382:
streetcar routes, extending from the existing subway lines into
Scarborough. When these plans were announced, a flurry of press releases from both parties denouncing each other appeared in the press. William Bidell, an assistant deputy minister, said after the CNE test project was half-finished: "I don't care what anybody says – for the kind of environmentally clean and virtually noiseless rapid transit system we want in Metro, there's just no way streetcars can do the job."
407:
gone, and daunting technical problems remaining to be solved, the maglev project died. The test track at the CNE was abandoned in place, with the foundations and a few support pillars already constructed. Krauss-Maffei continued development of the original inter-city
Transrapid, but at a very slow pace and through a series of mergers with other companies involved in maglev technology. The first Transrapid system did not enter service until 30 years later.
184:
are the canonical example of a separated mass transit system that can outperform cars even though their inter-station speeds can be quite low. However, subways were expensive to build and demand high ridership levels in order to justify their capital costs. The sort of density needed to provide these
116:
was formed to serve the growing area. Its priorities were infrastructure, including water systems and transportation so as to develop the suburbs. The highway plans to serve the suburbs were adopted into the Metro
Toronto Official Plan. Construction of some portions of the network had already started
192:
Another consideration was the cost of the stations, which was a factor of the size of the trains. In order to reduce station costs, and the cost of elevated tracks, the trains would have to be smaller than a normal subway. Finally, to reduce operating costs, the system should be completely automated
456:
The
Scarborough route had already been laid out as one of the TTC's new streetcar routes, and the TTC was uninterested in switching the service to the ICTS. However, the province was paying 75% of the capital costs for the line and threatened to refuse it if they did not make the switch. A deal was
352:
meeting was held at the CNE in 1973, where a speaker suggested that the federal government should also turn to Krauss-Maffei for inter-city train service between
Toronto and Montreal. He suggested that building such a line would eliminate the need for the expensive airports being built in those two
300:
Ford's ACT was fairly conventional and could not meet the requirements for the higher speed travel; they withdrew from the competition. The
Transurban and Hawker-Siddeley entries both solved the speed problems in the same fashion; each vehicle in the system could operate at high speed individually,
264:
When
Ontario announced the GO-Urban plan, it quickly became the focal point for many of these efforts – whatever system Toronto selected would be a major "win" that would help future sales of that system. When a call for tenders was put out in 1971 there was widespread response from industry,
188:
What was needed was a new system that could offer the trip times of a subway but with much lower capital and operational cost. Since a considerable portion of the capital cost of a subway is digging the routes underground, the new system could reduce this by operating aboveground, perhaps elevated.
168:
rose in the
Provincial Legislature and stated "Cities were built for people and not cars. If we are building a transportation system to serve the automobile, the Spadina Expressway would be a good place to start. But if we are building a transportation system to serve people, the Spadina Expressway
406:
There were also technical problems; in testing, the complex systems needed to switch trains on the magnetic tracks froze up in cold weather, and would require a re-design. A US report also noted that the system was surprisingly loud and had poor ride quality. With Krauss-Maffei's financial support
394:
Soon after construction started at the CNE, in
November 1974 Krauss-Maffei announced that they were forced to withdraw from the project. The underlying maglev technology was being developed as a part of a wider project on the part of the German government that was providing funding for a number of
312:
maglev concept quickly caught the attention of everyone involved. It had only two major moving parts on the vehicles, the doors and the air conditioning system. In theory, this would lead to far lower operational costs than the rubber-wheeled and motor-driven design from Hawker-Siddeley. It was no
296:
One feature of the ICTS requirements quickly weeded out many of the entries. Most AGT systems were designed to service denser areas of smaller cities, or less-dense areas of larger cities. In either case, the systems were envisioned to operate like small subways, with short inter-station distances
177:
If a mass transit network was going to be able to replace a highway, the system would need to offer the convenience of a car. Chief among these considerations was the total end-to-end trip time. Although the vehicles did not have to travel as fast as cars, they did need to have clear right-of-ways
431:
In testing it was found that the linear motor that powered the vehicle only worked efficiently if the vehicle was a set distance from the track, and the small amount of play in the tires was enough to upset the system. The rubber wheels had to be replaced by steel ones, but this re-introduced the
419:
and automated train control system remained the same. Instead of the maglev suspension, however, the vehicle would use rubber wheels. It also lost the ability to automatically form into trains, and operate in high-speed/low-speed situations. In most respects it was a much more conventional design
129:
By the late 1960s, the mood of the citizens had changed considerably. As the routes were extended, the number of houses that would have to be torn down increased dramatically. In addition, there was an increasing understanding that having more cars in the downtown area was not advantageous as the
464:
Construction eventually started in 1981, modifying the work already done on the streetcar route to allow it to run the ICTS, as well as adding a new maintenance yard at McCowan. Required changes to the tracks and stations and delays building the new system meant the route didn't open until 1985,
816:
Isaiah Litvak and
Christopher Maule, "The Light-Rapid Comfortable (LRC) Train and the Intermediate Capacity Transit System (ICTS): Two Case Studies of Innovation in the Urban Transportation Equipment Manufacturing Industry", University of Toronto/York University Joint Program in Transportation,
304:
Another consideration for the project was that the system had to be built in Ontario, and additional work or sales from Ontario would be considered to be a major advantage. Hawker-Siddeley had an obvious advantage in this respect, but Krauss-Maffei agreed to move all testing and construction to
381:
The small test track at the CNE would not be useful for a full-scale prototype system for GO-Urban, however, and the planners started looking for a suitable location for a short system that could be used in a full production setting. Their attention quickly settled on one of the TTC's planned
344:
Within the transit world, excitement about the system was widespread. GO-Urban would be the first production installation of what was then widely believed to be the next wave in mass transit. In 1973 Bill Davis won the transit "man of the year" in the U.S. in a presentation in Florida.
