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1109:, hoping that Halsey had taken the bait and moved most of his fleet away as he had in fact done. Kurita had been advised that Nishimura's Southern Force had been destroyed at Surigao Strait and would not be joining his force at Leyte Gulf. However, Kurita did not receive the transmission from the Northern Force that they had successfully lured away Halsey's Third Fleet of battleships and fleet carriers. Through most of the battle, Kurita would be haunted by doubts about Halsey's actual location. The wind was from the North-Northeast and visibility was approximately 20 nmi (23 mi; 37 km) with a low overcast and occasional heavy rain squalls which the US forces would exploit for concealment in the battle to come.
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3582:, Lieutenant Commander Kent Coleman argues that the division of command hierarchies of the Third Fleet, under Halsey reporting to Admiral Nimitz, and Seventh Fleet, under Vice Admiral Kinkaid reporting to General MacArthur, was the primary contributor to the near-success of Kurita's attack. Coleman concludes that "the divided U.S. naval chain of command amplified problems in communication and coordination between Halsey and Kinkaid. This divided command was more important in determining the course of the battle than the tactical decision made by Halsey and led to an American disunity of effort that nearly allowed Kuritaâs mission to succeed."
3232:, which seemed to confirm to the Japanese that they were engaging major fleet units rather than escort carriers and destroyers. Kurita was at first not aware that Halsey had already taken the bait and that his battleships and carriers were far out of range. The ferocity of the renewed air attacks further contributed to his confusion and reinforced his suspicion that Halsey's aircraft carriers were nearby. Signals from Ozawa eventually convinced Kurita that he was not currently engaged with the entirety of Third Fleet, and that the remaining elements of Halsey's forces might close in and destroy him if he lingered too long in the area.
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Their lack of armor allowed armor-piercing rounds to pass right through without exploding, until the
Japanese gunners switched to high-explosive (HE) shells, which caused much more damage. Their speed and agility enabled some ships to dodge shellfire completely before launching torpedoes. Effective damage control and redundancy in propulsion and power systems kept them running and fighting even after they had absorbed dozens of hits before they sank, although the decks would be littered with the dead and the seriously wounded. Destroyers from Taffy 2 to the south also found themselves under shellfire, but as they were spotted by
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3599:
valiant destroyers and one destroyer escort charged the battleships point-blank and, expending their last torpedoes in desperate defense of the entire group, went down under the enemy's heavy shells as a climax to two and one half hours of sustained and furious combat. The courageous determination and the superb teamwork of the officers and men who fought the embarked planes and who manned the ships of Task Unit 77.4.3 were instrumental in effecting the retirement of a hostile force threatening our Leyte invasion operations and were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval
Service.
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capabilities allowed the destroyers' guns to remain on target despite poor visibility and their own radical evasive maneuvering. The
Japanese reliance on optical range finders aided by color-coded dye loads in each shell and mechanical calculators made it difficult for them to identify their targets through the rain and smoke and limited their ability to maneuver while firing. The different colored splashes the Japanese shells made as they hit the water by the American ships after a near miss prompted one American sailor to quip "They're shooting at us in Technicolor!"
129:
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a carefully orchestrated effort, each division in his task force was to attack separately. The
Japanese had just changed to a circular anti-aircraft formation, and the order caused some confusion, allowing Sprague to lead the Japanese into a stern chase, which restricted the Japanese to using only their forward guns, and restricted their anti-aircraft gunnery. Sprague's ships would not lose as much of their firepower in a stern chase, as their stern chase weapons were more numerous than their forward guns, and his carriers would still be able to operate aircraft.
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Americans were now making target observation extremely difficult. At 08:00, Sprague ordered the carriers to "open fire with pea-shooters when the range is clear." The stern chase was also advantageous for the sole anti-ship armament of small carriers was a single manually controlled stern-mounted 5 in (127 mm) gun as a stinger, though they were loaded with anti-aircraft shells. As anti-aircraft gunners observed helplessly, an officer cheered them by exclaiming, "Just wait a little longer, boys, we're suckering them into 40-mm range."
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1305:
torpedoes had a range of only about 5.5 nmi (6.3 mi; 10.2 km), they were best used at night: during daylight, an attack on heavy warships would have to pass through a gauntlet of shellfire that could reach out to 25 nmi (29 mi; 46 km). In this battle they would be launched against a fleet led by the largest battleship in history, although it was the ships' ability to generate dense, heavy smoke from their funnels and chemical smoke generators which would most influence the course of the battle.
3609:
2374:
48:
1760:; watching that destroyer approach the enemy, Copeland realized his own ship's heading and location put it in a textbook position to launch a torpedo attack at the leading heavy cruiser. Over his ship's 1MC public-address circuit, he told his crew "This will be a fight against overwhelming odds from which survival cannot be expected. We will do what damage we can." Without orders and indeed against orders, he set course at full speed to follow
3290:, to assist. Halsey recalled that he did not receive the vital message from Kinkaid until around 10:00 and later claimed that he had known that Kinkaid was in trouble but had not dreamed of the seriousness of the crisis. McCain, by contrast, had monitored Sprague's messages and turned TG 38.1 to aid Sprague even before Halsey's orders arrived (after prodding from Nimitz), putting Halsey's defense in question.
3534:, with the carriers in the pursuit of Ozawa, while leaving the rest of the Battle Line off San Bernardino Strait. (Indeed, Halsey's original plan for the composition of TF 34 was that it would contain only four, not all six, of the Third Fleet's battleships.) Therefore, to guard San Bernardino Strait with a powerful battleship force would have been compatible with Halsey's personally going north aboard the
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of his formation, which would render his smoke less effective. Consequently, at 07:30 Sprague ordered a course change, first to the southeast and then to the south, and ordered his escorts to make their torpedo attack to cover the carrier's emergence from the storm. That was a very risky decision for
Sprague because it gave Kurita a chance to cut across the diameter of Sprague's arc and cut him off.
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with her two remaining guns. Finally at roughly 08:30, after withstanding over 40 hits from 5â16-inch (127â406 mm) guns, an 8-inch (200 mm) shell disabled her remaining engine. With her engine room underwater and No. 1 magazine ablaze, the ship began listing to port, settling by the stern. The order to abandon ship was given at 08:40, and many of her surviving crew swam away from the ship.
4674:, p. 256. "... chief yeoman Harold Whitney, Captain Hathaway's talker, ... saw the sharp rising prow, the blocky superstructure, the twin gun main mount, and the foreign dress of a sailor scurrying around pointing at the American destroyer, and he realized the ship was Japanese. 'I could have thrown a potato and hit that kid running around there,' Whitney said."
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carriers, although of less powerful types, and not armed for attacks on armored ships. The ships themselves, although slow and almost unarmed, in the confusion of battle and aided by weather and smokescreens, mostly survived. Their aircraft, although not appropriately armed, sank and damaged several ships, and did much to confuse and harass Center Force.
1336:, responded to incoming shell fire bracketing carriers of the group he was escorting by laying down a protective smokescreen and zigzagging. At about 07:10, Gunnery Officer Robert Hagen began firing at the closest attackers, then 8.9 nmi (10 mi; 16 km) away, and registered several hits on the leading heavy cruisers. The Japanese targeted
3236:"all ships, my course north, speed 20." He set a course for Leyte Gulf but became distracted by reports of another American carrier group to the north. Preferring to expend his ships against capital ships, rather than transports, he turned north after the non-existent enemy fleet and ultimately withdrew back through the San Bernardino Strait.
1241:, Leyte, to rearm and refuel". Many of the planes continued to make "dry runs" after expending their ammunition and ordnance to distract the enemy. At about 07:20 the formation entered the squall, and the Japanese fire slackened markedly as they did not have gunnery radar that could penetrate the rain and smoke.
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Morison writes in a footnote, "Admiral Lee, however, said after the battle that he would have been only too glad to have been ordered to cover San
Bernardino Strait without air cover." If Halsey had been in proper communication with Seventh Fleet, the escort carriers of TF 77 could have provided
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Halsey was criticized for his decision to take TF 34 north in pursuit of Ozawa and for failing to detach it when
Kinkaid first appealed for help. A piece of U.S. Navy slang for Halsey's actions is "Bull's Run," a phrase combining Halsey's newspaper nickname "Bull" (in the U.S. Navy, the nickname
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suffered considerable damage, all of the other heavy ships stayed inactive in their bases, and the
Japanese Navy, as a whole, had been rendered ineffective for the remainder of the war. Of the six U.S. ships, totaling 37,000 long tons (38,000 t), lost during Leyte Gulf operations, five were from
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Kurita and his officers knew they could not conduct a high-speed chase after the small force without a fleet oiler, and it contradicted with the original plan orders, which prioritized the landing forces over anything else. Kurita then received a cryptic message ordering him north, and in a unanimous
3364:
We saw this ship come up, it was circling around us, and a guy was standing up on the bridge with a megaphone. And he called out 'Who are you? Who are you?' and we all yelled out 'Samuel B. Roberts!' He's still circling, so now we're cursing at him. He came back and yelled 'Who won the World Series?'
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After one hour, the
Japanese had closed the chase to within 8.7 nmi (10 mi; 16 km) of the carriers. That the carriers had managed to evade destruction reinforced the Japanese belief that they were attacking fast fleet carriers. The heavy clouds of black and white smoke generated by the
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However, Kurita missed the chance and his forces followed Taffy 3 around the circle, his earlier decision to send his destroyers to the rear having removed them from a position that they could have intercepted or prevented the
American formation's turn. The escort carriers of Taffy 3 turned
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escaped detection. Not wanting to draw attention to his small ship, Copeland repeatedly denied his gun captain permission to open fire with the 5-inch (127 mm) guns; even though targets were clearly visible and in range, he intended to launch torpedoes at 2.5 nmi (2.8 mi; 4.6 km).
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s detailed action report records one. Hagen then shifted fire to the next destroyer in line, claiming five hits before it too turned away. At 09:20 the entire Tenth Destroyer Squadron turned west to fire their torpedoes from 5.2 nmi (6.0 mi; 9.6 km) before turning east in response to
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An advantage the American destroyers had was the radar-controlled Mark 37 Gun Fire Control System, which provided coordinated automatic firing of their 5-inch (127 mm) guns as long as the gun director was pointing at the target. A dual-purpose system, the Mark 37's gunfire radar and antiaircraft
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had immediate consequences, as the Tenth Destroyer Squadron was forced to turn away just as they were gaining on the right flank of the American formation. For the Second Destroyer Squadron, the consequences were more significant if less immediate: ordered to fall in behind Third Battleship Division,
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and 22 destroyers before coming under accurate radar-directed gunfire from six battleships (five of them survivors of the Pearl Harbor attack) and seven cruisers. As Shima's force encountered what was left of Nishimura's ships, he decided to retreat, stating "If we continued dashing further north, it
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Searches by my carrier planes revealed the presence of the Northern carrier force on the afternoon of October 24, which completed the picture of all enemy naval forces. As it seemed childish to me to guard statically San Bernardino Strait, I concentrated TF 38 during the night and steamed north
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Temporarily safe within the rain squall, Admiral Sprague had a difficult decision to make. The easterly course was drawing the enemy too close to San Bernardino Strait and away from any help that might come from Admiral Oldendorf's forces to the south, and Kurita was about to gain the windward side
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in rapid succession, disabling all the primary and secondary battery weapons aft of the second stack, stopping her port engine and depriving her of her Mark-37 fire control director, FD radar, and bridge steering control. His ship slowing to 17 knots under hand steering, Kintberger realized he would
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was in charge of the aft 5-inch (127 mm) gun mount, which had fired nearly all of its 325 stored rounds in 35 minutes before a breech explosion caused by the gun's barrel overheating. Carr was found dying at his station, begging for help loading the last round he was holding into the breech. He
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Not finding the silhouettes of the tiny escort carriers in his identification manuals, Kurita mistook them for large fleet carriers and assumed that he had a task group of the Third Fleet under his guns. His first priority was to eliminate the carrier threat, ordering a "General Attack": rather than
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torpedo bombers. Yet, the carriers had a top speed of only 18 knots, far less than the Japanese cruisers and destroyers capable of 30 knots. In addition, none of his ships had a gun larger than five inches, firing 54 pound shells, but unable to penetrate the Japanese cruiser or battleship armor, and
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attacks on the retreating American task force, sinking one escort carrier and damaging three others. With Taffy 2's aircraft joining the battle, the increasing severity of the air attack further convinced Kurita that he was engaging the Third Fleet's surface carriers. Satisfied with sinking what he
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For extraordinary heroism in action against powerful units of the Japanese Fleet during the Battle off Samar, Philippines, October 25, 1944. ... the gallant ships of the Task Unit waged battle fiercely against the superior speed and fire power of the advancing enemy, ... two of the Unit's
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It may be argued that the fact that Halsey was aboard one of the battleships and "would have had to remain behind" with TF 34 while the bulk of his fleet charged northwards to attack the Japanese carriers may have contributed to that decision. However, it would have been perfectly feasible and
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s, while Center Force, lacking air cover, was vulnerable to air attack and was forced to constantly conduct evasive maneuvers while under air attack. Lastly, the attacking Japanese force initially used armor-piercing shells which were largely ineffective against unarmored ships as they passed right
3378:
The Japanese had succeeded in luring Halsey's Third Fleet away from its role of covering the invasion fleet, but the remaining light forces proved to be a very considerable obstacle. The force that Halsey had unwittingly left behind carried about 450 aircraft, comparable to the forces of five fleet
3325:
Just hours after his perceived chastisement by Nimitz, Halsey's forces destroyed all four enemy aircraft carriers he had pursued. However, despite the complete absence of Third Fleet against the main Japanese force, the desperate efforts of Taffy 3 and assisting task forces had driven back the
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continued to take hits from the Japanese, which knocked out the number one gun mount, killing many men. By 09:20, forced from the bridge by exploding ammunition, Evans commanded the ship from the stern by shouting orders down to men manually operating the rudder. Shellfire knocked out the remaining
3517:
Halsey also said that he had feared that leaving TF 34 to defend the strait without carrier support would have left it vulnerable to attack from land-based aircraft and leaving one of the fast carrier groups behind to cover the battleships would have significantly reduced the concentration of
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s propellers, reducing her maximum speed to 20 knots. At 10:50, she was attacked by 30 more carrier aircraft. Another near miss by a bomb, this time starboard amidships, detonated a Long Lance torpedo loaded in one of her starboard tube mounts. The fires started by the explosion soon propagated to
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was now crippled and surrounded by the enemy, with her speed reduced to 17 knots. Within a few minutes, steerage had been restored from the aft steering room. Kintberger ordered a course south towards Taffy 3. In the process of fishtailing and zig-zagging, she fired at the closest enemy ships
1308:
After laying down smoke to hide the carriers from Japanese gunners, they were soon making desperate torpedo runs, using their smoke for concealment. The ship profiles and aggressiveness caused the Japanese to think the destroyers were cruisers, and the destroyer escorts were full-sized destroyers.
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acted independently for the remainder of the battle. Concerned that his destroyers would burn too much fuel in a stern chase of what he presumed were fast carriers while obstructing his battleships' line of fire, Kurita ordered his destroyers to the rear of his formation at 07:10, a decision which
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At 06:50 Admiral Sprague ordered a formation course change to 090, directed his carriers to turn to launch their aircraft and then withdraw towards a squall to the east, hoping that bad visibility would reduce the accuracy of Japanese gunfire. He ordered his escorts to the rear of the formation to
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was pointed at the target, Japanese fire control relied on a mechanical calculator for ballistics and another for own and target course and speed, fed by optical rangefinders. Color-coded dye loads were used in the battleships' armor-piercing shells so that the spotters of each ship could identify
3235:
Finally, Kurita received word that the Southern Force that he was to meet had been destroyed the previous night. Calculating that the fight was not worth further losses and believing he had already sunk or damaged several American carriers, Kurita broke off the engagement at 09:20 with the order:
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destroyer escorts were smaller and slower because they had been designed to protect slow freighter convoys against submarines. They were armed with two 5-inch (127 mm) guns without automatic fire control, and three torpedoes, although their crews rarely trained for torpedo attacks. Since the
675:
that comprised the only American forces remaining in the area. Composed of only six small escort carriers, three destroyers, and four destroyer escorts, Taffy 3 was intended to provide shore support and anti-submarine patrols, and did not have guns capable of penetrating the Japanese armor. The
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came under intense enemy fire. Though partially protected by smoke, a timely rain squall, and counterattacks by the screening destroyers and destroyer escorts, she took the first of fifteen direct hits at 07:50. Fired from an enemy battleship, the large-caliber shell (14 in (356 mm) or
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with her 5-inch (127 mm) guns, while hurriedly preparing a half-salvo torpedo attack. In the confusion of battle, the torpedoman on the second torpedo mount mistakenly fired two extra torpedoes at the same time as the number one mount before he was stopped by the mount captain. After firing
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fired several dozen rounds at the lead Japanese destroyer 4.9 nmi (5.7 mi; 9.1 km) distant. Firing then shifted to the cruisers approaching from the east, targeting several dozen more rounds at the closest ship 5.4 nmi (6.3 mi; 10 km) away. Neither target could be
3382:
The breakdown in Japanese communications left Kurita unaware of the opportunity that Ozawa's decoy plan had offered him. Kurita's mishandling of his forces during the surface engagement further compounded his losses. Despite Halsey's failure to protect the northern flank of the Seventh Fleet,
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port bilge near frame 142, close to her aft (starboard) engine room. While the ship was not struck directly, the mining effect of the under-keel explosion severely damaged her hull, deranged her starboard machinery, and tripped all of the circuit breakers in her electrical network. Prompt and
2357:
Due to a multitude of factors, including the fear that they were engaging a large surface force and a cryptic message from Ozawa's force signaling for a battle north, Kurita gave a "cease action" order at 09:00, with instructions to rendezvous north. Thus, unexpectedly, the Japanese began to
3561:
If TF 34 had been detached a few hours earlier, after Kinkaid's first urgent request for help, and had left the destroyers behind, since their fueling caused a delay of over two hours and a half, a powerful battle line of six modern battleships under the command of Admiral Lee, the most
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was struck by an 8 in (200 mm) shell and the carriers started taking direct hits. However, the Japanese ships were firing armor-piercing (AP) shells, which often carried right through the unarmored escort carriers without detonating. Though CVEs were popularly known as "Combustible
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was the first of Taffy 3's ships to sink, and suffered the heaviest proportional losses: only 86 of her complement survived; 253 officers and men died with their ship. Commander Kintberger, who would live to retire a rear admiral, described the courageous devotion to duty of the men of
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The lookouts of Taffy 3 spotted the anti-aircraft fire to the north. The Japanese came upon Taffy 3 at 06:45, achieving complete tactical surprise. At about the same time, others in Taffy 3 had picked up targets from surface radar and Japanese radio traffic. At about 07:00,
986:-class destroyers. The battleships carried a minimum of 14-inch guns, firing 1400-pound shells over a range of more than 20 miles. The heavy cruisers carried 8-inch batteries plus torpedo tubes, and were capable of 35 knots. The Japanese destroyers outnumbered Sprague's eleven to three.
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steamed into the action at flank speed through the formation of "baby flattops" through smoke and intermittent rain squalls that had reduced visibility at times to less than 100 yd (91 m), twice having to back emergency full to avoid collisions with friendly ships, first with
676:
Japanese opened fire shortly after dawn, targeting Taffy 3's escort carriers, which Kurita mistook for the main carriers of the Third Fleet. The escort carriers fled for the cover of rain squalls and launched their aircraft in defense, while the three destroyers and destroyer escort
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and visual range of the closest task group, Taffy 3. Armed only with depth charges in case of an encounter with enemy submarines, the aviators nevertheless carried out the first attack of the battle, dropping several depth charges which just bounced off the bow of a cruiser.
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Morison also observes, "The mighty gunfire of the Third Fleet's Battle Line, greater than that of the whole Japanese Navy, was never brought into action except to finish off one or two crippled light ships." Perhaps the most telling comment was made laconically by Vice Admiral
1885:. In a desperate bid to avoid approaching shells, Copeland ordered full back, causing the salvo to miss. Now, however, his small ship was an easy target, and at 08:51, cruiser shells found their mark, damaging one of her boilers. At 17 kn (20 mph; 31 km/h),
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distinguished herself in this battle as the "destroyer escort that fought like a battleship" combating armored cruisers (which were designed to withstand 5-inch gunfire). Around 07:40, Lieutenant Commander Robert W. Copeland maneuvered his small ship to evade the charging
3239:
As he retreated north and then west through the San Bernardino Strait, the smaller and heavily damaged American force continued to press the battle. While watching the Japanese retreat, Admiral Sprague heard a nearby sailor exclaim, "Damn it, boys, they're getting away!"
1244:
Kurita meanwhile was already experiencing the consequences of ordering a General Attack, as his Fifth Cruiser and Tenth Destroyer Divisions cut across the course of the Third Battleship Division in their haste to close with the American carriers, forcing the battleship
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s wheelhouse killed three men outright and fatally wounded another. A series of 8-inch (200 mm) shell hits flooded the forward part of the destroyer, pulling her bow down so far that her anchors were dragging in the water, and one of her guns was knocked out.
3189:, which had also engaged the carriers, received fatal damage from the air, although not hit directly. Early in the battle, she was attacked by ten Avengers from Taffy 3. A near-miss close astern to port by an HE bomb from one of the TBMs carried away one of
1133:, sighted a number of ships expected to be from Halsey's Third Fleet, but they appeared to be Japanese. When he was notified, Admiral Sprague was incredulous, and he demanded positive identification. Flying in for an even closer look, Brooks reported, "I can see
3276:." The receiving radioman repeated the "where is" section of this message and his staff failed to remove the trailing phrase "the world wonders." A simple query by a distant supervisor had, through the random actions of three sailors, become a stinging rebuke.
3562:
experienced battle squadron commander in the Navy, would have arrived off San Bernardino Strait in time to have clashed with Kurita's Center Force. ... Apart from the accidents common in naval warfare, there is every reason to suppose that Lee would have
2174:âcaptained by Commander Amos T. Hathaway was on the disengaged side of the carriers at the start of the fight when at 07:37 he received an order from Commodore Thomas to take the lead position in a column of "small boys" to attack the approaching enemy fleet.
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responded to their straddling salvos with her 5 in (127 mm) gun. Three 8 in (200 mm) armor-piercing projectiles struck her within minutes. At 08:25, the carrier scored a direct hit from 16,000 yd (15 km) on the No. 2 turret of a
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other torpedoes nearby and beyond, the subsequent explosions damaging one of the boilers and the starboard engine rooms. Abandon ship was ordered at 11:50, none too soon, as the fires set off the remaining torpedoes and her main magazines ten minutes later.
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s wake about 100 yd (91 m) astern of her. A shell from the latter's 5 in (127 mm) gun deflected a third from a collision course with her stern. At about 09:30, as the Japanese ships fired parting salvos and reversed course northward,
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s problem of slow rate of fire. For the next 35 minutes, from as close as 2.6 nmi (3.0 mi; 4.8 km), her guns would fire almost her entire supply of 5-inch (127 mm) ammunition on boardâover 600 rounds. However, unknown to the crew of
1504:
was not sunk. Already depleted before the battle, her remaining store of oil did not fuel a catastrophic explosion. The ship found sanctuary in rain squalls, where the crew had time to repair damage, restoring power to two of the three aft gun mounts.
2650:, but she took ten more 203 mm (8 in) hits from the now obscured cruisers. One shell passed through the flight deck and into the communications area and destroyed all the radar and radio equipment. Most of the hits occurred after 08:45 when
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s attack was to generate confusion in the minds of the Japanese commanders, who thought they were being engaged by American cruisers. Evans then reversed course and, under cover of his smokescreen, opened the range between his ship and the enemy.
3548:
Clifton Sprague, the commander of Task Unit 77.4.3 in the battle off Samar, was later bitterly critical of Halsey's decision and of his failure to inform Kinkaid and the Seventh Fleet clearly that their northern flank was no longer protected:
2822:
engaged enemy surface forces for the first and only time at Samar, entering the battle two meters down by the bow and limited to 26 knots due to 3,000 tons of flooding caused by three armor-piercing bombs during the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea.
2448:
effective damage control restored power and communications within three minutes and she was able to remain in formation by overspeeding her port engine to compensate. The gout of black smoke resulting from the shock of the explosion convinced
2259:
At 08:26, Commander Thomas requested covering fire on the cruisers firing on the CVEs from the east. Hathaway responded but first had to pass through the formation of carriers and escorts. This task proved hazardous. Traveling at flank speed,
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s crew were rewarded by what appeared to be the sight of large columns of water alongside their target. The torpedo hits could not be confirmed, however. The water spouts were probably near misses by bombs. Japanese action reports reveal that
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Japanese. A relieved Halsey sent the following message to Nimitz, Kinkaid and General Douglas MacArthur at 12:26: "It can be announced with assurance that the Japanese Navy has been beaten, routed and broken by the Third and Seventh Fleets."
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was towards the front of the formation after the turn to the south and escaped serious damage. At 10:13 she launched five Avengers (four armed with torpedoes, one with bombs) to attack the retreating Japanese. The five (along with one from
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and into her portside engine room, which cut the destroyer's speed in half to 17 kn (20 mph; 31 km/h) and disrupted electric power to her aft gun mounts. Hagen reports them as 14-inch (356 mm) shells from the battleship
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south and withdrew through shellfire at their top speed of 17.5 kn (20.1 mph; 32.4 km/h). The six carriers dodged in and out of rain squalls, occasionally turning into the wind to launch the few planes they had left.
1465:
s action report states that she was not engaging any targets at that time, as she was blinded by a rain squall. Based on the bearing and the angle of fall, it is far more likely that they were 18.1-inch (46 cm) shells fired by
2513:
were unsuccessful in drawing fire away from the doomed carrier. Fires raged through the riddled escort carrier. She capsized at 09:07 and disappeared beneath the waves at 09:11. 4 Grumman TBM Avenger torpedo bombers went down with
3219:
had been forced to turn north in order to avoid torpedoes, causing him to lose contact with much of his task force. The determined, concentrated sea and air attack from Taffy 3 had already sunk or crippled the heavy cruisers
3002:
s immobilizing damage resulted from a bomb hit at 08:51, she was later scuttled by torpedoes from Japanese destroyers as she could not join the retreat, confirmed by other officers of Center Force Contrary to Hornfischer's claim,
2137:
A Japanese cruiser and several destroyers closed to within 2,000 yd (1,800 m), giving the two forward gun crews, under Gun Captain Chester Fay, a large, close target. For about ten minutes, they traded salvos with the
811:. After alerting Halsey, the submarines torpedoed and sank two cruisers, while crippling a third and forcing it to withdraw. One of the cruisers lost was Admiral Kurita's flagship, but he was rescued and transferred his flag to
3441:), were lost, as were several aircraft. The other four U.S. destroyers and escorts were damaged. Although it was such a small task unit, over 1,500 Americans died, comparable to the losses suffered at the Allied defeat of the
1638:
turned away to the west to unmask her torpedo battery. Hagen presumed this was in response to his fire. From as close as 3.5 nmi (4.0 mi; 6.4 km), Hagen fired and claimed a dozen hits on the "destroyer leader"
707:
Taffy 3 sustained heavy losses in the action, losing two escort carriers, two destroyers, a destroyer escort and numerous aircraft. Over 1,000 Americans died, comparable to the combined losses of American men and ships at the
2696:
suffered extensive structural damage during the morning's intense action, and sixty casualties including five dead. Twelve direct hits and two large-caliber near misses were confirmed. The two near-misses exploded under her
1262:, leaving no Japanese units in position to intercept the American carriers when they turned back south at 07:30. Despite his General Attack order, Kurita continued to dictate fleet course changes throughout the battle.
1182:, a common practice for the capital ships of many navies. The Americans, unfamiliar with battleship combat, were soon astonished by the spectacle of colorful geysers as the first volleys of shellfire found their range.
3321:
At 11:15, more than two hours after the first distress messages had been received by his flagship, Halsey ordered TF 34 to turn around and head south to pursue Kurita, but the Japanese forces had already escaped.
2641:
At 08:30, five Japanese destroyers steamed over the horizon off her starboard quarter. They opened fire from about 14,500 yd (13.3 km). As screening ships engaged the cruisers and laid down concealing smoke,
1290:, none of which were effective against armored warships. Only their ten 21-inch (533 mm) Mark-15 torpedoesâhoused in two swiveling five-tube launchers amidshipsâposed a serious threat to battleships and cruisers.
1746:
Although destroyer escorts were conceived as inexpensive small ships that could protect slow cargo convoys against submarines, they retained a basic anti-ship capability with torpedoes and 5-inch (127 mm) guns.
2157:
in a seaman's epitaph: "Fully cognizant of the inevitable result of engaging such vastly superior forces, these men performed their assigned duties coolly and efficiently until their ship was shot from under them."
851:, Halsey's Third Fleet savaged the Center Force, which had been detected on its way to landing forces from the north. Center Force lacked any air cover to defend against the 259 sorties from the five fleet carriers
2229:
s torpedoes on parallel courses, and for 10 minutes was forced to head north away from the action, while Lundgren, based on a comparison of both Japanese and American sources, asserts that the torpedoes came from
667:, took his large force of battleships, cruisers and destroyers from the San Bernardino Strait and headed south toward Leyte, where they encountered Task Unit 77.4.3 ("Taffy 3"), the northernmost of the three
3403:
Well, I think it was really just determination that really meant something. I can't believe that they didn't just go in and wipe us out. We confused the Japanese so much. I think it deterred them. It was a great
3387:. Domination of the skies, prudent and timely maneuvers by the U.S. ships, tactical errors by the Japanese admiral, and superior American radar technology, gunnery and seamanship all contributed to this outcome.
2939:
slowed to 20 knots and came round to course 040, finally setting course 000 (due north) at 09:25. Kurita reported that his force had sunk two carriers, two cruisers, and some destroyers, apparently assuming that
3334:
Partly as a result of disastrous communication errors within Seventh Fleet and a reluctance to expose search ships to submarine attack, a very large number of survivors from Taffy 3, including those from
1984:, captained by Commander Leon S. Kintberger, was the flagship of the small destroyer and destroyer escort screen of Taffy 3. As splashes from Japanese shells began bracketing the ships of the task group,
1285:
destroyersâaffectionately nicknamed "tin cans" because they lacked armorâwere fast enough to keep up with a fast carrier task force. Each had five single-mounted 5-inch (127 mm) guns and several light
2353:
until she too turned away at 09:10. By 09:17, Sprague ordered Hathaway to lay smoke on the port quarter of the CVEs, and by 09:30, the group had reformed in its normal formation and was headed southward.
2127:, which turned hard to port to evade a torpedo salvo at 07:54 and was forced to run north until the torpedoes ran out of fuel, taking Kurita out of the battle and causing him to lose track of his forces.
704:
believed were multiple carriers and worried the bulk of the Third Fleet was approaching, Kurita withdrew his fleet north, having failed to carry out his orders to attack the landing forces at Leyte Gulf.
2058:
s main battery of five 5-inch (127 mm) guns in a rapid-fire barrage, drawing the attention of a substantial portion of the Japanese fleet. Soon shells of all calibers were straddling the destroyer.
5464:
3359:
of Task Group 78.12 arrived, its captain used what is almost a standard method of distinguishing friend from foe, asking a topical question about a national sport, as one survivor, Jack Yusen, relates:
2206:
Hathaway may now have been responsible for causing a series of events that may have had a decisive influence on the outcome of the battle. He directed 5 in (127 mm) gunfire on the battleship
2843:
reported main and secondary battery hits on an "enemy cruiser" at 11.541 mi (10.029 nmi; 18.574 km), the time, range and bearing of which all correspond with the hits on the destroyer
6288:
3351:, were not rescued until October 27, after two days adrift. A plane had spotted the survivors, but the location radioed back was incorrect. By then, many had died as a result of exposure, thirst and
2256:
was within throwing distance of a Japanese destroyer for several minutes, before being separated by the smoke. During this time, neither ship fired on the other, both having higher-priority targets.
6195:
6050:
Reynolds, Quentin; Jones, George E.; Teatsorth, Ralph; Morris, Frank D. (January 27, 1945). "America's Greatest Naval Battle: Report on the Second Battle of the Philippines (Third of three parts)".
2692:
from astern and the starboard quarter. Two were shot down when close, but the third crashed into the port side of the flight deck, damaging it severely, and the fourth destroyed the aft port stack.
890:. Although ordered to destroy enemy forces threatening the Philippine invasion area, Halsey was also ordered by Nimitz to destroy a major portion of the Japanese fleet if the opportunity arose.
5012:
2006:
s bridge at 6.9 nmi (8.0 mi; 13 km), knocking out all voice radio communication, killing four men and wounding Kintberger and Screen Flag Officer Commander William Dow Thomas.
3513:
to attack the Northern Force at dawn. I believed that the Center Force had been so heavily damaged in the Sibuyan Sea that it could no longer be considered a serious menace to Seventh Fleet.
2742:
s anti-aircraft batteries. She was the only one of Sprague's carriers to escape undamaged (this information seems to be incorrect, refer to Kitkun Bay's page for more detailed information).
1611:
At 08:40, a more pressing target appeared astern: seven Japanese destroyers in two columns, closing to attack the carriers. (This was the Tenth Destroyer Squadron, led by the light cruiser
3796:
Action Report â Leyte Operation from 12 October to 29 October 1944 submitted by Commander Task Group 77.4 (Commander Carrier Division 22) (Report). U.S. Navy. November 8, 1944. p. 31.
3456:
On the other side of the balance sheet, the Japanese lost three heavy cruisers, and a fourth limped back to base seriously damaged, having lost its bow. All of Kurita's battleships except
3007:
was not sunk by catastrophic secondary explosions from direct 5-inch hits to her torpedoes. Diving expeditions conducted on the ship's wreckage revealed her torpedoes to be still intact.
