Center squeeze - Knowledge

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expenditures for and against candidates. In this analysis, I found that negative spending increased significantly in Maine following the implementation of ranked-choice voting, casting doubt on the claim that RCV makes campaigns more civil. To provide more evidence, I also created a dataset of all Facebook advertisements that mentioned any congressional candidates for 2018, the first year that RCV was used in Maine. I then conducted a sentiment analysis to find each advertisement's sentiment (whether it was negative or not). I then used genetic matching to approximate an experiment to find the impact of RCV on civility. In doing so, I found that the 2018 campaign was even more negative than in paired districts around the country.

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directly to Palin voters. Imagine that she empathized with their position and identified issues they cared about that Palin and even Begich ignored. And let's say that as a consequence, Peltola got the first-choice votes of between 5,200 and 8,500 voters who would have otherwise ranked only Palin. What happens as a result? Palin would have gotten eliminated in the first round and Peltola would still not be able to beat Begich.

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views will rank the candidate in second place rather than in first place. Since ranked-choice voting counts only the number of first-choice votes (among the remaining candidates), the moderate candidate would be eliminated in the first round, leaving one of the extreme candidates to be declared the winner.

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However, ranked-choice voting makes it more difficult to elect moderate candidates when the electorate is polarized. For example, in a three-person race, the moderate candidate may be preferred to each of the more extreme candidates by a majority of voters. However, voters with far-left and far-right

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However, ranked-choice voting makes it more difficult to elect moderate candidates when the electorate is polarized. For example, in a three-person race, the moderate candidate may be preferred by a majority of voters to each of the more extreme candidates. However, voters with far-left and far-right

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The idea was that by opening up primaries to all voters, regardless of party, a flood of new centrist voters would arrive. That would give moderate candidates a route to victory .. Candidates did not represent voters any better after the reforms, taking positions just as polarized as they did before

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third place Candidate C is a centrist who is the second choice of Candidate A's left-wing supporters and Candidate B's right-wing supporters. ... In such a situation, Candidate C would prevail over both Candidates A ... and B ... in a one-on-one runoff election. Yet, Candidate C would not prevail

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It's a good thing for Peltola that she didn't attract more Palin voters—she'd have lost The strangeness continues. Peltola could have actually gotten more 1st choice votes in this election and caused herself to lose. How's that? Let's look. Imagine if Peltola reached across the aisle and spoke

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Voting systems that suffer from the center-squeeze effect incentivize candidates to avoid the political center, creating political polarization in the long run. As a result, rules like RCV can lead to extreme winners even if center-squeezes seem empirically rare, because the rules disincentivize

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Montroll was favored over Republican Kurt Wright 56% to 44% ... and over Progressive Bob Kiss 54% to 46% ... In other words, in voting terminology, Montroll was a 'beats-all winner,' also called a 'Condorcet winner' ... However, in the IRV election, Montroll came in third! ... voters preferred

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By eliminating the squeezing effect, Approval Voting would encourage the election of consensual candidates. The squeezing effect is typically observed in multiparty elections with a runoff. The runoff tends to prevent extremist candidates from winning, but a centrist candidate who would win any

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One of the main claims made by reformers about RCV is that it will make campaigns more civil, as campaigns will have the incentive to seek the second-place vote of supporters of different candidates. To study this claim, I first conducted a difference-in-differences analysis on independent

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Although the Democrat was the Condorcet winner (a majority of voters preferred him in all two way contests), he received the fewest first-place votes and so was eliminated ... 2009 mayoral election in Burlington, VT, which illustrates the key features of an upward monotonicity

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the 'squeeze effect' that tends to reduce Condorcet efficiency if the relative dispersion (RD) of candidates is low. This effect is particularly strong for the plurality, runoff, and Hare systems, for which the garnering of first-place votes in a large field is essential to

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third place C is a centrist who is the second choice of Candidate A's left-wing supporters and Candidate B's right-wing supporters. ... In such a situation, C would prevail over both Candidates A ... and B ... in a one-on-one runoff election. Yet, C would not prevail under

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The opposite situation—a bias toward "bland" or inoffensive candidates, and against polarizing ones—does not appear for any common rules. However, it can occur for bottom-heavy or negative voting methods that elect candidates with the least opposition, such as

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Over 64% of Burlington voters voted in favor of the IRV Charter amendment in March 2005, and it went into effect on May 12, 2005, when the governor signed the ratification bill, H.505, which had been passed by both the House and

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The election produced a winner opposed by a majority of voters, with a majority of voters ranking Begich above Peltola and Palin and more than half giving Peltola no support at all. The election was also notable as a

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Fiji's objective of ameliorating ethnic divisions by the adoption of AV was not successful. In elections in 1999 and 2001, moderate parties would have fared better under a proportional representation system

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neither the Citizens Redistricting Commission nor the top-two primary immediately halted the continuing partisan polarization of California's elected lawmakers or their drift away from the average voter

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of the voter distribution. As a result, while score voting does not always elect the candidate closest to the median voter, it often behaves like methods that do. Under most models of strategic voting,

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votes to lose). In this race, Peltola would have lost if she had received more support from Palin voters, and won as a result of 5,200 ballots that ranked her last (after Palin then Begich). However,

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Since our model is multi-dimensional, we can incorporate all criteria which we normally associate with a citizen's voting decision process — issues, style, partisan identification, and the like.

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were careful to note the results likely would have been the same under Alaska's previous primary system as well. This led several to recommend replacing the system with any one of several

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Instant Runoff Voting, however, achieves the most centripetal result (when it does) only by happenstance, not intrinsically, and fails to do so when the electorate is especially polarized

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a majority of voters liked the centrist candidate Montroll better than Kiss, and a majority of voters liked Montroll better than Wright ... yet Montroll was tossed in the first round.

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that repealed RCV by a vote of 52% to 48%, a 16-point shift from the 64% who had supported the 2005 ratification. The results of every possible one-on-one election are as follows:

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Ornstein, Joseph T.; Norman, Robert Z. (October 1, 2014). "Frequency of monotonicity failure under Instant Runoff Voting: estimates based on a spatial model of elections".

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Clelland, Jeanne N. (2023-02-28). "Ranked Choice Voting And the Center Squeeze in the Alaska 2022 Special Election: How Might Other Voting Methods Compare?". p. 6.

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Clelland, Jeanne N. (2023-02-28). "Ranked Choice Voting And the Center Squeeze in the Alaska 2022 Special Election: How Might Other Voting Methods Compare?". p. 6.

617: 1076:. However, in methods that strongly prioritize first preferences, these candidates are often eliminated early on because they aim for broad appeal rather than strong 3623: