1077:
enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac—caused the financial crisis. In specific, Wallison named the GSEs' Affordable Housing goals, heightened enforcement of the Community Reinvestment Act, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development's Best Practices Initiative as the primary culprits. According to Wallison, these programs, which were intended to give low- and moderate-income borrowers better access to mortgage credit, ultimately required Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to reduce the mortgage underwriting standards they used when acquiring loans from originators. Because the GSEs dominated the mortgage market, they set the underwriting standards for the entire industry and pushed private institutions into riskier loans. Wallison concludes that these policies fueled a massive housing bubble full of non-traditional, risky loans that ultimately led to a financial crisis. Regarding the AEI paper, Phil Angelides, chairman of the FCIC, has stated:
974:, often with a willful disregard for a borrower's ability to pay. ... While many of these mortgages were kept on banks' books, the bigger money came from global investors who clamored to put their cash into newly created mortgage-related securities. It appeared to financial institutions, investors, and regulators alike that risk had been conquered. ... But each step in the mortgage securitization pipeline depended on the next step to keep demand going. From the speculators who flipped houses to the mortgage brokers who scouted the loans, to the lenders who issued the mortgages, to the financial firms that created the mortgage-backed securities, collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), CDOs squared, and synthetic CDOs: no one in this pipeline of toxic mortgages had enough skin in the game. When borrowers
119:
available credit, scant regulation, and toxic mortgages—that was the spark that ignited a string of events, which led to a full-blown crisis in the fall of 2008. Trillions of dollars in risky mortgages had become embedded throughout the financial system, as mortgage-related securities were packaged, repackaged, and sold to investors around the world. When the bubble burst, hundreds of billions of dollars in losses in mortgages and mortgage-related securities shook markets as well as financial institutions that had significant exposures to those mortgages and had borrowed heavily against them. This happened not just in the United States but around the world. The losses were magnified by derivatives such as synthetic securities."
1068:
report ignored the global nature of the financial crisis and, consequently, focused too narrowly on US regulatory policy and supervision. For those reasons, the dissent argues that the majority's conclusion that the crisis could have been avoided with more restrictive regulations, in conjunction with more aggressive regulators and supervisors, is false. The dissent lists ten essential causes of the financial and economic crisis: Credit bubble, Housing bubble, Nontraditional mortgages, Credit ratings and securitization, Financial institutions concentrated correlated risk, Leverage and liquidity risk, Risk of contagion, Common shock, Financial shock and panic, Financial crisis causes economic crisis.
713:, a top Republican on the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, questioned the Federal Reserve's involvement as a possible conflict of interest, and there has been disagreement among some commission members on what information to make public and where to place blame. Mr. Angelides called the criticisms "silly, stupid Washington stuff," adding: "I don't know what Mr. Issa's agenda is, but I can tell you what ours is." In a joint interview the commission's chairman, Phil Angelides (D), and vice chairman, Bill Thomas (R), said that the turnover's effects had been exaggerated and that they were optimistic about a consensus.
940:"In our economy, we expect businesses and individuals to pursue profits, at the same time that they produce products and services of quality and conduct themselves well. Unfortunately ... enders made loans that they knew borrowers could not afford and that could cause massive losses to investors in mortgage securities. ... And the report documents that major financial institutions ineffectively sampled loans they were purchasing to package and sell to investors. They knew a significant percentage of the sampled loans did not meet their own
609:
25:
1020:. These synthetic CDOs were merely bets on the performance of real mortgage-related securities. They amplified the losses from the collapse of the housing bubble by allowing multiple bets on the same securities and helped spread them throughout the financial system. ... Finally, when the housing bubble popped and crisis followed, derivatives were in the center of the storm.
883:" of financial reports available to the investing public. ... The heavy debt taken on by some financial institutions was exacerbated by the risky assets they were acquiring with that debt. As the mortgage and real estate markets churned out riskier and riskier loans and securities, many financial institutions loaded up on them."
1024:, which had not been required to put aside capital reserves as a cushion for the protection it was selling, was bailed out when it could not meet its obligations. The government ultimately committed more than $ 180 billion because of concerns that AIG's collapse would trigger cascading losses throughout the
725:
on
December 15, 2010, but was not released until January 27, 2011. In voting on the adoption of the final report the commission was split evenly along partisan lines, with Angelides, Born, Georgiou, Graham, Murren, and Thompson (appointed by Democrats Pelosi and Reid) all voting in favor and Thomas,
222:
Expressed the "sense of the
Congress that individuals appointed to the Commission should be prominent United States citizens with national recognition and significant depth of experience in such fields as banking, regulation of markets, taxation, finance, economics, consumer protection, and housing"
114:
documents and witnesses for testimony, a power that the Pecora
Commission had but the 9/11 Commission did not. The first public hearing of the commission was held on January 13, 2010, with the presentation of testimony from various banking officials. Hearings continued during 2010 with "hundreds" of
1112:
The vote of the four
Republicans on the commission to ban the words "Wall Street," "shadow banking," "interconnection," and "deregulation" from the main report—which was rejected by the six Democratic commissioners but carried out in the dissenting Republican report—was criticized by some such as
1067:
In a 27-page dissenting statement, Vice
Chairman Bill Thomas and Commissioners Keith Hennessey and Douglas Holtz-Eakin criticized the majority report for being an "account of bad events" rather than a "focused explanation of what happened and why." According to the three Republicans, the majority
681:
February 26–27 the
Commission heard from academic experts and economists on issues related to the crisis. The following experts have appeared before the Commission in public or in private: Martin Baily, Markus Brunnermeier, John Geanakoplos, Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, Gary Gorton, Dwight Jaffee,
893:"ey policy makers ... were hampered because they did not have a clear grasp of the financial system they were charged with overseeing, particularly as it had evolved in the years leading up to the crisis. This was in no small measure due to the lack of transparency in key markets. They thought
476:
Provided that "a report containing the findings and conclusions of the
Commission" shall be submitted to the President and to the Congress on December 15, 2010, and that at the discretion of the chairperson of the commission, the report may include reports or specific findings on any financial
1088:
The FCIC constructed the report to be broadly appealing, at least in part due to the commercial and critical success of past appealing reports. To that end, the
Commission hired a communications firm, employed "cinematic language" within the report, and delayed the publishing of the report to
1076:
American
Enterprise Institute senior fellow Peter Wallison authored a 93-page dissent in which he disagreed with both the majority report and the three other Republican appointees. Wallison argued that the US government's housing policies—implemented primarily through the government-sponsored
654:
As part of its inquiry, the commission will hold a series of public hearings throughout the year including, but not limited to, the following topics: avoiding future catastrophe, complex financial derivatives, credit rating agencies, excess risk and financial speculation, government-sponsored
708:
July 27, The composition of the commission's staff changed several times since its formation. The executive director J. Thomas Greene was replaced by Wendy M. Edelberg, an economist from the Federal Reserve. Five of the initial fourteen senior staff members resigned, including Matt Cooper, a
118:
The Commission reported its findings in January 2011. In briefly summarizing its main conclusions the Commission stated: "While the vulnerabilities that created the potential for crisis were years in the making, it was the collapse of the housing bubble—fueled by low interest rates, easy and
1108:
However, the report was not just commercially and critically successful. It was also favored by legal scholars for its exhaustive detail. From 2010 to 2013, it was cited by at least seventy-six law review articles, a number on par with that of the most cited law review article in 2009.
901:
when, in fact, it had been concentrated. ... There was no comprehensive and strategic plan for containment, because they lacked a full understanding of the risks and interconnections in the financial markets. ... While there was some awareness of, or at least a debate about, the
906:, the record reflects that senior public officials did not recognize that a bursting of the bubble could threaten the entire financial system. ... In addition, the government's inconsistent handling of major financial institutions during the crisis—the decision to rescue
1117:
also criticized the partisanship of the Republican members of the commission who issued a nine-page, three-footnote minority report before the report had been written. According to Nocera the contents of the report "simply reiterates longstanding Republican dogma."
