Battle of the Denmark Strait

2393: 41: 2389:, causing the explosion. Recent research with submersible craft suggests that the initial explosion was in the aft 4 in (100 mm) magazine and that it spread to the 15 in (380 mm) magazines via the ammunition trunks. It has been suggested from examination of the wreckage, found in 2001, that the magazine explosion in the 4 in (100 mm) armament near the mainmast caused the vertical blast of flame seen there, and this in turn ignited the magazines of the aft 15 in (380 mm) guns that caused the explosion that wrecked the stern. This explosion might have travelled through the starboard fuel tanks, igniting the fuel oil there, setting off the forward magazines and completing the destruction of the ship. 168: 156: 144: 107: 238: 218: 206: 186: 2278: 121: 2483: 1669: 2599:, and he had pressed his case as far and hard as he should. Lütjens, as fleet chief and task force commander, operated at the strategic and operational levels. To some degree, his orders were clear – attacking convoys was his priority, not risking "a major engagement for limited, and perhaps uncertain, goals". Nevertheless, Raeder had also ordered Lütjens to be bold and imaginative, to accept battle if unavoidable and conduct it vigorously to the finish. 2680: 3516:. According to Kennedy the claim for a proposal to court martial Leach and Wake-Walker came from post war letters written by Admiral Tovey, after he retired, and not from Admiralty sources. Kennedy states in his epilogue that "...later in life Tovey's memory let him down..." and that plus the fact that Leach and Wake-Walker were retained in their commands and given commendations must cast considerable doubt on the court martial proposal. 2998: 2618:, that he would adhere to Raeder's directives. This meant he did not intend to become the third fleet chief to be relieved for contradicting Raeder's orders; Marschall, one of his two predecessors, had been relieved of command for not following his orders to the letter despite the fact that Marschall's analysis of the changes in the tactical situation since the orders were issued resulted in the sinking of the British aircraft carrier 1195: 4468: 2157: 1905:(8.7 nmi; 16 km) to the southeast when the Germans made this course change. If the visibility had not been reduced to 3–5 mi (2.6–4.3 nmi; 4.8–8.0 km), the German vessels would probably have been spotted (since generally on a calm, clear day ship lookouts can observe large objects and ships about 12 miles (19 km) distant on the horizon. And if the ship's lookouts are in a 3424:, according to her Gunnery Aspects Report: "A" Turret: No. 1 gun failed after the 1st salvo, from a previously known defect. No. 2 and No. 4 guns suffered from intermittent safety interlock problems. "A" turret suffered from water entering the lower portion of the turret/barbette structure, but there is no indication that this caused any problems other than discomfort for the crew. At Salvo 18, when 2417:

about 1.1 km (0.59 nmi; 0.68 mi) away from the main wreckage. This has sparked theories that the 15 in (380 mm) forward magazines exploded as a result of the force, flames and pressure, caused by the detonation of the aft magazines. However, a team of marine forensic scientists has found that implosion damage to the forward hull due to the rapid sinking of the

1901:

realize, that his force would not under any circumstance enter the Atlantic undetected nor would it enter unopposed. And by the time it was opposed, it would occur with forces that would likely ensure his fleet's ultimate destruction. And such destruction would take place before any supply convoy units (the whole purpose of the operation) were threatened by Operation Rhine Exercise.

1653: 2289:) for the 2nd Board of Enquiry, 1941. The sketch represents the column of smoke or flame that erupted from the vicinity of the mainmast immediately before a huge detonation which obliterated the after part of the ship from view. This phenomenon is believed to have been the result of a cordite fire venting through the engine-room ventilators (see 2822:, a little over 1,000 mi (870 nmi; 1,600 km) away. Steaming in that direction meant a return passage north or south of Iceland, with the enemy's air forces now fully alerted to their presence and the possibility of other heavy units between them and Scapa Flow. Lütjens knew his intelligence was unreliable. 2644:. He would have risked his ships and crews on an expressly forbidden opportunity. Lütjens would also have been facing a foe that was still combat effective, despite the hits taken the RN's damage assessment was that damage sustained was limited and caused no significant reduction in combat efficiency. 1731:

in the normal shipping lanes in the North Sea, and reported the movement to the Swedish authorities. Swedish territory as well hosted individual ground-level coast watchers who were able to follow and report on movements in Swedish coastal waters. These observations were passed directly to Royal Navy

3184:

Holland, like Beatty, possessed superiority in the number of heavy ships he possessed, yet he was encumbered by an inferiority in the fighting effectiveness of those units. Moreover, Holland's deployment of his units compared to Beatty's deployment at Jutland. Beatty and Holland both attacked while

2925:

Carls had already drafted a message recalling Lütjens to Germany, but had not yet sent it. Schniewind pointed out that at noon Lütjens had crossed the demarcation line between the Northern Hebrides and Southern Greenland, thus passing from Group North's operational control to Group West; therefore,

2803:

earlier in the voyage, left less than 3,000 long tons (3,000 t) of fuel remaining, not enough to operate effectively against the Atlantic convoys. The element of surprise – which was considered essential for the operation's success – had most definitely been lost; the German ships continued to

2129:

three times. One shell struck the commander's boat and put the seaplane catapult amidships out of action (the latter damage not being discovered until much later, during an attempt to fly off the ship's War Diary on the eve of her final battle). The second shell passed through the bow from one side

2043:

s shells would be flatter, and the shells would therefore be more likely to hit the armour belt protecting the sides of the ship or glance off the top deck, rather than penetrate vertically though the deck armour. Holland closed the range at an angle that placed the German ships too far forward of

1904:

Before contact was re-established, the two squadrons missed each other narrowly. Had the German ships not altered course to the west at 01:41 to follow the line of the Greenland icepack, the British would have intercepted them much earlier than they did. The British destroyers were just 10 mi

2753:

s receiving the first hit in the forecastle, all six of the ship's 26-man damage control teams had worked to repair the damage. When it was reported that the tips of the starboard propeller could be seen above water, Lindemann had ordered counterflooding two compartments aft to restore the ship's

2351:

heeled to 30 degrees at which point 'we knew she just wasn't coming back'. The bow rose clear of the water, pointed upward, pivoted about and sank shortly after the stern. "A" turret fired a salvo while in this upright position, possibly from the doomed gun crew, just before the bow section sank.

2602:

The reality was that Lütjens' orders did not cover a spectacular success like the one just achieved. His priority therefore was to stick to his instructions - to concentrate on sinking merchant shipping and avoid encounters with enemy warships whenever possible. Moreover, before leaving Germany,

2416:

revealed the bow section bereft of any structure. A huge section of her side is missing, from the 'A' barbette to the foredeck. The midship section had its plates curled outward. Moreover, the main parts of the forward structure, including the 600 long tons (610 t) conning tower, were found

2514:

Despite efforts by crew members and civilian technicians to repair the shell ring, it took until 08:25 for all four guns to be back in service, although two of the guns were serviceable by 07:20. This temporarily left only five 14 in (360 mm) guns operational, but nine of the ten were

1900:

s entrance into the Atlantic (the fundamental objective of Rhine Exercise), was known from the moment the fleet left German territorial waters. And that was a long enough time span before the fleet's final fitting out for transit to the Denmark Strait, that Lütjens could not have helped but to

1863:

lost contact with its reconnaissance target (the enemy fleet) in what was essentially a closed, confined rectangular space; aligned generally northeast (the entrance to the Denmark Strait) to southwest (the exit of the Strait into the Atlantic). The enemy units were firmly constrained by the

2845:

pursued for several hours and re-engaged on several occasions before the German ships evaded pursuit. Although the French coast was 600 mi (520 nmi; 970 km) further away than Bergen, Saint-Nazaire held the potential of longer nights and wider seas in which to shake off

2754:

trim. He then sent divers into the forecastle to connect the forward fuel tanks, containing a much-needed 1,000 long tons (1,000 t) of fuel, first to the tanks near the forward boiler then to the rear fuel tank by way of a provisional line running over the upper deck.

1397:. British reconnaissance aircraft confirmed the Germans' presence in Norway. Now aware that major German warships were at sea with the intention to break into the Atlantic, the Royal Navy began to despatch vessels to patrol the likely routes, including the heavy cruisers 2766:

and collision matting to be stuffed in the holes of the No. 2 boiler room and the auxiliary boiler room to stop the growing ingress of seawater. This attempt also failed. Boiler Room No. 2 was shut down, with a loss of speed to 28 kn (32 mph; 52 km/h).

1864:

Greenland ice pack to the north, and the extensive Royal Navy minefield to the south along the coast of Iceland. Given the prior warning of the German sortie, there was ample time for the Royal Navy to place armed reconnaissance at both ends of this narrow alignment.

1700:

into the Norwegian Sea, undetected by aerial searches; neutral ship encounters; and traditional "coast-watching" observations performed by formal and informal efforts of maritime intelligence gathering, in the neutral and occupied countries surrounding the North Sea.

2913:

s damage and the decision to head for France. Grand Admiral Raeder was not clear whether Lütjens intended to steam for St. Nazaire immediately or after shaking off his pursuers and oiling in mid-Atlantic. Raeder immediately conferred with his chief of staff, Admiral

1713:) were identified by in-country coast-watchers located in Denmark; who were able to identify the ships and communicate with their clandestine contacts, the dates and times of the German surface units, moving in their designated coast-watch areas of responsibility. 1608:

was eventually scheduled to receive an upgrade in 1939 that would have doubled her deck armour to 6 inches, but the outbreak of World War II meant the upgrade never took place. She thus sortied to war at a marked disadvantage against the new capital ships of the

2346:

This was followed by an explosion that destroyed a large portion of the ship from amidships clear to the rear of "Y" turret, blowing both aft turrets into the sea. The ship broke in two and the stern fell away and sank. Ted Briggs, one of the survivors, claimed

2888:

to continue raiding on her own. The cruiser went further south into the Atlantic, where she refuelled from a tanker at sea. She suffered engine trouble, abandoned her commerce raiding mission without having sunk any merchant ships, and made it to Brest.

2761:

and heel the ship first to one side then the other to weld patches from the inside to the holes in the forward hull. Lütjens refused, again without comment. Eventually, he had to agree to slow the ship to 22 kn (25 mph; 41 km/h) to allow

1704:

In the event, the ground-level coast-watching observations from both neutral and occupied territories identified the principal combatant units sortied for the Exercise Rhine operation from the moment they left German territorial waters. The combatants

4458: 2130:

to the other without exploding. The third struck the hull underwater and burst inside the ship, flooding a generator room and damaging the bulkhead to an adjoining boiler room, partially flooding it. The last two hits caused damage to

3058:

The British public were shocked that their most emblematic warship had been destroyed so suddenly, with the loss of more than 1,400 of her crew. The Admiralty mobilised every available warship in the Atlantic to hunt down and destroy

2446:

s wreckage. This violent change of course disrupted her aim and put her in a position that made it easier for the Germans to target her. She resumed her previous course but was now under the concentrated fire of both German ships.

1858:

to turn south-southwest but he detached his destroyers which continued searching to the north. However, the loss of contact should be understood as temporary and tactical only; and not strategic in terms of the tactical outcome.

3432:

turned away, both of 'B' turrets guns were in operation. "Y" Turret No.2 gun had loading problems and missed salvo 14 onwards. No.3 gun had problems with safety interlocks causing it to miss salvos 15 to 20. At salvo 18, when

2711:, or ensure that she be intercepted and brought to action by other heavy units. Wake-Walker chose the latter course, continuing to shadow the German ships. Further offensive action, he concluded, would cause more damage to 2502:

By this time, serious gunnery malfunctions had caused intermittent problems with the main armament, leading to a 26% reduction in output. According to Captain Leach, he decided that continuing the action would risk losing

3126:

s loss, and examined the vulnerabilities of other large British warships still in service in light of the probable causes of the explosion. It, like the first enquiry, concluded that a 15 in (380 mm) shell from

3185:

German units were well before the beam. As a result, the midship and aft turrets of Beatty's ships could barely fire on the enemy. Holland's ships could not use their aft turrets until the final turn to port just before

2515:

operational in five hours. The final salvos fired were ragged and are believed to have fallen short. The ship retired from the battle around 06:10. Thirteen of her crew had been killed, nine were wounded. The timing of

1748:

of German-occupied Norway, for final coastal refuelling and topping off of ships' stores and supplies, the RAF (weather permitting) was able to keep a final watch on the location and timing of the German raider force.

2474:

hit underwater below the armour belt, penetrating about 13 ft (4.0 m) into the ship's hull, about 25 ft (7.6 m) below the waterline, but was stopped by the anti-torpedo bulkhead. Fortunately for

1520:

had not yet been properly "shaken down", and her crew was inexperienced. She still had mechanical problems, especially with her main armament. The ship had sailed with shipyard workers still aboard working on her.

1935:

s loss of contact had placed the British at a disadvantage. Instead of the swiftly closing head-on approach Holland had envisioned, he would have to converge at a wider angle, much more slowly. This would leave

4711: 4456: 2952:

and nearly crippled the other, which was brand new and having trouble with her guns during the action, why didn't he sink her too? Why hasn't he tried to get out of there or why hasn't he turned around?

2231:

s boat deck, starting a sizable fire in the ready-use 4 in (100 mm) ammunition store but this fire did not spread to other areas of the ship or cause the later explosion. It is possible that

2036:

s thin deck armour, which offered weak protection against vertical plunging fire. Holland therefore wanted to reduce the range as quickly as possible, because at a shorter range the trajectory of

3218:

Note: The British escorting destroyers were ordered to the battle coordinates as part of the overall forces sent to intercept the German ships; they were detached the evening before the battle.

2933:

Raeder was against issuing a recall himself, telling Schniewind they did not know enough about the situation at hand and that the person who would best know would be Lütjens. He then telephoned

2100:

s movements instead of varying course and speed, which made it easier for the Germans to find the range to both British ships. It would have aided Holland's gunners if they had both fired upon

2569:

Lütjens refused to allow Lindemann to give chase, giving no explanation. Lindemann repeated his request, this time more assertively. Lütjens held firm orders from the German Naval Commander,

2511:

turned away just after 06:04, firing from her rear turret under local control until the turret suffered a jammed shell ring, cutting off the ammunition supply and making the guns inoperable.

2782:

she was leaving astern. The carpet of oil was broad enough to cover both sides of the ship's wake, was all colours of the rainbow and gave off a strong smell – all of which helped disclose

1928:

were 35 mi (30 nmi; 56 km) away, slightly ahead of the Germans. Holland signalled to steer toward the Germans and increased speed to 28 kn (32 mph; 52 km/h).

4457: 4721: 2944:

s sinking stoically, exhibiting neither joy nor any other triumphant behaviour. After hearing Raeder's report, he turned to those who were with him and expressed his personal thoughts:

1639:

could draw the German battleships' large-shell gunfire. Ultimately, Tovey did not give the order, later saying "I did not feel such interference with such a senior officer justified."

2967:' Propaganda Ministry. That evening it was broadcast to the nation, accompanied by "We march against England" and other martial airs. The German public, already enjoying the news of 2085:

and both British ships' "B" turret 30 ft (9.1 m) rangefinders. The shorter based (15 ft (4.6 m)) ones in the director towers had to be used instead. Holland had

3437:

turned away, two of "Y" turrets guns were in operation. "Y" turrets shell transfer ring jammed at salvo 20, due to a shell sliding out of its tray due to the motion of the ship as

1974:

and other ships to attack, or ordering his squadron into action. He chose the latter at 05:37. The rough seas in the Strait kept the destroyers' role to a minimum and the cruisers

1155:

but suffered serious malfunctions in her main armament. The British battleship had only been completed in late March 1941, and used new quadruple gun turrets that were unreliable.

2332:

abreast her mainmast. This straddle meant that some of the salvos fell to port, some to starboard (of the hull), and some precisely aligned over the center of the main deck of

1339:(Naval High Command) instructed Lütjens to begin the operation as soon as possible to keep pressure on Britain's supply lines. As a result, the only vessel available to support 2906:

and Paris. A blizzard of urgent telephone calls raced across German-occupied Europe. While the Berlin Admiralty was satisfied with Lütjens' success, it was tempered by news of

4147: 3119:

s explosion and produced a report. After criticism that the initial enquiry did not record all the available evidence, a second board of enquiry more extensively investigated

3138:

s aft ammunition magazines. This led to refitting some older British warships with increased protection for their ammunition magazines and some other related improvements.

2463:, killing or wounding several crewmen in the Compass Platform and Air Defence Platform. Pieces of another shell struck her radar office aft, killing the crewmen within. 3849: 4716: 2305:

could bear on the German ships. In terms of the force balance this would nominally give Holland's force the advantage of 18 large caliber (14/15 in.) guns (10 in

2881:

earlier that year but had been kept in port for repairs and overhaul. While Brest was closer than Saint-Nazaire, it was within range of Royal Air Force bombers.

2470:

found its way to the propelling charge/round manipulation chamber below the aft 5.25 in (133 mm) gun turrets, and a 38 cm (15 in) shell from

407: 2636:, Lütjens would probably have stuck to his decision. Following her would have meant exposing the squadron to further gunfire as well as to torpedo attacks from 4701: 3145:

engagement and weighed the participants' decisions. One of the most debated is Lütjens' decision to proceed into the Atlantic rather than continue the battle.

3094:. Tovey stated that the two officers had acted correctly, ensuring that the German ships were tracked and not endangering their ships needlessly. Furthermore, 3728: 4566: 3369:"A" turret was the furthest forward turret with "B" behind and above it. At the rear "Y" was the furthest aft with "X" behind and above, if present - the 3105:. Tovey threatened to resign his position and appear at any court-martial as 'defendant's friend' and defence witness. No more was heard of the proposal. 2104:

as originally planned, since they could time precisely each other's salvos to avoid mistaking one ship's fire for the other. The British could also use

2507:

without inflicting further damage on the enemy. He, therefore, ordered the ship to make smoke and withdraw, 'pending a more favourable opportunity'.

463: 1804:. Holland hoped to meet the enemy at approximately 02:00. Sunset in this latitude was at 01:51 (ship's clocks were four hours ahead of local time). 3486:, p8. The shell ring is a revolving metal tray that permits shells to be transferred from the magazine into the revolving structure of the turret. 4520: 3169:

immediately, rather than support Wake-Walker in shadowing until Force 'H' could arrive. Beatty, likewise, felt he needed to engage German Admiral

2044:

the beam, which meant that only 10 of the 18 British heavy guns could train and presented the Germans with a bigger target than necessary. One of

2604: 1951:

reported that the Germans had made a further course alteration to the west, placing the German and British squadrons almost abeam of each other.

3602:

British Battleships of World War Two: The Development and Technical History of the Royal Navy's Battleship and Battlecruisers from 1911 to 1946

1998:

opened fire at 05:52.5 at a distance of approximately 26,500 yd (24,200 m). Holland had ordered firing to begin on the leading ship,

3019: 4473: 436: 400: 2343:

s mainmast and "X" turret aft of the mast. A huge pillar of flame shot upward 'like a giant blowtorch' in the vicinity of the mainmast.

2235:

was struck again at the base of her bridge and in her foretop radar director. There has been contention over which German vessel struck

1958:

spotted the German ships 17 mi (15 nmi; 27 km) away. The Germans, already alerted to the British presence through their

4508: 3206:. Both admirals exercised tight tactical control over their units from their flagships. This prevented Captain Leach from manoeuvring 2930:, revealed that he did not plan to recall Lütjens and that he felt such a decision should be discussed between Schniewind and Raeder. 2494:

under director fire control between 05:53 and 06:02. Three salvos fired by "Y" turret under local control are not shown. The track of

3738: 2861:

poised on the edge of the British trade routes once the damage were repaired; it also meant the potential support of the battleships

2421:, is the most likely cause of the state of the forward hull, and they do not support any theory that the forward magazines exploded. 2141:

s crew by scalding. The damage to the bow cut access to 1,000 long tons (1,000 t) of fuel oil in the forward fuel tanks, caused

3441:

turned. In summary, three guns in "A" turret, two guns in "B" turret, and two guns in "Y" turret were in operation at salvo 18 when

2595:, Lindemann operated first and foremost as a tactician. As such, he had no doubt that his ship's immediate objective was to destroy 4559: 1692:

via the Denmark Strait, undetected and unopposed. The Germans based this hope upon a transit from German territorial waters on the

1593:

s greater speed and maneuverability were seen as an acceptable trade-off. This approach was proved to be flawed after the loss of

1309:, both under refit in Germany after their own raiding operations, was delayed by British air attacks that struck supply depots in 1552:, much of her bulk was dedicated to extra engine power instead of comprehensive armour coverage. This came from her design as an 2576:, to avoid unnecessary combat with the Royal Navy, especially when it could lead to further damage that could hasten delivering 4657: 3068: 393: 1287: 4351: 4333: 4256: 4226: 4208: 1506: 3860: 2591:

This clash between the two senior German officers reflected their disparate and distinct command functions. As captain of

1007: 4552: 4293:. Naval Staff History (Second World War) Battle Summary No. 5, March 1950. Reproduced in facsimile in Grove, Eric (ed.), 3192:

Beatty placed his lighter-armoured battlecruisers at the head of his line, leaving the more powerful and better-armoured

2392: 1962:, picked up the smoke and masts of the British ships 10 minutes later. At this point, Holland had the options of joining 1623:

s inadequate protective armour, distant to the southeast of where the battle took place, Holland's superior (Admiral Sir

458: 40: 2625:

and its two escorting destroyers. Nor was he predisposed to discuss his command decisions with a subordinate officer.

4420: 4381: 4366: 4317: 4302: 4283: 4193: 4179: 3609: 3045: 1842:

lost contact from 00:28. For 90 minutes, Holland neither sighted the German ships nor received any further news from

1199:

The setting of the battle, at top centre. German movements are in red, British in black, modern boundaries are shown.

3027: 3193: 3174: 802: 4726: 2926:

the decision to recall Lütjens was no longer Carls' to make. A subsequent call to Group West's commander, Admiral

1781: 431: 210: 4534: 2707:

until enough British warships could concentrate and destroy her. His choice was either to renew the action with

4643: 3428:

turned away, three of 'A' turret's guns were in operation. "B" Turret: No problems reported. At Salvo 18, when

3023: 1540:

was the pride of Great Britain's navy, and embodied the world dominance of British naval power. Despite this,

3158: 2862: 1557: 1304: 1298: 1243: 3454: 1020: 3499:

turned away at 06:13, "Y" turret jammed, temporarily leaving only two out of ten 14-inch guns operational":

2116: 2108:, where both ships' main armament salvos would be controlled by one ship's fire control computer—probably 1828:. The Germans would not expect an attack from this quarter, giving the British the advantage of surprise. 1258:, between January and March that year. The number of major warships available to the Germans was limited; 3409: 2878: 2868: 1697: 1553: 1255: 1249: 1054: 1049: 983: 562: 2297:

At 06:00, Holland ordered his force to turn once again to port to ensure that the aft main guns on both

1499:

that allowed them to shadow the Germans through the night whilst remaining outside of German gun range.

4696: 4587: 4517: 3236: 3228: 2282: 1344: 1225: 1119: 1110: 446: 269: 261: 45: 1162:

The battle was a tactical victory for the Germans, but its impact was short-lived. The damage done to

4594: 4492: 4295:

German Capital Ships and Raiders in World War II. Volume I: From "Graf Spee" to "Bismarck", 1939–1941

4233: 3210:

independently and possibly taking a different line of approach that might have confused the Germans.

1529: 1269: 476: 4706: 3828: 3660: 3251: 3008: 2490:

for the battle of the Denmark Strait. This shows the ranges and bearings of the 18 salvos fired by

1594: 1171: 1090: 284: 51: 2290: 4620: 4539: 3012: 2082: 2074:, meaning that the British ships were steaming into the wind, with spray drenching the lenses of 1335: 1183: 1124:, which were attempting to break out into the North Atlantic to attack Allied merchant shipping ( 1002: 708: 618: 441: 4610: 4529: 2554:

the previous day, he would still be more than 300 nmi (350 mi; 560 km) away from

1318: 1210: 1125: 606: 32: 3109: 2479:, neither shell exploded, but she still suffered minor flooding and the loss of some fuel oil. 1239: 1044: 591: 417: 2203:" (Permission to open fire?) several times without receiving a response, until the captain of 1586:, naval gunnery was severely inaccurate at the ranges necessary to produce plunging fire, and 1234:

carrying supplies from North America to Britain. The operation was intended to complement the

951: 946: 936: 894: 770: 730: 718: 533: 3385: 2927: 4629: 4505: 4488: 3090:, was appalled at this criticism. A row ensued between Tovey and his superior, Admiral Sir 2382: 2150: 1947:

s plunging shells for a much longer period. The situation worsened further when, at 03:20,

1789: 1717: 1369: 1314: 971: 966: 961: 674: 242: 148: 3742: 2826:

had been reported by Group North to be off West Africa and there had been no reports of a

2063:

during the action but both were out of range and had an insufficient speed advantage over

8: 4500: 976: 4428:

The Battle of the Denmark Strait: A Critical Analysis of the Bismarck's Singular Triumph

2814:

The question was which dockyard to head for. The nearest friendly ports were Bergen and

2189: 2145:

to leave an oil slick and reduced her speed by 2 kn (2.3 mph; 3.7 km/h).

1820:

could approach rapidly, unseen in the darkness, to a range close enough not to endanger

1733: 1166:

s forward fuel tanks forced the abandonment of the breakout and an attempt to escape to

3300: 2439:. Her commanding officer, Captain Leach, ordered an emergency avoidance turn away from 2194: 2137:

s machinery and medium flooding. The hit also severed a steam line and wounded five of

1444: 1037: 2588:

had fired 93 of her 353 base-fused Armour Piercing (AP) shells during the engagement.

2367:, Bob Tilburn and Bill Dundas survived to be rescued two hours later by the destroyer 2208: 2051:

forward guns became unserviceable after the first salvo, leaving only 9 still firing.

4416: 4377: 4362: 4347: 4329: 4313: 4298: 4279: 4252: 4222: 4204: 4189: 4175: 3605: 3318: 3306: 3293: 3162: 2615: 2368: 2247: 1601: 1545: 1450: 1438: 1432: 1394: 1279: 807: 696: 681: 172: 3173:'s battlecruisers with his own forces instead of drawing the Germans toward Admiral 3074:

Moves were subsequently made to court-martial Wake-Walker and Captain John Leach of

1872:

were at the eastern entrance to the Strait (where contact was made immediately upon

1604:

and combined with the accuracy of naval gunfire increasing in the inter-war period,

1475:, cruised to the south of Iceland to intercept the Germans once they were detected. 1147:

exploded and sank within three minutes, with the loss of all but three of her crew.

3324: 3282: 3275: 3170: 3154: 2609: 1886:

Strategically, it was an unquestioned fact (including the approximate timing) that

1468: 1462: 1405: 1398: 1073: 904: 785: 498: 453: 318: 310: 226: 194: 190: 2006:. Holland soon amended his order and directed both ships to engage the rear ship, 859: 4524: 4512: 4387: 4265: 3395:

scored no hits during the engagement and she appears to have continued to engage

2971: 2964: 2915: 2804:

be shadowed by Wake-Walker's squadron. Lütjens concluded that he needed to abort

2580:

toward the waiting hands of the British. He broke off combat instead of pursuing

2221:" (I'm not letting my ship get shot out from under my arse. Permission to fire!) 2218:

Ich lasse mir doch nicht mein Schiff unter dem Arsch wegschießen. Feuererlaubnis!

2212: 2079: 1222: 160: 3078:. The view was taken that they were wrong not to have continued the battle with 2937:, who was at the Obersalzberg in the Bavarian Alps. Hitler received the news of 2336:. It is likely that one 38 cm (15 in) shell struck somewhere between 2324:, fired from about 9 mi (7.8 nmi; 14 km), was seen by men aboard 1578:

she was likely to encounter, her 3 inches of deck armour left her vulnerable to

3312: 2948:

If now these British cruisers are maintaining contact and Lütjens has sunk the

2779: 2460: 2377:

The Admiralty later concluded that the most likely explanation for the loss of

2277: 1906: 1732:

intelligence by routine maritime diplomatic channels maintained by the British

1456: 1411: 1129: 997: 237: 217: 205: 185: 126: 78: 3411:

ADM 234/509: H.M.S. Prince of Wales' Gunnery Aspects of the "Bismarck" Pursuit

4690: 4672: 4659: 4544: 3272: 3260: 2903: 2874: 2838: 2833:

Disregarding Lindemann's recommendation to return to Bergen, Lütjens ordered

2071: 1801: 1689: 1579: 1575: 1549: 1419: 1386: 1295: 1291: 1116: 1097: 1015: 956: 941: 924: 919: 914: 899: 884: 879: 869: 864: 842: 837: 832: 827: 822: 817: 812: 797: 780: 765: 755: 750: 686: 657: 627: 601: 596: 586: 581: 569: 4476:

was created from a revision of this article dated 17 December 2017

4244: 3091: 2934: 2619: 2573: 1528:

was the largest and heaviest warship in the world. Combining eight massive

1414:

between Greenland and Iceland. Another group, consisting of the battleship

1217: 1082: 931: 909: 792: 775: 760: 745: 740: 735: 725: 713: 691: 662: 652: 647: 642: 637: 632: 576: 557: 552: 540: 528: 523: 513: 503: 493: 488: 167: 155: 143: 112: 4344:

Kapitän zur See Ernst Lindemann: Der Bismarck-Kommandant – Eine Biographie

3799: 2757:

Both these manoeuvres failed. Lindemann then requested permission to slow

2482: 1317:, the fleet commander who was to command German forces during the planned 4501:

HMS Hood Association: Battle of the Denmark Strait Documentation Resource

3980: 3978: 3969: 3198:

battleships in the rear. Likewise, Holland placed the old and vulnerable

3178: 2719:

and endanger his cruisers, plus he knew Tovey was on his way. He ordered

2175:

The Germans held their fire until 05:55, when both German ships fired on

1668: 1610: 1583: 1571: 1564: 1266: 854: 518: 508: 3101:

s main guns had repeatedly malfunctioned and she could not have matched

2522:

withdrawal was fortunate for her, as she had come into torpedo range of

1635:. With the ships in this position, Tovey concluded the better-protected 4240: 3087: 2919: 2551: 2364: 2029:

Holland was a gunnery expert; he was well aware of the danger posed by

1959: 1624: 1533: 1375: 1358: 1107: 1087: 1077: 1025: 889: 874: 222: 4148:"The Sinking of the 'Bismarck', 27 May 1941 | Royal Museums Greenwich" 3975: 2799:

s forward fuel tanks, combined with a missed opportunity to refuel at

2679: 2254:, following an order from the fleet commander. The Gunnery Officer of 4186:

Engage the enemy more closely: the Royal Navy in the Second World War

3290: 2968: 2815: 1737: 1693: 1428: 1390: 4712:

Naval battles and operations of the European theatre of World War II

3956: 3954: 2997: 2546:

and possibly finish her off. Lindemann requested that Lütjens allow

385: 3263: 2566:(a chase Lindemann calculated would take only two or three hours). 1422: 1167: 1100: 297: 4535:

Captain Leach's statement regarding the decision to end the action

2853:

s shadowers, plus the possibility of luring them across a line of

1194: 4291:

Admiralty report BR 1736: The Chase and Sinking of the "Bismarck"

3951: 2763: 2363:

sank in about three minutes with 1,415 members of the crew. Only

1688:

force would enter onto trans-Atlantic commerce raiding, from the

1660:

as a fighting unit. The four guns in the foreground are those of

1135:

Less than 10 minutes after the British opened fire, a shell from

3512:

Kennedy expounds on the court martial claim via the epilogue in

3352:

first sighted her in the Denmark Strait, they identified her as

2854: 2819: 2800: 2156: 2149:

was soon listing 9° to port and lost 2 m (6.6 ft) of

1838:

s continually unbroken contact with the German ships. However,

1676:

for the battle of the Denmark Strait, with manuscript additions

1235: 1231: 3604:. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. pp. 61–62. 2179:. Lütjens did not immediately give the order to begin firing. 1982:

would be too far behind the German force to reach the battle.

3723:

German Capital Ships and Raiders in WW2, Battle Summary No. 5

3484:

German Capital Ships and Raiders in WW2, Battle Summary No. 5

2974: 2902:

News of Lütjens' decision was received with shock in Berlin,

2811:

s mission and head toward a convenient dockyard for repairs.

2542:. There was also a keen expectation that they would close on 1745: 1496: 703: 4102: 4100: 1800:, for fear of disclosing his location. Instead, he observed 4221:. Barnsley, South Yorkshire UK: Pen and Sword Books, 2003. 3071:. The German battleship was sunk on the morning of 27 May. 2963:

s destruction was seized upon more enthusiastically by Dr.

2703:. With this command came the responsibility of coping with 1310: 4722:

Naval battles of World War II involving the United Kingdom

4249:

Germany and the Second World War: Volume 6: The Global War

3503:

This is not supported by Bennett, Roskill and ADM 234–509.

1652: 4326:

Battleships: Axis and Neutral Battleships in World War II

4097: 3717: 3715: 2526:

and turned away as the German cruiser was about to fire.

2160:

A modern reconstruction showing a 14-inch shell from HMS

331:

6 destroyers (on approach detached evening before battle)

4063: 4061: 4059: 3693: 3691: 3689: 3687: 3388:

The Pursuit of Bismarck & the Sinking of H.M.S. Hood

1879:

s entry). Holland was waiting at the western end as the

1792:, who as Commander of the 1st Cruiser Squadron directed 3870: 3852:

A MARINE FORENSIC ANALYSIS of HMS Hood and DKM Bismarck

3541: 3539: 3537: 3535: 3533: 3531: 3202:

ahead of the better armoured (albeit new and untested)

2655:, having mistaken a radar contact with an aircraft for 1812:

would be silhouetted against the sun's afterglow while

1076:, which took place on 24 May 1941 between ships of the 3712: 3469:

had a "total 104 possible shots Actually fired = 93".

3165:. According to Barnett, Holland felt he had to engage 4056: 3684: 3086:

had been sunk. John Tovey, Commander-in-Chief of the

4239: 3528: 3445:

turned away, for a total of seven guns in operation.

3141:

Many naval historians and writers have analyzed the

1780:

and not ahead of her). He signalled this to Captain

1143:

near her aft ammunition magazines. Soon afterwards,

4199:Bercuson, David J. & Herwig, Holger H. (2003). 3739:"Garzke and Dulin, Bismarck's Final Battle, part 1" 2550:to do just that. Even if Tovey's squadron had left 1582:at long range. At the time of her commissioning in 1254:had just completed a similar operation, code-named 4324:Garzke, William H. & Dulin, Robert O. (1985). 3599: 2125:struck her target first. She would ultimately hit 3455:The Battle of the Denmark Strait by John Asmussen 2687:remains on the bridge for lunch whilst shadowing 1174:victory for the British. Incensed by the loss of 4688: 4374:Pursuit: The Chase and Sinking of the "Bismarck" 1374:spotted the vessels passing through the western 4717:Naval battles of World War II involving Germany 4174:. London: Dorling Kindersley Publishing, 2000. 3473:"Total 184 possible shots Actually fired = 157" 3157:between Holland's actions and those of Admiral 2538:there was tremendous elation at the sinking of 2359:.5 mi (0.43 nmi; 0.80 km) away. 4574: 4530:The Sinking of the Bismarck, Official Despatch 4406:Loss of the Bismarck (Sea Battles in Close-Up) 4359:Pursuit: The Chase and Sinking of the Bismarck 4198: 3153:A number of parallels were drawn by historian 2922:, who commanded Group North in Wilhelmshaven. 1776:(which, Holland assumed, still steamed behind 1524:For 20 years after her commissioning in 1920, 4560: 4540:Antonio Bonomi's reconstruction of the battle 4376:. London: Cassell Military Paperbacks, 2004. 4022: 4020: 2735:could fall back on her if attacked. At 07:57 2258:, Paul Schmalenbach is quoted as saying that 401: 4271:. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995. ISBN 3063:. The Royal Navy forces pursued and brought 2216: 2198: 2187: 1909:, the observable distance is even farther). 1544:had one conspicuous flaw as compared to the 1170:facilities in occupied France, producing an 4323: 3850:"Jurens, Garzke, Dulin, Roberts (V),Fiske, 3026:. Unsourced material may be challenged and 2435:found herself steering towards the sinking 2002:, believing from her position that she was 1238:attacks on British supply lines during the 4567: 4553: 4017: 3391:. Despite maintaining a high rate of fire 2695:Holland's death led to responsibility for 2529: 408: 394: 4702:Germany–United Kingdom military relations 3046:Learn how and when to remove this message 2022:is believed to have continued to fire at 1744:and her escort moved into the unoccupied 1696:; and, through the territorial waters of 103: 4484:, and does not reflect subsequent edits. 4467: 3992: 3990: 3420:turrets during her first action against 3381: 3379: 2743:had reduced speed and appeared damaged. 2678: 2628:Even if he had known it was the untried 2584:and ordered a course of 270°, due west. 2481: 2466:A 20.3 cm (8.0 in) shell from 2424: 2391: 2385:by a 38 cm (15 in) shell from 2276: 2155: 1667: 1651: 1221:intended to send the recently completed 1193: 16:Naval battle during the Second World War 4415:. London: Arms and Armour Press, 1991. 4399:La battaglia dello Stretto di Danimarca 4312:. United States Naval Institute, 1980. 4308:Garzke, William H and Dulin, Robert O. 4276:Hood: Life and Death of a Battlecruiser 4243:; Rahn, Werner; Stumpf, Reinhard & 3903:Roskill, The War at Sea, Vol 1, p. 406. 3661:HMS Electra (H 27) - E-class Destroyer 3572:Boog, Rahn, Stumpf & Wegner, p. 132 3148: 2404:exploding in the far distance with the 1574:was considered sufficient against most 1548:battleships she served alongside: as a 4689: 4297:. London: Frank Cass Publishers 2002. 3984:Bercuson and Herwig 2001, pp. 166–167. 3948:Bercuson and Herwig 2001, pp. 165–166. 2774:was leaking fuel oil. Lütjens ordered 2663:was actually out of gun range of both 2651:fired six salvoes in the direction of 4548: 4026:Bercuson and Herwig 2001, pp. 169–70. 3987: 3514:Pursuit - The Sinking of the Bismarck 3376: 2459:. One shell passed through her upper 1970:and waiting for Tovey to arrive with 1647: 1282:overhaul after Operation Berlin, and 415: 389: 4361:. New York: The Viking Press, 1974. 4328:. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. 4278:. London: Cassell Publishing, 2002. 4269:Clash of Titans: World War II at Sea 3554:Garzke & Dulin 1985, pp. 210–211 3024:adding citations to reliable sources 2991: 2078:"A" turret's 42 ft (13 m) 1467:, under the command of Vice-Admiral 1230:into the Atlantic Ocean to raid the 4342:Grützner, Jens (2010) (in German). 4251:. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 3733: 3731: 3600:Raven, Alan; Roberts, John (1976). 2873:. Both ships had been stationed at 2830:-class battleship in the vicinity. 2778:to drop back and see how much of a 2498:(in red) is a post-battle estimate. 2014:had already identified and engaged 1385:s report was passed to the British 1368:s sortie after the Swedish cruiser 1321:, sought to delay until repairs to 13: 4454: 4310:Allied Battleships in World War II 3213: 3112:quickly investigated the cause of 2269: 1752:Holland's battle plan was to have 1627:) considered ordering him to have 1532:with a top speed greater than any 14: 4738: 4435: 4124:Bercuson and Herwig 2001, p. 169. 4085:Bercuson and Herwig 2001, p. 171. 4076:Bercuson and Herwig 2001, p. 172. 4053:Bercuson and Herwig 2001, p. 170. 4035:Bercuson and Herwig 2001, p. 173. 3960:Bercuson and Herwig 2001, p. 166. 3633:Bercuson and Herwig 2001, p. 140. 3590:Bercuson & Herwig, pp. 65, 68 2972:victories over the Royal Navy off 2918:, who in turn telephoned Admiral 2486:The original gunnery plot of HMS 1556:to meet the threat of the German 4466: 4234:The Battle of the Denmark Strait 4203:. New York: The Overlook Press. 3708:The Battle of the Denmark Strait 3465:also suffered a loss of output. 2996: 1990: 1672:The original track chart of HMS 1352: 1178:, a large British force pursued 1151:continued to exchange fire with 236: 216: 204: 184: 166: 154: 142: 119: 105: 39: 4413:King George V Class Battleships 4201:The Destruction of the Bismarck 4188:. New York: W.W. Norton, 1991. 4140: 4127: 4118: 4109: 4088: 4079: 4070: 4047: 4038: 4029: 4008: 3999: 3963: 3942: 3933: 3924: 3915: 3912:Garzke and Dulin, 1980. p. 190. 3906: 3897: 3888: 3879: 3842: 3833: 3822: 3813: 3793: 3784: 3781:Garzke & Dulin 1985, p. 226 3775: 3766: 3757: 3700: 3675: 3666: 3654: 3645: 3636: 3627: 3581:Garzke & Dulin 1985, p. 211 3506: 3501:Garzke and Dulin, 1980. p. 190. 3489: 3476: 3448: 3402: 3363: 2884:Lütjens detached the undamaged 2837:to head for the French port of 2770:As well as taking on seawater, 2683:Captain Robert Meyric Ellis of 1850:. Reluctantly, Holland ordered 1831:The plan's success depended on 1788:but did not radio Rear-Admiral 1204: 1159:soon broke off the engagement. 1132:between Greenland and Iceland. 4644:List of battleships of Germany 4408:. London: Ian Allan Ltd. 1972. 4133:Cited in Müllenheim-Rechberg, 3618: 3593: 3584: 3575: 3566: 3557: 3548: 3360:could not yet have put to sea. 3338: 2320:During the turn, a salvo from 1072:was a naval engagement in the 327:Did not participate in combat: 1: 4518:The Heavy Cruiser Prinz Eugen 3876:Garzke and Dulin 1980, p. 181 3829:Sonar image of the wreck site 3522: 3161:in the opening stages of the 1189: 4616:Battle of the Denmark Strait 4394:. Vol. I. (1954) ISBN (none) 3563:Bercuson & Herwig, p. 43 3177:and the rest of the British 2877:in France, since the end of 2674: 2117:Admiralty Fire Control Table 2067:to rapidly close the range. 1070:Battle of the Denmark Strait 26:Battle of the Denmark Strait 7: 3808:The Destruction of the Hood 2892: 2727:at her best speed, so that 1554:Admiral-class battlecruiser 1242:. The two fast battleships 10: 4743: 4106:Kennedy 2004, pp. 100–101. 3839:Chesneau 2002, pp. 178–179 3800:Rico, Operation Rheinübung 3373:did not have an "X" turret 2987: 2699:falling to Wake-Walker in 2603:Lütjens had told Admirals 2215:, impatiently responded: " 1642: 1530:BL 15-inch Mk I naval guns 1491:on the evening of 23 May; 1393:, who forwarded it to the 1215:In April 1941, the German 1208: 4639: 4606: 4583: 3244: 2897: 2647:Between 06:19 and 06:25, 2451:was struck four times by 2381:was a penetration of her 2355:Splinters rained down on 2186:s first gunnery officer, 2070:The Germans also had the 1985: 1883:force exited the Strait. 1505:was a newly commissioned 1274:was not yet operational, 1184:her loss three days later 427: 338: 251: 132: 97: 61: 38: 30: 25: 4392:The War at Sea 1939–1945 3672:Kennedy 2004, pp. 70–71. 3332: 3131:caused the explosion of 2984:s sinking euphorically. 2632:he was fighting and not 1824:with plunging fire from 4506:The Battleship Bismarck 3250:The British battleship 3221: 2977:, received the news of 2530:Breaking off the action 2396:A photo taken from the 2313:); to 8 (8 - 15 in. in 2083:coincidence rangefinder 1723:spotted the transit of 1512:battleship, similar to 1336:Oberkommando der Marine 4523:20 August 2013 at the 4462: 4442:Listen to this article 3819:Chesneau 2002, p. 156. 3790:Grützner 2010, p. 180. 3399:throughout the action. 2954: 2692: 2499: 2409: 2294: 2217: 2199: 2188: 2172: 1954:At 05:35, lookouts on 1916:regained contact with 1698:German-occupied Norway 1677: 1665: 1427:, and a screen of six 1343:was the heavy cruiser 1288:damaged by air attacks 1240:Battle of the Atlantic 1201: 133:Commanders and leaders 4461: 4430:. Casemate Publishers 4115:Kennedy 2004, p. 101. 4067:Kennedy 2004, p. 100. 3921:Barnett 1991, p. 294. 3721:Naval Staff History, 3697:Barnett 1991, p. 292. 3663:www.naval-history.net 3651:Chesneau 2002, p. 151 3545:Barnett 2004, p. 295. 3482:Naval Staff History, 3235:German heavy cruiser 2946: 2682: 2485: 2395: 2281:A sketch prepared by 2280: 2200:Frage Feuererlaubnis? 2159: 1960:hydrophonic equipment 1671: 1655: 1561:-class battlecruisers 1290:early April while in 1197: 339:Casualties and losses 4727:Operation Rheinübung 4630:Expedition: Bismarck 4611:Operation Rheinübung 4511:15 July 2019 at the 4493:More spoken articles 4346:. VDM Heinz Nickel. 4219:Naval Battles of WW2 4044:Kennedy 2004, p. 99. 3939:Kennedy 2004, p. 89. 3930:Tarrant 1991, p. 58. 3763:Kennedy 1974, p.116. 3642:Kennedy 1974, p. 108 3624:Kennedy 1974, p. 66. 3149:Parallels to Jutland 3020:improve this section 1656:The last picture of 1319:Operation Rheinübung 1211:Operation Rheinübung 1126:Operation Rheinübung 243:Frederic Wake-Walker 33:Operation Rheinübung 4669: / 4426:Robert Winklareth. 4217:Bennett, Geoffrey. 4184:Barnett, Correlli. 4135:Battleship Bismarck 3970:Bismarck's armament 3894:Bennett 2003, p.141 3885:Chesneau 2004, p.11 3810:. www.kbismarck.com 3356:, as they believed 2455:and three times by 1912:Just before 03:00, 1684:had hoped that the 1516:in size and power. 459:Blockade of Germany 369:HMS Prince of Wales 4575:German battleship 4463: 4372:Kennedy, Ludovic. 4357:Kennedy, Ludovic. 4232:Bonomi, Antonio. " 3745:on 7 December 2009 3681:Boyne 1995, p. 59. 3386:Allan and Bevand, 3227:German battleship 2928:Alfred Saalwächter 2693: 2500: 2410: 2295: 2250:), was firing at 2195:Adalbert Schneider 2173: 2106:Concentration Fire 1678: 1666: 1648:Both plans go awry 1570:While her 12-inch 1325:were completed or 1202: 1106:fought the German 4697:Conflicts in 1941 4673:63.333°N 31.833°W 4652: 4651: 4459: 4397:Storia Militare, 4352:978-3-86619-047-4 4335:978-0-87021-101-0 4274:Chesneau, Roger. 4258:978-0-19-822888-2 4227:978-0-85052-989-0 4210:978-1-58567-397-1 4014:Barnett, 297–299. 3163:Battle of Jutland 3056: 3055: 3048: 2857:. It would leave 2616:Wilhelm Marschall 2562:diverted to sink 2248:Helmuth Brinkmann 1602:Battle of Jutland 1546:super-dreadnought 1278:was in need of a 1063: 1062: 419:Atlantic campaign 384: 383: 306:2 heavy cruisers 173:Helmuth Brinkmann 93: 92: 4734: 4684: 4683: 4681: 4680: 4679: 4674: 4670: 4667: 4666: 4665: 4662: 4569: 4562: 4555: 4546: 4545: 4483: 4481: 4470: 4469: 4460: 4450: 4448: 4443: 4404:Schofield, B.B. 4388:Roskill, Stephen 4339: 4266:Boyne, Walter J. 4262: 4214: 4163: 4162: 4160: 4158: 4144: 4138: 4131: 4125: 4122: 4116: 4113: 4107: 4104: 4095: 4092: 4086: 4083: 4077: 4074: 4068: 4065: 4054: 4051: 4045: 4042: 4036: 4033: 4027: 4024: 4015: 4012: 4006: 4003: 3997: 3994: 3985: 3982: 3973: 3967: 3961: 3958: 3949: 3946: 3940: 3937: 3931: 3928: 3922: 3919: 3913: 3910: 3904: 3901: 3895: 3892: 3886: 3883: 3877: 3874: 3868: 3867: 3866:on 28 July 2011. 3865: 3859:. Archived from 3858: 3846: 3840: 3837: 3831: 3826: 3820: 3817: 3811: 3797: 3791: 3788: 3782: 3779: 3773: 3770: 3764: 3761: 3755: 3754: 3752: 3750: 3741:. Archived from 3735: 3726: 3719: 3710: 3704: 3698: 3695: 3682: 3679: 3673: 3670: 3664: 3658: 3652: 3649: 3643: 3640: 3634: 3631: 3625: 3622: 3616: 3615: 3597: 3591: 3588: 3582: 3579: 3573: 3570: 3564: 3561: 3555: 3552: 3546: 3543: 3517: 3510: 3504: 3493: 3487: 3480: 3474: 3452: 3446: 3415: 3406: 3400: 3383: 3374: 3367: 3361: 3342: 3155:Correlli Barnett 3137: 3125: 3118: 3110:board of enquiry 3100: 3051: 3044: 3040: 3037: 3031: 3000: 2992: 2983: 2962: 2943: 2912: 2879:Operation Berlin 2852: 2810: 2798: 2788: 2752: 2613: 2521: 2445: 2342: 2285:(commanding HMS 2283:Captain JC Leach 2230: 2220: 2202: 2193: 2190:Korvettenkapitän 2185: 2170: 2136: 2114: 2099: 2093:, conforming to 2076:Prince of Wales' 2059:tried to engage 2050: 2042: 2035: 1946: 1934: 1899: 1892: 1878: 1837: 1662:Prince of Wales' 1622: 1592: 1495:was fitted with 1469:Lancelot Holland 1384: 1367: 1264: 1074:Second World War 454:Northern Barrage 422: 420: 410: 403: 396: 387: 386: 293:1 battlecruiser 241: 240: 231: 221: 220: 209: 208: 199: 191:Lancelot Holland 189: 188: 171: 170: 159: 158: 147: 146: 125: 123: 122: 115: 111: 109: 108: 63: 62: 43: 23: 22: 4742: 4741: 4737: 4736: 4735: 4733: 4732: 4731: 4707:May 1941 events 4687: 4686: 4678:63.333; -31.833 4677: 4675: 4671: 4668: 4663: 4660: 4658: 4656: 4655: 4653: 4648: 4635: 4621:Last battle of 4602: 4579: 4573: 4525:Wayback Machine 4513:Wayback Machine 4497: 4496: 4485: 4479: 4477: 4474:This audio file 4471: 4464: 4455: 4452: 4446: 4445: 4441: 4438: 4433: 4336: 4259: 4211: 4166: 4156: 4154: 4146: 4145: 4141: 4132: 4128: 4123: 4119: 4114: 4110: 4105: 4098: 4093: 4089: 4084: 4080: 4075: 4071: 4066: 4057: 4052: 4048: 4043: 4039: 4034: 4030: 4025: 4018: 4013: 4009: 4004: 4000: 3996:Kennedy, p. 98. 3995: 3988: 3983: 3976: 3968: 3964: 3959: 3952: 3947: 3943: 3938: 3934: 3929: 3925: 3920: 3916: 3911: 3907: 3902: 3898: 3893: 3889: 3884: 3880: 3875: 3871: 3863: 3856: 3848: 3847: 3843: 3838: 3834: 3827: 3823: 3818: 3814: 3798: 3794: 3789: 3785: 3780: 3776: 3771: 3767: 3762: 3758: 3748: 3746: 3737: 3736: 3729: 3720: 3713: 3705: 3701: 3696: 3685: 3680: 3676: 3671: 3667: 3659: 3655: 3650: 3646: 3641: 3637: 3632: 3628: 3623: 3619: 3612: 3598: 3594: 3589: 3585: 3580: 3576: 3571: 3567: 3562: 3558: 3553: 3549: 3544: 3529: 3525: 3520: 3511: 3507: 3497:Prince of Wales 3494: 3490: 3481: 3477: 3453: 3449: 3443:Prince of Wales 3439:Prince of Wales 3435:Prince of Wales 3430:Prince of Wales 3426:Prince of Wales 3418:Prince of Wales 3408: 3407: 3403: 3384: 3377: 3371:Prince of Wales 3368: 3364: 3358:Prince of Wales 3343: 3339: 3335: 3253:Prince of Wales 3247: 3224: 3216: 3214:Order of battle 3208:Prince of Wales 3204:Prince of Wales 3195:Queen Elizabeth 3151: 3135: 3123: 3116: 3098: 3096:Prince of Wales 3076:Prince of Wales 3052: 3041: 3035: 3032: 3017: 3001: 2990: 2981: 2965:Joseph Goebbels 2960: 2941: 2916:Otto Schniewind 2910: 2900: 2895: 2850: 2843:Prince of Wales 2808: 2796: 2786: 2750: 2721:Prince of Wales 2713:Prince of Wales 2697:Prince of Wales 2677: 2630:Prince of Wales 2607: 2597:Prince of Wales 2582:Prince of Wales 2564:Prince of Wales 2544:Prince of Wales 2532: 2519: 2517:Prince of Wales 2509:Prince of Wales 2505:Prince of Wales 2492:Prince of Wales 2488:Prince of Wales 2477:Prince of Wales 2449:Prince of Wales 2443: 2433:Prince of Wales 2430: 2426:Prince of Wales 2406:Prince of Wales 2357:Prince of Wales 2340: 2326:Prince of Wales 2307:Prince of Wales 2303:Prince of Wales 2287:Prince of Wales 2275: 2252:Prince of Wales 2245:Kapitän zur See 2228: 2213:Ernst Lindemann 2209:Kapitän zur See 2183: 2168: 2162:Prince of Wales 2134: 2123:Prince of Wales 2112: 2110:Prince of Wales 2097: 2087:Prince of Wales 2080:Barr and Stroud 2048: 2046:Prince of Wales 2040: 2033: 2026:for some time. 2012:Prince of Wales 1993: 1988: 1956:Prince of Wales 1944: 1932: 1926:Prince of Wales 1897: 1890: 1876: 1856:Prince of Wales 1835: 1818:Prince of Wales 1786:Prince of Wales 1758:Prince of Wales 1674:Prince of Wales 1650: 1645: 1637:Prince of Wales 1629:Prince of Wales 1620: 1590: 1518:Prince of Wales 1503:Prince of Wales 1416:Prince of Wales 1382: 1365: 1355: 1315:Günther Lütjens 1262: 1223:fast battleship 1213: 1207: 1200: 1192: 1182:, resulting in 1157:Prince of Wales 1149:Prince of Wales 1093:Prince of Wales 1066: 1065: 1064: 1059: 466: 423: 418: 416: 414: 380: 356: 334: 326: 287:Prince of Wales 276: 247: 235: 227: 215: 203: 195: 183: 177: 165: 161:Ernst Lindemann 153: 149:Günther Lütjens 141: 120: 118: 106: 104: 81: 54:Prince of Wales 44: 17: 12: 11: 5: 4740: 4730: 4729: 4724: 4719: 4714: 4709: 4704: 4699: 4650: 4649: 4647: 4646: 4640: 4637: 4636: 4634: 4633: 4626: 4618: 4613: 4607: 4604: 4603: 4601: 4600: 4592: 4584: 4581: 4580: 4572: 4571: 4564: 4557: 4549: 4543: 4542: 4537: 4532: 4527: 4515: 4503: 4486: 4472: 4465: 4453: 4440: 4439: 4437: 4436:External links 4434: 4432: 4431: 4424: 4411:Tarrant, V E. 4409: 4402: 4395: 4385: 4370: 4355: 4340: 4334: 4321: 4306: 4287: 4272: 4263: 4257: 4237: 4230: 4215: 4209: 4196: 4182: 4170:Adams, Simon. 4167: 4165: 4164: 4139: 4126: 4117: 4108: 4096: 4087: 4078: 4069: 4055: 4046: 4037: 4028: 4016: 4007: 3998: 3986: 3974: 3962: 3950: 3941: 3932: 3923: 3914: 3905: 3896: 3887: 3878: 3869: 3841: 3832: 3821: 3812: 3802:see sections, 3792: 3783: 3774: 3765: 3756: 3727: 3711: 3699: 3683: 3674: 3665: 3653: 3644: 3635: 3626: 3617: 3610: 3592: 3583: 3574: 3565: 3556: 3547: 3526: 3524: 3521: 3519: 3518: 3505: 3488: 3475: 3447: 3401: 3375: 3362: 3336: 3334: 3331: 3330: 3329: 3287: 3273:heavy cruisers 3269: 3257: 3246: 3243: 3242: 3241: 3233: 3223: 3220: 3215: 3212: 3150: 3147: 3054: 3053: 3004: 3002: 2995: 2989: 2986: 2899: 2896: 2894: 2891: 2792:The damage to 2739:reported that 2676: 2673: 2531: 2528: 2461:superstructure 2429: 2423: 2274: 2268: 2089:stay close to 1992: 1989: 1987: 1984: 1940:vulnerable to 1649: 1646: 1644: 1641: 1631:sail ahead of 1412:Denmark Strait 1354: 1351: 1306:Admiral Scheer 1300:Admiral Hipper 1296:heavy cruisers 1294:. Work on the 1209:Main article: 1206: 1203: 1198: 1191: 1188: 1130:Denmark Strait 1128:) through the 1086:. The British 1061: 1060: 1058: 1057: 1052: 1047: 1042: 1029: 1028: 1023: 1018: 1013: 1005: 1000: 989: 988: 987: 986: 974: 969: 964: 959: 954: 949: 944: 939: 934: 929: 928: 927: 922: 917: 912: 902: 897: 892: 887: 882: 877: 872: 867: 862: 857: 846: 845: 840: 835: 830: 825: 820: 815: 810: 805: 800: 795: 790: 783: 778: 773: 768: 763: 758: 753: 748: 743: 738: 733: 728: 723: 716: 711: 706: 701: 694: 689: 684: 682:2nd Happy Time 679: 666: 665: 660: 655: 650: 645: 640: 635: 630: 625: 624: 623: 616: 614:Denmark Strait 604: 599: 594: 589: 584: 579: 574: 573: 572: 560: 555: 544: 543: 538: 531: 526: 521: 516: 511: 506: 501: 499:1st Happy Time 496: 491: 480: 479: 468: 467: 461: 456: 451: 450: 449: 444: 439: 428: 425: 424: 413: 412: 405: 398: 390: 382: 381: 379: 378: 375: 372: 366: 359: 357: 355: 354: 351: 344: 341: 340: 336: 335: 333: 332: 328: 325: 324: 316: 304: 303: 291: 290: 277: 275: 274: 268:Heavy cruiser 266: 257: 254: 253: 249: 248: 246: 245: 233: 213: 201: 180: 178: 176: 175: 163: 151: 138: 135: 134: 130: 129: 127:United Kingdom 116: 100: 99: 95: 94: 91: 90: 89:German victory 87: 83: 82: 79:Denmark Strait 77: 75: 71: 70: 67: 59: 58: 57:on 24 May 1941 36: 35: 28: 27: 21: 20: 15: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 4739: 4728: 4725: 4723: 4720: 4718: 4715: 4713: 4710: 4708: 4705: 4703: 4700: 4698: 4695: 4694: 4692: 4685: 4682: 4645: 4642: 4641: 4638: 4632: 4631: 4627: 4625: 4624: 4619: 4617: 4614: 4612: 4609: 4608: 4605: 4599: 4597: 4593: 4591: 4590: 4586: 4585: 4582: 4578: 4570: 4565: 4563: 4558: 4556: 4551: 4550: 4547: 4541: 4538: 4536: 4533: 4531: 4528: 4526: 4522: 4519: 4516: 4514: 4510: 4507: 4504: 4502: 4499: 4498: 4494: 4490: 4475: 4429: 4425: 4422: 4421:1-85409-524-2 4418: 4414: 4410: 4407: 4403: 4400: 4396: 4393: 4389: 4386: 4383: 4382:0-304-35526-7 4379: 4375: 4371: 4368: 4367:0-670-58314-6 4364: 4360: 4356: 4353: 4349: 4345: 4341: 4337: 4331: 4327: 4322: 4319: 4318:0-87021-100-5 4315: 4311: 4307: 4304: 4303:0-7146-5208-3 4300: 4296: 4292: 4288: 4285: 4284:0-304-35980-7 4281: 4277: 4273: 4270: 4267: 4264: 4260: 4254: 4250: 4246: 4245:Wegner, Bernd 4242: 4238: 4235: 4231: 4228: 4224: 4220: 4216: 4212: 4206: 4202: 4197: 4195: 4194:0-393-02918-2 4191: 4187: 4183: 4181: 4180:0-7894-6990-1 4177: 4173: 4169: 4168: 4153: 4152:www.rmg.co.uk 4149: 4143: 4136: 4130: 4121: 4112: 4103: 4101: 4091: 4082: 4073: 4064: 4062: 4060: 4050: 4041: 4032: 4023: 4021: 4011: 4002: 3993: 3991: 3981: 3979: 3971: 3966: 3957: 3955: 3945: 3936: 3927: 3918: 3909: 3900: 3891: 3882: 3873: 3862: 3855: 3853: 3845: 3836: 3830: 3825: 3816: 3809: 3805: 3801: 3796: 3787: 3778: 3769: 3760: 3744: 3740: 3734: 3732: 3724: 3718: 3716: 3709: 3703: 3694: 3692: 3690: 3688: 3678: 3669: 3662: 3657: 3648: 3639: 3630: 3621: 3613: 3611:0-87021-817-4 3607: 3603: 3596: 3587: 3578: 3569: 3560: 3551: 3542: 3540: 3538: 3536: 3534: 3532: 3527: 3515: 3509: 3502: 3498: 3492: 3485: 3479: 3472: 3468: 3464: 3460: 3456: 3451: 3444: 3440: 3436: 3431: 3427: 3423: 3419: 3413: 3412: 3405: 3398: 3394: 3390: 3389: 3382: 3380: 3372: 3366: 3359: 3355: 3354:King George V 3351: 3347: 3341: 3337: 3328: 3327: 3322: 3321: 3316: 3315: 3310: 3309: 3304: 3303: 3298: 3297: 3292: 3288: 3286: 3285: 3280: 3279: 3274: 3270: 3268: 3267: 3262: 3261:battlecruiser 3258: 3255: 3254: 3249: 3248: 3240: 3239: 3234: 3232: 3231: 3226: 3225: 3219: 3211: 3209: 3205: 3201: 3197: 3196: 3190: 3188: 3182: 3180: 3176: 3175:John Jellicoe 3172: 3168: 3164: 3160: 3156: 3146: 3144: 3139: 3134: 3130: 3122: 3115: 3111: 3106: 3104: 3097: 3093: 3089: 3085: 3081: 3077: 3072: 3070: 3066: 3062: 3050: 3047: 3039: 3029: 3025: 3021: 3015: 3014: 3010: 3005:This section 3003: 2999: 2994: 2993: 2985: 2980: 2976: 2973: 2970: 2966: 2959: 2953: 2951: 2945: 2940: 2936: 2931: 2929: 2923: 2921: 2917: 2909: 2905: 2904:Wilhelmshaven 2890: 2887: 2882: 2880: 2876: 2872: 2871: 2866: 2865: 2860: 2856: 2849: 2844: 2840: 2839:Saint-Nazaire 2836: 2831: 2829: 2828:King George V 2825: 2821: 2817: 2812: 2807: 2802: 2795: 2790: 2785: 2781: 2777: 2773: 2768: 2765: 2760: 2755: 2749: 2744: 2742: 2738: 2734: 2730: 2726: 2722: 2718: 2714: 2710: 2706: 2702: 2698: 2690: 2686: 2681: 2672: 2671:at the time. 2670: 2666: 2662: 2658: 2654: 2650: 2645: 2643: 2639: 2635: 2634:King George V 2631: 2626: 2624: 2623: 2617: 2611: 2606: 2605:Conrad Patzig 2600: 2598: 2594: 2589: 2587: 2583: 2579: 2575: 2572: 2567: 2565: 2561: 2557: 2553: 2549: 2545: 2541: 2537: 2527: 2525: 2518: 2512: 2510: 2506: 2497: 2493: 2489: 2484: 2480: 2478: 2473: 2469: 2464: 2462: 2458: 2454: 2450: 2442: 2438: 2434: 2427: 2422: 2420: 2415: 2412:The wreck of 2407: 2403: 2399: 2394: 2390: 2388: 2384: 2380: 2375: 2373: 2372: 2366: 2362: 2358: 2353: 2350: 2344: 2339: 2335: 2331: 2327: 2323: 2318: 2316: 2312: 2308: 2304: 2300: 2292: 2288: 2284: 2279: 2273: 2267: 2265: 2262:s target was 2261: 2257: 2253: 2249: 2246: 2242: 2238: 2234: 2227: 2222: 2219: 2214: 2211: 2210: 2206: 2201: 2196: 2192: 2191: 2182: 2178: 2167: 2163: 2158: 2154: 2152: 2148: 2144: 2140: 2133: 2128: 2124: 2120: 2118: 2111: 2107: 2103: 2096: 2092: 2088: 2084: 2081: 2077: 2073: 2072:weather gauge 2068: 2066: 2062: 2058: 2054: 2047: 2039: 2032: 2027: 2025: 2021: 2017: 2013: 2009: 2005: 2001: 1997: 1991:Opening moves 1983: 1981: 1977: 1973: 1972:King George V 1969: 1966:in shadowing 1965: 1961: 1957: 1952: 1950: 1943: 1939: 1931: 1927: 1923: 1919: 1915: 1910: 1908: 1902: 1896: 1889: 1884: 1882: 1875: 1871: 1867: 1862: 1857: 1853: 1849: 1845: 1841: 1834: 1829: 1827: 1823: 1819: 1815: 1811: 1807: 1803: 1802:radio silence 1799: 1795: 1791: 1787: 1783: 1782:John C. Leach 1779: 1775: 1771: 1767: 1763: 1759: 1755: 1750: 1747: 1743: 1740:. Thus, when 1739: 1735: 1734:naval attaché 1730: 1726: 1722: 1721: 1714: 1712: 1708: 1702: 1699: 1695: 1691: 1690:Norwegian Sea 1687: 1683: 1675: 1670: 1664:s 'A' turret. 1663: 1659: 1654: 1640: 1638: 1634: 1630: 1626: 1619: 1614: 1612: 1607: 1603: 1599: 1598: 1597:Indefatigable 1589: 1585: 1581: 1580:plunging fire 1577: 1576:capital ships 1573: 1568: 1566: 1562: 1560: 1555: 1551: 1550:battlecruiser 1547: 1543: 1539: 1535: 1531: 1527: 1522: 1519: 1515: 1511: 1509: 1508:King George V 1504: 1500: 1498: 1494: 1490: 1486: 1482: 1478: 1474: 1470: 1466: 1465: 1460: 1459: 1454: 1453: 1448: 1447: 1442: 1441: 1436: 1435: 1430: 1426: 1425: 1421: 1420:battlecruiser 1417: 1413: 1410:to cover the 1409: 1408: 1403: 1402: 1396: 1392: 1388: 1387:naval attache 1381: 1377: 1373: 1372: 1364: 1360: 1353:British plans 1350: 1348: 1347: 1342: 1338: 1337: 1332: 1328: 1324: 1320: 1316: 1312: 1308: 1307: 1302: 1301: 1297: 1293: 1292:Brest, France 1289: 1285: 1281: 1277: 1273: 1272: 1268: 1261: 1257: 1253: 1252: 1247: 1246: 1241: 1237: 1233: 1229: 1228: 1224: 1220: 1219: 1212: 1196: 1187: 1185: 1181: 1177: 1173: 1169: 1165: 1160: 1158: 1154: 1150: 1146: 1142: 1138: 1133: 1131: 1127: 1123: 1122: 1118: 1117:heavy cruiser 1114: 1113: 1109: 1105: 1104: 1099: 1098:battlecruiser 1095: 1094: 1089: 1085: 1084: 1079: 1075: 1071: 1056: 1053: 1051: 1048: 1046: 1043: 1041: 1040: 1036: 1035: 1034: 1033: 1027: 1024: 1022: 1019: 1017: 1014: 1012: 1011: 1006: 1004: 1003:26 April 1944 1001: 999: 996: 995: 994: 993: 985: 984:Bay of Biscay 982: 981: 980: 979: 975: 973: 972:SL 140/MKS 31 970: 968: 967:SL 139/MKS 30 965: 963: 962:SL 138/MKS 28 960: 958: 955: 953: 950: 948: 947:ONS 20/ON 206 945: 943: 940: 938: 937:ONS 18/ON 202 935: 933: 930: 926: 923: 921: 918: 916: 913: 911: 908: 907: 906: 903: 901: 898: 896: 895:HX 229/SC 122 893: 891: 888: 886: 883: 881: 878: 876: 873: 871: 868: 866: 863: 861: 858: 856: 853: 852: 851: 850: 844: 841: 839: 836: 834: 831: 829: 826: 824: 821: 819: 816: 814: 811: 809: 806: 804: 801: 799: 796: 794: 791: 789: 788: 784: 782: 779: 777: 774: 772: 769: 767: 764: 762: 759: 757: 754: 752: 749: 747: 744: 742: 739: 737: 734: 732: 729: 727: 724: 722: 721: 717: 715: 712: 710: 707: 705: 702: 700: 699: 695: 693: 690: 688: 687:Torpedo Alley 685: 683: 680: 678: 677: 673: 672: 671: 670: 664: 661: 659: 656: 654: 651: 649: 646: 644: 641: 639: 636: 634: 631: 629: 626: 622: 621: 617: 615: 612: 611: 610: 609: 605: 603: 600: 598: 595: 593: 590: 588: 585: 583: 580: 578: 575: 571: 568: 567: 566: 565: 561: 559: 556: 554: 551: 550: 549: 548: 542: 539: 537: 536: 532: 530: 527: 525: 522: 520: 517: 515: 512: 510: 507: 505: 502: 500: 497: 495: 492: 490: 487: 486: 485: 484: 478: 475: 474: 473: 472: 465: 462: 460: 457: 455: 452: 448: 445: 443: 440: 438: 437:United States 435: 434: 433: 430: 429: 426: 421: 411: 406: 404: 399: 397: 392: 391: 388: 376: 373: 370: 367: 364: 361: 360: 358: 352: 349: 346: 345: 343: 342: 337: 330: 329: 323: 322: 317: 315: 314: 309: 308: 307: 302: 301: 296: 295: 294: 289: 288: 283: 282: 281: 280:1 battleship 278: 273: 272: 267: 265: 264: 259: 258: 256: 255: 250: 244: 239: 234: 232: 230: 224: 219: 214: 212: 207: 202: 200: 198: 192: 187: 182: 181: 179: 174: 169: 164: 162: 157: 152: 150: 145: 140: 139: 137: 136: 131: 128: 117: 114: 102: 101: 96: 88: 85: 84: 80: 76: 73: 72: 68: 65: 64: 60: 56: 55: 49: 48: 42: 37: 34: 29: 24: 19: 4654: 4628: 4622: 4615: 4595: 4588: 4576: 4427: 4412: 4405: 4398: 4391: 4373: 4358: 4343: 4325: 4309: 4294: 4290: 4289:Dewar, A.D. 4275: 4268: 4248: 4218: 4200: 4185: 4172:World War II 4171: 4155:. Retrieved 4151: 4142: 4134: 4129: 4120: 4111: 4090: 4081: 4072: 4049: 4040: 4031: 4010: 4001: 3965: 3944: 3935: 3926: 3917: 3908: 3899: 3890: 3881: 3872: 3861:the original 3851: 3844: 3835: 3824: 3815: 3807: 3803: 3795: 3786: 3777: 3768: 3759: 3747:. Retrieved 3743:the original 3722: 3707: 3702: 3677: 3668: 3656: 3647: 3638: 3629: 3620: 3601: 3595: 3586: 3577: 3568: 3559: 3550: 3513: 3508: 3500: 3496: 3491: 3483: 3478: 3470: 3466: 3462: 3458: 3450: 3442: 3438: 3434: 3429: 3425: 3421: 3417: 3416:Problems in 3410: 3404: 3396: 3392: 3387: 3370: 3365: 3357: 3353: 3349: 3345: 3340: 3325: 3319: 3313: 3307: 3301: 3295: 3289:The British 3283: 3277: 3271:The British 3265: 3259:The British 3252: 3237: 3229: 3217: 3207: 3203: 3199: 3194: 3191: 3186: 3183: 3171:Franz Hipper 3166: 3159:David Beatty 3152: 3142: 3140: 3132: 3128: 3120: 3113: 3107: 3102: 3095: 3092:Dudley Pound 3083: 3079: 3075: 3073: 3064: 3060: 3057: 3042: 3033: 3018:Please help 3006: 2978: 2957: 2955: 2949: 2947: 2938: 2935:Adolf Hitler 2932: 2924: 2907: 2901: 2885: 2883: 2869: 2863: 2858: 2847: 2842: 2834: 2832: 2827: 2823: 2813: 2805: 2793: 2791: 2789:s location. 2783: 2775: 2771: 2769: 2758: 2756: 2747: 2745: 2740: 2736: 2732: 2728: 2724: 2720: 2716: 2712: 2708: 2704: 2700: 2696: 2694: 2688: 2684: 2668: 2664: 2660: 2656: 2652: 2648: 2646: 2641: 2637: 2633: 2629: 2627: 2621: 2601: 2596: 2592: 2590: 2585: 2581: 2577: 2574:Erich Raeder 2570: 2568: 2563: 2559: 2555: 2547: 2543: 2539: 2535: 2533: 2523: 2516: 2513: 2508: 2504: 2501: 2495: 2491: 2487: 2476: 2471: 2467: 2465: 2456: 2452: 2448: 2440: 2436: 2432: 2431: 2425: 2418: 2413: 2411: 2405: 2401: 2397: 2386: 2378: 2376: 2370: 2360: 2356: 2354: 2348: 2345: 2337: 2333: 2329: 2328:to straddle 2325: 2321: 2319: 2314: 2310: 2306: 2302: 2298: 2296: 2286: 2271: 2263: 2260:Prinz Eugen' 2259: 2255: 2251: 2244: 2240: 2236: 2232: 2225: 2224:A shell hit 2223: 2207: 2204: 2180: 2176: 2174: 2165: 2164:penetrating 2161: 2153:at her bow. 2146: 2142: 2138: 2131: 2126: 2122: 2121: 2109: 2105: 2101: 2094: 2090: 2086: 2075: 2069: 2064: 2060: 2056: 2052: 2045: 2037: 2030: 2028: 2023: 2019: 2015: 2011: 2007: 2003: 1999: 1995: 1994: 1979: 1975: 1971: 1967: 1963: 1955: 1953: 1948: 1941: 1937: 1929: 1925: 1921: 1917: 1913: 1911: 1903: 1894: 1887: 1885: 1880: 1873: 1869: 1865: 1860: 1855: 1851: 1847: 1843: 1839: 1832: 1830: 1825: 1821: 1817: 1813: 1809: 1805: 1797: 1793: 1785: 1777: 1773: 1769: 1765: 1761: 1757: 1753: 1751: 1741: 1728: 1724: 1719: 1715: 1710: 1706: 1703: 1685: 1682:Kriegsmarine 1681: 1679: 1673: 1661: 1657: 1636: 1632: 1628: 1617: 1615: 1605: 1596: 1587: 1569: 1558: 1541: 1537: 1536:on the sea, 1525: 1523: 1517: 1513: 1507: 1502: 1501: 1492: 1488: 1484: 1480: 1476: 1472: 1463: 1457: 1451: 1445: 1439: 1433: 1423: 1415: 1406: 1400: 1379: 1370: 1362: 1357:The British 1356: 1345: 1340: 1334: 1330: 1326: 1322: 1305: 1299: 1283: 1275: 1270: 1259: 1250: 1244: 1226: 1218:Kriegsmarine 1216: 1214: 1205:German plans 1179: 1175: 1163: 1161: 1156: 1152: 1148: 1144: 1140: 1136: 1134: 1120: 1111: 1102: 1092: 1083:Kriegsmarine 1081: 1069: 1067: 1055:7–8 May 1945 1050:5–6 May 1945 1045:Point Judith 1038: 1031: 1030: 1009: 991: 990: 977: 848: 847: 803:27 September 786: 719: 697: 675: 668: 667: 619: 613: 607: 563: 546: 545: 534: 482: 481: 470: 469: 447:St. Lawrence 368: 362: 347: 320: 312: 305: 299: 292: 286: 279: 270: 262: 228: 196: 98:Belligerents 53: 46: 18: 4676: / 4241:Boog, Horst 4157:15 February 3772:Dewar, p.9. 3749:24 November 3471:Prinz Eugen 3463:Prinz Eugen 3397:Prinz Eugen 3350:Prinz Eugen 3238:Prinz Eugen 3179:Grand Fleet 2886:Prinz Eugen 2864:Scharnhorst 2776:Prinz Eugen 2669:Prinz Eugen 2608: [ 2571:Großadmiral 2524:Prinz Eugen 2468:Prinz Eugen 2457:Prinz Eugen 2398:Prinz Eugen 2270:Sinking of 2256:Prinz Eugen 2241:Prinz Eugen 2024:Prinz Eugen 2000:Prinz Eugen 1907:crow's nest 1895:Prinz Eugen 1810:Prinz Eugen 1790:Wake-Walker 1774:Prinz Eugen 1729:Prinz Eugen 1711:Prinz Eugen 1611:Axis powers 1584:World War I 1572:belt armour 1565:World War I 1489:Prinz Eugen 1378:on 20 May; 1361:learned of 1346:Prinz Eugen 1329:could join 1323:Scharnhorst 1276:Scharnhorst 1267:sister ship 1245:Scharnhorst 1172:operational 1121:Prinz Eugen 1008:Capture of 771:Bell Island 720:Connecticut 535:Nordseetour 477:River Plate 271:Prinz Eugen 260:Battleship 69:24 May 1941 4691:Categories 4489:Audio help 4480:2017-12-17 4005:Dewar, p.8 3523:References 3291:destroyers 3189:was sunk. 3108:A British 3088:Home Fleet 2920:Rolf Carls 2723:to follow 2558:– even if 2552:Scapa Flow 2400:shows the 2365:Ted Briggs 2205:Bismarck, 2018:, whereas 1625:John Tovey 1534:battleship 1429:destroyers 1376:Baltic Sea 1359:Royal Navy 1333:, but the 1313:. Admiral 1190:Background 1108:battleship 1088:battleship 1078:Royal Navy 676:Postmaster 608:Rheinübung 374:1,428 dead 223:Ralph Kerr 211:John Leach 50:firing at 3804:Jot! Dora 3294:HMS 3276:HMS 3264:HMS 3007:does not 2969:Luftwaffe 2870:Gneisenau 2816:Trondheim 2675:Aftermath 2620:HMS 2383:magazines 2369:HMS 2197:, asked " 2151:freeboard 2139:Bismarck' 1738:Stockholm 1694:North Sea 1616:Aware of 1595:HMS 1559:Mackensen 1399:HMS 1395:Admiralty 1391:Stockholm 1286:had been 1284:Gneisenau 1251:Gneisenau 1164:Bismarck' 1101:HMS 1091:HMS 978:Stonewall 952:Sept-Îles 905:Black May 808:SG 6/LN 6 464:Gibraltar 442:Caribbean 377:9 wounded 353:5 wounded 319:HMS 311:HMS 298:HMS 285:HMS 52:HMS 4623:Bismarck 4596:Bismarck 4589:Bismarck 4577:Bismarck 4521:Archived 4509:Archived 4491: · 4247:(2001). 4236:", 2008. 3706:Bonomi, 3467:Bismarck 3459:Bismarck 3422:Bismarck 3346:Bismarck 3302:Antelope 3230:Bismarck 3167:Bismarck 3143:Bismarck 3129:Bismarck 3103:Bismarck 3080:Bismarck 3065:Bismarck 3061:Bismarck 3036:May 2018 2956:News of 2908:Bismarck 2893:Reaction 2859:Bismarck 2848:Bismarck 2835:Bismarck 2806:Bismarck 2794:Bismarck 2784:Bismarck 2772:Bismarck 2764:hammocks 2759:Bismarck 2748:Bismarck 2741:Bismarck 2717:Bismarck 2715:than to 2709:Bismarck 2705:Bismarck 2689:Bismarck 2665:Bismarck 2657:Bismarck 2653:Bismarck 2622:Glorious 2593:Bismarck 2586:Bismarck 2578:Bismarck 2560:Bismarck 2556:Bismarck 2548:Bismarck 2536:Bismarck 2496:Bismarck 2472:Bismarck 2453:Bismarck 2387:Bismarck 2322:Bismarck 2315:Bismarck 2181:Bismarck 2166:Bismarck 2147:Bismarck 2143:Bismarck 2132:Bismarck 2127:Bismarck 2102:Bismarck 2065:Bismarck 2061:Bismarck 2038:Bismarck 2016:Bismarck 2008:Bismarck 2004:Bismarck 1968:Bismarck 1942:Bismarck 1918:Bismarck 1888:Bismarck 1881:Bismarck 1874:Bismarck 1826:Bismarck 1806:Bismarck 1778:Bismarck 1772:engaged 1762:Bismarck 1742:Bismarck 1725:Bismarck 1707:Bismarck 1686:Bismarck 1514:Bismarck 1485:Bismarck 1483:spotted 1446:Antelope 1363:Bismarck 1341:Bismarck 1331:Bismarck 1260:Bismarck 1227:Bismarck 1180:Bismarck 1168:dry dock 1153:Bismarck 1137:Bismarck 1115:and the 1112:Bismarck 1096:and the 1080:and the 1039:Teardrop 998:Lyme Bay 709:27 March 620:Bismarck 432:Americas 363:HMS Hood 348:Bismarck 263:Bismarck 252:Strength 74:Location 47:Bismarck 31:Part of 4664:31°50′W 4661:63°20′N 4478: ( 4449:minutes 4401:, 2005. 4094:Kennedy 3320:Electra 3308:Anthony 3296:Achates 3284:Norfolk 3278:Suffolk 3028:removed 3013:sources 2988:British 2855:U-boats 2737:Suffolk 2733:Suffolk 2729:Norfolk 2725:Norfolk 2701:Norfolk 2685:Suffolk 2661:Suffolk 2649:Suffolk 2642:Suffolk 2638:Norfolk 2371:Electra 2309:, 8 in 2291:article 2115:modern 2057:Norfolk 2053:Suffolk 1980:Suffolk 1976:Norfolk 1964:Suffolk 1949:Suffolk 1930:Suffolk 1914:Suffolk 1870:Norfolk 1866:Suffolk 1861:Suffolk 1848:Suffolk 1844:Norfolk 1840:Suffolk 1833:Suffolk 1798:Norfolk 1794:Suffolk 1770:Norfolk 1766:Suffolk 1760:engage 1720:Gotland 1643:Prelude 1600:at the 1563:during 1493:Suffolk 1481:Suffolk 1477:Norfolk 1452:Anthony 1440:Achates 1434:Electra 1407:Suffolk 1401:Norfolk 1380:Gotland 1371:Gotland 1327:Tirpitz 1271:Tirpitz 1232:convoys 1139:struck 787:Laconia 698:Neuland 592:4 April 371:damaged 350:damaged 321:Suffolk 313:Norfolk 229:† 197:† 113:Germany 4419: 4380: 4365: 4350: 4332: 4316: 4301: 4282: 4255: 4225: 4207: 4192: 4178: 4137:, 149. 3608: 3326:Icarus 3245:Allied 3082:after 3069:battle 2898:German 2820:Norway 2801:Bergen 2746:Since 2408:nearby 2171:s bow. 1986:Battle 1893:s and 1764:while 1746:fjords 1718:HSwMS 1510:-class 1464:Icarus 1418:, the 1280:boiler 1256:Berlin 1236:U-boat 1026:BX 141 1016:HX 300 957:ON 207 942:SC 143 925:SC 130 920:SC 129 915:HX 237 900:HX 231 885:HX 228 880:SC 121 870:ON 166 865:SC 118 843:ON 154 838:ON 153 833:ON 144 828:SC 107 823:SL 125 818:HX 212 813:SC 104 798:SC 100 781:ON 127 766:ON 122 756:ON 115 751:ON 113 731:6 June 658:HX 156 628:HX 133 602:HX 126 597:OB 318 587:HX 112 582:OB 293 570:HX 106 564:Berlin 225: 193: 124: 110: 86:Result 4598:class 3864:(PDF) 3857:(PDF) 3725:, p8. 3344:When 3333:Notes 3136:' 3124:' 3117:' 3099:' 2982:' 2975:Crete 2961:' 2942:' 2911:' 2875:Brest 2851:' 2809:' 2797:' 2787:' 2780:trail 2751:' 2612:] 2520:' 2444:' 2428:alone 2341:' 2229:' 2184:' 2169:' 2135:' 2113:' 2098:' 2049:' 2041:' 2034:' 1945:' 1933:' 1898:' 1891:' 1877:' 1836:' 1621:' 1591:' 1497:radar 1383:' 1366:' 1263:' 1021:WEP 3 1010:U-505 932:Faith 910:ONS 5 890:UGS 6 860:SG 19 793:SQ 36 776:QS 33 761:SC 94 746:QS 15 741:SL 78 736:HG 84 726:ON 92 714:OG 82 704:ON 67 692:SC 67 663:HG 76 653:SC 48 648:HG 73 643:SC 42 638:OG 71 633:OG 69 577:HG 53 558:SC 20 553:SC 19 541:HX 90 529:HX 84 524:HX 79 514:HX 72 504:HX 65 494:HX 49 489:HX 47 4417:ISBN 4378:ISBN 4363:ISBN 4348:ISBN 4330:ISBN 4314:ISBN 4299:ISBN 4280:ISBN 4253:ISBN 4223:ISBN 4205:ISBN 4190:ISBN 4176:ISBN 4159:2024 3806:and 3751:2009 3606:ISBN 3495:"As 3461:and 3393:Hood 3348:and 3314:Echo 3266:Hood 3222:Axis 3200:Hood 3187:Hood 3133:Hood 3121:Hood 3114:Hood 3084:Hood 3011:any 3009:cite 2979:Hood 2958:Hood 2950:Hood 2939:Hood 2867:and 2824:Hood 2731:and 2667:and 2640:and 2614:and 2540:Hood 2441:Hood 2437:Hood 2419:Hood 2414:Hood 2402:Hood 2379:Hood 2361:Hood 2349:Hood 2338:Hood 2334:Hood 2330:Hood 2311:Hood 2301:and 2299:Hood 2272:Hood 2264:Hood 2237:Hood 2233:Hood 2226:Hood 2177:Hood 2095:Hood 2091:Hood 2055:and 2031:Hood 2020:Hood 1996:Hood 1978:and 1938:Hood 1924:and 1922:Hood 1868:and 1854:and 1852:Hood 1822:Hood 1816:and 1814:Hood 1808:and 1796:and 1768:and 1756:and 1754:Hood 1727:and 1716:The 1709:and 1680:The 1658:Hood 1633:Hood 1618:Hood 1606:Hood 1588:Hood 1542:Hood 1538:Hood 1526:Hood 1487:and 1479:and 1473:Hood 1461:and 1458:Echo 1424:Hood 1404:and 1311:Kiel 1303:and 1248:and 1176:Hood 1145:Hood 1141:Hood 1103:Hood 1068:The 1032:1945 992:1944 875:UC 1 855:TM 1 849:1943 669:1942 547:1941 519:SC 7 509:SC 2 483:1940 471:1939 365:sunk 300:Hood 66:Date 3067:to 3022:by 2818:in 2534:On 2317:). 1846:or 1784:of 1736:in 1471:in 1389:in 4693:: 4447:33 4390:. 4150:. 4099:^ 4058:^ 4019:^ 3989:^ 3977:^ 3953:^ 3730:^ 3714:^ 3686:^ 3530:^ 3457:: 3378:^ 3323:, 3317:, 3311:, 3305:, 3299:, 3281:, 3181:. 2841:. 2659:. 2610:de 2374:. 2293:). 2266:. 2239:; 2119:. 2010:. 1920:. 1613:. 1567:. 1455:, 1449:, 1443:, 1437:, 1431:, 1349:. 1265:s 1186:. 4568:e 4561:t 4554:v 4495:) 4487:( 4482:) 4451:) 4444:( 4423:. 4384:. 4369:. 4354:. 4338:. 4320:. 4305:. 4286:. 4261:. 4229:. 4213:. 4161:. 3972:. 3854:" 3753:. 3614:. 3414:. 3256:. 3049:) 3043:( 3038:) 3034:( 3030:. 3016:. 2691:. 2243:( 1705:( 409:e 402:t 395:v

Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.

Knowledge

Battle of the Denmark Strait

Index