84:
has the property that honestly reporting the truth is always a dominant strategy for each agent." However, the payments to agents become large, sacrificing budget neutrality to incentive compatibility.
88:
In a game where multiple agents are to report their preferences (or their type), it may be in the best interest of some agents to lie about their preferences. This may improve their
121:
mechanism that attains ("implements") this function. There are several degrees of implementability, corresponding to the different degrees of incentive-compatibility, including:
68:
showed that if preferences are restricted to the case of quasi-linear utility functions then the mechanism dominant strategy is dominant-strategy implementable. "A
218:
Vickrey, William. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, and
Competitive Sealed Tenders." The Journal of Finance 16, no. 1 (1961): 8–37.
296:
1195:
159:
1012:
547:
345:
831:
650:
243:
Jackson, Matthew O. "A Crash Course in
Implementation Theory." Social Choice and Welfare 18, no. 4 (2001): 655–708.
452:
95:
Although largely theoretical, implementation theory may have profound implications on policy creation because some
921:
181:
Palfrey, Thomas R. "Chapter 61 Implementation Theory." Handbook of Game Theory with
Economic Applications, 2002.
791:
462:
630:
53:
and choosing over a finite set of alternatives. In the case of producing and allocating public/private goods,
972:
390:
365:
1322:
748:
502:
492:
427:
542:
522:
1256:
1007:
977:
635:
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1215:
951:
507:
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1307:
1040:
926:
723:
517:
335:
1110:
1312:
911:
881:
537:
325:
46:
129:
if it is attainable by a mechanism which is dominant-strategy-incentive-compatible (also called
1337:
1317:
1297:
1246:
916:
821:
680:
625:
557:
527:
447:
375:
144:
See for a recent reference. In some textbooks, the entire field of mechanism design is called
114:
39:
796:
781:
355:
89:
1358:
1130:
1115:
1002:
997:
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886:
851:
816:
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73:
8:
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906:
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457:
340:
43:
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665:
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941:
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487:
437:
385:
58:
32:
201:
Maskin, Eric. "Implementation Theory." Handbook of Social Choice and
Welfare, 2002.
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1045:
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987:
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54:
24:
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320:
65:
1095:
38:
There are two general types of implementation problems: the economic problem of
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1160:
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1085:
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1065:
1050:
846:
826:
811:
806:
766:
733:
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713:
703:
512:
140:
if it is attainable by a mechanism which is
Bayesian-Nash-incentive-compatible.
77:
1352:
1210:
1200:
1155:
1140:
1120:
891:
866:
738:
708:
698:
685:
590:
532:
467:
400:
130:
69:
64:
In his paper "Counterspeculation, Auctions, and
Competitive Sealed Tenders",
1185:
1180:
1035:
610:
50:
248:
1302:
1105:
1100:
1080:
876:
861:
670:
640:
575:
565:
395:
330:
306:
268:
Martin J. Osborne & Ariel
Rubinstein: A Course in Game Theory (1994).
20:
274:
256:
931:
585:
231:
836:
756:
580:
99:
rules may be impossible to implement under specific game conditions.
28:
1271:
771:
992:
982:
660:
761:
92:, but it may not be seen as a fair outcome to other agents.