736:
wrote afterwards that the success of Taffy 3 was "nothing short of special dispensation from the Lord Almighty." The Battle off Samar has been cited by historians as one of the greatest
5582:
626:
Island, in the Philippines on October 25, 1944. It was the only major action in the larger battle in which the Americans were largely unprepared. After the previous day's fighting, the
3399:
decision with his officers ordered his force northward toward Ozawa's force, where he thought a surface battle between the Northern Force and an American fleet was about to take place.
6303:
1481:
s bridge, causing numerous casualties and severing the fingers of Commander Evans's left hand. The ship was mangled badly, with dead and dying sailors strewn across her bloody decks.
1512:
s search radar was destroyed, toppled to the deck in a tangled mess. Also damaged, the fire control radar was quickly returned to service. Only a few minutes were required to bring
6278:
5536:
2731:
at 10:35 without result (according to Kitkun Bay and Chikuma's Knowledge pages and Chikuma's Combined Fleet record, the TBMs actually attacked Chikuma, not Yamato). Attacked by a
1399:
closed to within maximum torpedo range, and at 4.4 nmi (5.1 mi; 8.2 km) she fired a full salvo of ten torpedoes. At 07:24, two or three struck, blowing the bow off
372:
2240:
At 08:03, believing that one of the torpedoes had hit the battleship, Hathaway set course for the carrier formation, zigzagging and under the cover of smoke. Still undamaged,
638:, had suffered significant damage and appeared to be retreating westward. However, by the next morning, the Japanese force had turned around and resumed its advance toward
3252:, sent in plain language, read, "My situation is critical. Fast battleships and support by airstrikes may be able to keep enemy from destroying CVEs and entering Leyte."
1233:
which would have enabled aircraft to sink heavy armored warships. The Wildcats were deemed a better fit on such small aircraft carriers instead of the faster and heavier
1145:
alone displaced as much as all units of Taffy 3 combined. Brooks had spotted the largest of the three attacking Japanese forces, consisting of four battleships, six
3215:
Although Kurita's battleships had not been seriously damaged, the air and destroyer attacks had broken up his formations, and he had lost tactical control. His flagship
1596:
s 14 in (356 mm) return fire. At 08:26 and again at 08:34, Thomas requested an attack on the heavy cruisers to the east of the carriers. Responding at 08:30,
3575:
in his action report as the Commander of TF 34: "No battle damage was incurred, nor inflicted on the enemy by vessels while operating as Task Force Thirty-Four."
3522:
adequate air cover for TF 34, a much easier matter than it would be for those escort carriers to defend themselves against the onslaught of Kurita's heavy ships.
2142:-class cruiser. When the destroyers slowed and approached to about 1,000 yd (910 m), they were also fired upon. The Japanese fire only stopped at 08:55 when
5751:
3553:
In the absence of any information that this exit was no longer blocked, it was logical to assume that our northern flank could not be exposed without ample warning.
2962:
1215:
to mask the retreating carriers and ordered the carriers to take evasive action, "chasing salvos" to throw off their enemy's aim, and then launched all available
1121:
launched a four-plane antisubmarine patrol while the remaining carriers of Taffy 3 prepared for the day's air strikes against the landing beaches. At 06:37,
4287:
5622:
818:
Subsequently, the carriers of the Third Fleet launched a series of air strikes against Kurita's forces in the Sibuyan Sea, damaging several vessels and sinking
6298:
5370:
1830:
would have to defend the escort carriers against a surface attack, chief engineer Lt. "Lucky" Trowbridge bypassed all the engine's safety mechanisms, enabling
6157:
2677:
scored a direct hit amidships on a retreating destroyer. Five minutes later, she ceased fire and retired southward with the other survivors of Taffy 3.
839:, Nishimura's ships entered a deadly trap. Outmatched by the U.S. Seventh Fleet Support Force, they were devastated, running a gauntlet of torpedoes from 39
1229:
with whatever armament they were already loaded with. Some had rockets, machine guns, depth charges, or nothing at all. Very few carried anti-ship bombs or
6173:
1651:
Kurita's recall order. Several torpedoes were detonated by strafing aircraft or defensive fire from the carriers, and the rest failed to strike a target.
784:, the largest battleships afloat, escorted by cruisers and destroyers. Nishimura's flotilla included two battleships and would be followed by Vice Admiral
3272:, communications officers were to add a nonsense phrase at both ends of a message, in this case, prefixed with "Turkey trots to water" and suffixed with "
2100:
Heading southwest after his initial torpedo attack, Commander Kintberger turned west and launched his second torpedo salvo at a "Heavy Cruiser" (probably
365:
2518:. 130 crewmen were killed. The majority of her nearly 800 survivors were rescued two days later by landing and patrol craft dispatched from Leyte Gulf.
3771:
3687:
While the battle is frequently included in historical accounts of the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the duels between the destroyer and destroyer escorts and
1485:
reported sinking a "cruiser" (the Japanese consistently overestimated the size of the US ships engaged) with a main battery salvo at 07:27. Destroyer
5805:
4945:
3318:
at the extreme range of 330 nmi (380 mi; 610 km). Although the attack did little damage, it strengthened Kurita's decision to retire.
1080:. These six escort carriers carried about 165 aircraft, equivalent to two fleet carriers. Each carrier had a squadron composed of twelve to fourteen
4550:
716:. Three Japanese cruisers were sunk by air attack, and three others were damaged. The Japanese had over 2,700 casualties. Taffy 3 was awarded the
5565:
4288:"Combined Action Report, Surface Engagement off Samar, Philippine Islands, and Report of loss of USS Samuel B. Roberts (DE-413) on 25 October 1944"
2596:
capsized and sank at 11:25 with the loss of 114 men. Six Grumman FM-2 Wildcat fighters and five Grumman TBM Avenger torpedo bombers went down with
3557:
Regarding Halsey's failure to turn TF 34 southwards when Seventh Fleet's first calls for assistance off Samar were received, Morison writes:
3476:
at 21,180 ft (6,460 m), and as of June 2022, the deepest wreck ever surveyed at a depth of 23,000 ft (7,000 m), the USS
2013:, he formed up the three destroyers of his command as best he could and at 07:40 ordered "Line up and let's go." Through rain showers and smoke,
1566:
closed to 3.0 nmi (3.4 mi; 5.5 km), now firing with reduced efficiency due to her lost SC radar, yet still registering many hits.
3092:. She was hit portside amidships by two torpedoes and her engine rooms flooded. At 14:00, three TBMs from a composite squadron of aircraft from
1733:
1395:
pressed its attack, firing more than two hundred shells as it followed an evasive course through moderate swells, making it a difficult target.
6273:
3718:
The survivors formed associations which still meet annually, and raised funds to build memorials in San Diego near the current location of the
358:
6196:
War Damage Report No. 51: Destroyer Report: Gunfire, Bomb and Kamikaze Damage Including Losses in Action â 17 October, 1941 to 15 August, 1945
5314:
3905:
5160:
3395:
through without exploding; such munitions can be ineffective against thinly-armored naval targets such as destroyers or destroyer escorts.
1992:. When the Japanese had closed to 8.9 nmi (10 mi; 16 km), Kintberger opened fire, and was in turn targeted by the Japanese.
1278:
Three destroyers and four smaller destroyer escorts had been tasked to protect the escort carriers from aircraft and submarines. The three
2411:
Vulnerable Expendable," they would ultimately prove durable in first dodging and then absorbing heavy shell fire and in downing attacking
1708:
sank 25 minutes later with 186 of her crew. Evans abandoned ship with his crew, but was never seen again. He was posthumously awarded the
1569:
During the battle, Evans engaged in several duels with much larger Japanese opponents. At 08:20, emerging through smoke and rain squalls,
5540:
5165:
4408:
4101:
3579:
2863:
with her 5 in (127 mm) anti-aircraft guns and was struck by an American 5 in (127 mm) shell in return. Hemmed in by
2299:
came under fire from the bulk of the Japanese fleet. Colored splashes of red, yellow, and green indicated that she was being targeted by
1806:
appeared, firing broadsides at the carriers. Copeland changed course to attack and told his gun captain, "Mr Burton, you may open fire."
2851:
at a range of 5.736 mi (4.985 nmi; 9.232 km) before steering hard to port to avoid a torpedo salvo from the charging USS
1654:
The Japanese and the American ships were now intertwined in a confused jumble. The heavy smoke had made the visibility so poor by 08:40
3591:
717:
836:
3545:, who was also wholeheartedly in favor of taking all Third Fleet's available forces northwards to attack the Japanese carrier force.
2928:
closed to within 2,400 yd (2.2 km) of the American ships before she was attacked by American aircraft are not supported by
2912:
sighted three of the American carriers, US smoke screens preventing her from seeing the entire US formation. Between 09:06 and 09:17
6158:
Summary of War Damage to U.S. Battleships, Carriers, Cruisers, Destroyers and Destroyer Escorts â 8 December 1943 to 7 December 1944
4737:
2066:
fired a half salvo of torpedoes and reversed course. The results of this salvo were not observed, the historian Morison claims that
1604:, then closed to 3.0 nmi (3.4 mi; 5.5 km) and fired for ten minutes at a heavier and better-armed opponent, possibly
1258:
and her accompanying destroyers steamed north from their position on the south side of Kurita's formation seeking division flagship
5544:
829:
5106:
3081:
s speed dropped to 18 knots (33 km/h), then to 9 knots (17 km/h), but more seriously, she became unsteerable. At 11:05,
2712:
Straddled several times early in the surface action during the run to the east as she was at the rear of the formation alongside
5337:
3497:"Bull" was used primarily by enlisted men, and Halsey's friends and fellow officers called him "Bill") with an allusion to the
1237:
that were flown from the larger U.S. Navy carriers. Their pilots were ordered "to attack the Japanese task force and proceed to
1156:
They were approaching from the west-northwest only 17 nmi (20 mi; 31 km) away, and they were already well within
2835:
with a near miss from her third salvo. The resulting gout of smoke from the stricken carrier obscured the target and convinced
2505:, which was the most exposed. Subsequent hits and near-misses, as the Japanese switched to high-explosive shells, first caused
3279:
Halsey was infuriated since he did not recognize the final phrase as padding, possibly chosen for the 90th anniversary of the
3261:
At 09:07, Kinkaid broadcast what his mismatched fleet was up against: "4 Battleships, 8 Cruisers Attack Our Escort Carriers".
2955:
s guns likely contributed to the sinking of three out of four, with claimed hits (some unconfirmed or disputed) on all except
1470:
from a range of 10.029 nmi (11.541 mi; 18.574 km), as, moments later, three 6.1-inch (155 mm) shells from
6087:
5729:
5700:
4453:(Report). U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, U.S. Naval Analysis Division. October 17, 1945. p. 43. Nav. No. 9; USSBS No. 47
3699:
1340:
and soon shell splashes were bracketing the destroyer. In response and without consulting with his commanders, Evans ordered
1298:
4000:: "At 65,000 tons, alone out-grossed all six escort carriers, three destroyers and four destroyer-escorts in Taffy 3."
2916:
received multiple strafing and torpedo attacks from US aircraft, claiming one US aircraft shot down at 09:15. Fighter pilot
2592:
attack. The resulting explosions and fires within her hangar forced Captain Francis McKenna to order abandon ship at 11:00.
6149:
5551:
5170:
4961:
4413:
4106:
2948:
with her first four salvoes. Kurita's forces had actually sunk one carrier, two destroyers, and one destroyer escort, and
1105:
Kurita's force passed through San Bernardino Strait at 03:00 on October 25, 1944 and steamed southwards along the coast of
382:
4403:
3248:
Shortly after 08:00, desperate messages calling for assistance began to come in from Seventh Fleet. One from Vice Admiral
764:, stripped of air cover by the Third Fleet, would then be attacked from the west and south by Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita's
4096:
2210:, the column's leader. Then, he quickly closed to a mere 4,400 yd (4.0 km) and fired his last three torpedoes.
1779:
s mast which fell and jammed the torpedo mount at 08:00. Finally recovering, at 2.0 nmi (2.3 mi; 3.7 km),
981:
765:
631:
6199:
6110:
5662:
5587:
5469:
5174:
4696:
4417:
4110:
3697:
television episode, "Death of the Japanese Navy". That episode, as well as a History Channel documentary, was based on
2680:
Around 10:50, the task unit came under a concentrated air attack. During the 40-minute battle, the first attack from a
1893:
for striking the final decisive blows at 09:00, which knocked out her remaining engine. Dead in the water and sinking,
1713:
201:
171:
34:
2638:-class heavy cruiser, and a second hit shortly after forced the Japanese ship to withdraw temporarily from formation.
6308:
6160:(Report). U.S. Navy, BuShips. June 1, 1945. pp. 7, 8, 11, 15, 24, 27â28, 31, 48, 55. War Damage Report A-3 (420)
6068:
6040:
6012:
5969:
5946:
5927:
5908:
5872:
5844:
5787:
5710:
5626:
5266:
5144:
4933:
4644:
3684:
struck a mine in 1988, her crew touched a plaque commemorating the original crew as they struggled to save the ship.
3020:, and she retired toward the San Bernardino Strait, where she suffered further, minor, damage from an aerial attack.
2871:
was forced to run due north away from the battle until the torpedoes ran out of fuel, finally turning back at 08:12.
2509:
to lose speed, and she was soon dead in the water. Three cruisers closed to point-blank range, as destroyers such as
2237:
s second salvo fired at 07:53. In either case, Kurita and his most powerful ship were temporarily out of the action.
2108:, both sides having difficulty with target identification in the poor visibility) at approximately 07:50. This time,
529:
3126:
1377:, in charge of the small destroyer screen, to attack. Struggling to form an attack formation, the three small ships
989:
6293:
3468:, with most sinkings in waters over 20,000 ft (6,000 m) deep. Wreckages that have been found include IJN
3114:
1359:. Firing the destroyer's 5-inch (127 mm) guns at their maximum range of 10 nmi (12 mi; 19 km),
3369:!' And then we could hear the engines stop, and cargo nets were thrown over the side. That's how we were rescued.
3296:
McCain raced toward the battle and briefly turned into the wind to recover returning planes. At 10:30, a force of
3268:
had monitored the desperate calls from Taffy 3, and sent Halsey a terse message: "Where is TF 34?". To
3038:
3028:
2976:
2460:
at the time) that they had scored a direct hit and they shifted fire to other targets. The turn to the south put
945:
615:
6178:
3449:, when four cruisers were sunk. It was also comparable to the combined losses of the 543 men and 3 ships at the
3383:
Taffy 3 and assisting aircraft turned back the most powerful surface fleet Japan had sent to sea since the
2565:
responded to their salvos with rapid fire from her single 5 in (127 mm) gun, claiming three hits on a
4903:
3677:
3184:
2554:
escaped serious damage during the surface phase of the action. By 07:38 the Japanese cruisers approaching from
1924:
1748:
1737:
1169:
opened fire at a range of 17 nmi (20 mi; 31 km). Lacking the Americans' gunnery radars and Ford
1075:
957:
939:
677:
1270:
6283:
3461:
Taffy 3. The Japanese lost 26 ships, totaling 306,000 long tons (311,000 t), in Leyte Gulf combat.
1701:
was hit so many times that one survivor recalled "they couldn't patch holes fast enough to keep her afloat."
6101:
For Crew and Country: The Inspirational True Story of Bravery and Sacrifice Aboard the USS Samuel B. Roberts
2443:
s third salvo was a close straddle landing at 07:04. One shell from this salvo exploded beneath the turn of
2330:
and the rest of the four heavy cruisers were under heavy air attack. At 09:02, under the combined effort of
2187:, as she tried to take her assigned position at the head of the column in preparation for a torpedo attack.
2009:
Admiral Sprague then ordered Thomas to attack the Japanese with torpedoes. From his position on the damaged
6174:
War Damage Report No. 60: Escort carriers: Gunfire, Bomb and Kamikaze Damage and Losses During World War II
4551:"USS Heermann (DD-532): Action Report â Philippine Operation; Battle East of Samar Island, 25 October 1944"
2970:
1697:
dead in the water at 09:40. Her attackers concentrated their fire on her rather than the fleeing carriers.
1550:
continued its course away from the Japanese, it came upon the charging screening force, led by the damaged
1170:
951:
4965:
1826:
fired with difficulty at her small, fast opponent. (Early in the battle, when it had become apparent that
909:
3280:
2646:
shifted her fire, and for the next hour traded shots with the Tenth Destroyer Squadron. No destroyer hit
2618:
16 in (406 mm)) struck the starboard side of the hangar deck just aft of the forward elevator.
1238:
779:
651:
489:
478:
165:
6257:
3750:. This was not achieved by the battleships, but rather by their escorting light cruisers and destroyers.
554:
3202:
3110:
2817:
2782:
escaped serious damage during the run to the east and was on the far side of the formation across from
2146:
rolled over and sank in 8,000 yd (7.3 km) of water, after enduring 90 minutes of punishment.
