480:
and
Associates failed to review the initial design thoroughly, and engineer Daniel M. Duncan accepted Havens Steel's proposed plan via a phone call without performing necessary calculations or viewing sketches that would have revealed its serious intrinsic flaws—in particular, doubling the load on the fourth-floor beams. Reports and court testimony cited a feedback loop of architects' unverified assumptions, each having believed that someone else had performed calculations and checked reinforcements but without any actual root in documentation or review channels. Onsite workers had neglected to report noticing beams bending, and instead rerouted their heavy wheelbarrows around the unsteady walkways.
385:. Survivors were buried beneath the walkways' many tons of steel, concrete and glass, which the fire department's jacks could not move. Volunteers responded to an appeal and brought jacks, flashlights, compressors, jackhammers, concrete saws and generators from construction companies and suppliers. They also brought cranes and forced the booms through the lobby windows to lift debris. Deputy Fire Chief Arnett Williams recalled this immediate outpouring from the industrial community: "They said 'take what you want'. I don't know if all those people got their equipment back. But no one has ever asked for an accounting and no one has ever submitted a bill."
366:
423:
611:, sponsored seminars and created trade manuals for the improvement of professional standards and public confidence. The Kansas City Codes Administration became its own department, doubling its staff and dedicating a single engineer comprehensively to all aspects of each reviewed building. Kansas City politics and government were colored for years with investigations against corruption. In 1983, the disaster was cited in the argument against the Reagan administration's attempt to eliminate an agency of the
358:
296:
failed even under one-third of the weight it held that night. Convicted of gross negligence, misconduct and unprofessional conduct, the engineering company lost its national affiliation and all engineering licenses in four states, but was acquitted of criminal charges. Company owner and engineer of record Jack D. Gillum eventually claimed full responsibility for the collapse and its obvious but unchecked design flaws, and he became an engineering disaster lecturer.
656:
22:
415:
448:, characterized the neglectful corporate culture surrounding the entire Hyatt construction project as "everyone wanting to walk away from responsibility". The NBS's final report cited structural overload resulting from design flaws where "the walkways had only minimal capacity to resist their own weight". Pfrang concluded they would have failed with one-third of the occupants' weight.
472:
failure, the box beams split along the weld and the nut supporting them slipped through the resulting gap, which was consistent with reports that the upper walkway at first fell several inches, after which the nut was held only by the upper side of the box beams; then the upper side of the box beams failed as well, allowing the entire walkway to fall in a
147:
378:
yards from the others. Guests heard popping noises and a loud crack moments before the fourth-floor walkway dropped several inches, paused, then fell completely onto the second-floor walkway. Both walkways then fell to the crowded lobby floor. A diner at the 42nd-floor revolving restaurant atop the Hyatt said it felt like an explosion.
515:. That lawsuit yielded $ 10 million, including $ 6.5 million dedicated as donations to charitable and civic endeavors that Hallmark called a "healing gesture to help Kansas City put the tragedy of the skywalks' collapse behind it." Each of the approximately 1,600 hotel occupants from that night was unconditionally offered
455:. The two walkways were suspended from a set of 1.25-inch-diameter (32 mm) steel hanger rods, with the second-floor walkway hanging directly under the fourth-floor walkway. The fourth-floor walkway platform was supported on three cross-beams suspended by the steel rods retained by nuts. The cross-beams were
460:
walkway, with a nut at the middle of each tie rod tightened up to the bottom of the fourth-floor walkway, and a nut at the bottom of each tie rod tightened up to the bottom of the second-floor walkway. Even this original design supported only 60% of the minimum load required by Kansas City building codes.
643:
Jack D. Gillum (1928–2012), the owner of the engineering company and an engineer of record for the Hyatt project, occasionally lectured at engineering conferences for years after the tragedy. Claiming full responsibility and disturbed by his memories "365 days a year", he said he wanted "to scare the
463:
Havens Steel
Company had manufactured the rods, and the company objected that the whole rod below the fourth floor would have to be threaded in order to screw on the nuts to hold the fourth-floor walkway in place. These threads would be subject to damage as the fourth-floor structure was hoisted into
591:
is one of the worst examples of people trying to push off their responsibilities to other parts of the team ... Since the Hyatt, there has been a lot of activity in the engineering profession to address quality, the final product and how you attain quality. The steps taken after the Hyatt helped the
527:
The hotel reopened three months after the tragedy. In 1983, local authorities reported that the $ 5 million hotel reconstruction made the building "possibly the safest in the country." The hotel was renamed the Hyatt
Regency Crown Center in 1987, and the Sheraton Kansas City at Crown Center in 2011.
