31:
592:
to intelligently waive the limitations defense. In that case, however, the Court believed the
Magistrate Judge gave Day due notice and a fair opportunity to show why the limitation period should not yield dismissal of the petition, and there was nothing to suggest that the State "strategically" withheld the defense or chose to relinquish it. The record instead indicated that the miscalculation was "merely an inadvertent error."
591:
by the delayed focus on the limitation issue, and "determine whether the interests of justice would be better served" by addressing the merits or by dismissing the petition as time barred. The Court also stated that a district court would not have the discretion to disregard the choice of a defendant
374:
or procedural default. The order stated that those arguments would be waived if not addressed in the answer, but it did not expressly mention the statute of limitations. The answer of the State of
Florida erroneously asserted that Day's petition was timely filed after "352 days of untolled time" and
760:
was characterized by Scalia as "what appears to be the chief ground of its decision." Scalia argued that if there was truly no "dispositive difference" between the alternatives, "the natural conclusion would be that there is no compelling reason to disregard the Civil Rules. Legislatively enacted
537:
Day's argument was characterized by the Court as relying primarily on Habeas Rule 4, which requires district courts to "promptly examine" petitions and dismiss "if it plainly appears... that the petitioner is not entitled to relief." Day argued that this limited a court's ability to raise AEDPA's
529:
although the issue not had been raised at the district court level. There was similar precedent involving the non-retroactivity rule and procedural default. The Court noted that the statute of limitations is expressly grouped with those other defenses under the current version of Rule 5(b) of the
388:
why Day's petition should not be dismissed as untimely. Day made three arguments against dismissal. Firstly, Day argued that the court should not dismiss his complaint after it had been pending for nearly a year without any suggestion that it was untimely. Secondly, Day argued that he had 90 days
709:
statute would be contradicted or undermined by applying the forfeiture rule to the limitations period. "Quite the contrary, on its most natural reading, the statute calls for the forfeiture rule." AEDPA enacted the one-year limitation period "without further qualification." Given the "background
575:
was instructive in establishing that courts instead have the discretion in each case to decide "whether the administration of justice" would be better served by reaching the merits of the petition or dismissing it because of the statute of limitations, and a petition should not be deemed timely
665:
proceedings to the extent that those rules are not inconsistent with federal statutes or the Habeas Rules. Scalia stated that the Court did not identify any such inconsistency "because there is none." Scalia believed the forfeiture rule could not be inconsistent with traditional
476:
petitions and the perceived lack of difference between outright dismissal by the district court and dismissal after allowing the State to amend its answer to include the limitations defense, the Court did not consider the district court's dismissal of Day's petition to be an
761:
rules are surely entitled to more respect than this apparent presumption that, when nothing substantial hangs on the point, they do not apply as written." Ata minimum, Scalia believed it "a nontrivial value in itself" to observe "the formalities of our
765:" by requiring the State to amend its own pleading. Scalia also observed that in contrast to the "novel regime" adopted by the majority, there is already a well-developed body of law regarding whether a party should have leave to amend a pleading. "
658:(AEDPA) statute of limitations. Scalia asserted that it is instead "the Court's unwarranted expansion of the timeliness rule enacted by Congress that is inconsistent with the statute, the Habeas Rules, the Civil Rules, and traditional practice."
354:
petition until
December 3, 2002, when the First District Court of Appeals issued its mandate denying Day collateral relief. By then, Day had used 353 of his allotted 365 days and accordingly had until December 16, 2002 to file a federal
550:
if it is not asserted in its answer, or an amendment thereto, just as the State of
Florida failed to do. However, the Court believed that were it to accept Day's position, courts would rarely be positioned to raise AEDPA's time bar
740:
that they do not compel making a legislatively created, forfeitable time limitation nonforfeitable." Court precedent prior to AEDPA had furthermore affirmatively rejected that the traditionally broad discretionary powers of
729:
and finality that federal collateral review of state criminal proceedings necessarily implicates." None of the defenses involved a time limitation, and the one-year limit in AEDPA "is entirely a recent creature of
654:(FRCP), which required the forfeiture of affirmative defenses when they are not raised. Because that ordinary forfeiture rule would be entirely consistent with the Habeas Rules and statutes, it should apply to the
555:
because information essential to the time calculation is often absent until the State has filed, along with its answer, copies of documents from the state-court proceedings, as was the case in Day's proceedings.
576:
simply because a government attorney miscounted the days. The Court observed that the State could have simply amended its answer had the
Magistrate Judge informed it of its computation error rather than acting
629:
petition without an evaluation of its merits when we have already granted certiorari to address the issue on which the Court of
Appeals may have erred." He suggested that the lower court may still avoid a
412:
petition. In his objection to the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge, Day argued for the first time that the concession of timeliness by the state was dispositive because it was a
580:. "Recognizing that an amendment to the State's answer might have obviated this controversy," the Court wrote, "we see no dispositive difference between that route, and the one taken here."
302:(AEDPA). In a 5–4 decision, the Court ruled that if the government unintentionally failed to object to the filing of a petition after the AEDPA limitations period has expired, it is not an
621:, a case which would answer the question of whether Day's petition was actually barred by the statute of limitations. Stevens wrote, "It seems improvident to affirm a possibly erroneous
118:
155:
petition after the statute of limitations expired does not prevent a district court from dismissing the petition on its own initiative. Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
571:
proceedings that motivated AEDPA...counsel against an excessively rigid or formal approach to the affirmative defenses" such as the statute of limitations. The State argued that
995:
604:, though believing the case was rightly decided, dissented from the Court's decision to announce its judgment when a relevant case would be decided later in the term. Justice
845:, 510 U.S. 383 (1994), ruling that courts are allowed but are not required to decline to apply the non-retroactivity rule if the State does not raise it. The rule prevents a
350:
relief began to run on March 20, 2000. On March 9, 2001, Day filed a post-conviction petition under
Florida state procedure, which tolled the limitation period for filing a
534:
petition "must state whether any claim in the petition is barred by a failure to exhaust state remedies, a procedural bar, non-retroactivity, or a statute of limitations."
670:
practice because there was no applicable statute of limitations until AEDPA was enacted in 1996. It was also consistent with Habeas Rule 5(b), which requires the State's
448:
745:
courts would support the imposition of a time limitation. "There is, therefore, no support for the notion that the traditional equitable discretion that governed
803:
420:
126:
678:
petition is barred by the statute of limitations. Finally, as Day had argued, forfeiture is also consistent with Habeas Rule 4 because that rule provides for
934:
655:
617:
299:
134:
82:
515:
841:
776:
for a district court to override an affirmative waiver of the defense by the State, and that the Court's assertion to the contrary was "without relevant
710:
understanding" that failure to raise the defense of limitations constitutes waiver, "the statute implies that the usual forfeiture rule is applicable."
530:
Rules
Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts (simply known as the Habeas Rules), which provides that the State's answer to a
682:
screening and dismissal by the district courts only prior to the filing of the State's answer. Scalia believed that the Court's concern over whether
1000:
337:
587:
and an opportunity to be heard before a court acts on its own initiative. Courts must also ensure that the petitioner is not significantly
990:
756:
The Court's observation that there was no substantive difference between allowing the State to amend its answer and simply dismissing
1005:
883:
petitions filed by state prisoners. It is distinguished from
Section 2255, which governs petitions filed by federal prisoners.
439:
the timeliness of a petition. The court also believed that Florida's concession of timeliness was "patently erroneous."
972:
35:
333:
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15, which grants parties a limited time to amend a pleading once as of right, or thereafter with leave of the court.
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122:
893:
651:
543:
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of that defense. The district court instead adopted the magistrate judge's report and dismissed Day's petition.
