:
2661:September 1999 events in Asia
2533:Sayonara Nuclear Power Plants
1663:Lamar, Joe (9 October 1999).
1600:"What Happened at Tokaimura?"
1338:Nuclear Regulatory Commission
925:
542:over the next several hours.
103:
1669:BMJ: British Medical Journal
739:
7:
2611:Man-made disasters in Japan
2424:Tokaimura nuclear accidents
1598:Levi, Barbara Goss (1999).
1039:Ryan, Michael (June 2001).
919:Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant
902:
489:The JCO facility converted
455:
279:Tokaimura nuclear accidents
190:
162:1997 nuclear waste accident
113:natural-resource-poor Japan
40:Tokaimura nuclear accidents
10:
2677:
2601:Nuclear reprocessing sites
2501:Project Sunshine for Japan
2419:Fukushima nuclear disaster
2339:Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited
897:Fukushima nuclear accident
792:broad-spectrum antibiotics
654:Timeline of 1999 accident
456:Tōkai-mura JCO-rinkai-jiko
165:
121:Fukushima nuclear disaster
2656:March 1997 events in Asia
2636:1999 industrial disasters
2626:1997 industrial disasters
2551:
2442:
2411:
2374:
2352:
2316:
2283:
2276:
2251:
2235:
2214:
2169:
2142:
2119:
2101:
2083:
2055:
2037:
2019:
1991:
1968:
1950:
1940:
1931:
1913:
1681:10.1136/bmj.319.7215.937a
1251:www.wiseinternational.org
1168:. Routledge. p. 56.
1141:www.wiseinternational.org
895:, a dramatization of the
653:
551:experiencing symptoms of
444:
432:World Nuclear Association
427:
419:
411:
400:
384:
373:
334:
323:
315:
283:
184:
132:Tōkai Nuclear Power Plant
2606:Nuclear history of Japan
2461:Japanese Communist Party
2429:Mihama nuclear accidents
1845:Consuming Postwar Japan.
1731:: 44 – via Amazon.
1587:: 45 – via Amazon.
1409:: 43 – via Amazon.
1364:"The Tokaimura Incident"
1164:Heenan, Patrick (2014).
780:hospital-borne pathogens
238:emergency response teams
174:nuclear-related incident
2651:1999 disasters in Japan
2646:1997 disasters in Japan
2538:Social Democratic Party
2386:membership organization
1137:"#468 – March 14, 1997"
879:nuclear energy in Japan
563:, and other radiation.
259:
2334:Mitsubishi FBR Systems
1907:Nuclear power in Japan
1843:Eiko Maruko Siniawer.
909:Nuclear power in Japan
809:multiple organ failure
358:36.47972°N 140.55361°E
272:considered for merging
248:Later, Prime Minister
202:low-level liquid waste
35:
2353:Research institutions
2263:research fast reactor
944:www.world-nuclear.org
860:Resulting legal suits
762:Impact on technicians
644:was selected for its
136:nuclear power station
33:
753:Environmental impact
731:Tōkaimura evacuation
491:uranium hexafluoride
379:criticality accident
74:criticality accident
1784:www.isis-online.org
1748:Wall Street Journal
1616:1999PhT....52l..52L
1469:: 3. Archived from
1050:: 5. Archived from
619:Cherenkov radiation
605:, emitting intense
473:reached criticality
363:36.47972; 140.55361
354: /
280:
204:in molten asphalt (
58:caught fire at the
2236:Under construction
2011:Kashiwazaki-Kariwa
1476:on 19 August 2019.
1368:large.stanford.edu
1227:. 21 November 2000
885:In popular culture
673:30 September 1999
646:neutron absorption
420:Non-fatal injuries
278:
226:radiation exposure
86:radiation exposure
48:Ibaraki Prefecture
36:
2583:
2582:
2522:Rokkasho Rhapsody
2506:Reiwa Shinsengumi
2496:Kiyoshiro Imawano
2434:List of incidents
2407:
2406:
2284:Regulatory bodies
2272:
2271:
2165:
2164:
2001:Fukushima Daiichi
1643:Los Angeles Times
1442:on 29 April 2023.