479:
Investigators concluded that the underlying problem was a lack of proper communication between Jack D. Gillum and
Associates and Havens Steel. In particular, the drawings prepared by Gillum and Associates were only preliminary sketches, but Havens Steel interpreted them as finalized drawings. Gillum
536:
said the victims were soon overshadowed by the community's daily preoccupation with the disaster and its polarized attitude of blame-seeking and "vendetta" that soon targeted even the local newspapers, judges and lawyers: "Seldom has a city's establishment been so emotionally torn by catastrophe as
467:
This design change would be fatal. In the original design, the beams of the fourth-floor walkway had to support only the weight of the fourth-floor walkway, with the weight of the second-floor walkway supported completely by the rods. In the revised design, however, the fourth-floor beams supported
348:
The hotel's lobby was its defining feature, with a multi-story atrium spanned by elevated walkways suspended from the ceiling. These steel, glass and concrete crossings connected the second, third and fourth floors between the north and south wings. The walkways were about 120 feet (37 m) long
491:
The
Missouri Board of Architects, Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors found the engineers at Jack D. Gillum and Associates who had approved the final drawings to be culpable of gross negligence, misconduct, and unprofessional conduct in the practice of engineering. They were acquitted of all
396:
Visibility was poor because of dust and because the power had been cut to prevent fires. Water from the hotel's ruptured sprinkler system flooded the lobby and put trapped survivors at risk of drowning. The final rescued victim, Mark
Williams, spent more than nine hours pinned underneath the lower
388:
The dead were taken to a ground-floor exhibition area as a makeshift morgue, and the hotel's driveway and lawn were used as a triage area. Able survivors were instructed to leave the hotel to simplify the rescue effort, and morphine was given to the mortally injured. Blood centers quickly received
471:
The serious flaws of the revised design were compounded by the fact that both designs placed the bolts directly through a welded joint connecting two C-channels, the weakest structural point in the box beams. Photographs of the wreckage show excessive deformations of the cross-section. During the
459:
made from 8-inch-wide (200 mm) C-channel strips welded together lengthwise, with a hollow space between them. The original design by Jack D. Gillum and
Associates specified three pairs of rods running from the second-floor walkway to the ceiling, passing through the beams of the fourth-floor
377:
on the evening of Friday, July 17, 1981. The second-level walkway held about 40 people at about 7:05 p.m., with more on the third and an additional 16 to 20 on the fourth. The fourth-floor bridge was suspended directly over the second-floor bridge, with the third-floor walkway offset several
295:
large construction with reduced oversight and major failures. Its roof had partially collapsed during construction, and the ill-conceived skywalk design progressively degraded due to a miscommunication loop of corporate neglect and irresponsibility. An investigation concluded that it would have
405:
A total of 114 were killed and 216 injured, 29 of whom were rescued from the rubble. Rescuers often had to dismember bodies to reach survivors among the wreckage. A surgeon spent 20 minutes amputating one victim's pinned and unsalvageable leg with a chainsaw; that victim later died.
1072:
537:
Kansas City's was". The owner of the Kansas City Star
Company guessed that the huge victim count ensured that "virtually half the town was affected directly or indirectly by the horror of the tragedy". The newspaper generated 16 months' worth of
435:
hired architectural engineer Wayne G. Lischka and national engineering firm
Simpson, Gumpertz, and Heger Inc. to investigate the collapse, and Lischka discovered a change to the original design of the walkways. Within days, a laboratory at
464:
place. Havens Steel proposed that two separate and offset sets of rods be used: the first set suspending the fourth-floor walkway from the ceiling, and the second set suspending the second-floor walkway from the fourth-floor walkway.
337:. There were numerous delays and setbacks, including the collapse of 2,700 square feet (250 m) of the roof. The newspaper observed that "Notable structures around the country were failing at an alarming rate", which included the
519:, of which 1,300 accepted by the deadline. Every defendant—including Hallmark Cards, Crown Center Corporation, architects, engineers, and the contractor—denied all legal liability, including that of the egregious engineering faults.
606:
adopted a clear policy—which carries weight in court—that structural engineers are now ultimately responsible for reviewing shop drawings by fabricators. Trade groups such as the ASCE issued investigations, improved standards of
1082:
587:" to multiple disciplines across jurisdictions, and teaching university students in engineering ethics classes how the smallest personal responsibility can impact the biggest projects with the worst possible results.
328:
described the national climate of the late 1970s as "high unemployment, inflation and double-digit interest rates pressure on builders to win contracts and complete projects swiftly". Described by the newspaper as
1586:
541:-winning investigative coverage of the disaster—putting the newspaper at odds with the Kansas City community in general, including the management of Hallmark Cards, the parent company of the hotel's owner.
418:
The original design vis-à-vis the final construction of the fourth-floor walkway support system. The revised design doubled the force on the nut, and hence on the welded joint of the beams which split.
1519:
1289:
714:
361:
Lobby floor, during the first day of the investigation. The third-floor walkway shows the comparable three pairs of tie-rods holding its support beams, which failed on the fourth-floor walkway.
