2010:
954:...ending plea bargaining has put responsibility back into every level of our system: police did better investigating; prosecutors and lawyers began preparing their cases better; lazy judges were compelled to spend more time in court and control their calendars more efficiently. Most importantly, justice was served—and criminals began to realize that they could not continue their arrogant manipulation of a paper-tiger court system.
794:
defendants, advised by competent counsel, would falsely condemn themselves. But our view is to the contrary and is based on our expectations that courts will satisfy themselves that pleas of guilty are voluntarily and intelligently made by competent defendants with adequate advice of counsel and that there is nothing to question the accuracy and reliability of the defendants' admissions".
707:. Accordingly, early US plea bargain history led to courts' permitting withdrawal of pleas and rejection of plea bargains, although such arrangements continued to happen behind the scenes. A rise in the scale and scope of criminal law led to plea bargaining's gaining new acceptance in the early 20th century, as courts and prosecutors sought to address an overwhelming influx of cases:
994:, or in any event to end up serving less time than they would serve waiting for trial. Outcomes in criminal cases are also made less predictable by the fact that, while a plaintiff in a civil case has a financial incentive to seek the largest judgment possible, a prosecutor does not necessarily have an incentive to pursue the most severe sentence possible.
778:
from other prior cases emphasizing improper confessions, concluding: "we cannot hold that it is unconstitutional for the State to extend a benefit to a defendant who in turn extends a substantial benefit to the State and who demonstrates by his plea that he is ready and willing to admit his crime and
661:
Several features of the
American justice system tend to promote plea bargaining. The adversarial nature of the system puts judges in a passive role, in which they are completely dependent upon the parties to develop the factual record and cannot independently discover information with which to assess
879:
The use of plea bargaining has inspired some controversy over issues such as its potentially coercive effect on incarcerated defendants, defendants who have been charged with more serious offenses than the facts warrant, and innocent defendants, all of whom might feel pressured to enter into a plea
863:
has published an optional seven-page form (containing all mandatory advisements required by federal and state law) to help prosecutors and defense attorneys reduce such bargains into written plea agreements. New
Hampshire and Wisconsin have also published similar forms, though they are much shorter
769:
he plea is more than an admission of past conduct; it is the defendant's consent that judgment of conviction may be entered without a trial—a waiver of his right to trial before a jury or a judge. Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done
742:
warned, in the same decision, that this was conditional only and required appropriate safeguards and usage—namely that plea incentives so large or coercive as to overrule defendants' abilities to act freely, or used in a manner giving rise to a significant number of innocent people pleading guilty,
715:
terminated in 1930 had become nearly eight times as many as the total number of all pending federal prosecutions in 1914. In a number of urban districts the enforcement agencies maintain that the only practicable way of meeting this situation with the existing machinery of the federal courts ... is
961:
Another argument against plea bargaining is that it may not actually reduce the costs of administering justice. For example, if a prosecutor has only a 25% chance of winning his case and sending the defendant away to prison for 10 years, he may make a plea agreement for a one-year sentence; but if
921:
is one reason why, in many countries, plea bargaining is forbidden. Often, precisely the prisoner's dilemma scenario applies: it is in the interest of both suspects to confess and testify against the other suspect, irrespective of the innocence of the accused. Arguably, the worst case is when only
912:
Even when the charges are more serious, prosecutors often can still bluff defense attorneys and their clients into pleading guilty to a lesser offense. As a result, people who might have been acquitted because of lack of evidence, but also who are in fact truly innocent, will often plead guilty to
989:
A counter-argument is that criminal sentencing laws are "lumpy", in that the sentencing ranges are not as precise as the dollars-and-cents calibration that can be achieved in civil case settlements. Furthermore, because some defendants facing small amounts of prison time are jailed pending trial,
846:
provide for two main types of plea agreements. An 11(c)(1)(B) agreement does not bind the court; the prosecutor's recommendation is merely advisory, and the defendant cannot withdraw his plea if the court decides to impose a sentence other than what was stipulated in the agreement. An 11(c)(1)(C)
801:
does not discuss "situation where the prosecutor or judge, or both, deliberately employ their charging and sentencing powers to induce a particular defendant to tender a plea of guilty. In Brady's case there is no claim that the prosecutor threatened prosecution on a charge not justified by the
793:
Plea bargaining "is no more foolproof than full trials to the court or to the jury. Accordingly, we take great precautions against unsound results. We would have serious doubts about this case if the encouragement of guilty pleas by offers of leniency substantially increased the likelihood that
930:
The United States
Supreme Court has recognized plea bargaining as both an essential and desirable part of the criminal justice system. The benefits of plea-bargaining are said to be obvious: the relief of court congestion, alleviation of the risks and uncertainties of trial, and its information
1006:
once noted that, in
America, the defendant "has an absolute, unqualified right to compel the State to investigate its own case, find its own witnesses, prove its own facts, and convince the jury through its own resources. Throughout the process, the defendant has a fundamental right to remain
977:
argument asserts that in the aggregate, plea agreements merely reflect the outcome that would have transpired had the case gone to trial. For example, if the accused faces 10 years and has a 50% chance of losing in court, then an agreement will result in a five-year sentence, less some amount
786:
Plea must not be "induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor's business (e. g.
1007:
silent, in effect challenging the State at every point to 'Prove it!'" It is argued that plea bargaining is inconsistent with limits imposed on the powers of the police and prosecutors by the Bill of Rights. This position has been rejected by the nation's courts.
647:
warned that plea incentives which were sufficiently large or coercive as to over-rule defendants' abilities to act freely, or used in a manner giving rise to a significant number of innocent people pleading guilty, might be prohibited or lead to concerns over
1263:
884:
found that under a range of scenarios ("for example, if criminals are more risk-seeking than the wrongfully accused, or if prosecutors derive a career benefit from trial wins"), the innocent are more likely to enter into guilty pleas than the guilty.
978:
deducted for saving the government the cost of trial. Theoretically, the shadow-of-trial should work even better in criminal cases than in civil cases, because civil judgments are discretionary, while criminal judgments are often regulated by
847:
agreement does bind the court once the court accepts the agreement. When such an agreement is proposed, the court can reject it if it disagrees with the proposed sentence, in which case the defendant has an opportunity to withdraw his plea.
559:
779:
to enter the correctional system in a frame of mind that affords hope for success in rehabilitation over a shorter period of time than might otherwise be necessary." It laid down the following conditions for a plea to be valid:
630:. They have also been increasing in frequency—they rose from 84% of federal cases in 1984 to 94% by 2001. Plea bargains are subject to the approval of the court, and different States and jurisdictions have different rules.
913:
the charge. Why? In a word, fear. And the more numerous and serious the charges, studies have shown, the greater the fear. That explains why prosecutors sometimes seem to file every charge imaginable against defendants.
864:
than the
California form because their state laws do not require as many advisements as California and do not require the defendant to repeatedly write his or her initials next to each separate group of advisements.
834:
are followed in federal cases and have been created to ensure a standard of uniformity in all cases decided in the federal courts. A two- or three-level offense level reduction is usually available for those who
1250:
900:
Plea bargaining is also criticized, particularly outside the United States, on the grounds that its close relationship with rewards, threats and coercion potentially endangers the correct legal outcome.
790:
Pleas entered would not become invalid later merely due to a wish to reconsider the judgment which led to them, or better information about the
Defendant's or the State's case, or the legal position.
753:
that a law was unconstitutional that had the effect of imposing undue fear in a defendant (in that case, the fear of death) to the point it discouraged the exercise of a constitutional right (the
965:
Plea bargaining may allow prosecutors to allocate their resources more efficiently, such that they may direct more time and resources to the trial of suspects charged with serious offenses.
811:
added that when plea bargains are broken, remedies exist; and it has been argued that given the prevalence of plea agreements, the most important rights of the accused may be found in the
313:
822:
Litigation is pending that could determine whether alleged victims of federal crime have a right to be informed by a U.S. Attorney before plea bargains are entered with a defendant.