66:, was introduced to fill the niche for the Transurban. However, by the time it was ready for service in the early 1980s, changes in the provincial government ended official support for the entire GO-Urban concept. Only a single short demonstration line was built in Toronto, the
104:
that was fed by the creation of large highway systems. The highways were built by the province, not the city, and did not enter the city core. Commuters could approach what was then the outskirts of the city, but getting to work in the business areas on the shore of
444:
By 1979 the system was nearing completion and a sales effort started. The larger vehicle, however, was no longer suitable for the original demonstration system at the CNE and a new real-world test site was needed. The company set its sights on two systems, one in
43:
services without the expense of constructing tunnels. GO-Urban would serve high-density areas in the downtown core, but also be able to accelerate to high speed between distant stations in the outskirts of the city. Similar deployments were planned for
125:
on the eastern side of the downtown area. There was initially little controversy as they were developed in areas that were formerly industrial or undeveloped, but as the Gardiner approached the downtown area it required the destruction of some houses.
301:
and when they approached the higher density areas they would automatically link together into multi-unit trains. That way they would still have the same, or greater, rider capacity even though they were travelling slower and stopping more often.
457:
eventually worked out when the province agreed to pay for any cost overruns if the new tracks cost more than the original system. The province briefly proposed that the ICTS also be used between the end of the existing subway line to a new
329:(CNE), just west of the downtown core. The system would open for riders around the park for the CNE show in August 1975, with stops at the GO station on the northern edge of the fair, the large parking lots on the west end, at the gates of
403:, and their funding was dropped. The ICTS project plan did not provide enough funding to develop both the vehicle and the underlying maglev technology, and the Ontario government was not interested in taking over the entire project.
473:
The experience soured the province on the ICTS. The original Transurban system was almost double its budget when it was cancelled, and the Scarborough line was about the same. When Davis announced his retirement in 1985, the new
373:(TTC) was in the midst of its own route planning. Having concluded that most routes suitable for subway service were already built, they too were looking for some sort of intermediate vehicle. Their search led them to select new
185:
levels were found in the downtown area, but the suburbs were too spread out. Buses could serve these areas, but were subject to the whims of traffic and were much slower than a car on the same route due to their frequent stops.
224:
and continuing north along Don Mills to Finch. For a portion of the route, especially in the downtown areas, the route ran in existing rail corridors. A second line ran east-west across Eglinton, mostly underground, from the
385:
The public reaction was negative as well. The mood was downright chilly when the planners held an open house to help choose a route through the Scarborough area, where citizens took the opportunity to blast the system.
377:
designs as the appropriate solution. A network of road-level, semi-separated and full-separated routes were being planned around the city, and UTDC had been selected to build the vehicles that would run on them.
305:
Ontario, as well as using the Ontario office for all sales into North America. The US companies would not match this later requirement, preferring to make sales to the US from their US factories and offices.
256:
Toronto was one of many cities facing the same sort of transit problems, and companies around the world were already developing a variety of ICTS-like vehicles under the broad variety of approaches known as
461:, a plan that the TTC said was a waste of money as previous studies had already clearly demonstrated that the ridership levels were already high enough that an extension of the subway was more appropriate.