915:
903:
773:
662:
2475:
2326:
approached the scene and were vectored via VHF by Taffy 3 to the cruisers to the east. By 08:53,
1619:-class destroyer). Reversing course to intercept, Evans attempted to pass in front of the formation,
921:
2924:
with his .50 in (12.7 mm) machine guns, further discouraging her. However, US reports that
2900:
s own records report a damaging near miss from a battleship-caliber shell around this time. At 08:34
2501:
closed to within 5 nmi (5.8 mi; 9.3 km) and finally landed hits on the flight deck of
2431:
1558:
rejoin the attack, to provide gun support to Thomas's small squadron on their torpedo run. Attacking
1015:
848:
647:
523:
447:
65:(faintly visible in the background, center-right) shortly before sinking during the Battle off Samar.
975:
969:
887:
3498:
1279:
963:
655:
6247:
5306:
5049:
Tully, Anthony P. (2000). "Solving some Mysteries of Leyte Gulf: Fate of the Chikuma and Chokai".
2307:. Many uncolored splashes were also observed, likely from the line of heavy cruisers being led by
1718:
cruised slowly nearby, Robert Billie and several other crewmen saw her captain salute the sinking
6252:
5674:
5465:"Navy and Marine Corps Awards Manual, NAVPERS 15,790 (Rev. 1953); recommendations for changes to"
4957:
3712:
3450:
2990:
2430:
opened fire at 06:59 at an estimated range of 17 nmi (20 mi; 32 km), she targeted
2252:, whose salvos were beginning to land uncomfortably close. At one point between 08:08 and 08:25,
1315:, which had signaled for their assistance, they were ordered back to protect their own carriers.
933:
927:
709:
690:, launched a torpedo attack that sank one ship and sent the Japanese strike force into disarray.
484:
471:
464:
418:
413:
5283:
3488:
1355:
At 07:15, Hagen concentrated fire on the leading cruiser squadron's flagship, the heavy cruiser
3356:
3297:
3269:
2572:
cruiser. At 10:00, she launched an Avenger armed with a torpedo to join the attack launched by
1913:
1430:, suffering damage from air attacks, was also taken out of the fight, as she stopped to assist
823:
627:
594:
509:
408:
5570:
4371:. Vol. L, no. 10. Alexandria, Virginia: The Retired Officers Association. p. 42
2070:
was forced to turn sharply away from the torpedo attack and dropped out of the lead to behind
1117:
Steaming about 60 nmi (69 mi; 110 km) east of Samar before dawn on October 25,
6241:
5809:
5779:
5504:
3693:
3669:
3442:
3255:
At 08:22, Kinkaid radioed, "Fast Battleships are Urgently Needed Immediately at Leyte Gulf".
2935:
s own action report. At 09:11, Kurita ordered his ships to regroup to the north and at 09:22
2831:
at an estimated range of 19.616 mi (17.046 nmi; 31.569 km), severely damaging
1904:
1331:
1051:
684:
453:
5253:
Hornfischer, James D. (February 12, 2004a). "Interview with Thomas Stevenson, Lt. (jg), USS
4987:
3988:
s gun turrets, weighing almost 3,000 tons, was heavier than the largest American destroyer."
1791:
disappeared into the smoke. A lookout reported at least one torpedo hit, but in reality the
6313:
5739:
5695:
5559:
5366:
4450:
4168:"USS Johnston (DD-557) Action Report â Surface Engagement off Samar, P.I., 25 October 1944"
3704:
3446:
2215:
2203:
changed course to engage a column of three battleships that had commenced firing upon her.
1941:
1069:
611:
584:
568:
424:
30:
6227:. History Channel. TV. Based on book, and with interview by Hornfischer, James D. (2004).
6130:
5390:
4745:
2920:
Richard W. Roby reportedly attacked destroyers before raking the decks and then bridge of
2244:
was able to fire through the smoke and rain at nearby targets. Now under continuous fire,
494:
8:
5836:
4988:"USSBS: Interrogations of Japanese Officials -- [Nav. No. 9 ; USSBS No. 47]"
3645:
3637:
3572:
3366:
3307:
3287:
2745:
2378:
2342:
was immobilized by an aerial bomb, and was later scuttled when Center Force moved north.
2338:, and the bombs, torpedoes, and strafing from the carrier-based planes, during this time
1585:
fired at least 40 rounds, with over 15 hits on the battleship's superstructure observed.
1234:
1194:
used a blood-red dye which could appear red, purple, or even blue in some circumstances.
1174:
1126:
1085:
798:
574:
499:
6131:
Reports of General MacArthur â Japanese Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area Part II
5527:
3819:
3541:
It seems likely that Halsey was strongly influenced by his chief of staff, Rear Admiral
1352:, still making smoke and zigzagging, accelerated at maximum speed towards the Japanese.
6099:
5958:
4012:"Definitions and Information about Naval Guns - Ammunition Definitions - Splash Colors"
3719:
3613:
3502:
3390:
In addition, accurate anti-aircraft fire and air cover over US ships shot down several
3301:
2566:
1954:
1581:, which reported engaging a US destroyer with her secondary battery around this time.)
1063:
822:, initially forcing Kurita to retreat. At the same time, the Third Fleet light carrier
761:
643:
562:
516:
504:
458:
6080:
The Battle for Leyte Gulf: The Incredible Story of World War II's Largest Naval Battle
3628:
A number of ships were named after participants and ships from that battle, including
6134:
6106:
6083:
6064:
6036:
6008:
5991:
5965:
5942:
5923:
5904:
5887:
5868:
5840:
5829:
5783:
5744:
5725:
5706:
5658:
5336:
Caladan Oceanic (March 21, 2021). Written at Offshore Samar Island, Philippine Sea.
5272:
5262:
5140:
4929:
4640:
3661:
3465:
3273:
3265:
3249:
2323:
2028:
Kintberger now had to choose a target quickly as the distance closed rapidly. In the
1979:
1411:
was forced to turn away north to avoid these torpedoes, but this is not reflected in
1039:
792:
733:
440:
395:
5110:
4514:"Combined Action Report and Report of Loss of USS Hoel (DD-533) on 25 October, 1944"
2533:
1190:
used a greenish-yellow variously described as green or yellow by the Americans; and
753:
6198:(Report). U.S. Navy, BuShips. January 25, 1945. pp. 16, 24, 37â41 – via
3508:
In his dispatch after the battle, Halsey gave reasons for his decision as follows:
3384:
3313:
1686:
was an easy target. She exchanged fire with four cruisers and numerous destroyers.
1287:
713:
237:
4011:
2464:
in the lead of the formation and she escaped any further hits from Japanese fire.
1869:
was not alone, and soon, the Japanese fleet's multicolored salvos were bracketing
5371:"US Navy ship sunk nearly 80 years ago reached in world's deepest shipwreck dive"
5088:
3608:
3093:
3071:
2777:
2612:
2492:
2406:
During the run to the east the ships had been battered by near-misses. At 08:05,
2092:
loosed her first half salvo, a devastating series of multi-caliber shells struck
2029:
1959:
also launched torpedoes. While they missed, this helped slow the Japanese chase.
1802:
was nearing the carrier formation. Through the smoke and rain, the heavy cruiser
1327:
1310:
1157:
1138:
1033:
1021:
1003:
993:
804:
769:
757:
749:
721:
672:
536:
432:
402:
350:
147:
134:
56:
6023:
3948:
2081:
s detailed action report, which records turning to engaging an "enemy cruiser" (
5772:
5338:"Submersible crew completes the world's deepest shipwreck dive in history (USS
3201:
rolled over and sank at 13:22. 401 officers and crew were rescued by destroyer
3100:
3086:
3064:
2882:
2717:
2283:
which was being pummeled at point-blank range. At 12,000 yd (11 km),
1989:
1709:
1623:(a classic naval maneuver to limit the enemy ships' firepower). Evans ordered
1620:
1454:, at a range of 7 nmi (8.1 mi; 13 km), but this is unlikely, as
1230:
1226:
1106:
1027:
808:
785:
772:
Southern Force. Kurita's Center Force consisted of five battleships, including
729:
668:
623:
619:
589:
224:
195:
61:, burning from earlier gunfire damage, is bracketed by a salvo from a Japanese
53:
6005:
The Men of the Gambier Bay: The Amazing True Story of the Battle of Leyte Gulf
5806:"How 1 U.S. World War II Destroyer Charged a Japanese Armada of 4 Battleships"
4789:
2373:
1002:
Rear Admiral Clifton Sprague's Task Unit 77.4.3 ("Taffy 3") consisted of
6267:
5891:
5276:
4240:
3563:
3542:
3141:
3128:
2776:
early in the action (red, yellow and blue shell splashes) Sprague's flagship
1519:
s main battery and radar online; from its position in the rain, around 07:35
1219:
1150:
1146:
1122:
832:, with secondary explosions causing damage to a cruiser assisting alongside.
264:
258:
120:
4700:
3526:
logical to have taken one or both of Third Fleet's two fastest battleships,
3264:
3,000 nmi (3,500 mi; 5,600 km) away at Pearl Harbor, Admiral
2665:âpiloted by Lieutenant (j.g.) Waldropâstrafed and exploded two torpedoes in
2611:
As the trailing ship in the escort carrier van after the turn to the south,
2561:
s port quarter had closed to within 6.9 nmi (8.0 mi; 13 km).
2062:
Sometime near 07:27, at a range of 4.4 nmi (5.1 mi; 8.2 km),
886:
Halsey's Third Fleet, having spotted Japanese carriers, engaged them in the
5995:
5831:
Sea of Thunder: Four Commanders and the Last Great Naval Campaign 1941â1945
5767:
5375:
4513:
4167:
3629:
3352:
2169:
2048:
in. The course took the ship into the middle of the charging Center Force.
1931:
1216:
1212:
1179:
1081:
1045:
635:
579:
549:
152:
5065:
4950:(Battleship, 1941â1945) â in the Battle of Leyte Gulf, 22â26 October 1944"
3154:
in the late morning of October 25, 1944, but a more recent study suggests
2497:
effectively diverted attention from the other fleeing carriers. At 08:10,
1662:
while it crossed the formation to engage the Japanese destroyers, forcing
1445:
At 07:30, three battleship main battery shells passed through the deck of
1418:
s own action report. It is unclear whether these torpedoes were fired by
47:
5824:
5132:
3492:
Admiral William F. "Bull" HalseyâCommander U.S. Third Fleet at Leyte Gulf
3060:
2904:
trained her secondary batteries on another "light cruiser", probably USS
2032:, Executive Officer Fred Green quickly suggested a course that would put
1909:
1345:
1223:
1134:
760:, using an apparently vulnerable force of Japanese carriers as bait. The
38:
2085:) at 5.1 nmi (5.9 mi; 9.4 km), but not a torpedo attack.
1967:
ceased fire after expending her ammunition an hour into the engagement.
1265:
1173:, which provided co-ordinated automatic firing solutions as long as the
756:'s Northern Force to lure the American Third Fleet away from the Allied
752:
strategy at Leyte Gulfâa plan known as ShÅ-Go 1âcalled for Vice Admiral
5505:"Task Force 34 Action Report: October 6, 1944 – November 3, 1944"
3800:
3429:
attack. Of the seven screening ships, fewer than half, two destroyers (
2917:
2577:
2549:
1948:
1772:
A stray shell, probably intended for one of the nearby destroyers, hit
1057:
1009:
737:
639:
252:
6217:. History Channel. TV. Based on book by Hornfischer, James D. (2004).
5293:
5219:
4364:
3293:
At 10:05, Kinkaid asked, "Who is guarding the San Bernardino Strait?"
3286:
Halsey sent Task Group 38.1 (TG 38.1), commanded by Vice Admiral
1630:
s guns to fire on the Japanese destroyers, who returned fire striking
5703:: The Extraordinary World War II Story of the U.S. Navy's Finest Hour
5682:. as told to Sidney Shalett. Saturday Evening Post Society. p. 9
4767:
3621:
2474:
s 5 in (127 mm) gun crew claimed six hits on heavy cruiser
1538:
At 07:37, Commodore Thomas ordered a torpedo attack via voice radio.
1389:
began a long sprint to get into firing position for their torpedoes.
231:
5886:. Ocala, FL: USS Samuel B. Roberts (DE 413) Survivors' Association.
3746:
In fact, Task Group 34.5 only finished off the straggling destroyer
3258:
At 09:05, Kinkaid radioed, "Need Fast Battleships and Air Support".
1988:
started zig-zagging and laying smoke to help defend the now fleeing
5939:
In the Service of the Emperor: Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army
5583:"TG 77.4.3 ("Taffy 3") Presidential Unit Citation and Other Awards"
3936:
3653:
2097:
have to fire his remaining torpedoes quickly while he still could.
1916:
1674:
were sinking. Finding targets was not difficult. After 09:00, with
699:
274:
6289:
World War II aerial operations and battles of the Pacific theatre
4075:
4073:
2798:
close aboard, helped shoot down a plane just about to crash into
2522:
was the only U.S. carrier sunk by naval gunfire in World War II.
840:
62:
6138:
4899:
3566:
of Kurita's fleet and completed the destruction of Center Force.
5603:
3074:
that severed her stern and disabled her port screw and rudder.
3023:
6024:"Forgotten Campaign: The Dutch East Indies Campaign 1941â1942"
5234:
5200:
4568:
4477:
4431:
4383:
4070:
3924:
3912:. Vol. 23, no. 5. U.S. Naval Institute. October 2009
1373:
At 07:16, Sprague ordered Commander William Dow Thomas aboard
5529:
Halsey at Leyte Gulf: Command Decision and Disunity of Effort
3886:
3874:
3862:
2698:
844:
was quite clear that we should only fall into a ready trap."
694:
654:
engaged to the south, the recently-landed 130,000 men of the
87:
6049:
5391:"USS Samuel B Roberts: World's deepest shipwreck discovered"
5093:
Forgotten Campaign: The Dutch East Indies Campaign 1941â1942
1524:
observed visually, and thus were not positively identified;
6176:(Report). U.S. Navy, BuShips. July 31, 1948. Archived from
4808:
3850:
2839:
she was destroyed, so they ceased fire at 07:09. At 07:27,
898:
The Japanese Center Force now consisted of the battleships
5485:
4732:
4730:
4604:
4489:
4465:
4332:
4322:
4320:
3162:
arrived only in time to pick up survivors from the water.
1834:
to go as fast as 28 kn (32 mph; 52 km/h).)
1562:, the leading heavy cruiser to the east of the formation,
1403:. Minutes later, at 07:33, four torpedoes narrowly missed
998:
and her escorts laying a smoke screen early in the battle.
6304:
Naval battles of World War II involving the United States
5960:
A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941â1945
5752:
History of United States Naval Operations in World War II
4715:
4677:
4211:
4209:
4022:
3838:
2036:
in a position to attack the leading "battleship", either
1198:
used no dye loads, so her shell splashes appeared white.
5013:"Interrogations of Japanese Officials - Vol. I & II"
3113:
for his action. It is generally thought that destroyer
3105:
led by Lt. Joseph Cady dropped more torpedoes which hit
2701:, and were the severest threats to the ship's survival.
2588:
into her flight deck from astern in the first organized
2491:
As Japanese gunners concentrated on the closest target,
2480:, although these are not verified by Japanese officers.
2368:
1767:
Under the cover of the smokescreen from the destroyers,
1704:
At 09:45, Evans finally gave the order to abandon ship.
1097:
6279:
Military history of the Philippines during World War II
5937:
Drea, Edward J. (1998). "Leyte: Unanswered Questions".
5246:
5030:
4880:
4856:
4844:
4832:
4820:
4727:
4653:
4616:
4401:
4344:
4317:
4305:
3464:
The battle took place in the very deep water above the
2735:
at 11:08, she was successfully defended by her own and
1822:. Hampered by the closing range and slow rate of fire,
1589:
reversed course and disappeared in the smoke, avoiding
1205:
875:, the combination of which sank the massive battleship
6215:
Lost Evidence of the Pacific: The Battle of Leyte Gulf
5920:
Death of a Navy: Japanese Naval Action in World War II
5445:
5433:
5421:
5109:. Home.earthlink.net. October 24, 1944. Archived from
4592:
4580:
4255:
4221:
4206:
4194:
4182:
4058:
4046:
4034:
3960:
3417:
Clifton Sprague's task unit lost two escort carriers:
3059:, but was soon attacked in the anvil approach by four
2802:, and landed planes from her sunk or damaged sisters.
1370:
s superstructure, which erupted into flame and smoke.
5409:
3070:, succeeded in hitting her stern port quarter with a
2621:
By 08:00 the Japanese cruisers off her port quarter (
2584:
squadron of the Special Attack Unit, crashed his A6M
1923:
was later named for him. The guided-missile frigates
1266:
American destroyer and destroyer escort counterattack
5865:
Choices Under Fire: Moral Dimensions of World War II
5261:(Audio book). Random House. End track of audiobook.
4135:
4133:
4131:
4129:
4127:
4094:
3972:
2847:. At 07:51, she turned her secondary battery on USS
2629:) had closed to within 18,000 yd (16 km).