268:
606:
242:
1531:
252:
958:
Some argue that plea bargaining in Alaska never fully ended, and that the result may not be a true indication of what could occur if plea bargaining was fully abolished.
2014:
892:
is secretly formed between judge, defense attorney and prosecutor, wherein the goal then becomes to speed cases through rather than to ensure that justice is served.
662:
the strength of the case against the defendant. The parties thus can control the outcome of the case by exercising their rights or bargaining them away. The lack of
51:
716:
for the United States
Attorneys to make bargains with defendants or their counsel whereby defendants plead guilty to minor offenses and escape with light penalties.
871:
for mental disorder. Some individuals alleged to be dangerous to self and/or dangerous to others bargain to be classified instead as merely "gravely disabled."
674:
and their limited ability to influence plea agreements also tends to encourage plea bargaining. These inducements to plea bargaining have been described as a "
720:
However, even though over 90% of convictions were based upon plea bargaining by 1930, courts remained reluctant for some time to endorse these when appealed.
1653:
1117:
599:
1483:
816:
762:
754:
60:
1591:
1258:
65:
308:
298:
247:
70:
922:
one party is guilty—here, the innocent one is unlikely to confess, while the guilty one is likely to confess and testify against the innocent.
592:
353:
802:
evidence or that the trial judge threatened Brady with a harsher sentence if convicted after trial in order to induce him to plead guilty."
88:
1392:
1284:
1174:
1922:
1002:
Some legal scholars argue that plea bargaining is unconstitutional because it takes away a person's right to a trial by jury. Justice
2035:
938:, ordered an end to all plea-bargaining; subsequent attorneys-general continued the practice. Similar consequences were observed in
293:
108:
1775:
1497:
1337:
79:
103:
237:
93:
513:
1471:
288:
21:
1215:
843:
534:
493:
483:
113:
1731:
1632:
1574:
1058:
739:
644:
328:
323:
273:
699:, and laws existed covering such criminal confessions, although by the 18th century inducements had been forbidden in
783:
Defendant must be "fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to him"
283:
129:
695:
Plea bargaining has existed for centuries; in older legal systems convictions were at times routinely procured by
333:
1024:
1459:
860:
575:
1074:
Baker, S.; Mezzetti, C. (2001). "Prosecutorial resources, plea bargaining, and the decision to go to trial".
856:
831:
448:
383:
98:
508:
174:
37:
1601:
1498:"Involuntary Commitment for Mental Disorder: The Application of California's Lanterman-Petris-Short Act"
1333:"The Innocent Defendant's Dilemma: An Innovative Empirical Study of Plea Bargaining's Innocence Problem"
943:
570:
880:
bargain to avoid the more serious consequences that would result from conviction. A 2024 study in the
1251:"The Trial Penalty: The Sixth Amendment Right to Trial on the Verge of Extinction and How to Save It"
398:
358:
1088:
1980:
1954:
1813:
1414:
947:
749:
318:
198:
32:
1332:
1213:
Ross, J. E. (2006). "The
Entrenched Position of Plea Bargaining in United States Legal Practice".
418:
348:
303:
1648:
1083:
868:
807:
734:
704:
663:
654:
639:
408:
212:
207:
184:
1159:
1657:
1179:
1121:
983:
918:
836:
554:
463:
403:
378:
159:
1929:
1841:
1141:
473:
169:
134:
1624:
1617:
8:
889:
671:
560:
List of unarmed
African Americans killed by law enforcement officers in the United States
217:
189:
622:
is very common; the vast majority of criminal cases in the United States are settled by
1903:
1886:
1863:
1846:
1822:
1791:
1704:
1660:
1513:
1304:
1232:
1195:
1124:
758:
1439:
1881:
1727:
1628:
1570:
1547:
1155:
1054:
744:
649:
539:
498:
442:
221:
1687:
Rubinstein, Michael L.; White, Teresa J. (1979). "Alaska's Ban on Plea
Bargaining".