1115:Los Angeles Times
1012:world-nuclear.org
984:world-nuclear.org
728:
727:
668:Affected parties
638:neutron reflector
631:Emergency service
611:neutron radiation
534:contributed to a
453:
437:
436:
319:30 September 1999
250:Ryutaro Hashimoto
72:The second was a
63:radioactive waste
16:(Redirected from
2668:
2571:
2570:
2559:
2558:
2543:Jinzaburo Takagi
2528:Ryuichi Sakamoto
2476:Mizuho Fukushima
2466:Genpatsu-shinsai
2281:
2280:
1948:
1947:
1938:
1937:
1900:
1893:
1886:
1877:
1876:
1872:
1869:www-pub.iaea.org
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1441:
1435:. Archived from
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1117:. 7 October 1999
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776:white blood cell
651:
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627:fission products
507:fission reaction
495:enriched uranium
458:
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423:667 contaminated
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242:radiation levels
195:
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140:nuclear research
128:nuclear reactors
21:
18:Masato Shinohara
2676:
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2481:Katsumi Furitsu
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2015:
2006:Fukushima Daini
1987:
1964:
1927:
1918:Energy in Japan
1909:
1904:
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1807:. 20 June 2021.
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772:radiation burns
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715:2 October 1999
701:1 October 1999
603:self-sustaining
599:nuclear fission
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540:chain reactions
390:nuclear fission
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804:cardiac arrest
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2471:Greens Japan
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2367:(abolished)
2302:Japan's NSC
2227:Namie-Odaka
1983:Higashidōri
1761:24 December
829:human error
788:painkillers
553:irradiation
519:nitric acid
361: /
349:140°33′13″E
336:Coordinates
261:‹ The
156:wet process
2590:Categories
1307:17 January
926:References
617:(possibly
615:blue flash
445:東海村JCO臨界事故
346:36°28′47″N
302:Tōkai-mura
191:Dōnen jiko
166:See also:
144:enrichment
104:Background
2412:Accidents
2317:Companies
2300:formerly
1941:(Active)
1756:0099-9660
1689:0959-8138
740:Aftermath
502:fuel rods
450:romanized
428:Inquiries
270:is being
210:radiation
67:radiation
2562:Category
2446:movement
2392:Rokkasho
2215:Canceled
2152:Tōkai II
2075:Takahama
2039:Hokuriku
1952:Hokkaido
1933:Reactors
1824:ABC News
1789:28 April
1707:10514143
1648:17 March
1373:27 April
1256:27 April
1231:27 April
1205:27 April
1146:29 April
1121:29 April
1081:27 April
1017:29 April
989:27 April
903:See also
892:The Days
718:All day
704:All day
528:isotopes
471:mixture
441:Japanese
396:overload
377:Nuclear
324:Location
274:. ›
263:template
233:cover-up
148:disposal
94:lawsuits
2574:Commons
2329:Toshiba
2324:Hitachi
2199:Tōkai I
2157:Tsuruga
2103:Shikoku
2093:Shimane
2085:Chugoku
2029:Hamaoka
1978:Onagawa
1829:18 July
1698:1116790
1612:Bibcode
561:neutron
523:ammonia
498:dioxide
469:uranium
452::
401:Outcome
330:, Japan
222:caesium
206:bitumen
2204:Magnox
2170:Closed
2134:Genkai
2129:Sendai
2121:Kyushu
2070:Mihama
2057:Kansai
1970:Tohoku
1960:Tomari
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1549:21 May
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1172:
676:10:35
517:using
412:Deaths
392:after
2375:Other
2365:Dōnen
2252:Other
2189:Monju
2177:Fugen
2111:Ikata
2047:Shika
2021:Chubu
1993:TEPCO
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949:9 May
662:Time
642:boron
607:gamma
557:gamma
493:into
385:Cause
178:PNC's
52:Japan
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2306:NISA
2304:and
2259:Jōyō
2222:Maki
2144:JAPC
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1791:2020
1763:2020
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