465:
three years after the original plans. Cost overruns ran to $ 100 million, and even after opening the system ran into many difficulties and the TTC received another $ 27 million to fix the problems.
313:
surprise when the Transurban was announced as the winners of the contest on 1 May 1973. The company took a share in the Ontario Crown Corporation set up to run location development, the
436:
patents from a US developer. Articulated bogies steer each wheel around bends, avoiding the rubbing that makes the sound. With these changes in place, development proceeded quickly.
145:
became a focal point of citizen concern. The Spadina route ran directly through several densely settled neighbourhoods, including one particularly upscale area of the city,
109:
was extremely time-consuming. As more and more of the population moved into the suburbs, an efficient transit system that served these users became increasingly important.
713:
297:
and fairly low speeds. GO-Urban envisioned a single vehicle operating in these denser environments, then moving along the long-distance routes at much higher speeds.
415:
Although the province was not willing to take over the maglev system, they did want to continue with the development of the ICTS concept. The basic vehicle chassis,
233:
in the east. Here it joined the final line in the network, running in the hydro corridor along Finch from near the airport in the west to the distant reaches of
62:
system as the GO-Urban vehicle, but this ran into serious technical and funding problems and was eventually cancelled in 1974. A new vehicle, known today as the
547:
Total peak capacity is a function of three values, the number of passengers per vehicle, the spacing between vehicles, and the speed of the vehicles. See
189:
This meant that it had to be very quiet, as the main complaint about elevated railways was the sound of the wheels, especially as they rounded corners.
646:
112:
Starting in the 1940s, various plans were developed to greatly expand the highway network within the city. In 1954, the new regional government of
73:
Although GO-Urban was never built as envisioned, the ART vehicle has seen use in other cities. Today it forms the basis for the majority of the
261:(AGT). Although there had been considerable interest in AGT within industry, this had failed to translate into any major purchase agreements.
520:
Christopher Leo, "The Politics of Urban Development: Canadian Urban Expressway Debates", Institute of Public Administration of Canada, 1977
421:
314:
573:
420:
than the original Transurban. A new consortium of Ontario companies was formed to take over development, and the newly rechristened
358:
169:
is a good place to stop." The expressway plan was dead, and in its place was a new plan to develop mass transit systems instead.
130:
amount of gridlock and air pollution increased. There was also growing understanding that the construction of highways led to a
193:
and have as few moving parts as possible. The new system would be aimed at ridership levels above that of buses, about 5,000
710:
395:
different maglev systems. A project review that year concluded Krauss-Maffei's system was less interesting that ones from
828:
194:
220:
where it bent into a U-shape passing through the downtown core, then started north again, hitting Eglinton again at
91:
265:
and a process of selecting a single system started. The first selection process reduced the field to three; a "
844:
161:. She was able to bring the same organizational powers to the Spadina debate, twice arrested in the process.
400:
326:
36:
739:
502:"Official plan of the portion of the City of Toronto Planning Area", Metropolitan Toronto Planning Board
432:
problem of squealing as the train rounded bends. In order to solve this problem, UTDC purchased several
370:
258:
32:
334:
278:
154:
56:
338:
416:
290:
213:
138:
seen in US cities in the 1950s. A report by the planning association admitted this in 1961.
570:
446:
234:
146:
74:
24:
204:
The ICTS would be used in a new network of three major lines in the Toronto area known as
8:
118:
270:
230:
142:
122:
59:
824:
450:
433:
425:
354:
241:
131:
45:
325:
A test track for the system started construction in late 1974 on the grounds of the
396:
810:
803:
717:
577:
226:
217:
511:"Report on Spadina Expressway Briefs", Metropolitan Toronto Planning Board, 1962
475:
221:
67:
63:
838:
330:
274:
181:
158:
113:
40:
178:
that eliminated non-scheduled stops or slowdowns due to traffic congestion.
479:
458:
348:
Toronto became a common destination for urban transit planners to meet. An
209:
153:, a tireless campaigner who had managed to end construction of the similar
106:
101:
20:
201:(ICTS) concept, aimed at ridership levels between 4,000 and 20,000 PPHPD.
150:
135:
619:
William Bragg, "Davis is named 'man-of-the-year' by U.S. transit body",
529:
Max Allen, "Ideas that Matter: The Worlds of Jane Jacobs", 1997, pg. 170
820:
337:. It was originally planned that this track would later be extended to
165:
28:
755:
James Bow, "UTDC Kingston Transit Development Center", Transit Toronto
478:
government balked at the GO-ALRT system and the Toronto subway plan,
374:
309:
266:
569:
A map of the proposed system (and the TTC's own version) appears on
286:
282:
197:(PPHPD), and subways, at 25,000 PPHPD and over. The result was the
548:
97:
662:"Air-cushion trains get wary reception, 'Remember the Turbo'",
245:
96:
Following World War II, like most other North American cities,
49:
823:, "Toronto Sketches 5: The Way We Were", Dundurn Press, 1997,
77:
system and several shorter lines in cities around the world.
