974:. Both sides agree that rationality demands and depends in some sense on reasons. They disagree on what reasons are relevant or how to conceive those reasons. Internalists understand reasons as mental states, for example, as perceptions, beliefs, or desires. On this view, an action may be rational because it is in tune with the agent's beliefs and realizes their desires. Externalists, on the other hand, see reasons as external factors about what is good or right. They state that whether an action is rational also depends on its actual consequences. The difference between the two positions is that internalists affirm and externalists reject the claim that rationality supervenes on the mind. This claim means that it only depends on the person's mind whether they are rational and not on external factors. So for internalism, two persons with the same mental states would both have the same degree of rationality independent of how different their external situation is. Because of this limitation, rationality can diverge from actuality. So if the agent has a lot of misleading evidence, it may be rational for them to turn left even though the actually correct path goes right.
1399:. Another form of overlap is that the study of the rules governing practical rationality is a theoretical matter. And practical considerations may determine whether to pursue theoretical rationality on a certain issue as well as how much time and resources to invest in the inquiry. It is often held that practical rationality presupposes theoretical rationality. This is based on the idea that to decide what should be done, one needs to know what is the case. But one can assess what is the case independently of knowing what should be done. So in this regard, one can study theoretical rationality as a distinct discipline independent of practical rationality but not the other way round. However, this independence is rejected by some forms of doxastic voluntarism. They hold that theoretical rationality can be understood as one type of practical rationality. This is based on the controversial claim that we can decide what to believe. It can take the form of
1743:. The mental states in the superstructure receive their justification from other rational mental states while the foundational mental states receive their justification from a more basic source. For example, the above-mentioned belief that there is a tree outside is foundational since it is based on a basic source: perception. Knowing that trees grow in soil, we may deduce that there is soil outside. This belief is equally rational, being supported by an adequate ground, but it belongs to the superstructure since its rationality is grounded in the rationality of another belief. Desires, like beliefs, form a hierarchy: intrinsic desires are at the foundation while instrumental desires belong to the superstructure. In order to link the instrumental desire to the intrinsic desire an extra element is needed: a belief that the fulfillment of the instrumental desire is a means to the fulfillment of the intrinsic desire.
1340:. A desire is instrumental if its fulfillment serves as a means to the fulfillment of another desire. For example, Jack is sick and wants to take medicine to get healthy again. In this case, the desire to take the medicine is instrumental since it only serves as a means to Jack's noninstrumental desire to get healthy. Both proceduralism and substantivism usually agree that a person can be irrational if they lack an instrumental desire despite having the corresponding noninstrumental desire and being aware that it acts as a means. Proceduralists hold that this is the only way a desire can be irrational. Substantivists, on the other hand, allow that noninstrumental desires may also be irrational. In this regard, a substantivist could claim that it would be irrational for Jack to lack his noninstrumental desire to be healthy. Similar debates focus on the rationality of
1062:, involves a doctor who receives a patient with a mild condition and has to prescribe one out of three drugs: drug A resulting in a partial cure, drug B resulting in a complete cure, or drug C resulting in the patient's death. The doctor's problem is that they cannot tell which of the drugs B and C results in a complete cure and which one in the patient's death. The objectively best case would be for the patient to get drug B, but it would be highly irresponsible for the doctor to prescribe it given the uncertainty about its effects. So the doctor ought to prescribe the less effective drug A, which is also the rational choice. This thought experiment indicates that rationality and normativity coincide since what is rational and what one ought to do depends on the agent's mind after all.
1047:, who considers the case of a fish an agent wants to eat. It contains salmonella, which is a decisive reason why the agent ought not to eat it. But the agent is unaware of this fact, which is why it is rational for them to eat the fish. So this would be a case where normativity and rationality come apart. This example can be generalized in the sense that rationality only depends on the reasons accessible to the agent or how things appear to them. What one ought to do, on the other hand, is determined by objectively existing reasons. In the ideal case, rationality and normativity may coincide but they come apart either if the agent lacks access to a reason or if he has a mistaken belief about the presence of a reason. These considerations are summed up in the statement that rationality
2221:(IR). Some scholars hold it indispensable. Others are more critical. Still, the pervasive and persistent usage of "rationality" in political science and IR is beyond dispute. "Rationality" remains ubiquitous in this field. Abulof finds that Some 40% of all scholarly references to "foreign policy" allude to "rationality"āand this ratio goes up to more than half of pertinent academic publications in the 2000s. He further argues that when it comes to concrete security and foreign policies, IR employment of rationality borders on "malpractice": rationality-based descriptions are largely either false or unfalsifiable; many observers fail to explicate the meaning of "rationality" they employ; and the concept is frequently used politically to distinguish between "us and them."
1073:. On this view, critique of irrational behavior, like the doctor prescribing drug B, involves a negative evaluation of the agent in terms of responsibility but remains silent on normative issues. On a competence-based account, which defines rationality in terms of the competence of responding to reasons, such behavior can be understood as a failure to execute one's competence. But sometimes we are lucky and we succeed in the normative dimension despite failing to perform competently, i.e. rationally, due to being irresponsible. The opposite can also be the case: bad luck may result in failure despite a responsible, competent performance. This explains how rationality and normativity can come apart despite our practice of criticizing irrationality.
1285:. In both cases, believing in the premises of an argument makes it rational to also believe in its conclusion. The difference between the two is given by how the premises support the conclusion. For deductive reasoning, the premises offer the strongest possible support: it is impossible for the conclusion to be false if the premises are true. The premises of non-deductive arguments also offer support for their conclusion. But this support is not absolute: the truth of the premises does not guarantee the truth of the conclusion. Instead, the premises make it more likely that the conclusion is true. In this case, it is usually demanded that the non-deductive support is sufficiently strong if the belief in the conclusion is to be rational.
1372:. But on the theoretical level, one does not have to form a belief about which route was taken upon hearing that someone reached the goal. In this case, the arbitrary choice for one belief rather than the other would be theoretically irrational. Instead, the agent should suspend their belief either way if they lack sufficient reasons. Another difference is that practical rationality is guided by specific goals and desires, in contrast to theoretical rationality. So it is practically rational to take medicine if one has the desire to cure a sickness. But it is theoretically irrational to adopt the belief that one is healthy just because one desires this. This is a form of
1878:
cards need to be turned around in order to verify the conditional claim "if there is a vowel on one side of the card, then there is an even number on the other side of the card". The correct answer is A and 7. But this answer is only given by about 10%. Many choose card 4 instead even though there is no requirement on what letters may appear on its opposite side. An important insight from using these and similar tests is that the rational ability of the participants is usually significantly better for concrete and realistic cases than for abstract or implausible cases. Various contemporary studies in this field use
880:. For example, if the agent has a pre-existing intention that turns out to conflict with their beliefs, then the enkratic norm requires them to change it, which is disallowed by the norm of persistence. This suggests that, in cases of rational dilemmas, it is impossible to be rational, no matter which norm is privileged. Some defenders of coherence theories of rationality have argued that, when formulated correctly, the norms of rationality cannot enter into conflict with each other. That means that rational dilemmas are impossible. This is sometimes tied to additional non-trivial assumptions, such that
1368:". On this view, theoretical rationality is about how the mind corresponds to the world by representing it. Practical rationality, on the other hand, is about how the world corresponds to the ideal set up by the mind and how it should be changed. Another difference is that arbitrary choices are sometimes needed for practical rationality. For example, there may be two equally good routes available to reach a goal. On the practical level, one has to choose one of them if one wants to reach the goal. It would even be practically irrational to resist this arbitrary choice, as exemplified by
1456:
This form of social or collective rationality concerns both theoretical and practical issues like group beliefs and group decisions. And just like in the individual case, it is possible to study these phenomena as well as the processes and structures that are responsible for them. On the social level, there are various forms of cooperation to reach a shared goal. In the theoretical cases, a group of jurors may first discuss and then vote to determine whether the defendant is guilty. Or in the practical case, politicians may cooperate to implement new regulations to combat
812:, which is a strong reason against eating the fish. But since the agent could not have known this fact, eating the fish is rational for them. Because of such problems, many theorists have opted for an internalist version of this account. This means that the agent does not need to respond to reasons in general, but only to reasons they have or possess. The success of such approaches depends a lot on what it means to have a reason and there are various disagreements on this issue. A common approach is to hold that this access is given through the possession of
2140:. These laws act as norms of rationality: beliefs are rational if they comply with them and irrational if they violate them. For example, it would be irrational to have a credence of 0.9 that it will rain tomorrow together with another credence of 0.9 that it will not rain tomorrow. This account of rationality can also be extended to the practical domain by requiring that agents maximize their subjective expected utility. This way, Bayesianism can provide a unified account of both theoretical and practical rationality.
1158:) to get the most useful results. For example, the ideal rational norms of decision theory demand that the agent should always choose the option with the highest expected value. However, calculating the expected value of each option may take a very long time in complex situations and may not be worth the trouble. This is reflected in the fact that actual reasoners often settle for an option that is good enough without making certain that it is really the best option available. A further difficulty in this regard is
719:. Arational things are outside the domain of rational evaluation, like digestive processes or the weather. Things within the domain of rationality are either rational or irrational depending on whether they fulfill the standards of rationality. For example, beliefs, actions, or general policies are rational if there is a good reason for them and irrational otherwise. It is not clear in all cases what belongs to the domain of rational assessment. For example, there are disagreements about whether desires and
1662:
emotionāto which Weber himself said that this was a kind of rationality that was on the borderline of what he considered "meaningfully oriented." The fourth was traditional or conventional, determined by ingrained habituation. Weber emphasized that it was very unusual to find only one of these orientations: combinations were the norm. His usage also makes clear that he considered the first two as more significant than the others, and it is arguable that the third and fourth are subtypes of the first two.
828:. A similar version states that "rationality consists in responding correctly to beliefs about reasons". So it is rational to bring an umbrella if the agent has strong evidence that it is going to rain. But without this evidence, it would be rational to leave the umbrella at home, even if, unbeknownst to the agent, it is going to rain. These versions avoid the previous objection since rationality no longer requires the agent to respond to external factors of which they could not have been aware.
750:", and "reasoning" are frequently used as synonyms. But in technical contexts, their meanings are often distinguished. Reason is usually understood as the faculty responsible for the process of reasoning. This process aims at improving mental states. Reasoning tries to ensure that the norms of rationality obtain. It differs from rationality nonetheless since other psychological processes besides reasoning may have the same effect. Rationality derives etymologically from the Latin term
1819:: "act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law". The principle of universality has been suggested as a basic principle both for morality and for rationality. This is closely related to the question of whether agents have a duty to be rational. Another issue concerns the value of rationality. In this regard, it is often held that human lives are more important than animal lives because humans are rational.
1162:, which states that one cannot deduce what ought to be based on what is. So just because a certain heuristic or cognitive bias is present in a specific case, it should not be inferred that it should be present. One approach to these problems is to hold that descriptive and normative theories talk about different types of rationality. This way, there is no contradiction between the two and both can be correct in their own field. Similar problems are discussed in so-called
1584:
885:
accounts of rationality since they "allow for rationality despite conflicting reasons but do not allow for rationality despite conflicting requirements". Some theorists suggest a weaker criterion of coherence to avoid cases of necessary irrationality: rationality requires not to obey all norms of coherence but to obey as many norms as possible. So in rational dilemmas, agents can still be rational if they violate the minimal number of rational requirements.
9813:
2099:
Game theory can be used to analyze various situations, like playing chess, firms competing for business, or animals fighting over prey. Rationality is a core assumption of game theory: it is assumed that each player chooses rationally based on what is most beneficial from their point of view. This way, the agent may be able to anticipate how others choose and what their best choice is relative to the behavior of the others. This often results in a
1690:, as well as the affective and value-based arguments of Weber) can be found in the critique of Etzioni (1988), who reframes thought on decision-making to argue for a reversal of the position put forward by Weber. Etzioni illustrates how purposive/instrumental reasoning is subordinated by normative considerations (ideas on how people 'ought' to behave) and affective considerations (as a support system for the development of human relationships).
873:
agents are required to intend what they believe they ought to do. This requires coherence between beliefs and intentions. The norm of persistence states that agents should retain their intentions over time. This way, earlier mental states cohere with later ones. It is also possible to distinguish different types of rationality, such as theoretical or practical rationality, based on the different sets of rules they require.
2301:" (1978), critiqued the notion of rationality as a neutral and objective force. Foucault emphasized the intertwining of rationality with power structures and its role in social control. He famously stated, "Power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society."
865:. Positive coherence refers to the support that different mental states provide for each other. For example, there is positive coherence between the belief that there are eight planets in the solar system and the belief that there are less than ten planets in the solar system: the earlier belief implies the latter belief. Other types of support through positive coherence include explanatory and
1460:. These forms of cooperation can be judged on their social rationality depending on how they are implemented and on the quality of the results they bear. Some theorists try to reduce social rationality to individual rationality by holding that the group processes are rational to the extent that the individuals participating in them are rational. But such a reduction is frequently rejected.
1758:, on the other hand, comes in the form of hedonic experience: the experience of pleasure and pain. So, for example, a desire to eat ice-cream is rational if it is based on experiences in which the agent enjoyed the taste of ice-cream, and irrational if it lacks such a support. Because of its dependence on experience, rationality can be defined as a kind of responsiveness to experience.
921:. The slogan of Hume's position is that "reason is the slave of the passions". This is often understood as the claim that rationality concerns only how to reach a goal but not whether the goal should be pursued at all. So people with perverse or weird goals may still be perfectly rational. This position is opposed by Kant, who argues that rationality requires having the right goals and
990:
usually accepted, but many theorists have raised doubts that rationality can be identified with normativity. On this view, rationality may sometimes recommend suboptimal actions, for example, because the agent lacks important information or has false information. In this regard, discussions between internalism and externalism overlap with discussions of the normativity of rationality.
957:
perspectives diverge a lot concerning the behavior they prescribe. One problem for all of them is that they ignore the role of the evidence or information possessed by the agent. In this regard, it matters for rationality not just whether the agent acts efficiently towards a certain goal but also what information they have and how their actions appear reasonable from this perspective.
9800:
2320:
1332:. Practical rationality includes the field of actions but not of behavior in general. The difference between the two is that actions are intentional behavior, i.e. they are performed for a purpose and guided by it. In this regard, intentional behavior like driving a car is either rational or irrational while non-intentional behavior like sneezing is outside the domain of rationality.
1477:
generate outputs. Output-oriented approaches are more common in philosophy and investigate the rationality of the resulting states. Another distinction is between relative and categorical judgments of rationality. In the relative case, rationality is judged based on limited information or evidence while categorical judgments take all the evidence into account and are thus judgments
836:. Cases of conflict are thus solved since one side usually outweighs the other. So despite the reasons cited in favor of eating the fish, the balance of reasons stands against it, since avoiding a salmonella infection is a much weightier reason than the other reasons cited. This can be expressed by stating that rational agents pick the option favored by the balance of reasons.
2334:
1431:, they should also believe in everything that logically follows from this proposition. However, many theorists reject this form of logical omniscience as a requirement for rationality. They argue that, since the human mind is limited, rationality has to be defined accordingly to account for how actual finite humans possess some form of resource-limited rationality.
702:, planning, and deciding as well as the formation of desires and intentions. These processes usually affect some kind of change in the thinker's mental states. In this regard, one can also talk of the rationality of mental states, like beliefs and intentions. A person who possesses these forms of rationality to a sufficiently high degree may themselves be called
1764:, in contrast to beliefs and desires, do not have a source of justification of their own. Their rationality is grounded in the rationality of other states instead: in the rationality of beliefs and desires. Desires motivate actions. Beliefs are needed here, as in the case of instrumental desires, to bridge a gap and link two elements. Audi distinguishes the
1191:. According to conservativism, the burden of proof is always in favor of already established belief: in the absence of new evidence, it is rational to keep the mental states one already has. According to foundationalism, the burden of proof is always in favor of suspending mental states. For example, the agent reflects on their pre-existing belief that the
1262:. In this regard, it is often argued that to be rational, the believer has to respond to the impressions or reasons presented by these sources. For example, the visual impression of the sunlight on a tree makes it rational to believe that the sun is shining. In this regard, it may also be relevant whether the formed belief is involuntary and implicit
1043:
is based on considerations of praise- and blameworthiness. It states that we usually hold each other responsible for being rational and criticize each other when we fail to do so. This practice indicates that irrationality is some form of fault on the side of the subject that should not be the case. A strong counterexample to this position is due to
670:, policies, and institutions. Because of this variety in different contexts, it has proven difficult to give a unified definition covering all these fields and usages. In this regard, different fields often focus their investigation on one specific conception, type, or aspect of rationality without trying to cover it in its most general sense.
2205:
nonlinear function of performance is often desired, so that the reward for winning is lower than the punishment for losing. An agent might be rational within its own problem area, but finding the rational decision for arbitrarily complex problems is not practically possible. The rationality of human thought is a key problem in the
857:. This means that the agent's mental states do not clash with each other. In some cases, inconsistencies are rather obvious, as when a person believes that it will rain tomorrow and that it will not rain tomorrow. In complex cases, inconsistencies may be difficult to detect, for example, when a person believes in the axioms of
1106:. This can take the form of studies that present their participants with a cognitive problem. It is then observed how the participants solve the problem, possibly together with explanations of why they arrived at a specific solution. Normative issues, on the other hand, are usually investigated in similar ways to how the
574:, which takes into account that this is not always possible since the computational power of the human mind is too limited. Most academic discussions focus on the rationality of individuals. This contrasts with social or collective rationality, which pertains to collectives and their group beliefs and decisions.
541:, which is why it is rational for an agent to do so in response. An important rival to this approach are coherence-based accounts, which define rationality as internal coherence among the agent's mental states. Many rules of coherence have been suggested in this regard, for example, that one should not hold
2044:. Decisions are situations where a number of possible courses of action are available to the agent, who has to choose one of them. Decision theory investigates the rules governing which action should be chosen. It assumes that each action may lead to a variety of outcomes. Each outcome is associated with a
735:. In the academic discourse, on the other hand, rationality is usually identified with being guided by reasons or following norms of internal coherence. Some of the earlier examples may qualify as rational in the academic sense depending on the circumstances. Examples of irrationality in this sense include
1446:
heuristic, for example, agents usually stop their search for the best option once an option is found that meets their desired achievement level. In this regard, people often do not continue to search for the best possible option, even though this is what theories of ideal rationality commonly demand.
989:
is a normative reason for not eating it. The problem of rationality is primarily concerned with normative reasons. This is especially true for various contemporary philosophers who hold that rationality can be reduced to normative reasons. The distinction between motivational and normative reasons is
980:
has criticized externalist conceptions of rationality based on the claim that rationality should help explain what motivates the agent to act. This is easy for internalism but difficult for externalism since external reasons can be independent of the agent's motivation. Externalists have responded to
888:
Another criticism rests on the claim that coherence-based accounts are either redundant or false. On this view, either the rules recommend the same option as the balance of reasons or a different option. If they recommend the same option, they are redundant. If they recommend a different option, they
693:
and act in reasonable ways. It does not imply that all humans are rational all the time: this ability is exercised in some cases but not in others. On the other hand, the term can also refer to the process of reasoning that results from exercising this ability. Often many additional activities of the
2062:
of an act is equivalent to the sum of all expected gains of the outcomes associated with it. From these basic ingredients, it is possible to define the rationality of decisions: a decision is rational if it selects the act with the highest expected utility. While decision theory gives a very precise
2031:
offer support to its conclusion. Theoretical rationality, on the other hand, is about what to believe or how to change one's beliefs. The laws of logic are relevant to rationality since the agent should change their beliefs if they violate these laws. But logic is not directly about what to believe.
1467:
usually perform better than individuals by themselves. This form of group superiority is sometimes termed "wisdom of crowds" and may be explained based on the claim that competent individuals have a stronger impact on the group decision than others. However, this is not always the case and sometimes
1323:
Some theorists define the rationality of actions in terms of beliefs and desires. On this view, an action to bring about a certain goal is rational if the agent has the desire to bring about this goal and the belief that their action will realize it. A stronger version of this view requires that the
998:
An important implication of internalist conceptions is that rationality is relative to the person's perspective or mental states. Whether a belief or an action is rational usually depends on which mental states the person has. So carrying an umbrella for the walk to the supermarket is rational for a
884:
also do not exist. A different response is to bite the bullet and allow that rational dilemmas exist. This has the consequence that, in such cases, rationality is not possible for the agent and theories of rationality cannot offer guidance to them. These problems are avoided by reason-responsiveness
2070:
like beliefs and preferences are consistent with each other or do not go against each other. One consequence of this position is that people with obviously false beliefs or perverse preferences may still count as rational if these mental states are consistent with their other mental states. Utility
1810:
are highly intelligent in the pursuit of their schemes and may, therefore, be seen as rational. However, there are also considerations suggesting that the two are closely related to each other. For example, according to the principle of universality, "one's reasons for acting are acceptable only if
1665:
The advantage in Weber's interpretation of rationality is that it avoids a value-laden assessment, say, that certain kinds of beliefs are irrational. Instead, Weber suggests that ground or motive can be givenāfor religious or affect reasons, for exampleāthat may meet the criterion of explanation or
1153:
Traditionally, it was often assumed that actual human reasoning should follow the rules described in normative theories. On this view, any discrepancy is a form of irrationality that should be avoided. However, this usually ignores the human limitations of the mind. Given these limitations, various
1086:
should work. Descriptive theories, on the other hand, investigate how the mind actually works. This includes issues like under which circumstances the ideal rules are followed as well as studying the underlying psychological processes responsible for rational thought. Descriptive theories are often
1042:
Most discussions of the normativity of rationality are interested in the strong sense, i.e. whether agents ought always to be rational. This is sometimes termed a substantive account of rationality in contrast to structural accounts. One important argument in favor of the normativity of rationality
839:
However, other objections to the reason-responsiveness account are not so easily solved. They often focus on cases where reasons require the agent to be irrational, leading to a rational dilemma. For example, if terrorists threaten to blow up a city unless the agent forms an irrational belief, this
2098:
of all available options and choose the option that is most beneficial from their point of view. In the case of game theory, several agents are involved. This further complicates the situation since whether a given option is the best choice for one agent may depend on choices made by other agents.