1895:
1855:
1783:
1756:
1696:
1539:
1505:
1296:
1224:
1187:
1142:"Bargained Justice: Plea Bargaining's Innocence Problem and the Brady Safety-Valve"
1093:
979:
812:
732:
The constitutionality of plea bargaining and its legal footing were established by
696:
549:
458:
179:
1760:
1228:
1146:
974:
712:
144:
1455:
770:
with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.
757:
covering the right to a jury trial), and also forced the defendant to act as an
2030:
1955:"Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 81-82, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 26 L.Ed.2d 446 (1970)"
488:
427:
154:
139:
1543:
2024:
1808:
1551:
990:
they may find it in their interests to plead guilty so as to be sentenced to
908:(1991), author Martin Yant discusses the use of coercion in plea bargaining.
675:
518:
388:
1981:"Bordenkircher v Hayes, 434 US 357, 364; 98 S Ct 663; 54 L Ed 2d 604 (1978)"
1097:
1747:
Marenin, Otwin (1 January 1995). "The State of Plea Bargaining in Alaska".
623:
478:
374:
338:
278:
991:
939:
935:
700:
631:
580:
503:
468:
393:
42:
1236:
1907:
1867:
1826:
1795:
1726:. Irving-On-Hudson, NY: Foundation for Economic Education. p. 76.
1708:
1517:
1308:
1199:
1003:
667:
627:
164:
1596:
679:
432:
343:
1899:
1859:
1787:
1700:
1509:
1456:
Form CR-101, Plea Form With Explanations and Waiver of Rights-Felony
1393:"Lawyers: Victims Not Told of 'Sweetheart Deal' for Jeffrey Epstein"
1300:
1191:
867:
In California, plea bargaining is sometimes used in proceedings for
1884:(2004). "Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law's Disappearing Shadow".
1051:
Plea Bargaining's Triumph: A History of Plea Bargaining in America
839:
by not holding the prosecution to the burden of proving its case.
2009:
962:
plea bargaining is unavailable, he may drop the case completely.
544:
453:
1724:
Criminal Justice? The Legal System vs. Individual Responsibility
658:
added that when plea bargains are broken, legal remedies exist.
149:
950:, where plea bargaining has been terminated. Bidinotto found:
1811:; Katz, M. L. (1983). "Plea bargaining and social welfare".
637:
The constitutionality of plea bargaining was established by
1619:
Presumed Guilty: When Innocent People Are Wrongly Convicted
1175:"A Constitutional Law of Remedies for Broken Plea Bargains"
906:
Presumed Guilty: When Innocent People Are Wrongly Convicted
437:
1495:
634:
has been used to analyze the plea bargaining decision.
1565:
Eisenstein, James; Jacob, Herbert (January 30, 1991).
1773:
1722:Bidinotto, Robert J. (1994). "Subverting Justice".
1616:
723:
1484:Form CR-227, Plea Questionnaire/ Waiver of Rights
1444:, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 2011-11-30
1285:"Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines"
2022:
1782:, vol. 13, no. 2, , pp. 555–556,
1504:, vol. 11, no. 4, , pp. 629–649,
1326:
1324:
1322:
1320:
1318:
1259:National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
685:
670:. And the inability of crime victims to mount a
1686:
1564:
1677:, 127 Misc.2d 880, 882 (1985).
1530:Little, Andrew T.; Simpson, Hannah K. (2024).
1331:Dervan, Lucian E.; Edkins, Vanessa A. (2013).
968:
1842:"Plea Bargaining outside the Shadow of Trial"
1529:
1472:Acknowledgement and Waiver of Rights - Felony
1315:
1073:
743:might be prohibited or lead to concerns over
600:
1807:
1330:
1172:
1044:
1042:
1243:
1076:Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
1592:"Analysis: the Natwest Three plea bargain"
678:", and prosecutors have been described as
607:
593:
1721:
1558:
1474:, State of New Hampshire Judicial Branch.
