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Social welfare function

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the poor to the rich results in a bigger increase in the utility of the rich than the decrease in the utility of the poor, the society is expected to accept such a transfer, because the total utility of the society has increased as a whole. Alternatively, society's welfare can also be measured under this function by taking the average of individual incomes:
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individuals in society. In this case, maximizing the social welfare means maximizing the total income of the people in the society, without regard to how incomes are distributed in society. It does not distinguish between an income transfer from rich to poor and vice versa. If an income transfer from
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of utility for everyone in the society from ethically lowest on up (with ties permitted), that is, it makes interpersonal comparisons of utility. Welfare maximization then consists of maximizing the welfare function subject to the possibility function as a constraint. The same welfare maximization
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Every social ordering can be made into a choice function by considering only the highest-ranked outcome. Less obviously, though, every social choice function is also an ordering function. Deleting the best outcome, then finding the new winner, results in a runner-up who is assigned second place.
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These two social welfare functions express very different views about how a society would need to be organised in order to maximize welfare, with the first emphasizing total incomes and the second emphasizing the needs of the worst-off. The max-min welfare function can be seen as reflecting an
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locus of utility combinations imposed by the restraints and allowed by Pareto efficiency. At a given point on the possibility function, if the utility of all but one person is determined, the remaining person's utility is determined. The welfare function ranks different hypothetical
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may belong, which is randomly picked from the sum of all unequally distributed incomes. This welfare function marks the income, which a randomly selected Euro most likely belongs to. The inverse value of that function will be larger than the average per capita income.
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dimension. As Bergson noted, a welfare improvement from the social welfare function could come from the "position of some individuals" improving at the expense of others. That social welfare function could then be described as characterizing an equity dimension.
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By Harsanyi's theorem, any non-utilitarian social choice function will be incoherent; in other words, it will agree to some bets that are unanimously opposed by every member of society. However, it is still possible to establish properties of such functions.
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the set of utility functions for everyone in the society. Each can (and commonly does) incorporate Pareto efficiency. The possibility function also depends on technology and resource restraints. It is written in implicit form, reflecting the
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that ranks a set of social states by their desirability. A social welfare function may yield several possible outcomes; each person's preferences are combined in some way to determine which outcome is considered better by society as a whole.
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demonstrated the problems with such an approach, though he would not immediately realize this. Along earlier lines, Arrow's version of a social welfare function, also called a 'constitution', maps a set of individual orderings
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as a way to identify socially-optimal decisions, giving a procedure to rigorously define which of two outcomes should be considered more desirable for society as a whole (e.g. to compare two different possible
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prefers (2, 2, 4) to (1, 3, 4), it also prefers (2, 2, 9) to (1, 3, 9); the utility of agent 3 should not affect the comparison between two utility profiles of agents 1 and 2. This property can also be called
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The respective hypothetical utilities of the two persons in two-dimensional utility space is analogous to respective quantities of commodities for the two-dimensional commodity space of the indifference-curve
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Two-person welfare maximization at the tangency of the highest Welfare function curve on the Possibility function is analogous to tangency of the highest indifference curve on the budget constraint.
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on utility profiles—it can tell us, given any two utility profiles, if they are indifferent or one of them is better than the other. A reasonable preference ordering should satisfy several axioms:
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measurable, and it was commonly inferred that redistributing income from a rich person to a poor person tends to increase total utility (however measured) in the society. But Lionel Robbins (
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As Samuelson (1983, p. xxii) notes, Bergson clarified how production and consumption efficiency conditions are distinct from the interpersonal ethical values of the social welfare function.
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Under instant-runoff voting, Top is the winner. Center is eliminated in the first round, and their second-preferences are evenly split between Top and Bottom, allowing Top to win.
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with the intention "to state in precise form the value judgments required for the derivation of the conditions of maximum economic welfare." The function was real-valued and
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Here the Theil-T index is applied. The inverse value yielded by this function has a concrete meaning as well. There are several possible incomes to which a
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Here maximizing societal welfare would mean maximizing the income of the poorest person in society without regard for the income of other individuals.
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is a key result on social welfare functions, showing an important difference between social and consumer choice: whereas it is possible to construct a
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Auxiliary specifications enable comparison of different social states by each member of society in preference satisfaction. These help define
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should strictly prefer the second profile. For example, it should prefer the profile (1, 4, 4, 5) to (1, 2, 4, 5). Such a change is called a
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election between Top, Center, and Bottom. Top has the most first-preference votes; Bottom has the second-most; and Center (positioned
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To find the second-place finisher, we find the winner if Top had not run. In this case, the election is between Center and Bottom.
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on the part of society as a whole, since it is concerned only with the worst conditions that a member of society could face.
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a complete and transitive ranking (an ethically "better", "worse", or "indifferent" ranking) of all social alternatives and
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function maps each candidate to a number representing their quality. For example, the standard social scoring function for
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The value yielded by this function has a concrete meaning. There are several possible incomes which could be earned by a
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The marginal "dis-welfare" of each "dollar's worth" of labor is equal for each commodity produced of each labor supplier
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dimension of a particular social welfare function with distribution of commodities among individuals characterizing
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The marginal "dollar" cost of each unit of resources is equal to the marginal value productivity for each commodity.
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Arrow's theorem shows that it is impossible for an ordinal social welfare function to satisfy a standard axiom of
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but not sufficient for defining interpersonal normative equity." Still, Pareto efficiency could also characterize
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function selects a single best outcome (a single candidate who wins, or multiple if there happens to be a tie).
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Instead of imposing rational behavior on the social utility function, we can impose a weaker criterion called
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For a two-person society, there is a graphical depiction of such welfare maximization at the first figure of
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utility functions onto a single output, in a way that accounts for the judgments of everyone in a society.
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The form of the social welfare function is intended to express a statement of objectives of a society.
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_____, 1977. "Reaffirming the Existence of 'Reasonable' Bergson–Samuelson Social Welfare Functions,"
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should be indifferent between (1, 4, 4, 5) and (5, 4, 4, 1), because the only difference is whether
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as implying interpersonally comparable utility. Irrespective of such comparability, income or wealth
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In contrast, the max-min or Rawlsian social welfare function (based on the philosophical work of
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is a function that takes as input numeric representations of individual utilities (also known as
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one set out of an infinity of welfare indices and cardinal indicators to characterize the belief.
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social welfare function measures social welfare as the total or sum of individual utilities:
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The marginal "dollar's worth" of welfare is equal for each individual and for each commodity
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Economic Welfare and the Economics of Soviet Socialism: Essays in Honor of Abram Bergson
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Because of this close relationship, the three kinds of functions are often conflated by
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should be independent of individuals whose utilities have not changed. For example, if
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must be equal to the utility functions of each individual. This result is known as
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The average per capita income of a measured group (e.g. nation) is multiplied with
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For the purposes of this section, income is adopted as the measurement of utility.
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Every preference relation with properties 1–4 can be represented as by a function
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The notion of social utility is analogous to the notion of a utility function in
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For a discussion of the same concept in the context of voting and politics, see
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Some authors maintain a distinction between three closely-related concepts:
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Necessary general conditions are that at the maximum value of the function:
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had described a standard of economic efficiency despite dispensing with
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There are two different notions of social welfare used by economists:
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_____, 1981. "Bergsonian Welfare Economics", in S. Rosefielde (ed.),
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behavior at the social level impossible. This result is now known as
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Function that ranks states of society according to their desirability
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as to two commodities consumed, there are the following parallels:
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the values in the utility profile should not change the output of
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If the preference relation has properties 1–5, then the function
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individualistic sense to derive Pareto efficiency (optimality).
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____, 1938, "Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: A Comment,"
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Samuelson further sharpened that distinction by specifying the
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Repeating this process gives a full ranking of all candidates.
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The Possibility function is analogous to the budget constraint
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The Welfare function is analogous to the indifference-curve
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An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science
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Earlier neoclassical welfare theory, heir to the classical
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one ethical belief, Pareto-bound or not, consistent with:
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used in producing different commodities, including labor.
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is the total number of voters who rank a candidate first.
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Introducing one additional axiom—the nonexistence of
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The Collected Scientific Papers of Paul A. Samuelson
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The Collected Scientific Papers of Paul A. Samuelson
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may be too technical for most readers to understand
4332:, Cambridge, pp. 223–66. Reprinted in (1986) 4180:in Paretian welfare economics from the New School. 3962: 3928: 3895: 3862: 3829: 3794: 3705: 3649: 3426: 3330: 3233: 3213: 3178: 3092: 3008: 2927: 2907: 2887: 2860: 2837: 2000:function lists the candidates, from best to worst. 3907:welfare function—maximizing the sum of utilities. 3093:{\displaystyle W=\min(Y_{1},Y_{2},\cdots ,Y_{n})} 1907:governments to choose between several options in 6142: 3795:{\displaystyle {\frac {c^{1-\eta }-1}{1-\eta }}} 3039: 2739:, the unique social welfare function satisfying 3445: 2690:Arrow found that contrary to the assertions of 2270:for grammar, style, cohesion, tone, or spelling 3950:(that inequality is not a positive good) then 1980: 5046: 4424: 4205:, 1987, “interpersonal utility comparisons," 1833: 942: 4881:Independence of Smith-dominated alternatives 4121: 4078:. New York: PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. p. 67. 2735:that if societies must make decisions under 2630:conditions emerge as in Bergson's analysis. 4403:The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics 4208:The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics 2189:Learn how and when to remove these messages 5053: 5039: 4431: 4417: 4178:Bergson–Samuelson social welfare functions 3518:and the set of profiles weakly worse than 2638:Bergson–Samuelson social welfare functions 1840: 1826: 949: 935: 4214: 4115: 3514:, the set of profiles weakly better than 2461:Learn how and when to remove this message 2396:Learn how and when to remove this message 2294:Learn how and when to remove this message 2239:Learn how and when to remove this message 2223:, without removing the technical details. 1962:better one choice is compared to another. 4401:_____, 1987, “social welfare function," 4232:The new Palgrave dictionary of economics 4876:Independence of irrelevant alternatives 4654:Sequential proportional approval voting 4126:. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 4098: 3970:in the above family must be at most 1. 3804:This family has some familiar members: 2723:independence of irrelevant alternatives 1894:Social choice functions are studied by 6143: 4073: 2838:{\displaystyle W=\sum _{i=1}^{n}Y_{i}} 1911:, based on the preferences of voters. 5034: 4438: 4412: 3874:—maximizing the product of utilities. 3667: 3664:is a continuous increasing function. 3117:proposed a welfare function in 1973: 2615:(1947, pp. 243–49). Each has as 2221:make it understandable to non-experts 2039:) has the fewest first preferences. 1958:information, with agents stating how 1954:) functions additionally incorporate 4358:Collective Choice and Social Welfare 4124:Fair Division and Collective Welfare 4059:Collective Choice and Social Welfare 2407: 2334:adding citations to reliable sources 2305: 2250: 2195: 2154: 5130:Agent-based computational economics 4686:Indirect single transferable voting 4363:, ch. 3, "Collective Rationality." 4155:Social Choice and Individual Values 3531:Independence of unconcerned agents: 2754: 2530:law of diminishing marginal utility 13: 3923: 3824: 3720: 3404: 3383: 3377: 3374: 3371: 3368: 3365: 3308: 3287: 3281: 3278: 3275: 3272: 3269: 3142: 3139: 3136: 3133: 2731:later strengthened this result by 2150: 53: 14: 6172: 4218:(2008), "social welfare function 3830:{\displaystyle \eta \to -\infty } 2632: 2170:This section has multiple issues. 5588:neoclassical–Keynesian synthesis 4293:Foundations of Economic Analysis 4191:, expanded edition with annexe, 3929:{\displaystyle \eta \to \infty } 2761:cardinal social welfare function 2412: 2310: 2255: 2200: 2159: 1807: 1795: 980: 918: 905: 893: 841:McKelvey–Schofield chaos theorem 487:Semi-proportional representation 119:First preference plurality (FPP) 4375:Choice, Welfare and Measurement 4026:Production-possibility frontier 2321:needs additional citations for 2178:or discuss these issues on the 1082:Concepts, theory and techniques 4797:Mixed ballot transferable vote 4381:and scroll to chapter-preview 4174:, 52(2), February 1938, 310–34 4172:Quarterly Journal of Economics 4092: 4067: 4048: 3920: 3818: 3715:Harsanyi's utilitarian theorem 3700: 3694: 3684:, i.e. the weighting function 3644: 3631: 3601: 3569: 3208: 3196: 3173: 3161: 3087: 3042: 2145:sequential elimination methods 879:Harsanyi's utilitarian theorem 836:Moulin's impossibility theorem 801:Conflicting majorities paradox 1: 5524:Critique of political economy 5060: 4143: 3986:Arrow's impossibility theorem 2712:Arrow's impossibility theorem 1967:Arrow's impossibility theorem 705:Frustrated majorities paradox 4998:Comparison of voting systems 4840:Satisfaction approval voting 4825:Single non-transferable vote 4644:Proportional approval voting 3991:Community indifference curve 3731:independence of common scale 3556:which is a sum of the form: 3446:Axioms of cardinal welfarism 3397: 3301: 3156: 3001: 2895:is the income of individual 874:Condorcet dominance theorems 814:Social and collective choice 7: 4604:Graduated majority judgment 4290:, 1947, Enlarged ed. 1983, 4074:Tresch, Richard W. (2008). 3973: 2425:to comply with Knowledge's 1981:Terminology and equivalence 540:By mechanism of combination 311:Proportional representation 10: 6177: 5662:Real business-cycle theory 4856:Condorcet winner criterion 4547:First-past-the-post voting 4330:Cambridge University Press 2512:interpersonally-comparable 2026: 2009:first-preference plurality 738:Multiple districts paradox 469:Fractional approval voting 457:Interactive representation 18: 6102: 6060: 5702: 5436: 5185: 5150: 5068: 5011: 5003:Voting systems by country 4990: 4944: 4906:Mutual majority criterion 4861:Condorcet loser criterion 4848: 4815: 4807:Vote linkage mixed system 4762: 4727: 4719:Largest remainders method 4694: 4621: 4612: 4463: 4446: 4314:–88. Reprinted in (1986) 4099:Quesada, Antonio (2002). 3678:axioms of rational choice 2702:) social orderings makes 2685:ordinal utility functions 2345:"Social welfare function" 1903:). They are also used by 685:Paradoxes and pathologies 534:Mixed-member proportional 529:Mixed-member majoritarian 524:By results of combination 415:Approval-based committees 4896:Majority loser criterion 4782:Additional member system 4740:Hagenbach-Bischoff quota 4659:Single transferable vote 4584:Positional voting system 4520:Minimax Condorcet method 4478:Combined approval voting 4042: 3996:Distribution (economics) 3872:Nash bargaining solution 3493:reordering or relabeling 2479:social welfare function, 2438:may contain suggestions. 2423:may need to be rewritten 1070:JEL classification codes 864:Condorcet's jury theorem 665:Double simultaneous vote 640:Rural–urban proportional 635:Dual-member proportional 597: 586: 553:Parallel (superposition) 445:Fractional social choice 432:Expanding approvals rule 261: 246: 231: 162: 151: 127: 5302:Industrial organization 5125:Computational economics 4921:Resolvability criterion 4911:Participation criterion 4886:Later-no-harm criterion 4702:Highest averages method 4152:, 1951, 2nd ed., 1963, 4076:Public Sector Economics 3896:{\displaystyle \eta =1} 3863:{\displaystyle \eta =0} 3450:Suppose we are given a 1862:social welfare function 1256:Industrial organization 1113:Computational economics 791:Tyranny of the majority 568:Fusion (majority bonus) 385:Quota-remainder methods 6161:Mathematical economics 5507:Modern monetary theory 5172:Experimental economics 5142:Pluralism in economics 5115:Mathematical economics 4962:First-preference votes 4901:Monotonicity criterion 4871:Independence of clones 4574:Simple majoritarianism 4216:Pattanaik, Prasanta K. 4189:On Economic Inequality 3964: 3947:Pigou–Dalton principle 3930: 3897: 3864: 3831: 3796: 3707: 3651: 3627: 3428: 3332: 3235: 3215: 3180: 3094: 3010: 2982: 2929: 2909: 2889: 2868:is social welfare and 2862: 2839: 2824: 2771:or per capita income. 1108:Experimental economics 925:Mathematics portal 831:Majority impossibility 820:Impossibility theorems 616:Negative vote transfer 437:Method of equal shares 58: 4866:Consistency criterion 4787:Alternative vote plus 4552:Instant-runoff voting 4122:Herve Moulin (2004). 3965: 3963:{\displaystyle \eta } 3931: 3898: 3865: 3832: 3797: 3708: 3652: 3607: 3457:on utility profiles. 3429: 3333: 3236: 3216: 3214:{\displaystyle (1-G)} 3181: 3095: 3011: 2962: 2930: 2910: 2890: 2888:{\displaystyle Y_{i}} 2863: 2840: 2804: 1938:) functions use only 728:Best-is-worst paradox 717:Pathological response 452:Direct representation 105:Single-winner methods 57: 6156:Social choice theory 5381:Social choice theory 5137:Behavioral economics 5120:Complexity economics 4936:Seats-to-votes ratio 4707:Webster/Sainte-LaguĂ« 4183:James E. Foster and 4031:Social choice theory 3954: 3914: 3881: 3848: 3812: 3750: 3706:{\displaystyle w(u)} 3688: 3563: 3510:: for every profile 3356: 3260: 3225: 3193: 3124: 3109:uncertainty aversion 3030: 2943: 2919: 2899: 2872: 2852: 2795: 2613:possibility function 2528:, often treated the 2506:Bergson argued that 2477:introduced the term 2330:improve this article 2021:abuse of terminology 1901:income distributions 1858:social choice theory 1335:Social choice theory 912:Economics portal 859:Median voter theorem 78:Comparative politics 5465:American (National) 5165:Economic statistics 4916:Plurality criterion 4515:Kemeny–Young method 4310:, N.S., 44(173), p 4252:Also available as: 4016:Justice (economics) 3981:Aggregation problem 3742:isoelastic function 3452:preference relation 2473:In a 1938 article, 2043: 1802:Business portal 1123:Operations research 1103:National accounting 900:Politics portal 611:Vote linkage system 582:Seat linkage system 169:Ranked-choice (RCV) 4957:Election threshold 4891:Majority criterion 4567:Supplementary vote 4254:a journal article. 4228:Blume, Lawrence E. 4224:Durlauf, Steven N. 4105:Economics Bulletin 3960: 3944:If we require the 3926: 3893: 3860: 3827: 3792: 3703: 3668:Harsanyi's theorem 3647: 3480:Pareto improvement 3424: 3328: 3231: 3211: 3176: 3090: 3006: 2925: 2905: 2885: 2858: 2835: 2559:Pareto improvement 2274:You can assist by 2042: 1133:Industrial complex 1128:Middle income trap 796:Discursive dilemma 755:Lesser evil voting 630:Supermixed systems 333:Largest remainders 191:Round-robin voting 59: 6151:Welfare economics 6138: 6137: 5669:New institutional 5028: 5027: 4926:Reversal symmetry 4835:Cumulative voting 4817:Semi-proportional 4792:Mixed single vote 4758: 4757: 4634:Mixed single vote 4542:Exhaustive ballot 4505:Copeland's method 4500:Condorcet methods 4440:Electoral systems 4288:Paul A. Samuelson 4271:, 1935, 2nd ed.. 4263:Jan de Van Graaff 4085:978-0-230-52223-7 4036:Welfare economics 4011:Gorman polar form 4006:Extended sympathy 3790: 3400: 3304: 3234:{\displaystyle G} 3159: 3004: 2960: 2928:{\displaystyle n} 2908:{\displaystyle i} 2861:{\displaystyle W} 2745:Pareto efficiency 2719:rational behavior 2673: 2672: 2554:Pareto efficiency 2508:welfare economics 2471: 2470: 2463: 2453: 2452: 2427:quality standards 2406: 2405: 2398: 2380: 2304: 2303: 2296: 2249: 2248: 2241: 2193: 2141: 2140: 2095: 2094: 1854:welfare economics 1850: 1849: 959: 958: 846:Gibbard's theorem 786:Dominance paradox 723:Perverse response 427:Phragmen's method 293:Majority judgment 221:Positional voting 179:Condorcet methods 47:electoral systems 21:electoral systems 6168: 5342:Natural resource 5177:Economic history 5103:Mechanism design 5055: 5048: 5041: 5032: 5031: 4967:Liquid democracy 4619: 4618: 4599:Two-round system 4510:Dodgson's method 4433: 4426: 4419: 4410: 4409: 4347:Economic Journal 4282:Economic Journal 4245: 4203:John C. Harsanyi 4150:Kenneth J. Arrow 4138: 4137: 4119: 4113: 4112: 4096: 4090: 4089: 4071: 4065: 4052: 4001:Economic welfare 3969: 3967: 3966: 3961: 3935: 3933: 3932: 3927: 3902: 3900: 3899: 3894: 3869: 3867: 3866: 3861: 3836: 3834: 3833: 3828: 3801: 3799: 3798: 3793: 3791: 3789: 3778: 3771: 3770: 3754: 3712: 3710: 3709: 3704: 3682:utilitarian rule 3656: 3654: 3653: 3648: 3643: 3642: 3626: 3621: 3600: 3599: 3581: 3580: 3433: 3431: 3430: 3425: 3423: 3422: 3421: 3420: 3407: 3401: 3393: 3388: 3387: 3386: 3337: 3335: 3334: 3329: 3327: 3326: 3325: 3324: 3311: 3305: 3297: 3292: 3291: 3290: 3240: 3238: 3237: 3232: 3220: 3218: 3217: 3212: 3185: 3183: 3182: 3177: 3160: 3152: 3147: 3146: 3145: 3107:extreme form of 3099: 3097: 3096: 3091: 3086: 3085: 3067: 3066: 3054: 3053: 3015: 3013: 3012: 3007: 3005: 2997: 2992: 2991: 2981: 2976: 2961: 2953: 2934: 2932: 2931: 2926: 2914: 2912: 2911: 2906: 2894: 2892: 2891: 2886: 2884: 2883: 2867: 2865: 2864: 2859: 2844: 2842: 2841: 2836: 2834: 2833: 2823: 2818: 2765:cardinal utility 2755:Cardinal welfare 2749:utilitarian rule 2633: 2609:welfare function 2515:cardinal utility 2466: 2459: 2448: 2445: 2439: 2416: 2408: 2401: 2394: 2390: 2387: 2381: 2379: 2338: 2314: 2306: 2299: 2292: 2288: 2285: 2279: 2259: 2258: 2251: 2244: 2237: 2233: 2230: 2224: 2204: 2203: 2196: 2185: 2163: 2162: 2155: 2103: 2102: 2044: 2041: 1842: 1835: 1828: 1814:Money portal 1812: 1811: 1810: 1800: 1799: 1296:Natural resource 1088:Economic systems 984: 961: 960: 951: 944: 937: 923: 922: 910: 909: 898: 897: 853:Positive results 748:Strategic voting 645:Majority jackpot 602: 591: 462:Liquid democracy 338:National remnant 328:Highest averages 265: 250: 235: 167: 158:Alternative vote 156: 140:Partisan primary 132: 73:Mechanism design 26: 25: 6176: 6175: 6171: 6170: 6169: 6167: 6166: 6165: 6141: 6140: 6139: 6134: 6131:Business portal 6098: 6097: 6096: 6056: 5820:von Böhm-Bawerk 5708: 5707: 5698: 5470:Ancient thought 5448: 5447: 5441: 5432: 5431: 5430: 5181: 5146: 5098:Contract theory 5083:Decision theory 5064: 5059: 5029: 5024: 5007: 4986: 4940: 4931:Smith criterion 4844: 4811: 4772:Parallel voting 4754: 4750:Imperiali quota 4723: 4690: 4608: 4562:Contingent vote 4525:Nanson's method 4483:Unified primary 4473:Approval voting 4459: 4442: 4437: 4388:Kotaro Suzumura 4343:Sen, Amartya K. 4284:, 43(4), 635–41 4242: 4146: 4141: 4134: 4120: 4116: 4097: 4093: 4086: 4072: 4068: 4053: 4049: 4045: 4040: 4021:Liberal paradox 3976: 3955: 3952: 3951: 3915: 3912: 3911: 3910:The limit when 3882: 3879: 3878: 3849: 3846: 3845: 3813: 3810: 3809: 3808:The limit when 3779: 3760: 3756: 3755: 3753: 3751: 3748: 3747: 3723: 3721:Non-utilitarian 3689: 3686: 3685: 3670: 3638: 3634: 3622: 3611: 3595: 3591: 3576: 3572: 3564: 3561: 3560: 3448: 3416: 3412: 3408: 3403: 3402: 3392: 3364: 3363: 3359: 3357: 3354: 3353: 3320: 3316: 3312: 3307: 3306: 3296: 3268: 3267: 3263: 3261: 3258: 3257: 3226: 3223: 3222: 3194: 3191: 3190: 3151: 3132: 3131: 3127: 3125: 3122: 3121: 3081: 3077: 3062: 3058: 3049: 3045: 3031: 3028: 3027: 2996: 2987: 2983: 2977: 2966: 2952: 2944: 2941: 2940: 2920: 2917: 2916: 2900: 2897: 2896: 2879: 2875: 2873: 2870: 2869: 2853: 2850: 2849: 2829: 2825: 2819: 2808: 2796: 2793: 2792: 2769:life expectancy 2757: 2642:consumer theory 2467: 2456: 2455: 2454: 2449: 2443: 2440: 2430: 2417: 2402: 2391: 2385: 2382: 2339: 2337: 2327: 2315: 2300: 2289: 2283: 2280: 2273: 2260: 2256: 2245: 2234: 2228: 2225: 2217:help improve it 2214: 2205: 2201: 2164: 2160: 2153: 2151:Ordinal welfare 2037:between the two 2029: 1983: 1916:consumer choice 1864:—also called a 1846: 1808: 1806: 1794: 1787: 1786: 1757: 1747: 1746: 1745: 1744: 1508:von Böhm-Bawerk 1396: 1385: 1384: 1146: 1138: 1137: 1093:Economic growth 1083: 1075: 1074: 1016: 1014:classifications 955: 917: 916: 904: 892: 884: 883: 850: 826:Arrow's theorem 816: 806: 805: 774: 744: 733:No-show paradox 714: 700:Cloning paradox 690:Spoiler effects 687: 677: 676: 651: 538: 521: 511: 510: 483: 474:Maximal lottery 441: 422:Thiele's method 411: 381: 313: 303: 302: 288:Approval voting 276:Cardinal voting 272: 217: 211:Maximal lottery 175: 107: 97: 24: 17: 12: 11: 5: 6174: 6164: 6163: 6158: 6153: 6136: 6135: 6133: 6128: 6123: 6118: 6113: 6108: 6103: 6100: 6099: 6095: 6094: 6089: 6079: 6074: 6068: 6067: 6066: 6064: 6058: 6057: 6055: 6054: 6047: 6042: 6037: 6032: 6027: 6022: 6017: 6012: 6007: 6002: 5997: 5992: 5987: 5982: 5977: 5972: 5967: 5962: 5957: 5952: 5947: 5942: 5937: 5932: 5927: 5922: 5917: 5912: 5907: 5902: 5897: 5892: 5887: 5882: 5877: 5872: 5867: 5862: 5857: 5852: 5847: 5842: 5837: 5832: 5827: 5822: 5817: 5812: 5807: 5802: 5797: 5792: 5787: 5782: 5777: 5772: 5767: 5762: 5757: 5752: 5747: 5742: 5737: 5732: 5727: 5722: 5717: 5711: 5709: 5703: 5700: 5699: 5697: 5696: 5691: 5686: 5681: 5676: 5671: 5666: 5665: 5664: 5654: 5653: 5652: 5642: 5637: 5632: 5631: 5630: 5620: 5615: 5610: 5609: 5608: 5607: 5606: 5596: 5591: 5576: 5571: 5566: 5561: 5556: 5551: 5546: 5541: 5536: 5534:Disequilibrium 5531: 5526: 5521: 5516: 5511: 5510: 5509: 5499: 5494: 5489: 5484: 5483: 5482: 5472: 5467: 5462: 5457: 5451: 5449: 5437: 5434: 5433: 5429: 5428: 5423: 5418: 5413: 5408: 5403: 5398: 5393: 5388: 5383: 5374: 5369: 5364: 5359: 5354: 5349: 5347:Organizational 5344: 5339: 5334: 5329: 5324: 5319: 5314: 5309: 5304: 5299: 5294: 5289: 5284: 5279: 5274: 5269: 5264: 5259: 5254: 5249: 5244: 5239: 5234: 5229: 5224: 5219: 5214: 5209: 5204: 5199: 5193: 5192: 5191: 5189: 5183: 5182: 5180: 5179: 5174: 5169: 5168: 5167: 5156: 5154: 5148: 5147: 5145: 5144: 5139: 5134: 5133: 5132: 5122: 5117: 5112: 5110:Macroeconomics 5107: 5106: 5105: 5100: 5095: 5090: 5085: 5078:Microeconomics 5074: 5072: 5066: 5065: 5058: 5057: 5050: 5043: 5035: 5026: 5025: 5012: 5009: 5008: 5006: 5005: 5000: 4994: 4992: 4988: 4987: 4985: 4984: 4979: 4974: 4969: 4964: 4959: 4954: 4948: 4946: 4942: 4941: 4939: 4938: 4933: 4928: 4923: 4918: 4913: 4908: 4903: 4898: 4893: 4888: 4883: 4878: 4873: 4868: 4863: 4858: 4852: 4850: 4846: 4845: 4843: 4842: 4837: 4832: 4830:Limited voting 4827: 4821: 4819: 4813: 4812: 4810: 4809: 4804: 4799: 4794: 4789: 4784: 4779: 4774: 4768: 4766: 4760: 4759: 4756: 4755: 4753: 4752: 4747: 4742: 4737: 4731: 4729: 4725: 4724: 4722: 4721: 4716: 4715: 4714: 4709: 4698: 4696: 4692: 4691: 4689: 4688: 4683: 4678: 4677: 4676: 4671: 4666: 4656: 4651: 4646: 4641: 4636: 4631: 4625: 4623: 4616: 4610: 4609: 4607: 4606: 4601: 4596: 4591: 4586: 4581: 4576: 4571: 4570: 4569: 4564: 4559: 4557:Coombs' method 4549: 4544: 4539: 4538: 4537: 4535:Schulze method 4532: 4527: 4522: 4517: 4512: 4507: 4497: 4495:Bucklin voting 4492: 4487: 4486: 4485: 4480: 4469: 4467: 4461: 4460: 4447: 4444: 4443: 4436: 4435: 4428: 4421: 4413: 4407: 4406: 4405:, v. 4, 418–20 4399: 4385: 4373:_____ (1982). 4371: 4356:_____, 1970 , 4354: 4340: 4322: 4304: 4285: 4278: 4269:Lionel Robbins 4266: 4259: 4258: 4257: 4256: 4247: 4246: 4240: 4212: 4211:, v. 2, 955–58 4200: 4181: 4175: 4165: 4145: 4142: 4140: 4139: 4132: 4114: 4091: 4084: 4066: 4055:Amartya K. Sen 4046: 4044: 4041: 4039: 4038: 4033: 4028: 4023: 4018: 4013: 4008: 4003: 3998: 3993: 3988: 3983: 3977: 3975: 3972: 3959: 3942: 3941: 3925: 3922: 3919: 3908: 3892: 3889: 3886: 3875: 3859: 3856: 3853: 3842: 3826: 3823: 3820: 3817: 3788: 3785: 3782: 3777: 3774: 3769: 3766: 3763: 3759: 3722: 3719: 3702: 3699: 3696: 3693: 3669: 3666: 3658: 3657: 3646: 3641: 3637: 3633: 3630: 3625: 3620: 3617: 3614: 3610: 3606: 3603: 3598: 3594: 3590: 3587: 3584: 3579: 3575: 3571: 3568: 3447: 3444: 3435: 3434: 3419: 3415: 3411: 3406: 3399: 3396: 3391: 3385: 3382: 3379: 3376: 3373: 3370: 3367: 3362: 3339: 3338: 3323: 3319: 3315: 3310: 3303: 3300: 3295: 3289: 3286: 3283: 3280: 3277: 3274: 3271: 3266: 3230: 3210: 3207: 3204: 3201: 3198: 3187: 3186: 3175: 3172: 3169: 3166: 3163: 3158: 3155: 3150: 3144: 3141: 3138: 3135: 3130: 3101: 3100: 3089: 3084: 3080: 3076: 3073: 3070: 3065: 3061: 3057: 3052: 3048: 3044: 3041: 3038: 3035: 3017: 3016: 3003: 3000: 2995: 2990: 2986: 2980: 2975: 2972: 2969: 2965: 2959: 2956: 2951: 2948: 2924: 2904: 2882: 2878: 2857: 2846: 2845: 2832: 2828: 2822: 2817: 2814: 2811: 2807: 2803: 2800: 2756: 2753: 2692:Lionel Robbins 2671: 2670: 2669: 2668: 2665: 2662: 2656: 2640:. Relative to 2602: 2601: 2598: 2567:Paul Samuelson 2522:utilitarianism 2504: 2503: 2500: 2497: 2483:differentiable 2469: 2468: 2451: 2450: 2420: 2418: 2411: 2404: 2403: 2318: 2316: 2309: 2302: 2301: 2263: 2261: 2254: 2247: 2246: 2208: 2206: 2199: 2194: 2168: 2167: 2165: 2158: 2152: 2149: 2139: 2138: 2135: 2131: 2130: 2125: 2121: 2120: 2115: 2111: 2110: 2107: 2093: 2092: 2089: 2086: 2082: 2081: 2076: 2071: 2067: 2066: 2061: 2058: 2054: 2053: 2050: 2047: 2033:instant-runoff 2028: 2025: 2013: 2012: 2001: 1994: 1982: 1979: 1964: 1963: 1943: 1848: 1847: 1845: 1844: 1837: 1830: 1822: 1819: 1818: 1817: 1816: 1804: 1789: 1788: 1785: 1784: 1779: 1769: 1764: 1758: 1753: 1752: 1749: 1748: 1743: 1742: 1735: 1730: 1725: 1720: 1715: 1710: 1705: 1700: 1695: 1690: 1685: 1680: 1675: 1670: 1665: 1660: 1655: 1650: 1645: 1640: 1635: 1630: 1625: 1620: 1615: 1610: 1605: 1600: 1595: 1590: 1585: 1580: 1575: 1570: 1565: 1560: 1555: 1550: 1545: 1540: 1535: 1530: 1525: 1520: 1515: 1510: 1505: 1500: 1495: 1490: 1485: 1480: 1475: 1470: 1465: 1460: 1455: 1450: 1445: 1440: 1435: 1430: 1425: 1420: 1415: 1410: 1405: 1399: 1398: 1397: 1391: 1390: 1387: 1386: 1383: 1382: 1377: 1372: 1367: 1362: 1357: 1352: 1347: 1342: 1337: 1328: 1323: 1318: 1313: 1308: 1303: 1301:Organizational 1298: 1293: 1288: 1283: 1278: 1273: 1268: 1263: 1258: 1253: 1248: 1243: 1238: 1233: 1228: 1223: 1218: 1213: 1208: 1203: 1198: 1193: 1188: 1183: 1178: 1173: 1168: 1163: 1158: 1153: 1147: 1145:By application 1144: 1143: 1140: 1139: 1136: 1135: 1130: 1125: 1120: 1115: 1110: 1105: 1100: 1095: 1090: 1084: 1081: 1080: 1077: 1076: 1073: 1072: 1067: 1062: 1057: 1052: 1047: 1038: 1033: 1028: 1023: 1017: 1011: 1010: 1007: 1006: 1005: 1004: 999: 994: 986: 985: 977: 976: 970: 969: 957: 956: 954: 953: 946: 939: 931: 928: 927: 915: 914: 902: 889: 886: 885: 882: 881: 876: 871: 866: 861: 849: 848: 843: 838: 833: 828: 817: 812: 811: 808: 807: 804: 803: 798: 793: 788: 773: 772: 770:Turkey-raising 767: 762: 757: 743: 742: 741: 740: 730: 725: 713: 712: 710:Center squeeze 707: 702: 697: 695:Spoiler effect 688: 683: 682: 679: 678: 675: 674: 669: 668: 667: 654:By ballot type 650: 649: 648: 647: 642: 637: 627: 626: 625: 624: 623: 618: 608: 607: 606: 595: 572: 571: 570: 565: 560: 555: 537: 536: 531: 522: 517: 516: 513: 512: 509: 508: 506:Limited voting 503: 502: 501: 482: 481: 476: 471: 466: 465: 464: 459: 440: 439: 434: 429: 424: 410: 409: 404: 399: 394: 380: 379: 378: 377: 375:Localized list 372: 367: 362: 357: 347: 346: 345: 343:Biproportional 340: 335: 330: 314: 309: 308: 305: 304: 301: 300: 295: 290: 285: 271: 270: 255: 240: 216: 215: 214: 213: 208: 203: 198: 188: 174: 173: 172: 171: 160: 147:Instant-runoff 144: 143: 142: 134:Jungle primary 121: 110:Single vote - 108: 103: 102: 99: 98: 96: 95: 85: 80: 75: 70: 64: 61: 60: 50: 49: 39: 38: 15: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 6173: 6162: 6159: 6157: 6154: 6152: 6149: 6148: 6146: 6132: 6129: 6127: 6124: 6122: 6119: 6117: 6114: 6112: 6109: 6107: 6104: 6101: 6093: 6090: 6087: 6083: 6080: 6078: 6075: 6073: 6070: 6069: 6065: 6063: 6059: 6053: 6052: 6048: 6046: 6043: 6041: 6038: 6036: 6033: 6031: 6028: 6026: 6023: 6021: 6018: 6016: 6013: 6011: 6008: 6006: 6003: 6001: 5998: 5996: 5993: 5991: 5988: 5986: 5983: 5981: 5978: 5976: 5973: 5971: 5968: 5966: 5963: 5961: 5958: 5956: 5953: 5951: 5948: 5946: 5943: 5941: 5938: 5936: 5933: 5931: 5928: 5926: 5923: 5921: 5918: 5916: 5913: 5911: 5908: 5906: 5903: 5901: 5898: 5896: 5893: 5891: 5888: 5886: 5883: 5881: 5878: 5876: 5873: 5871: 5868: 5866: 5863: 5861: 5858: 5856: 5853: 5851: 5848: 5846: 5843: 5841: 5838: 5836: 5833: 5831: 5828: 5826: 5823: 5821: 5818: 5816: 5813: 5811: 5808: 5806: 5803: 5801: 5798: 5796: 5793: 5791: 5788: 5786: 5783: 5781: 5778: 5776: 5773: 5771: 5768: 5766: 5763: 5761: 5758: 5756: 5753: 5751: 5748: 5746: 5743: 5741: 5738: 5736: 5733: 5731: 5728: 5726: 5723: 5721: 5718: 5716: 5715:de Mandeville 5713: 5712: 5710: 5706: 5701: 5695: 5692: 5690: 5687: 5685: 5682: 5680: 5677: 5675: 5672: 5670: 5667: 5663: 5660: 5659: 5658: 5657:New classical 5655: 5651: 5648: 5647: 5646: 5643: 5641: 5638: 5636: 5633: 5629: 5626: 5625: 5624: 5621: 5619: 5616: 5614: 5613:Malthusianism 5611: 5605: 5602: 5601: 5600: 5597: 5595: 5592: 5589: 5585: 5582: 5581: 5580: 5577: 5575: 5574:Institutional 5572: 5570: 5567: 5565: 5562: 5560: 5557: 5555: 5552: 5550: 5547: 5545: 5542: 5540: 5537: 5535: 5532: 5530: 5527: 5525: 5522: 5520: 5517: 5515: 5512: 5508: 5505: 5504: 5503: 5500: 5498: 5495: 5493: 5490: 5488: 5485: 5481: 5478: 5477: 5476: 5473: 5471: 5468: 5466: 5463: 5461: 5458: 5456: 5453: 5452: 5450: 5445: 5440: 5435: 5427: 5424: 5422: 5419: 5417: 5414: 5412: 5409: 5407: 5404: 5402: 5399: 5397: 5394: 5392: 5389: 5387: 5384: 5382: 5378: 5377:Public choice 5375: 5373: 5370: 5368: 5365: 5363: 5360: 5358: 5355: 5353: 5352:Participation 5350: 5348: 5345: 5343: 5340: 5338: 5335: 5333: 5330: 5328: 5325: 5323: 5320: 5318: 5315: 5313: 5312:Institutional 5310: 5308: 5305: 5303: 5300: 5298: 5295: 5293: 5290: 5288: 5285: 5283: 5280: 5278: 5275: 5273: 5270: 5268: 5265: 5263: 5262:Expeditionary 5260: 5258: 5255: 5253: 5252:Environmental 5250: 5248: 5245: 5243: 5240: 5238: 5235: 5233: 5230: 5228: 5225: 5223: 5220: 5218: 5215: 5213: 5210: 5208: 5205: 5203: 5200: 5198: 5195: 5194: 5190: 5188: 5184: 5178: 5175: 5173: 5170: 5166: 5163: 5162: 5161: 5158: 5157: 5155: 5153: 5149: 5143: 5140: 5138: 5135: 5131: 5128: 5127: 5126: 5123: 5121: 5118: 5116: 5113: 5111: 5108: 5104: 5101: 5099: 5096: 5094: 5091: 5089: 5086: 5084: 5081: 5080: 5079: 5076: 5075: 5073: 5071: 5067: 5063: 5056: 5051: 5049: 5044: 5042: 5037: 5036: 5033: 5023: 5022: 5017: 5016: 5010: 5004: 5001: 4999: 4996: 4995: 4993: 4989: 4983: 4980: 4978: 4975: 4973: 4970: 4968: 4965: 4963: 4960: 4958: 4955: 4953: 4950: 4949: 4947: 4943: 4937: 4934: 4932: 4929: 4927: 4924: 4922: 4919: 4917: 4914: 4912: 4909: 4907: 4904: 4902: 4899: 4897: 4894: 4892: 4889: 4887: 4884: 4882: 4879: 4877: 4874: 4872: 4869: 4867: 4864: 4862: 4859: 4857: 4854: 4853: 4851: 4847: 4841: 4838: 4836: 4833: 4831: 4828: 4826: 4823: 4822: 4820: 4818: 4814: 4808: 4805: 4803: 4800: 4798: 4795: 4793: 4790: 4788: 4785: 4783: 4780: 4778: 4775: 4773: 4770: 4769: 4767: 4765: 4761: 4751: 4748: 4746: 4743: 4741: 4738: 4736: 4733: 4732: 4730: 4726: 4720: 4717: 4713: 4710: 4708: 4705: 4704: 4703: 4700: 4699: 4697: 4693: 4687: 4684: 4682: 4679: 4675: 4672: 4670: 4667: 4665: 4662: 4661: 4660: 4657: 4655: 4652: 4650: 4647: 4645: 4642: 4640: 4637: 4635: 4632: 4630: 4627: 4626: 4624: 4620: 4617: 4615: 4611: 4605: 4602: 4600: 4597: 4595: 4592: 4590: 4587: 4585: 4582: 4580: 4577: 4575: 4572: 4568: 4565: 4563: 4560: 4558: 4555: 4554: 4553: 4550: 4548: 4545: 4543: 4540: 4536: 4533: 4531: 4528: 4526: 4523: 4521: 4518: 4516: 4513: 4511: 4508: 4506: 4503: 4502: 4501: 4498: 4496: 4493: 4491: 4488: 4484: 4481: 4479: 4476: 4475: 4474: 4471: 4470: 4468: 4466: 4465:Single-winner 4462: 4458: 4456: 4452: 4445: 4441: 4434: 4429: 4427: 4422: 4420: 4415: 4414: 4411: 4404: 4400: 4397: 4394:, 47(186), p 4393: 4389: 4386: 4384: 4380: 4377:, MIT Press. 4376: 4372: 4370: 4369:0-444-85127-5 4366: 4362: 4361:(description) 4359: 4355: 4352: 4348: 4344: 4341: 4339: 4336:, pp. 3 4335: 4331: 4327: 4323: 4321: 4317: 4313: 4309: 4305: 4303: 4302:0-674-31301-1 4299: 4295: 4294: 4289: 4286: 4283: 4279: 4276: 4275: 4270: 4267: 4264: 4261: 4260: 4255: 4251: 4250: 4249: 4248: 4243: 4241:9780333786765 4237: 4233: 4229: 4225: 4221: 4217: 4213: 4210: 4209: 4204: 4201: 4198: 4197:0-19-828193-5 4194: 4190: 4186: 4182: 4179: 4176: 4173: 4169: 4168:Abram Bergson 4166: 4164: 4163:0-300-01364-7 4160: 4157: 4156: 4151: 4148: 4147: 4135: 4133:9780262134231 4129: 4125: 4118: 4110: 4106: 4102: 4095: 4087: 4081: 4077: 4070: 4064: 4060: 4056: 4051: 4047: 4037: 4034: 4032: 4029: 4027: 4024: 4022: 4019: 4017: 4014: 4012: 4009: 4007: 4004: 4002: 3999: 3997: 3994: 3992: 3989: 3987: 3984: 3982: 3979: 3978: 3971: 3957: 3949: 3948: 3939: 3917: 3909: 3906: 3890: 3887: 3884: 3876: 3873: 3857: 3854: 3851: 3843: 3840: 3821: 3815: 3807: 3806: 3805: 3802: 3786: 3783: 3780: 3775: 3772: 3767: 3764: 3761: 3757: 3745: 3743: 3739: 3734: 3732: 3727: 3718: 3716: 3697: 3691: 3683: 3679: 3675: 3665: 3663: 3639: 3635: 3628: 3623: 3618: 3615: 3612: 3608: 3604: 3596: 3592: 3588: 3585: 3582: 3577: 3573: 3566: 3559: 3558: 3557: 3555: 3550: 3548: 3544: 3539: 3535: 3532: 3527: 3525: 3521: 3517: 3513: 3509: 3504: 3502: 3498: 3494: 3490: 3489: 3483: 3481: 3477: 3473: 3472: 3466: 3464: 3460: 3456: 3453: 3443: 3440: 3417: 3413: 3409: 3394: 3389: 3380: 3360: 3352: 3351: 3350: 3348: 3344: 3321: 3317: 3313: 3298: 3293: 3284: 3264: 3256: 3255: 3254: 3252: 3248: 3244: 3228: 3205: 3202: 3199: 3170: 3167: 3164: 3153: 3148: 3128: 3120: 3119: 3118: 3116: 3112: 3110: 3104: 3082: 3078: 3074: 3071: 3068: 3063: 3059: 3055: 3050: 3046: 3036: 3033: 3026: 3025: 3024: 3022: 2998: 2993: 2988: 2984: 2978: 2973: 2970: 2967: 2963: 2957: 2954: 2949: 2946: 2939: 2938: 2937: 2922: 2902: 2880: 2876: 2855: 2830: 2826: 2820: 2815: 2812: 2809: 2805: 2801: 2798: 2791: 2790: 2789: 2787: 2783: 2778: 2775: 2772: 2770: 2766: 2762: 2752: 2750: 2746: 2742: 2738: 2734: 2730: 2729:John Harsanyi 2726: 2724: 2720: 2716: 2713: 2709: 2705: 2701: 2697: 2693: 2688: 2686: 2681: 2677: 2676:Kenneth Arrow 2666: 2663: 2661: 2657: 2655: 2650: 2649: 2647: 2643: 2639: 2635: 2634: 2631: 2628: 2623: 2618: 2614: 2610: 2605: 2599: 2596: 2595: 2594: 2592: 2588: 2583: 2580: 2576: 2572: 2568: 2564: 2563:substantively 2560: 2556: 2555: 2549: 2547: 2543: 2542:unfalsifiable 2539: 2535: 2531: 2527: 2523: 2518: 2516: 2513: 2509: 2501: 2498: 2495: 2494: 2493: 2490: 2488: 2484: 2480: 2476: 2475:Abram Bergson 2465: 2462: 2447: 2437: 2433: 2428: 2424: 2421:This section 2419: 2415: 2410: 2409: 2400: 2397: 2389: 2378: 2375: 2371: 2368: 2364: 2361: 2357: 2354: 2350: 2347: â€“  2346: 2342: 2341:Find sources: 2335: 2331: 2325: 2324: 2319:This section 2317: 2313: 2308: 2307: 2298: 2295: 2287: 2277: 2271: 2269: 2264:This section 2262: 2253: 2252: 2243: 2240: 2232: 2222: 2218: 2212: 2209:This section 2207: 2198: 2197: 2192: 2190: 2183: 2182: 2177: 2176: 2171: 2166: 2157: 2156: 2148: 2146: 2136: 2133: 2132: 2129: 2126: 2123: 2122: 2119: 2116: 2113: 2112: 2108: 2105: 2104: 2101: 2098: 2090: 2087: 2084: 2083: 2080: 2077: 2075: 2072: 2069: 2068: 2065: 2062: 2059: 2056: 2055: 2051: 2048: 2046: 2045: 2040: 2038: 2034: 2024: 2022: 2017: 2010: 2006: 2002: 1999: 1995: 1992: 1988: 1987: 1986: 1978: 1976: 1972: 1968: 1961: 1957: 1953: 1949: 1948: 1944: 1941: 1937: 1936:ranked voting 1933: 1932: 1928: 1927: 1926: 1923: 1921: 1917: 1912: 1910: 1906: 1902: 1897: 1892: 1889: 1885: 1882: 1878: 1874: 1870: 1867: 1863: 1859: 1855: 1843: 1838: 1836: 1831: 1829: 1824: 1823: 1821: 1820: 1815: 1805: 1803: 1798: 1793: 1792: 1791: 1790: 1783: 1780: 1777: 1773: 1770: 1768: 1765: 1763: 1760: 1759: 1756: 1751: 1750: 1741: 1740: 1736: 1734: 1731: 1729: 1726: 1724: 1721: 1719: 1716: 1714: 1711: 1709: 1706: 1704: 1701: 1699: 1696: 1694: 1691: 1689: 1686: 1684: 1681: 1679: 1676: 1674: 1671: 1669: 1666: 1664: 1661: 1659: 1656: 1654: 1651: 1649: 1646: 1644: 1641: 1639: 1636: 1634: 1631: 1629: 1626: 1624: 1621: 1619: 1616: 1614: 1611: 1609: 1606: 1604: 1601: 1599: 1596: 1594: 1591: 1589: 1586: 1584: 1581: 1579: 1576: 1574: 1571: 1569: 1566: 1564: 1561: 1559: 1556: 1554: 1551: 1549: 1546: 1544: 1541: 1539: 1536: 1534: 1531: 1529: 1526: 1524: 1521: 1519: 1516: 1514: 1511: 1509: 1506: 1504: 1501: 1499: 1496: 1494: 1491: 1489: 1486: 1484: 1481: 1479: 1476: 1474: 1471: 1469: 1466: 1464: 1461: 1459: 1456: 1454: 1451: 1449: 1446: 1444: 1441: 1439: 1436: 1434: 1431: 1429: 1426: 1424: 1421: 1419: 1416: 1414: 1411: 1409: 1406: 1404: 1403:de Mandeville 1401: 1400: 1395: 1389: 1388: 1381: 1378: 1376: 1373: 1371: 1368: 1366: 1363: 1361: 1358: 1356: 1353: 1351: 1348: 1346: 1343: 1341: 1338: 1336: 1332: 1331:Public choice 1329: 1327: 1324: 1322: 1319: 1317: 1314: 1312: 1309: 1307: 1306:Participation 1304: 1302: 1299: 1297: 1294: 1292: 1289: 1287: 1284: 1282: 1279: 1277: 1274: 1272: 1269: 1267: 1266:Institutional 1264: 1262: 1259: 1257: 1254: 1252: 1249: 1247: 1244: 1242: 1239: 1237: 1234: 1232: 1229: 1227: 1224: 1222: 1219: 1217: 1216:Expeditionary 1214: 1212: 1209: 1207: 1206:Environmental 1204: 1202: 1199: 1197: 1194: 1192: 1189: 1187: 1184: 1182: 1179: 1177: 1174: 1172: 1169: 1167: 1164: 1162: 1159: 1157: 1154: 1152: 1149: 1148: 1142: 1141: 1134: 1131: 1129: 1126: 1124: 1121: 1119: 1116: 1114: 1111: 1109: 1106: 1104: 1101: 1099: 1096: 1094: 1091: 1089: 1086: 1085: 1079: 1078: 1071: 1068: 1066: 1063: 1061: 1058: 1056: 1053: 1051: 1048: 1046: 1042: 1039: 1037: 1036:International 1034: 1032: 1029: 1027: 1024: 1022: 1019: 1018: 1015: 1012:Branches and 1009: 1008: 1003: 1000: 998: 995: 993: 990: 989: 988: 987: 983: 979: 978: 975: 972: 971: 967: 963: 962: 952: 947: 945: 940: 938: 933: 932: 930: 929: 926: 921: 913: 908: 903: 901: 896: 891: 890: 888: 887: 880: 877: 875: 872: 870: 869:May's theorem 867: 865: 862: 860: 857: 856: 855: 854: 847: 844: 842: 839: 837: 834: 832: 829: 827: 824: 823: 822: 821: 815: 810: 809: 802: 799: 797: 794: 792: 789: 787: 784: 783: 782: 781: 780: 779:majority rule 777:Paradoxes of 771: 768: 766: 763: 761: 758: 756: 753: 752: 751: 750: 749: 739: 736: 735: 734: 731: 729: 726: 724: 721: 720: 719: 718: 711: 708: 706: 703: 701: 698: 696: 693: 692: 691: 686: 681: 680: 673: 670: 666: 663: 662: 661: 658: 657: 656: 655: 646: 643: 641: 638: 636: 633: 632: 631: 628: 622: 619: 617: 614: 613: 612: 609: 605: 600: 596: 594: 589: 585: 584: 583: 580: 579: 578: 577: 573: 569: 566: 564: 561: 559: 556: 554: 551: 550: 549: 548: 543: 542: 541: 535: 532: 530: 527: 526: 525: 520: 519:Mixed systems 515: 514: 507: 504: 500: 497: 496: 495: 492: 491: 490: 489: 488: 480: 479:Random ballot 477: 475: 472: 470: 467: 463: 460: 458: 455: 454: 453: 450: 449: 448: 447: 446: 438: 435: 433: 430: 428: 425: 423: 420: 419: 418: 417: 416: 408: 405: 403: 400: 398: 395: 393: 390: 389: 388: 387: 386: 376: 373: 371: 368: 366: 363: 361: 358: 356: 353: 352: 351: 348: 344: 341: 339: 336: 334: 331: 329: 326: 325: 324: 323:Apportionment 321: 320: 319: 318: 312: 307: 306: 299: 296: 294: 291: 289: 286: 284: 281: 280: 279: 278: 277: 268: 264: 259: 258:Antiplurality 256: 253: 249: 244: 241: 238: 234: 229: 226: 225: 224: 223: 222: 212: 209: 207: 204: 202: 199: 197: 194: 193: 192: 189: 187: 186:Condorcet-IRV 184: 183: 182: 181: 180: 170: 165: 161: 159: 154: 150: 149: 148: 145: 141: 138: 137: 135: 130: 125: 122: 120: 117: 116: 115: 113: 106: 101: 100: 93: 89: 86: 84: 81: 79: 76: 74: 71: 69: 68:Social choice 66: 65: 63: 62: 56: 52: 51: 48: 44: 43:Social choice 41: 40: 36: 32: 28: 27: 22: 6126:Publications 6082:Publications 6049: 5645:Neoclassical 5635:Mercantilism 5544:Evolutionary 5406:Sociological 5379: / 5277:Geographical 5257:Evolutionary 5232:Digitization 5197:Agricultural 5160:Econometrics 5088:Price theory 5019: 5013: 4629:Mixed-member 4614:Proportional 4589:Score voting 4530:Ranked pairs 4449:Part of the 4448: 4402: 4391: 4374: 4357: 4346: 4333: 4325: 4315: 4307: 4291: 4281: 4272: 4231: 4220:(definition) 4219: 4206: 4188: 4171: 4153: 4123: 4117: 4108: 4104: 4094: 4075: 4069: 4063:Description. 4058: 4050: 3945: 3943: 3937: 3838: 3803: 3746: 3740:must be the 3737: 3735: 3730: 3728: 3724: 3671: 3661: 3659: 3553: 3551: 3547:separability 3546: 3542: 3537: 3533: 3530: 3528: 3519: 3515: 3511: 3507: 3505: 3500: 3496: 3487: 3484: 3475: 3471:Monotonicity 3470: 3467: 3458: 3454: 3449: 3438: 3436: 3342: 3340: 3188: 3113: 3105: 3102: 3018: 2847: 2779: 2776: 2773: 2760: 2758: 2727: 2714: 2696:behaviorists 2689: 2674: 2659: 2653: 2645: 2626: 2621: 2612: 2608: 2606: 2603: 2590: 2584: 2578: 2574: 2570: 2562: 2558: 2552: 2550: 2533: 2519: 2511: 2505: 2491: 2478: 2472: 2457: 2441: 2432:You can help 2422: 2392: 2383: 2373: 2366: 2359: 2352: 2340: 2328:Please help 2323:verification 2320: 2290: 2281: 2268:copy editing 2266:may require 2265: 2235: 2226: 2210: 2186: 2179: 2173: 2172:Please help 2169: 2142: 2127: 2117: 2099: 2096: 2078: 2073: 2063: 2031:Consider an 2030: 2018: 2014: 2004: 1997: 1990: 1984: 1965: 1959: 1952:rated voting 1946: 1942:information. 1930: 1924: 1919: 1913: 1893: 1883: 1880: 1876: 1872: 1868: 1865: 1861: 1851: 1772:Publications 1737: 1360:Sociological 1333: / 1231:Geographical 1211:Evolutionary 1186:Digitization 1151:Agricultural 1055:Mathematical 1026:Econometrics 852: 851: 818: 776: 775: 760:Exaggeration 746: 745: 716: 715: 689: 653: 652: 621:Mixed ballot 576:Compensatory 574: 547:compensatory 544: 539: 523: 485: 484: 443: 442: 413: 412: 383: 382: 370:List-free PR 315: 283:Score voting 274: 273: 219: 218: 206:Ranked pairs 177: 176: 109: 5920:von Neumann 5689:Supply-side 5674:Physiocracy 5618:Marginalism 5307:Information 5247:Engineering 5227:Development 5222:Demographic 5093:Game theory 5070:Theoretical 4972:Spoilt vote 4735:Droop quota 4674:Schulze STV 4649:Rural–urban 4594:STAR voting 4490:Borda count 4379:Description 4349:, 73(292), 4185:Amartya Sen 3905:utilitarian 3903:we get the 3870:we get the 3674:Dutch Books 3524:closed sets 3463:total order 3251:Theil index 3115:Amartya Sen 2782:utilitarian 2737:uncertainty 2585:Samuelson ( 2546:behaviorism 1975:second-best 1608:von Neumann 1261:Information 1201:Engineering 1181:Development 1176:Demographic 1118:Game theory 1060:Methodology 660:Single vote 563:Conditional 558:Coexistence 407:Quota Borda 397:Schulze STV 355:Closed list 298:STAR voting 243:Borda count 6145:Categories 6077:Economists 5950:Schumacher 5855:Schumpeter 5825:von Wieser 5745:von ThĂĽnen 5705:Economists 5604:Circuitism 5569:Humanistic 5564:Historical 5539:Ecological 5529:Democratic 5502:Chartalism 5492:Behavioral 5455:Mainstream 5416:Statistics 5411:Solidarity 5332:Managerial 5297:Humanistic 5292:Historical 5237:Ecological 5202:Behavioral 4991:Comparison 4745:Hare quota 4695:Allocation 4681:Spare vote 4669:Hare-Clark 4639:Party-list 4144:References 4111:(16): 1–7. 3508:Continuity 3461:is a weak 3243:Gini index 3021:John Rawls 2786:Benthamite 2694:and other 2646:individual 2444:March 2024 2386:March 2024 2356:newspapers 2284:March 2024 2276:editing it 2229:March 2024 2175:improve it 2106:Runner-up 2079:Eliminated 1920:individual 1905:democratic 1896:economists 1767:Economists 1638:Schumacher 1543:Schumpeter 1513:von Wieser 1433:von ThĂĽnen 1394:economists 1370:Statistics 1365:Solidarity 1286:Managerial 1251:Humanistic 1246:Historical 1191:Ecological 1156:Behavioral 1050:Mainstream 765:Truncation 494:Cumulative 317:Party-list 92:By country 83:Comparison 5995:Greenspan 5960:Samuelson 5940:Galbraith 5910:Tinbergen 5850:von Mises 5845:Heckscher 5805:Edgeworth 5684:Stockholm 5679:Socialist 5579:Keynesian 5559:Happiness 5519:Classical 5480:Mutualism 5475:Anarchist 5460:Heterodox 5357:Personnel 5317:Knowledge 5282:Happiness 5272:Financial 5242:Education 5217:Democracy 5152:Empirical 5062:Economics 4982:Unseating 4977:Sortition 4579:Plurality 4455:Economics 4392:Economica 4308:Economica 4057:, 1970 , 3958:η 3940:ordering. 3924:∞ 3921:→ 3918:η 3885:η 3852:η 3841:ordering. 