1133:
An important question in this field concerns the relation between descriptive and normative approaches to rationality. One difficulty in this regard is that there is in many cases a huge gap between what the norms of ideal rationality prescribe and how people actually reason. Examples of normative
1455:
Most discussions and research in the academic literature focus on individual rationality. This concerns the rationality of individual persons, for example, whether their beliefs and actions are rational. But the question of rationality can also be applied to groups as a whole on the social level.
1200:
problem for foundationalism is that very few beliefs, if any, would remain if this approach was carried out meticulously. Another is that enormous mental resources would be required to constantly keep track of all the justificatory relations connecting non-fundamental beliefs to fundamental ones.
1199:
but is unable to access any reason for or against this belief. In this case, conservatists think it is rational to keep this belief while foundationalists reject it as irrational due to the lack of reasons. In this regard, conservatism is much closer to the ordinary conception of rationality. One
1930:
gave an influential account of how the stages in human development from childhood to adulthood can be understood in terms of the increase of rational and logical abilities. He identifies four stages associated with rough age groups: the sensorimotor stage below the age of two, the preoperational
1877:
is an influential test for studying rationality and reasoning abilities. In it, four cards are placed before the participants. Each has a number on one side and a letter on the opposite side. In one case, the visible sides of the four cards are A, D, 4, and 7. The participant is then asked which
1661:
or value/belief-oriented. Here the action is undertaken for what one might call reasons intrinsic to the actor: some ethical, aesthetic, religious or other motives, independent of whether it will lead to success. The third type was affectual, determined by an actor's specific affect, feeling, or
1554:
has a variety of meanings. It is often used for puzzles or unsolved problems of rationality. Some are just situations where it is not clear what the rational person should do. Others involve apparent faults within rationality itself, for example, where rationality seems to recommend a suboptimal
1476:
Many other classifications are discussed in the academic literature. One important distinction is between approaches to rationality based on the output or on the process. Process-oriented theories of rationality are common in cognitive psychology and study how cognitive systems process inputs to
1245:
Theoretical rationality concerns the rationality of cognitive mental states, in particular, of beliefs. It is common to distinguish between two factors. The first factor is about the fact that good reasons are necessary for a belief to be rational. This is usually understood in terms of evidence
961:
responds to this idea by proposing a conception of rationality based on relevant information: "Rationality is a matter of what would survive scrutiny by all relevant information." This implies that the subject repeatedly reflects on all the relevant facts, including formal facts like the laws of
872:
Coherence-based accounts are also referred to as rule-based accounts since the different aspects of coherence are often expressed in precise rules. In this regard, to be rational means to follow the rules of rationality in thought and action. According to the enkratic rule, for example, rational
831:
A problem faced by all forms of reason-responsiveness theories is that there are usually many reasons relevant and some of them may conflict with each other. So while salmonella contamination is a reason against eating the fish, its good taste and the desire not to offend the host are reasons in
848:
An influential rival to the reason-responsiveness account understands rationality as internal coherence. On this view, a person is rational to the extent that their mental states and actions are coherent with each other. Diverse versions of this approach exist that differ in how they understand
791:
A common idea of many theories of rationality is that it can be defined in terms of reasons. On this view, to be rational means to respond correctly to reasons. For example, the fact that a food is healthy is a reason to eat it. So this reason makes it rational for the agent to eat the food. An
565:
Various types of rationality are discussed in the academic literature. The most influential distinction is between theoretical and practical rationality. Theoretical rationality concerns the rationality of beliefs. Rational beliefs are based on evidence that supports them. Practical rationality
2148:
Rationality plays a key role in economics and there are several strands to this. Firstly, there is the concept of instrumentalityābasically the idea that people and organisations are instrumentally rationalāthat is, adopt the best actions to achieve their goals. Secondly, there is an axiomatic
1510:
goals. The study of rationality is very old and has occupied many of the greatest minds since ancient Greek. This interest is often motivated by discovering the potentials and limitations of our minds. Various theorists even see rationality as the essence of being human, often in an attempt to
1335:
For various other practical phenomena, there is no clear consensus on whether they belong to this domain or not. For example, concerning the rationality of desires, two important theories are proceduralism and substantivism. According to proceduralism, there is an important distinction between
1208:
Rationality is discussed in a great variety of fields, often in very different terms. While some theorists try to provide a unifying conception expressing the features shared by all forms of rationality, the more common approach is to articulate the different aspects of the individual forms of
641:
In its most common sense, rationality is the quality of being guided by reasons or being reasonable. For example, a person who acts rationally has good reasons for what they do. This usually implies that they reflected on the possible consequences of their action and the goal it is supposed to
2204:
is the usefulness of the consequences of its actions. The utility function is arbitrarily defined by the designer, but should be a function of "performance", which is the directly measurable consequences, such as winning or losing money. In order to make a safe agent that plays defensively, a
1174:
Rationality is usually understood as conservative in the sense that rational agents do not start from zero but already possess many beliefs and intentions. Reasoning takes place on the background of these pre-existing mental states and tries to improve them. This way, the original beliefs and
803:
Some theorists understand reasons as external facts. This view has been criticized based on the claim that, in order to respond to reasons, people have to be aware of them, i.e. they have some form of epistemic access. But lacking this access is not automatically irrational. In one example by
2032:
Additionally, there are also other factors and norms besides logic that determine whether it is rational to hold or change a belief. The study of rationality in logic is more concerned with epistemic rationality, that is, attaining beliefs in a rational manner, than instrumental rationality.
2149:
concept that rationality is a matter of being logically consistent within your preferences and beliefs. Thirdly, people have focused on the accuracy of beliefs and full use of informationāin this view, a person who is not rational has beliefs that do not fully use the information they have.
775:
or explains the rational state is central. For coherence-based accounts, the relation of coherence between mental states matters. There is a lively discussion in the contemporary literature on whether reason-based accounts or coherence-based accounts are superior. Some theorists also try to
956:
or to the greatest general good. For perfectionism, a certain ideal of perfection, either moral or non-moral, is the goal of rationality. According to the intuitionist perspective, something is rational "if and only if conforms to self-evident truths, intuited by reason". These different
1827:
Many psychological theories have been proposed to describe how reasoning happens and what underlying psychological processes are responsible. One of their goals is to explain how the different types of irrationality happen and why some types are more prevalent than others. They include
2287:'s rationality. They argued that the dominance of instrumental reason in modern society leads to the domination of nature and the dehumanization of individuals. Horkheimer and Adorno highlighted how rationality narrows the scope of human experience and hinders critical thinking.
1914:
suffer from methodological and conceptual problems. This has led to disputes in psychology over whether researchers should (only) use standard rules of logic, probability theory and statistics, or rational choice theory as norms of good reasoning. Opponents of this view, such as
1237:. This corresponds to the distinction between theoretical reasoning and practical reasoning: theoretical reasoning tries to assess whether the agent should change their beliefs while practical reasoning tries to assess whether the agent should change their plans and intentions.
1776:. Global rationality has a derivative status: it depends on the focal rationality. Or more precisely: "Global rationality is reached when a person has a sufficiently integrated system of sufficiently well-grounded propositional attitudes, emotions, and actions". Rationality is
985:. Motivational reasons explain why someone acts the way they do while normative reasons explain why someone ought to act in a certain way. Ideally, the two overlap, but they can come apart. For example, liking chocolate cake is a motivational reason for eating it while having
1031:. Others understand them from an evaluative perspective as good or valuable. A further approach is to talk of rationality based on what is praise- and blameworthy. It is important to distinguish the norms of rationality from other types of norms. For example, some forms of
1780:
in the sense that it depends on the experience of the person in question. Since different people undergo different experiences, what is rational to believe for one person may be irrational to believe for another person. That a belief is rational does not entail that it is
1657:, is related to the expectations about the behavior of other human beings or objects in the environment. These expectations serve as means for a particular actor to attain ends, ends which Weber noted were "rationally pursued and calculated." The second type, Weber called
1901:
among others is that humans are rational in principle but they err in practice, that is, humans have the competence to be rational but their performance is limited by various factors. However, it has been argued that many standard tests of reasoning, such as those on the
2304:
These philosophers' critiques of rationality shed light on its limitations, assumptions, and potential dangers. Their ideas challenge the universal application of rationality as the sole framework for understanding the complexities of human existence and the world.
1039:. Understood in the strongest sense, a norm prescribes what an agent ought to do or what they have most reason to do. The norms of fashion are not norms in this strong sense: that it is unfashionable does not mean that men ought not to wear bell-bottom trousers.
1438:, theories of rationality should take into account cognitive limitations, such as incomplete knowledge, imperfect memory, and limited capacities of computation and representation. An important research question in this field is about how cognitive agents use
1870:. Some empirical findings suggest that metacognition is an important aspect of rationality. The idea behind this claim is that reasoning is carried out more efficiently and reliably if the responsible thought processes are properly controlled and monitored.
1493:
Rationality is central to solving many problems, both on the local and the global scale. This is often based on the idea that rationality is necessary to act efficiently and to reach all kinds of goals. This includes goals from diverse fields, such as
1352:
Theoretical and practical rationality are often discussed separately and there are many differences between them. In some cases, they even conflict with each other. However, there are also various ways in which they overlap and depend on each other.
1320:. There are various aspects of practical rationality, such as how to pick a goal to follow and how to choose the means for reaching this goal. Other issues include the coherence between different intentions as well as between beliefs and intentions.
570:. In some cases, the two can conflict, as when practical rationality requires that one adopts an irrational belief. Another distinction is between ideal rationality, which demands that rational agents obey all the laws and implications of logic, and
770:
terms: something, like a belief or an intention, is rational because of how it is related to something else. But there are disagreements as to what it has to be related to and in what way. For reason-based accounts, the relation to a reason that
1511:
distinguish humans from other animals. However, this strong affirmation has been subjected to many criticisms, for example, that humans are not rational all the time and that non-human animals also show diverse forms of intelligence.
849:
coherence and what rules of coherence they propose. A general distinction in this regard is between negative and positive coherence. Negative coherence is an uncontroversial aspect of most such theories: it requires the absence of
1179:
reject this approach. According to them, the whole system of beliefs is to be justified by self-evident beliefs. Examples of such self-evident beliefs may include immediate experiences as well as simple logical and mathematical
1728:. Irrational mental states, on the other hand, lack a sufficient ground. For example, the perceptual experience of a tree when looking outside the window can ground the rationality of the belief that there is a tree outside.
1991:
is based on the assumption that people are rational agents that maximize expected utility. However, people often depart from the ideal standards of rationality in various ways. For example, they may only look for confirming
1931:
state until the age of seven, the concrete operational stage until the age of eleven, and the formal operational stage afterward. Rational or logical reasoning only takes place in the last stage and is related to abstract
1685:
perspective (Eagleton, 2003) whereby Weber's rationality constructs are viewed as imbued with masculine values and oriented toward the maintenance of male power. An alternative position on rationality (which includes both
1447:
Using heuristics can be highly rational as a way to adapt to the limitations of the human mind, especially in complex cases where these limitations make brute calculations impossible or very time- and resource-intensive.
1390:
links beliefs and intentions. It states that "ationality requires of you that you intend to F if you believe your reasons require you to F". Failing to fulfill this requirement results in cases of irrationality known as
2152:
Debates within economic sociology also arise as to whether or not people or organizations are "really" rational, as well as whether it makes sense to model them as such in formal models. Some have argued that a kind of
1996:
and ignore disconfirming evidence. Another factor studied in this regard are the limitations of human intellectual capacities. Many discrepancies from rationality are caused by limited time, memory, or attention. Often
1081:
The concept of normativity can also be used to distinguish different theories of rationality. Normative theories explore the normative nature of rationality. They are concerned with rules and ideals that govern how the
1963:
or severe psychopathy. Thus, such an idealized form of rationality is best exemplified by computers, and not people. However, scholars may productively appeal to the idealization as a point of reference. In his book,
726:
The meaning of the terms "rational" and "irrational" in academic discourse often differs from how they are used in everyday language. Examples of behaviors considered irrational in ordinary discourse are giving into
561:
of rationality concern the question of whether one should always be rational. A further discussion is whether rationality requires that all beliefs be reviewed from scratch rather than trusting pre-existing beliefs.
2119:
will win their next match and absolutely certain that two plus two equals four. In this case, the degree of the first belief is weaker than the degree of the second belief. These degrees are usually referred to as
2063:
formal treatment of this issue, it leaves open the empirical problem of how to assign utilities and probabilities. So decision theory can still lead to bad empirical decisions if it is based on poor assignments.
1555:
course of action. A special case are so-called rational dilemmas, in which it is impossible to be rational since two norms of rationality conflict with each other. Examples of paradoxes of rationality include
1806:. Many debates center around the question of whether rationality implies morality or is possible without it. Some examples based on common sense suggest that the two can come apart. For example, some immoral
6861:
Chater, Nick; Felin, Teppo; Funder, David C.; Gigerenzer, Gerd; Koenderink, Jan J.; Krueger, Joachim I.; Noble, Denis; Nordli, Samuel A.; Oaksford, Mike; Schwartz, Barry; Stanovich, Keith E. (1 April 2018).
1328:. In decisions, the agent is presented with a set of possible courses of action and has to choose one among them. Decision theory holds that the agent should choose the alternative that has the highest
706:. In some cases, also non-mental results of rational processes may qualify as rational. For example, the arrangement of products in a supermarket can be rational if it is based on a rational plan.
7658:(2007). "Rationality and Indeterminacy", in D. Ross and H. Kinkaid (eds.) The Handbook of Philosophy of Economics, The Oxford Reference Library of Philosophy, Oxford University Press, vol. 6, n.2.
1620:
1019:
in the sense that it sets up certain rules or standards of correctness: to be rational is to comply with certain requirements. For example, rationality requires that the agent does not have
2124:
and represented by numbers between 0 and 1. 0 corresponds to full disbelief, 1 corresponds to full belief and 0.5 corresponds to suspension of belief. Bayesians understand this in terms of
7394:
Bueno De
Mesquita, Bruce (2010) Foreign Policy Analysis and Rational Choice Models. In The International Studies Encyclopedia, edited by Robert Allen Denemark. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
7142:
3605:
5581:
2988:
1023:
beliefs. Many discussions on this issue concern the question of what exactly these standards are. Some theorists characterize the normativity of rationality in the deontological terms of
2863:
Knauff, Markus; Spohn, Wolfgang (14 December 2021). "Psychological and
Philosophical Frameworks of Rationality - A Systematic Introduction". In Knauff, Markus; Spohn, Wolfgang (eds.).
832:
favor of eating it. This problem is usually approached by weighing all the different reasons. This way, one does not respond directly to each reason individually but instead to their
2269:, emphasizing the primacy of our everyday practical engagement with the world. Heidegger challenged the notion that rationality alone is the sole arbiter of truth and understanding.
654:
and beliefs are the most paradigmatic forms of rationality, the term is used both in ordinary language and in many academic disciplines to describe a wide variety of things, such as
537:
shared by all forms of rationality. According to reason-responsiveness accounts, to be rational is to be responsive to reasons. For example, dark clouds are a reason for taking an
1542:. Some forms of research restrict themselves to one specific domain while others investigate the topic in an interdisciplinary manner by drawing insights from different fields.
7596:
545:
beliefs or that one should intend to do something if one believes that one should do it. Goal-based accounts characterize rationality in relation to goals, such as acquiring
6402:
3028:
897:
A different approach characterizes rationality in relation to the goals it aims to achieve. In this regard, theoretical rationality aims at epistemic goals, like acquiring
3135:
4776:
Broome, John (14 December 2021). "1.1 Theories of
Rationality and the DescriptiveāNormative Divide: A Historical Approach". In Knauff, Markus; Spohn, Wolfgang (eds.).
1383:
to one's child may demand the belief that they are innocent while the evidence linking them to the crime may demand a belief in their guilt on the theoretical level.
7066:
4032:
3637:
3274:
7037:
6010:
4872:
2247:" (1886), criticized the overemphasis on rationality and argued that it neglects the irrational and instinctual aspects of human nature. Nietzsche advocated for a
1754:, there are four types of experience that act as sources: perception, memory, introspection, and rational intuition. The main basic source of the rationality of
1716:
developed a comprehensive account of rationality that covers both the theoretical and the practical side of rationality. This account centers on the notion of a
1265:
The second factor pertains to the norms and procedures of rationality that govern how agents should form beliefs based on this evidence. These norms include the
1959:
show that no human has ever satisfied this criterion, except perhaps a person with no affective feelings, for example, an individual with a massively damaged
1225:: whether it is rational to hold a given belief and how certain one should be about it. Practical rationality, on the other hand, is about the rationality of
5921:
1221:
The most influential distinction contrasts theoretical or epistemic rationality with practical rationality. Its theoretical side concerns the rationality of
1007:: what is rational depends on the agent's experience. Since different people make different experiences, there are differences in what is rational for them.
723:
can be evaluated as rational and irrational rather than arational. The term "irrational" is sometimes used in a wide sense to include cases of arationality.
577:
Rationality is important for solving all kinds of problems in order to efficiently reach one's goal. It is relevant to and discussed in many disciplines. In
6721:
1423:
Various theories of rationality assume some form of ideal rationality, for example, by demanding that rational agents obey all the laws and implications of
1292:. In this case, beliefs are formed based on one's desires or what is pleasing to imagine without proper evidential support. Faulty reasoning in the form of
1923:, especially for tasks under high uncertainty. The concept of rationality continues to be debated by psychologists, economists and cognitive scientists.
7599:, by Richard Samuels, Stephen Stich, Luc Faucher on the broad field of reason and rationality from descriptive, normative, and evaluative points of view
5410:
5090:
2178:
aims to account for economic actors as they actually are, allowing for psychological biases, rather than assuming idealized instrumental rationality.
1987:
try to describe, explain, and predict how people think and act. Their models are often based on the assumption that people are rational. For example,
1882:
to study subjective degrees of belief, for example, how the believer's certainty in the premises is carried over to the conclusion through reasoning.
1670:
orientation of means and ends. The opposite is therefore also true: some means-ends explanations will not satisfy those whose grounds for action are
1277:
argument offer support to the conclusion and make therefore the belief in the conclusion rational. The support offered by the premises can either be
3233:
6939:
1209:
rationality. The most common distinction is between theoretical and practical rationality. Other classifications include categories for ideal and
909:
goals. This is usually understood in the sense that rationality follows these goals but does not set them. So rationality may be understood as a "
7118:
6092:
5319:
3581:
2103:, which constitutes a set of strategies, one for each player, where no player can improve their outcome by unilaterally changing their strategy.
7232:
5790:
5689:
5557:
3857:
3810:
2964:
2666:
1463:
Various studies indicate that group rationality often outperforms individual rationality. For example, groups of people working together on the
783:
or also on external factors, whether rationality requires a review of all one's beliefs from scratch, and whether we should always be rational.
9868:
4843:
4210:
460:
7287:
2094:
is closely related to decision theory and the problem of rational choice. Rational choice is based on the idea that rational agents perform a
1951:
According to A. C. Grayling, rationality "must be independent of emotions, personal feelings or any kind of instincts". Certain findings in
1481:. For example, believing that one's investments will multiply can be rational in a relative sense because it is based on one's astrological
876:
One problem with such coherence-based accounts of rationality is that the norms can enter into conflict with each other, so-called rational
6686:"The Dunning-Kruger effect is (mostly) a statistical artefact: Valid approaches to testing the hypothesis with individual differences data"
5981:
4128:
6603:
6069:
5056:
9863:
7754:
6909:
4094:
2454:
589:
is interested in how psychological processes implement rationality. This also includes the study of failures to do so, as in the case of
4903:
8597:
6181:
6662:
4241:
2115:. Bayesian epistemology sees belief as a continuous phenomenon that comes in degrees. For example, Daniel is relatively sure that the
1126:. These forms of investigation can arrive at conclusions about what forms of thought are rational and irrational without depending on
731:, going out late even though one has to get up early in the morning, smoking despite being aware of the health risks, or believing in
8875:
792:
important aspect of this interpretation is that it is not sufficient to merely act accidentally in accordance with reasons. Instead,
7176:
1379:
In some cases, the demands of practical and theoretical rationality conflict with each other. For example, the practical reason of
609:. These laws are highly relevant to the rationality of beliefs. A very influential conception of practical rationality is given in
6394:
5441:
3020:
1324:
responsible beliefs and desires are rational themselves. A very influential conception of the rationality of decisions comes from
7610:
2636:
7256:
6116:
5814:
5713:
5343:
3881:
3834:
2690:
4974:
9512:
952:. This contrasts with the utilitarian point of view, which states that rationality entails trying to contribute to everyone's
7688:
7250:
7136:
6972:
6757:
6496:
6315:
6110:
5967:
5808:
5707:
5575:
5337:
5204:
4837:
4787:
4026:
3925:
3875:
3828:
3599:
3545:
3304:
3268:
3227:
3127:
2982:
2874:
2736:
2684:
2665:
Audi, Robert (2004). "Theoretical
Rationality: Its Sources, Structure, and Scope". In Mele, Alfred R; Rawling, Piers (eds.).
2612:
181:
7206:
6978:
6763:
5210:
4793:
3931:
3551:
3062:
2880:
2742:
6964:
The Growth of
Logical Thinking from Childhood to Adolescence: An Essay on the Construction of Formal Operational Structures
5193:
Knauff, Markus; Spohn, Wolfgang (14 December 2021). "Overview of the
Handbook". In Knauff, Markus; Spohn, Wolfgang (eds.).
3409:
889:
are false since, according to its critics, there is no special value in sticking to rules against the balance of reasons.
3631:
913:" since it serves goals external to itself. This issue has been the source of an important historical discussion between
7001:
6004:
5472:
4866:
8081:
7713:
7553:
2066:
According to decision theorists, rationality is primarily a matter of internal consistency. This means that a person's
453:
206:
9138:
2190:
is concerned, among other things, with how problems of rationality can be implemented and solved by computers. Within
1403:, which states that people try to fulfill epistemic aims when deciding what to believe. A similar idea is defended by
9843:
9163:
7528:
2429:
2079:. However, this is not a necessary aspect of decisions theory and it can also be interpreted in terms of goodness or
1514:
The topic of rationality is relevant to a variety of disciplines. It plays a central role in philosophy, psychology,
1095:
tends to focus more on normative issues. This division also reflects how different these two types are investigated.