1278:
1276:
1087:
1039:
1135:
1133:
934:In 1975 the Attorney-General of Alaska,
888:A theory was put forth that an informal
1776:"Plea Bargaining: A Critic's Rejoinder"
1746:
1415:"Doe v. United States (S.D. Fla. 2015)"
1282:
1109:
1107:
2023:
1880:
1589:
1390:
1273:
1269:from the original on October 23, 2021.
1139:
1048:
925:
1920:
1839:
1173:Westen, Peter; Westin, David (1978).
1130:
986:, making sentences more predictable.
261:Police operations/organization/issues
2015:Plea bargaining in the United States
1614:
1212:
1104:
1025:"Interview: Judge Michael McSpadden"
997:
761:against himself in violation of the
747:. Previously, the Court had held in
620:Plea bargaining in the United States
1216:American Journal of Comparative Law
855:Plea bargains are so common in the
844:Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
13:
1923:"The Case Against Plea Bargaining"
917:The theoretical work based on the
895:
269:Police certification and licensure
14:
2047:
2002:
1590:Bawden, Tom (November 28, 2007),
1536:American Political Science Review
1496:Warren, Carol A. B. (1976–1977),
882:American Political Science Review
825:
230:Lists of law enforcement agencies
2036:United States criminal procedure
2008:
1928:. Cato Institute. Archived from
1391:Winter, Tom (12 February 2016).
850:
690:
1973:
1947:
1914:
1874:
1833:
1801:
1767:
1740:
1715:
1680:
1666:
1641:
1608:
1583:
1569:. University Press Of America.
1523:
1489:
1477:
1465:
1448:
1432:
1407:
1384:
1372:
1360:
1348:
666:also gives prosecutors greater
1460:Judicial Council of California
1206:
1166:
1067:
1027:. PBS. Frontline. 17 June 2004
1017:
874:
861:Judicial Council of California
711:ederal prosecutions under the
1:
1774:Kipnis, Kenneth (1978–1979),
1761:10.1080/0735648X.1995.9721039
1053:. Stanford University Press.
1010:
857:Superior Courts of California
832:Federal Sentencing Guidelines
725:
686:History and constitutionality
384:State bureau of investigation
1921:Lynch, Timothy (Fall 2003).
1749:Journal of Crime and Justice
1623:. Prometheus Books. p.
494:Probation and parole officer
449:Sheriff and sheriff's deputy
7:
969:Impact on average sentences
314:Killings by law enforcement
175:Fruit of the poisonous tree
10:
2052:
1229:10.1093/ajcl/54.suppl1.717
1140:Dervan, Lucian E. (2012).
944:Ventura County, California
514:Marshal and deputy marshal
1840:Bibas, Stephanos (2004).
1544:10.1017/S0003055424000765
1486:, Wisconsin Court System.
1283:Standen, Jeffrey (1993).
774:The ruling distinguished
765:. The Court stated that:
1814:American Economic Review
1689:Law & Society Review
1600:, London, archived from
1532:"Guilt and Guilty Pleas"
948:Oakland County, Michigan
750:United States v. Jackson
419:law enforcement officers
359:Gangs in law enforcement
354:Women in law enforcement
319:Militarization of police
1049:Fisher, George (2003).
815:rather than the law of
349:Criminal justice reform
2013:Quotations related to
1649:Santobello v. New York
1338:J. Crim. Law Criminol.
1114:Brady v. United States
956:
915:
869:involuntary commitment
808:Santobello v. New York
772:
735:Brady v. United States
718:
705:miscarriage of justice
664:compulsory prosecution
655:Santobello v. New York
643:in 1970, although the
640:Brady v. United States
213:State attorney general
185:Criminal investigation
1674:People v. Glendenning
1615:Yant, Martin (1991).
1098:10.1093/jleo/17.1.149
984:sentencing guidelines
952:
910:
837:accept responsibility
767:
709:
555:Medical jurisprudence
160:Searches and seizures
1970:Black, J. Dissenting
1780:Law & Soc'y Rev.