507:(equivalent to $ 469 million in 2023) was actually awarded to victims and their families, under hotel owner Crown Center Redevelopment Corporation. The single largest award was about
1327:
133:
288:
in the lobby. Kansas City society was affected for years, with the collapse resulting in billions of dollars of insurance claims, legal investigations, and city government reforms.
1954:
801:
1420:
850:
1126:
552:
The Hyatt
Regency collapse remains the deadliest non-deliberate structural failure in American history, and it was the deadliest structural collapse in the U.S. until the
1687:
1448:
1594:
483:
Jack D. Gillum would later reflect that the design flaw was so obvious that "any first-year engineering student could figure it out," if only it had been checked.
492:
the crimes with which they were initially charged, but the company lost its engineering licenses in Missouri, Kansas and Texas, and lost its membership with the
511:, for a victim who required full-time medical care. A class-action lawsuit seeking punitive damages was won against Crown Center Corporation, a subsidiary of
426:
A cross-section of the fourth-floor support beam that fell, together with the second-floor support rod passing through its left and right halves vertically
219:
1716:
1279:
702:
1515:
1994:
636:
A memorial was dedicated by Skywalk Memorial Foundation, a nonprofit organization established for victims of the collapse, on November 12, 2015, in
1989:
1944:
1036:
39:
1745:
1984:
1949:
1627:
1317:
1174:
998:
86:
881:
1934:
1355:
1239:
284:, collapsed on July 17, 1981, killing 114 people and injuring 216. Loaded with partygoers, the concrete and glass platforms crashed onto a
58:
1491:
963:
1776:
277:
189:
1564:
65:
1974:
674:
544:
Several rescuers suffered considerable stress due to their experience and later relied upon each other in an informal support group.
1452:
811:
1806:
1404:
834:
1136:
440:
began testing box beams on behalf of the steel fabrication source. The Missouri licensing board, the state attorney general and
72:
1683:
1869:
1414:
1168:
957:
914:
755:
920:
1832:
1073:"Former Chiefs doctor Joseph Waeckerle – a veteran of the NFL's concussion wars – is on a mission to protect young players"
54:
603:
493:
349:
and weighed about 64,000 pounds (29,000 kg). The fourth-level walkway was directly above the second-level walkway.
560:. The world responded to the Hyatt disaster by upgrading the culture and academic curriculum of engineering ethics and
553:
308:
1979:
1666:
1622:
1485:
569:
105:
1969:
43:
1709:
307:
over 120 years earlier, and remained the second deadliest structural collapse in the United States until the
79:
1964:
612:
445:
212:
1377:
1959:
1046:
877:
1939:
1741:
451:
Investigators found that the collapse was the result of changes to the design of the walkway's steel
342:
334:
1617:
1158:
1231:
441:
1913:
1008:
528:
It has been renovated numerous times since, though the lobby retains the same layout and design.
330:
292:
32:
1349:
1658:
1003:
128:
1475:
947:
873:
468:
both the fourth- and second-floor walkways, but were strong enough only for 30% of that load.
338:
1077:
669:
444:
investigated the collapse over the following years. Edward Pfrang, lead investigator for the
281:
197:
1768:
1650:
640:
Park across the street from the hotel. It included a $ 25,000 donation from Hallmark Cards.
397:
skywalk with both legs dislocated and having nearly drowned before the water was shut off.
1559:
1554:
1322:
1131:
1041:
806:
619:
584:
561:
557:
431:
324:
312:
300:
299:
The disaster contributed many lessons and reforms to engineering ethics and safety, and to
476:. A court order was required to retrieve the skywalk pieces from storage for examination.
389:
lineups of hundreds of donors. The Life Line helicopter pilot compared the carnage to the
8:
381:
The rescue operation lasted 14 hours, directed by Kansas City emergency medical director
1798:
1859:
1284:
577:
532:
369:
The landing of the concrete fourth-floor walkway, atop the crowded second-floor walkway
499:
In the months after the disaster, more than 300 lawsuits sought a cumulative total of
1865:
1662:
1651:
1481:
1410:
1212:
1164:
953:
910:
906:
Planning for disaster: how natural and man-made disasters shape the built environment
842:
761:
751:
745:
625:
473:
437:
365:
1204:
382:
1107:
D'Aulairey, Emily; Per Ola D'Aulairey (July 1982). "There Wasn't Time To Scream".
146:
904:
565:
422:
291:
The Hyatt had been built just a few years before, during a nationwide pattern of
1907:
1351:
Incident Command System for Structural Collapse Incidents; ICSSCI-Student Manual
1208:
1280:"Collapse of Hotel's 'Skywalks' in 1981 is still Reverberating; in Kansas City"
741:
630:
538:
512:
304:
1919:
1886:
1828:
1928:
846:
765:
637:
357:
234:
221:
124:
1160:
The Associated Press Library of Disasters: Nuclear and Industrial Disasters
661:
1216:
1710:"Negligence And The Professional "Debate" Over Responsibility For Design"
1195:
Waeckerle, Joseph F. (March 21, 1991). "Disaster Planning and Response".
608:
390:
633:
in 1982 for their 16 months of investigative coverage of the collapse.
456:
374:
285:
1106:
949:
Everyday crisis management: how to think like an emergency physician
802:"20 years later: Many are continuing to learn from skywalk collapse"
655:
21:
303:. It was the deadliest non-deliberate structural failure since the
201:
703:"Investigation of the Kansas City Hyatt Regency Walkways Collapse"
644:
daylights out of them" in the hope of preventing future mistakes.
583:
The disaster provides a case study teaching first responders the "
1900:
700:
452:
1381:
503:(equivalent to $ 10.1 billion in 2023). Of this, at least
1857:
1451:. School of Engineering, University of Alabama. Archived from
747:
To Engineer Is Human: The Role of Failure in Structural Design
1920:
Network news feature from July 23, 1981, including interviews
1653:
Disaster Response: Principles of Preparation and Coordination
1127:"20 years later: Fatal disaster remains impossible to forget"
1769:"Memorial to Kansas City skywalk disaster finally a reality"
1742:"The Pulitzer Prizes – Local General or Spot News Reporting"
564:. In this respect, the event joins the legacies of the 1984
414:
1684:"Why Engineers Must Remember the Kansas City Hyatt Tragedy"
835:"45 Killed at Hotel in Kansas City, Mo., as Walkways Fall"
1587:"Hyatt Regency Disaster | ThinkReliability, Case Studies"
1555:"From the archives: Surviving the Hyatt skywalk disaster"
597:
Paul Munger, chairman of the Missouri architectural board
713:. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, National Bureau of Standards.
1548:
1546:
151:
Original location of second- and fourth-story walkways
1955:
Building and structure collapses in the United States
1480:. New York: Cambridge University Press. p. 116.
1102:
1100:
1354:(FEMA P-702 ed.). FEMA. 2006. pp. SM 1–7.
651:
1831:. Horan & McConaty Funeral Home. July 5, 2012.
1543:
46:. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed.
1702:
1097:
701:Marshall, Richard D.; et al. (May 31, 1982).
1007:. Associated Press. July 15, 2001. Archived from
795:
333:, construction began in May 1978 on the 40-story
118:1981 structural collapse in Kansas City, Missouri
1926:
1273:
1271:
1269:
1267:
1265:
1263:
1261:
1259:
1257:
1163:. Grolier Academic Reference. 1997. p. 67.
793:
791:
789:
787:
785:
783:
781:
779:
777:
775:
373:About 1,600 people gathered in the atrium for a
1715:. Texas A&M University. February 22, 2009.
1318:"Hyatt skywalks collapse changed lives forever"
1120:
1118:
1030:
1028:
1026:
345:. The hotel officially opened on July 1, 1980.
254:Structural overload resulting from design flaws
1510:
1508:
1675:
1657:. St. Louis MO: C.V. Mosby Company. pp.
1648:
1615:
1406:Engineering ethics: an industrial perspective
1254:
772:
1861:Why Buildings Fall Down: How Structures Fail
1229:
1115:
1023:
1858:Levy, M.; Salvadori, M.; Woest, K. (1994).
1618:"The Hyatt Regency disaster 20 years later"
1505:
1477:Ethics in Engineering Practice and Research
1311:
1309:
1307:
999:"Lives forever changed by skywalk collapse"
1066:
1064:
952:. First Decision Press. pp. 134–136.
941:
939:
937:
799:
736:
734:
732:
145:
1681:
1579:
1194:
1188:
1034:
675:List of structural failures and collapses
106:Learn how and when to remove this message
1995:Building and structure collapses in 1981
1766:
1734:
1473:
1467:
1304:
1223:
945:
740:
421:
413:
364:
356:
343:1978 Hartford Civic Center roof collapse
1990:Pedestrian bridges in the United States
1945:Box girder bridges in the United States
1910:photos of the failed walkway components
1779:from the original on September 21, 2016
1682:Andracsek, Robynn (December 16, 2015).
1277:
1061:
934:
902:
729:
1927:
1835:from the original on December 17, 2013
1748:from the original on December 28, 2015
1552:
1315:
1070:
896:
1985:July 1981 events in the United States
1950:Bridge disasters in the United States
1518:. Engineering.com. October 24, 2006.
1443:
1441:
1439:
1437:
1402:
1396:
1232:"Disaster medicine dilemmas examined"
1151:
1037:"Disaster made heroes of the helpers"
832:
696:
694:
692:
690:
1767:Campbell, Matt (November 12, 2015).
1567:from the original on August 18, 2020
1342:
1292:from the original on August 27, 2020
1071:Martin, David (September 14, 2011).
993:
991:
989:
987:
985:
983:
981:
44:adding citations to reliable sources
15:
1935:1981 disasters in the United States
1888:KMBC 9 Chronicle: The Skywalk Tapes
1722:from the original on August 1, 2020
1690:from the original on August 1, 2020
1358:from the original on April 17, 2021
1278:Haskins, Paul J. (March 29, 1983).
