903:"trader-turned hedge fund manager" telling him, "guys who can't get a job on Wall Street get a job at Moody's," as Moody's paid much less. This was despite the fact that a job at Moody'sâor any of the other rating agenciesâgave an analyst the power to upgrade or downgrade a security, whereas the higher paid analysts' recommendations at Wall Street investment banks had no such impact on the market. However, the difference in pay meant that the "smartest" analysts at the credit rating agencies "leave for Wall Street firms where they could use their knowledge (of criteria used to rate securities) to manipulate the companies they used to work for." Consequently, it was widely known on Wall Street that the "inner workings" of the rating models used by the credit rating agencies, while "officially, a secret", "were ripe for exploitation." At least one other investment firm that bet against the agencies' credit ratings with huge success believed "there was a massive amount of gaming going on."
645:") against mortgage default. Synthetics "referenced" cash CDOs, and rather than providing investors with interest and principal payments from MBS tranches, they paid insurance premium-like payments from credit default swap "insurance". If the referenced CDOs defaulted, investors lost their investment, which was paid out as insurance. Because synthetics referenced another (cash) CDO, more than oneâin fact numerousâsynthetics could be made to reference the same original. This multiplied the effect if a referenced security defaulted.
2616:... both Moody's and S&P favored floating-rate mortgages with low teaser rates over fixed-rate ones. Or that they didn't care if a loan had been made in a booming real estate market or a quiet one. Or that they were seemingly oblivious to the fraud implicit in no-doc loans. Or that they were blind to the presence of 'silent seconds' -- second mortgages that left the homeowner with no equity in his home and thus no financial incentive not to hand the keys to the bank and walk away from it.
1224:
had to calculate the statistical probabilities that certain kinds of mortgages might default, and to estimate the revenues that would be lost because of those defaults. Then investors had to determine the effect of the losses on the payments to different tranches. This complexity transformed the three leading credit rating agenciesâMoody's, Standard & Poor's (S&P), and Fitchâinto key players in the process, positioned between the issuers and the investors of securities.
680:
776:
the product was available, prohibit credit rating agencies from structuring the same products that they rate, and require the public disclosure of the information a credit rating agency uses to determine a rating on a structured product, including information on the underlying assets. The last proposed requirement is designed to facilitate "unsolicited" ratings of structured securities by rating agencies not compensated by issuers.
979:
down only 1% from 98% in 2007. Critics have complained that the criteria to designate a rating agency as "a nationally recognized statistical rating organization" was written by a "yet-to-be-identified official of one of the big three ratings agencies", and is so difficult that it has "prevented at least one potential competitor from winning approval and have dissuaded others from even applying". Former
Federal Reserve chairman
581:", each with a different priority in the debt repayment stream of income. The most "senior" tranches highest up in priority of revenueâwhich usually made up most of the pool of debtâreceived the triple A ratings. This made them eligible for purchase by the pension funds and money market funds restricted to top-rated debt, and for use by banks wanting to reduce costly capital requirements under
1393:
what
Goldman Sachs had cleverly done. it was absurd. The 100 buildings occupied the same floodplain; in the event of flood, the ground floors of all of them were equally exposed. But never mind: the rating agencies, who were paid fat fees by Goldman Sachs and other Wall Street firms for each deal they rated, pronounced 80% of the new tower of debt triple-A." (source: Michael Lewis,
984:
responsible for misleading investors about the safety of risky debt vehicles that they had rated". The suits were filed in 2008 and had sought more than $ 700 million of damages. Settlement terms were not disclosed in both cases, and the lawsuits were dismissed "with prejudice", meaning they cannot be brought again. Other lawsuits are still outstanding as of
September 2013.
1294:
do that because you know the people that we were selling these bonds to had never really had any history in the mortgage business. ... They were looking for an independent party to develop an opinion," Jim
Callahan told the FCIC; Callahan is CEO of PentAlpha, which services the securitization industry, and years ago he worked on some of the earliest securitizations
2495:, told the FCIC that they had warned the SEC in 2007 that the agencies were dangerously overoptimistic in their assessment of mortgage-backed CDOs. Mai and Hockett saw the rating agencies as "the root of the mess," because their ratings removed the need for buyers to study prices and perform due diligence, even as "there was a massive amount of gaming going on."
938:
and FICO scores ignored and personal or household income. Thus did low income immigrants increase the percentage of pool of loans that could be declared triple-A" and explain otherwise unlikely sounding press reports of a "Mexican strawberry picker with an income of $ 14,000 and no
English" being "lent every penny he needed to buy a house of $ 724,000".
1259:
Department of Labor restricts pension fund investments to securities rated A or higher. Credit ratings affect even private transactions: contracts may contain triggers that require the posting of collateral or immediate repayment, should a security or entity be downgraded. Triggers played an important role in the financial crisis and helped cripple AIG.
907:
that particular institution, but notifying management of any such interview was the responsibility of the employee. After getting a job at an investment bank, former employees were barred from interacting with Moody's on "the same series of deals they had rated while in its employ", but not on any other deals with Moody's.