566:
pertains primarily to actions. This includes certain mental states and events preceding actions, like intentions and
5605:"Rationality in Action. By John Searle. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001. 303 pages, ISBN 0-262-19463-5. Hardback $ 35.00"
743:
when assessing the likelihood of future events. This article focuses mainly on irrationality in the academic sense.
9858:
9695:
5661:
4179:
3993:
3580:
McClennen, Edward F. (2004). "THE RATIONALITY OF BEING GUIDED BY RULES". In Mele, Alfred R; Rawling, Piers (eds.).
2439:
1735:: the idea that justified beliefs, or in his case, rational states in general, can be divided into two groups: the
5909:
5531:
5152:
4930:
Bendor, Jonathan Brodie; Kumar, Sunil; Siegel, David A (31 March 2009). "Satisficing: A 'Pretty Good' Heuristic".
9725:
7747:
6488:
Grounding for the metaphysics of morals ; with, On a supposed right to lie because of philanthropic concerns
6463:
6431:
6368:
5886:
5764:
4596:
4431:
4365:
4284:
3509:
1972:
sets out to debunk myths about reason (e.g., that it is "purely objective and requires no subjective judgment").
1701:
proposed a "reforming definition" of rationality, arguing someone is rational if their notions survive a form of
9333:
5688:
Harman, Gilbert (2004). "PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF THEORETICAL REASONING". In Mele, Alfred R; Rawling, Piers (eds.).
3787:
1273:
as well as other norms of coherence between mental states. In the case of rules of inference, the premises of a
1175:
intentions are privileged: one keeps them unless a reason to doubt them is encountered. Some forms of epistemic
9751:
8911:
7578:
7345:
6826:
Sturm, Thomas (February 2012). "The 'Rationality Wars' in
Psychology: Where They Are and Where They Could Go".
5857:
5242:
5083:"Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification: 4. Internalist Alternatives to Classical Foundationalism"
5025:
4751:
4698:
4647:
4528:
4474:
4336:
3739:
3471:
3367:
3105:
2544:
82:
7316:
6632:
6524:
3683:
1681:(1984) perspective (as devoid of social context and under-theorised in terms of social power) and also from a
8325:
7910:
1746:
Audi asserts that all the basic sources providing justification for the foundational mental states come from
1630:
notably articulated a theory of rationality that divided human capacity to think through things in four ways.
1187:
An important difference between conservatism and foundationalism concerns their differing conceptions of the
446:
201:
5404:
2001:
and rules of thumb are used to mitigate these limitations, but they may lead to new forms of irrationality.
982:
9730:
9635:
9283:
8000:
5082:
1725:
1188:
772:
252:
5374:
3856:
O'Neill, Onora (2004). "KANT: Rationality as
Practical Reason". In Mele, Alfred R; Rawling, Piers (eds.).
9878:
9848:
9534:
9248:
7877:
6143:"Max Weber's Types of Rationality: Cornerstones for the Analysis of Rationalization Processes in History"
3209:
2058:
1879:
1288:
An important form of theoretical irrationality is motivationally biased belief, sometimes referred to as
999:
person believing that it will rain but irrational for another person who lacks this belief. According to
971:
550:
488:
rationally if they have a good reason for what they do, or a belief is rational if it is based on strong
6034:"Collective rationality and functional wisdom of the crowd in far-from-rational institutional investors"
1485:. But this belief is irrational in a categorical sense if the belief in astrology is itself irrational.
9873:
9853:
9401:
9070:
8376:
8152:
7740:
2601:
Broome, John (14 December 2021). "Reasons and rationality". In Knauff, Markus; Spohn, Wolfgang (eds.).
2280:
1356:
It is sometimes claimed that theoretical rationality aims at truth while practical rationality aims at
941:
910:
46:
7786:
7117:
Bicchieri, Cristina. (2004). "RATIONALITY AND GAME THEORY". In Mele, Alfred R; Rawling, Piers (eds.).
766:
There are many disputes about the essential characteristics of rationality. It is often understood in
9607:
7819:
7809:
7726:
Simons, H. and
Hawkins, D. (1949), "Some Conditions in Macro-Economic Stability", Econometrica, 1949.
7696:
7635:
2230:
1867:
1044:
932:
there are four conceptions of rationality based on the goals it tries to achieve. They correspond to
805:
312:
211:
42:
6552:
4819:
4202:
901:
and avoiding falsehood. Practical rationality, on the other hand, aims at non-epistemic goals, like
9710:
9273:
8523:
8363:
8360:
8086:
7920:
7905:
7279:
6235:
Hawkins, David; Simon, Herbert A. (July 1949). "Note: Some
Conditions of Macroeconomic Stability".
2424:
2419:
2388:
2298:
2248:
1654:
1415:. He understands acceptance as a voluntary and context-dependent decision to affirm a proposition.
1163:
427:
171:
146:
17:
2229:
The concept of rationality has been subject to criticism by various philosophers who question its
1595:
9288:
9229:
9182:
9040:
9003:
8371:
8286:
8276:
8200:
8066:
8038:
2358:
2218:
2206:
2191:
2187:
2056:
of an outcome can be calculated by multiplying its conditional probability with its utility. the
2045:
1886:
1527:
1110:
conduct their inquiry. In the field of theoretical rationality, for example, it is accepted that
1028:
630:
397:
392:
322:
72:
6270:
Etzioni, Amitai (June 1988). "Normative-affective factors: Toward a new decision-making model".
5947:
5789:
Dreier, James (2004). "DECISION THEORY AND MORALITY". In Mele, Alfred R; Rawling, Piers (eds.).
4120:
1386:
But the two domains also overlap in certain ways. For example, the norm of rationality known as
9421:
9353:
8433:
8271:
7849:
7824:
7814:
7630:
6567:
6033:
5048:
2161:
2129:
1816:
1568:
1123:
1058:
But there are also thought experiments in favor of the normativity of rationality. One, due to
7646:(2007). Human-machine Reconfigurations: Plans and Situated Action. Cambridge University Press.
7404:
Walt, Stephen M. (April 1999). "Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies".
7060:
4058:
9658:
9597:
9577:
9411:
9323:
9303:
9293:
8926:
8775:
8408:
8340:
8248:
8215:
8043:
8023:
7829:
7602:
7439:
Abulof, Uriel (16 July 2015). "The malpractice of 'rationality' in international relations".
6486:
6142:
5318:
Mele, Alfred R. (2004). "MOTIVATED IRRATIONALITY". In Mele, Alfred R; Rawling, Piers (eds.).
4895:
4016:
3256:
2348:
2294:
2112:
2095:
2010:
1560:
1059:
767:
622:
432:
422:
77:
6091:
Sorensen, Roy (2004). "PARADOXES OF RATIONALITY". In Mele, Alfred R; Rawling, Piers (eds.).
9675:
9630:
9592:
9539:
9468:
9224:
9020:
8931:
8754:
8724:
8465:
7993:
7839:
7834:
6654:
6298:
Etzioni, Amitai (1999). "Normative-Affective Factors: Toward a New Decision-Making Model".
6210:
The Theory of Communicative Action Volume 1; Reason and the Rationalization of Society
5954:. Virtues and Economics. Vol. 6. Springer International Publishing. pp. 139ā158.
4233:
2284:
2244:
2175:
2171:
1907:
1894:
1874:
1846:. Cognitive biases are systematic tendencies to engage in erroneous or irrational forms of
1531:
1464:
1396:
1282:
1247:
1070:
945:
477:
307:
267:
257:
1468:
groups perform worse due to conformity or unwillingness to bring up controversial issues.
1337:
8:
9816:
9771:
9761:
9720:
9668:
9653:
9582:
9562:
9544:
9376:
9343:
9204:
9191:
8998:
8795:
8706:
8661:
8567:
8453:
8266:
8114:
6961:
Inhelder, BƤrbel; Piaget, Jean (1958). "Part I: The development of propositional logic".
5556:
Hooker, Brad; Streumer, Bart (2004). "PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE PRACTICAL RATIONALITY".
2240:
2154:
1988:
1984:
1920:
1903:
1838:
1687:
1435:
1404:
1309:
1278:
1226:
1210:
1111:
986:
862:
651:
598:
571:
485:
417:
337:
332:
317:
8528:
7168:
1811:
it is acceptable that everyone acts on such reasons". A similar formulation is given in
9838:
9766:
9735:
9715:
9663:
9645:
9620:
9615:
9567:
9554:
9521:
9416:
9318:
9253:
9209:
9153:
8993:
8822:
8716:
8624:
8428:
8307:
8298:
8261:
8256:
8162:
8157:
8134:
8053:
7867:
7794:
7655:
7649:
7456:
7421:
7017:
6931:
6896:
6843:
6808:
6713:
6540:
6333:
6287:
6252:
6173:
6165:
6061:
5973:
5756:
5653:
5523:
5433:
5295:
5144:
5017:
4947:
4818:
Over, David (1 January 2004). "Rationality and the Normative/Descriptive Distinction".
4743:
4690:
4639:
4588:
4520:
4423:
4332:
4171:
4086:
3985:
3809:
Smith, Michael (2004). "HUMEAN RATIONALITY". In Mele, Alfred R; Rawling, Piers (eds.).
3731:
3463:
2137:
1297:
1266:
1139:
1127:
1119:
1103:
1066:
858:
840:
is a very weighty reason to do all in one's power to violate the norms of rationality.
740:
594:
520:
who possess these other forms of rationality. A thing that lacks rationality is either
7670:
The Theory of Communicative Action Volume 1; Reason and the Rationalization of Society
7607:
6746:
Evans, Jonathan (18 April 2005). "8. Deductive reasoning". In Morrison, Robert (ed.).
6205:
2628:
2383:
1678:
1442:
rather than brute calculations to solve problems and make decisions. According to the
1308:
All forms of practical rationality are concerned with how we act. It pertains both to
9804:
9705:
9700:
9685:
9625:
9587:
9572:
9529:
9100:
9060:
8978:
8906:
8889:
8867:
8495:
8470:
8281:
8101:
7844:
7709:
7684:
7680:
7574:
7549:
7524:
7460:
7246:
7132:
7029:
7021:
6968:
6901:
6883:
6847:
6753:
6717:
6705:
6595:
6587:
6492:
6311:
6283:
6106:
6065:
6053:
5977:
5963:
5804:
5760:
5703:
5645:
5571:
5515:
5333:
5299:
5287:
5200:
5136:
5021:
4951:
4833:
4783:
4747:
4643:
4592:
4524:
4427:
4280:
4163:
4090:
4078:
4022:
3977:
3973:
3921:
3871:
3824:
3735:
3595:
3541:
3467:
3300:
3264:
3223:
2978:
2870:
2732:
2680:
2608:
2339:
2325:
2276:
2196:
1980:
1952:
1936:
1911:
1890:
1859:
1855:
1556:
948:. According to the egoist perspective, rationality implies looking out for one's own
779:
Other disputes in this field concern whether rationality depends only on the agent's
557:. Externalists contend that external factors may also be relevant. Debates about the
501:
7425:
6812:
6291:
6177:
4966:
377:
9756:
9690:
9680:
9381:
9328:
9278:
9258:
9219:
9214:
9055:
8983:
8701:
8612:
8503:
8475:
8460:
8423:
8129:
8109:
8076:
7981:
7943:
7448:
7413:
7238:
7124:
7092:
7088:
7013:
6891:
6875:
6835:
6798:
6697:
6579:
6303:
6279:
6244:
6157:
6098:
6045:
5955:
5849:
5796:
5748:
5695:
5612:
5563:
5507:
5325:
5277:
5128:
5009:
4939:
4825:
4733:
4682:
4631:
4578:
4512:
4466:
4413:
4328:
4276:
4070:
3969:
3863:
3816:
3779:
3723:
3675:
3587:
3502:
Kiesewetter, Benjamin (2017). "7. Rationality as Responding Correctly to Reasons".
3453:
3359:
3219:
3215:
3097:
2970:
2672:
2449:
2363:
2258:
2200:
is typically one that maximizes its expected utility, given its current knowledge.
2100:
1898:
1893:
have defended different positions on human rationality. One prominent view, due to
1843:
1564:
1373:
1369:
1365:
1289:
1274:
1147:
977:
929:
881:
614:
362:
327:
6395:"Review of The Architecture of Reason: The Structure and Substance of Rationality"
4583:
2217:
There is an ongoing debate over the merits of using "rationality" in the study of
601:
usually assume that people are rational enough to predict how they think and act.
9462:
9431:
9396:
9361:
9239:
9090:
8988:
8946:
8857:
8845:
8830:
8805:
8780:
8550:
8418:
8413:
8330:
8315:
7988:
7872:
7614:
7231:
Joyce, James M. (2004). "BAYESIANISM". In Mele, Alfred R; Rawling, Piers (eds.).
7198:
7095:(January 2017). "The Edge of Reason: A Rational Skeptic in an Irrational World".
6962:
6839:
6747:
6701:
5194:
4777:
3915:
3535:
3056:
2963:
Mele, Alfred R.; Rawling, Piers. (2004). "INTRODUCTION: Aspects of Rationality".
2864:
2726:
2602:
2378:
2290:
2234:
2166:
2041:
1940:
1916:
1732:
1519:
1325:
1176:
1143:
1135:
1107:
686:
610:
493:
131:
38:
8602:
7603:
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Historicist Theories of Rationality
7242:
7128:
6307:
6102:
5959:
5800:
5699:
5567:
5329:
3867:
3820:
3591:
2974:
2676:
613:, which states that a decision is rational if the chosen option has the highest
227:
9371:
9366:
9234:
9199:
9131:
9105:
8941:
8790:
8729:
8642:
8485:
8381:
8124:
7804:
6803:
6786:
6685:
6049:
4738:
4470:
3401:
2409:
2353:
2272:
2262:
2116:
2080:
1969:
1863:
1698:
1639:
1535:
1457:
1329:
1293:
958:
937:
736:
590:
367:
8812:
8587:
7729:
Johnson-Laird, P.N. & Byrne, R.M.J. (1991). Deduction. Hillsdale: Erlbaum.
6879:
5282:
5265:
5013:
4829:
4074:
3727:
3679:
37:"Rational" redirects here. For the mathematical property of some numbers, see
9832:
9426:
9338:
9268:
9010:
8800:
8734:
8691:
8560:
8185:
7971:
7953:
7452:
7025:
6887:
6709:
6591:
6057:
5649:
5519:
5464:
5291:
5140:
4167:
4082:
4018:
New Perspectives on Technology, Values, and Ethics: Theoretical and Practical
3981:
3783:
2404:
2368:
2252:
2072:
1812:
1702:
1619:
1594: with: subsections on ancient Greek philosophy and Kant. You can help by
1255:
1159:
1118:
leads to rational beliefs. This claim can be investigated using methods like
1099:
1020:
918:
850:
694:
higher cognitive faculties are included as well, such as acquiring concepts,
542:
387:
372:
151:
136:
106:
6863:
4418:
970:
An important contemporary discussion in the field of rationality is between
9457:
9447:
9406:
9386:
9158:
9121:
9080:
8966:
8916:
8577:
8555:
8533:
8480:
8448:
8320:
8180:
8091:
7887:
7706:
History of Rationalities: Ways of Thinking from Vico to Hacking and Beyond.
7643:
7033:
6905:
6599:
6485:
Kant, Immanuel; Ellington, James W. (James Wesley); Kant, Immanuel (1993).
5617:
5604:
4943:
4620:"Decision-Theoretic Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest Objection"
3458:
2399:
2067:
1956:
1721:
1539:
1115:
1036:
833:
817:
699:
682:
505:
62:
7652:(1993). Rationality and Coordination, New York: Cambridge University Press
5853:
2019:, but not identical to it. Logic is often defined as the study of correct
9452:
9391:
9263:
9243:
9148:
9085:
9045:
9025:
8951:
8921:
8582:
8518:
8210:
8195:
8071:
8061:
8010:
7976:
7915:
3363:
2444:
2434:
2265:" (1927), offered a critique of the instrumental and calculative view of
2170:(economic man: the imaginary man being assumed in economic models who is
2133:
2125:
2091:
2024:
1927:
1713:
1523:
1515:
1443:
1428:
1361:
1016:
1000:
854:
618:
558:
247:
161:
121:
101:
31:
7621:
Spohn, Wolfgang (2002). "The Many Facets of the Theory of Rationality".
7417:
6032:
Primicerio, Kevin; Challet, Damien; Gualdi, Stanislao (1 January 2021).
5657:
5633:
5266:"Varieties of JustificationāHow (Not) to Solve the Problem of Induction"
4175:
4151:
3989:
3957:
1583:
1312:
directly as well as to mental states and events preceding actions, like
9298:
9126:
9075:
9065:
8936:
8840:
8785:
8592:
8572:
8438:
8205:
8119:
7948:
7895:
7859:
7763:
6256:
6169:
5527:
5495:
5148:
5116:
4694:
3101:
2076:
1998:
1807:
1747:
1643:
1503:
1251:
1092:
1088:
1024:
1004:
953:
922:
914:
821:
809:
728:
711:
586:
526:
382:
242:
166:
156:
141:
116:
7546:
The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the CollĆØge de France, 1978-1979
6457:
6425:
6364:
The Architecture of Reason: The Structure and Substance of Rationality
6362:
5880:
5736:
4566:
4401:
4359:
4358:
Carter, J. Adam; McKenna, Robin (2019). "Relativism and Externalism".
4264:
3503:
9313:
9308:
9168:
9095:
9030:
8901:
8835:
8647:
8637:
8632:
8607:
8403:
7963:
7925:
4152:"Normativity and Rationality: Bernard Williams on Reasons for Action"
3767:
2414:
2233:
and capacity to provide a comprehensive understanding of reality and
1677:
Weber's constructions of rationality have been critiqued both from a
1635:
1627:
1507:
1482:
1439:
1387:
1313:
1230:
1192:
1048:
949:
906:
866:
825:
797:
776:
understand rationality in relation to the goals it tries to realize.
732:
674:
663:
626:
513:
357:
262:
232:
176:
111:
8538:
7339:
6248:
5837:
5511:
5236:
5132:
4997:
4721:
4686:
4670:
4619:
4500:
4454:
4316:
4059:"Rationality, Justification, and the Internalism/Externalism Debate"
3711:
3630:
Moriarty, Michael (27 February 2020). "Reasons for the Irrational".
3441:
3347:
3085:
2538:
9143:
9050:
9015:
8973:
8961:
8749:
8543:
8443:
8386:
8190:
8144:
8028:
7310:
7280:"Interpretations of Probability: 3.3 The Subjective Interpretation"
6626:
6583:
6518:
6161:
5752:
4635:
4516:
4156:
Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly / ×¢×××: ×Ø××¢×× ×¤××××”×פ×
3663:
2394:
2020:
1993:
1960:
1932:
1847:
1803:
1682:
1499:
1357:
877:
813:
647:
606:
582:
538:
530:, if it belongs to this domain but does not fulfill its standards.
489:
7338:
Hartmann, Stephan; Sprenger, Jan (2010). "Bayesian Epistemology".
7087:
8770:
8744:
8739:
8681:
8676:
8508:
8396:
8391:
8350:
8172:
8018:
7900:
4501:"Review of Kiesewetter, The Normativity of Rationality. (Ethics)"
2373:
2201:
2049:
2028:
1851:
1623:
1495:
1392:
1380:
1341:
1146:. Actual reasoners often diverge from these standards because of
1032:
720:
695:
678:
534:
497:
126:
6785:
Johnson-Laird, Philip N.; Byrne, Ruth M. J. (1 September 2009).
3534:
Lord, Errol (30 May 2018). "3. What it is to possess a reason".
2164:
is a useless concept for understanding human behavior; the term
1427:. This can include the requirement that if the agent believes a
673:
These different forms of rationality are sometimes divided into
650:
for it and it is coherent with the agent's other beliefs. While
9035:
8956:
8686:
8345:
8335:
8033:
7935:
6864:"Mind, rationality, and cognition: An interdisciplinary debate"
5366:
2266:
1799:
1317:
1259:
1234:
1222:
933:
747:
685:, and persons. For example, when it is claimed that humans are
667:
659:
655:
643:
578:
567:
517:
509:
481:
287:
277:
222:
6302:. Studies in Economic Ethics and Philosophy. pp. 91ā119.
2537:
Moser, Paul (2006). "Rationality". In Borchert, Donald (ed.).
1966:
The Edge of Reason: A Rational Skeptic in an Irrational World,
8851:
8513:
7799:
7732:
6787:"Corrigendum: 'If' and the problems of conditional reasoning"
6335:
Ethical Theory: The Problems of Normative and Critical Ethics
2160:
Others think that any kind of rationality along the lines of
2016:
1666:
justification even if it is not an explanation that fits the
1424:
1270:
1181:
1098:
Descriptive and normative theorists usually employ different
902:
898:
690:
602:
546:
282:
7503:
4865:
Pust, Joel (2014). "3 Empirical Evidence for Rationalism?".
4234:"Reasons for Action: Justification, Motivation, Explanation"
2040:
An influential account of practical rationality is given by
1798:
The problem of rationality is relevant to various issues in
761:
646:, it is rational to believe something if the agent has good
581:, one question is whether one can be rational without being
7081:
6860:
6003:
Townley, Barbara (24 July 2008). "Collective rationality".
5235:
Jaakko, Hintikka; Sandu, Gabriel (2006). "What is Logic?".
2136:
is true. As probabilities, they are subject to the laws of
2111:
A popular contemporary approach to rationality is based on
1196:
1083:
1052:
780:
554:
237:
6628:
The Oxford Companion to Emotion and the Affective Sciences
8696:
1407:. He argues that the proper object of rationality is not
524:, if it is outside the domain of rational evaluation, or
3712:"Slote on Rational Dilemmas and Rational Supererogation"
3086:"Which Mental States Are Rationally Evaluable, And Why?"
7002:"Inhelder and Piaget's the Growth of Logical Thinkingā "
6031:
2255:, stating, "There are no facts, only interpretations."
1526:. But it is also covered in other disciplines, such as
3958:"Concepts of Rational Action in the History of Ethics"
2174:
but amoral) was coined largely in honor of this view.
1842:. An important psychological area of study focuses on
553:
believe that rationality depends only on the person's
7608:
Legal Reasoning After Post-Modern Critiques of Reason
6684:
Gignac, Gilles E.; Zajenkowski, Marcin (1 May 2020).