1230:O'Reilly, Kevin (January 2, 2012).
1124:
966:from the original on April 17, 2021
884:from the original on April 30, 2019
865:
623:and its associated publication the
604:American Society of Civil Engineers
494:American Society of Civil Engineers
13:
1851:
1809:from the original on July 17, 2019
1803:Kansas City Parks & Recreation
1799:"Skywalk Memorial Plaza Dedicated"
1630:from the original on July 25, 2019
1522:from the original on April 3, 2019
1434:
1330:from the original on July 14, 2021
1242:from the original on April 5, 2019
853:from the original on July 17, 2019
826:
800:Montgomery, Rick (July 15, 2001).
717:from the original on July 17, 2021
687:
554:collapse of the World Trade Center
309:collapse of the World Trade Center
14:
2006:
1879:
1623:Seattle Daily Journal of Commerce
978:
1975:History of Kansas City, Missouri
1516:"Hyatt Regency Walkway Collapse"
1449:"Hyatt Regency Walkway Collapse"
909:. Kaplan Business. p. 177.
654:
409:
55:"Hyatt Regency walkway collapse"
20:
1821:
1791:
1760:
1642:
1616:Staff writers (July 18, 2001).
1609:
1553:Murphy, Kevin (July 17, 2014).
1534:
1494:from the original on 2021-04-17
1423:from the original on 2021-04-17
1370:
1197:New England Journal of Medicine
1177:from the original on 2020-02-21
923:from the original on 2017-02-15
871:
339:1979 Kemper Arena roof collapse
31:needs additional citations for
1864:. W. W. Norton & Company.
1409:. Academic Press. p. 55.
1316:Murphy, Kevin (July 9, 2011).
592:industry recover from failure.
140:Hyatt Regency walkway collapse
1:
1908:Civil Engineering Ethics Site
1081:. Kansas City. Archived from
680:
400:
318:
276:Two overhead walkways in the
1649:Auf der Heide, Erik (1989).
1238:. Vol. 55, no. 1.
810:. p. A1. Archived from
613:National Bureau of Standards
522:
446:National Bureau of Standards
7:
1686:. Engineering News-Record.
1474:Whitbeck, Caroline (1998).
1209:10.1056/nejm199103213241206
709:. Building Science Series.
647:
352:
10:
2011:
1829:"Obituary: Jack D. Gillum"
878:Kansas City Public Library
305:collapse of Pemberton Mill
1378:"History & Education"
974:– via Google Books.
903:Ramroth, William (2007).
547:
335:Hyatt Regency Kansas City
266:
258:
250:
211:
190:Hyatt Regency Kansas City
182:
174:
156:
144:
1980:Hyatt Hotels and Resorts
486:
393:but in greater numbers.
946:Friedman, Mark (2002).
833:Staff (July 18, 1981).
122:
1916:– physics presentation
1004:Lawrence Journal-World
600:
427:
419:
370:
362:
162:; 43 years ago
134:considered for merging
1970:Disasters in Missouri
1891:. KMBC. July 13, 2021
1805:. November 13, 2015.
1236:American Medical News
670:Engineering disasters
589:
425:
417:
368:
360:
282:Kansas City, Missouri
1773:The Kansas City Star
1560:The Kansas City Star
1403:Baura, Gail (2006).
1323:The Kansas City Star
1132:The Kansas City Star
1042:The Kansas City Star
807:The Kansas City Star
620:The Kansas City Star
585:all-hazards approach
562:emergency management
432:The Kansas City Star
325:The Kansas City Star
301:emergency management
40:improve this article
1965:Disasters in hotels
1384:on February 7, 2005
1085:on October 20, 2012
278:Hyatt Regency Hotel
231: /
141:
1960:Corporate scandals
1455:on August 14, 2007
1285:The New York Times
1139:on August 22, 2011
1049:on 16 October 2014
839:The New York Times
814:on January 8, 2016
578:Chernobyl disaster
533:The New York Times
428:
420:
371:
363:
267:Non-fatal injuries
160:July 17, 1981
139:
1914:Failure By Design
1871:978-0-393-31152-5
1416:978-0-12-088531-2
1170:978-0-7172-9176-2
1111:. pp. 49–56.
959:978-0-9718452-0-6
916:978-1-4195-9373-4
757:978-0-679-73416-1
626:Kansas City Times
474:cascading failure
438:Lehigh University
274:
273:
235:39.085°N 94.580°W
194:2345 McGee Street
178:19:05 CDT (UTC−5)
116:
115:
108:
90:
2002:
1940:1981 in Missouri
1904:
1898:
1896:
1875:
1845:
1844:
1842:
1840:
1825:
1819:
1818:
1816:
1814:
1795:
1789:
1788:
1786:
1784:
1764:
1758:
1757:
1755:
1753:
1744:. Pulitzer.org.
1738:
1732:
1731:
1729:
1727:
1721:
1714:
1706:
1700:
1699:
1697:
1695:
1679:
1673:
1672:
1656:
1646:
1640:
1639:
1637:
1635:
1613:
1607:
1606:
1604:
1602:
1593:. Archived from
1591:ThinkReliability
1583:
1577:
1576:
1574:
1572:
1550:
1541:
1538:
1532:
1531:
1529:
1527:
1512:
1503:
1502:
1500:
1499:
1471:
1465:
1464:
1462:
1460:
1445:
1432:
1431:
1429:
1428:
1400:
1394:
1393:
1391:
1389:
1380:. Archived from
1374:
1368:
1367:
1365:
1363:
1346:
1340:
1339:
1337:
1335:
1313:
1302:
1301:
1299:
1297:
1275:
1252:
1251:
1249:
1247:
1227:
1221:
1220:
1192:
1186:
1185:
1183:
1182:
1155:
1149:
1148:
1146:
1144:
1135:. Archived from
1125:McGuire, Donna.
1122:
1113:
1112:
1104:
1095:
1094:
1092:
1090:
1068:
1059:
1058:
1056:
1054:
1045:. Archived from
1032:
1021:
1020:
1018:
1016:
1011:on June 14, 2010
995:
976:
975:
973:
971:
943:
932:
931:
929:
928:
900:
894:
893:
891:
889:
869:
863:
862:
860:
858:
830:
824:
823:
821:
819:
797:
770:
769:
738:
727:
726:
724:
722:
698:
664:
659:
658:
598:
518:
510:
506:
502:
383:Joseph Waeckerle
246:
245:
243:
242:
241:
236:
232:
229:
228:
227:
224:
170:
168:
163:
149:
142:
138:
111:
104:
100:
97:
91:
89:
48:
24:
16:
2010:
2009:
2005:
2004:
2003:
2001:
2000:
1999:
1925:
1924:
1894:
1892:
1885:
1882:
1872:
1854:
1852:Further reading
1849:
1848:
1838:
1836:
1827:
1826:
1822:
1812:
1810:
1797:
1796:
1792:
1782:
1780:
1765:
1761:
1751:
1749:
1740:
1739:
1735:
1725:
1723:
1719:
1712:
1708:
1707:
1703:
1693:
1691:
1680:
1676:
1669:
1647:
1643:
1633:
1631:
1614:
1610:
1600:
1598:
1597:on July 6, 2019
1585:
1584:
1580:
1570:
1568:
1551:
1544:
1539:
1535:
1525:
1523:
1514:
1513:
1506:
1497:
1495:
1488:
1472:
1468:
1458:
1456:
1447:
1446:
1435:
1426:
1424:
1417:
1401:
1397:
1387:
1385:
1376:
1375:
1371:
1361:
1359:
1348:
1347:
1343:
1333:
1331:
1314:
1305:
1295:
1293:
1276:
1255:
1245:
1243:
1228:
1224:
1203:(12): 815–821.
1193:
1189:
1180:
1178:
1171:
1157:
1156:
1152:
1142:
1140:
1123:
1116:
1109:Reader's Digest
1105:
1098:
1088:
1086:
1069:
1062:
1052:
1050:
1035:Staff writers.
1033:
1024:
1014:
1012:
997:
996:
979:
969:
967:
960:
944:
935:
926:
924:
917:
901:
897:
887:
885:
870:
866:
856:
854:
831:
827:
817:
815:
798:
773:
758:
742:Petroski, Henry
739:
730:
720:
718:
699:
688:
683:
660:
653:
650:
599:
596:
566:Bhopal disaster
550:
525:
516:
508:
504:
500:
489:
412:
403:
355:
321:
240:39.085; -94.580
239:
237:
233:
230:
225:
222:
220:
218:
217:
207:
166:
164:
161:
152:
137:
119:
112:
101:
95:
92:
49:
47:
37:
25:
12:
11:
5:
2008:
1998:
1997:
1992:
1987:
1982:
1977:
1972:
1967:
1962:
1957:
1952:
1947:
1942:
1937:
1923:
1922:
1917:
1911:
1905:
1881:
1880:External links
1878:
1877:
1876:
1870:
1853:
1850:
1847:
1846:
1820:
1790:
1759:
1733:
1701:
1674:
1667:
1661:, 72, 76, 82.
1641:
1608:
1578:
1542:
1533:
1504:
1486:
1466:
1433:
1415:
1395:
1369:
1341:
1303:
1253:
1222:
1187:
1169:
1150:
1114:
1096:
1060:
1022:
977:
958:
933:
915:
895:
874:"Hotel Horror"
864:
825:
771:
756:
728:
685:
684:
682:
679:
678:
677:
672:
666:
665:
649:
646:
631:Pulitzer Prize
594:
570:Space Shuttle
558:20 years later
549:
546:
539:Pulitzer Prize
524:
521:
513:Hallmark Cards
488:
485:
442:Jackson County
411:
408:
402:
399:
354:
351:
320:
317:
313:20 years later
272:
271:
268:
264:
263:
260:
256:
255:
252:
248:
247:
215:
209:
208:
206:
205:
195:
192:
186:
184:
180:
179:
176:
172:
171:
158:
154:
153:
150:
117:
114:
113:
28:
26:
19:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
2007:
1996:
1993:
1991:
1988:
1986:
1983:
1981:
1978:
1976:
1973:
1971:
1968:
1966:
1963:
1961:
1958:
1956:
1953:
1951:
1948:
1946:
1943:
1941:
1938:
1936:
1933:
1932:
1930:
1921:
1918:
1915:
1912:
1909:
1906:
1902:
1890:
1889:
1884:
1883:
1873:
1867:
1863:
1862:
1856:
1855:
1834:
1830:
1824:
1808:
1804:
1800:
1794:
1778:
1774:
1770:
1763:
1747:
1743:
1737:
1718:
1711:
1705:
1689:
1685:
1678:
1670:
1668:0-8016-0385-4
1664:
1660:
1655:
1654:
1645:
1629:
1625:
1624:
1619:
1612:
1596:
1592:
1588:
1582:
1566:
1562:
1561:
1556:
1549:
1547:
1537:
1521:
1517:
1511:
1509:
1493:
1489:
1487:0-521-47944-4
1483:
1479:
1478:
1470:
1454:
1450:
1444:
1442:
1440:
1438:
1422:
1418:
1412:
1408:
1407:
1399:
1383:
1379:
1373:
1357:
1353:
1352:
1345:
1329:
1325:
1324:
1319:
1312:
1310:
1308:
1291:
1287:
1286:
1281:
1274:
1272:
1270:
1268:
1266:
1264:
1262:
1260:
1258:
1241:
1237:
1233:
1226:
1218:
1214:
1210:
1206:
1202:
1198:
1191:
1176:
1172:
1166:
1162:
1161:
1154:
1138:
1134:
1133:
1128:
1121:
1119:
1110:
1103:
1101:
1084:
1080:
1079:
1074:
1067:
1065:
1048:
1044:
1043:
1038:
1031:
1029:
1027:
1010:
1006:
1005:
1000:
994:
992:
990:
988:
986:
984:
982:
965:
961:
955:
951:
950:
942:
940:
938:
922:
918:
912:
908:
907:
899:
883:
879:
875:
868:
852:
848:
844:
840:
836:
829:
813:
809:
808:
803:
796:
794:
792:
790:
788:
786:
784:
782:
780:
778:
776:
767:
763:
759:
753:
749:
748:
743:
737:
735:
733:
716:
712:
708:
704:
697:
695:
693:
691:
686:
676:
673:
671:
668:
667:
663:
657:
652:
645:
641:
639:
638:Hospital Hill
634:
632:
628:
627:
622:
621:
616:
614:
610:
605:
593:
588:
586:
581:
579:
576:and the 1986
575:
573:
567:
563:
559:
555:
545:
542:
540:
535:
534:
529:
520:
514:
505:$ 140 million
497:
495:
484:
481:
477:
475:
469:
465:
461:
458:
454:
449:
447:
443:
439:
434:
433:
424:
416:
410:Investigation
407:
398:
394:
392:
386:
384:
379:
376:
367:
359:
350:
346:
344:
340:
336:
332:
327:
326:
316:
314:
310:
306:
302:
297:
294:
289:
287:
283:
279:
269:
265:
261:
257:
253:
249:
244:
216:
214:
210:
203:
199:
196:
193:
191:
188:
187:
185:
181:
177:
173:
159:
155:
148:
143:
135:
131:
130:
129:Infobox event
126:
121:
110:
107:
99:
88:
85:
81:
78:
74:
71:
67:
64:
60:
57: –
56:
52:
51:Find sources:
45:
41:
35:
34:
29:This article
27:
23:
18:
17:
1899:– via
1893:. Retrieved
1887:
1860:
1837:. Retrieved
1823:
1811:. Retrieved
1802:
1793:
1781:. Retrieved
1772:
1762:
1750:. Retrieved
1736:
1724:. Retrieved
1704:
1692:. Retrieved
1677:
1652:
1644:
1634:December 15,
1632:. Retrieved
1621:
1611:
1601:December 15,
1599:. Retrieved
1595:the original
1590:
1581:
1569:. Retrieved
1558:
1540:NIST, p. 244
1536:
1524:. Retrieved
1496:. Retrieved
1476:
1469:
1457:. Retrieved
1453:the original
1425:. Retrieved
1405:
1398:
1386:. Retrieved
1382:the original
1372:
1360:. Retrieved
1350:
1344:
1332:. Retrieved
1321:
1294:. Retrieved
1283:
1244:. Retrieved
1235:
1225:
1200:
1196:
1190:
1179:. Retrieved
1159:
1153:
1141:. Retrieved
1137:the original
1130:
1108:
1087:. Retrieved
1083:the original
1076:
1051:. Retrieved
1047:the original
1040:
1013:. Retrieved
1009:the original
1002:
968:. Retrieved
948:
925:. Retrieved
905:
898:
886:. Retrieved
872:Roe, Jason.