673:
testified before the commission, that he considered Goldman Sachs' role as primarily that of a market maker, not a creator of the product (i.e.; subprime mortgage-related securities). Goldman Sachs was sued on April 16, 2010 by the SEC for the fraudulent selling of
447:, other legislative panels, and any other department, agency, bureau, board, commission, office, independent establishment, or instrumentality of the United States (to the fullest extent permitted by law) with respect to the current financial and economic crisis.
415:(2) to examine the causes of the collapse of each major financial institution that failed (including institutions that were acquired to prevent their failure) or was likely to have failed if not for the receipt of exceptional Government assistance from the
1028:. In addition, the existence of millions of derivatives contracts of all types between systemically important financial institutions—unseen and unknown in this unregulated market—added to uncertainty and escalated panic, helping to precipitate government
480:
Provides that the chairperson of the Commission shall, not later than 120 days after the date of submission of the final report, appear before the Senate Banking Committee and the House Financial Services Committee to testify regarding the commission's
801:
and others, supported by successive administrations and Congresses, and actively pushed by the powerful financial industry at every turn, had stripped away key safeguards, which could have helped avoid catastrophe. This approach had opened up gaps in
242:
Provided that Commission's chair be selected jointly by the congressional majority leadership and that the vice chair be selected jointly by the congressional minority leadership, and that the chair and vice chair may not be from the same political
1054:... includ the flawed computer models, the pressure from financial firms that paid for the ratings, the relentless drive for market share, the lack of resources to do the job despite record profits, and the absence of meaningful public oversight."
874:
values could wipe out a firm. To make matters worse, much of their borrowing was short-term, in the overnight market—meaning the borrowing had to be renewed each and every day. ... And the leverage was often hidden—in derivatives positions, in
1104:
hailed it as "the most comprehensive indictment of the American financial failure that has yet been made" and "the definitive history of this period." The report was released on a Thursday and, by Sunday, Amazon had already run out of copies.
730:
drafted his alone and proposed that the crisis was caused by government affordable housing policies rather than market forces. However, this view has not been supported by subsequent detailed analyses of mortgage market data.
1744:
472:
or otherwise, the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of books, records, correspondence, memoranda, papers, and documents." This subpoena power was also held by the Pecora Commission, but not the 9/11
300:
agencies in the financial system, including reliance on credit ratings by financial institutions and federal financial regulators, the use of credit ratings in financial regulation, and the use of credit ratings in the
726:
Hennessey, Holtz-Eakin, and Wallison (appointed by Republicans Boehner and McConnell) all dissenting. Among those dissenting Thomas, Hennessey, and Holtz-Eakin collaborated on a single report while Wallison, from the
146:
1050:. Investors relied on them, often blindly. In some cases, they were obligated to use them, or regulatory capital standards were hinged on them. ... he forces at work behind the breakdowns at
1632:
436:
150:
1365:
1079:"The source for this newfound wisdom shopworn data, produced by a consultant to the corporate-funded American Enterprise Institute, which was analyzed and debunked by the FCIC Report."
768:, among many other red flags. Yet there was pervasive permissiveness; little meaningful action was taken to quell the threats in a timely manner." The Commission especially singles out
686:, Randall Kroszner, Annamaria Lusardi, Chris Mayer, David Moss, Carmen M. Reinhart, Kenneth T. Rosen, Hal S. Scott, Joseph E. Stiglitz, John B. Taylor, Mark Zandi and Luigi Zingales.
1582:
848:
that made effective management more challenging," narrow emphasis on mathematical models of risk as opposed to actual risk, and short-sighted compensation systems at all levels.
978:, the losses—amplified by derivatives—rushed through the pipeline. As it turned out, these losses were concentrated in a set of systemically important financial institutions."
832:"Too many of these institutions acted recklessly, taking on too much risk, with too little capital, and with too much dependence on short-term funding. ... took on enormous
212:
996:
was a key turning point in the march toward the financial crisis. ... OTC derivatives contributed to the crisis in three significant ways. First, one type of derivative—
1650:
1285:
258:(B) Federal and State financial regulators, including the extent to which they enforced, or failed to enforce statutory, regulatory, or supervisory requirements;
1235:
692:
May 5–6, former Bear Stearns CEO Jimmy Cayne, former SEC Chairman Christopher Cox, Tim Geithner and Hank Paulson are scheduled to appear before the commission.
1564:
1907:
200:
1046:
were key enablers of the financial meltdown. The mortgage-related securities at the heart of the crisis could not have been marketed and sold without their
1253:
1745:"REPUBLICAN COMMISSIONERS ON THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION FINANCIAL CRISIS PRIMER QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS"
440:
1809:
1513:
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1451:"The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States"
888:
We conclude the government was ill-prepared for the crisis, and its inconsistent response added to the uncertainty and panic in the financial markets.
1824:
347:(N) changes in compensation for employees of financial companies, as compared to compensation for others with similar skill sets in the labor market;
1269:
862:"In the years leading up to the crisis, too many financial institutions, as well as too many households, borrowed to the hilt. ... s of 2007, the
1373:
1872:
814:. In addition, the government permitted financial firms to pick their preferred regulators in what became a race to the weakest supervisor."
1413:
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176:
Set the purpose of the commission, i.e., "to examine the causes, domestic and global, of the current financial and economic crisis in the
1867:
989:
1203:
1458:
689:
April 7–9, 2010, Alan Greenspan, Chuck Prince and Robert Rubin testified before the commission on subprime lending and securitization.
162:
42:
216:
204:
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308:(I) lending practices and securitization, including the originate-to-distribute model for extending credit and transferring risk;
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34:
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Drawbaugh, Kevin; Karey Wutkowski; Steve Eder; Dan Margolies; Elinor Comlay; Joe Rauch (January 13, 2010). Tim Dobbyn (ed.).
236:
1613:
Hartlage, Andrew (April 2013). ""Never Again," Again: A Functional Examination of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission".
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390:, including the extent to which the structure creates the opportunity for financial institutions to engage in regulatory
1882:
1877:
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in acquiring and supporting subprime lenders and creating, packaging, repackaging, and selling trillions of dollars in
1514:"Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Keith Hennessey, Commissioner Douglas Holtz-Eakin and Vice Chairman Bill Thomas"
705:
praised the commission's approach and technical expertise in understanding complex financial issues during July 2010.
1323:
79:
431:
any person that the Commission finds may have violated the laws of the United States in relation to such crisis; and
530:
510:
444:
208:
196:
251:
To examine the causes of the current financial and economic crisis in the United States, specifically the role of
435:(5) to build upon the work of other entities, and avoid unnecessary duplication, by reviewing the record of the
255:(A) fraud and abuse in the financial sector, including fraud and abuse towards consumers in the mortgage sector;
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424:
166:
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We conclude the failures of credit rating agencies were essential cogs in the wheel of financial destruction.
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of mortgage-related securities backed by risky loans. ... Second, CDS were essential to the creation of
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1313:
898:
416:
280:
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1902:
970:"Many mortgage lenders set the bar so low that lenders simply took eager borrowers' qualifications
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1836:
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission : Documents Relating to the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009
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in 2000 to ban the regulation by both the federal and state governments of over-the-counter (OTC)
1719:
1025:
811:
484:
Provides for the termination of the Commission 60 days after the submission of the final report.
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1691:
Poltenson, Norman (February 4, 2011). "The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission: Good Theater".
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Testimony of Alan Greenspan - Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Wednesday, April 7, 2010
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Financial Crisis Panel In Turmoil As Republicans Defect; Plan To Blame Government For Crisis
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1805:
Official live streaming video of the proceedings of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
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ratios were as high as 40 to 1, meaning for every $ 40 in assets, there was only $ 1 in
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366:
1815:
Report on Financial Crisis: Role of Gaussian copula function and lack of data provenance
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948:. Nonetheless, they sold those securities to investors. The commission's review of many
1829:
1204:"Official Transcript - First Public Hearing of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission"
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971:
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262:
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at many systemically important financial institutions were a key cause of this crisis.
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975:
753:
591:
362:
312:
293:, including the capital structures of regulated and non-regulated financial entities;
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basis in consultation with relevant Committees. Six members are to be chosen by the
1147:
745:
663:
585:
397:(T) the legal and regulatory structure governing investor and mortgagor protection;
290:
95:
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We conclude over-the-counter derivatives contributed significantly to this crisis.
16:
American commission that investigated the causes of the 2007–2008 financial crisis
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919:
880:
853:
We conclude a combination of excessive borrowing, risky investments, and lack of
833:
824:
670:
567:
522:
319:
269:
142:, each of which the government brought under consideration for financial rescue.
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1001:
903:
798:
752:, an unsustainable rise in housing prices, widespread reports of egregious and
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579:
555:
549:
537:
302:
184:
147:
United States Senate Homeland Security Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
87:
1835:
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The commissions efforts to make the report appealing were successful. It made
952:
provided to investors found that this critical information was not disclosed.
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1161:
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841:
760:, and exponential growth in financial firms' trading activities, unregulated
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453:
408:
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institutions and securities, insurance, and other types of nonbank companies;
297:
177:
265:, international capital flows, and fiscal imbalances of various governments;
1366:"Goldman Sachs Sued by SEC for Fraud Tied to CDOs (Update4) - BusinessWeek"
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941:
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1209:. US Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. January 13, 2010. Archived from
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on September 17, 2009, and consisted of opening remarks by Commissioners.
1113:
Bethany McLean, Paul Krugman, and Shahien Nasiripour. Business columnist
915:
797:
by financial institutions, championed by former Federal Reserve chairman
543:
334:
330:
276:
139:
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922:, followed by its decision not to save Lehman Brothers and then to save
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tied to subprime mortgages, a product which Goldman Sachs had created.
561:
546:(vice chairman) – jointly chosen as vice chair by Boehner and McConnell
502:
498:
135:
659:, subprime lending practices and securitization, and too big to fail.
1005:
961:
and the mortgage securitization pipeline lit and spread the flame of
623:
457:
391:
151:
Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: Anatomy of a Financial Collapse
1499:
1448:
619:
526:
469:
461:
111:
1267:
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission-Press Release-January 27, 2011
379:(R) financial-institution reliance on numerical models, including
122:
The commission was explicit in its concerns about insurance giant
1181:
806:
of critical areas with trillions of dollars at risk, such as the
598:
1799:
734:
The Commission reached nine main conclusions (directly quoted):
115:
other persons in business, academia, and government testifying.
1633:"Paperback Nonfiction Books - Best Sellers - February 20, 2011"
1136:"The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission and Economic Research"
506:
441:
Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives
437:
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate
419:
during the period beginning in August 2007 through April 2009;
74:) was a ten-member commission appointed by the leaders of the
871:
513:) each made three appointments, while House Minority Leader
350:(O) the legal and regulatory structure of the United States
894:
857:
put the financial system on a collision course with crisis.
518:
465:
1772:"Joe Nocera on the GOP's Financial Crisis Commission Fail"
1565:"The real causes of the economic crisis? They're history."
1519:. US Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. January 13, 2010
1021:
923:
289:(G) capital requirements and regulations on leverage and
1539:"Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Peter J. Wallison"
1397:"On Financial Crisis, Hearings That Aren't Just Theater"
286:(F) tax treatment of financial products and investments;
540:(chairman) – jointly chosen as chair by Pelosi and Reid
1430:
Harsh Words for Regulators in Crisis Commission Report
153:
report, sometimes known as the "Levin-Coburn" report.
1584:
Wallison: Still Wrong About Genesis of Housing Crisis
1062:
1708:
Covering the Republicans' Crisis Commission Document
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to the stability of the nation's financial markets.
721:The commission's final report was initially due to
329:, including the impact of company conversions from
1449:Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011-01-25).
662:The first meeting of the Commission took place in
183:Set its composition of 10 members, appointed on a
1544:. American Enterprise Institute. January 14, 2011
1501:Competition and Crisis in Mortgage Securitization
926:—increased uncertainty and panic in the market."
386:(S) the legal and regulatory structure governing
156:
78:with the goal of investigating the causes of the
1859:
1252:: CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (
1177:"Barons of Wall St concede failures; no apology"
1133:
844:." The report goes on to fault "poorly executed
739:We conclude this financial crisis was avoidable.
1853:The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (full text)
772:"failure to stem the flow of toxic mortgages."
318:(K) the concept that certain institutions are '
161:The commission was created by section 5 of the
1414:Staff Losses and Dissent May Hurt Crisis Panel
1308:
599:Commission's investigation and public response
283:, and treatment of off-balance sheet vehicles;
207:) and four by the congressional minority, the
1444:
1442:
1341:"Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Day One"
1236:"Bloomberg-Dimon, Blankfein, Mack to Testify"
1908:Publications of the United States government
421:(3) to submit a report under subsection (h);
1800:Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Website
1242:. Archived from the original on 2012-10-26.
1439:
172:on May 20, 2009. That section of the Act:
163:Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009
90:. The commission has been compared to the
1893:Financial regulation in the United States
1690:
1562:
1151:
404:and government-sponsored enterprises; and
272:and the availability and terms of credit;
246:Set the "functions of the Commission" as:
239:may serve as a member of the Commission."
98:in the 1930s, and has been nicknamed the
1612:
1134:Edelberg, Wendy; Feldberg, Greg (2024).
1057:
1004:pipeline. CDS were sold to investors to
870:to cover losses. Less than a 3% drop in
456:, sit and act at times and places, take
322:' and its impact on market expectations;
165:(Public Law 111–21), signed into law by
82:. The Commission has been nicknamed the
1763:
1671:
1260:
709:journalist who was writing the report.
477:institution examined by the commission.
102:. Analogies have also been made to the
94:, which investigated the causes of the
1860:
1394:
1338:
1168:
846:acquisition and integration strategies
443:, other congressional committees, the
1841:
1710:| December 17, 2010 | By Ryan Chittum
1694:The Central New York Business Journal
1608:
1606:
1604:
1089:continue working on its "unveiling."
425:Attorney General of the United States
411:undertaken by financial institutions;
1873:Great Recession in the United States
1810:Profiles and photos of commissioners
1722:| By PAUL KRUGMAN| December 16, 2010
1492:
812:over-the-counter derivatives markets
602:
110:. The commission had the ability to
47:move details into the article's body
18:
1825:Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
1769:
1737:
1580:
1339:Kenney, Caitlin (13 January 2010).
777:We conclude widespread failures in
452:Authorized the commission to "hold
281:mark-to-market and fair value rules
68:Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
13:
1868:United States national commissions
1751:. Barry Ritholtz. 16 December 2010
1601:
1063:Hennessey, Holtz-Eakin, and Thomas
781:and supervision proved devastating
756:, dramatic increases in household
14:
1919:
1827:collected news and commentary at
1793:
1286:"FCIC Report-Conclusions Excerpt"
931:We conclude there was a systemic
819:We conclude dramatic failures of
744:"There was an explosion in risky
1318:. DIANE Publishing. p. xv.
1140:Journal of Economic Perspectives
976:stopped making mortgage payments
607:
445:Government Accountability Office
23:
1725:
1713:
1701:
1684:
1672:Madrick, Jeff (28 April 2011).
1665:
1651:"BOOK WORLD - February 6, 2011"
1643:
1625:
1574:
1556:
1531:
1506:
1423:
1407:
1388:
1315:Financial Crisis Inquiry Report
676:collateralized debt obligations
1563:Angelides, Phil (2011-06-28),
1358:
1332:
1302:
1278:
1228:
1196:
1127:
622:format but may read better as
533:) each made two appointments:
488:
227:or officer or employee of the
157:Creation and statutory mandate
1:
1888:United States economic policy
1121:
728:American Enterprise Institute
80:financial crisis of 2007–2008
1678:The New York Review of Books
1102:The New York Review of Books
1083:
842:synthetic financial products
124:American International Group
7:
1680:. Vol. 58, no. 7.