1102:
in their research. Descriptive issues are studied by
1076:
6625:
Litvak, P.; Lerner, J. S. (2009). "Cognitive Bias".
4203:"Bernard Williams: 5. Internal and external reasons"
3261:
Philosophy of Science and the Occult: Second Edition
3128:"The American Heritage Dictionary entry: irrational"
2315:
1975:
1724:
is rational if it is "well-grounded" in a source of
861:
and is nonetheless convinced that it is possible to
6491:. Indianapolis : Hackett Pub. Co. p. 30.
3341:
3339:
3337:
3335:
3333:
3257:"On Dismissing Astrology and Other Irrationalities"
1169:
6784:
6332:
5110:
5108:
4821:Blackwell Handbook of Judgment and Decision Making
3497:
3495:
3493:
3491:
3489:
3331:
3329:
3327:
3325:
3323:
3321:
3319:
3317:
3315:
3313:
3208:Harman, Gilbert (1 February 2013). "Rationality".
1213:as well as for individual and social rationality.
1154:discrepancies may be necessary (and in this sense
7521:Surveiller et punir : Naissance de la prison
7309:Olsson, Erik J. (2018). "Bayesian Epistemology".
7286:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
7175:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
7112:
7110:
6683:
6484:
6424:Audi, Robert (2002). "The Sources of Knowledge".
6330:
5471:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
5440:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
5089:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
5055:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
4973:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
4929:
4902:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
4550:Broome, John (nd). "Rationality vs normativity".
4240:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
4209:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
4127:. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
3058:EnzyklopƤdie Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie
3050:
3048:
3046:
2540:Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd Edition
1768:rationality of individual mental states from the
786:
9830:
7381:Johnson-Laird, P.N. & Byrne, R.M.J. (1991).
7337:
6749:The Cambridge Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning
6512:
6510:
6508:
6038:Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination
5941:
5939:
5403:Hampton, Jean (1996). "Rationality, practical".
4201:Chappell, Sophie-Grace; Smyth, Nicholas (2018).
3575:
3573:
3571:
3569:
636:
492:. This quality can apply to an ability, as in a
6356:
6354:
6352:
6350:
6348:
6346:
5948:"Between Individual and Collective Rationality"
5878:
5230:
5228:
5105:
4118:
3951:
3949:
3625:
3623:
3486:
3310:
3214:. Blackwell Publishing Ltd. pp. wbiee181.
1364:, the difference can be expressed in terms of "
1300:is another cause of theoretical irrationality.
7677:Lo mejor posible: Racionalidad y acciĆ³n humana
7107:
6960:
5945:
5555:
5398:
5396:
5394:
5392:
5188:
5186:
5184:
5182:
5180:
5178:
5176:
5174:
5172:
5170:
4402:"Rationality, Appearances, and Apparent Facts"
4052:
4050:
3705:
3703:
3701:
3657:
3655:
3297:Lo mejor posible: Racionalidad y acciĆ³n humana
3203:
3201:
3199:
3197:
3195:
3193:
3191:
3189:
3187:
3185:
3183:
3181:
3179:
3177:
3175:
3173:
3043:
2858:
2856:
2854:
2852:
2850:
2848:
2846:
2844:
2842:
2840:
2838:
2836:
2834:
2832:
2830:
2828:
2826:
2824:
2822:
2820:
2818:
2816:
2814:
2812:
2810:
2808:
2806:
2804:
2802:
2800:
2798:
2796:
2794:
2792:
2790:
2788:
2786:
2784:
2782:
2780:
2725:Lord, Errol (30 May 2018). "1. Introduction".
2015:Theoretical rationality is closely related to
965:
843:
7748:
7226:
7224:
6565:
6505:
6451:
6449:
5936:
5784:
5782:
5683:
5681:
5679:
5080:
4925:
4923:
4921:
4722:"Respect and the Reality of Apparent Reasons"
4494:
4492:
4357:
4200:
4114:
4112:
3761:
3759:
3757:
3566:
3529:
3527:
3435:
3433:
3431:
3429:
3427:
3395:
3393:
3391:
3389:
3387:
3385:
3171:
3169:
3167:
3165:
3163:
3161:
3159:
3157:
3155:
3153:
2778:
2776:
2774:
2772:
2770:
2768:
2766:
2764:
2762:
2760:
2596:
2594:
2592:
2590:
2588:
2586:
2584:
2582:
454:
7162:
7160:
6741:
6739:
6624:
6343:
6234:
6006:Reason's Neglect: Rationality and Organizing
5882:The Foundations of Epistemic Decision Theory
5462:
5313:
5311:
5309:
5225:
5076:
5074:
4771:
4769:
3946:
3620:
3014:
3012:
3010:
3008:
3006:
2958:
2956:
2954:
2952:
2950:
2948:
2946:
2944:
2942:
2940:
2938:
2936:
2934:
2932:
2930:
2928:
2926:
2924:
2922:
2920:
2918:
2720:
2718:
2716:
2714:
2712:
2710:
2708:
2580:
2578:
2576:
2574:
2572:
2570:
2568:
2566:
2564:
2562:
2532:
2530:
2528:
2526:
2524:
2522:
2520:
2518:
2516:
2514:
2512:
2510:
2508:
2506:
2504:
2502:
2500:
2498:
2496:
2494:
2492:
2490:
1216:
6430:. Oxford University Press. pp. 71ā94.
5551:
5549:
5425:
5389:
5234:
5192:
5167:
5114:
4824:. Blackwell Publishing Ltd. pp. 1ā18.
4813:
4811:
4564:
4452:
4121:"Reasons for Action: Internal vs. External"
4047:
3917:Encyclopedia of Business Ethics and Society
3909:
3907:
3905:
3903:
3901:
3899:
3855:
3698:
3652:
3501:
3345:
3299:. Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2008. 318 pp.
3054:
2962:
2916:
2914:
2912:
2910:
2908:
2906:
2904:
2902:
2900:
2898:
2862:
2488:
2486:
2484:
2482:
2480:
2478:
2476:
2474:
2472:
2470:
1545:
1347:
1150:, heuristics, or other mental limitations.
752:
7755:
7741:
7366:
7221:
6446:
6136:
6134:
5779:
5676:
5456:
4995:
4967:"Hume's Moral Philosophy: 5. Is and ought"
4918:
4498:
4489:
4455:"PrƩcis Zu The Normativity of Rationality"
4109:
3754:
3524:
3424:
3382:
3150:
2757:
2660:
2658:
2656:
2654:
2212:
2181:
2128:: the higher the credence, the higher the
1642:that distinguished between four different
1069:by distinguishing between normativity and
808:, the agent eats a fish contaminated with
461:
447:
7663:Foundations of Rational Choice Under Risk
7634:
7488:
7473:
7369:Foundations of Rational Choice Under Risk
7157:
7116:
6895:
6802:
6736:
6516:
5946:Horodecka, Anna; Vozna, Liudmyla (2021).
5734:
5616:
5493:
5306:
5281:
5071:
4932:The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
4766:
4737:
4668:
4582:
4417:
4310:
4308:
4306:
4304:
4302:
4119:Finlay, Stephen; Schroeder, Mark (2017).
4015:Gonzalez, Wenceslao J. (8 October 2015).
3579:
3457:
3003:
2705:
2559:
2251:based on individual perspectives and the
2023:. This concerns the relation between the
981:this objection by distinguishing between
762:Disputes about the concept of rationality
7568:
7543:
7518:
7169:"Game Theory: 2.2 Games and Rationality"
6566:Johnson-Laird, Phil (30 December 2009).
6090:
5907:
5602:
5546:
5494:Mele, Alfred R.; Moser, Paul K. (1994).
5263:
4808:
4459:Zeitschrift fĆ¼r Philosophische Forschung
4400:Salas, Javier GonzƔlez de Prado (2018).
4395:
4393:
4391:
4389:
4387:
4385:
4383:
4321:Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
4014:
3955:
3896:
3629:
2895:
2467:
1618:
1450:
1338:instrumental and noninstrumental desires
689:, this usually refers to the ability to
549:in the case of theoretical rationality.
7708:New York: Springer- Palgrave McMillan.
7504:Max Horkheimer; Theodor Adorno (1947).
7432:
7344:. London: Routledge. pp. 609ā620.
7341:The Routledge Companion to Epistemology
7284:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
7173:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
6999:
6388:
6386:
6297:
6269:
6140:
6131:
6002:
5835:
5631:
5469:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
5463:Wilson, George; Shpall, Samuel (2016).
5438:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
5431:
5402:
5087:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
5053:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
4971:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
4900:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
4893:
4617:
4567:"Rationality as Reasons-Responsiveness"
4406:Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy
4238:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
4231:
4207:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
4149:
4125:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
4056:
3914:Kolb, Robert W. (2008). "Rationality".
3709:
3661:
2651:
2455:Von NeumannāMorgenstern utility theorem
1065:Some theorists have responded to these
709:The term "rational" has two opposites:
14:
9831:
7721:A Concise Companion to Feminist Theory
7701:Princeton: Princeton University Press.
7438:
7308:
6527:from the original on 28 September 2022
6223:A Concise Companion to Feminist Theory
5952:Words, Objects and Events in Economics
5879:Konek, Jason; Levinstein, Ben (2017).
5788:
5687:
5081:Hasan, Ali; Fumerton, Richard (2022).
5046:
4775:
4719:
4317:"PrƩcis of the Architecture of Reason"
4299:
4262:
3765:
3439:
3207:
2600:
1793:
905:, prudential, political, economic, or
9869:Concepts in the philosophy of science
9494:
8236:
7774:
7736:
7620:
7290:from the original on 17 February 2021
7277:
7259:from the original on 30 December 2023
7230:
7069:from the original on 30 December 2023
7058:
6981:from the original on 30 December 2023
6912:from the original on 30 December 2023
6825:
6766:from the original on 30 December 2023
6745:
6665:from the original on 30 November 2021
6466:from the original on 13 November 2020
6187:from the original on 14 November 2020
6119:from the original on 30 December 2023
5817:from the original on 30 December 2023
5716:from the original on 30 December 2023
5346:from the original on 30 December 2023
5213:from the original on 30 December 2023
4964:
4906:from the original on 22 February 2022
4796:from the original on 30 December 2023
4399:
4380:
4035:from the original on 30 December 2023
3934:from the original on 30 December 2023
3884:from the original on 30 December 2023
3837:from the original on 30 December 2023
3808:
3554:from the original on 30 December 2023
3277:from the original on 30 December 2023
3083:
2883:from the original on 30 December 2023
2745:from the original on 30 December 2023
2693:from the original on 30 December 2023
2536:
533:There are many discussions about the
7403:
7179:from the original on 17 October 2021
7166:
7040:from the original on 7 December 2021
6635:from the original on 2 November 2021
6606:from the original on 24 January 2023
6459:Rationality and Religious Commitment
6455:
6423:
6405:from the original on 23 October 2020
6392:
6383:
6360:
5584:from the original on 22 January 2022
5444:from the original on 29 October 2020
5406:Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy
5317:
5245:from the original on 7 December 2021
4977:from the original on 10 January 2018
4864:
4817:
4549:
4314:
3913:
3533:
3254:
3211:International Encyclopedia of Ethics
3065:from the original on 20 October 2021
2991:from the original on 22 January 2022
2724:
2664:
2547:from the original on 12 January 2021
1788:
1578:
1418:
1003:, this can be explained in terms of
27:Quality of being agreeable to reason
7059:Kumar, Dr Binoy (22 January 2022).
6427:The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology
6072:from the original on 18 August 2022
6013:from the original on 18 August 2022
5984:from the original on 18 August 2022
5889:from the original on 14 August 2022
5860:from the original on 14 August 2022
5767:from the original on 14 August 2022
5664:from the original on 14 August 2022
5603:Douglass, Curran F. (1 June 2003).
5534:from the original on 14 August 2022
5413:from the original on 14 August 2022
5371:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
5155:from the original on 18 August 2022
5059:from the original on 17 August 2022
5028:from the original on 14 August 2022
4875:from the original on 18 August 2022
4846:from the original on 18 August 2022
4368:from the original on 18 August 2022
4182:from the original on 18 August 2022
4097:from the original on 18 August 2022
3996:from the original on 14 August 2022
3790:from the original on 14 August 2022
3742:from the original on 12 August 2023
3686:from the original on 14 August 2022
3640:from the original on 14 August 2022
3608:from the original on 31 August 2021
3508:. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
3412:from the original on 14 August 2022
3370:from the original on 14 August 2022
3236:from the original on 14 August 2022
3138:from the original on 12 August 2023
3031:from the original on 11 August 2022
2639:from the original on 17 August 2017
1854:, and acting. Examples include the
24:
9864:Concepts in the philosophy of mind
7665:, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
7590:
7234:The Oxford Handbook of Rationality
7120:The Oxford Handbook of Rationality
7018:10.1111/j.2044-8295.1960.tb00727.x
6942:from the original on 28 April 2015
6094:The Oxford Handbook of Rationality
5792:The Oxford Handbook of Rationality
5691:The Oxford Handbook of Rationality
5609:Auslegung: A Journal of Philosophy
5559:The Oxford Handbook of Rationality
5475:from the original on 22 April 2021
5377:from the original on 29 April 2010
5364:
5321:The Oxford Handbook of Rationality
5093:from the original on 5 August 2019
4339:from the original on 14 April 2021
4333:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00031.x
4057:Langsam, Harold (1 January 2008).
3859:The Oxford Handbook of Rationality
3812:The Oxford Handbook of Rationality
3583:The Oxford Handbook of Rationality
3399:
3018:
2966:The Oxford Handbook of Rationality
2668:The Oxford Handbook of Rationality
2157:makes more sense for such models.
2035:
2027:used in the argument: whether its
1077:Normative and descriptive theories
983:motivational and normative reasons
25:
9890:
7312:Introduction to Formal Philosophy
7209:from the original on 26 July 2022
7145:from the original on 24 June 2022
6868:Psychonomic Bulletin & Review
6434:from the original on 12 June 2022
6371:from the original on 19 June 2021
5924:from the original on 13 July 2019
5241:. North Holland. pp. 13ā39.
4571:Australasian Philosophical Review
4552:Australasian Philosophical Review
4244:from the original on 26 July 2021
4213:from the original on 10 July 2022
4131:from the original on 10 July 2022
3055:MittelstraĆ, JĆ¼rgen, ed. (2005).
2430:Rational emotive behavior therapy
2384:Humeanism Ā§ Practical reason
1976:Cognitive and behavioral sciences
1693:
1122:or careful deliberation toward a
892:
796:to reasons implies that one acts
9812:
9811:
9798:
7562:
7537:
7512:
7497:
7493:. TĆ¼bingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag.
7482:
7467:
7397:
7388:
7375:
7360:
7348:from the original on 16 May 2021
7331:
7319:from the original on 16 May 2021
7302:
7271:
7191:
7052:
6993:
6724:from the original on 15 May 2022
6399:Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
5264:Backmann, Marius (1 June 2019).
4754:from the original on 7 June 2021
4701:from the original on 7 June 2021
4650:from the original on 7 June 2021
4599:from the original on 5 June 2021
4531:from the original on 7 June 2021
4477:from the original on 7 June 2021
4434:from the original on 7 June 2021
4361:Routledge Handbook to Relativism
4287:from the original on 13 May 2021
4281:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2008.00679.x
3537:The Importance of Being Rational
3512:from the original on 7 June 2021
3474:from the original on 7 June 2021
3108:from the original on 5 June 2021
2728:The Importance of Being Rational
2440:Rationalization (making excuses)
2332:
2318:
2071:is often understood in terms of
1582:
1170:Conservatism and foundationalism
617:. Other relevant fields include
7723:, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
6954:
6924:
6854:
6819:
6778:
6677:
6647:
6618:
6559:
6478:
6417:
6324:
6263:
6228:
6225:, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
6215:
6199:
6084:
6025:
5996:
5901:
5872:
5829:
5728:
5625:
5596:
5487:
5358:
5257:
5040:
4989:
4958:
4887:
4858:
4713:
4662:
4611:
4558:
4543:
4446:
4351:
4256:
4225:
4194:
4143:
4008:
3849:
3802:
3289:
3248:
3120:
3077:
1731:Audi is committed to a form of
1035:prescribe that men do not wear
480:of being guided by or based on
7762:
7623:Croatian Journal of Philosophy
7315:. Springer. pp. 431ā442.
6752:. Cambridge University Press.
6272:Journal of Economic Psychology
5737:"A Solution for Buridan's Ass"
5117:"Conservatism in Epistemology"
4669:Zimmerman, Michael J. (2002).
4565:Kiesewetter, Benjamin (2020).
4453:Kiesewetter, Benjamin (2017).
3974:10.5840/soctheorpract198392/37
3505:The Normativity of Rationality
3348:"Rationality is Not Coherence"
3255:Grim, Patrick (17 July 1990).
3220:10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee181
2621:
2106:
2086:
1708:
1638:proposed an interpretation of
1240:
1010:
787:Based on reason-responsiveness
207:Analyticāsynthetic distinction
13:
1:
9495:
7474:Nietzsche, Friedrich (1886).
7006:British Journal of Psychology
6150:American Journal of Sociology
4938:(1): 0000102202193517041478.
4584:10.1080/24740500.2021.1964239
3956:Frankena, William K. (1983).
2461:
1822:
1488:
1434:According to the position of
993:
972:internalists and externalists
637:Definition and semantic field
9284:Ordinary language philosophy
7775:
7508:. Amsterdam: Querido Verlag.
6840:10.1080/0020174X.2012.643628
6791:Trends in Cognitive Sciences
6702:10.1016/j.intell.2020.101449
6284:10.1016/0167-4870(88)90048-7
5049:"Naturalism in Epistemology"
4499:Littlejohn, Clayton (2018).
3633:Pascal: Reasoning and Belief
2224:
2143:
1614:
1303:
605:studies the laws of correct
7:
9334:Contemporary utilitarianism
9249:Internalism and externalism
7243:10.1093/0195145399.001.0001
7237:. Oxford University Press.
7129:10.1093/0195145399.001.0001
7123:. Oxford University Press.
6631:. Oxford University Press.
6462:. Oxford University Press.
6367:. Oxford University Press.
6308:10.1007/978-3-662-03900-7_5
6103:10.1093/0195145399.001.0001
6097:. Oxford University Press.
5960:10.1007/978-3-030-52673-3_9
5910:"Acceptance without belief"
5838:"Epistemic Decision Theory"
5801:10.1093/0195145399.001.0001
5795:. Oxford University Press.
5700:10.1093/0195145399.001.0001
5694:. Oxford University Press.
5568:10.1093/0195145399.001.0001
5562:. Oxford University Press.
5330:10.1093/0195145399.001.0001
5324:. Oxford University Press.
5196:The Handbook of Rationality
5115:Christensen, David (1994).
4779:The Handbook of Rationality
4364:. London, U.K.: Routledge.
3868:10.1093/0195145399.001.0001
3862:. Oxford University Press.
3821:10.1093/0195145399.001.0001
3815:. Oxford University Press.
3592:10.1093/0195145399.001.0001
3586:. Oxford University Press.
3540:. Oxford University Press.
3442:"Is Rationality Normative?"
2975:10.1093/0195145399.001.0001
2969:. Oxford University Press.
2866:The Handbook of Rationality
2731:. Oxford University Press.
2677:10.1093/0195145399.001.0001
2671:. Oxford University Press.
2604:The Handbook of Rationality
2311:
1946:
1939:, reasoning, planning, and
1880:Bayesian probability theory
1649:The first, which he called
1134:systems of rationality are
966:Internalism and externalism
844:Based on rules of coherence
484:. In this regard, a person
10:
9895:
8598:Svatantrika and Prasangika
8237:
7672:, Cambridge: Polity Press.
7489:Heidegger, Martin (1927).
7371:. Oxford University Press.
6804:10.1016/j.tics.2009.08.003
6517:Schechter, Joshua (2013).
6393:Haji, Ish (9 March 2002).
6331:Richard B. Brandt (1959).
6212:, Cambridge: Polity Press.
6050:10.1007/s11403-020-00288-0
5735:Chislenko, Eugene (2016).
4998:"Two Dogmas of Metaethics"
4739:10.1007/s11098-020-01573-1
4471:10.3196/004433017822228923
3962:Social Theory and Practice
3346:Heinzelmann, Nora (2022).
3263:. SUNY Press. p. 28.
2281:Dialectic of Enlightenment
2008:
1574:
1246:provided by the so-called
1087:investigated in empirical
1055:but normativity does not.
911:minister without portfolio
800:because of these reasons.
746:The terms "rationality", "
739:and violating the laws of
45:. Not to be confused with
36:
29:
9792:
9744:
9644:
9606:
9553:
9520:
9511:
9507:
9490:
9440:
9352:
9190:
9181:
9114:
8897:
8888:
8866:
8821:
8763:
8715:
8669:
8660:
8623:
8494:
8359:
8306:
8297:
8247:
8243:
8232:
8171:
8143:
8100:
8052:
8009:
7962:
7934:
7886:
7858:
7820:Philosophy of mathematics
7810:Philosophy of information
7785:
7781:
7770:
7719:Eagleton, M. (ed) (2003)
7697:The Nature of Rationality
7571:Dits et Ć©crits, 1954-1988
7569:Foucault, Michel (1977).
7544:Foucault, Michel (1979).
7519:Foucault, Michel (1975).
7478:. Leipzig: C. G. Naumann.
7476:Jenseits von Gut und Bƶse
7062:Urban and Rural Sociology
7000:Parsons, Charles (1960).
6880:10.3758/s13423-017-1333-5
6300:Essays in Socio-Economics
6221:Eagleton, M. (ed) (2003)
6141:Kalberg, Stephen (1980).
5632:Kissine, Mikhail (2007).
5283:10.1007/s12136-018-0371-6
5014:10.1007/s11098-005-2509-9
4830:10.1002/9780470752937.ch1
4075:10.1007/s10670-007-9059-9
3680:10.1080/09515089808573270
2283:" (1947), questioned the
2279:, in their seminal work "
1471:
1401:epistemic decision theory
1217:Theoretical and practical
816:in the form of cognitive
313:Evolutionary epistemology
43:Rational (disambiguation)
9844:Concepts in epistemology
7704:Sciortino, Luca (2023).
7675:MosterĆn, JesĆŗs (2008).