867:
855:. Retrieved
838:
828:
816:. Retrieved
812:the original
805:
746:
719:. Retrieved
710:
706:
662:1980s portal
642:
635:
624:
618:
617:
601:
590:
582:
571:
551:
543:
531:
530:
526:
509:$ 12 million
498:
490:
482:
478:
470:
466:
462:
450:
430:
429:
404:
395:
387:
380:
372:
347:
331:fast-tracked
323:
322:
298:
293:fast-tracked
290:
275:
127:
120:
102:
93:
83:
76:
69:
62:
50:
38:Please help
33:verification
30:
1459:January 29,
1362:October 10,
1143:December 3,
1015:January 28,
750:. Vintage.
609:peer review
568:, the 1986
501:$ 3 billion
457:box girders
453:hanger rods
391:Vietnam War
238: /
213:Coordinates
198:Kansas City
123:‹ The
96:August 2023
1929:Categories
1783:August 27,
1498:2016-10-11
1427:2020-10-23
1181:2016-10-11
927:2017-01-30
681:References
572:Challenger
401:Casualties
319:Background
226:94°34′48″W
223:39°05′06″N
167:1981-07-17
66:newspapers
1388:April 30,
1246:August 9,
1078:The Pitch
888:April 30,
847:0362-4331
766:493623634
744:(1992) .
523:Aftermath
375:tea dance
286:tea dance
132:is being
1895:July 14,
1833:Archived
1813:July 17,
1807:Archived
1777:Archived
1752:July 30,
1746:Archived
1717:Archived
1688:Archived
1628:Archived
1565:Archived
1520:Archived
1492:Archived
1421:Archived
1356:Archived
1334:July 14,
1328:Archived
1290:Archived
1240:Archived
1175:Archived
1089:July 14,
970:June 14,
964:Archived
921:Archived
882:Archived
857:July 17,
851:Archived
721:July 14,
715:Archived
648:See also
595:—
574:disaster
353:Collapse
341:and the
202:Missouri
183:Location
136:. ›
125:template
1901:YouTube
1526:June 1,
1217:1997854
1053:17 July
556:towers
517:$ 1,000
311:towers
165: (
80:scholar
1868:
1839:May 4,
1726:May 4,
1694:May 4,
1665:
1571:May 4,
1484:
1413:
1296:May 4,
1215:
1167:
956:
913:
845:
818:May 4,
764:
754:
629:won a
548:Legacy
259:Deaths
82:
75:
68:
61:
53:
1720:(PDF)
1713:(PDF)
487:Legal
251:Cause
204:64108
87:JSTOR
73:books
1897:2021
1866:ISBN
1841:2020
1815:2019
1785:2016
1754:2010
1728:2020
1696:2020
1663:ISBN
1636:2022
1603:2022
1573:2020
1528:2006
1482:ISBN
1461:2017
1411:ISBN
1390:2019
1364:2011
1336:2021
1298:2020
1248:2013
1213:PMID
1165:ISBN
1145:2011
1091:2021
1055:2019
1017:2011
972:2019
954:ISBN
911:ISBN
890:2019
859:2019
843:ISSN
820:2020
762:OCLC
752:ISBN
723:2021
707:NIST
602:The
175:Time
157:Date
59:news
1205:doi
1201:324
711:143
280:in
270:216
262:114
42:by
1931::
1801:.
1775:.
1771:.
1626:.
1620:.
1589:.
1563:.
1557:.
1545:^
1507:^
1490:.
1436:^
1419:.
1326:.
1320:.
1306:^
1288:.
1282:.
1256:^
1234:.
1211:.
1199:.
1173:.
1129:.
1117:^
1099:^
1075:.
1063:^
1039:.
1025:^
1001:.
980:^
962:.
936:^
919:.
880:.
876:.
849:.
841:.
837:.
804:.
774:^
760:.
731:^
705:.
689:^
615:.
580:.
496:.
315:.
200:,
1903:.
1874:.
1843:.
1817:.
1787:.
1756:.
1730:.
1698:.
1671:.
1659:3
1638:.
1605:.
1575:.
1530:.
1501:.
1463:.
1430:.
1392:.
1366:.
1338:.
1300:.
1250:.
1219:.
1207::
1184:.
1147:.
1093:.
1057:.
1019:.
930:.
892:.
861:.
822:.
768:.
725:.
169:)
109:)
103:(
98:)
94:(
84:·
77:·
70:·
63:·
36:.
Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.
