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Egalitarian item allocation

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25: 203:. The goal is to maximize the minimum value of an agent. That is, among all possible allocations, the goal is to find an allocation in which the smallest value of an agent is as large as possible. In case there are two or more allocations with the same smallest value, then the goal is to select, from among these allocations, the one in which the second-smallest value is as large as possible, and so on (by the 121: 66: 529:-factor approximation to the optimal egalitarian value. The second finds an allocation that is egalitarian up-to one good, that is, each agent receives his value in the optimal egalitarian allocation minus at most a single item. Their algorithm is based on a previous algorithm by Lenstra, Shmoys and Tardos, which essentially finds an allocation that is egalitarian up-to one 308:
3,3,3,3, then the absolute-leximin rule would give three items to Alice and one item to George, since the utility profile in this case is (3,3), which is optimal. In contrast, the relative-leximin rule would give two items to each agent, since the normalized utility profile in this case, when the total value of both agents is normalized to 1, is (0.5,0.5), which is optimal.
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The relative-leximin allocation might not be EF1 for three or more agents. For example, suppose there are four goods and three agents who value them at {30,0,0,0} {20,5,5,0} and {0,12,12,6}. Note that the valuations are normalized (the total value is 30). In a leximin allocation, the first good must
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However, when agents have different valuations, the problems are different. The maximin-share allocation is a satisfaction problem: the goal is to guarantee that each agent receives a value above the identical-valuations threshold. In contrast, the egalitarian allocation is an optimization problem:
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The absolute-leximin allocation might not be EF1 even for two agents with additive valuations. For example, suppose there are four goods and two agents who value them at {0,1,1,1} and {3,3,3,3}. The unique absolute-leximin allocation gives {1,1,1} to the first agent and {3} to the second agent, but
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The two rules are equivalent when the agents' valuations are already normalized, that is, all agents assign the same value to the set of all items. However, they may differ with non-normalized valuations. For example, if there are four items, Alice values them at 1,1,1,1 and George values them at
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the goal is to give each agent as high value as possible. In some instances, the resulting allocations might be very different. For example, suppose there are four goods and three agents who value them at {3,0,0,0}, {3-2
1036: 445: 751:. For the special case in which every item has nonzero utility for at most two agents, they gave a 2-factor approximation algorithm, and proved that it is hard to approximate to any better factor. 1187:
Whenever a proportional allocation exists, the relative-leximin allocation is proportional. This is because, in a proportional allocation, the smallest relative value of an agent is at least 1/
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Nguyen, Nhan-Tam; Nguyen, Trung Thanh; Roos, Magnus; Rothe, Jörg (2013). "Computational complexity and approximability of social welfare optimization in multiagent resource allocation".
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be allocated to agent 1. Then, the second and third goods must be allocated to agent 2, and the good remains for agent 3. But then agent 3 envies agent 2 even after removing an item.
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Nguyen, Trung Thanh; Roos, Magnus; Rothe, Jörg (2013). "A survey of approximability and inapproximability results for social welfare optimization in multiagent resource allocation".
683: 639: 1236:(i.e., submodular with binary marginals), the set of absolute-leximin allocations is equivalent to the set of max-product allocations; all such allocations are max-sum and EF1. 273:
is a different problem, in which the goal is not to attain an optimal solution, but rather to find any solution in which each agent receives a value above a certain threshold.
879: 848:. This result is obtained from rounding a suitable linear programming relaxation of the problem, and is the best possible result for this linear program. He also gave an 1287:): the first item must go to agent 1 - otherwise the smallest utility is 0. Then, the second and third items must go to agent 2 - otherwise the next-smallest utility is 1191:, so the same must hold when we maximize the smallest relative value. However, the absolute-leximin allocation might not be proportional, as shown in the example above. 940: 812: 527: 846: 772: 1719:. Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms. Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 2020. pp. 2748–2757. 537:
of the linear program for finding a fractional egalitarian allocation, and round it such that each agent loses at most one good, or gains at most one chore.
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is a small positive constant). Note that the valuations are normalized (the total value is 3), so absolute-leximin and relative-leximin are equivalent.
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Benabbou, Nawal; Chakraborty, Mithun; Igarashi, Ayumi; Zick, Yair (2020). "Finding Fair and Efficient Allocations when Valuations Don't Add up".
1298:, 1. Therefore, a maximin-share allocation must give agent 3 one of the first three items; some possible utility profiles in this case are (0, 948: 229:: santa claus has a fixed set of gifts, and wants to allocate them among children such that the least-happy child is as happy as possible. 38: 241:
with the max-min objective corresponds to a special case in which all agents have the same valuations. An even more special case is the
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When all agents have identical valuations, the egalitarian allocation, by definition, gives each agent at least his/her maximin share.
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The standard egalitarian rule requires that each agent assigns a numeric value to each object. Often, the agents only have
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1. When all agents have identical valuations with nonzero marginal utilities, any relative-leximin allocation is PO and
328:-optimal solutions to discrete constraint-satisfaction problems. They present max-min item allocation as a special case. 2282:
Caragiannis, Ioannis; Kurokawa, David; Moulin, Hervé; Procaccia, Ariel D.; Shah, Nisarg; Wang, Junxing (2019-09-24).
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The leximin rule has been used for fairly allocating unused classrooms in public schools to charter schools.
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Dall'Aglio and Mosca gave an exact, branch-and-bound algorithm for two agents, based on an adaptation of the
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Demko and Hill present a randomized algorithm that attains an egalitarian item allocation in expectation.
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Feige proved that a polynomial-time constant-factor approximation algorithm exists, but the proof used
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Chen, Xingyu; Liu, Zijie (2020-05-11). "The Fairness of Leximin in Allocation of Indivisible Chores".
2130: 1195: 332: 135: 80: 2063: 1951: 1507: 851: 303:) where the maximization uses their normalized values - bundle value divided by value of all items. 1629:. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Vol. 5171. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer. pp. 10–20. 1752: 2408: 1103:
finds an ordinally-egalitarian allocation for any number of agents with any ordering of bundles.
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with equal eating speeds is the unique rule that returns an ordinally-egalitarian allocation.
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2. For two agents with additive valuations, any relative-leximin allocation is EF1. However:
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Goemans, Michel X.; Harvey, Nicholas J. A.; Iwata, Satoru; Mirrokni, Vahab (2009-01-04),
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Asadpour, Feige and Saberi gave an actual constant-factor approximation algorithm, using
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Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing - STOC '06
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Approximation, Randomization and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques
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Annamalai, Kalaitzis and Svensson gave a polynomial-time 13-approximation algorithm.
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Dall'Aglio, Marco; Mosca, Raffaele (2007). "How to allocate hard candies fairly".
1438: 592:-approximation algorithm. Their algorithm uses an iterative method for rounding a 471:
Davies, Rothvoss and Zhang improved the approximation factor to 4 by introducing
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Although the general problem is NP-hard, small instances can be solved exactly by
1997:, Proceedings, Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, pp. 535–544, 1470: 1453: 1249:
agents with general identical valuations, any leximin-optimal allocation is EFX.
744:{\displaystyle \varepsilon \in \Omega \left({\frac {\log \log m}{\log m}}\right)} 2250: 1634: 2002: 1967: 1870: 1625:. In Goel, Ashish; Jansen, Klaus; Rolim, José D. P.; Rubinfeld, Ronitt (eds.). 2146: 2107: 2072: 1608:
Proceedings of the Nineteenth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
1422: 2397: 2309: 2206: 2154: 1975: 1855: 1832:"An Approximation Algorithm for Max-Min Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods" 1808: 1693: 1555: 1479: 1430: 1253: 1054:. There are two generalizations of the egalitarian rule to ordinal settings. 325: 269: 204: 2365: 1761: 1724: 1578: 1396: 2353: 1928: 1892: 1658:
Annamalai, Chidambaram; Kalaitzis, Christos; Svensson, Ola (2017-05-26).
1031:{\displaystyle O({\sqrt {m}}\cdot n^{1/4}\cdot \log n\cdot \log ^{3/2}m)} 245:, which corresponds to the case of two agents. Even this special case is 2358:
Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
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Proceedings of the 2009 Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
881:-approximation algorithm for the special case with two classes of goods. 2198: 1800: 2235:. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Vol. 12283. pp. 32–46. 1847: 1738:
Bezáková, Ivona; Dani, Varsha (2005). "Allocating indivisible goods".
1785:"Approximation algorithms for scheduling unrelated parallel machines" 1784: 1569:
Bansal, Nikhil; Sviridenko, Maxim (2006). "The Santa Claus problem".
465:. They could not prove that it converges in a finite number of steps. 2300: 2283: 1685: 324:
Bouveret and Lemaître present five different algorithms for finding
2337: 2241: 2189: 1413: 207:). Therefore, an egalitarian item allocation is sometimes called a 75:
provides insufficient context for those unfamiliar with the subject
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2009 50th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
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Kurokawa, David; Procaccia, Ariel D.; Shah, Nisarg (2015-06-15).
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Lenstra, Jan Karel; Shmoys, David B.; Tardos, Éva (1990-01-01).
1660:"Combinatorial Algorithm for Restricted Max-Min Fair Allocation" 293:), where the maximization uses the nominal values of the agents; 2230: 1213:
guarantees EFX (but not PO) with general identical valuations.
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Nguyen, Roos and Rothe present some stronger hardness results.
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Bezakova and Dani presented two algorithms. The first gives a
1110:. Given any discrete or fractional allocation, for any agent 1454:"Computing leximin-optimal solutions in constraint networks" 1715:
Davies, Sami; Rothvoss, Thomas; Zhang, Yihao (2018-07-18).
533:. Both algorithms are based on a similar idea. They find a 1988: 1657: 1397:"Monotonicity and competitive equilibrium in cake-cutting" 1106:
2. Suppose agents have an ordinal ranking over the set of
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1. Suppose agents have an ordinal ranking over the set of
440:{\displaystyle O(\log {\log {n}}/\log {\log {\log {n}}})} 1868: 1175: 1093:
allocation is one that minimizes the largest element in
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Chakrabarty, D.; Chuzhoy, J.; Khanna, S. (2009-10-01).
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The leximin allocation yields the utility profile (3,
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Golovin gave an algorithm by which, for every integer
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Segal-Halevi, Erel; Sziklai, Balázs R. (2019-09-01).
1073:) as the rank of agent i's bundle, so that r(i)=1 if 951: 910: 854: 820: 780: 760: 691: 647: 611: 546: 497: 376: 199:
problem, in which the fairness criterion follows the
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Asadpour, Arash; Feige, Uriel; Saberi, Amin (2008).
1045: 2284:"The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare" 1782: 1714: 1620: 1492: 1394: 130:
may be too technical for most readers to understand
1452:Bouveret, Sylvain; Lemaître, Michel (2009-02-01). 1030: 934: 884:When the number of agents is constant there is an 873: 840: 806: 766: 743: 677: 633: 584: 521: 439: 2051:Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence 363:For the special case of the santa claus problem: 214:The special case in which the value of each item 2395: 2171:Plaut, Benjamin; Roughgarden, Tim (2020-01-01). 2170: 1568: 1530:Demko, Stephen; Hill, Theodore P. (1988-10-01). 1451: 814:fraction of the agents receive utility at least 282:There are two variants of the egalitarian rule: 2131:"Random assignment: Redefining the serial rule" 2048: 1991:"Approximating Submodular Functions Everywhere" 1717:A tale of Santa Claus, hypergraphs and matroids 1532:"Equitable distribution of indivisible objects" 1241:4. In the context of indivisible allocation of 1061:. Given any discrete allocation, for any agent 2173:"Almost Envy-Freeness with General Valuations" 1929:"Max-min fair allocation of indivisible goods" 1829: 1294:The maximin-share values of the agents are 0, 585:{\displaystyle O({\sqrt {n}}\cdot \log ^{3}n)} 447:-approximation algorithm, based on rounding a 2288:ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation 1326:+1 goods and three agents who value them at { 1830:Asadpour, Arash; Saberi, Amin (2010-01-01). 1737: 1291:or less; so agent 3 gets only the last item. 1232:3. When all agents have valuations that are 1162:allocation is one that maximizes the vector 641:-approximation algorithm with a run-time of 2128: 945:Goemans, Harvey, Iwata and Mirrkoni give a 347: 257:is a dual problem, in which the goal is to 218:to each agent is either 0 or some constant 53:Learn how and when to remove these messages 1871:"On Allocating Goods to Maximize Fairness" 2336: 2299: 2240: 2188: 2096:Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 2062: 2010: 1949: 1882: 1751: 1675: 1529: 1506: 1469: 1412: 1373: 176:Learn how and when to remove this message 158:Learn how and when to remove this message 142:, without removing the technical details. 103:Learn how and when to remove this message 1623:"Santa Claus Meets Hypergraph Matchings" 1358:}. The leximin utility profile must be ( 1314:The example can be extended to 1-out-of- 339: 2354:"Leximin Allocations in the Real World" 2330: 1926: 1604:"On allocations that maximize fairness" 605:Chakrabarty, Chuzoy and Khanna gave an 2396: 2087: 1922: 1920: 1081:got his second-best bundle, etc. This 483:For the general case, for agents with 2226: 2224: 2166: 2164: 2042: 1601: 1176:Comparison to other fairness criteria 678:{\displaystyle O(m^{1/\varepsilon })} 140:make it understandable to non-experts 85:providing more context for the reader 2177:SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics 1950:Woeginger, Gerhard J. (2000-02-01). 1731: 114: 59: 18: 1917: 1562: 1486: 1138:topmost indifference classes. This 1130:) as the total fraction that agent 634:{\displaystyle O(m^{\varepsilon })} 311: 13: 2221: 2161: 1943: 1180: 698: 14: 2425: 1445: 1209:An improvement of leximin called 1046:Ordinally egalitarian allocations 34:This article has multiple issues. 2129:Bogomolnaia, Anna (2015-07-01). 1517:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.04.008 1252: 1194: 277: 119: 64: 23: 2345: 2324: 2275: 2122: 1982: 1862: 1823: 1776: 1077:got his best bundle, r(i)=2 if 42:or discuss these issues on the 1708: 1664:ACM Transactions on Algorithms 1651: 1614: 1595: 1523: 1388: 1025: 955: 929: 911: 874:{\displaystyle O({\sqrt {n}})} 868: 858: 801: 781: 672: 651: 628: 615: 579: 550: 516: 498: 434: 380: 1: 1381: 1222:then the second agent envies. 1169:Simultaneous Eating algorithm 270:Maximin share item allocation 254:Unrelated-machines scheduling 1956:INFORMS Journal on Computing 1548:10.1016/0165-4896(88)90047-9 1536:Mathematical Social Sciences 1495:Mathematical Social Sciences 1471:10.1016/j.artint.2008.10.010 1154:is the number of agents and 1142:is a vector of size at most 898:submodular utility functions 356:is the number of agents and 238:Multiway number partitioning 16:Fair item allocation problem 7: 2251:10.1007/978-3-030-57980-7_3 1635:10.1007/978-3-540-85363-3_2 1602:Feige, Uriel (2008-01-20). 1158:is the number of items. An 1100:Decreasing Demand procedure 1089:(the number of agents). An 540:Asadpour and Saberi gave a 232:Some related problems are: 189:Egalitarian item allocation 10: 2430: 2404:Combinatorial optimization 2135:Journal of Economic Theory 2003:10.1137/1.9781611973068.59 1968:10.1287/ijoc.12.1.57.11901 1166:in the leximin order. The 2147:10.1016/j.jet.2015.04.008 2108:10.1007/s10458-013-9224-2 2073:10.1007/s10472-012-9328-4 1836:SIAM Journal on Computing 1423:10.1007/s00199-018-1128-6 475:constraints to the basic 458:and was non-constructive. 360:is the number of items. 333:Adjusted winner procedure 1927:Golovin, Daniel (2005). 1789:Mathematical Programming 1038:-approximation algorithm 348:Approximation algorithms 2366:10.1145/2764468.2764490 2233:Algorithmic Game Theory 1762:10.1145/1120680.1120683 1725:10.1137/1.9781611975994 1579:10.1145/1132516.1132522 1458:Artificial Intelligence 935:{\displaystyle (m-n+1)} 807:{\displaystyle (1-1/k)} 535:basic feasible solution 522:{\displaystyle (m-n+1)} 209:leximin item allocation 193:max-min item allocation 1374:Real-world application 1234:matroid rank functions 1032: 936: 875: 842: 808: 768: 745: 679: 635: 586: 523: 441: 318:constraint programming 1740:ACM SIGecom Exchanges 1370:MMS of agent 3 is 1. 1366:) while the 1-out-of- 1160:ordinally-egalitarian 1114:and positive integer 1091:ordinally-egalitarian 1033: 937: 876: 843: 841:{\displaystyle OPT/k} 809: 769: 746: 680: 636: 587: 524: 442: 367:Bansal and Sviridenko 340:Randomized algorithms 2414:Fair item allocation 1893:10.1109/FOCS.2009.51 1877:. pp. 107–116. 1085:is a vector of size 949: 908: 852: 818: 778: 758: 689: 645: 609: 544: 495: 374: 297:relative egalitarian 287:absolute egalitarian 197:fair item allocation 594:fractional matching 485:additive valuations 463:hypergraph matching 227:santa claus problem 81:improve the article 2199:10.1137/19M124397X 1801:10.1007/BF01585745 1134:receives from his 1028: 932: 871: 838: 804: 764: 741: 675: 631: 582: 519: 456:Lovász local lemma 437: 2375:978-1-4503-3410-5 2294:(3): 12:1–12:32. 2260:978-3-030-57979-1 2022:978-0-89871-680-1 1902:978-1-4244-5116-6 1848:10.1137/080723491 1670:(3): 37:1–37:28. 1644:978-3-540-85363-3 1322:>3. There are 1052:ordinal utilities 963: 866: 767:{\displaystyle k} 735: 558: 243:partition problem 186: 185: 178: 168: 167: 160: 113: 112: 105: 57: 2421: 2388: 2387: 2349: 2343: 2342: 2340: 2328: 2322: 2321: 2303: 2279: 2273: 2272: 2244: 2228: 2219: 2218: 2192: 2183:(2): 1039–1068. 2168: 2159: 2158: 2126: 2120: 2119: 2091: 2085: 2084: 2066: 2046: 2040: 2039: 2038: 2037: 2014: 1986: 1980: 1979: 1947: 1941: 1940: 1938: 1936: 1924: 1915: 1914: 1886: 1866: 1860: 1859: 1842:(7): 2970–2989. 1827: 1821: 1820: 1780: 1774: 1773: 1755: 1735: 1729: 1728: 1712: 1706: 1705: 1679: 1655: 1649: 1648: 1618: 1612: 1611: 1599: 1593: 1592: 1566: 1560: 1559: 1527: 1521: 1520: 1510: 1490: 1484: 1483: 1473: 1449: 1443: 1442: 1416: 1392: 1037: 1035: 1034: 1029: 1018: 1017: 1013: 985: 984: 980: 964: 959: 941: 939: 938: 933: 904:Golovin gave an 896:For agents with 880: 878: 877: 872: 867: 862: 847: 845: 844: 839: 834: 813: 811: 810: 805: 797: 773: 771: 770: 765: 750: 748: 747: 742: 740: 736: 734: 723: 706: 684: 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2289: 2285: 2278: 2270: 2266: 2262: 2256: 2252: 2248: 2243: 2238: 2234: 2227: 2225: 2216: 2212: 2208: 2204: 2200: 2196: 2191: 2186: 2182: 2178: 2174: 2167: 2165: 2156: 2152: 2148: 2144: 2140: 2136: 2132: 2125: 2117: 2113: 2109: 2105: 2101: 2097: 2090: 2082: 2078: 2074: 2070: 2065: 2060: 2056: 2052: 2045: 2032: 2028: 2024: 2018: 2013: 2008: 2004: 2000: 1996: 1992: 1985: 1977: 1973: 1969: 1965: 1961: 1957: 1953: 1946: 1930: 1923: 1921: 1912: 1908: 1904: 1898: 1894: 1890: 1885: 1880: 1876: 1872: 1865: 1857: 1853: 1849: 1845: 1841: 1837: 1833: 1826: 1818: 1814: 1810: 1806: 1802: 1798: 1794: 1790: 1786: 1779: 1771: 1767: 1763: 1759: 1754: 1753:10.1.1.436.18 1749: 1745: 1741: 1734: 1726: 1722: 1718: 1711: 1703: 1699: 1695: 1691: 1687: 1683: 1678: 1673: 1669: 1665: 1661: 1654: 1646: 1640: 1636: 1632: 1628: 1624: 1617: 1609: 1605: 1598: 1590: 1584: 1580: 1576: 1572: 1565: 1557: 1553: 1549: 1545: 1541: 1537: 1533: 1526: 1518: 1514: 1509: 1504: 1500: 1496: 1489: 1481: 1477: 1472: 1467: 1463: 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fair item allocation
egalitarian rule
leximin order
Multiway number partitioning
partition problem
NP-hard
Unrelated-machines scheduling
Maximin share item allocation
constraint programming
leximin
Adjusted winner procedure
linear program
Lovász local lemma
hypergraph matching
matroid
linear program
additive valuations
basic feasible solution
fractional matching
tree

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