7506:Dialectic of Enlightment
7453:10.1177/1043463115593144
5908:MosterĆn, JesĆŗs (2002).
5836:Greaves, Hilary (2013).
5432:Wallace, R. Jay (2020).
5047:Rysiew, Patrick (2021).
4896:"Reflective Equilibrium"
4894:Daniels, Norman (2020).
4720:Sylvan, Kurt L. (2020).
4021:. Springer. p. 64.
3668:Philosophical Psychology
3295:MosterĆn, JesĆŗs (2008).
2629:"Definition of rational"
2425:Principle of rationality
2420:List of cognitive biases
2391:(individual rationality)
2389:Imputation (game theory)
2299:The Birth of Biopolitics
2004:
1919:, favor a conception of
1655:instrumental rationality
1546:Paradoxes of rationality
1348:Relation between the two
1203:
1164:naturalized epistemology
642:realize. In the case of
428:Philosophy of perception
30:Not to be confused with
9859:Metaphysical properties
9289:Postanalytic philosophy
9230:Experimental philosophy
7694:Nozick, Robert (1993).
7441:Rationality and Society
6655:"Dunning-Kruger effect"
6572:WIREs Cognitive Science
4996:Bloomfield, P. (2007).
4671:"Taking Luck Seriously"
4618:Jackson, Frank (1991).
4419:10.26556/jesp.v14i2.505
3728:10.1023/A:1005337707418
3352:Philosophical Quarterly
2359:Coherence (linguistics)
2219:international relations
2213:International relations
2207:psychology of reasoning
2192:artificial intelligence
2188:artificial intelligence
2182:Artificial intelligence
2046:conditional probability
1887:psychology of reasoning
1703:cognitive-psychotherapy
1528:artificial intelligence
631:artificial intelligence
323:Historical epistemology
9422:Social constructionism
8434:Hellenistic philosophy
7850:Theoretical philosophy
7825:Philosophy of religion
7815:Philosophy of language
7597:Reason and Rationality
7406:International Security
5618:10.17161/AJP.1808.9520
4965:Cohon, Rachel (2018).
4944:10.2202/1935-1704.1478
4265:"Motivation in Agents"
3784:10.1093/analys/62.1.11
3662:Thagard, Paul (1998).
3459:10.2478/disp-2007-0008
2249:reevaluation of values
2162:rational choice theory
2130:subjective probability
1817:categorical imperative
1631:
1569:St. Petersburg paradox
1552:paradox of rationality
1250:, i.e. faculties like
1124:reflective equilibrium
753:
41:. For other uses, see
9805:Philosophy portal
9324:Scientific skepticism
9304:Reformed epistemology
7830:Philosophy of science
7385:. Hillsdale: Erlbaum.
7065:. K.K. Publications.
6932:"Philosophy of logic"
6568:"Deductive reasoning"
6456:Audi, Robert (2011).
6361:Audi, Robert (2001).
5002:Philosophical Studies
4726:Philosophical Studies
4675:Journal of Philosophy
4315:Audi, Robert (2003).
4150:Kriegel, Uri (1999).
3710:Mintoff, Joe (1997).
3440:Broome, John (2007).
3025:Oxford Bibliographies
2349:Bayesian epistemology
2295:Discipline and Punish
2113:Bayesian epistemology
2096:cost-benefit analysis
2011:Logic and rationality
1899:Ruth M. J. Byrne
1868:DunningāKruger effect
1839:dual process theories
1834:mental model theories
1830:mental logic theories
1622:
1479:all things considered
1451:Individual and social
1269:discussed in regular
496:, to a psychological
433:Philosophy of science
9225:Critical rationalism
8932:Edo neo-Confucianism
8776:Acintya bheda abheda
8755:Renaissance humanism
8466:School of the Sextii
7840:Practical philosophy
7835:Political philosophy
7668:Habermas, J. (1984)
7573:. Paris: Gallimard.
7523:. Paris: Gallimard.
7278:HƔjek, Alan (2019).
6967:. Psychology Press.
5496:"Intentional Action"
3132:www.ahdictionary.com
3090:Philosophical Issues
3084:Nolfi, Kate (2015).
2245:Beyond Good and Evil
2176:Behavioral economics
2172:logically consistent
1968:British philosopher
1908:Wason selection task
1895:Philip Johnson-Laird
1891:cognitive scientists
1889:, psychologists and
1875:Wason selection task
1532:behavioral economics
1465:Wason selection task
1397:weakness of the will
1248:sources of knowledge
1051:only on the agent's
1037:bell-bottom trousers
308:Applied epistemology
8796:Nimbarka Sampradaya
8707:Korean Confucianism
8454:Academic Skepticism
7548:. Seuil: Galimard.
7418:10.1162/isec.23.4.5
7367:Paul Anand (1993).
6520:Deductive Reasoning
5854:10.1093/mind/fzt090
5238:Philosophy of Logic
3768:"Rational Dilemmas"
3766:Priest, G. (2002).
3664:"Ethical Coherence"
2241:Friedrich Nietzsche
2155:bounded rationality
1989:classical economics
1985:behavioral sciences
1921:bounded rationality
1904:conjunction fallacy
1794:Ethics and morality
1688:bounded rationality
1634:The German scholar
1436:bounded rationality
1211:bounded rationality
1112:deductive reasoning
1067:thought experiments
987:high blood pressure
599:behavioral sciences
572:bounded rationality
418:Epistemic cognition
338:Virtue epistemology
333:Social epistemology
318:Formal epistemology
57:Part of a series on
9879:Philosophy of life
9849:Concepts in ethics
9417:Post-structuralism
9319:Scientific realism
9274:Quinean naturalism
9254:Logical positivism
9210:Analytical Marxism
8429:Peripatetic school
8341:Chinese naturalism
7868:Aesthetic response
7795:Applied philosophy
7656:Cristina Bicchieri
7650:Cristina Bicchieri
7613:2012-12-21 at the
7203:www.britannica.com
7167:Ross, Don (2021).
7097:Skeptical Inquirer
6936:www.britannica.com
6659:www.britannica.com
6523:. SAGE Reference.
5638:Logique et Analyse
5634:"Direction of Fit"
5434:"Practical Reason"
4232:Alvarez M (2017).
3406:www.britannica.com
3364:10.1093/pq/pqac083
3102:10.1111/phis.12051
2138:probability theory
2132:that the believed
1632:
1561:Prisoner's dilemma
1298:informal fallacies
1267:rules of inference
1140:probability theory
1128:empirical evidence
1120:rational intuition
1104:empirical research
859:Euclidean geometry
741:probability theory
585:at the same time.
535:essential features
9874:Philosophy of law
9854:Concepts in logic
9826:
9825:
9788:
9787:
9784:
9783:
9780:
9779:
9486:
9485:
9482:
9481:
9478:
9477:
9205:Analytic feminism
9177:
9176:
9139:Kierkegaardianism
9101:Transcendentalism
9061:Neo-scholasticism
8907:Classical Realism
8884:
8883:
8656:
8655:
8471:Neopythagoreanism
8228:
8227:
8224:
8223:
7845:Social philosophy
7689:978-84-206-8206-8
7681:Alianza Editorial
7661:Anand, P (1993).
7252:978-0-19-514539-7
7138:978-0-19-514539-7
7093:Frazier, Kendrick
7089:Radford, Benjamin
6974:978-0-415-21002-7
6759:978-0-521-82417-0
6498:978-0-87220-166-8
6317:978-3-642-08415-7
6112:978-0-19-514539-7
5969:978-3-030-52673-3
5810:978-0-19-514539-7
5709:978-0-19-514539-7
5577:978-0-19-514539-7
5365:Dowden, Bradley.
5339:978-0-19-514539-7
5206:978-0-262-04507-0
4839:978-0-470-75293-7
4789:978-0-262-04507-0
4732:(10): 3129ā3156.
4263:Miller C (2008).
4028:978-3-319-21870-0
3927:978-1-4129-1652-3
3877:978-0-19-514539-7
3830:978-0-19-514539-7
3601:978-0-19-514539-7
3547:978-0-19-254675-3
3305:978-84-206-8206-8
3270:978-1-4384-0498-1
3229:978-1-4051-8641-4
3019:Rysiew, Patrick.
2984:978-0-19-514539-7
2876:978-0-262-04507-0
2738:978-0-19-254675-3
2686:978-0-19-514539-7
2614:978-0-262-04507-0
2340:Psychology portal
2326:Philosophy portal
1953:cognitive science
1937:concept formation
1926:The psychologist
1912:base rate fallacy
1860:self-serving bias
1856:confirmation bias
1789:In various fields
1612:
1611:
1419:Ideal and bounded
863:square the circle
471:
470:
16:(Redirected from
9886:
9815:
9814:
9803:
9802:
9801:
9518:
9517:
9509:
9508:
9492:
9491:
9382:Frankfurt School
9329:Transactionalism
9279:Normative ethics
9259:Legal positivism
9235:Falsificationism
9220:Consequentialism
9215:Communitarianism
9188:
9187:
9056:New Confucianism
8895:
8894:
8702:Neo-Confucianism
8667:
8666:
8476:Second Sophistic
8461:Middle Platonism
8304:
8303:
8245:
8244:
8234:
8233:
8077:Epiphenomenalism
7944:Consequentialism
7878:Institutionalism
7783:
7782:
7772:
7771:
7757:
7750:
7743:
7734:
7733:
7640:
7638:
7636:10.1.1.1019.3269
7617:, by Peter Suber
7585:
7584:
7566:
7560:
7559:
7541:
7535:
7534:
7516:
7510:
7509:
7501:
7495:
7494:
7486:
7480:
7479:
7471:
7465:
7464:
7436:
7430:
7429:
7401:
7395:
7392:
7386:
7379:
7373:
7372:
7364:
7358:
7357:
7355:
7353:
7335:
7329:
7328:
7326:
7324:
7306:
7300:
7299:
7297:
7295:
7275:
7269:
7268:
7266:
7264:
7228:
7219:
7218:
7216:
7214:
7195:
7189:
7188:
7186:
7184:
7164:
7155:
7154:
7152:
7150:
7114:
7105:
7104:
7085:
7079:
7078:
7076:
7074:
7056:
7050:
7049:
7047:
7045:
6997:
6991:
6990:
6988:
6986:
6958:
6952:
6951:
6949:
6947:
6928:
6922:
6921:
6919:
6917:
6899:
6858:
6852:
6851:
6823:
6817:
6816:
6806:
6782:
6776:
6775:
6773:
6771:
6743:
6734:
6733:
6731:
6729:
6681:
6675:
6674:
6672:
6670:
6651:
6645:
6644:
6642:
6640:
6622:
6616:
6615:
6613:
6611:
6563:
6557:
6556:
6550:
6546:
6544:
6536:
6534:
6532:
6514:
6503:
6502:
6482:
6476:
6475:
6473:
6471:
6453:
6444:
6443:
6441:
6439:
6421:
6415:
6414:
6412:
6410:
6390:
6381:
6380:
6378:
6376:
6358:
6341:
6340:
6339:. Prentice-Hall.
6338:
6328:
6322:
6321:
6296:Republished in:
6295:
6267:
6261:
6260:
6232:
6226:
6219:
6213:
6203:
6197:
6196:
6194:
6192:
6186:
6156:(5): 1145ā1179.
6147:
6138:
6129:
6128:
6126:
6124:
6088:
6082:
6081:
6079:
6077:
6029:
6023:
6022:
6020:
6018:
6000:
5994:
5993:
5991:
5989:
5943:
5934:
5933:
5931:
5929:
5905:
5899:
5898:
5896:
5894:
5876:
5870:
5869:
5867:
5865:
5848:(488): 915ā952.
5833:
5827:
5826:
5824:
5822:
5786:
5777:
5776:
5774:
5772:
5732:
5726:
5725:
5723:
5721:
5685:
5674:
5673:
5671:
5669:
5644:(198): 113ā128.
5629:
5623:
5622:
5620:
5600:
5594:
5593:
5591:
5589:
5553:
5544:
5543:
5541:
5539:
5491:
5485:
5484:
5482:
5480:
5460:
5454:
5453:
5451:
5449:
5429:
5423:
5422:
5420:
5418:
5400:
5387:
5386:
5384:
5382:
5362:
5356:
5355:
5353:
5351:
5315:
5304:
5303:
5285:
5261:
5255:
5254:
5252:
5250:
5232:
5223:
5222:
5220:
5218:
5190:
5165:
5164:
5162:
5160:
5112:
5103:
5102:
5100:
5098:
5078:
5069:
5068:
5066:
5064:
5044:
5038:
5037:
5035:
5033:
4993:
4987:
4986:
4984:
4982:
4962:
4956:
4955:
4927:
4916:
4915:
4913:
4911:
4891:
4885:
4884:
4882:
4880:
4862:
4856:
4855:
4853:
4851:
4815:
4806:
4805:
4803:
4801:
4773:
4764:
4763:
4761:
4759:
4741:
4717:
4711:
4710:
4708:
4706:
4666:
4660:
4659:
4657:
4655:
4615:
4609:
4608:
4606:
4604:
4586:
4562:
4556:
4555:
4547:
4541:
4540:
4538:
4536:
4496:
4487:
4486:
4484:
4482:
4450:
4444:
4443:
4441:
4439:
4421:
4397:
4378:
4377:
4375:
4373:
4355:
4349:
4348:
4346:
4344:
4312:
4297:
4296:
4294:
4292:
4260:
4254:
4253:
4251:
4249:
4229:
4223:
4222:
4220:
4218:
4198:
4192:
4191:
4189:
4187:
4147:
4141:
4140:
4138:
4136:
4116:
4107:
4106:
4104:
4102:
4054:
4045:
4044:
4042:
4040:
4012:
4006:
4005:
4003:
4001:
3968:(2/3): 165ā197.
3953:
3944:
3943:
3941:
3939:
3911:
3894:
3893:
3891:
3889:
3853:
3847:
3846:
3844:
3842:
3806:
3800:
3799:
3797:
3795:
3763:
3752:
3751:
3749:
3747:
3707:
3696:
3695:
3693:
3691:
3659:
3650:
3649:
3647:
3645:
3627:
3618:
3617:
3615:
3613:
3577:
3564:
3563:
3561:
3559:
3531:
3522:
3521:
3519:
3517:
3499:
3484:
3483:
3481:
3479:
3461:
3437:
3422:
3421:
3419:
3417:
3400:Pinker, Steven.
3397:
3380:
3379:
3377:
3375:
3343:
3308:
3293:
3287:
3286:
3284:
3282:
3252:
3246:
3245:
3243:
3241:
3205:
3148:
3147:
3145:
3143:
3124:
3118:
3117:
3115:
3113:
3081:
3075:
3074:
3072:
3070:
3052:
3041:
3040:
3038:
3036:
3016:
3001:
3000:
2998:
2996:
2960:
2893:
2892:
2890:
2888:
2860:
2755:
2754:
2752:
2750:
2722:
2703:
2702:
2700:
2698:
2662:
2649:
2648:
2646:
2644:
2625:
2619:
2618:
2598:
2557:
2556:
2554:
2552:
2534:
2450:Superrationality
2364:Counterintuitive
2342:
2337:
2336:
2335:
2328:
2323:
2322:
2321:
2259:Martin Heidegger
2101:Nash equilibrium
2081:value in general
2059:expected utility
1844:cognitive biases
1646:of rationality.
1607:
1604:
1586:
1579:
1506:goals, and even
1374:wishful thinking
1366:direction of fit
1290:wishful thinking
1148:cognitive biases
978:Bernard Williams
930:William Frankena
882:ethical dilemmas
756:
737:cognitive biases
687:rational animals
615:expected utility
591:cognitive biases
463:
456:
449:
363:Sextus Empiricus
328:Metaepistemology
54:
53:
21:
9894:
9893:
9889:
9888:
9887:
9885:
9884:
9883:
9829:
9828:
9827:
9822:
9799:
9797:
9776:
9740:
9640:
9602:
9549:
9503:
9502:
9474:
9463:Russian cosmism
9436:
9432:Western Marxism
9397:New Historicism
9362:Critical theory
9348:
9344:Wittgensteinian
9240:Foundationalism
9173:
9110:
9091:Social contract
8947:Foundationalism
8880:
8862:
8846:Illuminationism
8831:Aristotelianism
8817:
8806:Vishishtadvaita
8759:
8711:
8652:
8619:
8490:
8419:Megarian school
8414:Eretrian school
8355:
8316:Agriculturalism
8293:
8239:
8220:
8167:
8139:
8096:
8048:
8005:
7989:Incompatibilism
7958:
7930:
7882:
7854:
7777:
7766:
7761:
7683:. 318 pp.
7615:Wayback Machine
7593:
7591:Further reading
7588:
7581:
7567:
7563:
7556:
7542:
7538:
7531:
7517:
7513:
7502:
7498:
7487:
7483:
7472:
7468:
7437:
7433:
7402:
7398:
7393:
7389:
7380:
7376:
7365:
7361:
7351:
7349:
7336:
7332:
7322:
7320:
7307:
7303:
7293:
7291:
7276:
7272:
7262:
7260:
7253:
7229:
7222:
7212:
7210:
7197:
7196:
7192:
7182:
7180:
7165:
7158:
7148:
7146:
7139:
7115:
7108:
7086:
7082:
7072:
7070:
7057:
7053:
7043:
7041:
6998:
6994:
6984:
6982:
6975:
6959:
6955:
6945:
6943:
6930:
6929:
6925:
6915:
6913:
6859:
6855:
6824:
6820:
6783:
6779:
6769:
6767:
6760:
6744:
6737:
6727:
6725:
6682:
6678:
6668:
6666:
6653:
6652:
6648:
6638:
6636:
6623:
6619:
6609:
6607:
6564:
6560:
6548:
6547:
6538:
6537:
6530:
6528:
6515:
6506:
6499:
6483:
6479:
6469:
6467:
6454:
6447:
6437:
6435:
6422:
6418:
6408:
6406:
6391:
6384:
6374:
6372:
6359:
6344:
6329:
6325:
6318:
6268:
6264:
6249:10.2307/1905526
6233:
6229:
6220:
6216:
6206:JĆ¼rgen Habermas
6204:
6200:
6190:
6188:
6184:
6145:
6139:
6132:
6122:
6120:
6113:
6089:
6085:
6075:
6073:
6030:
6026:
6016:
6014:
6001:
5997:
5987:
5985:
5970:
5944:
5937:
5927:
5925:
5906:
5902:
5892:
5890:
5877:
5873:
5863:
5861:
5834:
5830:
5820:
5818:
5811:
5787:
5780:
5770:
5768:
5733:
5729:
5719:
5717:
5710:
5686:
5677:
5667:
5665:
5630:
5626:
5601:
5597:
5587:
5585:
5578:
5554:
5547:
5537:
5535:
5512:10.2307/2215919
5492:
5488:
5478:
5476:
5461:
5457:
5447:
5445:
5430:
5426:
5416:
5414:
5401:
5390:
5380:
5378:
5363:
5359:
5349:
5347:
5340:
5316:
5307:
5262:
5258:
5248:
5246:
5233:
5226:
5216:
5214:
5207:
5191:
5168:
5158:
5156:
5133:10.2307/2215920
5113:
5106:
5096:
5094:
5079:
5072:
5062:
5060:
5045:
5041:
5031:
5029:
4994:
4990:
4980:
4978:
4963:
4959:
4928:
4919:
4909:
4907:
4892:
4888:
4878:
4876:
4863:
4859:
4849:
4847:
4840:
4816:
4809:
4799:
4797:
4790:
4774:
4767:
4757:
4755:
4718:
4714:
4704:
4702:
4687:10.2307/3655750
4681:(11): 553ā576.
4667:
4663:
4653:
4651:
4616:
4612:
4602:
4600:
4563:
4559:
4548:
4544:
4534:
4532:
4497:
4490:
4480:
4478:
4451:
4447:
4437:
4435:
4398:
4381:
4371:
4369:
4356:
4352:
4342:
4340:
4313:
4300:
4290:
4288:
4261:
4257:
4247:
4245:
4230:
4226:
4216:
4214:
4199:
4195:
4185:
4183:
4148:
4144:
4134:
4132:
4117:
4110:
4100:
4098:
4055:
4048:
4038:
4036:
4029:
4013:
4009:
3999:
3997:
3954:
3947:
3937:
3935:
3928:
3912:
3897:
3887:
3885:
3878:
3854:
3850:
3840:
3838:
3831:
3807:
3803:
3793:
3791:
3764:
3755:
3745:
3743:
3708:
3699:
3689:
3687:
3660:
3653:
3643:
3641:
3628:
3621:
3611:
3609:
3602:
3578:
3567:
3557:
3555:
3548:
3532:
3525:
3515:
3513:
3500:
3487:
3477:
3475:
3452:(23): 161ā178.
3438:
3425:
3415:
3413:
3398:
3383:
3373:
3371:
3344:
3311:
3294:
3290:
3280:
3278:
3271:
3253:
3249:
3239:
3237:
3230:
3206:
3151:
3141:
3139:
3126:
3125:
3121:
3111:
3109:
3082:
3078:
3068:
3066:
3053:
3044:
3034:
3032:
3017:
3004:
2994:
2992:
2985:
2961:
2896:
2886:
2884:
2877:
2861:
2758:
2748:
2746:
2739:
2723:
2706:
2696:
2694:
2687:
2663:
2652:
2642:
2640:
2633:Merriam-Webster
2627:
2626:
2622:
2615:
2599:
2560:
2550:
2548:
2535:
2468:
2464:
2459:
2379:Homo economicus
2338:
2333:
2331:
2324:
2319:
2317:
2314:
2308:
2291:Michel Foucault
2243:, in his work "
2235:human existence
2227:
2215:
2184:
2167:homo economicus
2146:
2109:
2089:
2042:decision theory
2038:
2036:Decision theory
2013:
2007:
1978:
1949:
1941:problem-solving
1917:Gerd Gigerenzer
1825:
1796:
1791:
1772:rationality of
1733:foundationalism
1711:
1696:
1644:idealized types
1617:
1608:
1602:
1599:
1592:needs expansion
1577:
1548:
1520:decision theory
1491:
1474:
1453:
1421:
1360:. According to
1350:
1326:decision theory
1306:
1243:
1219:
1206:
1189:burden of proof
1177:foundationalism
1172:
1144:decision theory
1136:classical logic
1114:in the form of
1108:formal sciences
1079:
1015:Rationality is
1013:
996:
968:
895:
855:inconsistencies
846:
789:
764:
639:
611:decision theory
494:rational animal
467:
438:
437:
423:Epistemic logic
413:
412:
403:
402:
353:
352:
351:Epistemologists
343:
342:
303:
302:
293:
292:
197:
196:
187:
186:
132:Foundationalism
97:
96:
87:
50:
39:Rational number
35:
28:
23:
22:
15:
12:
11:
5:
9892:
9882:
9881:
9876:
9871:
9866:
9861:
9856:
9851:
9846:
9841:
9824:
9823:
9821:
9820:
9808:
9793:
9790:
9789:
9786:
9785:
9782:
9781:
9778:
9777:
9775:
9774:
9769:
9764:
9759:
9754:
9748:
9746:
9742:
9741:
9739:
9738:
9733:
9728:
9723:
9718:
9713:
9708:
9703:
9698:
9693:
9688:
9683:
9678:
9673:
9672:
9671:
9661:
9656:
9650:
9648:
9642:
9641:
9639:
9638:
9633:
9628:
9623:
9618:
9612:
9610:
9608:Middle Eastern
9604:
9603:
9601:
9600:
9595:
9590:
9585:
9580:
9575:
9570:
9565:
9559:
9557:
9551:
9550:
9548:
9547:
9542:
9537:
9532:
9526:
9524:
9515:
9505:
9504:
9501:
9500:
9496:
9488:
9487:
9484:
9483:
9480:
9479:
9476:
9475:
9473:
9472:
9465:
9460:
9455:
9450:
9444:
9442:
9438:
9437:
9435:
9434:
9429:
9424:
9419:
9414:
9409:
9404:
9399:
9394:
9389:
9384:
9379:
9374:
9372:Existentialism
9369:
9367:Deconstruction
9364:
9358:
9356:
9350:
9349:
9347:
9346:
9341:
9336:
9331:
9326:
9321:
9316:
9311:
9306:
9301:
9296:
9291:
9286:
9281:
9276:
9271:
9266:
9261:
9256:
9251:
9246:
9237:
9232:
9227:
9222:
9217:
9212:
9207:
9202:
9200:Applied ethics
9196:
9194:
9185:
9179:
9178:
9175:
9174:
9172:
9171:
9166:
9164:Nietzscheanism
9161:
9156:
9151:
9146:
9141:
9136:
9135:
9134:
9124:
9118:
9116:
9112:
9111:
9109:
9108:
9106:Utilitarianism
9103:
9098:
9093:
9088:
9083:
9078:
9073:
9068:
9063:
9058:
9053:
9048:
9043:
9038:
9033:
9028:
9023:
9018:
9013:
9008:
9007:
9006:
9004:Transcendental
9001:
8996:
8991:
8986:
8981:
8971:
8970:
8969:
8959:
8954:
8949:
8944:
8942:Existentialism
8939:
8934:
8929:
8924:
8919:
8914:
8909:
8904:
8898:
8892:
8886:
8885:
8882:
8881:
8879:
8878:
8872:
8870:
8864:
8863:
8861:
8860:
8855:
8848:
8843:
8838:
8833:
8827:
8825:
8819:
8818:
8816:
8815:
8810:
8809:
8808:
8803:
8798:
8793:
8788:
8783:
8778:
8767:
8765:
8761:
8760:
8758:
8757:
8752:
8747:
8742:
8737:
8732:
8730:Augustinianism
8727:
8721:
8719:
8713:
8712:
8710:
8709:
8704:
8699:
8694:
8689:
8684:
8679:
8673:
8671:
8664:
8658:
8657:
8654:
8653:
8651:
8650:
8645:
8643:Zoroastrianism
8640:
8635:
8629:
8627:
8621:
8620:
8618:
8617:
8616:
8615:
8610:
8605:
8600:
8595:
8590:
8585:
8580:
8575:
8565:
8564:
8563:
8558:
8548:
8547:
8546:
8541:
8536:
8531:
8526:
8521:
8516:
8511:
8500:
8498:
8492:
8491:
8489:
8488:
8486:Church Fathers
8483:
8478:
8473:
8468:
8463:
8458:
8457:
8456:
8451:
8446:
8441:
8431:
8426:
8421:
8416:
8411:
8406:
8401:
8400:
8399:
8394:
8389:
8384:
8379:
8368:
8366:
8357:
8356:
8354:
8353:
8348:
8343:
8338:
8333:
8328:
8323:
8318:
8312:
8310:
8301:
8295:
8294:
8292:
8291:
8290:
8289:
8284:
8279:
8274:
8269:
8259:
8253:
8251:
8241:
8240:
8230:
8229:
8226:
8225:
8222:
8221:
8219:
8218:
8213:
8208:
8203:
8198:
8193:
8188:
8183:
8177:
8175:
8169:
8168:
8166:
8165:
8160:
8155:
8149:
8147:
8141:
8140:
8138:
8137:
8132:
8127:
8122:
8117:
8112:
8106:
8104:
8098:
8097:
8095:
8094:
8089:
8084:
8079:
8074:
8069:
8064:
8058:
8056:
8050:
8049:
8047:
8046:
8041:
8036:
8031:
8026:
8021:
8015:
8013:
8007:
8006:
8004:
8003:
8001:Libertarianism
7998:
7997:
7996:
7986:
7985:
7984:
7974:
7968:
7966:
7960:
7959:
7957:
7956:
7951:
7946:
7940:
7938:
7932:
7931:
7929:
7928:
7923:
7918:
7913:
7908:
7903:
7898:
7892:
7890:
7884:
7883:
7881:
7880:
7875:
7870:
7864:
7862:
7856:
7855:
7853:
7852:
7847:
7842:
7837:
7832:
7827:
7822:
7817:
7812:
7807:
7805:Metaphilosophy
7802:
7797:
7791:
7789:
7779:
7778:
7768:
7767:
7760:
7759:
7752:
7745:
7737:
7731:
7730:
7727:
7724:
7717:
7714:978-3031240034
7702:
7692:
7673:
7666:
7659:
7653:
7647:
7641:
7629:(6): 249ā264.
7618:
7605:
7600:
7592:
7589:
7587:
7586:
7579:
7561:
7555:978-2020324014
7554:
7536:
7529:
7511:
7496:
7481:
7466:
7447:(3): 358ā384.
7431:
7396:
7387:
7374:
7359:
7330:
7301:
7270:
7251:
7220:
7190:
7156:
7137:
7106:
7080:
7051:
6992:
6973:
6953:
6923:
6874:(2): 793ā826.
6853:
6818:
6797:(9): 282ā287.
6777:
6758:
6735:
6676:
6646:
6617:
6584:10.1002/wcs.20
6558:
6549:|website=
6504:
6497:
6477:
6445:
6416:
6382:
6342:
6323:
6316:
6278:(2): 125ā150.
6262:
6243:(3/4): 245ā8.
6227:
6214:
6198:
6162:10.1086/227128
6130:
6111:
6083:
6044:(1): 153ā171.
6024:
5995:
5968:
5935:
5920:(2): 313ā335.
5900:
5871:
5828:
5809:
5778:
5753:10.1086/683537
5747:(2): 283ā310.
5727:
5708:
5675:
5624:
5595:
5576:
5545:
5486:
5455:
5424:
5388:
5357:
5338:
5305:
5276:(2): 235ā255.
5270:Acta Analytica
5256:
5224:
5205:
5166:
5104:
5070:
5039:
5008:(3): 439ā466.
4988:
4957:
4917:
4886:
4857:
4838:
4807:
4788:
4765:
4712:
4661:
4636:10.1086/293312
4630:(3): 461ā482.
4610:
4577:(4): 332ā342.
4557:
4542:
4517:10.1086/698737
4488:
4445:
4379:
4350:
4327:(1): 177ā180.
4298:
4275:(2): 222ā266.
4255:
4224:
4193:
4142:
4108:
4046:
4027:
4007:
3945:
3926:
3895:
3876:
3848:
3829:
3801:
3753:
3722:(1): 111ā126.
3697:
3674:(4): 405ā422.
3651:
3619:
3600:
3565:
3546:
3523:
3485:
3423:
3381:
3309:
3288:
3269:
3247:
3228:
3149:
3119:
3076:
3042:
3002:
2983:
2894:
2875:
2756:
2737:
2704:
2685:
2650:
2620:
2613:
2558:
2465:
2463:
2460:
2458:
2457:
2452:
2447:
2442:
2437:
2432:
2427:
2422:
2417:
2412:
2410:Law of thought
2407:
2402:
2397:
2392:
2386:
2381:
2376:
2371:
2366:
2361:
2356:
2354:Cognitive bias
2351:
2345:
2344:
2343:
2329:
2313:
2310:
2297:" (1975) and "
2277:Theodor Adorno
2273:Max Horkheimer
2263:Being and Time
2226:
2223:
2214:
2211:
2197:rational agent
2183:
2180:
2145:
2142:
2117:Boston Celtics
2108:
2105:
2088:
2085:
2037:
2034:
2009:Main article:
2006:
2003:
1977:
1974:
1970:Julian Baggini
1948:
1945:
1864:hindsight bias
1824:
1821:
1795:
1792:
1790:
1787:
1741:superstructure
1710:
1707:
1699:Richard Brandt
1695:
1694:Richard Brandt
1692:
1616:
1613:
1610:
1609:
1589:
1587:
1576:
1573:
1557:Pascal's Wager
1547:
1544:
1536:microeconomics
1490:
1487:
1473:
1470:
1458:climate change
1452:
1449:
1420:
1417:
1405:JesĆŗs MosterĆn
1349:
1346:
1330:expected value
1305:
1302:
1242:
1239:
1218:
1215:
1205:
1202:
1171:
1168:
1078:
1075:
1071:responsibility
1012:
1009:
995:
992:
967:
964:
959:Richard Brandt
938:utilitarianism
894:
893:Based on goals
891:
851:contradictions
845:
842:
788:
785:
763:
760:
638:
635:
469:
468:
466:
465:
458:
451:
443:
440:
439:
436:
435:
430:
425:
420:
414:
411:Related fields
410:
409:
408:
405:
404:
401:
400:
395:
393:W. V. O. Quine
390:
385:
380:
378:RenƩ Descartes
375:
370:
368:Edmund Gettier
365:
360:
354:
350:
349:
348:
345:
344:
341:
340:
335:
330:
325:
320:
315:
310:
304:
300:
299:
298:
295:
294:
291:
290:
285:
280:
275:
270:
265:
260:
255:
250:
245:
240:
235:
230:
225:
220:
209:
204:
198:
194:
193:
192:
189:
188:
185:
184:
179:
174:
169:
164:
159:
154:
149:
144:
139:
134:
129:
124:
119:
114:
109:
104:
98:
94:
93:
92:
89:
88:
86:
85:
80:
75:
69:
66:
65:
59:
58:
26:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
9891:
9880:
9877:
9875:
9872:
9870:
9867:
9865:
9862:
9860:
9857:
9855:
9852:
9850:
9847:
9845:
9842:
9840:
9837:
9836:
9834:
9819:
9818:
9809:
9807:
9806:
9795:
9794:
9791:
9773:
9770:
9768:
9765:
9763:
9760:
9758:
9755:
9753:
9750:
9749:
9747:
9745:Miscellaneous
9743:
9737:
9734:
9732:
9729:
9727:
9724:
9722:
9719:
9717:
9714:
9712:
9709:
9707:
9704:
9702:
9699:
9697:
9694:
9692:
9689:
9687:
9684:
9682:
9679:
9677:
9674:
9670:
9667:
9666:
9665:
9662:
9660:
9657:
9655:
9652:
9651:
9649:
9647:
9643:
9637:
9634:
9632:
9629:
9627:
9624:
9622:
9619:
9617:
9614:
9613:
9611:
9609:
9605:
9599:
9596:
9594:
9591:
9589:
9586:
9584:
9581:
9579:
9576:
9574:
9571:
9569:
9566:
9564:
9561:
9560:
9558:
9556:
9552:
9546:
9543:
9541:
9538:
9536:
9533:
9531:
9528:
9527:
9525:
9523:
9519:
9516:
9514:
9510:
9506:
9498:
9497:
9493:
9489:
9471:
9470:
9466:
9464:
9461:
9459:
9456:
9454:
9451:
9449:
9446:
9445:
9443:
9441:Miscellaneous
9439:
9433:
9430:
9428:
9427:Structuralism
9425:
9423:
9420:
9418:
9415:
9413:
9412:Postmodernism
9410:
9408:
9405:
9403:
9402:Phenomenology
9400:
9398:
9395:
9393:
9390:
9388:
9385:
9383:
9380:
9378:
9375:
9373:
9370:
9368:
9365:
9363:
9360:
9359:
9357:
9355:
9351:
9345:
9342:
9340:
9339:Vienna Circle
9337:
9335:
9332:
9330:
9327:
9325:
9322:
9320:
9317:
9315:
9312:
9310:
9307:
9305:
9302:
9300:
9297:
9295:
9292:
9290:
9287:
9285:
9282:
9280:
9277:
9275:
9272:
9270:
9269:Moral realism
9267:
9265:
9262:
9260:
9257:
9255:
9252:
9250:
9247:
9245:
9241:
9238:
9236:
9233:
9231:
9228:
9226:
9223:
9221:
9218:
9216:
9213:
9211:
9208:
9206:
9203:
9201:
9198:
9197:
9195:
9193:
9189:
9186:
9184:
9180:
9170:
9167:
9165:
9162:
9160:
9157:
9155:
9152:
9150:
9147:
9145:
9142:
9140:
9137:
9133:
9130:
9129:
9128:
9125:
9123:
9120:
9119:
9117:
9113:
9107:
9104:
9102:
9099:
9097:
9094:
9092:
9089:
9087:
9084:
9082:
9079:
9077:
9074:
9072:
9071:Phenomenology
9069:
9067:
9064:
9062:
9059:
9057:
9054:
9052:
9049:
9047:
9044:
9042:
9039:
9037:
9034:
9032:
9029:
9027:
9024:
9022:
9019:
9017:
9014:
9012:
9011:Individualism
9009:
9005:
9002:
9000:
8997:
8995:
8992:
8990:
8987:
8985:
8982:
8980:
8977:
8976:
8975:
8972:
8968:
8965:
8964:
8963:
8960:
8958:
8955:
8953:
8950:
8948:
8945:
8943:
8940:
8938:
8935:
8933:
8930:
8928:
8925:
8923:
8920:
8918:
8915:
8913:
8910:
8908:
8905:
8903:
8900:
8899:
8896:
8893:
8891:
8887:
8877:
8876:Judeo-Islamic
8874:
8873:
8871:
8869:
8865:
8859:
8856:
8854:
8853:
8852:ŹæIlm al-KalÄm
8849:
8847:
8844:
8842:
8839:
8837:
8834:
8832:
8829:
8828:
8826:
8824:
8820:
8814:
8811:
8807:
8804:
8802:
8801:Shuddhadvaita
8799:
8797:
8794:
8792:
8789:
8787:
8784:
8782:
8779:
8777:
8774:
8773:
8772:
8769:
8768:
8766:
8762:
8756:
8753:
8751:
8748:
8746:
8743:
8741:
8738:
8736:
8735:Scholasticism
8733:
8731:
8728:
8726:
8723:
8722:
8720:
8718:
8714:
8708:
8705:
8703:
8700:
8698:
8695:
8693:
8690:
8688:
8685:
8683:
8680:
8678:
8675:
8674:
8672:
8668:
8665:
8663:
8659:
8649:
8646:
8644:
8641:
8639:
8636:
8634:
8631:
8630:
8628:
8626:
8622:
8614:
8611:
8609:
8606:
8604:
8601:
8599:
8596:
8594:
8591:
8589:
8586:
8584:
8581:
8579:
8576:
8574:
8571:
8570:
8569:
8566:
8562:
8559:
8557:
8554:
8553:
8552:
8549:
8545:
8542:
8540:
8537:
8535:
8532:
8530:
8527:
8525:
8522:
8520:
8517:
8515:
8512:
8510:
8507:
8506:
8505:
8502:
8501:
8499:
8497:
8493:
8487:
8484:
8482:
8479:
8477:
8474:
8472:
8469:
8467:
8464:
8462:
8459:
8455:
8452:
8450:
8447:
8445:
8442:
8440:
8437:
8436:
8435:
8432:
8430:
8427:
8425:
8422:
8420:
8417:
8415:
8412:
8410:
8407:
8405:
8402:
8398:
8395:
8393:
8390:
8388:
8385:
8383:
8380:
8378:
8375:
8374:
8373:
8370:
8369:
8367:
8365:
8362:
8358:
8352:
8349:
8347:
8344:
8342:
8339:
8337:
8334:
8332:
8329:
8327:
8324:
8322:
8319:
8317:
8314:
8313:
8311:
8309:
8305:
8302:
8300:
8296:
8288:
8285:
8283:
8280:
8278:
8275:
8273:
8270:
8268:
8265:
8264:
8263:
8260:
8258:
8255:
8254:
8252:
8250:
8246:
8242:
8235:
8231:
8217:
8214:
8212:
8209:
8207:
8204:
8202:
8199:
8197:
8194:
8192:
8189:
8187:
8186:Conceptualism
8184:
8182:
8179:
8178:
8176:
8174:
8170:
8164:
8161:
8159:
8156:
8154:
8151:
8150:
8148:
8146:
8142:
8136:
8133:
8131:
8128:
8126:
8123:
8121:
8118:
8116:
8115:Particularism
8113:
8111:
8108:
8107:
8105:
8103:
8099:
8093:
8090:
8088:
8085:
8083:
8082:Functionalism
8080:
8078:
8075:
8073:
8070:
8068:
8067:Eliminativism
8065:
8063:
8060:
8059:
8057:
8055:
8051:
8045:
8042:
8040:
8037:
8035:
8032:
8030:
8027:
8025:
8022:
8020:
8017:
8016:
8014:
8012:
8008:
8002:
7999:
7995:
7992:
7991:
7990:
7987:
7983:
7980:
7979:
7978:
7975:
7973:
7972:Compatibilism
7970:
7969:
7967:
7965:
7961:
7955:
7952:
7950:
7947:
7945:
7942:
7941:
7939:
7937:
7933:
7927:
7924:
7922:
7919:
7917:
7914:
7912:
7911:Particularism
7909:
7907:
7904:
7902:
7899:
7897:
7894:
7893:
7891:
7889:
7885:
7879:
7876:
7874:
7871:
7869:
7866:
7865:
7863:
7861:
7857:
7851:
7848:
7846:
7843:
7841:
7838:
7836:
7833:
7831:
7828:
7826:
7823:
7821:
7818:
7816:
7813:
7811:
7808:
7806:
7803:
7801:
7798:
7796:
7793:
7792:
7790:
7788:
7784:
7780:
7773:
7769:
7765:
7758:
7753:
7751:
7746:
7744:
7739:
7738:
7735:
7728:
7725:
7722:
7718:
7715:
7711:
7707:
7703:
7700:
7698:
7693:
7690:
7686:
7682:
7678:
7674:
7671:
7667:
7664:
7660:
7657:
7654:
7651:
7648:
7645:
7642:
7637:
7632:
7628:
7624:
7619:
7616:
7612:
7609:
7606:
7604:
7601:
7598:
7595:
7594:
7582:
7576:
7572:
7565:
7557:
7551:
7547:
7540:
7532:
7530:9782070291793
7526:
7522:
7515:
7507:
7500:
7492:
7491:Sein und Zeit
7485:
7477:
7470:
7462:
7458:
7454:
7450:
7446:
7442:
7435:
7427:
7423:
7419:
7415:
7411:
7407:
7400:
7391:
7384:
7378:
7370:
7363:
7347:
7343:
7342:
7334:
7318:
7314:
7313:
7305:
7289:
7285:
7281:
7274:
7258:
7254:
7248:
7244:
7240:
7236:
7235:
7227:
7225:
7208:
7204:
7200:
7199:"game theory"
7194:
7178:
7174:
7170:
7163:
7161:
7144:
7140:
7134:
7130:
7126:
7122:
7121:
7113:
7111:
7102:
7098:
7094:
7090:
7084:
7068:
7064:
7063:
7055:
7039:
7035:
7031:
7027:
7023:
7019:
7015:
7011:
7007:
7003:
6996:
6980:
6976:
6970:
6966:
6965:
6957:
6941:
6937:
6933:
6927:
6911:
6907:
6903:
6898:
6893:
6889:
6885:
6881:
6877:
6873:
6869:
6865:
6857:
6849:
6845:
6841:
6837:
6833:
6829:
6822:
6814:
6810:
6805:
6800:
6796:
6792:
6788:
6781:
6765:
6761:
6755:
6751:
6750:
6742:
6740:
6723:
6719:
6715:
6711:
6707:
6703:
6699:
6695:
6691:
6687:
6680:
6664:
6660:
6656:
6650:
6634:
6630:
6629:
6621:
6605:
6601:
6597:
6593:
6589:
6585:
6581:
6577:
6573:
6569:
6562:
6554:
6542:
6526:
6522:
6521:
6513:
6511:
6509:
6500:
6494:
6490:
6489:
6481:
6465:
6461:
6460:
6452:
6450:
6433:
6429:
6428:
6420:
6404:
6400:
6396:
6389:
6387:
6370:
6366:
6365:
6357:
6355:
6353:
6351:
6349:
6347:
6337:
6336:
6327:
6319:
6313:
6309:
6305:
6301:
6293:
6289:
6285:
6281:
6277:
6273:
6266:
6258:
6254:
6250:
6246:
6242:
6238:
6231:
6224:
6218:
6211:
6207:
6202:
6183:
6179:
6175:
6171:
6167:
6163:
6159:
6155:
6151:
6144:
6137:
6135:
6118:
6114:
6108:
6104:
6100:
6096:
6095:
6087:
6071:
6067:
6063:
6059:
6055:
6051:
6047:
6043:
6039:
6035:
6028:
6012:
6008:
6007:
5999:
5983:
5979:
5975:
5971:
5965:
5961:
5957:
5953:
5949:
5942:
5940:
5923:
5919:
5915:
5911:
5904:
5888:
5884:
5883:
5875:
5859:
5855:
5851:
5847:
5843:
5839:
5832:
5816:
5812:
5806:
5802:
5798:
5794:
5793:
5785:
5783:
5766:
5762:
5758:
5754:
5750:
5746:
5742:
5738:
5731:
5715:
5711:
5705:
5701:
5697:
5693:
5692:
5684:
5682:
5680:
5663:
5659:
5655:
5651:
5647:
5643:
5639:
5635:
5628:
5619:
5614:
5610:
5606:
5599:
5583:
5579:
5573:
5569:
5565:
5561:
5560:
5552:
5550:
5533:
5529:
5525:
5521:
5517:
5513:
5509:
5505:
5501:
5497:
5490:
5474:
5470:
5466:
5459:
5443:
5439:
5435:
5428:
5412:
5409:. Routledge.