2548:
Straddled several times during the run to the east,
1787:
without being fired upon. Quickly reversing course,
1531:
s presumed "cruiser" was most likely the battleship
791:
On the night of October 23, the American submarines
6190:– via U.S. Naval Academy Digital Collections.
5881:
4090:
4088:
3453:, and 307 men and 2 ships at the Battle of Midway.
3283:. He threw his hat to the deck and began to curse.
2658:had closed to within 10,100 yd (9.2 km).
2365:was the only destroyer from the screen to survive.
1889:began to suffer hits regularly. Credit is given to
1600:bore down on a huge cruiser firing at the helpless
1274:
Destroyers of Taffy 3 making smoke under fire.
6244:: public domain documents from HyperWar Foundation
6177:
6098:
5957:
5828:
5771:
5743:
5722:The World Wonder'd: What really happened off Samar
5673:
4545:
4543:
4541:
4539:
4537:
4535:
4533:
4531:
4162:
4160:
4158:
4156:
4154:
4152:
4150:
4148:
3991:
3169:was herself sunk, with the loss of all but one of
3043:engaged the U.S. escort carriers, helping to sink
2017:zig-zagged toward the Japanese fleet, followed by
1458:was on the far side of the Japanese formation and
658:were left vulnerable to Japanese attack on Leyte.
380:
6253:Task Force 77 Action Report: Battle of Leyte Gulf
4282:
4280:
4278:
4276:
4274:
4272:
4270:
4241:"IJN NOSHIRO: Tabular Record of Movement, Rev. 2"
4124:
3243:
3207:, followed by further rescues by American ships.
3180:was lost and is still a topic of research today.
1038:. Screening for Taffy 3 were the destroyers
6265:
5457:
5220:"The Battle Off Samar â Taffy III at Leyte Gulf"
4085:
3063:torpedo-bombers. Richard Deitchman, flying from
2908:, which was observed sinking at 08:40. At 08:45
6061:The Battle Of Leyte Gulf: The Last Fleet Action
5335:
4528:
4145:
3906:"Leyte Gulf: The Pacific War's Greatest Battle"
3898:
3612:A memorial to Sprague and Taffy 3 next to
2752:prepares to launch her Wildcat fighters, while
5903:. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press.
5882:Copeland, Robert W.; O'Neill, Jack E. (2007).
5550:from the original on June 9, 2018 – via
4738:"USN Overseas Aircraft Loss List October 1944"
4637:U.S. Destroyers: An Illustrated Design History
4508:
4506:
4504:
4363:Ash, Leonard D.; Hill, Martin (October 1994).
4267:
3472:at nearly 17,000 ft (5,000 m),, USS
2786:during the run to the south. During the later
2756:is straddled by 18.1-inch (46 cm) shells.
2684:unit in World War II, all escort carriers but
1999:s 6.1-inch (155 mm) guns scored a hit on
1818:now divided her fire between the carriers and
6299:Naval battles of World War II involving Japan
5988:The Japanese at Leyte Gulf: The Sho Operation
5655:The Battle Off Samar: Taffy III at Leyte Gulf
5526:Coleman, Kent S., LCDR, USN (June 16, 2006).
3691:and the Japanese force were the subject of a
3585:
1112:
366:
6030:
5901:The Battle of Leyte Gulf: 23â26 October 1944
5564:: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (
5299:
5252:
5131:
3158:sank from the effect of the air attack, and
3033:maneuvering after sustaining torpedo damage.
2456:, which was also firing her main battery at
1963:was struck by a pair of cruiser shells, and
5917:
5754:. Vol. XII. Boston: Little & Brown
5694:
5609:
5575:
5541:U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
5240:
5206:
5166:Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships
5125:
4671:
4610:
4574:
4501:
4495:
4483:
4471:
4437:
4409:Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships
4389:
4338:
4102:Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships
4079:
3954:
3942:
3930:
3892:
3880:
3868:
3856:
3844:
3806:
3580:U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
3300:, Avengers, and Hellcats was launched from
3176:s surviving crewmen, it is unknown how the
6133:(Report). Vol. II. pp. 394â402.
5941:. Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press.
5497:
5329:
4524:– via USS JohnstonâHoel Association.
4178:– via USS JohnstonâHoel Association.
3016:s bow was blown off by a torpedo from USS
2827:opened the battle at 06:59, firing on USS
2688:were damaged. Four diving planes attacked
2275:Finally on course for the enemy cruisers,
2264:again had two near misses, this time with
2051:Gunnery Officer Lt. Bill Sanders directed
1873:, indicating that she was under fire from
373:
359:
46:
6128:
4009:
3812:
2044:. Without hesitation, Kintberger ordered
1937:were named for the ship and its captain.
6248:Battle Experience: Battle for Leyte Gulf
6096:
6077:
6058:
5719:
5036:
4886:
4862:
4850:
4838:
4826:
4814:
4721:
4683:
4659:
4634:
4622:
4598:
4350:
4326:
4311:
4261:
4227:
4215:
4200:
4064:
4052:
4040:
4028:
3966:
3607:
3578:In his master's thesis submitted at the
3487:
3165:While withdrawing from the battle area,
3022:
2961:
2867:to starboard and her destroyers to port
2744:
2532:
2467:During the surface phase of the action,
2401:
2372:
1732:
1725:
1269:
1096:
988:
5738:
5675:"We Asked For the Jap Fleetâand Got It"
5623:"Dogfights: Death of the Japanese Navy"
5525:
5491:
5451:
5439:
5427:
4699:. Battleshipyamato.info. Archived from
4586:
4362:
4188:
3826:. Encyclopedia Britannica. May 25, 2023
3518:air power going north to strike Ozawa.
2969:and a Japanese heavy cruiser, possibly
2074:, an assertion that is contradicted by
1141:on the biggest battleship I ever saw!"
125:
6266:
5898:
5823:
5803:
5766:
5415:
5317:from the original on November 29, 2020
5086:
5068:. Bookscrounger.com. December 11, 2015
3997:
3978:
3483:
2995:'s detailed action report states that
6274:Pacific Ocean theatre of World War II
6229:The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors
6225:Dogfights: Death of the Japanese Navy
6219:The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors
6208:
6031:Lacroix, Eric; Wells, Linton (1997).
5985:
5720:Lundgren, Robert (October 23, 2014).
5701:The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors
5671:
5048:
4139:
4095:Cressman, Robert J. (April 7, 2021).
3957:, pp. 70, 84, 91, 137, 151, 154.
3700:The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors
3109:portside. Cady was later awarded the
2806:suffered four dead and four wounded.
2369:The Run to the South (07:30 to 09:45)
1084:fighters and an equivalent number of
354:
6150:U.S. Army Center of Military History
6033:Japanese Cruisers of the Pacific War
6002:
5955:
5936:
5862:
5552:Defense Technical Information Center
4451:Interrogations of Japanese Officials
3329:
2889:though this hit was also claimed by
2809:
1862:also aimed her guns at the cruiser.
1206:The Run to the East (06:45 to 07:15)
1089:had a limited range of seven miles.
5652:
5365:
5307:"Discoveries of R/V Petrel in 2019"
5289:
4938:
4906:from the original on March 24, 2010
4796:. USS Gambier Bay/VC-10 Association
4402:Evans, Mark L. (October 21, 2019).
3210:
2418:
2295:. During this phase of the battle,
803:detected Center Force entering the
693:Japanese aircraft from the base at
13:
6200:Naval History and Heritage Command
5855:
5804:Roblin, Sebastien (June 2, 2019).
5588:Naval History and Heritage Command
5470:Naval History and Heritage Command
5175:Naval History and Heritage Command
4418:Naval History and Heritage Command
4111:Naval History and Heritage Command
3726:Museum, which contains a model of
2985:
2885:reported a primary battery hit on
2760:
2603:
2483:
2214:evaded all of them, but historian
1497:sank one enemy cruiser" at 07:28.
883:) with 17 bombs and 19 torpedoes.
650:north after a decoy fleet and the
14:
6325:
6235:
6021:
5672:Hagen, Robert C. (May 26, 1945).
5657:(5th ed.). Agogeebic Press.
5259:Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors
4404:"Kalinin Bay Johnston I (CVE-68)"
4243:. Bob Hackett and Sander Kingsepp
4010:DiGiulian, Tony (March 2, 2021).
2704:
1615:, which Hagen misidentified as a
610:was the centermost action of the
242:~322 aircraft from Taffys 2 and 3
6168:– via HyperWar Foundation.
5615:
5515:– via HyperWar Foundation.
5139:. Random House. pp. 40â41.
4564:– via HyperWar Foundation.
4461:– via Hyperwar Foundation.
4301:– via Hyperwar Foundation.
1249:to turn north out of formation;
616:largest naval battles in history
127:
113:
16:Part of the Battle of Leyte Gulf
5746:Leyte, June 1944 â January 1945
5519:
5383:
5359:
5212:
5188:
5153:
5099:
5080:
5058:
5053:. No. 3. pp. 248â258.
5042:
5005:
4980:
4918:
4892:
4868:
4782:
4760:
4689:
4665:
4628:
4443:
4395:
4356:
4233:
4003:
3981:, p. 21: "A single one of
3740:
3707:. There was also an episode of
3085:was attacked by five TBMs from
2161:
1900:s part in the battle was over.
1682:out of the fight, the crippled
1573:was confronted by a 36,600-ton
1318:
646:lured into taking his powerful
384:Philippines campaign (1944â45)
5990:. Princeton University Press.
5645:
5507:. U.S. Navy. December 14, 1944
5347:(Press release). Dallas, Texas
5066:"Thomas J. Lupo & Taffy 3"
4964:. May 13, 2000. Archived from
4877:: "Death of the Japanese Navy"
4516:. U.S. Navy. November 15, 1944
4293:. U.S. Navy. November 20, 1944
4170:. U.S. Navy. November 14, 1944
3789:
3764:
3409:Thomas Stevensen, Survivor of
3244:Seventh Fleet's calls for help
2279:came upon the heavily damaged
2040:or possibly the heavy cruiser
661:Kurita, aboard the battleship
35:Philippines Campaign (1944â45)
1:
5867:. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
4556:. U.S. Navy. November 1, 1944
3809:, pp. 351â354, 406, 407.
3757:
3047:, but came under attack from
2525:
2222:was bracketed between two of
807:along the northwest coast of
743:
728:was posthumously awarded the
6063:. Indiana University Press.
5473:. U.S. Navy. August 19, 1954
4369:The Retired Officer Magazine
3373:
2436:with her first four salvos.
2361:Though extensively damaged,
2345:At 09:07, the heavy cruiser
1940:Companion destroyer escorts
1712:. As the Japanese destroyer
1577:-class battleship (probably
1171:Mark I Fire Control Computer
1153:, and about ten destroyers.
1125:William C. Brooks, flying a
788:'s cruisers and destroyers.
7:
5089:"Rear-Admiral Takeo Kurita"
4900:"Battleship Yamato Battles"
4742:www.aviationarchaeology.com
4697:"Battleship Yamato Battles"
3590:Taffy 3 was awarded a
3281:Charge of the Light Brigade
3123:, and then scuttled her at
3055:inflicted severe damage on
2358:disengage and turned away.
2248:began an unequal duel with
1970:
1814:began to trade broadsides.
1764:in to attack the cruisers.
1493:at the time, reported "The
1489:, which was also firing at
1101:Movements during the battle
632:First Mobile Striking Force
312:2 destroyer escorts damaged
10:
6330:
6121:
6078:Woodward, C. Vann (2007).
4924:Reynolds, Clark G (1982).
4794:/VC-10 â Killed in Action"
3592:Presidential Unit Citation
3586:Presidential Unit Citation
3437:) and a destroyer escort (
2661:At 09:15, an Avenger from
2194:engaged the heavy cruiser
1795:was not hit by a torpedo.
1783:launched her torpedoes at
1634:several times. At 09:06
1113:Taffy 3 comes under attack
718:Presidential Unit Citation
671:groups under Rear Admiral
618:, which took place in the
6242:Return to the Philippines
6035:. Naval Institute Press.
5964:. Naval Institute Press.
5922:. New York: Devin-Adair.
5918:D'Albas, Andrieu (1965).
5884:The Spirit of the Sammy B
5680:The Saturday Evening Post
4902:. Battleshipyamato.info.
4639:. Naval Institute Press.
4635:Friedman, Norman (2004).
3715:called "Courage at Sea".
3603:
3421:, to surface attack, and
2030:Combat Information Center
1608:, scoring numerous hits.
1407:. (Morison asserts that
1092:
893:
849:Battle of the Sibuyan Sea
392:
342:2,700+ killed and wounded
306:4 escort carriers damaged
285:
214:
158:
141:
106:
69:
45:
28:
23:
6309:History of Eastern Samar
6059:Willmott, H. P. (2005).
5986:Field, James A. (1947).
5774:Bull Halsey: A Biography
5653:Cox, Robert Jon (2010).
5625:. Tv.com. Archived from
4379:– via bosamar.com.
3945:, pp. 137â138, 153.
3733:
3119:took off survivors from
2322:At 08:50, aircraft from
1643:) before it veered off,
1056:, and destroyer escorts
837:Battle of Surigao Strait
530:Cotabato and Maguindanao
336:3 heavy cruisers damaged
315:1,161 killed and missing
6294:1944 in the Philippines
6129:MacArthur, D. (1994) .
6097:Wukovits, John (2013).
6082:. Skyhorse Publishing.
6003:Hoyt, Edwin P. (2003).
5899:Cutler, Thomas (2001).
5778:. Annapolis, Maryland:
5195:Heavy Metal: Destroyers
5135:; Salter, Mark (1999).
5087:L, Klemen (1999â2000).
5055:Note especially p. 251.
4958:Naval Historical Center
3713:American Heroes Channel
3451:Battle of the Coral Sea
2183:and then at 07:49 with
1363:scored several hits on
1186:used a brilliant pink;
634:, under the command of
300:1 destroyer escort sunk
6105:. St. Martin's Press.
5956:Dull, Paul S. (1978).
5863:Bess, Michael (2006).
5770:(1985). "Last Years".
4962:Department of the Navy
3910:Naval History Magazine
3820:"Battle of Leyte Gulf"
3625:
3601:
3568:
3555:
3515:
3493:
3415:
3371:
3357:Landing Craft Infantry
3034:
2982:
2883:F1M2 "Pete" floatplane
2757:
2545:
2386:
2123:s target was probably
1914:guided-missile frigate
1743:
1275:
1102:
999:
888:Battle off Cape Engaño
628:Imperial Japanese Navy
595:Action of 24 July 1945
294:2 escort carriers sunk
142:Commanders and leaders
6054:. pp. 18, 69â72.
5810:The National Interest
5780:Naval Institute Press
5696:Hornfischer, James D.
5051:Warship International
4097:"Johnston I (DD-557)"
3611:
3596:
3559:
3551:
3510:
3491:
3443:Battle of Savo Island
3401:
3362:
3270:complicate decryption
3027:The Japanese cruiser
3026:
2965:
2748:
2536:
2402:Carriers under attack
2376:
2311:. At 08:45, a hit on
1736:
1658:nearly collided with
1426:.) The heavy cruiser
1348:, full left rudder";
1273:
1100:
992:
333:2 battleships damaged
327:3 heavy cruisers sunk
286:Casualties and losses
6284:Battle of Leyte Gulf
6182:on February 16, 2022
5837:Simon & Schuster
5311:VisitPearlHarbor.org
5107:"Battleship Musashi"
3776:www.history.navy.mil
3705:James D. Hornfischer
3543:Robert "Mick" Carney
2855:at 07:54. At 07:55,
2349:exchanged fire with
2291:as her guns cleared
2216:Samuel Eliot Morison
1666:to evade them both.
1326:At 07:00, Commander
1235:Grumman F6F Hellcats
1137:. I see the biggest
871:, and light carrier
612:Battle of Leyte Gulf
585:South China Sea raid
98:US strategic victory
31:Battle of Leyte Gulf
6007:. The Lyons Press.
5612:, pp. 425â427.
5494:, pp. 336â337.
5243:, pp. 390â391.
5209:, pp. 391â394.
5137:Faith of My Fathers
4968:on November 2, 2000
4954:Japanese Navy Ships
4928:. Time-Life Books.
4817:, pp. 222â223.
4577:, pp. 222â224.
4486:, pp. 325â332.
4440:, pp. 253â255.
4392:, pp. 198â201.
4082:, pp. 308â310.
3933:, pp. 127â128.
3895:, pp. 102â114.
3883:, pp. 120â130.
3871:, pp. 119â120.
3573:Willis Augustus Lee
3484:Criticism of Halsey
3367:St. Louis Cardinals
3365:and we all yelled '
3138: /
2576:at 10:13. At 10:51
2379:Grumman TBF Avenger
1978:The fast destroyer
1127:Grumman TBF Avenger
1086:Grumman TBF Avenger
768:, and Vice Admiral
339:1 destroyer damaged
309:1 destroyer damaged
6209:Audio/visual media
6022:L, Klemen (2000).