482:. Plans were seriously curtailed, and GO-ALRT disappeared.
349:
453:, to the west. Hamilton eventually backed out in 1981.
632:"Fast air-cushion trains, single big airport urged",
711:"1934 - 1977; From the idea to the system decision"
647:"Super-fast magnetic train floats above the track"
308:In spite of being the outsider, the Transurban's
149:. Adding to the debate was the recent arrival of
836:
538:John Sewell, "The Shape of the Suburbs", pg. 68
449:on the eastern side of Toronto, and another in
315:Ontario Transportation Development Corporation
134:out of the city cores that caused the rapid
39:and other unused parcels of land to provide
688:"GO-Urban's bright future fades suddenly",
806:, US Government Printing office, June 1975
341:, downtown, but these plans were dropped.
772:
770:
675:"People sceptical of GO-Urban: Report",
597:
595:
593:
591:
589:
587:
585:
837:
779:
767:
732:
532:
369:While GO-Urban was being planned, the
554:
604:
582:
364:
199:Intermediate Capacity Transit System
55:The planners initially selected the
496:
31:. The system envisioned the use of
13:
208:. GO-Urban's main line started at
85:
14:
856:
740:"Schanghai stutzt den Transrapid"
439:
240:Similar systems were planned for
195:passengers per hour per direction
164:On June 3, 1971, Ontario Premier
809:Jason McBride and Alana Wilcox,
468:
92:Cancelled expressways in Toronto
811:"UTOpia: towards a new Toronto"
791:
758:
749:
723:
704:
695:
682:
669:
656:
639:
626:
613:
389:
172:
141:As the debate intensified, the
563:
541:
523:
514:
505:
424:purchased a parcel of land in
1:
485:
333:, and the eastern end at the
251:
229:in the west to Finch and the
121:along the lake shore and the
117:at this point, including the
804:"Automated Guideway Transit"
327:Canadian National Exhibition
320:
7:
785:McBride and Wilcox, pg. 152
776:McBride and Wilcox, pg. 151
666:, 14 September 1973, pg. B2
560:McBride and Wilcox, pg. 150
10:
861:
764:Litvak & Maule, pg. 99
720:, Transrapid International
610:Litvak & Maule, pg. 72
410:
401:Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm
371:Toronto Transit Commission
259:automated guideway transit
89:
80:
33:automated guideway transit
813:, Coach House Books, 2005
623:, 15 October 1973, pg. A4
636:, 3 October 1973, pg. B8
490:
237:and beyond in the east.
155:Mid-Manhattan Expressway
57:Krauss-Maffei Transurban
428:as a testing facility.
285:, and a version of the
216:, running down Jane to
571:"Network 2011 Subways"
417:linear induction motor
291:Hawker-Siddeley Canada
845:Transport in Toronto
100:entered a period of
119:Gardiner Expressway
35:vehicles set up in
716:2011-06-09 at the
692:, 14 November 1974
679:, 17 November 1973
576:2010-08-13 at the
231:Don Valley Parkway
143:Spadina Expressway
123:Don Valley Parkway
75:Vancouver SkyTrain
27:to be operated by
746:, 1 February 2008
729:AGT 1975, pg. 248
551:for a discussion.