5408:
5407:
5399:
5397:
5395:
5393:
5376:
5372:
5368:
5361:
5345:
5341:
5335:
5331:
5327:
5323:
5322:
5314:
5312:
5310:
5301:
5297:
5293:
5289:
5284:
5279:
5275:
5271:
5267:
5260:
5244:
5240:
5239:
5231:
5229:
5212:
5208:
5202:
5199:. MIT Press.
5198:
5197:
5189:
5187:
5185:
5183:
5181:
5179:
5177:
5175:
5173:
5171:
5154:
5150:
5146:
5142:
5138:
5134:
5130:
5126:
5122:
5118:
5111:
5109:
5092:
5088:
5084:
5077:
5075:
5058:
5054:
5050:
5043:
5027:
5023:
5019:
5015:
5011:
5007:
5003:
4999:
4992:
4976:
4972:
4968:
4961:
4953:
4949:
4945:
4941:
4937:
4933:
4926:
4924:
4922:
4905:
4901:
4897:
4890:
4874:
4870:
4869:
4861:
4845:
4841:
4835:
4831:
4827:
4823:
4822:
4814:
4812:
4795:
4791:
4785:
4782:. MIT Press.
4781:
4780:
4772:
4770:
4753:
4749:
4745:
4740:
4735:
4731:
4727:
4723:
4716:
4700:
4696:
4692:
4688:
4684:
4680:
4676:
4672:
4665:
4649:
4645:
4641:
4637:
4633:
4629:
4625:
4621:
4614:
4598:
4594:
4590:
4585:
4580:
4576:
4572:
4568:
4561:
4553:
4546:
4530:
4526:
4522:
4518:
4514:
4510:
4506:
4502:
4495:
4493:
4476:
4472:
4468:
4464:
4460:
4456:
4449:
4433:
4429:
4425:
4420:
4415:
4411:
4407:
4403:
4396:
4394:
4392:
4390:
4388:
4386:
4384:
4367:
4363:
4362:
4354:
4338:
4334:
4330:
4326:
4322:
4318:
4311:
4309:
4307:
4305:
4303:
4286:
4282:
4278:
4274:
4270:
4266:
4259:
4243:
4239:
4235:
4228:
4212:
4208:
4204:
4197:
4181:
4177:
4173:
4169:
4165:
4161:
4157:
4153:
4146:
4130:
4126:
4122:
4115:
4113:
4096:
4092:
4088:
4084:
4080:
4076:
4072:
4069:(1): 79ā101.
4068:
4064:
4060:
4053:
4051:
4034:
4030:
4024:
4020:
4019:
4011:
3995:
3991:
3987:
3983:
3979:
3975:
3971:
3967:
3963:
3959:
3952:
3950:
3933:
3929:
3923:
3919:
3918:
3910:
3908:
3906:
3904:
3902:
3900:
3883:
3879:
3873:
3869:
3865:
3861:
3860:
3852:
3836:
3832:
3826:
3822:
3818:
3814:
3813:
3805:
3789:
3785:
3781:
3777:
3773:
3769:
3762:
3760:
3758:
3741:
3737:
3733:
3729:
3725:
3721:
3717:
3713:
3706:
3704:
3702:
3685:
3681:
3677:
3673:
3669:
3665:
3658:
3656:
3639:
3635:
3634:
3626:
3624:
3607:
3603:
3597:
3593:
3589:
3585:
3584:
3576:
3574:
3572:
3570:
3553:
3549:
3543:
3539:
3538:
3530:
3528:
3511:
3507:
3506:
3498:
3496:
3494:
3492:
3490:
3473:
3469:
3465:
3460:
3455:
3451:
3447:
3443:
3436:
3434:
3432:
3430:
3428:
3411:
3407:
3403:
3402:"rationality"
3396:
3394:
3392:
3390:
3388:
3386:
3369:
3365:
3361:
3357:
3353:
3349:
3342:
3340:
3338:
3336:
3334:
3332:
3330:
3328:
3326:
3324:
3322:
3320:
3318:
3316:
3314:
3306:
3302:
3298:
3292:
3276:
3272:
3266:
3262:
3258:
3251:
3235:
3231:
3225:
3221:
3217:
3213:
3212:
3204:
3202:
3200:
3198:
3196:
3194:
3192:
3190:
3188:
3186:
3184:
3182:
3180:
3178:
3176:
3174:
3172:
3170:
3168:
3166:
3164:
3162:
3160:
3158:
3156:
3154:
3137:
3133:
3129:
3123:
3107:
3103:
3099:
3095:
3091:
3087:
3080:
3064:
3060:
3059:
3051:
3049:
3047:
3030:
3026:
3022:
3021:"Rationality"
3015:
3013:
3011:
3009:
3007:
2990:
2986:
2980:
2976:
2972:
2968:
2967:
2959:
2957:
2955:
2953:
2951:
2949:
2947:
2945:
2943:
2941:
2939:
2937:
2935:
2933:
2931:
2929:
2927:
2925:
2923:
2921:
2919:
2917:
2915:
2913:
2911:
2909:
2907:
2905:
2903:
2901:
2899:
2882:
2878:
2872:
2869:. MIT Press.
2868:
2867:
2859:
2857:
2855:
2853:
2851:
2849:
2847:
2845:
2843:
2841:
2839:
2837:
2835:
2833:
2831:
2829:
2827:
2825:
2823:
2821:
2819:
2817:
2815:
2813:
2811:
2809:
2807:
2805:
2803:
2801:
2799:
2797:
2795:
2793:
2791:
2789:
2787:
2785:
2783:
2781:
2779:
2777:
2775:
2773:
2771:
2769:
2767:
2765:
2763:
2761:
2744:
2740:
2734:
2730:
2729:
2721:
2719:
2717:
2715:
2713:
2711:
2709:
2692:
2688:
2682:
2678:
2674:
2670:
2669:
2661:
2659:
2657:
2655:
2638:
2634:
2630:
2624:
2616:
2610:
2607:. MIT Press.
2606:
2605:
2597:
2595:
2593:
2591:
2589:
2587:
2585:
2583:
2581:
2579:
2577:
2575:
2573:
2571:
2569:
2567:
2565:
2563:
2546:
2543:. Macmillan.
2542:
2541:
2533:
2531:
2529:
2527:
2525:
2523:
2521:
2519:
2517:
2515:
2513:
2511:
2509:
2507:
2505:
2503:
2501:
2499:
2497:
2495:
2493:
2491:
2489:
2487:
2485:
2483:
2481:
2479:
2477:
2475:
2473:
2471:
2466:
2456:
2453:
2451:
2448:
2446:
2443:
2441:
2438:
2436:
2433:
2431:
2428:
2426:
2423:
2421:
2418:
2416:
2413:
2411:
2408:
2406:
2405:Irrationality
2403:
2401:
2398:
2396:
2393:
2390:
2387:
2385:
2382:
2380:
2377:
2375:
2372:
2370:
2369:Dysrationalia
2367:
2365:
2362:
2360:
2357:
2355:
2352:
2350:
2347:
2346:
2341:
2330:
2327:
2316:
2309:
2306:
2302:
2300:
2296:
2292:
2288:
2286:
2285:Enlightenment
2282:
2278:
2274:
2270:
2268:
2264:
2260:
2256:
2254:
2253:will to power
2250:
2246:
2242:
2238:
2236:
2232:
2222:
2220:
2210:
2208:
2203:
2199:
2198:
2193:
2189:
2186:The field of
2179:
2177:
2173:
2169:
2168:
2163:
2158:
2156:
2150:
2141:
2139:
2135:
2131:
2127:
2123:
2118:
2114:
2104:
2102:
2097:
2093:
2084:
2082:
2078:
2074:
2073:self-interest
2069:
2068:mental states
2064:
2061:
2060:
2055:
2054:expected gain
2051:
2047:
2043:
2033:
2030:
2026:
2022:
2018:
2012:
2002:
2000:
1995:
1990:
1986:
1982:
1973:
1971:
1967:
1962:
1958:
1954:
1944:
1942:
1938:
1934:
1929:
1924:
1922:
1918:
1913:
1909:
1905:
1900:
1896:
1892:
1888:
1883:
1881:
1876:
1871:
1869:
1865:
1861:
1857:
1853:
1849:
1845:
1841:
1840:
1835:
1831:
1820:
1818:
1814:
1813:Immanuel Kant
1809:
1805:
1801:
1786:
1784:
1779:
1775:
1771:
1767:
1763:
1759:
1757:
1753:
1749:
1744:
1742:
1738:
1734:
1729:
1727:
1726:justification
1723:
1719:
1715:
1706:
1704:
1700:
1691:
1689:
1684:
1680:
1675:
1673:
1669:
1668:Zweckrational
1663:
1660:
1656:
1653:or purposive/
1652:
1651:Zweckrational
1647:
1645:
1641:
1640:social action
1637:
1629:
1625:
1621:
1606:
1597:
1593:
1590:This section
1588:
1585:
1581:
1580:
1572:
1570:
1566:
1565:Buridan's ass
1562:
1558:
1553:
1543:
1541:
1537:
1533:
1529:
1525:
1521:
1517:
1512:
1509:
1505:
1501:
1497:
1486:
1484:
1480:
1469:
1466:
1461:
1459:
1448:
1445:
1441:
1437:
1432:
1430:
1426:
1416:
1414:
1410:
1406:
1402:
1398:
1394:
1389:
1384:
1382:
1377:
1375:
1371:
1370:Buridan's ass
1367:
1363:
1359:
1354:
1345:
1343:
1339:
1333:
1331:
1327:
1321:
1319:
1315:
1311:
1301:
1299:
1295:
1291:
1286:
1284:
1283:non-deductive
1280:
1276:
1272:
1268:
1263:
1261:
1257:
1256:introspection
1253:
1249:
1238:
1236:
1232:
1228:
1224:
1214:
1212:
1201:
1198:
1194:
1190:
1185:
1183:
1178:
1167:
1165:
1161:
1157:
1151:
1149:
1145:
1141:
1137:
1131:
1129:
1125:
1121:
1117:
1113:
1109:
1105:
1101:
1100:methodologies
1096:
1094:
1090:
1085:
1074:
1072:
1068:
1063:
1061:
1060:Frank Jackson
1056:
1054:
1050:
1046:
1040:
1038:
1034:
1030:
1026:
1022:
1021:contradictory
1018:
1008:
1006:
1002:
991:
988:
984:
979:
975:
973:
963:
960:
955:
951:
947:
943:
942:perfectionism
939:
935:
931:
928:According to
926:
924:
920:
919:Immanuel Kant
916:
912:
908:
904:
900:
890:
886:
883:
879:
874:
870:
869:connections.
868:
864:
860:
856:
852:
841:
837:
835:
829:
827:
823:
819:
818:mental states
815:
811:
807:
801:
799:
798:intentionally
795:
784:
782:
777:
774:
769:
759:
757:
755:
749:
744:
742:
738:
734:
730:
724:
722:
718:
714:
713:
707:
705:
701:
697:
692:
688:
684:
683:mental states
680:
676:
671:
669:
665:
661:
657:
653:
649:
645:
634:
632:
628:
624:
620:
616:
612:
608:
604:
600:
596:
592:
588:
584:
580:
575:
573:
569:
563:
560:
556:
552:
548:
544:
543:contradictory
540:
536:
531:
529:
528:
523:
519:
515:
511:
507:
506:mental states
503:
499:
495:
491:
487:
483:
479:
475:
464:
459:
457:
452:
450:
445:
444:
442:
441:
434:
431:
429:
426:
424:
421:
419:
416:
415:
407:
406:
399:
396:
394:
391:
389:
388:Immanuel Kant
386:
384:
381:
379:
376:
374:
373:Wang Yangming
371:
369:
366:
364:
361:
359:
356:
355:
347:
346:
339:
336:
334:
331:
329:
326:
324:
321:
319:
316:
314:
311:
309:
306:
305:
297:
296:
289:
286:
284:
281:
279:
276:
274:
271:
269:
266:
264:
261:
259:
256:
254:
253:Justification
251:
249:
246:
244:
241:
239:
236:
234:
231:
229:
226:
224:
221:
219:
218:
214:
210:
208:
205:
203:
200:
199:
191:
190:
183:
182:Structuralism
180:
178:
175:
173:
170:
168:
165:
163:
160:
158:
155:
153:
152:Perspectivism
150:
148:
145:
143:
140:
138:
137:Infallibilism
135:
133:
130:
128:
125:
123:
120:
118:
115:
113:
110:
108:
107:Contextualism
105:
103:
100:
99:
91:
90:
84:
81:
79:
76:
74:
71:
70:
68:
67:
64:
61:
60:
56:
55:
52:
48:
44:
40:
33:
19:
9810:
9796:
9467:
9458:Postcritique
9448:Kyoto School
9407:Posthumanism
9387:Hermeneutics
9242: /
9183:Contemporary
9159:Newtonianism
9122:Cartesianism
9081:Reductionism
8917:Conservatism
8912:Collectivism
8850:
8578:SarvÄstivadÄ
8556:Anekantavada
8481:Neoplatonism
8449:Epicureanism
8382:Pythagoreans
8321:Confucianism
8287:Contemporary
8277:Early modern
8181:Anti-realism
8135:Universalism
8092:Subjectivism
7888:Epistemology
7720:
7705:
7695:
7676:
7669:
7662:
7644:Lucy Suchman
7626:
7622:
7570:
7564:
7545:
7539:
7520:
7514:
7505:
7499:
7490:
7484:
7475:
7469:
7444:
7440:
7434:
7409:
7405:
7399:
7390:
7382:
7377:
7368:
7362:
7350:. Retrieved
7340:
7333:
7321:. Retrieved
7311:
7304:
7292:. Retrieved
7283:
7273:
7261:. Retrieved
7233:
7211:. Retrieved
7202:
7193:
7181:. Retrieved
7172:
7147:. Retrieved
7119:
7100:
7096:
7083:
7071:. Retrieved
7061:
7054:
7042:. Retrieved
7012:(1): 75ā84.
7009:
7005:
6995:
6983:. Retrieved
6963:
6956:
6944:. Retrieved
6935:
6926:
6914:. Retrieved
6871:
6867:
6856:
6834:(1): 66ā81.
6831:
6827:
6821:
6794:
6790:
6780:
6768:. Retrieved
6748:
6726:. Retrieved
6693:
6690:Intelligence
6689:
6679:
6667:. Retrieved
6658:
6649:
6637:. Retrieved
6627:
6620:
6608:. Retrieved
6575:
6571:
6561:
6529:. Retrieved
6519:
6487:
6480:
6468:. Retrieved
6458:
6436:. Retrieved
6426:
6419:
6407:. Retrieved
6398:
6373:. Retrieved
6363:
6334:
6326:
6299:
6275:
6271:
6265:
6240:
6237:Econometrica
6236:
6230:
6222:
6217:
6209:
6201:
6189:. Retrieved
6153:
6149:
6121:. Retrieved
6093:
6086:
6074:. Retrieved
6041:
6037:
6027:
6015:. Retrieved
6005:
5998:
5986:. Retrieved
5951:
5926:. Retrieved
5917:
5913:
5903:
5891:. Retrieved
5881:
5874:
5862:. Retrieved
5845:
5841:
5831:
5819:. Retrieved
5791:
5769:. Retrieved
5744:
5740:
5730:
5718:. Retrieved
5690:
5666:. Retrieved
5641:
5637:
5627:
5608:
5598:
5586:. Retrieved
5558:
5536:. Retrieved
5506:(1): 39ā68.
5503:
5499:
5489:
5477:. Retrieved
5468:
5458:
5446:. Retrieved
5437:
5427:
5415:. Retrieved
5405:
5379:. Retrieved
5370:
5360:
5348:. Retrieved
5320:
5273:
5269:
5259:
5247:. Retrieved
5237:
5215:. Retrieved
5195:
5157:. Retrieved
5127:(1): 69ā89.
5124:
5120:
5095:. Retrieved
5086:
5061:. Retrieved
5052:
5042:
5030:. Retrieved
5005:
5001:
4991:
4979:. Retrieved
4970:
4960:
4935:
4931:
4908:. Retrieved
4899:
4889:
4877:. Retrieved
4867:
4860:
4848:. Retrieved
4820:
4798:. Retrieved
4778:
4756:. Retrieved
4729:
4725:
4715:
4703:. Retrieved
4678:
4674:
4664:
4652:. Retrieved
4627:
4623:
4613:
4601:. Retrieved
4574:
4570:
4560:
4551:
4545:
4533:. Retrieved
4508:
4504:
4479:. Retrieved
4465:(4): 560ā4.
4462:
4458:
4448:
4436:. Retrieved
4409:
4405:
4370:. Retrieved
4360:
4353:
4341:. Retrieved
4324:
4320:
4289:. Retrieved
4272:
4268:
4258:
4246:. Retrieved
4237:
4227:
4215:. Retrieved
4206:
4196:
4184:. Retrieved
4159:
4155:
4145:
4133:. Retrieved
4124:
4099:. Retrieved
4066:
4062:
4037:. Retrieved
4017:
4010:
3998:. Retrieved
3965:
3961:
3936:. Retrieved
3916:
3886:. Retrieved
3858:
3851:
3839:. Retrieved
3811:
3804:
3792:. Retrieved
3778:(1): 11ā16.
3775:
3771:
3744:. Retrieved
3719:
3715:
3688:. Retrieved
3671:
3667:
3642:. Retrieved
3632:
3610:. Retrieved
3582:
3556:. Retrieved
3536:
3514:. Retrieved
3504:
3476:. Retrieved
3449:
3445:
3414:. Retrieved
3405:
3372:. Retrieved
3355:
3351:
3296:
3291:
3279:. Retrieved
3260:
3250:
3238:. Retrieved
3210:
3140:. Retrieved
3131:
3122:
3110:. Retrieved
3096:(1): 41ā63.
3093:
3089:
3079:
3067:. Retrieved
3057:
3033:. Retrieved
3024:
2993:. Retrieved
2965:
2885:. Retrieved
2865:
2747:. Retrieved
2727:
2695:. Retrieved
2667:
2643:24 September
2641:. Retrieved
2632:
2623:
2603:
2549:. Retrieved
2539:
2400:Intelligence
2307:
2303:
2289:
2271:
2257:
2239:
2231:universality
2228:
2216:
2195:
2185:
2165:
2159:
2151:
2147:
2121:
2110:
2090:
2075:or personal
2065:
2057:
2053:
2039:
2025:propositions
2014:
1979:
1965:
1957:neuroscience
1950:
1925:
1884:
1872:
1837:
1833:
1829:
1826:
1797:
1782:
1777:
1773:
1769:
1765:
1761:
1760:
1755:
1751:
1745:
1740:
1736:
1730:
1722:mental state
1717:
1712:
1697:
1676:
1672:Wertrational
1671:
1667:
1664:
1659:Wertrational
1658:
1650:
1648:
1633:
1600:
1596:adding to it
1591:
1551:
1549:
1540:neuroscience
1513:
1492:
1478:
1475:
1462:
1454:
1433:
1422:
1412:
1408:
1400:
1385:
1378:
1355:
1351:
1334:
1322:
1307:
1287:
1264:
1244:
1220:
1207:
1186:
1173:
1155:
1152:
1132:
1116:modus ponens
1097:
1080:
1064:
1057:
1041:
1014:
997:
976:
969:
946:intuitionism
927:
896:
887:
875:
871:
847:
838:
834:weighted sum
830:
802:
793:
790:
778:
765:
754:rationalitas
751:
745:
725:
716:
710:
708:
703:
700:deliberating
672:
640:
576:
564:
551:Internalists
532:
525:
521:
473:
472:
272:
217:a posteriori
216:
212:
63:Epistemology
51:
9453:Objectivism
9392:Neo-Marxism
9354:Continental
9264:Meta-ethics
9244:Coherentism
9149:Hegelianism
9086:Rationalism
9046:Natural law
9026:Materialism
8952:Historicism
8922:Determinism
8813:Navya-NyÄya
8588:SautrÄntika
8583:Pudgalavada
8519:Vaisheshika
8372:Presocratic
8272:Renaissance
8211:Physicalism
8196:Materialism
8102:Normativity
8087:Objectivism
8072:Emergentism
8062:Behaviorism
8011:Metaphysics
7977:Determinism
7916:Rationalism
7412:(4): 5ā48.
6946:21 November
6916:18 December
6728:20 December
6639:20 December
6578:(1): 8ā17.
5367:"Fallacies"
4910:28 February
4162:: 281ā292.
3358:: 312ā332.
3281:3 September
3061:. Metzler.
2445:Satisficing
2435:Rationalism
2134:proposition
2126:probability
2107:Bayesianism
2092:Game theory
2087:Game theory
2077:preferences
1928:Jean Piaget
1808:psychopaths
1714:Robert Audi
1709:Robert Audi
1679:Habermasian
1603:August 2022
1524:game theory
1516:Bayesianism
1444:satisficing
1429:proposition
1362:John Searle
1241:Theoretical
1045:John Broome
1029:permissions
1025:obligations
1011:Normativity
1001:Robert Audi
822:perceptions
806:John Broome
729:temptations
623:Bayesianism
619:game theory
559:normativity
474:Rationality
273:Rationality
248:Information
162:Rationalism
122:Fallibilism
102:Coherentism
32:Rationalism
9833:Categories
9752:Amerindian
9659:Australian
9598:Vietnamese
9578:Indonesian
9127:Kantianism
9076:Positivism
9066:Pragmatism
9041:Naturalism
9021:Liberalism
8999:Subjective
8937:Empiricism
8841:Avicennism
8786:Bhedabheda
8670:East Asian
8593:Madhyamaka
8573:Abhidharma
8439:Pyrrhonism
8206:Nominalism
8201:Naturalism
8130:Skepticism
8120:Relativism
8110:Absolutism
8039:Naturalism
7949:Deontology
7921:Skepticism
7906:Naturalism
7896:Empiricism
7860:Aesthetics
7764:Philosophy
7679:. Madrid:
7580:2020324016
6696:: 101449.