863:
622:
721:
petitions as having been created as judicial doctrines by the courts, "in the exercise of their traditional
683:
455:
424:
307:
502:
362:
However, Day did not file his petition until January 8, 2003, after the limitations period had run. A US
405:
for 352 days and the delay had cost him time in which he could have worked toward filing his appeals.
366:
judge nevertheless acknowledged that the petition was "in proper form" and ordered Florida to file an
945:
389:
from the denial of his motion for rehearing on collateral appeal to file a petition for a writ of
631:
510:
498:
397:
petition did not run until 90 days after November 15, 2002. Thirdly, Day argued that the state
393:
to the U.S. Supreme Court. Under his calculation, the limitation period for filing his federal
371:
341:
289:
938:
815:
138:
74:
608:, who believed the case was wrongly decided, also joined in Stevens' dissent on this issue.
546:
governed the proceedings. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c), the statute of limitations defense is
433:
decision. The court had ruled on the issue to uphold the ability of a trial court to review
811:
714:
691:
469:
325:
54:
Patrick A. Day v. James R. McDonough, Interim Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections
8:
807:
773:
520:
478:
451:
385:
303:
210:
954:
266:
63:
766:
601:
482:
178:
879:
Section 2254, a reference to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, is the statutory provision governing
849:
petitioner from challenging his conviction with changes in the law that postdate it.
762:
413:
402:
398:
285:
273:
8, 81; Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts 4, 5
77:
647:
588:
202:
190:
734:. If comity and finality did not compel any time limitation at all, it follows
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context but noted in its majority opinion that there was unanimity among the
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discretion, because they were seen as necessary to protect the interests of
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The Court concluded by emphasizing the need for the parties to receive fair
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to the preanswer, initial screening stage, and that after that point, the
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is decided, "but it would be better practice for us to do so ourselves."
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The Court affirmed the decision of the Eleventh Circuit in a 5–4 ruling.
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Scalia also believed that under the Court's ruling, it would not be an
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650:, objected that the Court was disregarding the clear provisions of the
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The Court had not addressed the waiver of procedural default in the
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state court and sentenced to imprisonment for 55 years. After the
560:
329:
726:
584:
564:
547:
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The State's unintentional failure to object to the filing of a
30:
427:
only regarding Day's forfeiture argument and affirmed it in a
705:
Scalia considered it most important that no provision of the
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constituted the three-judge panel that decided his appeal.
769:
is offended by today's decision, even if no one else is."
454:
delivered the opinion for the majority in holding that
421:
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
996:
United States Supreme Court cases of the Roberts Court
300:
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
408:
The magistrate judge recommended dismissal of Day's
370:
and to make all arguments regarding Day's potential
316:(on its own initiative) the petition on that basis.
324:On September 3, 1998, Patrick Day was convicted of
239:
Ginsburg, joined by Roberts, Kennedy, Souter, Alito
634:" by keeping Day's case on its docket until after
982:
753:petitions on the sole ground of untimeliness."
702:. "That is precisely the question before us."
690:under Day's construction of the Habeas Rules
656:Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
468:petition. Based on precedent involving other
338:Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
567:, finality, and the expeditious handling of
375:then addressed Day's substantive arguments.
336:affirmed Day's conviction and sentence, the
559:The Court instead agreed with the State of
563:, which argued that "he considerations of
458:are permitted but not obliged to consider
828:Jackson v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corrections
892:Amendments to pleadings are governed by
973:Supreme Court (slip opinion) (archived)
866:in ruling that it could also be raised
749:proceedings permitted the dismissal of
334:Florida First District Court of Appeals
983:
686:could ever raise the AEDPA limitation
298:petitions that was established by the
462:the timeliness of a state prisoner's
18:2006 United States Supreme Court case
1001:United States habeas corpus case law
641:
595:
492:
13:
908:granted, 164 L. Ed. 2d 332 (2006).