1502:Law & Soc'y Rev.
890:courtroom work group
253:District of Columbia
170:Exculpatory evidence
135:Reasonable suspicion
52:Separation of powers
24:in the United States
926:Judicial efficiency
672:private prosecution
509:Federal air marshal
190:Criminal psychology
1887:Harvard Law Review
1882:Stuntz, William J.
1847:Harvard Law Review
919:prisoner's dilemma
740:U.S. Supreme Court
728: 1950 onward)
489:Correction officer
130:Criminal procedure
998:Constitutionality
931:gathering value.
759:unwilling witness
745:constitutionality
650:constitutionality
626:rather than by a
617:
616:
540:Police dispatcher
499:Probation officer
248:State corrections
222:district attorney
2043:
2012:
1996:
1995:
1993:
1991:
1977:
1971:
1969:
1967:
1965:
1951:
1945:
1944:
1942:
1940:
1934:
1927:
1918:
1912:
1911:
1894:(8): 2548–2569.
1878:
1872:
1871:
1854:(8): 2463–2547.
1837:
1831:
1830:
1805:
1799:
1798:
1771:
1765:
1764:
1744:
1738:
1737:
1719:
1713:
1712:
1684:
1678:
1676:
1670:
1664:
1663: (1971), 261
1645:
1639:
1638:
1622:
1612:
1606:
1605:
1604:on June 11, 2011
1587:
1581:
1580:
1562:
1556:
1555:
1527:
1521:
1520:
1493:
1487:
1481:
1475:
1469:
1463:
1452:
1446:
1445:
1436:
1430:
1429:
1427:
1425:
1411:
1405:
1404:
1402:
1400:
1388:
1382:
1376:
1370:
1364:
1358:
1352:
1346:
1345:
1328:
1313:
1312:
1295:(6): 1471–1538.
1280:
1271:
1270:
1268:
1255:
1247:
1241:
1240:
1210:
1204:
1203:
1170:
1164:
1163:
1137:
1128:
1111:
1102:
1101:
1091:
1071:
1065:
1064:
1046:
1037:
1036:
1034:
1032:
1021:
980:mandatory minima
813:law of contracts
727:
724:Modern history (
609:
602:
595:
550:Medical examiner
459:County detective
274:Internal affairs
218:State's attorney
180:Actual innocence
18:
17:
2051:
2050:
2046:
2045:
2044:
2042:
2041:
2040:
2021:
2020:
2005:
2000:
1999:
1989:
1987:
1979:
1978:
1974:
1963:
1961:
1953:
1952:
1948:
1938:
1936:
1935:on 7 March 2004
1932:
1925:
1919:
1915:
1900:10.2307/4093405
1879:
1875:
1860:10.2307/4093404
1838:
1834:
1809:Grossman, G. M.
1806:
1802:
1788:10.2307/3053268
1772:
1768:
1745:
1741:
1734:
1720:
1716:
1701:10.2307/3053259
1685:
1681:
1672:
1671:
1667:
1646:
1642:
1635:
1613:
1609:
1588:
1584:
1577:
1563:
1559:
1528:
1524:
1510:10.2307/3053175
1494:
1490:
1482:
1478:
1470:
1466:
1453:
1449:
1438:
1437:
1433:
1423:
1421:
1413:
1412:
1408:
1398:
1396:
1389:
1385:
1377:
1373:
1365:
1361:
1353:
1349:
1329:
1316:
1301:10.2307/3480956
1281:
1274:
1266:
1253:
1249:
1248:
1244:
1211:
1207:
1192:10.2307/3480098
1171:
1167:
1147:Utah Law Review
1138:
1131:
1112:
1105:
1089:10.1.1.173.4073
1072:
1068:
1061:
1047:
1040:
1030:
1028:
1023:
1022:
1018:
1013:
1000:
975:shadow-of-trial
971:
928:
898:
896:Coercive effect
877:
853:
828:
817:trial procedure
730:
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