6669:7 December
6470:7 November
6438:7 November
6409:7 November
6375:7 November
5914:Manuscrito
4868:Intuitions
4511:: 127ā32.
4343:7 November
4063:Erkenntnis
3716:Erkenntnis
3636:. Oxford.
3446:Disputatio
2462:References
1999:heuristics
1866:, and the
1823:Psychology
1748:experience
1737:foundation
1567:, and the
1504:scientific
1489:Importance
1440:heuristics
1413:acceptance
1314:intentions
1252:perception
1231:intentions
1160:Hume's law
1093:philosophy
1089:psychology
1049:supervenes
1005:experience
994:Relativity
954:well-being
915:David Hume
810:salmonella
794:responding
768:relational
712:irrational
664:intentions
587:Psychology
527:irrational
514:intentions
508:, such as
383:David Hume
243:Experience
172:Skepticism
167:Relativism
157:Pragmatism
147:Naturalism
142:Infinitism
117:Empiricism
9839:Reasoning
9631:Pakistani
9593:Taiwanese
9540:Ethiopian
9513:By region
9499:By region
9314:Scientism
9309:Systemics
9169:Spinozism
9096:Socialism
9031:Modernism
8994:Objective
8902:Anarchism
8836:Averroism
8725:Christian
8677:Neotaoism
8648:Zurvanism
8638:Mithraism
8633:Mazdakism
8404:Cyrenaics
8331:Logicians
7964:Free will
7926:Solipsism
7873:Formalism
7631:CiteSeerX
7461:147058088
7383:Deduction
7352:19 August
7323:19 August
7263:18 August
7149:18 August
7073:22 August
7044:19 August
7026:2044-8295
6985:19 August
6888:1531-5320
6848:144877200
6770:18 August
6718:216410901
6710:0160-2896
6610:19 August
6592:1939-5078
6551:ignored (
6541:cite book
6531:18 August
6123:18 August
6076:18 August
6066:225536288
6058:1860-7128
6017:18 August
5988:18 August
5978:224838593
5893:14 August
5864:14 August
5821:14 August
5771:14 August
5761:147175535
5720:14 August
5668:14 August
5650:0024-5836
5588:14 August
5538:14 August
5520:0029-4624
5479:11 August
5448:11 August
5417:14 August
5350:14 August
5300:125767384
5292:1874-6349
5249:14 August
5217:14 August
5159:18 August
5141:0029-4624
5097:10 August
5063:10 August
5032:18 August
5022:170556071
4952:154212187
4879:18 August
4850:18 August
4800:14 August
4748:225137550
4644:170544860
4593:243349119
4525:171691529
4428:240066121
4372:18 August
4291:18 August
4217:10 August
4186:18 August
4168:0021-3306
4135:10 August
4101:18 August
4091:144602049
4083:1572-8420
4039:14 August
4000:14 August
3982:0037-802X
3938:14 August
3888:14 August
3841:14 August
3794:14 August
3746:14 August
3736:117173349
3690:14 August
3644:14 August
3612:14 August
3558:14 August
3468:171079649
3374:14 August
3240:14 August
3142:10 August
3112:14 August
3069:14 August
2995:14 August
2887:14 August
2749:14 August
2697:14 August
2551:14 August
2415:LessWrong
2225:Criticism
2144:Economics
2122:credences
2021:arguments
1981:Cognitive
1910:, or the
1906:, on the
1750:. As for
1636:Max Weber
1628:Max Weber
1615:Max Weber
1550:The term
1508:religious
1483:horoscope
1318:decisions
1304:Practical
1279:deductive
1235:decisions
1193:Taj Mahal
1017:normative
950:happiness
907:aesthetic
826:knowledge
773:justifies
733:astrology
717:arational
679:processes
675:abilities
668:decisions
627:economics
607:arguments
595:Cognitive
568:decisions
522:arational
502:reasoning
358:Aristotle
263:Knowledge
258:Induction
233:Certainty
177:Solipsism
112:Dogmatism
47:Rationale
9817:Category
9772:Yugoslav
9762:Romanian
9669:Scottish
9654:American
9583:Japanese
9563:Buddhist
9545:Africana
9535:Egyptian
9377:Feminist
9299:Rawlsian
9294:Quietism
9192:Analytic
9144:Krausism
9051:Nihilism
9016:Kokugaku
8979:Absolute
8974:Idealism
8962:Humanism
8750:Occamism
8717:European
8662:Medieval
8608:Yogacara
8568:Buddhist
8561:SyÄdvÄda
8444:Stoicism
8409:Cynicism
8397:Sophists
8392:Atomists
8387:Eleatics
8326:Legalism
8267:Medieval
8191:Idealism
8145:Ontology
8125:Nihilism
8029:Idealism
7787:Branches
7776:Branches
7611:Archived
7426:53513711
7346:Archived
7317:Archived
7288:Archived
7257:Archived
7207:Archived
7177:Archived
7143:Archived
7103:(1): 60.
7067:Archived
7038:Archived
7034:14430621
6979:Archived
6940:Archived
6910:Archived
6906:28744767
6813:54389097
6764:Archived
6722:Archived
6663:Archived
6633:Archived
6604:Archived
6600:26272833
6525:Archived
6464:Archived
6432:Archived
6403:Archived
6369:Archived
6292:17871420
6182:Archived
6178:16388036
6117:Archived
6070:Archived
6011:Archived
5982:Archived
5922:Archived
5887:Archived
5858:Archived
5815:Archived
5765:Archived
5714:Archived
5662:Archived
5658:44084854
5582:Archived
5532:Archived
5473:Archived
5465:"Action"
5442:Archived
5411:Archived
5381:19 March
5375:Archived
5344:Archived
5243:Archived
5211:Archived
5153:Archived
5091:Archived
5057:Archived
5026:Archived
4975:Archived
4904:Archived
4873:Archived
4844:Archived
4794:Archived
4752:Archived
4699:Archived
4648:Archived
4597:Archived
4529:Archived
4475:Archived
4432:Archived
4366:Archived
4337:Archived
4285:Archived
4242:Archived
4211:Archived
4180:Archived
4176:23352588
4129:Archived
4095:Archived
4033:Archived
3994:Archived
3990:23558957
3932:Archived
3920:. SAGE.
3882:Archived
3835:Archived
3788:Archived
3772:Analysis
3740:Archived
3684:Archived
3638:Archived
3606:Archived
3552:Archived
3510:Archived
3472:Archived
3416:6 August
3410:Archived
3368:Archived
3275:Archived
3234:Archived
3136:Archived
3106:Archived
3063:Archived
3035:6 August
3029:Archived
2989:Archived
2881:Archived
2743:Archived
2691:Archived
2637:Archived
2545:Archived
2395:Instinct
2312:See also
2029:premises
1994:evidence
1961:amygdala
1947:Emotions
1933:thinking
1848:thinking
1804:morality
1778:relative
1739:and the
1683:feminist
1626:scholar
1500:humanist
1388:enkrasia
1358:goodness
1342:emotions
1156:rational
878:dilemmas
814:evidence
721:emotions
704:rational
648:evidence
539:umbrella
516:, or to
490:evidence
228:Credence
213:A priori
195:Concepts
78:Category
18:Rational
9767:Russian
9736:Spanish
9731:Slovene
9721:Maltese
9716:Italian
9696:Finland
9664:British
9646:Western
9636:Turkish
9621:Islamic
9616:Iranian
9568:Chinese
9555:Eastern
9522:African
9469:more...
9154:Marxism
8984:British
8927:Dualism
8823:Islamic
8781:Advaita
8771:Vedanta
8745:Scotism
8740:Thomism
8682:Tiantai
8625:Persian
8613:Tibetan
8603:ÅÅ«nyatÄ
8544:CÄrvÄka
8534:ÄjÄ«vika
8529:MÄ«mÄį¹sÄ
8509:Samkhya
8424:Academy
8377:Ionians
8351:Yangism
8308:Chinese
8299:Ancient
8262:Western
8257:Ancient
8216:Realism
8173:Reality
8163:Process
8044:Realism
8024:Dualism
8019:Atomism
7901:Fideism
7294:6 March
7213:28 July
7183:28 July
6897:5902517
6828:Inquiry
6257:1905526
6208:(1984)
6191:8 April
6170:2778894
5928:13 July
5528:2215919
5149:2215920
4695:3655750
2374:Flipism
2202:Utility
2050:utility
1885:In the
1852:judging
1774:persons
1762:Actions
1756:desires
1752:beliefs
1575:History
1502:goals,
1498:goals,
1496:ethical
1393:akrasia
1381:loyalty
1310:actions
1227:actions
1223:beliefs
1033:fashion
962:logic.
923:motives
820:, like
696:judging
660:desires
656:persons
652:actions
644:beliefs
518:persons
510:beliefs
500:, like
498:process
478:quality
476:is the
398:more...
301:Domains
268:Meaning
127:Fideism
95:Schools
73:Outline
9726:Polish
9706:German
9701:French
9686:Danish
9676:Canada
9626:Jewish
9588:Korean
9573:Indian
9115:People
9036:Monism
8989:German
8957:Holism
8890:Modern
8868:Jewish
8791:Dvaita
8764:Indian
8687:Huayan
8539:AjƱana
8496:Indian
8361:Greco-
8346:Taoism
8336:Mohism
8282:Modern
8249:By era
8238:By era
8153:Action
8034:Monism
7954:Virtue
7936:Ethics
7712:
7687:
7633:
7577:
7552:
7527:
7459:
7424:
7249:
7135:
7032:
7024:
6971:
6904:
6894:
6886:
6846:
6811:
6756:
6716:
6708:
6598:
6590:
6495:
6314:
6290:
6255:
6176:
6168:
6109:
6064:
6056:
5976:
5966:
5807:
5759:
5741:Ethics
5706:
5656:
5648:
5574:
5526:
5518:
5336:
5298:
5290:
5203:
5147:
5139:
5020:
4981:21 May
4950:
4836:
4786:
4758:7 June
4746:
4705:7 June
4693:
4654:7 June
4642:
4624:Ethics
4603:7 June
4591:
4535:7 June
4523:
4505:Ethics
4481:7 June
4438:7 June
4426:
4248:13 May
4174:
4166:
4089:
4081:
4025:
3988:
3980:
3924:
3874:
3827:
3734:
3598:
3544:
3516:7 June
3478:7 June
3466:
3303:
3267:
3226:
2981:
2873:
2735:
2683:
2611:
2293:, in "
2267:reason
2261:, in "
2052:. The
2048:and a
1862:, the
1858:, the
1836:, and
1800:ethics
1770:global
1718:ground
1624:German
1559:, the
1538:, and
1522:, and
1472:Others
1409:belief
1294:formal
1260:memory
1258:, and
1233:, and
1195:is in
1182:axioms
1142:, and
1091:while
944:, and
934:egoism
867:causal
748:reason
629:, and
579:ethics
482:reason
288:Wisdom
278:Reason
223:Belief
202:Action
9757:Aztec
9711:Greek
9691:Dutch
9681:Czech
9530:Bantu
8967:Anti-
8514:Nyaya
8504:Hindu
8364:Roman
8158:Event
7800:Logic
7457:S2CID
7422:S2CID
6844:S2CID
6809:S2CID
6714:S2CID
6288:S2CID
6253:JSTOR
6185:(PDF)
6174:S2CID
6166:JSTOR
6146:(PDF)
6062:S2CID
5974:S2CID
5757:S2CID
5654:JSTOR
5524:JSTOR
5296:S2CID
5145:JSTOR
5018:S2CID
4948:S2CID
4744:S2CID
4691:JSTOR
4640:S2CID
4589:S2CID
4521:S2CID
4424:S2CID
4412:(2).
4172:JSTOR
4087:S2CID
3986:JSTOR
3732:S2CID
3464:S2CID
2017:logic
2005:Logic
1766:focal
1425:logic
1275:valid
1271:logic
1204:Types
903:moral
899:truth
691:think
603:Logic
583:moral
547:truth
504:, to
283:Truth
83:Index
8858:Sufi
8692:Chan
8551:Jain
8524:Yoga
8054:Mind
7994:Hard
7982:Hard
7710:ISBN
7685:ISBN
7575:ISBN
7550:ISBN
7525:ISBN
7354:2022
7325:2022
7296:2021
7265:2022
7247:ISBN
7215:2022
7185:2022
7151:2022
7133:ISBN
7075:2022
7046:2022
7030:PMID
7022:ISSN
6987:2022
6969:ISBN
6948:2021
6918:2021
6902:PMID
6884:ISSN
6772:2022
6754:ISBN
6730:2021
6706:ISSN
6671:2021
6641:2021
6612:2022
6596:PMID
6588:ISSN
6553:help
6533:2022
6493:ISBN
6472:2020
6440:2020
6411:2020
6377:2020
6312:ISBN
6193:2020
6125:2022
6107:ISBN
6078:2022
6054:ISSN
6019:2022
5990:2022
5964:ISBN
5930:2019
5895:2022
5866:2022
5842:Mind
5823:2022
5805:ISBN
5773:2022
5722:2022
5704:ISBN
5670:2022
5646:ISSN
5590:2022
5572:ISBN
5540:2022
5516:ISSN
5500:Noƻs
5481:2022
5450:2022
5419:2022
5383:2021
5352:2022
5334:ISBN
5288:ISSN
5251:2022
5219:2022
5201:ISBN
5161:2022
5137:ISSN
5121:Noƻs
5099:2022
5065:2022
5034:2022
4983:2021
4912:2022
4881:2022
4852:2022
4834:ISBN
4802:2022
4784:ISBN
4760:2021
4707:2021
4656:2021
4605:2021
4537:2021
4483:2021
4440:2021
4374:2022
4345:2020
4293:2022
4269:Noƻs
4250:2021
4219:2022
4188:2022
4164:ISSN
4137:2022
4103:2022
4079:ISSN
4041:2022
4023:ISBN
4002:2022
3978:ISSN
3940:2022
3922:ISBN
3890:2022
3872:ISBN
3843:2022
3825:ISBN
3796:2022
3748:2022
3692:2022
3646:2022
3614:2022
3596:ISBN
3560:2022
3542:ISBN
3518:2021
3480:2021
3418:2022
3376:2022
3301:ISBN
3283:2022
3265:ISBN
3242:2022
3224:ISBN
3144:2022
3114:2022
3071:2022
3037:2022
2997:2022
2979:ISBN
2889:2022
2871:ISBN
2751:2022
2733:ISBN
2699:2022
2681:ISBN
2645:2017
2609:ISBN
2553:2022
2275:and
2194:, a
1983:and
1955:and
1897:and
1873:The
1802:and
1783:true
1720:: a
1411:but
1316:and
1296:and
1197:Agra
1084:mind
1053:mind
1027:and
917:and
853:and
824:and
781:mind
715:and
597:and
555:mind
512:and
486:acts
238:Data
215:and
9132:Neo
8697:Zen
7449:doi
7414:doi
7239:doi
7125:doi
7014:doi
6892:PMC
6876:doi
6836:doi
6799:doi
6698:doi
6580:doi
6304:doi
6280:doi
6245:doi
6158:doi
6099:doi
6046:doi
5956:doi
5850:doi
5846:122
5797:doi
5749:doi
5745:126
5696:doi
5613:doi
5564:doi
5508:doi
5326:doi
5278:doi
5129:doi
5010:doi
5006:132
4940:doi
4826:doi
4734:doi
4730:178
4683:doi
4632:doi
4628:101
4579:doi
4513:doi
4509:129
4467:doi
4414:doi
4329:doi
4277:doi
4071:doi
3970:doi
3864:doi
3817:doi
3780:doi
3724:doi
3676:doi
3588:doi
3454:doi
3360:doi
3356:999
3216:doi
3098:doi
2971:doi
2673:doi
1815:'s
1598:.
1395:or
1281:or
9835::
7627:II
7625:.
7455:.
7445:27
7443:.
7420:.
7410:23
7408:.
7282:.
7255:.
7245:.
7223:^
7205:.
7201:.
7171:.
7159:^
7141:.
7131:.
7109:^
7101:41
7099:.
7091:;
7036:.
7028:.
7020:.
7010:51
7008:.
7004:.
6977:.
6938:.
6934:.
6908:.
6900:.
6890:.
6882:.
6872:25
6870:.
6866:.
6842:.
6832:55
6830:.
6807:.
6795:13
6793:.
6789:.
6762:.
6738:^
6720:.
6712:.
6704:.
6694:80
6692:.
6688:.
6661:.
6657:.
6602:.
6594:.
6586:.
6574:.
6570:.
6545::
6543:}}
6539:{{
6507:^
6448:^
6401:.
6397:.
6385:^
6345:^
6310:.
6286:.
6274:.
6251:.
6241:17
6239:.
6180:.
6172:.
6164:.
6154:85
6152:.
6148:.
6133:^
6115:.
6105:.
6068:.
6060:.
6052:.
6042:16
6040:.
6036:.
6009:.
5980:.
5972:.
5962:.
5950:.
5938:^
5918:25
5916:.
5912:.
5885:.
5856:.
5844:.
5840:.
5813:.
5803:.
5781:^
5763:.
5755:.
5743:.
5739:.
5712:.
5702:.
5678:^
5660:.
5652:.
5642:50
5640:.
5636:.
5611:.
5607:.
5580:.
5570:.
5548:^
5530:.
5522:.
5514:.
5504:28
5502:.
5498:.
5467:.
5436:.
5391:^
5373:.
5369:.
5342:.
5332:.
5308:^
5294:.
5286:.
5274:34
5272:.
5268:.
5227:^
5209:.
5169:^
5151:.
5143:.
5135:.
5125:28
5123:.
5119:.
5107:^
5085:.
5073:^
5051:.
5024:.
5016:.
5004:.
5000:.
4969:.
4946:.
4934:.
4920:^
4898:.
4871:.
4842:.
4832:.
4810:^
4792:.
4768:^
4750:.
4742:.
4728:.
4724:.
4697:.
4689:.
4679:99
4677:.
4673:.
4646:.
4638:.
4626:.
4622:.
4595:.
4587:.
4573:.
4569:.
4527:.
4519:.
4507:.
4503:.
4491:^
4473:.
4463:71
4461:.
4457:.
4430:.
4422:.
4410:14
4408:.
4404:.
4382:^
4335:.
4325:67
4323:.
4319:.
4301:^
4283:.
4273:42
4271:.
4267:.
4236:.
4205:.
4178:.
4170:.
4160:48
4158:.
4154:.
4123:.
4111:^
4093:.
4085:.
4077:.
4067:68
4065:.
4061:.
4049:^
4031:.
3992:.
3984:.
3976:.
3964:.
3960:.
3948:^
3930:.
3898:^
3880:.
3870:.
3833:.
3823:.
3786:.
3776:62
3774:.
3770:.
3756:^
3738:.
3730:.
3720:46
3718:.
3714:.
3700:^
3682:.
3672:11
3670:.
3666:.
3654:^
3622:^
3604:.
3594:.
3568:^
3550:.
3526:^
3488:^
3470:.
3462:.
3448:.
3444:.
3426:^
3408:.
3404:.
3384:^
3366:.
3354:.
3350:.
3312:^
3273:.
3259:.
3232:.
3222:.
3152:^
3134:.
3130:.
3104:.
3094:25
3092:.
3088:.
3045:^
3027:.
3023:.
3005:^
2987:.
2977:.
2897:^
2879:.
2759:^
2741:.
2707:^
2689:.
2679:.
2653:^
2635:.
2631:.
2561:^
2469:^
2237:.
2209:.
2083:.
1943:.
1935:,
1850:,
1832:,
1785:.
1705:.
1674:.
1571:.
1563:,
1534:,
1530:,
1518:,
1376:.
1344:.
1254:,
1229:,
1184:.
1166:.
1138:,
1130:.
940:,
936:,
925:.
758:.
698:,
681:,
677:,
666:,
662:,
658:,
633:.
625:,
621:,
593:.
7756:e
7749:t
7742:v
7716:.
7699:.
7691:.
7639:.
7583:.
7558:.
7533:.
7463:.
7451::
7428:.
7416::
7356:.
7327:.
7298:.
7267:.
7241::
7217:.
7187:.
7153:.
7127::
7077:.
7048:.
7016::
6989:.
6950:.
6920:.
6878::
6850:.
6838::
6815:.
6801::
6774:.
6732:.
6700::
6673:.
6643:.
6614:.
6582::
6576:1
6555:)
6535:.
6501:.
6474:.
6442:.
6413:.
6379:.
6320:.
6306::
6294:.
6282::
6276:9
6259:.
6247::
6195:.
6160::
6127:.
6101::
6080:.
6048::
6021:.
5992:.
5958::
5932:.
5897:.
5868:.
5852::
5825:.
5799::
5775:.
5751::
5724:.
5698::
5672:.
5621:.
5615::
5592:.
5566::
5542:.
5510::
5483:.
5452:.
5421:.
5385:.
5354:.
5328::
5302:.
5280::
5253:.
5221:.
5163:.
5131::
5101:.
5067:.
5036:.
5012::
4985:.
4954:.
4942::
4936:9
4914:.
4883:.
4854:.
4828::
4804:.
4762:.
4736::
4709:.
4685::
4658:.
4634::
4607:.
4581::
4575:4
4554:.
4539:.
4515::
4485:.
4469::
4442:.
4416::
4376:.
4347:.
4331::
4295:.
4279::
4252:.
4221:.
4190:.
4139:.
4105:.
4073::
4043:.
4004:.
3972::
3966:9
3942:.
3892:.
3866::
3845:.
3819::
3798:.
3782::
3750:.
3726::
3694:.
3678::
3648:.
3616:.
3590::
3562:.
3520:.
3482:.
3456::
3450:2
3420:.
3378:.
3362::
3307:.
3285:.
3244:.
3218::
3146:.
3116:.
3100::
3073:.
3039:.
2999:.
2973::
2891:.
2753:.
2701:.
2675::
2647:.
2617:.
2555:.
1605:)
1601:(
462:e
455:t
448:v
49:.
34:.
20:)
Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.