1674:"The Wall Street Leviathan"
1395:Nocera, Joe (2 July 2010).
1071:
933:breakdown in accountability
838:mortgage-related securities
754:predatory lending practices
521:and Senate Minority Leader
501:and Senate Majority Leader
263:global imbalance of savings
223:and also provided that "no
10:
1924:
1459:Government Printing Office
1000:(CDS) fueled the mortgage
959:mortgage-lending standards
944:standards or those of the
1883:2010s in economic history
1878:2000s in economic history
1621:: 1193 – via EBSCO.
1581:Min, David (2011-07-13),
1272:January 30, 2011, at the
716:
417:Secretary of the Treasury
365:and practices, including
311:(J) affiliations between
1848:FCIC Conclusions Excerpt
1032:to those institutions."
1100:best sellers lists and
1026:global financial system
957:We conclude collapsing
879:entities, and through "
789:"More than 30 years of
631:converting this article
199:(three of these by the
1480:Cite journal requires
1044:credit rating agencies
766:"repo" lending markets
449:
429:State attorney general
402:financial institutions
388:financial institutions
279:practices, including,
217:Senate Minority Leader
205:Senate Majority Leader
134:, and mortgage giants
76:United States Congress
1720:Wall Street Whitewash
1058:Dissenting Statements
808:shadow banking system
669:On January 13, 2010,
657:shadow banking system
493:Speaker of the House
249:
213:House Minority Leader
106:, which examined the
100:New Pecora Commission
1734:| Shahien Nasiripour
1661:on February 9, 2013.
1370:www.businessweek.com
998:credit default swaps
821:corporate governance
779:financial regulation
427:and any appropriate
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367:credit default swaps
327:corporate governance
201:Speaker of the House
108:September 11 attacks
86:after the chairman,
84:Angelides Commission
1655:The Washington Post
1615:Michigan Law Review
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1153:10.1257/jep.38.2.43
1098:The Washington Post
574:Douglas Holtz-Eakin
468:" and "require, by
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383:and credit ratings;
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1842:Commission Reports
1830:The New York Times
1637:The New York Times
1498:Michael Simkovic,
1436:; January 27, 2011
1434:The New York Times
1418:The New York Times
1401:The New York Times
1094:The New York Times
988:"The enactment of
910:and then to place
702:The New York Times
633:, if appropriate.
363:financial products
313:insured depository
229:federal government
225:member of Congress
1455:Washington, D. C.
1376:on April 18, 2010
1216:on March 26, 2010
764:, and short-term
655:enterprises, the
652:
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592:Peter J. Wallison
464:, and administer
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92:Pecora Commission
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43:length guidelines
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793:and reliance on
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611:
610:
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586:John W. Thompson
361:and unregulated
237:local government
96:Great Depression
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27:
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881:window dressing
825:risk management
795:self-regulation
719:
682:Simon Johnson,
671:Lloyd Blankfein
648:
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568:Keith Hennessey
523:Mitch McConnell
491:
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320:too-big-to-fail
270:monetary policy
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132:Lehman Brothers
104:9/11 Commission
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965:and crisis.
946:originators
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916:Freddie Mac
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762:derivatives
576:(McConnell)
570:(McConnell)
544:Bill Thomas
531:Republicans
489:Composition
473:Commission.
381:risk models
359:derivatives
344:structures;
209:Republicans
140:Freddie Mac
55:August 2024
1862:Categories
1595:2015-02-23
1464:2012-06-04
1188:14 January
1122:References
1115:Joe Nocera
1030:assistance
912:Fannie Mae
697:Joe Nocera
664:Washington
562:Bob Graham
503:Harry Reid
499:California
460:, receive
277:accounting
185:bipartisan
136:Fannie Mae
1380:April 19,
1350:April 19,
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594:(Boehner)
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458:testimony
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189:bicameral
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1270:Archived
1248:cite web
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1072:Wallison
972:on faith
864:leverage
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470:subpoena
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454:hearings
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1784:2013
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1550:2015
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1382:2010
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1320:ISBN
1254:link
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