510:
1392:
80%. "In a CDO you gathered a 100 different mortgage bondsâusually the riskiest lower floors of the original tower ... They bear a lower credit rating triple B. ... if you could somehow get them rerated as triple A, thereby lowering their perceived risk, however dishonestly and artificially. This is
1258:
Credit ratings also determined whether investors could buy certain investments at all. The SEC restricts money market funds to purchasing "securities that have received credit ratings from any two NRSROs ... in one of the two highest short-term rating categories or comparable unrated securities." The
1223:
Purchasers of the safer tranches got a higher rate of return than ultra-safe
Treasury notes without much extra riskâat least in theory. However, the financial engineering behind these investments made them harder to understand and to price than individual loans. To determine likely returns, investors
865:
One study of "6,500 structured debt ratings" produced by
Standard & Poor's, Moody's and Fitch, found ratings by agencies "biased in favour of issuer clients that provide the agencies with more rating business. This result points to a powerful conflict of interest, which goes beyond the occasional
848:
Another email between colleagues at
Standard & Poor's written before the bubble burst, suggests awareness of what would happen to the securities they were giving top ratings to: "Rating agencies continue to create and even bigger monster--the CDO market. Let's hope we are all wealthy and retired
687:
Rating agencies lowered the credit ratings on $ 1.9 trillion in mortgage backed securities from the third fiscal quarter (1 Julyâ30 September) of 2007 to the second quarter (1 Aprilâ30 June) of 2008. One institution, Merrill Lynch, sold more than $ 30 billion of collateralized debt obligations for 22
1293:
Participants in the securitization industry realized that they needed to secure favorable credit ratings in order to sell structured products to investors. Investment banks therefore paid handsome fees to the rating agencies to obtain the desired ratings. "The rating agencies were important tools to
978:
However, in 2013, McClatchy
Newspapers found that "little competition has emerged in rating the kinds of complex home-mortgage securities whose implosion led to the 2007 financial crisis". In the 12 months that ended in June 2011, the SEC reported that the big three issued 97% of all credit ratings,
937:
One way was to convince immigrants to buy homes. People who had not been in the country long, often had "never failed to repay a debt, because they had never been given a loan". Such people had surprisingly high FICO scores if you ignored the short credit history or "thin file". Rating agencies did,
662:
By the end of 2009, over half of the collateralized debt obligations by value issued at the end of the housing bubble (from 2005â2007) that rating agencies gave their highest "triple-A" rating to, were "impaired"âthat is either written-down to "junk" or suffered a "principal loss" (i.e. not only had
628:
Trust in rating agencies was particularly important for CDOs for another reasonâtheir contents were subject to change, so CDO managers "didn't always have to disclose what the securities contained". This lack of transparency did not affect demand for the securities. Investors "weren't so much buying
1164:
Without those AAA ratings, the gold standard for debt, banks, insurance companies and pension funds wouldn't have bought the products. Bank write-downs and losses on the investments totaling $ 523.3 billion led to the collapse or disappearance of Bear
Stearns Cos., Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. and
906:
When asked by the FCIC Commission about "the high turnover" and "revolving door that often left raters dealing with their old colleagues, this time as clients", Moody's officials stated their employees were prohibited from rating deals by a bank or issuer while they were interviewing for a job with
775:
proposed far-reaching rules designed to address perceived conflicts of interest between rating agencies and issuers of structured securities. The proposal would, among other things, prohibit a credit rating agency from issuing a rating on a structured product unless information on assets underlying
648:
Here again the giving of triple-A ratings to "large chunks" of synthetics by the rating agencies was crucial to the securities' success. The buyer of synthetic tranches (who often went on to lose his investment) was seldom an analyst "who had investigated the mortgage-backed security", was aware of
1378:
70%. "Firms bought mortgage-backed bonds with the very highest yields they could find and reassembled them into new CDOs. The original bonds ... could be lower-rated securities that once reassembled into a new CDO would wind up with as much as 70% of the tranches rated triple-A. Ratings arbitrage,
1197:
Adam Davidson: And by the way, before you finance enthusiasts start writing any letters, we do know that $ 70 trillion technically refers to that subset of global savings called fixed income securities. ... Ceyla Pazarbasioglu: This number doubled since 2000. In 2000 this was about $ 36 trillion.
878:
According to journalists McLean and Nocera, "The analysts in structured finance were working 12 to 15 hours a day. They made a fraction of the pay of even a junior investment banker. There were far more deals in the pipeline than they could possibly handle. They were overwhelmed. Moody's top brass
874:
While Moody's and other credit rating agencies were quite profitableâMoody's operating margins were consistently over 50%, higher than famously successful Exxon Mobil or Microsoft, and its stock rose 340% between the time it was spun off into a public company and February 2007âsalaries and bonuses
762:
Dozens of suits involving claims of inaccurate ratings were filed against the rating agencies by investors. Plaintiffs have included by collateralized debt obligation investors (the state of Ohio for losses of $ 457 million, California state employees for $ 1 billion), the bankrupt investment bank
596:
According to the CEO of a servicer of the securitization industry, Jim Callahan of PentAlpha, "The rating agencies were important tools to do that because you know the people that we were selling these bonds to had never really had any history in the mortgage business. ... They were looking for an
933:
of the pool of scores, it left out useful information. A pool of loans composed of borrowers all of whom had a FICO score of 615 was likely far fewer defaults than a pool of loans with the same average but more dispersionâe.g.composed of borrowers half of whom had FICO scores of 550 and half 680,
822:
Richard Michalek, a former vice president and senior credit officer at Moody's, testified to the FCIC that even when they were not realized, "The threat of losing business to a competitor ... absolutely tilted the balance away from an independent arbiter of risk ...." When asked if the investment
716:
The mortgage-related securities at the heart of the crisis could not have been marketed and sold without their seal of approval. Investors relied on them, often blindly. In some cases, they were obligated to use them, or regulatory capital standards were hinged on them. This crisis could not have
620:
To sell these "mezzanine" tranches, investment bankers pooled them to form another securityâknown as a collateralized debt obligation (CDO). Though the raw material of these "obligations" was made up of BBB, Aâ, etc. tranches, the CRAs rated 70% to 80% of the new CDO tranches triple A. The 20â30%
536:
Demand for the securities was stimulated by the large global pool of fixed income investments which had doubled from $ 36 trillion in 2000 to $ 70 trillion by 2006âmore than annual global spendingâand the low interest rates from competing fixed income securities, made possible by the low interest
983:
complained in a September 2013 article on banking and the shortcoming of post-crisis financial reform, that "no meaningful reform of the credit-rating agencies has been undertaken". In the spring of 2013, Moody's and Standard & Poor's settled two "long-running" lawsuits "seeking to hold them
882:
Moody's Team manager Gary Witt complained that "penny-pinching" and "stingy" management was reluctant to pay up for experienced employees. "The problem of recruiting and retaining good staff was insoluble. Investment banks often hired away our best people. As far as I can remember, we were never
794:
The FCIC commission found that agencies' credit ratings were influenced by "flawed computer models, the pressure from financial firms that paid for the ratings, the relentless drive for market share, the lack of resources to do the job despite record profits, and the absence of meaningful public
576:
sponsored by the Federal government. Their safety wasn't questioned by conservative money managers. Non-prime private label mortgage securities were neither made up of loans to borrowers with high credit ratings nor insured by a government enterprise, so issuers used an innovation in securities
857:
Critics have claimed there was a conflict of interest for agenciesâa conflict between accommodating clients for whom higher ratings of debt mean higher earnings, and accurately rating the debt for the benefit of the debt buyer/investor customers, who provide no revenue to the agencies. Being a
691:
The net worth of financial institutions owning the newly downgraded securities declined, requiring the institutions to acquire additional capital, to maintain capital ratios, which in turn often lowered the net-worth value of the institutions above and beyond the low of value of the downgraded
481:
The pools of debt the agencies gave their highest ratings to included over three trillion dollars of loans to homebuyers with bad credit and undocumented incomes through 2007. Hundreds of billions of dollars' worth of these triple-A securities were downgraded to "junk" status by 2010, and the
1002:
at least one rating agencyâS&Pâresponded to the credit crisis by first tightening up its standards and sacrificing market share to restore its reputation, after which it loosened standards again "to get more business", tripling its market share in the first half of 2013. This is because,
612:
Rating agencies were even more important in disposing of the MBS tranches that could not be rated triple A. Although these made up a minority of the value of the MBS tranches, unless buyers were found for them, it would not be profitable to make the security in the first place. And because
2740:
S.& P. said that the lawsuit was an effort to punish it for exercising its First Amendment rights ... It said the government's "impermissibly selective, punitive and meritless" lawsuit was brought "in retaliation for defendants' exercise of their free-speech rights with respect to the
1408:"According to data compiled by the FCIC, tranches from CDOs rose from an average of 7% of the collateral in mortgage-backed CDOs in 2003 to 14% by 2007. CDO-Squared dealsâthose engineered primarily from the tranches of other CDOsâgrew from 36 marketwide in 2005 to 48 in 2006 and 41 2007."
738:
considered "the rating agencies as one of the key culprits... They were the party that performed the alchemy that converted the securities from F-rated to A-rated. The banks could not have done what they did without the complicity of the rating agencies." In their book on the
588:
The complexity of analyzing the debt pool mortgages and tranche priority, and the position of the Big Three credit rating agencies "between the issuers and the investors of securities", is what "transformed" the agencies into "key" players in the process, according to the
934:
since someone who had earned a FICO score as low as 550 "was virtually certain to default". Knowing this blind spot, securities issuers who could no longer find high-FICO-scoring families who wanted to take out a mortgage found other ways to raise the average pool score.
2453:
Nobody gives a f**k if Goldman Sachs likes General Electric paper, if Moody's downgrades GE paper, it is a big deal. So why does the guy at Moody's want to work at Goldman Sachs? The guy who is a bank analyst at Goldman's should want to go to Moody's. It should be that
763:
Bear Stearns (for losses of $ 1.12 billion from alleged "fraudulently issuing inflated ratings for securities"), bond insurers. The U.S. Government is also a plaintiff (suing S&P for $ 5 billion for "misrepresenting the credit risk of complex financial products").
692:
securities. Adding to the financial chain reaction were regulationsâgovernmental or internalârequiring some institutional investors to carry only investment-grade (e.g., "BBB" and better) assets. A downgrade below that meant forced asset sales and further devaluation.
675:
including over-collateralization (i.e., pledging collateral in excess of debt issued), credit default insurance, and equity investors willing to bear the first losses. But as of September 2008, bank writedowns and losses on these investments totaled $ 523 billion.
663:
they not paid interest but investors would not get back some of the principal they invested). The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission estimates that by April 2010, of all mortgage-backed securities Moody's had rated triple-A in 2006, 73% were downgraded to junk.
2213:"UBS banker Rovert Morelli, upon hearing that S&P might be revising its RMSBS ratings, sent an e-mail to an S&P analyst. 'Heard your ratings could be 5 notches back of moddys equivalent, Gonna kill you resi biz. May force us to do moddyfitch only ...'"
593:. "Participants in the securitization industry realized that they needed to secure favorable credit ratings in order to sell structured products to investors. Investment banks therefore paid handsome fees to the rating agencies to obtain the desired ratings."
640:
Still another structured product was the "synthetic CDO". Cheaper and easier to create than original "cash" CDOs, these securities did not provide funding for housing. Instead synthetic CDO-buying investors were in effect providing insurance (in the form of
1487:"Unlike the traditional cash CDO, synthetic CDOs contained no actual tranches of mortgage-backed securities ... in the place of real mortgage assets, these CDOs contained credit default swaps and did not finance a single home purchase." (source:
795:
oversight." McLean and Nocera blame credit ratings lapses on "an erosion of standards, a willful suspension of skepticism, a hunger for big fees and market share, and an inability to stand up to" the investment banks issuing the securities.
1003:
according to Norris, for rating franchises to be worth anything, they must seem to be credible to investors. But once they overcome that minimal hurdle, they will get more business if they are less critical than their competitors.
926:, the "best-known and most widely used credit score model". The average FICO score needed to be about 615 for a pool of loans to meet rating agencies' minimum standard and allow a maximum percentage of triple-A rated tranches.
1061:
Driven by competition for fees and market share, the New York-based companies stamped out top ratings on debt pools that included $ 3.2 trillion of loans to homebuyers with bad credit and undocumented incomes between 2002 and
779:
On 3 December 2008, the SEC approved measures to strengthen oversight of credit rating agencies, following a ten-month investigation that found "significant weaknesses in ratings practices," including conflicts of interest.
653:
standards, or that the payments they would receive were often coming from investors betting against mortgage-backed security solvency. Rather, "it was someone who was buying a rating and thought he couldn't lose money."
625:" securities which also produced tranches rated mostly triple A by rating agencies. This process was disparaged as a way of transforming "dross into gold" or "ratings laundering" by at least some business journalists.
600:
From 2000 to 2007, Moody's rated nearly 45,000 mortgage-related securitiesâmore than half of those it ratedâas triple-A. In contrast only six (private sector) companies in the United States were given that top rating.
724:
Commissioner Kathleen Casey complained the ratings of the large rating agencies were "catastrophically misleading", yet the agencies "enjoyed their most profitable years ever during the past decade" while doing so.
2049:
The five billion dollar lawsuit accuses S&P of misrepresenting the credit risk of complex financial products including residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDO)
2316:
And let's not forget our credit rating agencies, which happily bestowed AAA ratings on securitized loans in return for enormous fees that were paid in return by the issuers themselves. (It's called "conflict of
1770:
819:âone of the largest agencies. But there was always a danger of losing out on this lucrative business. Issuers played the three big credit agencies off one another, 'shopping' around to find the best ratings.
951:
whether a lender had a 'silent second', i.e. an undisclosed second mortgages that left the homeowner with no equity in his home and thus no financial incentive not abandon it if real estate prices declined;
2800:
For nearly four years, credit rating agencies like Standard & Poor's have tried to use the First Amendment as a shield against angry investors who have demanded compensation for bad bets on the housing
753:
criticized rating agencies for continuing "to slap their triple-A s on subprime securities even as the underwriting deterioratedâand as the housing boom turned into an outright bubble" in 2005, 2006, 2007.
666:
Mortgage underwriting standards deteriorated to the point that between 2002 and 2007 an estimated $ 3.2 trillion in loans were made to homeowners with bad credit and undocumented incomes (e.g., subprime or
1077:(CDOs) issued in 2005â2007 (over half of the CDOs by value during that time period) that rating agencies gave their highest "triple-A" rating to, were written down to "junk" by the end of 2009. (source:
858:
publicly traded firm intensifies the pressure to grow and increase profits. Of the two biggest agencies Moody's became a public firm in 2001, while Standard & Poor's is part of the publicly traded
1120:
Overall, my findings suggest that the problems in the CDO market were caused by a combination of poorly constructed CDOs, irresponsible underwriting practices, and flawed credit rating procedures.
827:âOh God, are you kidding? All the time. I mean, that's routine. I mean, they would threaten you all of the time. . . . It's like, âWell, next time, we're just going to go with Fitch and S&P.'â
995:). This maintains a credit rating is an opinion protected as free speech and requires plaintiffs to prove actual malice by the agency However, some wonder if the defense will ultimately prevail.
671:
mortgages) and bundled into MBSs and collateralized debt obligations that received high ratings and therefore could be sold to global investors. Higher ratings were believed justified by various
975:
was passed, intending to break the dominance of the "big three" agenciesâStandard & Poor's, Moody's, and Fitchâby making it easier to qualify as a "nationally recognized" ratings agency.
1932:| Daniel Indiviglio| theatlantic.com| Nov 20 2009| quote from Ohio's attorney general="credit rating agencies, in exchange for fees, departed from their objective, neutral role as arbiters,"
1514:
1270:"under Basel II, a AAA rated securitization requires capital allocation of only 0.6%, a BBB requires 4.8%, a BB requires 34%, whilst a BB(-) securitization requires a 52% allocation"
915:
According to the hedge fund managers Michael Lewis talked to who had bet against mortgages securities, there were a number of ways to game or "reverse-engineer" the raters' models.
3093:
269:
2723:
3088:
2682:
963:"The models used by the rating agencies were riddled with these sorts of opportunities", according to Lewis. "The trick was finding them" before other security issuers did.
71:
3118:
450:
according to the debtor's ability to pay lenders back, played a significant role at various stages in the American subprime mortgage crisis of 2007â2008 that led to the
220:
811:, their traditional business. On top of revenue generated for issuing credit ratings, agencies often earned $ 300,000â500,000 and as much as $ 1 million to construct a
3055:
2491:
Betting against CDOs was also, in some cases, a bet against the rating agencies and their models. Jamie Mai and Ben Hockett, principals at the small investment firm
789:
2076:
3138:
1918:
Investors, including public pension funds and foreign banks, lost hundreds of billions of dollars, and have since filed dozens of lawsuits against the agencies.
235:
823:
banks frequently threatened to withdraw their business if they didn't get their desired rating, former Moody team managing director Gary Witt told the FCIC,
717:
happened without the rating agencies. Their ratings helped the market soar and their downgrades through 2007 and 2008 wreaked havoc across markets and firms."
2668:(chart of percentage of outstanding credit ratings reported to the SEC 2007 and 2011; and Moody's revenue and income 1996, 2000, 2010, 2012)| mcclatchydc.com
731:
magazine opined that "it is beyond argument that ratings agencies did a horrendous job evaluating mortgage-tied securities before the financial crisis hit."
3022:
113:
2032:
2960:
541:
for much of that period. These high ratings encouraged the flow of global investor funds into these securities funding the housing bubble in the US.
988:
153:
3108:
2661:
987:
In the dozens of suits filed against them by investors involving claims of inaccurate ratings the rating agencies have defended themselves using a
884:
405:
215:
103:
1945:
1813:
the ten-member commission appointed by the United States government with the goal of investigating the causes of the financial crisis of 2007â2010
883:
allocated funds to make counter offers. We had almost no ability to do meaningful research." When asked about this by the FCIC, Moody's president
1165:
Merrill Lynch & Co. and compelled the Bush administration to propose buying $ 700 billion of bad debt from distressed financial institutions.
1929:
700:
In the wake of the financial crisis of 2007â2010, the rating agencies came under criticism from investigators, economists, and journalists. The
3113:
190:
1680:
1518:
1198:
Adam Davidson: So it took several hundred years for the world to get to $ 36 trillion. And then it took six years to get another $ 36 trillion
1842:""In Search of Transparency, Accountability, and Competition: The Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies", remarks at "The SEC Speaks in 2009""
899:
argues that the low pay of credit rating agency employees allowed security issuers to game the ratings of their securities. Lewis quotes one
56:
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rating agencies were "essential cogs in the wheel of financial destruction" and "key enablers of the financial meltdown". It went on to say
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210:
1653:
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3143:
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2755:"Note, Credit Rating Agencies and the First Amendment: Applying Constitutional Journalistic Protections to Subprime Mortgage Litigation"
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1395:
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478:âwere restricted in their bylaws to holding only the safest securitiesâi.e. securities the rating agencies designated "triple-A".
66:
3194:
3012:
772:
721:
614:
1582:. National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States. 2011. pp. 228â9, figure 11.4
923:
3133:
2985:
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2149:
2872:
1975:
521:
Credit rating agencies came under scrutiny following the mortgage crisis for giving investment-grade, "money safe" ratings to
2345:
2064:
195:
807:"âin the words of one agency manager. Agencies earned as much as three times more for grading these complex products as for
2479:
2411:
836:
398:
352:
2814:
2581:
1885:
701:
2930:"Morgan Stanley Plans to Turn Downgraded Loan CDO Into AAA Bonds", Pierre Paulden, Caroline Salas and Sarah Mulholland,
1379:
Wall Street called this practice. A more accurate term would have been ratings laundering." (source: McLean and Nocera,
3230:
1757:
709:
185:
98:
51:
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604:
By December 2008, there were over $ 11 trillion structured finance securities outstanding in the US bond market debt.
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2783:
2565:
2532:
2446:
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1221:. National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States. 2011. pp. 43â44.
879:... wouldn't add staff because they didn't want to be stuck with the cost of employees if the revenues slowed down."
451:
436:
200:
180:
1087:. National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States. 2011. pp. 228â9.
815:. By 2007 the business accounted for just under half of the total ratings revenue and all of the revenue growth for
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347:
1993:
2990:
2522:
2397:. National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States. 2011. p. 149.
2182:. National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States. 2011. p. 210.
1342:. National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States. 2011. p. xxv.
1291:. National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States. 2011. p. 44.
972:
573:
458:" used to finance subprime mortgages could not have been sold without ratings by the "Big Three" rating agenciesâ
391:
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1719:. National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States. 2011. p. 122
463:
3148:
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1074:
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704:(FCIC) set up by the U.S. Congress and president to investigate the causes of the crisis, and publisher of the
530:
515:
Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States
61:
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1800:
812:
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205:
90:
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929:
While using an average was less work than getting a list of the borrowers' individual scores or finding the
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2687:
2018:
1155:
1052:
816:
459:
277:
3000:
2224:
1235:
945:
Moody's and S&P favoring of "floating-rate mortgages with low teaser rates over fixed-rate" mortgages;
617:
regulations or restrictions in their charters), these less-safe tranches were the most difficult to sell.
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1100:
307:
141:
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1742:
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their lack of interest in whether "a loan had been made in a booming real estate market or a quiet one";
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369:
835:
rating service one subpoenaed email sent by a security-issuing banker angry over possible revision of
3199:
2286:
1868:
561:"âwhose "financial engineering" make them "harder to understand and to price than individual loans".
364:
337:
2480:
National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States (2010).
2412:
National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States (2010).
1687:
3103:
2969:
1426:
Reckless Endangerment : How Outsized ambition, Greed and Corruption Led to Economic Armageddon
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admitted that investment banks paid more than his agency so retaining employees was "a challenge".
526:
432:
419:
41:
2375:
2077:
Standard & Poor's Says Civil Lawsuit Threatened By DOJ Is Without Legal Merit And Unjustified
918:
Rating agencies judged creditworthiness of a pool of loans in part by looking at the averages of
832:
741:
359:
159:
2132:
553:âsuch as subprime mortgage-backed securities (MBS), and collateralized debt obligations (CDO), "
3235:
875:
for non-management were low by Wall Street standards and its employees complained of overwork.
1515:"The Magnetar Trade: How One Hedge Fund Helped Keep the Bubble Going (Single Page)-April 2010"
1431:
564:
Earlier traditional and more simple "prime" mortgage securities were issued and guaranteed by
2090:"SEC Proposes Comprehensive Reforms to Bring Increased Transparency to Credit Rating Process"
1634:
650:
550:
2853:
The company rated only 22 percent of the bonds issued in 2011, down from 80 percent in 2006.
577:
structure to get higher agency ratings. They pooled debt and then "sliced" the result into "
538:
443:
428:
76:
2607:
2481:
2413:
2389:
2262:
2174:
1825:
1711:
1574:
1334:
1283:
1248:
1213:
1079:
839:
ratings, told an analyst: "Heard your ratings could be 5 notches back of moddys [
514:
8:
3204:
2225:
U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Government Oversight and Reform (2008-10-22).
1841:
642:
46:
485:
This led "to the collapse or disappearance" in 2008â09 of three major investment banks (
3173:
3158:
2703:
1794:
930:
672:
629:
a security" as they "were buying a triple-A rating", according to business journalists
455:
447:
2582:"Yearly Income, $ 14,000. Purchase of House, $ 720,000. Have we All Lost our Minds???"
621:
remaining mezzanine tranches were usually bought up by other CDOs, to make so-called "
3128:
2561:
2528:
2442:
2341:
2202:
2195:
1837:
1435:
1424:
471:
845:] equivalent, Gonna kill you resi biz. May force us to do moddyfitch only ..."
2897:
2840:
2492:
2334:
2110:
2089:
1309:
3045:
2665:
735:
490:
127:
26:
2938:
2227:"Committee Holds Hearing on the Credit Rating Agencies and the Financial Crisis"
2233:
808:
746:
630:
522:
302:
225:
147:
135:
3219:
3189:
2551:
2518:
2432:
2329:
2304:
2033:"Federal judge denies credit rating agency's motion to dismiss fraud lawsuit"
1775:
1743:
Bloomberg-Smith-Race to Bottom at Rating Agencies Secured Subprime Boom, Bust
1630:
900:
896:
803:
Structured investment mortgage-related securities were the rating agencies' "
727:
558:
494:
312:
2868:
2678:
1601:
1313:
999:
980:
919:
804:
486:
475:
1826:
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION Final Report-Conclusions-January 2011
956:
859:
622:
569:
554:
467:
297:
2065:
Corrupted credit ratings: Standard & Poor's lawsuit and the evidence
1886:
Ratings agencies suffer 'conflict of interest', says former Moody's boss
1788:
With trades scarce and losses mounting, it is going to be a harsh winter
941:
Other "opportunities" for issuers manipulating credit raters included
750:
679:
634:
565:
292:
2784:"S&P Lawsuit First Amendment Defense May Fare Poorly, Experts Say"
1902:"S&P Lawsuit First Amendment Defense May Fare Poorly, Experts Say"
509:
287:
2143:
2133:"CDOs mask huge subprime losses, abetted by credit rating agencies"
1323:. National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER Macroeconomics Annual.
1030:
All the Devils Are Here, the Hidden History of the Financial Crisis
582:
282:
613:
traditional mortgage investors were risk-averse (often because of
2724:"S.&P. Calls Federal Fraud Suit Payback for Credit Downgrade"
2150:
The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission: Final Report-Conclusions
1156:"Bringing Down Wall Street as Ratings Let Loose Subprime Scourge"
1053:"Bringing Down Wall Street as Ratings Let Loose Subprime Scourge"
578:
2635:"Industry wrote provision that undercuts credit-rating overhaul"
1137:
Bloomberg-Smith-Bringing Down Ratings Let Loose Subprime Scourge
533:(CDO)) based on "non-prime"âsubprime or Alt-Aâmortgages loans.
1994:"Liquidators of failed Bear Stearns funds sue rating agencies"
3094:
Acquired or bankrupt banks in the late 2000s financial crisis
1101:"The Story of the CDO Market Meltdown: An Empirical Analysis"
668:
1946:"Credit Rating Agencies Settle 2 Suits Brought by Investors"
869:
482:
writedowns and losses came to over half a trillion dollars.
1745:| By Elliot Blair Smith | bloomberg.com| September 25, 2008
1139:| By Elliot Blair Smith | bloomberg.com| September 24, 2008
221:
Government intervention during the subprime mortgage crisis
1654:"Banks learn to reprice risk in post-crisis credit market"
1187:. This American Life (radio program) from WBEZ. 9 May 2008
798:
3089:
DoddâFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
1430:. New York: Times Books, Henry Holt and Company. p.
922:
of borrowers who made up the security. The agencies used
841:
317:
72:
DoddâFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
1779:. 2007-11-08. Archived from the original on July 7, 2012
790:
Criticism of credit scoring systems in the United States
783:
236:
National fiscal policy response to the Great Recession
2902:"Banks Find S.&P. More Favorable in Bond Ratings"
2845:"Banks Find S.&P. More Favorable in Bond Ratings"
2815:"US credit raters set back on First Amendment--judge"
470:. A large section of the debt securities marketâmany
114:
Government policies and the subprime mortgage crisis
3139:
PublicâPrivate Investment Program for Legacy Assets
1681:"Interpreting Moody's Historical Default Rate Data"
2741:creditworthiness of the United States of America."
2333:
2194:
1423:
2968:
1930:Ohio Jumps On The Rating Agency Lawsuit Bandwagon
1760:| By Jon Birger| August 6, 2008| Fortune Magazine
3217:
2557:The Big Short : Inside the Doomsday Machine
2524:The Big Short : Inside the Doomsday Machine
2438:The Big Short : Inside the Doomsday Machine
2131:Tomlinson, Richard; Evans, David (1 June 2007).
1415:
1308:
216:Federal Reserve responses to the subprime crisis
104:Causes of the 2000s United States housing bubble
2092:. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. 2008
1421:
3114:Federal takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
2130:
1149:
1147:
1145:
1024:
1022:
1020:
1018:
1016:
544:
442:Credit rating agencies, firms which rate debt
425:Credit rating agencies and the subprime crisis
191:American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
109:Credit rating agencies and the subprime crisis
2954:
2683:"The Fed & Big Banking at the Crossroads"
1821:
1819:
910:
708:(FCIR), concluded that the "failures" of the
399:
57:2000s United States housing market correction
3084:Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008
2406:
2404:
2309:"Aspiring to Build a Better Financial World"
2256:"Email to Belinda Ghetti and Nicole Billick"
2192:
1888:| Rupert Neate| The Guardian| 22 August 2011
1422:Morgenson, Gretchen; Rosner, Joshua (2011).
1346:
1238:| Upstart Business Journal| December 5, 2007
657:
211:Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008
3154:2009 Supervisory Capital Assessment Program
3124:Homeowners Affordability and Stability Plan
2546:
2544:
2425:
2070:
2060:
2058:
1869:"Free speech or knowing misrepresentation?"
1758:The woman who called Wall Street's meltdown
1278:
1276:
1142:
1013:
241:Regulatory responses to the subprime crisis
3164:Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility
2961:
2947:
2691:. Archived from the original on 2013-09-20
2483:Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Report
2415:Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Report
2067:| Matthias Efing, Harald Hau, 18 June 2013
1969:
1967:
1816:
1753:
1751:
1396:The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
1154:Smith, Elliot Blair (September 24, 2008).
1051:Smith, Elliot Blair (September 24, 2008).
1044:
890:
849:by the time this house of cards falters."
597:independent party to develop an opinion,"
549:Ratings were/are vital to "private-label"
406:
392:
251:Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility
3079:Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008
2628:
2626:
2624:
2401:
2382:
2167:
1976:"Calpers Sues Over Ratings of Securities"
1940:
1938:
1896:
1894:
1848:. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
1738:
1736:
1734:
1678:
1327:
1041:(the raw material of the debt securities)
870:Unwillingness to spend on human resources
246:Subprime mortgage crisis solutions debate
231:Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008
154:ChinaâJapanâSouth Korea trilateral summit
2541:
2513:
2511:
2509:
2507:
2505:
2503:
2186:
2055:
2019:Bond Insurer Sues Credit-Rating Agencies
1273:
1241:
1098:
852:
683:MBS Credit Rating Downgrades, By Quarter
678:
508:
501:from distressed financial institutions.
174:Government response and policy proposals
3195:Financial position of the United States
2863:
2861:
2812:
2806:
2716:
2677:
2024:
1986:
1964:
1748:
1606:"Being Kept in the Dark on Wall Street"
1304:
1302:
1208:
1206:
1175:
1173:
1132:
1130:
1128:
1092:
799:Competitive pressure to lower standards
773:U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
722:U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
688:cents on the dollar in late July 2008.
504:
3218:
2896:
2890:
2867:
2839:
2813:Stempel, Jonathan (25 November 2011).
2671:
2632:
2621:
2600:
2574:
2472:
2030:
1935:
1891:
1731:
1635:"Basel II: back to the drawing board?"
1629:
1600:
2942:
2550:
2527:. WW Norton and Co. pp. 99â100.
2517:
2500:
2431:
2336:The Battle for the Soul of Capitalism
2328:
2303:
2253:
1973:
1830:
1153:
1050:
196:Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008
2858:
2746:
2612:April 16, 2007, Revised May 23, 2007
1860:
1651:
1299:
1203:
1170:
1125:
837:residential mortgage-backed security
525:(in the form of securities known as
67:2008â2010 automotive industry crisis
2776:
2391:The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report
2176:The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report
2124:
1713:The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report
1576:The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report
1489:The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report
1336:The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report
1285:The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report
1215:The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report
1081:The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report
991:defense (based on the precedent of
784:Explanations for inaccurate ratings
702:Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
499:buying of $ 700 billion of bad debt
13:
1866:
1181:"Giant Pool of Money (transcript)"
1032:, Portfolio, Penguin, 2010 (p.111)
454:. The new, complex securities of "
99:Causes of the European debt crisis
52:2000s United States housing bubble
14:
3247:
2923:
2441:. WW Norton and Co. p. 156.
1836:
1679:Wadden IV, William "Biv" (2002).
201:Chinese economic stimulus program
181:2008 European Union stimulus plan
2752:
2560:. WW Norton and Co. p. 97.
1652:Kerr, Duncan (15 October 2007).
1028:McLean, Bethany and Joe Nocera.
757:
497:), and the federal government's
2833:
2652:
2633:Gordon, Greg (August 7, 2013).
2459:
2367:
2354:
2322:
2297:
2279:
2247:
2218:
2154:
2103:
2082:
2012:
1923:
1879:
1807:
1763:
1704:
1672:
1645:
1623:
1594:
1567:
1558:
1545:
1532:
1507:
1494:
1481:
1468:
1455:
1410:Financial Crisis Inquiry Report
1402:
1386:
1372:
1367:Financial Crisis Inquiry Report
1359:
1321:NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2009
1264:
1250:Financial Crisis Inquiry Report
1229:
1075:collateralized debt obligations
973:Credit Rating Agency Reform Act
866:disagreement among employees."
706:Financial Crisis Inquiry Report
591:Financial Crisis Inquiry Report
531:collateralized debt obligations
3149:Primary Dealer Credit Facility
3018:Role of credit rating agencies
2978:Background / timeline
2659:Status quo for rating agencies
2031:Snyder, Peter (18 July 2013).
1974:Wayne, Leslie (15 July 2009).
1399:WW Norton and Co, 2010, p. 73)
1099:Barnett-Hart, Anna Katherine.
1067:
1035:
993:New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
766:
186:2008â2009 Keynesian resurgence
1:
3169:Troubled Asset Relief Program
3074:Economic Stimulus Act of 2008
2970:U.S. subprime mortgage crisis
1006:
813:structured investment vehicle
437:financial crisis of 2007â2008
435:of 2007â2008 that led to the
256:Troubled Asset Relief Program
206:Economic Stimulus Act of 2008
3009:United States housing bubble
2790:. Huff Post. 4 February 2013
2730:. REUTERS. September 3, 2013
2688:The New York Review of Books
2137:International Herald Tribune
1908:. Huff Post. 4 February 2013
1312:; Dlugosz, Jennifer (2009).
966:
695:
452:great recession of 2008â2009
313:Royal Bank of Scotland Group
278:American International Group
7:
2254:Meyer, Chris (2006-12-15).
2111:"SEC â Rating Agency Rules"
1185:Originally aired 05.09.2008
545:Mortgage-related securities
10:
3252:
3099:Capital Assistance Program
3041:2007â2008 financial crisis
2614:. The Mortgage Professor.
1771:"Credit markets, CDOh no!"
1314:"The Credit Rating Crisis"
1256:. GPO. 2011. p. 119.
787:
527:mortgage-backed securities
417:
62:2007â2008 financial crisis
3231:2000s in economic history
3200:Foreclosure rescue scheme
3182:
3109:Federal Reserve responses
3064:
3056:Indirect economic effects
3031:
3013:housing market correction
2999:
2976:
2708:: CS1 maint: unfit URL (
2608:"Silent Second Mortgages"
2340:. Yale University Press.
2079:| reuters.com| 2013/02/04
1799:: CS1 maint: unfit URL (
658:Downgrades and writedowns
460:Moody's Investors Service
3226:Subprime mortgage crisis
3104:Capital Purchase Program
2314:. Princeton University.
2021:| July 17, 2013| wsj.com
1660:. eFinancialNews Limited
1110:. Harvard Kennedy School
537:rate policy of the U.S.
433:subprime mortgage crisis
420:Subprime mortgage crisis
42:Subprime mortgage crisis
3119:Government intervention
2376:All the Devils Are Here
2362:All the Devils Are Here
2197:All the Devils Are Here
2193:Nocera; McLean (2010).
2162:All the Devils Are Here
2039:. Paper Chase Newsburst
2000:. Reuters. 10 July 2013
1553:All the Devils Are Here
1540:All the Devils Are Here
1502:All the Devils Are Here
1476:All the Devils Are Here
1463:All the Devils Are Here
1381:All the Devils Are Here
998:According to columnist
955:"the fraud implicit in
891:Manipulation of ratings
742:All the Devils Are Here
607:
551:asset-backed securities
431:(CRAs) in the American
21:Part of a series on the
2986:Background information
2764:. Minnesota Law Review
1867:TE (5 February 2013).
1236:Here's how a CDO works
829:
719:
684:
518:
429:credit rating agencies
142:G-20 Washington summit
2873:"Pick Your Own Judge"
2113:. Sec.gov. 2008-12-03
1633:(21 September 2007).
1448:Reckless Endangerment
1446:Morgenson and Rosner
1354:Reckless Endangerment
1352:Morgenson and Rosner
853:Conflicts of interest
833:Standard & Poor's
825:
714:
682:
651:mortgage underwriting
523:securitized mortgages
512:
464:Standard & Poor's
3205:Property derivatives
3144:Regulatory responses
2588:. Dr. Housing Bubble
2489:. GPO. p. 193.
2160:McLean, and Nocera.
1500:McLean, and Nocera.
1461:McLean, and Nocera.
771:On 11 June 2008 the
643:credit default swaps
539:Federal Reserve Bank
517:, p.229, figure 11.4
505:Impact on the crisis
77:European debt crisis
3023:Government policies
2681:(August 15, 2013).
2421:. GPO. p. 150.
2373:McLean and Nocera,
2360:McLean and Nocera,
2268:on October 28, 2008
1639:The Financial Times
1604:(2 November 2007).
1564:worth $ 300 billion
1551:McLean and Nocera.
1538:McLean and Nocera.
1474:McLean and Nocera,
673:credit enhancements
47:2000s energy crisis
3174:Wall Street reform
3159:Tea Party protests
2906:The New York Times
2877:The New York Times
2871:(August 1, 2013).
2849:The New York Times
2728:The New York Times
2664:2017-03-16 at the
2287:"Credit and blame"
1980:The New York Times
1610:The New York Times
931:standard deviation
685:
519:
456:structured finance
160:G-20 London Summit
3213:
3212:
3134:Loan modification
3129:Hope Now Alliance
2900:(July 31, 2013).
2898:Popper, Nathaniel
2843:(July 31, 2013).
2841:Popper, Nathaniel
2435:(February 2011).
2347:978-0-300-11971-8
2307:(30 April 2009).
1310:Benmelech, Efraim
427:is the impact of
416:
415:
270:Business failures
3243:
2963:
2956:
2949:
2940:
2939:
2917:
2916:
2914:
2912:
2894:
2888:
2887:
2885:
2883:
2865:
2856:
2855:
2837:
2831:
2830:
2828:
2826:
2819:25 November 2011
2810:
2804:
2803:
2797:
2795:
2780:
2774:
2773:
2771:
2769:
2759:
2750:
2744:
2743:
2737:
2735:
2720:
2714:
2713:
2707:
2699:
2697:
2696:
2675:
2669:
2656:
2650:
2649:
2647:
2645:
2630:
2619:
2618:
2604:
2598:
2597:
2595:
2593:
2578:
2572:
2571:
2548:
2539:
2538:
2515:
2498:
2497:
2493:Cornwall Capital
2488:
2476:
2470:
2465:Lewis, Michael
2463:
2457:
2456:
2429:
2423:
2422:
2420:
2408:
2399:
2398:
2396:
2386:
2380:
2379:, 2010, (p.123)
2371:
2365:
2358:
2352:
2351:
2339:
2326:
2320:
2319:
2313:
2301:
2295:
2294:
2283:
2277:
2276:
2274:
2273:
2267:
2261:. Archived from
2260:
2251:
2245:
2244:
2242:
2241:
2232:. Archived from
2231:
2222:
2216:
2215:
2200:
2190:
2184:
2183:
2181:
2171:
2165:
2158:
2152:
2147:
2141:
2140:
2128:
2122:
2121:
2119:
2118:
2107:
2101:
2100:
2098:
2097:
2086:
2080:
2074:
2068:
2062:
2053:
2052:
2046:
2044:
2028:
2022:
2016:
2010:
2009:
2007:
2005:
1990:
1984:
1983:
1971:
1962:
1961:
1959:
1957:
1952:. April 27, 2013
1942:
1933:
1927:
1921:
1920:
1915:
1913:
1898:
1889:
1883:
1877:
1876:
1864:
1858:
1857:
1855:
1853:
1846:February 6, 2009
1834:
1828:
1823:
1814:
1811:
1805:
1804:
1798:
1790:
1785:
1784:
1767:
1761:
1755:
1746:
1740:
1729:
1728:
1726:
1724:
1718:
1708:
1702:
1701:
1699:
1698:
1692:
1686:. Archived from
1685:
1676:
1670:
1669:
1667:
1665:
1649:
1643:
1642:
1627:
1621:
1620:
1618:
1616:
1598:
1592:
1591:
1589:
1587:
1581:
1571:
1565:
1562:
1556:
1555:, 2010 (p. 266)
1549:
1543:
1542:, 2010 (p. 265)
1536:
1530:
1529:
1527:
1526:
1517:. Archived from
1511:
1505:
1498:
1492:
1485:
1479:
1472:
1466:
1465:, 2010 (p. 122)
1459:
1453:
1452:
1429:
1419:
1413:
1406:
1400:
1390:
1384:
1376:
1370:
1363:
1357:
1350:
1344:
1343:
1341:
1331:
1325:
1324:
1318:
1306:
1297:
1296:
1290:
1280:
1271:
1268:
1262:
1261:
1255:
1245:
1239:
1233:
1227:
1226:
1220:
1210:
1201:
1200:
1194:
1192:
1177:
1168:
1167:
1151:
1140:
1134:
1123:
1122:
1117:
1115:
1105:
1096:
1090:
1088:
1086:
1071:
1065:
1064:
1048:
1042:
1039:
1033:
1026:
911:Ways of "gaming"
408:
401:
394:
18:
17:
3251:
3250:
3246:
3245:
3244:
3242:
3241:
3240:
3216:
3215:
3214:
3209:
3178:
3060:
3046:Great Recession
3027:
2995:
2991:Impact timeline
2972:
2967:
2926:
2921:
2920:
2910:
2908:
2895:
2891:
2881:
2879:
2866:
2859:
2838:
2834:
2824:
2822:
2811:
2807:
2793:
2791:
2788:4 February 2013
2782:
2781:
2777:
2767:
2765:
2757:
2753:Nagy, Theresa.
2751:
2747:
2733:
2731:
2722:
2721:
2717:
2701:
2700:
2694:
2692:
2676:
2672:
2666:Wayback Machine
2657:
2653:
2643:
2641:
2631:
2622:
2606:
2605:
2601:
2591:
2589:
2580:
2579:
2575:
2568:
2549:
2542:
2535:
2516:
2501:
2486:
2477:
2473:
2469:, 2010, (p.156)
2464:
2460:
2449:
2430:
2426:
2418:
2409:
2402:
2394:
2388:
2387:
2383:
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2311:
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2284:
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2271:
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35:Major aspects
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3011: /
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2693:. Retrieved
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2590:. Retrieved
2586:May 03, 2007
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2270:. Retrieved
2263:the original
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2234:the original
2220:
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2188:
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2161:
2156:
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2115:. Retrieved
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2041:. Retrieved
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2014:
2002:. Retrieved
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1954:. Retrieved
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1910:. Retrieved
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1850:. Retrieved
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1809:
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1781:. Retrieved
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1706:
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1688:the original
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1613:. Retrieved
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1584:. Retrieved
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1519:the original
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1356:, 2010 p.278
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1189:. Retrieved
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1119:
1112:. Retrieved
1107:
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1056:
1046:
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1029:
1000:Floyd Norris
997:
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981:Paul Volcker
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957:no doc loans
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555:CDOs squared
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162:(April 2009)
108:
15:
2911:4 September
2882:4 September
2825:4 September
2794:4 September
2768:4 September
2734:4 September
2644:4 September
2330:Bogle, John
2317:interest.")
2305:Bogle, John
2201:. Penguin.
1912:4 September
1191:3 September
895:Journalist
862:Companies.
860:McGraw-Hill
767:SEC actions
623:CDO-Squared
570:Freddie Mac
444:instruments
298:Freddie Mac
138:(July 2008)
3220:Categories
3051:Writedowns
2695:2020-12-29
2272:2008-10-23
2240:2008-10-23
2117:2009-02-27
2096:2008-09-19
1783:2020-12-29
1723:5 November
1697:2013-09-04
1586:3 November
1525:2017-06-30
1007:References
788:See also:
751:Joe Nocera
734:Economist
635:Joe Nocera
566:Fannie Mae
529:(MBS) and
448:securities
293:Fannie Mae
3066:Responses
2821:. Reuters
2704:cite news
2639:McClatchy
2592:27 August
2478:see also
2410:see also
1852:21 August
1795:cite news
1365:see also
1160:Bloomberg
1057:Bloomberg
967:Aftermath
710:Big Three
696:Criticism
288:Citigroup
148:APEC Peru
2662:Archived
2554:(2010).
2521:(2010).
2332:(2005).
2043:7 August
2004:7 August
1956:8 August
1615:30 April
1412:, p. 203
1369:, p. 127
583:Basel II
579:tranches
557:", and "
513:source:
382:Timeline
343:Americas
283:Chrysler
3033:Impacts
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