231:
to
Rajdhani pass, occupied by the Battalion Tactical Headquarters and one company of the 2/4 Gorkha Rifles, vulnerable to attack by large forces. A quick attack from Gurais on 26 July failed to relieve Kanzalwan. The 1st Grenadiers then launched a two-pronged night attack supported by artillery on 29 July. The Gorkhas by rigorous patrolling forced the Pakistanis and captured one of the dominating heights over Kanzalwan. The concerted attack broke the siege and the raiders fled westwards towards
227:
on 25 June by the 1st
Grenadiers over the snow-capped ridges along a foot track through Viju Gali. The 1st Grenadiers advanced by tactical leaps and bounds but were caught in the open on the night of 26/27 June by a blizzard without shelter. By superhuman privations, they managed to bring up the guns, outflank the enemy and push him off the ridge towards Gurais. The enemy broke and ran and 1st Grenadiers captured Gurais on at dawn on 28 June.
22:
222:, the 'General Officer Commanding' of the Srinagar Division, prepared for a spring offensive to counter the Pakistanis. The 1st Grenadiers won the race to capture the still snow-bound Rajdhani Pass, on the night of 26/27 May, occupying it hours before the Pakistanis. Thimayya now planned for the capture of Gurais codenamed Operation Eraze. Since a single battalion was inadequate, the 2nd Battalion,
119:
230:
In the meantime, 2/4 Gorkha Rifles had successfully advanced along the pilgrim route and pushed back the
Pakistanis from Kanzalwan which they captured with two companies. The Pakistanis stabilised their positions downriver of Kanzalwan and proceeded to isolate the Gorkha picquets. This left the road
246:
so as to secure the communications of their columns besieging Ladakh. The Indian Army devoid of infantry was unable to apre forces for progressing operations in this sector. Lt. Col. Singh, according to official war diaries, Gorkhas failed to clear Burzil Pass due to strong enemy counterattacks and
226:
was inducted to
Tragbal and the 1st Grenadiers moved forward for offensive operations, supported by Patiala Mountain Battery. Thimayya planned to advance two companies of 2/4 GR on 24 June along the pilgrim route to hold the enemy and deceive him of the direction of the attack proper to be launched
194:
The fall of
Muzaffarabad led to the advancing of tribal lashkars to Gurais along the Kishenganga valley. Tribal lashkars pushed back by the operations of 161 Infantry Brigade in the winter of 1947 retreated to Gurais over the Rajdhani pass when the snows sealed the pass for the winter. Pakistani
210:
to advance on 15 April 1948 to contact the enemy along the pilgrim route, i.e. the
Bandipore - Kanzalwan - Gurais axis. The battalion captured Tragbal and pushed the raiders back to the Rajdhani pass. In May 1948, the battalion was rotated and replaced by the 1st Battalion,
247:
he walked to
Thimmaya requesting not to deploy the Regiment under his command to Ladakh. This strategic deployment allowed complete command control communications for the entire Kashmir valley.
301:
279:. New Delhi: History Department, Ministry of Defence, Government of India. (Printed at Thomson Press (India) Limited). p. 418.
199:
and deserters from the princely State Forces reinforced the lashkars. The
Pakistanis were poised to attack Tragbal just north of
86:
58:
296:
65:
105:
39:
72:
43:
54:
219:
145:
164:
242:
For the remainder of the war, the raiders were content to secure the Burzil pass on the route to
32:
79:
8:
236:
223:
212:
207:
290:
196:
176:
180:
172:
141:
183:
by a track along the river valley and by cross-country tracks south to
167:, crosses it in the vicinity of Gurais and Dawar and then proceeds to
200:
21:
184:
160:
137:
243:
232:
168:
156:
132:
118:
188:
203:
and enter the
Kashmir valley as soon as the snows melted.
159:
is an important communication centre where the route from
277:
History of
Operations In Jammu and Kashmir 1947–1948
206:
The Indian Army responded by sending 2nd Battalion,
46:. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed.
288:
270:
268:
266:
264:
262:
260:
274:
195:forces comprising regular army troops from the
257:
106:Learn how and when to remove this message
117:
289:
44:adding citations to reliable sources
15:
302:Military operations involving India
129:is the codename of the assault and
13:
14:
313:
275:Prasad, S.N.; Dharm Pal (1987).
235:, harried by air strikes of the
20:
31:needs additional citations for
179:. Gurais is also connected to
1:
250:
7:
10:
318:
297:History of the Indian Army
151:
146:Indo-Pakistani War of 1947
215:under Lt. Col. Singh.
123:
121:
40:improve this article
163:comes north to the
124:
213:Indian Grenadiers
165:Kishenganga river
116:
115:
108:
90:
55:"Operation Eraze"
309:
281:
280:
272:
237:Indian Air Force
111:
104:
100:
97:
91:
89:
48:
24:
16:
317:
316:
312:
311:
310:
308:
307:
306:
287:
286:
285:
284:
273:
258:
253:
224:4 Gorkha Rifles
154:
127:Operation Eraze
122:Operation Eraze
112:
101:
95:
92:
49:
47:
37:
25:
12:
11:
5:
315:
305:
304:
299:
283:
282:
255:
254:
252:
249:
220:K. S. Thimayya
208:Bihar Regiment
153:
150:
114:
113:
28:
26:
19:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
314:
303:
300:
298:
295:
294:
292:
278:
271:
269:
267:
265:
263:
261:
256:
248:
245:
240:
238:
234:
228:
225:
221:
216:
214:
209:
204:
202:
198:
197:Gilgit Scouts
192:
190:
186:
182:
178:
174:
170:
166:
162:
158:
149:
147:
143:
139:
135:
134:
128:
120:
110:
107:
99:
88:
85:
81:
78:
74:
71:
67:
64:
60:
57: –
56:
52:
51:Find sources:
45:
41:
35:
34:
29:This article
27:
23:
18:
17:
276:
241:
229:
217:
205:
193:
187:and east to
181:Muzaffarabad
177:Astor valley
155:
136:in northern
130:
126:
125:
102:
93:
83:
76:
69:
62:
50:
38:Please help
33:verification
30:
173:Burzil pass
144:during the
142:Indian Army
131:capture of
291:Categories
251:References
66:newspapers
201:Bandipore
96:July 2022
218:Maj Gen
185:Sonamarg
175:and the
171:via the
161:Srinagar
152:History
140:by the
138:Kashmir
80:scholar
244:Skardu
233:Taobat
169:Gilgit
157:Gurais
133:Gurais
82:
75:
68:
61:
53:
87:JSTOR
73:books
189:Dras
59:news
191:.
42:by
293::
259:^
239:.
148:.
109:)
103:(
98:)
94:(
84:·
77:·
70:·
63:·
36:.
Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.