434:articulated bogie
426:Kingston, Ontario
365:Scarborough route
355:Pickering Airport
132:flight of capital
852:
786:
783:
777:
774:
765:
762:
756:
753:
747:
736:
730:
727:
721:
708:
702:
701:AGT 1975. pg. 47
699:
693:
686:
680:
673:
667:
660:
654:
653:, 9 October 2009
643:
637:
630:
624:
617:
611:
608:
602:
599:
580:
567:
561:
558:
552:
545:
539:
536:
530:
527:
521:
518:
512:
509:
503:
500:
397:Thyssen-Henschel
860:
859:
855:
854:
853:
851:
850:
849:
835:
834:
833:
794:
789:
784:
780:
775:
768:
763:
759:
754:
750:
737:
733:
728:
724:
718:Wayback Machine
709:
705:
700:
696:
687:
683:
674:
670:
661:
657:
644:
640:
631:
627:
618:
614:
609:
605:
600:
583:
578:Wayback Machine
568:
564:
559:
555:
546:
542:
537:
533:
528:
524:
519:
515:
510:
506:
501:
497:
493:
488:
471:
442:
413:
392:
367:
357:in Toronto and
323:
254:
218:Eglinton Avenue
175:
94:
88:
86:Expressway plan
83:
37:hydro corridors
25:Greater Toronto
12:
11:
5:
858:
848:
847:
832:
831:
818:
814:
807:
795:
793:
790:
788:
787:
778:
766:
757:
748:
731:
722:
703:
694:
681:
668:
655:
638:
625:
612:
603:
581:
562:
553:
540:
531:
522:
513:
504:
494:
492:
489:
487:
484:
476:David Peterson
470:
467:
459:Warden station
441:
440:Scarborough RT
438:
412:
409:
391:
388:
366:
363:
335:Princes' Gates
322:
319:
253:
250:
227:Malton Airport
222:Don Mills Road
174:
171:
90:Main article:
87:
84:
82:
79:
68:Scarborough RT
64:Bombardier ART
19:was a planned
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
857:
846:
843:
842:
840:
830:
829:1-55002-292-X
826:
822:
819:
815:
812:
808:
805:
801:
797:
796:
782:
773:
771:
761:
752:
745:
741:
738:Harald Maas,
735:
726:
719:
715:
712:
707:
698:
691:
685:
678:
672:
665:
659:
652:
648:
642:
635:
629:
622:
616:
607:
601:Filey, pg. 39
598:
596:
594:
592:
590:
588:
586:
579:
575:
572:
566:
557:
550:
544:
535:
526:
517:
508:
499:
495:
483:
481:
477:
469:Disappearance
466:
462:
460:
454:
452:
448:
437:
435:
429:
427:
423:
418:
408:
404:
402:
398:
387:
383:
379:
376:
372:
362:
361:in Montreal.
360:
356:
351:
346:
342:
340:
339:Union Station
336:
332:
331:Ontario Place
328:
318:
316:
311:
306:
302:
298:
294:
292:
288:
284:
280:
277:known as the
276:
275:Krauss-Maffei
272:
268:
262:
260:
249:
247:
243:
238:
236:
232:
228:
223:
219:
215:
211:
207:
202:
200:
196:
190:
186:
183:
179:
170:
167:
162:
160:
159:New York City
156:
152:
148:
144:
139:
137:
133:
127:
124:
120:
115:
114:Metro Toronto
110:
108:
103:
99:
93:
78:
76:
71:
69:
65:
61:
58:
53:
51:
47:
42:
41:rapid transit
38:
34:
30:
26:
22:
18:
799:
792:Bibliography
781:
760:
751:
744:Tagesspiegel
743:
734:
725:
706:
697:
690:Toronto Star
689:
684:
677:Toronto Star
676:
671:
664:Toronto Star
663:
658:
651:Toronto Star
650:
645:San Grewal,
641:
634:Toronto Star
633:
628:
621:Toronto Star
620:
615:
606:
565:
556:
543:
534:
525:
516:
507:
498:
480:Network 2011
472:
463:
455:
443:
430:
414:
405:
393:
390:Cancellation
384:
380:
368:
347:
343:
324:
307:
303:
299:
295:
289:system from
263:
255:
239:
210:Finch Avenue
205:
203:
198:
191:
187:
180:
176:
173:ICTS concept
163:
140:
128:
111:
107:Lake Ontario
102:urban sprawl
95:
72:
54:
23:project for
21:mass transit
16:
15:
447:Scarborough
273:entry from
235:Scarborough
214:Jane Street
151:Jane Jacobs
147:Forest Hill
136:urban decay
821:Mike Filey
486:References
279:Transurban
252:Transurban
166:Bill Davis
29:GO Transit
375:streetcar
353:cities -
321:Prototype
310:space age
267:space age
839:Category
800:AGT 1975
714:Archived
574:Archived
451:Hamilton
287:Minitram
283:Ford ACT
242:Hamilton
206:GO-Urban
46:Hamilton
17:GO-Urban
549:headway
411:Rebirth
359:Mirabel
182:Subways
98:Toronto
81:History
827:
281:, the
271:maglev
246:Ottawa
60:maglev
50:Ottawa
491:Notes
825:ISBN
817:1982
422:UTDC
399:and
350:IEEE
244:and
212:and
48:and
802:),
157:in
841::
769:^
742:,
649:,
584:^
317:.
293:.
269:"
248:.
70:.
52:.
798:(
Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.