5740:Morison, Samuel E.
5207:Hornfischer (2004)
4748:on August 20, 2008
4703:on October 5, 2010
3626:
3503:American Civil War
3499:Battle of Bull Run
3494:
3355:. Finally, when a
3183:The heavy cruiser
3142:11.417°N 126.600°E
3035:
2983:
2758:
2546:
2387:
1744:
1276:
1103:
1000:
740:in naval history.
644:William Halsey Jr.
6089:978-1-60239-194-9
5731:978-1-608-88046-1
5698:(February 2004).
5369:(April 4, 2021).
5255:Samuel B. Roberts
5161:"Wasp IX (CV-18)"
4724:, pp. 29â36.
4686:, pp. 86â87.
4031:, pp. 21â22.
3859:, pp. 93â99.
3680:Samuel B. Roberts
3478:Samuel B. Roberts
3466:Philippine Trench
3439:Samuel B. Roberts
3411:Samuel B. Roberts
3330:Survivors' ordeal
3274:The world wonders
3266:Chester W. Nimitz
3250:Thomas C. Kinkaid
2957:Samuel B. Roberts
2794:took a near-miss
2199:seven torpedoes,
2181:Samuel B. Roberts
2023:Samuel B. Roberts
1926:Samuel B. Roberts
1751:Samuel B. Roberts
1739:Samuel B. Roberts
1728:Samuel B. Roberts
1680:Samuel B. Roberts
1664:Samuel B. Roberts
1546:acknowledged. As
1387:Samuel B. Roberts
1330:of the destroyer
1288:antiaircraft guns
1239:Tacloban airstrip
1077:Samuel B. Roberts
956:; light cruisers
920:; heavy cruisers
770:Shoji Nishimura's
758:landings on Leyte
734:Chester W. Nimitz
732:. Fleet Admiral
680:Samuel B. Roberts
603:
602:
490:Villa Verde Trail
349:
348:
297:2 destroyers sunk
238:destroyer escorts
102:
101:
6321:
6203:
6191:
6189:
6187:
6181:
6169:
6167:
6165:
6153:
6147:
6145:
6116:
6104:
6093:
6074:
6055:
6046:
6027:
6018:
5999:
5982:
5980:
5978:
5963:
5952:
5933:
5914:
5895:
5878:
5850:
5834:
5820:
5818:
5816:
5800:
5798:
5796:
5777:
5763:
5761:
5759:
5749:
5735:
5724:. Nimble Books.
5716:
5691:
5689:
5687:
5677:
5668:
5639:
5638:
5636:
5634:
5619:
5613:
5610:Hornfischer 2004
5607:
5601:
5600:
5598:
5596:
5579:
5573:
5569:
5563:
5555:
5549:
5534:
5523:
5517:
5516:
5514:
5512:
5501:
5495:
5489:
5483:
5482:
5480:
5478:
5461:
5455:
5449:
5443:
5437:
5431:
5425:
5419:
5413:
5407:
5406:
5404:
5402:
5387:
5381:
5380:
5363:
5357:
5356:
5354:
5352:
5346:
5333:
5327:
5326:
5324:
5322:
5303:
5297:
5287:
5281:
5280:
5250:
5244:
5241:Hornfischer 2004
5238:
5232:
5231:
5229:
5227:
5216:
5210:
5204:
5198:
5192:
5186:
5185:
5183:
5181:
5157:
5151:
5150:
5129:
5123:
5122:
5120:
5118:
5103:
5097:
5096:
5084:
5078:
5077:
5075:
5073:
5062:
5056:
5054:
5046:
5040:
5034:
5028:
5027:
5025:
5023:
5009:
5003:
5002:
5000:
4998:
4984:
4978:
4977:
4975:
4973:
4942:
4936:
4922:
4916:
4915:
4913:
4911:
4896:
4890:
4884:
4878:
4872:
4866:
4860:
4854:
4848:
4842:
4836:
4830:
4824:
4818:
4812:
4806:
4805:
4803:
4801:
4786:
4780:
4779:
4777:
4775:
4764:
4758:
4757:
4755:
4753:
4744:. Archived from
4734:
4725:
4719:
4713:
4712:
4710:
4708:
4693:
4687:
4681:
4675:
4672:Hornfischer 2004
4669:
4663:
4657:
4651:
4650:
4632:
4626:
4620:
4614:
4611:Hornfischer 2004
4608:
4602:
4596:
4590:
4584:
4578:
4575:Hornfischer 2004
4572:
4566:
4565:
4563:
4561:
4555:
4547:
4526:
4525:
4523:
4521:
4510:
4499:
4496:Hornfischer 2004
4493:
4487:
4484:Hornfischer 2004
4481:
4475:
4472:Hornfischer 2004
4469:
4463:
4462:
4460:
4458:
4447:
4441:
4438:Hornfischer 2004
4435:
4429:
4428:
4426:
4424:
4399:
4393:
4390:Hornfischer 2004
4387:
4381:
4380:
4378:
4376:
4360:
4354:
4348:
4342:
4339:Hornfischer 2004
4336:
4330:
4324:
4315:
4309:
4303:
4302:
4300:
4298:
4292:
4284:
4265:
4259:
4253:
4252:
4250:
4248:
4237:
4231:
4225:
4219:
4213:
4204:
4198:
4192:
4186:
4180:
4179:
4177:
4175:
4164:
4143:
4137:
4122:
4121:
4119:
4117:
4092:
4083:
4080:Hornfischer 2004
4077:
4068:
4062:
4056:
4050:
4044:
4038:
4032:
4026:
4020:
4019:
4007:
4001:
3995:
3989:
3987:
3976:
3970:
3964:
3958:
3955:Hornfischer 2004
3952:
3946:
3943:Hornfischer 2004
3940:
3934:
3931:Hornfischer 2004
3928:
3922:
3921:
3919:
3917:
3902:
3896:
3893:Hornfischer 2004
3890:
3884:
3881:Hornfischer 2004
3878:
3872:
3869:Hornfischer 2004
3866:
3860:
3857:Hornfischer 2004
3854:
3848:
3845:Hornfischer 2004
3842:
3836:
3835:
3833:
3831:
3816:
3810:
3807:Hornfischer 2004
3804:
3798:
3797:
3793:
3787:
3786:
3784:
3782:
3768:
3751:
3744:
3709:Ultimate Warfare
3413:
3385:Battle of Midway
3211:Kurita withdraws
3195:
3175:
3153:
3152:
3150:
3149:
3148:
3143:
3139:
3136:
3135:
3134:
3131:
3080:
3015:
3001:
2954:
2944:had indeed sunk
2934:
2899:
2880:
2741:
2671:
2580:, leader of the
2560:
2473:
2442:
2317:
2236:
2228:
2122:
2114:
2080:
2057:
2005:
1998:
1899:
1850:, shortly after
1844:
1778:
1693:engine, leaving
1649:
1629:
1621:crossing the "T"
1595:
1530:
1518:
1511:
1480:
1464:
1440:
1434:. The effect of
1417:
1369:
1231:aerial torpedoes
642:. With Admiral
608:Battle off Samar
544:Naval operations
387:
385:
375:
368:
361:
352:
351:
330:11 aircraft lost
303:23 aircraft lost
272:36 aircraft (in
176:Task Group 77.4
137:
133:
131:
130:
119:
117:
116:
77:October 25, 1944
71:
70:
50:
24:Battle off Samar
21:
20:
6329:
6328:
6324:
6323:
6322:
6320:
6319:
6318:
6264:
6263:
6260:at NavWeaps.com
6258:Order of Battle
6238:
6211:
6206:
6194:
6185:
6183:
6172:
6163:
6161:
6156:
6143:
6141:
6124:
6119:
6113:
6090:
6071:
6043:
6015:
5976:
5974:
5972:
5949:
5930:
5911:
5875:
5858:
5856:Further reading
5853:
5847:
5814:
5812:
5794:
5792:
5790:
5757:
5755:
5732:
5713:
5685:
5683:
5665:
5648:
5643:
5642:
5632:
5630:
5629:on June 4, 2011
5621:
5620:
5616:
5608:
5604:
5594:
5592:
5581:
5580:
5576:
5557:
5556:
5547:
5543:. p. iii.
5532:
5524:
5520:
5510:
5508:
5503:
5502:
5498:
5490:
5486:
5476:
5474:
5463:
5462:
5458:
5450:
5446:
5438:
5434:
5426:
5422:
5414:
5410:
5400:
5398:
5389:
5388:
5384:
5364:
5360:
5350:
5348:
5344:
5334:
5330:
5320:
5318:
5305:
5304:
5300:
5288:
5284:
5269:
5251:
5247:
5239:
5235:
5225:
5223:
5218:
5217:
5213:
5205:
5201:
5197:television show
5193:
5189:
5179:
5177:
5171:Navy Department
5159:
5158:
5154:
5147:
5130:
5126:
5116:
5114:
5113:on June 2, 2011
5105:
5104:
5100:
5085:
5081:
5071:
5069:
5064:
5063:
5059:
5047:
5043:
5035:
5031:
5021:
5019:
5011:
5010:
5006:
4996:
4994:
4992:www.ibiblio.org
4986:
4985:
4981:
4971:
4969:
4944:
4943:
4939:
4926:The Carrier War
4923:
4919:
4909:
4907:
4898:
4897:
4893:
4885:
4881:
4873:
4869:
4861:
4857:
4849:
4845:
4837:
4833:
4825:
4821:
4813:
4809:
4799:
4797:
4788:
4787:
4783:
4773:
4771:
4766:
4765:
4761:
4751:
4749:
4736:
4735:
4728:
4720:
4716:
4706:
4704:
4695:
4694:
4690:
4682:
4678:
4670:
4666:
4658:
4654:
4647:
4633:
4629:
4621:
4617:
4609:
4605:
4597:
4593:
4585:
4581:
4573:
4569:
4559:
4557:
4553:
4549:
4548:
4529:
4519:
4517:
4512:
4511:
4502:
4494:
4490:
4482:
4478:
4470:
4466:
4456:
4454:
4449:
4448:
4444:
4436:
4432:
4422:
4420:
4414:Navy Department
4400:
4396:
4388:
4384:
4374:
4372:
4365:"In Harm's Way"
4361:
4357:
4349:
4345:
4337:
4333:
4325:
4318:
4310:
4306:
4296:
4294:
4290:
4286:
4285:
4268:
4260:
4256:
4246:
4244:
4239:
4238:
4234:
4226:
4222:
4214:
4207:
4199:
4195:
4187:
4183:
4173:
4171:
4166:
4165:
4146:
4138:
4125:
4115:
4113:
4107:Navy Department
4093:
4086:
4078:
4071:
4063:
4059:
4051:
4047:
4039:
4035:
4027:
4023:
4008:
4004:
3996:
3992:
3985:
3977:
3973:
3965:
3961:
3953:
3949:
3941:
3937:
3929:
3925:
3915:
3913:
3904:
3903:
3899:
3891:
3887:
3879:
3875:
3867:
3863:
3855:
3851:
3843:
3839:
3829:
3827:
3818:
3817:
3813:
3805:
3801:
3795:
3794:
3790:
3780:
3778:
3770:
3769:
3765:
3760:
3755:
3754:
3745:
3741:
3736:
3648:Clifton Sprague
3642: (DE-1023)
3606:
3588:
3486:
3414:
3408:
3376:
3332:
3246:
3213:
3193:
3173:
3147:11.417; 126.600
3146:
3144:
3140:
3137:
3132:
3129:
3127:
3125:
3124:
3078:
3072:Mark 13 torpedo
3013:
2999:
2988:
2986:Japanese losses
2952:
2932:
2897:
2878:
2859:opened fire on
2815:
2766:
2739:
2710:
2669:
2609:
2558:
2540:explodes after
2531:
2489:
2471:
2440:
2424:
2404:
2371:
2315:
2234:
2226:
2167:
2120:
2112:
2078:
2055:
2003:
1996:
1976:
1897:
1842:
1776:
1731:
1647:
1627:
1593:
1528:
1516:
1509:
1478:
1462:
1438:
1415:
1367:
1328:Ernest E. Evans
1324:
1268:
1227:torpedo bombers
1208:
1115:
1095:
896:
830:a Japanese bomb
805:Palawan Passage
746:
722:Ernest E. Evans
673:Clifton Sprague
604:
599:
590:Raid on Taihoku
388:
383:
381:
379:
345:
321:
281:
245:
225:escort carriers
148:Clifton Sprague
128:
126:
114:
112:
90:
51:
17:
12:
11:
5:
6327:
6317:
6316:
6311:
6306:
6301:
6296:
6291:
6286:
6281:
6276:
6262:
6261:
6255:
6250:
6245:
6237:
6236:External links
6234:
6233:
6232:
6222:
6210:
6207:
6205:
6204:
6192:
6170:
6154:
6125:
6123:
6120:
6118:
6117:
6112:978-0312681890
6111:
6094:
6088:
6075:
6069:
6056:
6047:
6041:
6028:
6019:
6013:
6000:
5983:
5970:
5953:
5947:
5934:
5928:
5915:
5909:
5896:
5879:
5873:
5859:
5857:
5854:
5852:
5851:
5845:
5821:
5801:
5788:
5764:
5736:
5730:
5717:
5711:
5692:
5669:
5664:978-0982239032
5663:
5649:
5647:
5644:
5641:
5640:
5614:
5602:
5574:
5518:
5496:
5484:
5456:
5454:, p. 330.
5444:
5442:, p. 194.
5432:
5430:, p. 193.
5420:
5418:, p. 378.
5408:
5382:
5358:
5328:
5298:
5282:
5267:
5245:
5233:
5211:
5199:
5187:
5152:
5145:
5124:
5098:
5079:
5057:
5041:
5039:, p. 184.
5029:
5004:
4979:
4937:
4917:
4891:
4889:, p. 159.
4879:
4867:
4865:, p. 153.
4855:
4853:, p. 131.
4843:
4841:, p. 110.
4831:
4829:, p. 175.
4819:
4807:
4781:
4759:
4726:
4714:
4688:
4676:
4664:
4662:, p. 111.
4652:
4645:
4627:
4625:, p. 109.
4615:
4613:, p. 229.
4603:
4591:
4589:, p. 259.
4579:
4567:
4527:
4500:
4498:, p. 332.
4488:
4476:
4474:, p. 286.
4464:
4442:
4430:
4394:
4382:
4355:
4353:, p. 142.
4343:
4341:, p. 256.
4331:
4329:, p. 169.
4316:
4314:, p. 124.
4304:
4266:
4254:
4232:
4220:
4205:
4193:
4191:, p. 258.
4181:
4144:
4123:
4084:
4069:
4057:
4045:
4033:
4021:
4002:
3990:
3971:
3959:
3947:
3935:
3923:
3897:
3885:
3873:
3861:
3849:
3847:, p. 406.
3837:
3824:britannica.com
3811:
3799:
3788:
3762:
3761:
3759:
3756:
3753:
3752:
3738:
3737:
3735:
3732:
3682: (FFG-58)
3674: (DD-821)
3666: (DDG-13)
3658: (FFG-52)
3650: (FFG-16)
3634: (FFG-25)
3605:
3602:
3587:
3584:
3485:
3482:
3406:
3375:
3372:
3331:
3328:
3288:John S. McCain
3245:
3242:
3212:
3209:
2987:
2984:
2814:
2808:
2765:
2759:
2709:
2703:
2608:
2602:
2578:Lt. Yukio Seki
2530:
2524:
2488:
2482:
2423:
2417:
2403:
2400:
2370:
2367:
2166:
2160:
2088:Moments after
1975:
1969:
1965:John C. Butler
1956:John C. Butler
1935: (FFG-25)
1928: (FFG-58)
1921: (FFG-52)
1908:was awarded a
1903:Gunner's Mate
1838:did not share
1753: (DE-413)
1730:
1724:
1710:Medal of Honor
1323:
1317:
1300:John C. Butler
1267:
1264:
1220:fighter planes
1213:generate smoke
1207:
1204:
1151:light cruisers
1147:heavy cruisers
1114:
1111:
1094:
1091:
1065:John C. Butler
895:
892:
809:Palawan Island
786:Kiyohide Shima
762:landing forces
754:JisaburÅ Ozawa
745:
742:
730:Medal of Honor
669:escort carrier
620:Philippine Sea
601:
600:
598:
597:
592:
587:
582:
577:
572:
565:
560:
552:
541:
540:
533:
526:
513:
512:
507:
502:
497:
492:
487:
482:
475:
468:
461:
456:
451:
444:
429:
428:
421:
416:
411:
406:
393:
390:
389:
378:
377:
370:
363:
355:
347:
346:
344:
343:
340:
337:
334:
331:
328:
324:
322:
320:
319:
316:
313:
310:
307:
304:
301:
298:
295:
291:
288:
287:
283:
282:
280:
279:
270:
267:
265:light cruisers
261:
259:heavy cruisers
255:
248:
246:
244:
243:
240:
234:
228:
227:(Taffy 3)
220:
217:
216:
212:
211:
210:
209:
208:
207:
196:Combined Fleet
192:
191:
190:
189:
188:
187:
186:
183:
180:
161:
160:
159:Units involved
156:
155:
150:
144:
143:
139:
138:
123:
109:
108:
104:
103:
100:
99:
96:
92:
91:
85:
83:
79:
78:
75:
67:
66:
54:escort carrier
43:
42:
41:(World War II)
26:
25:
15:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
6326:
6315:
6312:
6310:
6307:
6305:
6302:
6300:
6297:
6295:
6292:
6290:
6287:
6285:
6282:
6280:
6277:
6275:
6272:
6271:
6269:
6259:
6256:
6254:
6251:
6249:
6246:
6243:
6240:
6239:
6230:
6226:
6223:
6220:
6216:
6213:
6212:
6201:
6197:
6193:
6180:
6175:
6171:
6159:
6155:
6151:
6140:
6136:
6132:
6127:
6126:
6114:
6108:
6103:
6102:
6095:
6091:
6085:
6081:
6076:
6072:
6070:0-253-34528-6
6066:
6062:
6057:
6053:
6048:
6044:
6042:0-87021-311-3
6038:
6034:
6029:
6025:
6020:
6016:
6014:1-58574-643-6
6010:
6006:
6001:
5997:
5993:
5989:
5984:
5973:
5971:0-87021-097-1
5967:
5962:
5961:
5954:
5950:
5948:0-8032-1708-0
5944:
5940:
5935:
5931:
5929:0-8159-5302-X
5925:
5921:
5916:
5912:
5910:1-55750-243-9
5906:
5902:
5897:
5893:
5889:
5885:
5880:
5876:
5874:0-307-26365-7
5870:
5866:
5861:
5860:
5848:
5846:0-7432-5221-7
5842:
5838:
5833:
5832:
5826:
5822:
5811:
5807:
5802:
5791:
5789:0-87021-146-3
5785:
5781:
5776:
5775:
5769:
5768:Potter, E. B.
