Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan border

209:, or the various Turkmen/Uzbek tribes along the Amu Darya). Local national elites strongly argued (and in many cases overstated) their case and the Soviets were often forced to adjudicate between them, further hindered by a lack of expert knowledge and the paucity of accurate or up-to-date ethnographic data on the region. Furthermore, NTD also aimed to create ‘viable’ entities, with economic, geographical, agricultural and infrastructural matters also to be taken into account and frequently trumping those of ethnicity. The attempt to balance these contradictory aims within an overall nationalist framework proved exceedingly difficult and often impossible, resulting in the drawing of often tortuously convoluted borders, multiple enclaves and the unavoidable creation of large minorities who ended up living in the ‘wrong’ republic. Additionally the Soviets never intended for these borders to become international frontiers as they are today. 132: 33: 42: 213: 235:(Kirghiz ASSR, Kirgizistan ASSR on the map), which was created on 26 August 1920 in the territory roughly coinciding with the northern part of today's Kazakhstan (at this time Kazakhs were referred to as ‘Kyrgyz’ and what are now the Kyrgyz were deemed a sub-group of the Kazakhs and referred to as ‘Kara-Kyrgyz’ i.e. mountain-dwelling ‘black-Kyrgyz’). There were also the two separate successor ‘republics’ of the 323:

to continued tension along the border at this time. In more recent years relations have improved and a border agreement was signed in 2018 delimiting much of the boundary; discussions over the status of the enclaves is currently ongoing. In November 2022, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan signed ratifications of a final treaty delimiting their border. In May of 2023, they approved border demarcations.

267:

then exceedingly rapidly. There were initial plans to possibly keep the Khorezm and Bukhara PSRs, however it was eventually decided to partition them in April 1924, over the often vocal opposition of their Communist Parties (the Khorezm Communists in particular were reluctant to destroy their PSR and had to be strong-armed into voting for their own dissolution in July of that year).

20: 275:, an overwhelmingly Uzbek-populated town. There were further disputes over Andijan, Margilan and Jala-abad; eventually the first two were given to the Uzbeks, the latter to the Kyrgyz. Originally the border was much longer, as the Uzbek SSR included the Khojand region as well as the rest of what is now Tajikistan as the 190:, a deliberately Machiavellian attempt by Stalin to maintain Soviet hegemony over the region by artificially dividing its inhabitants into separate nations and with borders deliberately drawn so as to leave minorities within each state. Though indeed the Soviets were concerned at the possible threat of 322:

and mining sections of the border, citing the threat of cross-border terrorism. A 2001 agreement to potentially demarcate sections of the border and create land-swaps connecting their respective enclaves to the ‘mainland’ was poorly received in Kyrgyzstan and the agreement was never ratified, leading

270:

The border between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan proved exceedingly hard to draw owing to the mixed nature of settlement in the Ferghana Valley. As a rule of thumb the territorial committees gave nomadic areas to the Kyrgyz and settled ones to the Uzbeks. However the Soviets felt that the Kyrgyz entity

266:

of the Soviet Union announced that it would proceed with NTD in Central Asia. The process was to be overseen by a Special Committee of the Central Asian Bureau, with three sub-committees for each of what were deemed to be the main nationalities of the region (Kazakhs, Turkmen and Uzbeks), with work

122:

The Uzbek railway network has several sections which cross this border, leaving a handful of stations in Kyrgyzstan at the end of small branch lines, and the easternmost section of railway crosses the border twice. This is a legacy of the Soviet era where infrastructure was built without regard to

104:. The rest of the boundary is very convoluted, consisting of a series of twisted lines forming the 'arrow-head' shape of eastern Uzbekistan. The north side of this ‘arrow’ contains a point of Uzbek territory in the middle, creating a small Uzbek 672:

The charge is so common as to have become almost the conventional wisdom within mainstream journalistic coverage of Central Asia, with Stalin himself often the one drawing the borders, see for example Stourton, E. in The Guardian, 2010

179:(or NTD). This was in line with Communist theory that nationalism was a necessary step on the path towards an eventually communist society, and Joseph Stalin's definition of a nation as being 181:"a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture" 80:

The border starts in the north at the tripoint with Kazakhstan and then creates a ‘finger’ of Uzbek territory wedged between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan; the border traverses the

296: 292: 263: 223:

NTD of the area along ethnic lines had been proposed as early as 1920. At this time Central Asia consisted of two Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (ASSRs) within the

232: 119:

The northernmost section of the border is mountainous and sparsely populated, in stark contrast to the rest which traverses the densely populated Ferghana Valley.

259: 291:

in October 1924, with borders matching those of modern Kyrgyzstan. In 1925 it was renamed the Kirghiz Autonomous Oblast in May 1925, then became the

231:, created in April 1918 and covering large parts of what are now southern Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, as well as Turkmenistan, and the 1366: 1300: 228: 1450: 1430: 224: 300: 1425: 271:

lacked towns, and that this would act as an impediment to economic development. It was for this reason that the Kyrgyz were awarded

1182: 101: 1159: 1204: 198:

of the 1920s, closer analysis informed by the primary sources paints a much more nuanced picture than is commonly presented.

244: 1359: 1293: 677: 248: 1404: 637: 713: 1384: 176: 84:, with much of this area being taken up by a series of national parks (Ugam-Chatkal National Park in Uzbekistan and 1399: 1389: 1328: 1323: 632: 691: 311: 201:

The Soviets aimed to create ethnically homogeneous republics, however many areas were ethnically-mixed (e.g. the

1445: 1440: 1435: 1352: 1286: 684: 284: 205:) and it often proved difficult to assign a ‘correct’ ethnic label to some peoples (e.g. the mixed Tajik-Uzbek 85: 705: 1133: 517: 1318: 131: 1110: 279:. The border assumed its current position in 1929, with Tajikistan gaining Khojand and becoming a full 159:

Russia had conquered Central Asia in the 19th century by annexing the formerly independent Khanates of

537: 698: 186:

The NTD is commonly portrayed by anti-communists as being nothing more than a cynical exercise in

88:

in Kyrgyzstan). The boundary then proceeds in a roughly south-eastwards direction, traversing the

314:

and the independence of its constituent republics. Tensions has already become apparent with the

657: 460: 610: 175:

it was decided to divide Central Asia into ethnically-based republics in a process known as

557: 547: 349: 113: 8: 1077: 615: 216: 116:. The border then proceeds via a series of jagged lines westwards to the Tajik tripoint. 32: 1260: 542: 455: 417: 236: 168: 109: 678:

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/jun/20/kyrgyzstan-stalins-deadly-legacy

562: 195: 160: 140: 1184:

Tug-Of-War: Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan Look To Finally Settle Decades-Old Border Dispute

714:

https://www.thenational.ae/world/asia/stalin-at-core-of-kyrgyzstan-carnage-1.548241

522: 336: 319: 315: 240: 164: 93: 425: 202: 187: 97: 81: 41: 692:

https://www.economist.com/briefing/2010/06/17/stalins-harvest?story_id=16377083

139:

There are several enclaves along the border: one Kyrgyz enclave in Uzbekistan (

1419: 1228: 89: 685:

https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/kyrgyzstan-crisis-and-russian-dilemma

1083: 430: 332: 172: 105: 1057: