405:), or a hybrid system (otherwise known as a soft-peg) such as that which Mexico undertook. The hybrid system consisted of various levels of control over exchange rates, and it was discredited in the early 1990s when empirical evidence from several currency crises showed that, in a world of high capital mobility, a semi-fixed exchange rate was very unstable, because it allowed a country with poor monetary policy to exercise too much discretionary power. The consequence was that a government had to choose between either fixed or fully floating exchange rate systems.
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Argentina's largest trading partner, and the crisis was coupled with an appreciating U.S. dollar and a slump in the world prices of primary products. Argentina's competitiveness in world markets was severely hit, given the peso's link to the appreciating U.S. dollar and weakening demand in its northern trading partner. As a result, the economy stalled and subsequently contracted.
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markets. On the other hand, allowing the market to determine the exchange rate would radically improve competitiveness and eliminate the current account deficit along with the need to borrow money to finance it. Many solutions were considered, including changing the peg to a currency basket of U.S. dollars and euros (which would have entailed an effective and controlled
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The reason of this incredible depreciation of the peso was not the economic crisis or the overvaluation, it was the "pesification" of all the accounts. As a consequence of the pesification of every account in
Argentina, the 100 billion dollars that were in the banks were changed to 100 billion pesos.
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These ongoing crises and the strong U.S. dollar in the late 1990s put the spotlight on the decision to peg the peso to the U.S. dollar rather than to a basket of currencies that were better aligned with its trade patterns. While
Argentina was mostly trading with countries (Europe and Brazil) that did
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Government debt increased sharply. Unwilling or unable to raise taxes, and precluded from printing money by the currency board system, the government's only other recourse to finance its budget deficit was to issue debt instruments in the capital markets. Public debt increased sharply from 29.5% of
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Initially, the poverty rate declined as hyperinflation receded, reaching 17% by 1993 (implying that the inflation tax was primarily absorbed by low-income households), but after the
Mexican crisis the trend reversed. Although overall wages increased, they did not benefit all workers equally. Skilled
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issued by the government of
Argentina. It acted as lender of last resort and regulated reserve requirements for commercial banks. And it engaged in monetary policy activities. The impact of all this was to reduce the credibility of the Argentine government's intent, and to put speculative pressure
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GDP in 1993 to 50.3% in 1999. Moreover, this debt was in foreign currency, since the domestic private savings remained low, and it took place despite large inflows of income from the privatization of formerly state-owned companies. Associated with the increase in public debt was an increase in the
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to repeal the
Convertibility Law and adopt a new, provisional fixed exchange rate of 1.4 pesos to the dollar (a 29% devaluation) and the conversion of all the bank accounts denominated in dollars into pesos and its transformation in bonds ("Corralon"); soon afterward it completely abandoned its peg
604:
financial crises pounded at the economy by further increasing interest rates as foreign investors became much warier of where they invested their assets, continuing to keep the cost of borrowing high for
Argentina. The Brazilian crisis of 1999 probably had the most severe effect, because Brazil is
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from the countries that were
Argentina's major trading partners. Others argued that the peso should be pegged to the U.S. dollar because it would provide simplicity of understanding, the highest degree of safety, greater international credibility, and the promise of increased trade with the United
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Part of
President Menem's program included large-scale privatization of state-owned companies. Unfortunately, because of the fixed exchange rate, privatization agreements generally linked price increase flexibility to the rate of U.S. inflation, which was often higher than that in Argentina. The
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During the second half of 2001, the pressure mounted on the currency board but there was no clear way out. Since most of country's debt was denominated in U.S. dollars, there would be a huge cost to breaking the peg, not to mention the long-term damage to
Argentina's credibility in world capital
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trimmed this 4% in 1985, though the 1989 crisis pushed the shortfall to 7.6% (which could only be financed by suspending debt interest payments). Since
Argentina could not participate meaningfully in world capital markets given the great investment risk it posed, the only course available was the
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Argentina's currency board established a fixed pegging of one-to-one parity between the peso and the U.S. dollar. It also guaranteed full convertibility of pesos into U.S. dollars. The government hoped to establish local and international credibility in the peg and to limit the amount of local
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bonds. Tightening domestic credit became increasingly limited to the public sector: only US$ 17 billion of loans outstanding (45% of the total) were accounted for by private sector borrowers, and this declined to US$ 7 billion during the 1989 crisis. Accordingly, the nation's money supply
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rescinded the surcharge (by then, commercial banks had been writing off 5% of their loan portfolio a month). The debacle shattered credit market confidence locally for the rest of the 1980s, directly contributing to the negative economic climate in Argentina during those years.
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and Cavallo had to resign. First Ramón Puerta took the presidency, followed by Rodríguez Sáa two days later. In the week he was in charge, Argentina suspended payments on its external debt. In January 2002, the new president Eduardo Duhalde ordered his finance minister
595:
External shocks also affected the Argentine currency board. The first was the Mexican crisis of 1994–1995, resulting in a liquidity crunch that drove interest rates sharply higher, stalling growth and spurring unemployment. In quick succession, the ensuing
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also increased dramatically, reflecting the growing degree of openness of the country. Imports increased from US$ 11.6 billion in 1991 to US$ 32.3 billion in 2000. Likewise, exports also increased from US$ 12.1 billion in 1991 to US$ 30.7 billion in 2000.
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At the time, there was much debate in Argentina and abroad about how to control inflation and build confidence in local currencies in order to foster investment and growth. There were three options of exchange rate management available to any government: a
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Another reason for the instability of the Argentine currency was the fragility of domestic financial institutions. The Argentine banking crisis of 1990 underlined this point, as the Central Bank moved to confiscate the deposits of commercial banks with the
681:
de la Torre, Augusto; Levy Yeyati, Eduardo & Schmukler, Sergio L. (2003) Living and Dying with Hard Pegs: The Rise and Fall of Argentina's Currency Board, Journal of LACEA Economia, LACEA - LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC
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Levy-Yeyati, Eduardo & Martinez Peria, Maria Soledad & Schmukler, Sergio L., 2004. Market discipline under systemic risk - evidence from bank runs in emerging economies, Policy Research Working Paper Series 3440, The World
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relative prices of public utilities thus increased and shifted wealth from the state to the privatized firms which, without any exchange control restraints, were free to expatriate these windfalls and invest them elsewhere.
571:
Income inequality increased: the bottom 20% of the population decreased its share of national income from 4.6% in 1991 to 4.1% in 2000, while the top 20% of the population increased its share from 50.4% to 51.4%.
255:- particularly in the industrial sector. Social indicators deteriorated seriously: real wages collapsed to about half of their 1974 peak and income poverty rates increased from 27% in 1980 to 47% in 1989.
560:. Unemployment increased from 6.1% in 1991 to 15% in 2000 as the fixed exchange rate increased foreign price competition and forced local firms to invest in more advanced technologies that required less
502:
The Argentine currency board violated all these rules at one time or another, except that of a fixed exchange rate. Full convertibility with the U.S. dollar became jeopardized upon implementation of
408:
Before the implementation of the currency board there was much debate over which currency or currencies to peg the peso against. In the view of many economists, the peso should have been pegged to a
672:
Baer, Werner; Elosegui, Pedro & Gallo, Andrés. (2002) The Achievements and Failures of Argentina's Neo-Liberal Economic Policies, Oxford Development Studies, Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 63–85.
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control over monetary and fiscal policy. The currency board regime intended to stabilize the peso, encourage both foreign and local investment, and foster sustained economic growth.
675:
Bird, Graham. (2002) Argentina's Currency Board: Cry for Argentina - But not for its currency board, New Economy: Surrey Centre for International Economic Studies, pp. 158–165.
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not have the U.S. dollar as their currency, the peso was fluctuating according to the U.S. dollar and not according to Argentina's actual economic position (this is known as the "
685:
Dornbusch, Rudi. (2001) Exchange Rates and the Choice of Monetary-Policy Regimes: Fewer Monies, Better Monies, AEA Papers and Proceedings, May, Volume 91, No. 2, pp. 238–242.
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Argentina implemented its currency board in April 1991. Its main achievement was in controlling inflation, which was brought down from more than 3,000% in 1989 to 3.4% in 1994.
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between its notes and coins and the currency against which they are pegged, at a fixed rate of exchange, with no restrictions on current-account or capital-account transactions.
610:
691:
Gurtner, Francois J. (2003) Currency Boards and Debt Traps: Evidence from Argentina and Relevance for Estonia, (Oxford, Blackwell Publishing Ltd.), pp. 209–228.
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Edwards, Sebastian. (2002) The Great Exchange Rate Debate after Argentina, The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Volume 13, Issue 3, pp. 237–252.
498:. The peg with the foreign currency tends to keep interest rates and inflation very closely aligned to those in the country against whose currency the peg is fixed.
803:
Living and dying with hard pegs: the rise and fall of Argentina's currency board, De la Torre, Augusto & Levy Yeyati, Eduardo & Schmukler, Sergio L., 2003)
678:
Cavallo, Domingo F. & Cottani, Joaquin A. (1997) Argentina's Convertibility Plan and the IMF, AEA Papers and Proceedings, May, Vol. 87, No. 2, pp. 17–22.
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bearing the brunt. One particularly damaging austerity policy was the Central Bank Circular 1050. Enacted in 1980, it tied monthly installment payments to the
1056:
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The Crisis that Was Not Prevented: Lessons for Argentina, the IMF, and Globalisation, Jan Joost Teunissen and Age Akkerman (eds.), Fondad, 2003, book, pdf)
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Levy Yeyati, Eduardo (2006) Liquidity Insurance in a Financially Dollarized Economy, NBER Working Papers 12345, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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of the peso, which lost 75% of its value with respect to the U.S. dollar in a matter of months, stabilizing at a rate of 2.9 pesos per dollar by 2003.
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imposed tight monetary discipline upon its own institutions, which made it more expensive to borrow money because banks were required to keep higher
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Hanke, Steve H. (2003) The Argentine Straw Man: A response to Currency Board Critics, Cato Journal, Spring/Summer, Vol. 23, No. 1, p. 47-57.
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216:. While it initially met with considerable success, the board's actions ultimately failed. The peso was only pegged to the dollar until 2002.
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This caused an enormous demand for dollars and transformed the normal change of 1.40 pesos per dollar to 4 pesos per dollar in 5 months.
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and infused the country with cash to finance its fiscal deficits. However, the linchpin of the new system was the introduction of the
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restricted bank deposit withdrawals to a maximum of 1000 pesos/dollars per month until 3 March 2002. This was popularly known as
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Hanke, Steve H. (2002) On Dollarization and Currency Boards: Error and Deception, Policy Reform, Vol 5 (4), pp. 203–222.
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For most of the period between 1975 and 1990, Argentina experienced hyperinflation (averaging 325% a year), poor or negative
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to finance the large fiscal deficits maintained by successive governments. Driven by rising tax evasion and losses among
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Horn, Gustav A., Fritsche, Ulrich. (2002) Argentina in Crisis, DIW Economic Bulletin, Vol. 39, No. 4, pp. 119–126.
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peaked in 1989, reaching 5,000% that year. GDP was 10% lower than in 1980 and per capita GDP had fallen by over 20%.
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from interest on reserves (less the expense of note-issuing), and does not engage in forward-exchange transactions.
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Another major accomplishment of the system was renewed economic growth. Enjoying the high world prices of
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took office six months in advance. His early attempts to stabilize inflation failed, resulting in further
308:) fell by nearly identical figures, while affluent Argentine nationals held over US$ 50 billion overseas.
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in Argentina, which rose over ten-fold between early 1981 and July 1982, when new Central Bank President
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613:"). Simply put, the dollar peg overvalued the peso in the rest of the world, especially against a weak
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financing of these fiscal deficits by monetizing them. This meant that the government levied an
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must be sufficient to ensure that all holders of its notes and coins can convert them into the
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and unskilled workers lost ground compared to managerial and professional income groups.
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States. The latter argument won the day, with both positive and negative consequences.
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of the peso), and dollarization (using U.S. dollars as the country's only currency).
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530:(Argentina's main exports), GDP grew at an annual rate of 8% between 1991 until the
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Despite these impressive results, side effects on social issues included increased
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and does not lend to the government. Governments cannot print money, and can only
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To a large extent, the main reason behind this long period of hyperinflation was un
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to pay for the fiscal deficits, which in turn contributed to stalling growth.
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In April 1991, Menem reverted the country's policies according to ideas of
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Schuler, Kurt. (2002) Fixing Argentina, Policy Analysis, July 16, No. 445.
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reached 10% of GDP in 1983. Austerity measures pursued by President
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1990s economic policy pegging the Argentine peso to the US dollar
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645:. The effect of the Corralito was so unpopular that president
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There were also external factors that further triggered the
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and allowed the peso to float freely, resulting in a swift
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was a plan by the Argentine Currency Board that pegged the
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A currency board has no discretionary powers to affect
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fell by over half and, by 1989, could not cover yearly
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The main qualities of an orthodox currency board are:
243:. After eight currency crises since the early 1970s,
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fluctuations. In the early 1980s, for example, the
49:. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed.
208:between 1991 and 2002 in an attempt to eliminate
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484:A currency board does not attempt to manipulate
1193:1994 amendment of the Constitution of Argentina
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109:Learn how and when to remove this message
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925:2018–present Argentine monetary crisis
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295:crunch by exchanging certain types of
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775:Argentina: From Insolvency to Growth.
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60: –
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54:Find sources:
48:
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32:This article
30:
26:
21:
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1183:AMIA bombing
1172:
1163:Plaza del sí
1135:Carlos Menem
1077:Trade unions
989:Central Bank
894:
880:Austral plan
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682:ASSOCIATION.
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566:productivity
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41:Please help
36:verification
33:
1330:Zulema Yoma
1289:Ivo Rojnica
940:Agriculture
885:Spring plan
632:devaluation
564:and higher
206:U.S. dollar
1345:Categories
1168:BONEX plan
1143:Presidency
890:BONEX plan
728:References
598:1997 Asian
552:, unequal
397:, a super-
377:and labor
315:, such as
289:BONEX plan
241:investment
220:Background
164:2001 riots
160:Cacerolazo
69:newspapers
1294:Swiftgate
1202:Elections
1042:Companies
875:Rodrigazo
647:de la Rúa
643:Corralito
293:liquidity
245:inflation
149:Corralito
1299:Yomagate
1277:Scandals
1072:Taxation
794:Archived
711:See also
617:and the
440:reserves
389:System.
232:and the
155:Corralón
1021:Tourism
984:Banking
963:Whaling
958:Tobacco
863:·
853:History
667:Sources
508:exports
494:like a
356:austral
354:of the
262:of the
238:capital
204:to the
83:scholar
1308:Family
1151:Events
1011:Mining
1001:Energy
953:Timber
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452:profit
169:Apagón
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1030:Other
809:Bank)
562:labor
558:wages
512:bonds
301:BONEX
188:edit
90:JSTOR
76:books
1243:Laws
968:Wine
948:Beef
749:ISBN
615:euro
600:and
299:for
196:The
62:news
473:to
464:tax
226:GDP
45:by
1347::
763:^
588:.
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362:.
306:M2
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