27:
whose equilibrium outcomes implement a given set of
1350:
290:
25:mechanisms (or institutions) can be designed
297:
283:
304:
177:
175:
197:
195:
1351:
172:
113:, implementability is a property of a
278:
192:
160:Implementability (mechanism design)
102:
13:
346:First-player and second-player win
224:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x
23:concerned with whether a class of
14:
1370:
453:Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium
127:dominant-strategy implementable
463:Evolutionarily stable strategy
262:
237:
212:
1:
391:Simultaneous action selection
207:10.1016/S1574-0110(02)80009-1
187:10.1016/S1574-0005(02)03024-2
165:
1323:List of games in game theory
503:Quantal response equilibrium
493:Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
428:Bayes correlated equilibrium
117:. It means that there is an
7:
792:Optional prisoner's dilemma
523:Self-confirming equilibrium
153:
138:Bayesian-Nash implementable
10:
1375:
1257:Principal variation search
973:Aumann's agreement theorem
636:Strategy-stealing argument
548:Trembling hand equilibrium
478:Markov perfect equilibrium
473:Mertens-stable equilibrium
72:rule is dominant strategy
19:is an area of research in
1293:Combinatorial game theory
1280:
1239:
1021:
965:
952:Princess and monster game
747:
649:
556:
508:Quasi-perfect equilibrium
433:Bayesian Nash equilibrium
414:
313:
1308:Evolutionary game theory
1041:Antoine Augustin Cournot
927:Guess 2/3 of the average
724:Strictly determined game
518:Satisfaction equilibrium
336:Escalation of commitment
1313:Glossary of game theory
912:Stackelberg competition
538:Strong Nash equilibrium
57:are focused on finding
1338:Tragedy of the commons
1318:List of game theorists
1298:Confrontation analysis
1008:Sprague–Grundy theorem
528:Sequential equilibrium
448:Correlated equilibrium
115:social choice function
1111:Jean-François Mertens
249:10.1007/s003550100152
147:implementation theory
17:Implementation theory
1240:Search optimizations
1116:Jennifer Tour Chayes
1003:Revelation principle
998:Purification theorem
937:Nash bargaining game
902:Bertrand competition
887:El Farol Bar problem
852:Electronic mail game
817:Lewis signaling game
361:Hierarchy of beliefs
119:incentive-compatible
82:revelation mechanism
80:, if the associated
74:incentive compatible
1288:Bounded rationality
907:Cournot competition
857:Rock paper scissors
832:Battle of the sexes
822:Volunteer's dilemma
694:Perfect information
621:Dominant strategies
458:Epsilon-equilibrium
341:Extensive-form game
59:dominant strategies
1267:Paranoid algorithm
1247:Alpha–beta pruning
1126:John Maynard Smith
957:Rendezvous problem
797:Traveler's dilemma
787:Gift-exchange game
782:Prisoner's dilemma
699:Large Poisson game
666:Bargaining problem
571:Backward induction
543:Subgame perfection
498:Proper equilibrium
1346:
1345:
1252:Aspiration window
1221:Suzanne Scotchmer
1176:Oskar Morgenstern
1071:Donald B. Gillies
1013:Zermelo's theorem
942:Induction puzzles
897:Fair cake-cutting
872:Public goods game
802:Coordination game
676:Intransitive game
606:Forward induction
488:Pareto efficiency
468:Gibbs equilibrium
438:Berge equilibrium
386:Simultaneous game
55:solution concepts
1366:
1333:Topological game
1328:No-win situation
1226:Thomas Schelling
1206:Robert B. Wilson
1166:Merrill M. Flood
1136:John von Neumann
1046:Ariel Rubinstein
1031:Albert W. Tucker
882:War of attrition
842:Matching pennies
483:Nash equilibrium
406:Mechanism design
371:Normal-form game
326:Cooperative game
299:
292:
285:
276:
275:
269:
266:
260:
241:
235:
216:
210:
199:
190:
179:
110:mechanism design
103:Implementability
1374:
1373:
1369:
1368:
1367:
1365:
1364:
1363:
1349:
1348:
1347:
1342:
1276:
1262:max^n algorithm
1235:
1231:William Vickrey
1191:Reinhard Selten
1146:Kenneth Binmore
1061:David K. Levine
1056:Daniel Kahneman
1023:
1017:
993:Negamax theorem
983:Minimax theorem
961:
922:Diner's dilemma
777:All-pay auction
743:
729:Stochastic game
681:Mean-field game
652:
645:
616:Markov strategy
552:
418:
410:
381:Sequential game
366:Information set
351:Game complexity
321:Congestion game
309:
303:
273:
272:
267:
263:
242:
238:
217:
213:
200:
193:
180:
173:
168:
156:
105:
66:William Vickrey
12:
11:
5:
1372:
1362:
1361:
1344:
1343:
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1335:
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1325:
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1315:
1310:
1305:
1300:
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1274:
1269:
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1259:
1254:
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1243:
1241:
1237:
1236:
1234:
1233:
1228:
1223:
1218:
1213:
1208:
1203:
1198:
1196:Robert Axelrod
1193:
1188:
1183:
1178:
1173:
1171:Olga Bondareva
1168:
1163:
1161:Melvin Dresher
1158:
1153:
1151:Leonid Hurwicz
1148:
1143:
1138:
1133:
1128:
1123:
1118:
1113:
1108:
1103:
1098:
1093:
1088:
1086:Harold W. Kuhn
1083:
1078:
1076:Drew Fudenberg
1073:
1068:
1066:David M. Kreps
1063:
1058:
1053:
1051:Claude Shannon
1048:
1043:
1038:
1033:
1027:
1025:
1019:
1018:
1016:
1015:
1010:
1005:
1000:
995:
990:
988:Nash's theorem
985:
980:
975:
969:
967:
963:
962:
960:
959:
954:
949:
944:
939:
934:
929:
924:
919:
914:
909:
904:
899:
894:
889:
884:
879:
874:
869:
864:
859:
854:
849:
847:Ultimatum game
844:
839:
834:
829:
827:Dollar auction
824:
819:
814:
812:Centipede game
809:
804:
799:
794:
789:
784:
779:
774:
769:
767:Infinite chess
764:
759:
753:
751:
745:
744:
742:
741:
736:
734:Symmetric game
731:
726:
721:
719:Signaling game
716:
714:Screening game
711:
706:
704:Potential game
701:
696:
691:
683:
678:
673:
668:
663:
657:
655:
647:
646:
644:
643:
638:
633:
631:Mixed strategy
628:
623:
618:
613:
608:
603:
598:
593:
588:
583:
578:
573:
568:
562:
560:
554:
553:
551:
550:
545:
540:
535:
530:
525:
520:
515:
513:Risk dominance
510:
505:
500:
495:
490:
485:
480:
475:
470:
465:
460:
455:
450:
445:
440:
435:
430:
424:
422:
412:
411:
409:
408:
403:
398:
393:
388:
383:
378:
373:
368:
363:
358:
356:Graphical game
353:
348:
343:
338:
333:
328:
323:
317:
315:
311:
310:
302:
301:
294:
287:
279:
271:
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261:
236:
211:
191:
170:
169:
167:
164:
163:
162:
155:
152:
142:
141:
136:A function is
134:
125:A function is
104:
101:
78:strategy-proof
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
1371:
1360:
1357:
1356:
1354:
1339:
1336:
1334:
1331:
1329:
1326:
1324:
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1319:
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1314:
1311:
1309:
1306:
1304:
1301:
1299:
1296:
1294:
1291:
1289:
1286:
1285:
1283:
1281:Miscellaneous
1279:
1273:
1270:
1268:
1265:
1263:
1260:
1258:
1255:
1253:
1250:
1248:
1245:
1244:
1242:
1238:
1232:
1229:
1227:
1224:
1222:
1219:
1217:
1216:Samuel Bowles
1214:
1212:
1211:Roger Myerson
1209:
1207:
1204:
1202:
1201:Robert Aumann
1199:
1197:
1194:
1192:
1189:
1187:
1184:
1182:
1179:
1177:
1174:
1172:
1169:
1167:
1164:
1162:
1159:
1157:
1156:Lloyd Shapley
1154:
1152:
1149:
1147:
1144:
1142:
1141:Kenneth Arrow
1139:
1137:
1134:
1132:
1129:
1127:
1124:
1122:
1121:John Harsanyi
1119:
1117:
1114:
1112:
1109:
1107:
1104:
1102:
1099:
1097:
1094:
1092:
1091:Herbert Simon
1089:
1087:
1084:
1082:
1079:
1077:
1074:
1072:
1069:
1067:
1064:
1062:
1059:
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1004:
1001:
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994:
991:
989:
986:
984:
981:
979:
976:
974:
971:
970:
968:
964:
958:
955:
953:
950:
948:
945:
943:
940:
938:
935:
933:
930:
928:
925:
923:
920:
918:
915:
913:
910:
908:
905:
903:
900:
898:
895:
893:
892:Fair division
890:
888:
885:
883:
880:
878:
875:
873:
870:
868:
867:Dictator game
865:
863:
860:
858:
855:
853:
850:
848:
845:
843:
840:
838:
835:
833:
830:
828:
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823:
820:
818:
815:
813:
810:
808:
805:
803:
800:
798:
795:
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790:
788:
785:
783:
780:
778:
775:
773:
770:
768:
765:
763:
760:
758:
755:
754:
752:
750:
746:
740:
739:Zero-sum game
737:
735:
732:
730:
727:
725:
722:
720:
717:
715:
712:
710:
709:Repeated game
707:
705:
702:
700:
697:
695:
692:
690:
688:
684:
682:
679:
677:
674:
672:
669:
667:
664:
662:
659:
658:
656:
654:
648:
642:
639:
637:
634:
632:
629:
627:
626:Pure strategy
624:
622:
619:
617:
614:
612:
609:
607:
604:
602:
599:
597:
594:
592:
591:De-escalation
589:
587:
584:
582:
579:
577:
574:
572:
569:
567:
564:
563:
561:
559:
555:
549:
546:
544:
541:
539:
536:
534:
533:Shapley value
531:
529:
526:
524:
521:
519:
516:
514:
511:
509:
506:
504:
501:
499:
496:
494:
491:
489:
486:
484:
481:
479:
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471:
469:
466:
464:
461:
459:
456:
454:
451:
449:
446:
444:
441:
439:
436:
434:
431:
429:
426:
425:
423:
421:
417:
413:
407:
404:
402:
401:Succinct game
399:
397:
394:
392:
389:
387:
384:
382:
379:
377:
374:
372:
369:
367:
364:
362:
359:
357:
354:
352:
349:
347:
344:
342:
339:
337:
334:
332:
329:
327:
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319:
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316:
312:
308:
300:
295:
293:
288:
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265:
258:
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250:
246:
240:
233:
229:
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221:
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208:
204:
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196:
188:
184:
178:
176:
171:
161:
158:
157:
151:
149:
148:
139:
135:
132:
131:strategyproof
128:
124:
123:
122:
120:
116:
112:
111:
100:
98:
97:social choice
93:
91:
86:
83:
79:
75:
71:
70:social choice
67:
62:
60:
56:
52:
51:private goods
48:
45:
41:
36:
34:
30:
26:
22:
18:
1186:Peyton Young
1181:Paul Milgrom
1096:Hervé Moulin
1036:Amos Tversky
978:Folk theorem
689:-player game
686:
611:Grim trigger
264:
239:
214:
146:
145:
143:
137:
126:
108:
106:
94:
87:
63:
37:
16:
15:
1359:Game theory
1303:Coopetition
1106:Jean Tirole
1101:John Conway
1081:Eric Maskin
877:Blotto game
862:Pirate game
671:Global game
641:Tit for tat
576:Bid shading
566:Appeasement
416:Equilibrium
396:Solved game
331:Determinacy
314:Definitions
307:game theory
21:game theory
947:Trust game
932:Kuhn poker
601:Escalation
596:Deterrence
586:Cheap talk
558:Strategies
376:Preference
305:Topics of
166:References
44:allocating
35:criteria.
1131:John Nash
837:Stag hunt
581:Collusion
40:producing
31:goals or
29:normative
1353:Category
1272:Lazy SMP
966:Theorems
917:Deadlock
772:Checkers
653:of games
420:concepts
257:41106420
154:See also
1024:figures
807:Chicken
661:Auction
651:Classes
232:2977633
33:welfare
255:
230:
90:payoff
47:public
762:Chess
749:Games
253:JSTOR
228:JSTOR
76:, or
443:Core
49:and
42:and
1022:Key
245:doi
220:doi
203:doi
183:doi
107:In
1355::
757:Go
251:.
226:.
194:^
174:^
150:.
133:).
61:.
687:n
298:e
291:t
284:v
259:.
247::
234:.
222::
209:.
205::
189:.
185::
Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.