Battle of Ipsus - Knowledge

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of the battle-line (tactics commonly used by both Philip and Alexander) as the principal tactical thrust – even though they must have been aware of the likelihood their opponents would perform the same maneuver on the opposite side of the battlefield. When armies were numerically even and deploying the same tactics, gaining a clear advantage was difficult. The use of novel weapons, such as war elephants and scythed chariots, to change the tactical balance was one approach used by the Diadochi, but such innovations were readily copied. Thus, both sides at Ipsus had war elephants, although thanks to Seleucus, the allies were able to field an unusually high number, in addition to scythed chariots. Both sides therefore sought an open battlefield; the allies in order to use their elephants to full potential, and the Antigonids to allow full use of their strong cavalry arm. For the Antigonids, strong in both infantry and cavalry, the tactical situation was straightforward, and followed the template Successor tactic of a massive cavalry assault on the right wing. For the allies, weaker in infantry, the tactics would have been to maximize their overwhelming superiority in elephants, though it is not clear exactly how they intended to do this. Nevertheless, the elephants played a pivotal role in the battle.

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station on the right wing and protect the Antigonid phalanx's flank. However, Demetrius found himself unable to return to the battlefield because of the deployment of 300 elephants in his path. The ancient sources repeatedly emphasise the effect of elephants on horses, which are alarmed by the smell and noise of elephants and are loath to approach them. Demetrius would not have been able to take his horses through the line of elephants, nor manoeuvre around such a large quantity of elephants. This 'elephant manoeuvre' was the decisive moment in the battle, but it is not clear how it came about; Plutarch only says that "the elephants were thrown in his way". If the elephants had indeed been held in reserve, then it might have been relatively straightforward to deploy them, but as discussed, it is not clear why so many elephants would have been held in reserve. However, it is also possible that the deployment of the elephants was a piece of improvisation during the battle, though moving such a large number of elephants in such a coordinated manoeuvre in the middle of the battle would have been difficult. Since he was the only allied commander with significant experience of handling elephants, it has been assumed that Seleucus was responsible for this manoeuvre.

1127:. Diodorus claims that Seleucus brought 20,000 infantry, 12,000 cavalry (including mounted archers), 480 elephants and more than a hundred scythed chariots with him from the eastern satrapies. The numbers of elephants and chariots supposed to be present at the battle are therefore relatively consistent between these sources. However, Seleucus's cavalry component according to Diodorus is alone larger than Plutarch's claims for the whole allied cavalry, and Lysimachus must have had at least some cavalry; he sent at least 1,000 horsemen with Prepelaus the previous year. Modern experts thus estimate the total number of allied cavalry at 15,000. Of the 44,000 non-Seleucid infantry, it is unclear what proportion were supplied by Cassander and Lysimachus respectively. Cassander sent 12,000 men under Pleistarchus, of which two-thirds were lost in crossing the Black Sea, but it is not clear how many men were in the initial dispatch of troops sent under Prepelaus. Modern experts estimate that, of the allies' total infantry, perhaps 30,000–40,000 were phalangites, with the remainder being light troop types. 1083:

narrative. In his description of the battle, Plutarch does not describe the preliminary manoeuvring that must have occurred in 301 BC before the battle, so it is unclear how events unfolded. Lysimachus and Seleucus were probably anxious to bring Antigonus to battle, since their respective power-centres in Thrace and Babylon were vulnerable in their prolonged absence. The armies eventually met in battle around 50 miles north-east of Synnada, near the village of Ipsus. Antigonus was aware of Ptolemy's raid on Syria the previous year, and thus would have been loath to be cut off from Syria and his capital in Antigonia, and thus moved to intercept the allied army. The exact location of the battle is unknown, but it occurred in a large open plain, well-suited for both the allied preponderance of elephants and the Antigonid superiority in cavalry numbers and training.

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Lysimachus, Seleucus or Pleistarchus were stationed. It is clear that some of Seleucus's elephants were placed in front of the battle line, but not how many, though a figure of 100 is often suggested. It has been suggested that Seleucus retained command of the majority of his elephants in a tactical reserve, but the use of such a large reserve would have been unprecedented in battles amongst the successors. Furthermore, it would have meant shunning an opportunity to deploy the major tactical advantage held by the allies. As modern sources point out, understanding this 'elephant problem' is key to understanding the outcome of the battle, but the ancient sources do not allow the point to be resolved.

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continued his campaign in Greece, and although Cassander had blocked the land-passes, Demetrius had entered Thessaly by sea. There had followed a somewhat inconsequential campaign of manoeuvre between the two armies in Thessaly, before Demetrius received his father's messages asking for reinforcements. Demetrius thus hastily arranged a truce with Cassander, and took his army by sea across the Aegean to Ephesos. He recaptured Ephesos, and marched north to the Hellespont, where he established a strong garrison and fleet to prevent European reinforcements reaching the allied army in Asia. Demetrius then also dispersed his army into winter quarters.

306: 1092: 339: 1071:. The men had to be sent in batches due to a lack of ships, and although the first batch arrived safely, the second shipment was intercepted by Demetrius's fleet, and the third wrecked in a storm. Pleistarchus himself narrowly survived the wreck of his command ship, eventually being carried to Heraclea to recuperate over the winter. Similarly, the concentration of Antigonid forces in Asia now made Ptolemy feel secure enough to bring an army out of Egypt to try to conquer 1038: 1136:

up, even if he would have preferred to defeat them individually. However, little is known about the specific strategic considerations facing the two sides before the battle, as the precise circumstances and location of the engagement remain uncertain. As mentioned above, it has been suggested that the allied army was trying to cut Antigonus's lines of communication with Syria, in order to prompt him into battle, but this is only one of several possible scenarios.

37: 1183: 1017:. Lysimachus, hearing of the approach of Antigonus's army, held counsel with his officers, and decided to avoid open battle until Seleucus's arrival. The allies thus defended their camp with entrenchments and palisades, and when Antigonus arrived offering battle, they remained within the camp. Antigonus therefore moved to cut off the allies' provisions, forcing Lysimachus to abandon the camp and make a night-time march of some 40 miles to 1195:

large reserve of elephants on the allied side). Demetrius then launched the principal Antigonid thrust, manoeuvering his cavalry round the elephants, and attacking the allied cavalry under Antiochus. Plutarch says that Demetrius "fought brilliantly and routed his enemy". However it is also clear that Demetrius allowed the pursuit of the routed allied cavalry to go too far, resulting in his men becoming isolated from the battlefield.

1149: 752:). Diodorus is often derided by modern historians for his style and inaccuracies, but he preserves many details of the ancient period found nowhere else. Diodorus worked primarily by epitomizing the works of other historians, omitting many details where they did not suit his purpose, which was to illustrate moral lessons from history. However, since Diodorus provides the only continuous narrative for the history of the 346: 313: 1235: 783:. Plutarch was writing some 400 years after the events in question, and is therefore a secondary source, but he often names his sources, which allows some degree of verification of his statements. Plutarch was also primarily interested in moral lessons from history, rather than actually detailing history in depth, and thus his description of the battle does not go into great detail. 883: 1226:

either defected to the allied side or otherwise fled. Antigonus, stationed in the centre, tried to rally his men, hoping for Demetrius's return. However, he was gradually surrounded by allied infantry and eventually killed by several javelins thrown by allied skirmishers. With the death of its commander, the Antigonid battle-line dissolved, and the battle effectively ended.

900:("Savior") for his role in preventing the fall of Rhodes, but the victory was ultimately Demetrius's, as it left him with a free hand to attack Cassander in Greece. Demetrius thus returned to Greece and set about liberating the cities of Greece, expelling Cassander's garrisons, and the pro-Antipatrid oligarchies. This occupied much of Demetrius's efforts in 303 and 302 BC. 1079:, he was brought false reports of an Antigonid victory, and told that Antigonus was marching south into Syria. He thus garrisoned the cities he had captured, and retreated into Egypt. At around the same time, Seleucus appears to have finished his march from the east, arriving in Cappadocia with his army, which he then sent into winter quarters. 1111:. The majority of this number were presumably supplied by Antigonus's army that marched from Syria, since Demetrius's army in Greece had no elephants and only 1,500 cavalry. Diodorus claims that Demetrius's had approximately 56,000 infantry in Greece (8,000 Macedonian phalangites, 15,000 mercenaries, 25,000 troops from Greek cities and 8,000 1139:

Tactically, both sides faced the common problem of the wars fought amongst the Successors; how to defeat an army equipped in the same manner and using the same basic tactics. The Diadochi seem to have been inherently conservative, and continued to favour a strong attack with cavalry on the right wing

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Seeing that Demetrius's war effort was aimed at destroying his power in Greece, and ultimately in Macedonia, Cassander tried to come to terms with Antigonus. However, Antigonus rejected these advances, intent on forcing Cassander's complete surrender. Cassander therefore held counsel with Lysimachus,

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and two thirds of his empire. Ipsus confirmed this failure. As Paul K. Davis writes, "Ipsus was the high point of the struggle among Alexander the Great’s successors to create an international Hellenistic empire, which Antigonus failed to do." Instead, the empire was carved up between the victors,

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Whilst settling his army for the winter, Antigonus heard the news that Seleucus was en route from the eastern satrapies to support Lysimachus. He therefore dispatched messengers to Demetrius, ordering him to bring his army over to Asia to reinforce the Antigonid forces. Demetrius had in the meantime

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Seleucus, observing that his opponents' phalanx was unprotected by cavalry, took measures accordingly. He did not actually charge upon them, but kept them in fear of a charge by continually riding around them, thus giving them an opportunity to come over to his side. And this was what actually came

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In terms of overall strategy, it is clear that both sides had resolved on battle; for the allies, it represented the best chance of stopping Antigonid expansion, rather than allowing themselves to be defeated piecemeal. For Antigonus, the chance to defeat all his enemies at once could not be passed

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In 306, Antigonus attempted to invade Egypt, but storms prevented Demetrius's fleet from supplying him, and he was forced to return home. With Cassander and Ptolemy both weakened, and Seleucus still occupied by attempting to assert his control over the East, Antigonus and Demetrius now turned their

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This move against the Antigonid right flank probably involved detaching cavalry from the allies own right wing, including Seleucus's horse-archers, who could rain down missiles on the immobile phalanx. The morale of the troops appears to have collapsed, and it seems that some of the heavy infantry

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The battle seems to have begun in earnest with a clash of the elephants from both sides. Diodorus says that "the elephants of Antigonus and Lysimachus fought as if nature had matched them equally in courage and strength", suggesting that they were also equal in number (and supporting the idea of a

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was in command of the cavalry on the left wing, traditionally the weaker wing in the Macedonian system, intended only to skirmish. However, it has been suggested that on this occasion the allied cavalry were evenly split between the two wings. We do not know who commanded the right wing, nor where

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Diodorus completes book XX of his Library at this point, saying that he will describe the battle between the Kings at the start of the next book. However, only fragments remain of books XXI onwards, and although some fragments of his description of the battle do remain, they do not form a coherent

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From the wreck of the Antigonid army and the death of his father, Demetrius managed to recover 5,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry, and escaped with them to Ephesos. Despite the expectation that he would raid the Ephesian treasury, Demetrius instead immediately set sail for Greece "putting his chief

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It is not explicitly stated by Plutarch, but it has been assumed that the two phalanxes engaged each other during the battle. If this was the case, then the Antigonid strategy would have been for Demetrius to take his cavalry and attack the rear of the allied phalanx; or alternatively, return to

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of heavy infantry in the centre of the battle line. In front, and to the sides of the phalanx, light infantry were deployed to act as skirmishers and to protect the flanks of the phalanx; cavalry was split between the two wings. In the Antigonid line, Demetrius commanded the best of the cavalry,

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for the assault. Lysimachus sent sorties to try to disrupt the siege-works, but the Antigonid forces always ended with the upper hand in ensuing skirmishes. With the siege works nearing completion and food running low, Lysimachus decided to abandon the camp, and marched away during a night-time

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by Demetrius's forces in 305 BC. The island was reinforced by troops from Ptolemy, Lysimachus, and Cassander. Ultimately, the Rhodians reached a compromise with Demetrius – they would support Antigonus and Demetrius against all enemies, save their ally Ptolemy. Ptolemy took the title of Soter

1115:), but it is unclear what proportion of this infantry accompanied him to Asia. Based on other battles between the Diadochi, modern experts estimate that of the 70,000 Antigonid infantry, perhaps 40,000 were phalangites and 30,000 were light troops of various kinds. 1292:

remaining hopes in Athens". However, he was to be disappointed; the Athenians had voted not to allow any of the kings into Athens. Concealing his wrath, he asked the Athenians for the return of his ships that were moored there, and then sailed on to the

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in 281 BC, but he was assassinated shortly afterward. Ipsus finalized the breakup of an empire, which may account for its obscurity; despite that, it was still a critical battle in classical history and decided the character of the Hellenistic age.

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and they agreed on a joint strategy that included sending envoys to Ptolemy and Seleucus, asking them to join in combatting the Antigonid threat. Seeking to take the initiative, Cassander sent a significant portion of the Macedonian army under

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storm. Antigonus again attempted to follow, but as winter approached with further rain, conditions became difficult, and he abandoned pursuit and dispersed his men into winter quarters instead. The allied army marched on into

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stationed on the right wing. Antigonus, with his personal bodyguard was positioned in the centre behind the phalanx. The 75 elephants were deployed in front of the battle-line with their infantry guards.

1021:. There, the allies built a new, triple-palisaded camp amongst the hills, with relatively easy access to food and water. Antigonus followed closely behind, and laid siege to the allied camp, bringing up 879:. In the aftermath of this victory, Antigonus and Demetrius both assumed the crown of Macedon, in which they were shortly followed by Ptolemy, Seleucus, Lysimachus, and eventually Cassander. 1312:

with Ptolemy retaining Egypt, Seleucus expanding his power to eastern Asia Minor, and Lysimachus receiving the remainder of Asia Minor. Eventually Seleucus would defeat Lysimachus at the

627: 816:). This left Antigonus in prime position to claim overall rule over the Macedonian empire. Antigonus's growing power alarmed the other major Successors, resulting in the eruption of the 419: 622: 504: 772:, and later became a member of the Antigonid court; he was therefore very much familiar and contemporary with the events he described, and possibly a direct eyewitness to some. 649: 597: 587: 529: 470: 632: 592: 485: 875:, Cassander's governor, and proclaiming the city free again. Demetrius then turned his attention to Ptolemy, invading Cyprus and defeating Ptolemy's fleet at the 514: 509: 305: 519: 321: 524: 480: 446: 764:

leading up to Ipsus. It is generally thought that Diodorus's source for much of this period was the now-lost history of the Diadochi written by

2023: 958:. This siege was unsuccessful however, since Demetrius sent the city reinforcements from Greece by sea. Lysimachus instead went on to win over 612: 388: 756:, we have no alternative but to rely on his account. Unfortunately, from book XXI onwards (301 BC), including the actual Battle of Ipsus, the 2018: 1207:

With Demetrius now isolated from the battlefield, the Antigonid phalanx was exposed on its right flank. Plutarch describes what followed:

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In the absence of Demetrius, Cassander now felt able to send further reinforcements to Lysimachus, under the command of his brother,

860: 817: 1948: 1872: 1853: 1296:. He found that everywhere his garrisons were being expelled, and his erstwhile allies defecting to the other kings. He left 844:

lasted from 311 to 309 BC, and resulted in defeat for Antigonus, allowing Seleucus to re-claim the satrapy of Babylonia and

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had been left in undisputed control of the Asian territories of the Macedonian empire (Asia Minor, Syria and the vast

1967: 1929: 1910: 1891: 424: 2043: 2013: 1300:(at that time part of the Antigonid faction) in charge of the Antigonid cause in Greece, and himself sailed to the 617: 79: 1107:

According to Plutarch, Antigonus's army before the battle numbered around 70,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry and 75

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in 302 BC, intending to take advantage of Antigonus's absence in Syria by overrunning Asia Minor. The cities of

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100 Decisive Battles from Ancient Times to the Present: The World's Major Battles and How They Shaped History

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Diodorus Siculus – Greek history 480–431 BC: the alternative version (translated by Peter Green)

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When Antigonus received news of the invasion, he abandoned preparations for a great festival to be held in

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Plutarch gives a total of 64,000 infantry for the allies, with 10,500 cavalry, 400 elephants and 120

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The last chance to reunite the Alexandrine Empire had already been passed when Antigonus lost the

573: 534: 68: 1041: 864: 704: 676: 177: 832:(ruler of Egypt). Only one of these leaders, Lysimachus, had actually been one of Alexander's 1818: 959: 946:, after which he installed a garrison there. He then sent Prepelaus with 7,000 men to attack 872: 748: 475: 1380: 1169:

The situation with the allied deployment is less clear. Plutarch states that Seleucus's son

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The Wars of Alexander's Successors 323–281 BC; Volume I: Commanders & Campaigns

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While Antigonus was distracted elsewhere, Ptolemy had been expanding his power into the

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Both sides probably deployed their troops in a standard Macedonian formation, with the

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is the principal source for the history of the Diadochi, in his 'Library of history' (

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The Wars of Alexander's Successors 323–281 BC; Volume II: Battles and Tactics

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only exists in fragments. Nevertheless, Diodorus provides extensive details of the

743: 558: 168: 1059:. Since Demetrius was guarding the easy crossing points at the Hellespont and the 2003: 1275: 1124: 1068: 979: 836:. This war ended in a compromise peace in 311 BC, after which Antigonus attacked 829: 813: 146: 1983: 1829: 1308: 1222:

The Antigonid phalanx and Allied phalanx engaged in a stiff and chaotic fight.

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Kingdoms of the Successors of Alexander: After the Battle of Ipsus, B.C. 301

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were pitted against the coalition of three other successors of Alexander:

1072: 1037: 1266: 1095: 1006: 987: 931: 859:. Antigonus thus resumed the war with Ptolemy in 308 BC, beginning the 852: 845: 825: 716: 366: 198: 136: 36: 1257: 1182: 1064: 1060: 1018: 1001:, and quickly began to march his army northwards from Syria, through 935: 905: 821: 728: 708: 213: 208: 141: 1988: 1824: 1249: 1027: 1022: 1010: 983: 913: 909: 792: 776: 684: 288: 271: 246: 1379:

e.g. Themistocles chapter 25 has a direct reference to Thucydides

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Kingdoms of the Diadochi after the battle of Ipsus, c. 301 BC.

991: 947: 939: 892: 868: 856: 806: 720: 72: 1234: 1076: 1063:, Pleistarchus attempted to ship his men directly across the 951: 692: 1075:. He captured a number of cities, but while laying siege to 975: 908:

to Lysimachus, which was to be used in joint operations in

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The successor kingdoms before the battle of Ipsus, 303 BC.

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Battle in 301 BC that ended the Fourth War of the Diadochi

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and went into winter quarters in and around the city of

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The only full description of the battle available is in

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The Battle of Ipsus in 301 BC. 19th century engraving.

867:to regain control of Greece, and in 307 BC he took 820:in 314 BC, in which Antigonus faced a coalition of 1995: 1152:Schematic diagram of the Battle of Ipsus, 301 BC 1862: 1843: 1765: 1763: 1761: 1742: 1740: 1738: 1677: 1675: 1673: 1671: 1669: 1667: 1636: 1634: 1632: 1630: 1628: 1609: 1607: 1605: 1603: 1601: 1599: 1597: 1569: 1567: 1548: 1546: 382: 1941:Alexander the Great and the Hellenistic Age 1758: 1735: 1664: 1625: 1594: 1564: 1543: 389: 375: 287:All but 5,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry ( 1655: 1533: 1531: 1529: 1527: 1525: 1523: 1510: 1508: 1506: 1504: 1491: 1489: 1487: 1474: 1472: 1470: 1348: 1900: 1778:Bennett & Roberts, pp. 109–110 1728: 1726: 1724: 1722: 1720: 1706: 1704: 1702: 1700: 1698: 1696: 1583: 1581: 1579: 1457: 1455: 1453: 1451: 1449: 1447: 1434: 1432: 1430: 1428: 1415: 1413: 1411: 1409: 1407: 1405: 1403: 1233: 1181: 1147: 1090: 1036: 881: 396: 1881: 994:, another major administrative centre. 345: 312: 1996: 1643: 1520: 1501: 1484: 1467: 942:submitted to him, but he had to storm 2024:Battles involving the Seleucid Empire 1957: 1938: 1919: 1717: 1693: 1576: 1444: 1425: 1400: 1131:Strategic and tactical considerations 370: 2019:Battles involving Antipatrid Macedon 1863:Bennett, Bob; Roberts, Mike (2009). 1844:Bennett, Bob; Roberts, Mike (2008). 1190:, whose elephants decided the battle 655:Campaign of the Chersonese (300-299) 13: 2029:History of Afyonkarahisar Province 1807: 1787:Bennett & Roberts, pp. 112–113 1561:Bennett & Roberts, pp. 106–107 1086: 14: 2055: 1977: 1837: 683:) was fought between some of the 328:Show map of West and Central Asia 1177: 966:. Meanwhile, Prepelaus captured 848:of the territories to the east. 344: 337: 325:Location of the Battle of Ipsus. 311: 304: 35: 1984:Livius.org: The battle of Ipsus 1802: 1790: 1781: 1772: 1749: 1684: 1616: 1555: 1198: 1067:to Heraclea, using the port of 982:; he could not however capture 1573:Bennett & Roberts, pp. 107 1385: 1373: 1361: 1339: 1334:Greek History 480–431 BC 1326: 1098:, one of the victors of Ipsus. 1: 1962:. University of Texas Press. 1769:Bennett & Roberts, p. 112 1746:Bennett & Roberts, p. 110 1681:Bennett & Roberts, p. 111 1640:Bennett & Roberts, p. 109 1613:Bennett & Roberts, p. 108 1552:Bennett & Roberts, p. 106 1320: 1156: 1102: 786: 768:. Hieronymus was a friend of 691:) in 301 BC near the town of 1884:Philip II and the Sacred War 1690:Bennett & Roberts, p. 22 1661:Bennett & Roberts, p. 77 1229: 930:Lysimachus crossed over the 7: 1924:. Oxford University Press. 877:Battle of Salamis-in-Cyprus 10: 2060: 1367:Bennett & Roberts, p. 926:Fourth War of the Diadochi 923: 919: 861:Fourth War of the Diadochi 803:Second War of the Diadochi 790: 762:Fourth War of the Diadochi 738: 680: 2034:Antigonus I Monophthalmus 1901:Cawkwell, George (1978). 1217:Plutarch, Demetrius 29, 3 1143: 1118: 863:. Antigonus sent his son 818:Third War of the Diadochi 810:Antigonus I Monophthalmus 701:Antigonus I Monophthalmus 408: 298: 281: 227: 165:Antigonus I Monophthalmus 155: 122: 45: 34: 26: 21: 801:In the aftermath of the 353:Battle of Ipsus (Turkey) 2044:Demetrius I Poliorcetes 2014:Battles of the Diadochi 1920:Davis, Paul K. (1999). 1867:. Pen and Sword Books. 1848:. Pen and Sword Books. 916:to confront Demetrius. 1882:Buckler, John (1989). 1288: 1220: 1191: 1153: 1099: 1048: 887: 828:(ruler of Thrace) and 824:(ruler of Macedonia), 156:Commanders and leaders 67:(modern-day Çayırbağ, 1958:Green, Peter (2006). 1939:Green, Peter (2008). 1905:. Faber & Faber. 1819:Bibliotheca historica 1237: 1209: 1185: 1151: 1094: 1040: 960:Hellespontine Phrygia 885: 873:Demetrius of Phaleron 749:Bibliotheca historica 282:Casualties and losses 1903:Philip II of Macedon 1314:Battle of Corupedium 1302:Thracian Chersonesos 954:, while he besieged 805:(315 BC), the aging 797:Wars of the Diadochi 766:Hieronymus of Cardia 400:Wars of the Diadochi 322:class=notpageimage| 267:120 scythed chariots 29:Wars of the Diadochi 689:Alexander the Great 687:(the successors of 431:Intermediate period 91: / 2039:Seleucus I Nicator 1294:Isthmus of Corinth 1289: 1192: 1154: 1100: 1049: 888: 725:Seleucus I Nicator 356:Show map of Turkey 194:Seleucus Nicator I 2009:300s BC conflicts 1950:978-0-7538-2413-9 1886:. Brill Archive. 1874:978-1-84415-924-6 1855:978-1-84415-761-7 1336:, pp. 1–13. 1298:Pyrrhus of Epirus 1274: Kingdom of 1265: Kingdom of 1256: Kingdom of 1243: Kingdom of 814:eastern satrapies 781:Life of Demetrius 668: 667: 365: 364: 204:Antiochus Soter I 118: 117: 114:Coalition victory 2051: 1973: 1954: 1935: 1916: 1897: 1878: 1859: 1814:Diodorus Siculus 1797: 1794: 1788: 1785: 1779: 1776: 1770: 1767: 1756: 1753: 1747: 1744: 1733: 1730: 1715: 1708: 1691: 1688: 1682: 1679: 1662: 1659: 1653: 1647: 1641: 1638: 1623: 1620: 1614: 1611: 1592: 1585: 1574: 1571: 1562: 1559: 1553: 1550: 1541: 1535: 1518: 1512: 1499: 1493: 1482: 1476: 1465: 1459: 1442: 1436: 1423: 1417: 1398: 1389: 1383: 1377: 1371: 1365: 1359: 1352: 1346: 1345:Cawkwell, p. 31. 1343: 1337: 1330: 1282: 1273: 1264: 1255: 1242: 1218: 1125:scythed chariots 744:Diodorus Siculus 682: 403: 401: 391: 384: 377: 368: 367: 357: 348: 347: 341: 329: 315: 314: 308: 173: 106: 105: 103: 102: 101: 96: 92: 89: 88: 87: 84: 47: 46: 39: 19: 18: 2059: 2058: 2054: 2053: 2052: 2050: 2049: 2048: 1994: 1993: 1980: 1970: 1951: 1932: 1913: 1894: 1875: 1856: 1840: 1810: 1808:Ancient Sources 1805: 1800: 1795: 1791: 1786: 1782: 1777: 1773: 1768: 1759: 1755:Diodorus XXI, 1 1754: 1750: 1745: 1736: 1731: 1718: 1709: 1694: 1689: 1685: 1680: 1665: 1660: 1656: 1648: 1644: 1639: 1626: 1621: 1617: 1612: 1595: 1586: 1577: 1572: 1565: 1560: 1556: 1551: 1544: 1536: 1521: 1513: 1502: 1494: 1485: 1477: 1468: 1460: 1445: 1437: 1426: 1418: 1401: 1390: 1386: 1378: 1374: 1366: 1362: 1353: 1349: 1344: 1340: 1331: 1327: 1323: 1287: 1280: 1278: 1271: 1269: 1262: 1260: 1253: 1247: 1240: 1232: 1219: 1216: 1201: 1180: 1159: 1146: 1133: 1121: 1105: 1089: 1087:Opposing forces 928: 922: 799: 791:Main articles: 789: 741: 673:Battle of Ipsus 669: 664: 644:Minor conflicts 420:Camel's Rampart 404: 399: 397: 395: 361: 360: 359: 358: 355: 354: 351: 350: 349: 332: 331: 330: 327: 326: 324: 318: 317: 316: 277: 258:64,000 infantry 252: 236:70,000 infantry 223: 187: 169: 151: 99: 97: 95:38.95°N 30.99°E 93: 90: 85: 82: 80: 78: 77: 76: 66: 40: 22:Battle of Ipsus 17: 12: 11: 5: 2057: 2047: 2046: 2041: 2036: 2031: 2026: 2021: 2016: 2011: 2006: 1992: 1991: 1986: 1979: 1978:External links 1976: 1975: 1974: 1968: 1955: 1949: 1936: 1930: 1917: 1911: 1898: 1892: 1879: 1873: 1860: 1854: 1839: 1838:Modern Sources 1836: 1835: 1834: 1822: 1809: 1806: 1804: 1801: 1799: 1798: 1789: 1780: 1771: 1757: 1748: 1734: 1716: 1692: 1683: 1663: 1654: 1642: 1624: 1615: 1593: 1575: 1563: 1554: 1542: 1519: 1500: 1483: 1466: 1443: 1424: 1399: 1384: 1372: 1360: 1347: 1338: 1324: 1322: 1319: 1309:Babylonian War 1279: 1270: 1261: 1252: 1239: 1231: 1228: 1214: 1200: 1197: 1179: 1176: 1158: 1155: 1145: 1142: 1132: 1129: 1120: 1117: 1104: 1101: 1088: 1085: 924:Main article: 921: 918: 842:Babylonian War 834:somatophylakes 788: 785: 740: 737: 666: 665: 663: 662: 657: 652: 646: 645: 641: 640: 635: 630: 625: 620: 615: 610: 605: 600: 595: 590: 584: 583: 577: 576: 571: 566: 561: 556: 550: 549: 547:Babylonian War 543: 542: 537: 532: 527: 522: 517: 512: 507: 501: 500: 494: 493: 488: 483: 478: 473: 468: 463: 457: 456: 450: 449: 444: 439: 433: 432: 428: 427: 422: 416: 415: 409: 406: 405: 394: 393: 386: 379: 371: 363: 362: 352: 343: 342: 336: 335: 334: 333: 320: 319: 310: 309: 303: 302: 301: 300: 299: 296: 295: 292: 284: 283: 279: 278: 276: 275: 268: 265: 262: 261:15,000 cavalry 259: 255: 253: 251: 250: 243: 240: 239:10,000 cavalry 237: 233: 230: 229: 225: 224: 222: 221: 216: 211: 206: 201: 196: 190: 188: 186: 185: 180: 175: 161: 158: 157: 153: 152: 150: 149: 144: 139: 133: 131: 125: 124: 120: 119: 116: 115: 112: 108: 107: 69:Afyonkarahisar 61: 59: 55: 54: 51: 43: 42: 32: 31: 24: 23: 15: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 2056: 2045: 2042: 2040: 2037: 2035: 2032: 2030: 2027: 2025: 2022: 2020: 2017: 2015: 2012: 2010: 2007: 2005: 2002: 2001: 1999: 1990: 1987: 1985: 1982: 1981: 1971: 1969:0-292-71277-4 1965: 1961: 1956: 1952: 1946: 1942: 1937: 1933: 1931:0-19-514366-3 1927: 1923: 1918: 1914: 1912:0-571-10958-6 1908: 1904: 1899: 1895: 1893:90-04-09095-9 1889: 1885: 1880: 1876: 1870: 1866: 1861: 1857: 1851: 1847: 1842: 1841: 1832: 1831: 1826: 1823: 1821: 1820: 1815: 1812: 1811: 1796:Davis, p. 39. 1793: 1784: 1775: 1766: 1764: 1762: 1752: 1743: 1741: 1739: 1729: 1727: 1725: 1723: 1721: 1713: 1707: 1705: 1703: 1701: 1699: 1697: 1687: 1678: 1676: 1674: 1672: 1670: 1668: 1658: 1652: 1646: 1637: 1635: 1633: 1631: 1629: 1619: 1610: 1608: 1606: 1604: 1602: 1600: 1598: 1590: 1584: 1582: 1580: 1570: 1568: 1558: 1549: 1547: 1540: 1534: 1532: 1530: 1528: 1526: 1524: 1517: 1511: 1509: 1507: 1505: 1498: 1492: 1490: 1488: 1481: 1475: 1473: 1471: 1464: 1458: 1456: 1454: 1452: 1450: 1448: 1441: 1435: 1433: 1431: 1429: 1422: 1416: 1414: 1412: 1410: 1408: 1406: 1404: 1397: 1394: 1388: 1382: 1376: 1370: 1364: 1357: 1351: 1342: 1335: 1329: 1325: 1318: 1315: 1310: 1305: 1303: 1299: 1295: 1286: 1277: 1268: 1259: 1251: 1246: 1236: 1227: 1223: 1213: 1208: 1205: 1196: 1189: 1184: 1178:Initial phase 1175: 1172: 1167: 1164: 1150: 1141: 1137: 1128: 1126: 1116: 1114: 1110: 1109:war elephants 1097: 1093: 1084: 1080: 1078: 1074: 1070: 1066: 1062: 1058: 1053: 1047: 1043: 1039: 1035: 1033: 1029: 1024: 1020: 1016: 1012: 1008: 1004: 1000: 995: 993: 989: 985: 981: 977: 973: 969: 965: 961: 957: 953: 949: 945: 941: 937: 933: 927: 917: 915: 911: 907: 901: 898: 894: 891:attention to 884: 880: 878: 874: 870: 866: 862: 858: 854: 849: 847: 843: 839: 835: 831: 827: 823: 819: 815: 811: 808: 804: 798: 794: 784: 782: 778: 773: 771: 767: 763: 759: 755: 751: 750: 745: 736: 734: 730: 726: 722: 718: 714: 710: 706: 702: 698: 694: 690: 686: 678: 677:Ancient Greek 674: 661: 658: 656: 653: 651: 648: 647: 643: 642: 639: 636: 634: 631: 629: 626: 624: 621: 619: 616: 614: 611: 609: 606: 604: 601: 599: 596: 594: 591: 589: 586: 585: 582: 579: 578: 575: 572: 570: 567: 565: 562: 560: 557: 555: 552: 551: 548: 545: 544: 541: 538: 536: 533: 531: 528: 526: 523: 521: 518: 516: 513: 511: 508: 506: 503: 502: 499: 496: 495: 492: 489: 487: 484: 482: 479: 477: 474: 472: 469: 467: 464: 462: 459: 458: 455: 452: 451: 448: 445: 443: 440: 438: 435: 434: 430: 429: 426: 423: 421: 418: 417: 414: 411: 410: 407: 402: 392: 387: 385: 380: 378: 373: 372: 369: 340: 323: 307: 297: 293: 290: 286: 285: 280: 273: 269: 266: 264:500 elephants 263: 260: 257: 256: 254: 248: 244: 241: 238: 235: 234: 232: 231: 226: 220: 217: 215: 212: 210: 207: 205: 202: 200: 197: 195: 192: 191: 189: 184: 181: 179: 176: 174: 172: 166: 163: 162: 160: 159: 154: 148: 145: 143: 140: 138: 135: 134: 132: 130: 127: 126: 121: 113: 110: 109: 104: 74: 70: 65: 60: 57: 56: 52: 49: 48: 44: 38: 33: 30: 25: 20: 1959: 1940: 1921: 1902: 1883: 1864: 1845: 1828: 1817: 1803:Bibliography 1792: 1783: 1774: 1751: 1732:Davis, p. 38 1711: 1686: 1657: 1645: 1622:Davis, p. 37 1618: 1588: 1557: 1396:I, 1–3 1392: 1387: 1375: 1368: 1363: 1355: 1354:Buckler, p. 1350: 1341: 1333: 1328: 1306: 1290: 1224: 1221: 1210: 1206: 1202: 1199:Second phase 1193: 1168: 1160: 1138: 1134: 1122: 1113:light troops 1106: 1081: 1057:Pleistarchus 1054: 1050: 996: 929: 902: 895:, which was 889: 871:, expelling 850: 846:overlordship 800: 780: 774: 757: 753: 747: 742: 672: 670: 637: 613:Pseudostonum 242:75 elephants 219:Pleistarchus 170: 123:Belligerents 100:38.95; 30.99 27:Part of the 1943:. Phoenix. 1833:(Demetrius) 1073:Coele Syria 1013:, and into 968:Adramyttion 758:Bibliotheca 727:, ruler of 719:, ruler of 711:, ruler of 569:3rd Babylon 564:2nd Babylon 554:1st Babylon 476:Paraitakene 461:Megalopolis 178:Demetrius I 142:Antipatrids 137:Lysimachids 98: / 1998:Categories 1710:Plutarch, 1587:Plutarch, 1391:Plutarch, 1321:References 1267:Lysimachus 1157:Deployment 1103:Antigonids 1096:Lysimachus 1007:Cappadocia 988:Clazomenae 932:Hellespont 910:Asia Minor 853:Aegean Sea 826:Lysimachus 787:Background 717:Lysimachus 660:Corupedium 650:Amphipolis 628:Kallidromo 581:Fourth War 454:Second War 442:Cretopolis 425:Hellespont 199:Lysimachus 129:Antigonids 1712:Demetrius 1649:Diodorus 1589:Demetrius 1537:Diodorus 1514:Diodorus 1495:Diodorus 1478:Diodorus 1461:Diodorus 1438:Diodorus 1419:Diodorus 1393:Alexander 1258:Cassander 1230:Aftermath 1171:Antiochus 1065:Black Sea 1061:Bosphorus 1046:Antigonus 1044:, son of 1042:Demetrius 1023:catapults 1019:Dorylaion 999:Antigonia 936:Lampsakos 906:Prepelaus 865:Demetrius 822:Cassander 729:Babylonia 709:Cassander 705:Demetrius 608:Phatnicum 574:25 of Abu 498:Third War 466:Byzantium 413:First War 214:Prepelaus 209:Cassander 147:Seleucids 1827:– 1825:Plutarch 1816:– 1250:diadochi 1245:Seleucus 1215:— 1212:to pass. 1188:Seleucus 1186:Bust of 1032:Heraclea 1028:Bithynia 1011:Lycaonia 984:Erythrae 980:Colophon 914:Thessaly 897:besieged 838:Seleucus 793:Diadochi 777:Plutarch 754:Diadochi 685:Diadochi 598:Munychia 471:Coprates 289:Plutarch 272:Plutarch 247:Plutarch 228:Strength 58:Location 1651:XX, 106 1539:XX, 113 1516:XX, 112 1497:XX, 111 1480:XX, 110 1463:XX, 109 1440:XX, 108 1421:XX, 107 1332:Green, 1276:Ptolemy 1163:phalanx 1069:Odessos 1015:Phrygia 1003:Cilicia 972:Ephesos 964:Synnada 944:Sigeion 920:Prelude 855:and to 830:Ptolemy 770:Eumenes 739:Sources 713:Macedon 697:Phrygia 603:Salamis 588:Piraeus 530:Chalcis 515:Tralles 491:Gabiene 437:Orkynia 294:Unknown 183:Pyrrhus 171:† 86:30°59′E 83:38°57′N 64:Phrygia 62:Ipsus, 2004:301 BC 1966: 1947: 1928: 1909: 1890: 1871: 1852: 1381:I, 137 1285:Epirus 1283: 1281: 1272: 1263: 1254: 1248:Other 1241: 1144:Battle 1119:Allies 992:Sardis 978:, and 956:Abydos 948:Aeolis 940:Parion 893:Rhodes 869:Athens 857:Cyprus 807:satrap 733:Persia 723:; and 721:Thrace 623:Athens 618:Rhodes 593:Megara 559:Tigris 520:Kaunus 167: 111:Result 73:Turkey 53:301 BC 1830:Lives 1077:Sidon 952:Ionia 693:Ipsus 638:Ipsus 633:Sydon 525:Iasus 510:Caria 486:Pydna 481:Tegea 1964:ISBN 1945:ISBN 1926:ISBN 1907:ISBN 1888:ISBN 1869:ISBN 1850:ISBN 976:Teos 950:and 938:and 795:and 731:and 681:Ἱψός 671:The 540:Myus 535:Gaza 505:Tyre 447:Nora 50:Date 1356:xiv 986:or 779:'s 735:. 695:in 2000:: 1760:^ 1737:^ 1719:^ 1714:29 1695:^ 1666:^ 1627:^ 1596:^ 1591:28 1578:^ 1566:^ 1545:^ 1522:^ 1503:^ 1486:^ 1469:^ 1446:^ 1427:^ 1402:^ 1369:xv 1304:. 1034:. 1009:, 1005:, 974:, 970:, 715:; 699:. 679:: 71:, 1972:. 1953:. 1934:. 1915:. 1896:. 1877:. 1858:. 1358:. 675:( 390:e 383:t 376:v 291:) 274:) 270:( 249:) 245:( 75:)

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