674:to state whether any claim in the
36:Supreme Court of the United States
14:
1017:
991:United States Supreme Court cases
941:198 (2006) is available from:
923:
372:failure to exhaust state remedies
830:, 292 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2002)
652:Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
544:Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
255:Scalia, joined by Thomas, Breyer
29:
713:Scalia distinguished the other
611:The Court had recently granted
513:, which the Court had ruled in
1006:2006 in United States case law
911:
899:
886:
873:
852:
833:
821:
789:
625:judgment that dismissed Day's
1:
646:Scalia, joined by Breyer and
319:
783:
698:be able to raise that issue
425:certificate of appealability
378:In December 2003, the court
288:case involving the one-year
284:, 547 U.S. 198 (2006), is a
7:
489:filed dissenting opinions.
442:
10:
1022:
964:Oyez (oral argument audio)
694:, by assuming that courts
505:affirmative defenses to a
344:for Day to obtain federal
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521:federal appellate courts
43:Argued February 27, 2006
917:See Fed. R. Civ. P. 81.
501:defense with other non-
401:had withheld his trial
806:2004). Circuit Judges
632:miscarriage of justice
519:, 481 U.S. 129 (1987)
511:exhaustion of remedies
499:statute of limitations
497:The Court grouped the
342:statute of limitations
290:statute of limitations
45:Decided April 25, 2006
816:William H. Pryor, Jr.
113:dismissed, sub nom.,
88:126 S. Ct. 1675; 164
812:Joel Fredrick Dubina
715:affirmative defenses
470:affirmative defenses
326:second-degree murder
808:Gerald Bard Tjoflat
774:abuse of discretion
692:begged the question
661:The FRCP govern in
618:Lawrence v. Florida
479:abuse of discretion
452:Ruth Bader Ginsburg
386:order to show cause
304:abuse of discretion
211:Ruth Bader Ginsburg
516:Granberry v. Greer
175:Associate Justices
864:courts of appeals
842:Caspari v. Bohlen
509:petition such as
483:John Paul Stevens
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642:Scalia's dissent
623:Court of Appeals
596:Stevens' dissent
493:Majority opinion
399:public defenders
340:(AEDPA) 365-day
286:US Supreme Court
281:Day v. McDonough
160:Court membership
141:1164 (2005).
121:; affirmed, 391
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24:Day v. McDonough
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102:Case history
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15:
538:limitation
481:. Justices
310:to dismiss
292:for filing
269:§ 2244(d);
985:Categories
868:sua sponte
758:sua sponte
737:a fortiori
700:sua sponte
688:sua sponte
680:sua sponte
613:certiorari
589:prejudiced
578:sua sponte
553:sua sponte
540:sua sponte
526:sua sponte
460:sua sponte
436:sua sponte
430:per curiam
423:granted a
414:forfeiture
403:transcript
391:certiorari
384:issued an
381:sua sponte
364:magistrate
359:petition.
320:Background
313:sua sponte
94:U.S. LEXIS
92:376; 2006
60:Docket no.
804:11th Cir.
784:Footnotes
723:equitable
573:Granberry
548:forfeited
133:granted,
127:11th Cir.
90:L. Ed. 2d
70:Citations
929:Text of
778:citation
636:Lawrence
600:Justice
443:Decision
236:Majority
119:N.D. Fla
111:Petition
732:statute
602:Stevens
561:Florida
449:Justice
330:Florida
252:Dissent
244:Dissent
146:Holding
129:2004);
64:04-1324
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970:
967:
961:
958:
955:Justia
952:
949:
943:
860:habeas
847:habeas
802:1192 (
798:, 391
767:Ockham
751:habeas
747:habeas
743:habeas
727:comity
719:habeas
707:habeas
696:should
676:habeas
672:answer
668:habeas
627:habeas
606:Breyer
585:notice
569:habeas
565:comity
532:habeas
474:habeas
410:habeas
395:habeas
368:answer
357:habeas
352:habeas
306:for a
267:U.S.C.
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125:1192 (
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131:cert.
107:Prior
939:U.S.
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800:F.3d
485:and
419:The
139:U.S.
123:F.3d
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83:more
75:U.S.
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328:in
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