5765:
5758:September 13,
5753:
5748:
5747:
5741:
5737:
5733:
5727:
5723:
5718:
5714:
5712:0-553-80257-7
5708:
5704:
5702:
5697:
5693:
5681:
5676:
5670:
5666:
5660:
5656:
5651:
5650:
5628:
5624:
5618:
5611:
5606:
5590:
5589:
5584:
5578:
5572:
5567:
5561:
5553:
5546:
5542:
5538:
5531:
5530:
5522:
5506:
5500:
5493:
5488:
5472:
5471:
5466:
5460:
5453:
5448:
5441:
5436:
5429:
5424:
5417:
5412:
5396:
5392:
5386:
5378:
5377:
5372:
5368:
5362:
5343:
5341:
5332:
5316:
5312:
5308:
5302:
5295:
5291:
5286:
5278:
5274:
5270:
5268:9780739309087
5264:
5260:
5256:
5249:
5242:
5237:
5222:. bosamar.com
5221:
5215:
5208:
5203:
5196:
5191:
5176:
5172:
5168:
5167:
5162:
5156:
5148:
5146:0-375-50191-6
5142:
5138:
5134:
5128:
5112:
5108:
5102:
5094:
5090:
5083:
5067:
5061:
5052:
5045:
5038:
5037:Lundgren 2014
5033:
5018:
5014:
5008:
4993:
4989:
4983:
4967:
4963:
4959:
4955:
4951:
4949:
4941:
4935:
4934:0-8094-3304-4
4931:
4927:
4921:
4905:
4901:
4895:
4888:
4887:Lundgren 2014
4883:
4876:
4871:
4864:
4863:Lundgren 2014
4859:
4852:
4851:Lundgren 2014
4847:
4840:
4839:Lundgren 2014
4835:
4828:
4827:Lundgren 2014
4823:
4816:
4815:Lundgren 2014
4811:
4795:
4793:
4785:
4770:. Bosamar.com
4769:
4763:
4752:September 15,
4747:
4743:
4739:
4733:
4731:
4723:
4722:Lundgren 2014
4718:
4702:
4698:
4692:
4685:
4684:Lundgren 2014
4680:
4673:
4668:
4661:
4660:Lundgren 2014
4656:
4648:
4646:1-55750-442-3
4642:
4638:
4631:
4624:
4623:Lundgren 2014
4619:
4612:
4607:
4601:, p. 80.
4600:
4599:Lundgren 2014
4595:
4588:
4583:
4576:
4571:
4552:
4546:
4544:
4542:
4540:
4538:
4536:
4534:
4532:
4515:
4509:
4507:
4505:
4497:
4492:
4485:
4480:
4473:
4468:
4452:
4446:
4439:
4434:
4419:
4415:
4411:
4410:
4405:
4398:
4391:
4386:
4370:
4366:
4359:
4352:
4351:Lundgren 2014
4347:
4340:
4335:
4328:
4327:Lundgren 2014
4323:
4321:
4313:
4312:Lundgren 2014
4308:
4289:
4283:
4281:
4279:
4277:
4275:
4273:
4271:
4264:, p. 74.
4263:
4262:Lundgren 2014
4258:
4242:
4236:
4230:, p. 78.
4229:
4228:Lundgren 2014
4224:
4218:, p. 70.
4217:
4216:Lundgren 2014
4212:
4210:
4203:, p. 81.
4202:
4201:Lundgren 2014
4197:
4190:
4185:
4169:
4163:
4161:
4159:
4157:
4155:
4153:
4151:
4149:
4141:
4136:
4134:
4132:
4130:
4128:
4112:
4108:
4104:
4103:
4098:
4091:
4089:
4081:
4076:
4074:
4067:, p. 59.
4066:
4065:Lundgren 2014
4061:
4055:, p. 20.
4054:
4053:Lundgren 2014
4049:
4043:, p. 86.
4042:
4041:Lundgren 2014
4037:
4030:
4029:Lundgren 2014
4025:
4017:
4013:
4006:
3999:
3994:
3984:
3980:
3975:
3969:, p. 15.
3968:
3967:Lundgren 2014
3963:
3956:
3951:
3944:
3939:
3932:
3927:
3911:
3907:
3901:
3894:
3889:
3882:
3877:
3870:
3865:
3858:
3853:
3846:
3841:
3825:
3821:
3815:
3808:
3803:
3792:
3781:September 14,
3777:
3773:
3767:
3763:
3749:
3743:
3739:
3731:
3729:
3725:
3724: (CV-41)
3723:
3716:
3714:
3710:
3706:
3703:, written by
3702:
3701:
3696:
3695:
3690:
3685:
3683:
3681:
3675:
3673:
3667:
3665:
3659:
3657:
3651:
3649:
3643:
3641:
3635:
3633:
3623:
3619:
3618: (CV-41)
3617:
3610:
3600:
3595:
3593:
3583:
3581:
3576:
3574:
3567:
3565:
3564:crossed the T
3558:
3554:
3550:
3546:
3544:
3539:
3537:
3533:
3529:
3523:
3519:
3514:
3509:
3506:
3504:
3500:
3490:
3481:
3479:
3475:
3471:
3467:
3462:
3459:
3454:
3452:
3448:
3444:
3440:
3436:
3432:
3428:
3424:
3420:
3412:
3405:
3400:
3396:
3393:
3388:
3386:
3380:
3370:
3368:
3361:
3358:
3354:
3353:shark attacks
3350:
3346:
3342:
3338:
3327:
3323:
3319:
3317:
3316:
3311:
3310:
3305:
3304:
3299:
3294:
3291:
3289:
3284:
3282:
3277:
3275:
3271:
3267:
3262:
3259:
3256:
3253:
3251:
3241:
3237:
3233:
3231:
3227:
3223:
3218:
3208:
3206:
3205:
3200:
3192:
3188:
3187:
3181:
3179:
3172:
3168:
3163:
3161:
3157:
3151:
3122:
3118:
3117:
3112:
3108:
3104:
3103:
3098:
3097:
3091:
3090:
3084:
3077:
3073:
3069:
3068:
3062:
3058:
3054:
3050:
3046:
3042:
3041:
3032:
3031:
3025:
3021:
3019:
3012:
3008:
3006:
2998:
2994:
2993:
2980:
2979:
2974:
2973:
2968:
2964:
2960:
2958:
2951:
2947:
2943:
2938:
2931:
2927:
2923:
2919:
2915:
2911:
2907:
2903:
2896:
2892:
2888:
2884:
2877:
2872:
2870:
2866:
2862:
2858:
2854:
2850:
2846:
2842:
2838:
2834:
2830:
2826:
2821:
2820:
2813:
2807:
2805:
2801:
2797:
2793:
2790:attacks, the
2789:
2785:
2781:
2780:
2775:
2771:
2764:
2755:
2751:
2747:
2743:
2738:
2734:
2730:
2726:
2721:
2720:
2715:
2708:
2702:
2700:
2695:
2691:
2687:
2683:
2678:
2676:
2668:
2664:
2659:
2657:
2653:
2649:
2645:
2639:
2637:
2632:
2628:
2624:
2619:
2616:
2615:
2607:
2601:
2599:
2595:
2591:
2587:
2583:
2579:
2575:
2571:
2569:
2564:
2557:
2553:
2552:
2543:
2539:
2535:
2529:
2523:
2521:
2517:
2512:
2508:
2504:
2500:
2496:
2495:
2487:
2481:
2479:
2478:
2470:
2465:
2463:
2459:
2455:
2451:
2446:
2439:
2435:
2434:
2429:
2422:
2416:
2414:
2409:
2399:
2395:
2391:
2384:
2380:
2375:
2366:
2364:
2359:
2355:
2352:
2348:
2343:
2341:
2337:
2333:
2329:
2325:
2320:
2314:
2310:
2306:
2302:
2298:
2294:
2290:
2286:
2282:
2278:
2273:
2271:
2267:
2263:
2257:
2255:
2251:
2247:
2243:
2238:
2233:
2225:
2221:
2218:asserts that
2217:
2213:
2209:
2204:
2202:
2197:
2193:
2188:
2186:
2182:
2177:
2173:
2172:
2165:
2159:
2156:
2151:
2147:
2145:
2141:
2135:
2132:
2128:
2126:
2119:
2111:
2107:
2103:
2098:
2095:
2091:
2086:
2084:
2077:
2073:
2069:
2065:
2060:
2054:
2049:
2047:
2043:
2039:
2035:
2031:
2026:
2024:
2020:
2016:
2012:
2007:
2002:
1995:
1991:
1987:
1983:
1982:
1974:
1968:
1966:
1962:
1958:
1957:
1952:
1951:
1946:
1945:
1938:
1936:
1934:
1929:
1927:
1922:
1920:
1915:
1911:
1906:
1901:
1896:
1892:
1888:
1884:
1880:
1876:
1872:
1868:
1863:
1861:
1857:
1853:
1849:
1841:
1837:
1833:
1829:
1825:
1821:
1817:
1813:
1809:
1805:
1801:
1796:
1794:
1790:
1786:
1782:
1775:
1770:
1765:
1763:
1759:
1754:
1752:
1741:
1740:
1735:
1729:
1723:
1721:
1717:
1716:
1711:
1707:
1702:
1700:
1696:
1691:
1687:
1685:
1681:
1677:
1673:
1669:
1665:
1661:
1657:
1652:
1646:
1642:
1637:
1633:
1626:
1622:
1618:
1614:
1609:
1607:
1603:
1599:
1592:
1588:
1584:
1580:
1576:
1572:
1567:
1565:
1561:
1557:
1553:
1549:
1545:
1541:
1536:
1534:
1527:
1522:
1515:
1508:
1503:
1498:
1496:
1492:
1488:
1484:
1477:
1473:
1469:
1461:
1457:
1453:
1448:
1443:
1437:
1433:
1429:
1425:
1421:
1414:
1410:
1406:
1402:
1398:
1394:
1390:
1388:
1384:
1380:
1376:
1371:
1366:
1362:
1358:
1353:
1351:
1347:
1343:
1339:
1335:
1334:
1329:
1322:
1316:
1314:
1313:
1306:
1303:
1301:
1295:
1291:
1289:
1284:
1282:
1272:
1263:
1261:
1257:
1252:
1248:
1242:
1240:
1236:
1232:
1228:
1225:
1221:
1218:
1214:
1203:
1199:
1197:
1193:
1189:
1185:
1181:
1176:
1172:
1168:
1162:
1159:
1154:
1152:
1148:
1144:
1140:
1139:meatball flag
1136:
1132:
1128:
1124:
1120:
1110:
1108:
1099:
1090:
1087:
1083:
1079:
1078:
1073:
1072:
1067:
1066:
1061:
1060:
1055:
1054:
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674:
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659:
657:
653:
652:Seventh Fleet
649:
645:
641:
637:
633:
629:
625:
621:
617:
614:, one of the
613:
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448:Lingayen Gulf
445:
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269:11 destroyers
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172:Task Force 77
170:
169:
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166:Seventh Fleet
163:
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121:United States
111:
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72:
68:
64:
60:
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55:
49:
44:
40:
36:
32:
27:
22:
19:
6228:
6224:
6218:
6214:
6184:. Retrieved
6179:the original
6162:. Retrieved
6148:– via
6142:. Retrieved
6100:
6079:
6060:
6051:
6032:
6004:
5987:
5977:September 2,
5975:. Retrieved
5959:
5938:
5919:
5900:
5883:
5864:
5830:
5825:Thomas, Evan
5813:. Retrieved
5795:September 2,
5793:. Retrieved
5773:
5756:. Retrieved
5745:
5721:
5699:
5684:. Retrieved
5679:
5654:
5631:. Retrieved
5627:the original
5617:
5605:
5593:. Retrieved
5586:
5577:
5528:
5521:
5511:September 2,
5509:. Retrieved
5499:
5492:Morison 1958
5487:
5477:September 2,
5475:. Retrieved
5468:
5459:
5452:Morison 1958
5447:
5440:Morison 1958
5435:
5428:Morison 1958
5423:
5411:
5399:. Retrieved
5394:
5385:
5376:The Guardian
5374:
5361:
5349:. Retrieved
5339:
5331:
5319:. Retrieved
5310:
5301:
5285:
5258:
5254:
5248:
5236:
5224:. Retrieved
5214:
5202:
5194:
5190:
5178:. Retrieved
5164:
5155:
5136:
5133:McCain, John
5127:
5115:. Retrieved
5111:the original
5101:
5092:
5082:
5070:. Retrieved
5060:
5050:
5044:
5032:
5022:February 14,
5020:. Retrieved
5016:
5007:
4997:February 14,
4995:. Retrieved
4991:
4982:
4970:. Retrieved
4966:the original
4953:
4947:
4940:
4925:
4920:
4908:. Retrieved
4894:
4882:
4874:
4870:
4858:
4846:
4834:
4822:
4810:
4798:. Retrieved
4791:
4784:
4772:. Retrieved
4762:
4750:. Retrieved
4746:the original
4741:
4717:
4705:. Retrieved
4701:the original
4691:
4679:
4667:
4655:
4636:
4630:
4618:
4606:
4594:
4587:Morison 1958
4582:
4570:
4558:. Retrieved
4518:. Retrieved
4491:
4479:
4467:
4455:. Retrieved
4445:
4433:
4421:. Retrieved
4407:
4397:
4385:
4373:. Retrieved
4368:
4358:
4346:
4334:
4307:
4295:. Retrieved
4257:
4245:. Retrieved
4235:
4223:
4196:
4189:Morison 1958
4184:
4172:. Retrieved
4114:. Retrieved
4100:
4060:
4048:
4036:
4024:
4015:
4005:
3993:
3982:
3974:
3962:
3950:
3938:
3926:
3914:. Retrieved
3909:
3900:
3888:
3876:
3864:
3852:
3840:
3828:. Retrieved
3823:
3814:
3802:
3791:
3779:. Retrieved
3775:
3772:"H-Gram 036"
3766:
3747:
3742:
3727:
3721:
3717:
3708:
3698:
3692:
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3686:
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3029:
3017:
3010:
3009:
3004:
2996:
2991:
2989:
2977:
2971:
2966:
2956:
2949:
2946:White Plains
2945:
2941:
2936:
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2925:
2921:
2913:
2909:
2905:
2901:
2894:
2890:
2886:
2875:
2873:
2868:
2864:
2860:
2856:
2852:
2848:
2844:
2840:
2836:
2833:White Plains
2832:
2829:White Plains
2828:
2824:
2818:
2816:
2811:
2803:
2799:
2795:
2791:
2787:
2783:
2778:
2773:
2769:
2768:Targeted by
2767:
2762:
2754:White Plains
2753:
2749:
2736:
2732:
2728:
2724:
2718:
2714:White Plains
2713:
2711:
2706:
2693:
2689:
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2674:
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2655:
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2527:
2519:
2515:
2510:
2506:
2502:
2498:
2493:
2490:
2485:
2476:
2469:White Plains
2468:
2466:
2462:White Plains
2461:
2458:White Plains
2457:
2453:
2449:
2445:White Plains
2444:
2437:
2433:White Plains
2432:
2427:
2425:
2421:White Plains
2420:
2412:
2407:
2405:
2396:
2392:
2388:
2382:
2362:
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2356:
2350:
2346:
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2207:
2205:
2200:
2195:
2191:
2189:
2184:
2180:
2175:
2170:
2168:
2163:
2154:
2149:
2148:
2143:
2139:
2136:
2130:
2129:
2124:
2117:
2109:
2105:
2101:
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2087:
2082:
2075:
2071:
2067:
2063:
2061:
2052:
2050:
2045:
2041:
2037:
2033:
2027:
2022:
2018:
2014:
2010:
2008:
2000:
1993:
1985:
1980:
1977:
1972:
1964:
1960:
1955:
1949:
1943:
1939:
1932:
1925:
1918:
1905:Paul H. Carr
1902:
1894:
1890:
1886:
1882:
1878:
1874:
1870:
1866:
1864:
1859:
1855:
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1703:
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1659:
1655:
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1644:
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1631:
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1605:
1601:
1597:
1590:
1586:
1582:
1578:
1574:
1570:
1568:
1563:
1559:
1555:
1554:. Evans had
1551:
1547:
1543:
1539:
1537:
1532:
1525:
1520:
1513:
1506:
1501:
1499:
1494:
1490:
1486:
1482:
1475:
1471:
1467:
1459:
1455:
1451:
1446:
1444:
1435:
1431:
1427:
1423:
1419:
1412:
1408:
1404:
1400:
1396:
1392:
1391:
1386:
1382:
1378:
1374:
1372:
1364:
1360:
1356:
1354:
1349:
1341:
1337:
1332:
1325:
1320:
1311:
1307:
1299:
1296:
1292:
1280:
1277:
1259:
1255:
1250:
1246:
1243:
1217:FM-2 Wildcat
1209:
1200:
1195:
1191:
1187:
1183:
1180:fall of shot
1175:gun director
1166:
1163:
1155:
1142:
1135:pagoda masts
1130:
1118:
1116:
1104:
1082:FM-2 Wildcat
1076:
1070:
1064:
1058:
1052:
1046:
1040:
1034:
1028:
1022:
1017:White Plains
1016:
1010:
1004:
1001:
994:
982:
976:
970:
964:
958:
952:
946:
940:
934:
928:
922:
916:
910:
904:
899:
897:
885:
880:
876:
872:
868:
864:
860:
856:
852:
846:
834:
828:was sunk by
824:
819:
817:
812:
799:
793:
790:
780:
774:
766:Center Force
748:The overall
747:
725:
724:of the sunk
720:and Captain
706:
698:
692:
686:
679:
663:
660:
636:Takeo Kurita
607:
605:
580:Convoy Hi-81
567:
556:Shin'yÅ Maru
555:
550:Convoy Hi-71
543:
542:
535:
528:
515:
514:
510:Bessang Pass
477:
470:
463:
446:
439:
431:
430:
423:
401:
394:
273:
194:
185:Taffy 3
182:Taffy 2
179:Taffy 1
164:
153:Takeo Kurita
107:Belligerents
57:
29:Part of the
18:
6314:Last stands
5646:Works cited
5591:. U.S. Navy
5560:cite thesis
5416:Potter 1985
5072:October 21,
4792:Gambier Bay
3998:Roblin 2019
3979:Thomas 2006
3728:Gambier Bay
3447:Guadalcanal
3419:Gambier Bay
3404:experience.
3337:Gambier Bay
3145: /
3096:Ommaney Bay
3061:TBM Avenger
3045:Gambier Bay
2895:Gambier Bay
2887:Gambier Bay
2810:Battleship
2804:Fanshaw Bay
2792:Fanshaw Bay
2784:Gambier Bay
2779:Fanshaw Bay
2763:Fanshaw Bay
2737:Fanshaw Bay
2727:) attacked
2694:Kalinin Bay
2690:Kalinin Bay
2686:Fanshaw Bay
2675:Kalinin Bay
2667:Kalinin Bay
2648:Kalinin Bay
2644:Kalinin Bay
2631:Kalinin Bay
2614:Kalinin Bay
2606:Kalinin Bay
2520:Gambier Bay
2516:Gambier Bay
2507:Gambier Bay
2503:Gambier Bay
2494:Gambier Bay
2486:Gambier Bay
2408:Kalinin Bay
2293:Gambier Bay
2281:Gambier Bay
2266:Fanshaw Bay
1910:Silver Star
1668:Gambier Bay
1602:Gambier Bay
1346:flank speed
1312:Gambier Bay
1224:TBM Avenger
1035:Gambier Bay
1023:Kalinin Bay
1005:Fanshaw Bay
995:Gambier Bay
879:(sister to
738:last stands
648:Third Fleet
454:Kirang Pass
318:913 wounded
253:battleships
58:Gambier Bay
39:Pacific War
6268:Categories
5705:. Bantam.
5686:August 31,
5595:August 24,
5294:Chapter 14
4560:August 31,
4520:August 31,
4457:August 30,
4423:August 30,
4297:August 31,
4174:August 31,
4140:Hagen 1945
4116:August 30,
3916:August 24,
3758:References
3536:New Jersey
3532:New Jersey
3298:Helldivers
3111:Navy Cross
3102:Natoma Bay
3089:Kitkun Bay
3067:Manila Bay
2918:Lieutenant
2800:Kitkun Bay
2750:Kitkun Bay
2719:Kitkun Bay
2707:Kitkun Bay
2582:Shikishima
2574:Kitkun Bay
2190:At 07:50,
1912:, and the
1798:By 08:10,
1029:Kitkun Bay
865:Enterprise
744:Background
656:Sixth Army
640:Leyte Gulf
569:Leyte Gulf
479:Corregidor
459:Cabanatuan
232:destroyers
6186:March 17,
6164:March 17,
6144:March 17,
6052:Collier's
5892:219730560
5633:March 18,
5539:thesis).
5277:870704396
5180:March 17,
5117:March 18,
4910:March 18,
4875:Dogfights
4774:March 18,
4707:March 18,
3720:USS
3694:Dogfights
3678:USS
3670:USS
3662:USS
3654:USS
3646:USS
3638:USS
3630:USS
3622:San Diego
3614:USS
3374:Aftermath
3094:USS
3087:USS
3065:USS
2981:off Samar
2874:At 08:23
2381:from USS
1942:USS
1917:USS
1865:However,
1749:USS
1617:Terutsuki
1500:However,
1487:Kishinami
1297:The four
983:Shimakaze
968:; and 11
861:Lexington
825:Princeton
710:Coral Sea
697:launched
685:USS
683:, led by
678:USS
575:Ormoc Bay
495:Los Baños
425:Cebu City
202:2nd Fleet
6139:66-60007
5827:(2006).
5742:(1958).
5545:Archived
5537:M.M.A.S.
5401:June 22,
5395:BBC News
5351:April 1,
5340:Johnston
5321:April 5,
5315:Archived
5313:. 2020.
5290:Cox 2010
4972:March 7,
4904:Archived
4800:June 13,
4016:NavWeaps
3830:June 11,
3672:Johnston
3632:Copeland
3474:Johnston
3435:Johnston
3427:kamikaze
3407:â
3392:kamikaze
3345:Johnston
3133:126°36â²E
3057:Heermann
3049:Heermann
3037:Cruiser
3018:Johnston
2845:Johnston
2796:kamikaze
2788:kamikaze
2733:kamikaze
2682:kamikaze
2590:kamikaze
2542:kamikaze
2511:Johnston
2415:planes.
2413:kamikaze
2363:Heermann
2351:Heermann
2332:Heermann
2313:Heermann
2297:Heermann
2287:engaged
2285:Heermann
2277:Heermann
2270:Johnston
2262:Heermann
2254:Heermann
2246:Heermann
2242:Heermann
2224:Heermann
2201:Heermann
2192:Heermann
2176:Heermann
2171:Heermann
2164:Heermann
2019:Heermann
1933:Copeland
1860:Heermann
1854:engaged
1762:Heermann
1758:Heermann
1720:Johnston
1715:Yukikaze
1706:Johnston
1699:Johnston
1695:Johnston
1690:Johnston
1684:Johnston
1656:Johnston
1632:Johnston
1625:Johnston
1598:Johnston
1587:Johnston
1583:Johnston
1571:Johnston
1564:Johnston
1556:Johnston
1548:Johnston
1544:Heermann
1540:Johnston
1526:Johnston
1521:Johnston
1514:Johnston
1507:Johnston
1502:Johnston
1491:Johnston
1476:Johnston
1447:Johnston
1436:Johnston
1420:Johnston
1397:Johnston
1393:Johnston
1383:Heermann
1361:Johnston
1350:Johnston
1342:Johnston
1338:Johnston
1333:Johnston
1321:Johnston
1281:Fletcher
1178:its own
1053:Johnston
1047:Heermann
869:Franklin
853:Intrepid
841:PT boats
750:Japanese
726:Johnston
700:kamikaze
687:Johnston
558:incident
524:Bukidnon
517:Mindanao
505:Wawa Dam
275:kamikaze
215:Strength
86:East of
82:Location
6122:Reports
5996:1261836
5815:May 22,
5571:Alt URL
5226:May 17,
4768:"CVE73"
4375:May 27,
4247:June 9,
3676:. When
3501:in the
3349:Roberts
3309:Hancock
3230:Chikuma
3204:Okinami
3171:Chikuma
3156:Chikuma
3130:11°25â²N
3121:Chikuma
3107:Chikuma
3083:Chikuma
3076:Chikuma
3053:Chikuma
3040:Chikuma
3030:Chikuma
2978:Chikuma
2849:Raymond
2699:counter
2544:strike.
2499:Chikuma
2340:Chikuma
2336:Roberts
2328:Chikuma
2309:Chikuma
2289:Chikuma
1944:Raymond
1895:Roberts
1887:Roberts
1871:Roberts
1867:Chikuma
1856:Chikuma
1852:Roberts
1848:Roberts
1840:Chikuma
1836:Roberts
1832:Roberts
1828:Roberts
1824:Chikuma
1820:Roberts
1816:Chikuma
1812:Chikuma
1808:Roberts
1804:Chikuma
1800:Roberts
1789:Roberts
1781:Roberts
1774:Roberts
1769:Roberts
1742:at sea.
1660:Heerman
1474:struck
1071:Raymond
965:Noshiro
947:Chikuma
877:Musashi
847:At the
835:In the
820:Musashi
781:Musashi
563:Formosa
500:Palawan
441:Mindoro
396:Visayas
278:attack)
206:Force A
63:cruiser
6137:
6109:
6086:
6067:
6039:
6011:
5994:
5968:
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5907:
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5728:
5709:
5661:
5397:. 2022
5275:
5265:
5143:
4948:Yamato
4932:
4643:
3983:Yamato
3748:Nowaki
3722:Midway
3689:Yamato
3668:, and
3616:Midway
3604:Legacy
3470:ChÅkai
3458:Yamato
3423:St. Lo
3347:, and
3312:, and
3303:Hornet
3228:, and
3226:Kumano
3222:ChÅkai
3217:Yamato
3199:Suzuya
3191:Suzuya
3186:Suzuya
3178:Nowaki
3167:Nowaki
3160:Nowaki
3116:Nowaki
3011:Kumano
3005:Chokai
2997:ChÅkai
2992:Haguro
2967:Yamato
2950:Yamato
2942:Yamato
2937:Yamato
2930:Yamato
2926:Yamato
2922:Yamato
2914:Yamato
2910:Yamato
2902:Yamato
2876:Yamato
2869:Yamato
2865:Haruna
2857:Yamato
2841:Yamato
2837:Yamato
2825:Yamato
2819:Yamato
2812:Yamato
2774:Haruna
2729:Yamato
2725:St. Lo
2663:St. Lo
2656:Haguro
2627:Haguro
2598:St. Lo
2594:St. Lo
2570:-class
2563:St. Lo
2556:St. Lo
2551:St. Lo
2538:St. Lo
2528:St. Lo
2477:ChÅkai
2454:Nagato
2450:Yamato
2438:Yamato
2428:Yamato
2383:Santee
2305:Haruna
2250:Nagato
2220:Yamato
2212:Haruna
2208:Haruna
2196:Haguro
2125:Yamato
2106:Haruna
2102:Yamato
2076:Haguro
2068:Haguro
2042:Haguro
1994:Yamato
1961:Dennis
1953:, and
1950:Dennis
1883:Haruna
1881:, and
1879:Nagato
1875:Yamato
1793:ChÅkai
1785:ChÅkai
1645:Yahagi
1641:Yahagi
1636:Yahagi
1613:Yahagi
1606:Haguro
1591:Haruna
1579:Haruna
1533:Haruna
1495:Yamato
1483:Yamato
1472:Yamato
1468:Yamato
1432:Kumano
1428:Suzuya
1401:Kumano
1365:Kumano
1357:Kumano
1302:-class
1283:-class
1256:Yahagi
1196:Yamato
1188:Haruna
1184:Nagato
1167:Yamato
1149:, two
1143:Yamato
1131:St. Lo
1123:Ensign
1119:St. Lo
1093:Battle
1074:, and
1059:Dennis
1011:St. Lo
980:- and
977:YÅ«gumo
971:KagerÅ
962:, and
959:Yahagi
941:Suzuya
935:Kumano
929:Haguro
923:ChÅkai
917:Haruna
914:, and
905:Nagato
900:Yamato
894:Forces
881:Yamato
867:, and
813:Yamato
800:Darter
775:Yamato
714:Midway
664:Yamato
485:Baguio
472:Manila
465:Bataan
419:Negros
414:Simara
132:
118:
95:Result
5548:(PDF)
5533:(PDF)
5345:(PDF)
4790:"USS
4554:(PDF)
4291:(PDF)
3986:'
3734:Notes
3640:Evans
3425:, to
3194:'
3174:'
3079:'
3014:'
3000:'
2953:'
2933:'
2898:'
2891:KongÅ
2879:'
2770:KongÅ
2740:'
2670:'
2636:Nachi
2559:'
2472:'
2452:(and
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2324:VC-10
2316:'
2301:KongÅ
2235:'
2227:'
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2113:'
2079:'
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2038:KongÅ
2004:'
1997:'
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1891:KongÅ
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1575:KongÅ
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1460:KongÅ
1456:KongÅ
1452:KongÅ
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1413:KongÅ
1409:KongÅ
1405:KongÅ
1368:'
1260:KongÅ
1251:KongÅ
1247:KongÅ
1192:KongÅ
1129:from
1107:Samar
911:KongÅ
873:Cabot
857:Essex
695:Luzon
624:Samar
537:Davao
433:Luzon
409:Panay
403:Leyte
135:Japan
88:Samar
6188:2021
6166:2021
6146:2021
6135:LCCN
6107:ISBN
6084:ISBN
6065:ISBN
6037:ISBN
6009:ISBN
5992:OCLC
5979:2020
5966:ISBN
5943:ISBN
5924:ISBN
5905:ISBN
5888:OCLC
5869:ISBN
5841:ISBN
5817:2021
5797:2020
5784:ISBN
5760:2020
5726:ISBN
5707:ISBN
5688:2020
5659:ISBN
5635:2010
5597:2020
5566:link
5513:2020
5479:2020
5403:2022
5353:2021
5323:2021
5273:OCLC
5263:ISBN
5228:2012
5182:2021
5141:ISBN
5119:2010
5074:2017
5024:2023
5017:NHHC
4999:2023
4974:2009
4930:ISBN
4912:2010
4802:2024
4776:2010
4754:2021
4709:2010
4641:ISBN
4562:2020
4522:2020
4459:2024
4425:2024
4377:2021
4299:2020
4249:2012
4176:2020
4118:2024
3918:2020
3832:2023
3783:2021
3664:Hoel
3660:and
3656:Carr
3530:and
3528:Iowa
3445:off
3433:and
3431:Hoel
3341:Hoel
3315:Wasp
3099:and
2972:Tone
2906:Hoel
2861:Hoel
2853:Hoel
2772:and
2761:USS
2705:USS
2654:and
2652:Tone
2625:and
2623:Tone
2604:USS
2586:Zero
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2526:USS
2484:USS
2419:USS
2347:Tone
2303:and
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2232:Hoel
2185:Hoel
2162:USS
2155:Hoel
2150:Hoel
2144:Hoel
2140:Tone
2131:Hoel
2118:Hoel
2110:Hoel
2094:Hoel
2090:Hoel
2083:Hoel
2072:Tone
2064:Hoel
2053:Hoel
2046:Hoel
2034:Hoel
2021:and
2015:Hoel
2011:Hoel
2001:Hoel
1990:CVEs
1986:Hoel
1981:Hoel
1973:Hoel
1971:USS
1930:and
1919:Carr
1810:and
1726:USS
1678:and
1676:Hoel
1672:Hoel
1670:and
1560:Tone
1552:Hoel
1542:and
1424:Hoel
1385:and
1379:Hoel
1375:Hoel
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1319:USS
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794:Dace
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622:off
606:The
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