3825:∞ 3822:− 3819:→ 3816:η 3787:η 3784:− 3773:− 3768:η 3765:− 3609:∑ 3586:… 3410:− 3398:¯ 3381:− 3314:− 3302:¯ 3285:− 3203:− 3168:− 3157:¯ 3072:⋯ 3002:¯ 2964:∑ 2806:∑ 2741:coherence 2721:, called 2680:1963 book 2617:arguments 2571:necessary 2487:resources 2436:talk page 2181:talk page 2003:A social 1996:A social 1989:A social 1909:elections 1683:Greenspan 1648:Samuelson 1628:Galbraith 1598:Tinbergen 1538:von Mises 1533:Heckscher 1493:Edgeworth 1311:Personnel 1271:Knowledge 1236:Happiness 1226:Financial 1196:Education 1171:Democracy 1065:Political 1031:Heterodox 974:Economics 672:Dual-vote 365:Panachage 360:Open list 350:List type 228:Plurality 124:Two-round 112:plurality 35:Economics 6106:Category 6086:journals 6072:Glossary 6025:Stiglitz 5990:Rothbard 5970:Buchanan 5955:Friedman 5945:Koopmans 5935:Leontief 5915:Robinson 5800:Marshall 5650:Lausanne 5554:Georgism 5549:Feminist 5497:Buddhist 5487:Austrian 5386:Regional 5362:Planning 5337:Monetary 5267:Feminist 5212:Cultural 5207:Business 4849:Criteria 4802:Scorporo 4451:politics 4277:, ch. VI 4230:(eds.), 4187:, 1996, 3974:See also 3543:locality 3488:Symmetry 3247:Atkinson 2708:coherent 2704:rational 2700:cardinal 2622:feasible 2611:and the 2118:Excluded 2109:Round 1 2052:Round 2 2049:Round 1 1998:ordering 1971:rational 1956:cardinal 1947:Cardinal 1888:function 1884:function 1869:ordering 1776:journals 1762:Glossary 1713:Stiglitz 1678:Rothbard 1658:Buchanan 1643:Friedman 1633:Koopmans 1623:Leontief 1603:Robinson 1488:Marshall 1392:Notable 1340:Regional 1316:Planning 1291:Monetary 1221:Feminist 1166:Cultural 1161:Business 966:a series 964:Part of 392:Hare STV 31:Politics 29:A joint 6121:Outline 6092:Schools 6084: ( 6045:Piketty 6040:Krugman 5905:Kuznets 5895:Kalecki 5870:Polanyi 5760:Cournot 5755:Bastiat 5740:Ricardo 5730:Malthus 5720:Quesnay 5623:Marxian 5514:Chicago 5444:history 5439:Schools 5426:Welfare 5396:Service 5187:Applied 5021:Project 4712:D'Hondt 4664:CPO-STV 4622:Systems 4396:pp. 125 4351:pp. 771 3938:leximax 3936:is the 3839:leximin 3837:is the 3241:is the 2747:is the 2733:showing 2654:surface 2644:for an 2579:another 2526:Bentham 2370:scholar 2215:Please 2134:Bottom 2124:Center 2085:Bottom 2070:Center 2027:Example 2005:scoring 1940:ordinal 1931:Ordinal 1877:utility 1873:ranking 1782:Schools 1774: ( 1733:Piketty 1728:Krugman 1593:Kuznets 1583:Kalecki 1558:Polanyi 1448:Cournot 1443:Bastiat 1428:Ricardo 1418:Malthus 1408:Quesnay 1380:Welfare 1350:Service 1021:Applied 997:Outline 992:History 402:CPO-STV 252:Baldwin 201:Schulze 196:Minimax 114:methods 6030:Thaler 6010:Ostrom 6005:Becker 6000:Sowell 5980:Baumol 5885:Myrdal 5880:Sraffa 5875:Frisch 5865:Knight 5860:Keynes 5835:Fisher 5830:Veblen 5815:Pareto 5795:Menger 5790:George 5785:Jevons 5780:Walras 5770:Gossen 5694:Thermo 5372:Public 5367:Policy 5322:Labour 5287:Health 5015:Portal 4952:Ballot 4728:Quotas 4457:series 4383:links. 4367:  4320:47–54. 4318:, pp. 4312:pp. 81 4300:  4238:  4222:", in 4195:  4161:  4130:  4082:  3660:where 3347:median 3343:person 3221:where 2915:among 2848:where 2434:. The 2372:  2365:  2358:  2351:  2343:  1991:choice 1886:—is a 1881:choice 1866:social 1718:Thaler 1698:Ostrom 1693:Becker 1688:Sowell 1668:Baumol 1573:Myrdal 1568:Sraffa 1563:Frisch 1553:Knight 1548:Keynes 1523:Fisher 1518:Veblen 1503:Pareto 1483:Menger 1478:George 1473:Jevons 1468:Walras 1458:Gossen 1326:Public 1321:Policy 1276:Labour 1241:Health 1098:Market 267:Coombs 37:series 6116:Lists 6111:Index 6062:Lists 6035:Hoppe 6020:Lucas 5985:Solow 5975:Arrow 5965:Simon 5930:Lange 5925:Hicks 5900:Röpke 5890:Hayek 5840:Pigou 5810:Clark 5725:Smith 5640:Mixed 5599:Post- 5421:Urban 5401:Socio 5391:Rural 4945:Other 4764:Mixed 4043:Notes 2377:JSTOR 2363:books 1879:, or 1755:Lists 1723:Hoppe 1708:Lucas 1673:Solow 1663:Arrow 1653:Simon 1618:Lange 1613:Hicks 1588:Röpke 1578:Hayek 1528:Pigou 1498:Clark 1413:Smith 1375:Urban 1355:Socio 1345:Rural 1045:Macro 1041:Micro 1002:Index 604:'MMP' 593:'AMS' 6051:more 5775:Marx 5765:Mill 5750:List 5628:Neo- 5584:Neo- 4453:and 4398:–39. 4365:ISBN 4353:–78. 4338:–46. 4298:ISBN 4236:ISBN 4193:ISBN 4159:ISBN 4128:ISBN 4080:ISBN 3877:For 3844:For 3522:are 3439:Euro 2780:The 2743:and 2627:sets 2587:1947 2538:1935 2349:news 2057:Top 1960:much 1950:(or 1934:(or 1860:, a 1856:and 1739:more 1463:Marx 1453:Mill 1438:List 545:Non- 499:SNTV 88:List 45:and 33:and 6015:Sen 5735:Say 5594:New 5327:Law 4777:MMP 3545:or 3529:4. 3506:3. 3485:2. 3468:1. 3040:min 2784:or 2706:or 2678:'s 2660:map 2591:any 2575:one 2524:of 2332:by 2219:to 2137:34 2091:47 2088:34 2060:40 1852:In 1703:Sen 1423:Say 1281:Law 263:el. 248:el. 237:IRV 233:el. 6147:: 5018:— 4328:, 4226:; 4107:. 4103:. 3744:: 3717:. 3526:. 3491:: 3482:. 2759:A 2751:. 2548:. 2534:is 2184:. 2128:66 2114:— 2074:26 2064:53 2023:. 1977:. 1875:, 1871:, 1043:/ 968:on 599:NZ 588:UK 164:US 153:UK 136:) 129:US 6088:) 5590:) 5586:( 5446:) 5442:( 5054:e 5047:t 5040:v 4432:e 4425:t 4418:v 4244:. 4199:. 4136:. 4109:4 4088:. 3891:1 3888:= 3858:0 3855:= 3781:1 3776:1 3762:1 3758:c 3738:w 3701:) 3698:u 3695:( 3692:w 3662:w 3645:) 3640:i 3636:u 3632:( 3629:w 3624:n 3619:1 3616:= 3613:i 3605:= 3602:) 3597:n 3593:u 3589:, 3583:, 3578:1 3574:u 3570:( 3567:W 3554:W 3538:R 3534:R 3520:v 3516:v 3512:v 3501:R 3497:R 3476:R 3459:R 3455:R 3418:T 3414:T 3405:e 3395:Y 3390:= 3384:T 3378:l 3375:i 3372:e 3369:h 3366:T 3361:W 3322:L 3318:T 3309:e 3299:Y 3294:= 3288:L 3282:l 3279:i 3276:e 3273:h 3270:T 3265:W 3229:G 3209:) 3206:G 3200:1 3197:( 3174:) 3171:G 3165:1 3162:( 3154:Y 3149:= 3143:i 3140:n 3137:i 3134:G 3129:W 3088:) 3083:n 3079:Y 3075:, 3069:, 3064:2 3060:Y 3056:, 3051:1 3047:Y 3043:( 3037:= 3034:W 2999:Y 2994:= 2989:i 2985:Y 2979:n 2974:1 2971:= 2968:i 2958:n 2955:1 2950:= 2947:W 2923:n 2903:i 2881:i 2877:Y 2856:W 2831:i 2827:Y 2821:n 2816:1 2813:= 2810:i 2802:= 2799:W 2715:. 2683:( 2464:) 2458:( 2446:) 2442:( 2429:. 2399:) 2393:( 2388:) 2384:( 2374:· 2367:· 2360:· 2353:· 2326:. 2297:) 2291:( 2286:) 2282:( 2278:. 2272:. 2242:) 2236:( 2231:) 2227:( 2213:. 2191:) 2187:( 1841:e 1834:t 1827:v 1778:) 950:e 943:t 936:v 601:: 590:: 269:) 260:( 254:) 245:( 239:) 230:( 166:: 155:: 131:: 126:( 94:) 90:( 23:.

Index

electoral systems
Politics
Economics
Social choice
electoral systems

Social choice
Mechanism design
Comparative politics
Comparison
List
By country
Single-winner methods
plurality
First preference plurality (FPP)
Two-round
US
Jungle primary
Partisan primary
Instant-runoff
UK
Alternative vote
US
Ranked-choice (RCV)
Condorcet methods
Condorcet-IRV
Round-robin voting
Minimax
Schulze
Ranked pairs

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