382:) was only in the initial stages of acceptance, but still Lewis stated the logical possibility that, if the physical world was proved to be indeterministic, this would provide an entry (interaction) point into the traditionally viewed closed system, where a scientifically described physically probable/improbable event could be philosophically described as an action of a non-physical entity on physical reality (noting that, under a physicalist point of view, the non-physical entity must be independent of the self-identity or mental processing of the sentient being). Lewis mentions this only in passing, making clear that his thesis does not depend on it in any way.
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Anti-classical incompatibilism is the explanatory thesis of neo-classical incompatibilism; anti-classical incompatibilism is neutral on the truth-value of incompossibilism. Correspondingly, anti-classical compatibilism is the negation of neo-classical incompatibilism's positive tenet, i.e. anti-classical compatibilism is the contradictory of anti-classical incompatibilism. Post-classical incompatibilism is just the negative, non-explanatory thesis of neo-classical incompatibilism; this view is neutral on whether the positive, explanatory thesis of neo-classical incompatibilism is true. (Put another way, on the post-classical redefinition of
268:) is a leading incompatibilist philosopher in favour of free will. Kane seeks to hold persons morally responsible for decisions that involved indeterminism in their process. Critics maintain that Kane fails to overcome the greatest challenge to such an endeavor: "the argument from luck". Namely, if a critical moral choice is a matter of luck (indeterminate quantum fluctuations), then the question of holding a person responsible for their final action arises. Moreover, even if we imagine that a person can make an act of will ahead of time, to make the
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originally coined for use within a research paradigm that was dominant among academics during the so-called "classical period" from the 1960s to 1980s, or what has been called the "classical analytic paradigm". Within the classical analytic paradigm, the problem of free will and determinism was understood as a compatibility question: "Is it possible for an ordinary human to exercise free will (classically defined as an ability to otherwise) when determinism is true?" Those working in the classical analytic paradigm who answered "no" were
169:, namely: neo-classical incompatibilism, post-classical incompatibilism (a.k.a. incompossibilism), and anti-classical incompatibilism. Correspondingly, there are neo-classical, post-classical (compossibilist), and anti-classical versions of compatibilism as well. Neo-classical incompatibilism is a two-tenet view: incompossibilism is true (i.e. it is metaphysically impossible for an ordinary human to act freely when determinism is true), and determinism-related causal/nomological factors preclude free will (which explains
129:. Given that classical free will theorists (i.e. those working in the classical analytic paradigm) agreed that it is at least metaphysically possible for an ordinary human to exercise free will, all classical compatibilists accepted a compossibilist account of free will (i.e. a compossibilist interpretation of the ability to do otherwise) and all classical incompatibilists accepted a libertarian (a.k.a. libertarianist) account of free will (i.e. a libertarian/libertarianist interpretation of the ability to do otherwise).
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314:". One major objection to this view is that science has gradually shown that more and more of the physical world obeys completely deterministic laws, and seems to suggest that our minds are just as much part of the physical world as anything else. If these assumptions are correct, incompatibilist libertarianism can only be maintained as the claim that free will is a supernatural phenomenon, which does not obey the laws of nature (as, for instance, maintained by some religious traditions).
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naturally have compatibilist or incompatibilist intuitions has not come out overwhelmingly in favor of one view or the other. Still, there has been some evidence that people can naturally hold both views. For instance, when people are presented with abstract cases which ask if a person could be morally responsible for an immoral act when they could not have done otherwise, people tend to say no, or give
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518:, according to which agents as substances (thus not merely as having a role in events) can cause actions without being causally determined to do so. Pereboom argues that for empirical reasons it is unlikely that we are agent causes of this sort, and that as a result, it is likely that we lack free will.
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to suggest that although the mind is in fact part of the physical world, it involves a different level of description of the same facts, so that although there are deterministic laws under the physical description, there are no such laws under the mental description, and thus our actions are free and
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aspect of moral responsibility—for our deserving to be blamed or punished for immoral actions, and to be praised or rewarded for morally exemplary actions. He contends that if our decisions were indeterministic events, their occurrence would not be in the control of the agent in the way required for
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The number of philosophers who reject the classical assumption of anthropocentric possibilism, i.e. the view that it is at least metaphysically possible for a human to exercise free will, has also risen in recent years. As philosophers adjusted Lehrer's original (classical) definitions of the terms
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The classical analytic paradigm has fallen out of favor over the last few decades, largely because philosophers no longer agree that free will is equivalent to some kind of ability to do otherwise; many hold that it is, instead, a type of sourcehood that does not require an ability to do otherwise.
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was coined (also by Lehrer) to name the view that the classical free will thesis is logically compatible with determinism, i.e. it is possible for an ordinary human to exercise free will (the freedom-relevant ability to do otherwise), even in a universe where determinism is true. These terms were
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events occur. Determinists sometimes assert that it is stubborn to resist scientifically motivated determinism on purely intuitive grounds about one's own sense of freedom. They reason that the history of the development of science suggests that determinism is the logical method in which reality
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have been working on determining whether ordinary people, who are not experts in this field, naturally have compatibilist or incompatibilist intuitions about determinism and moral responsibility. Some experimental work has even conducted cross-cultural studies. The debate about whether people
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are variously known as "hard determinists", hard incompatibilists, free will skeptics, illusionists, or impossibilists. They believe that there is no free will and that any sense of the contrary is an illusion. Hard determinists do not deny that one has desires, but say that these desires are
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incompossibilism is true). Correspondingly, neo-classical compatibilism is the two-tenet view that: the negative, non-explanatory tenet of neo-classical incompatibilism is false (i.e. compossibilism is true), and that the positive, explanatory tenet of neo-classical incompatibilism is false.
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determinism is true (i.e. not at all because certain causal/nomological factors obtain); most propose that the real threat to free will is that people lack adequate control over their own constitutive properties, or what is often called their "constitutive luck" (as opposed to causal luck).
506:, the hard incompatibilist holds that if determinism were true, our having free will would be ruled out. But Pereboom argues in addition that if our decisions were indeterministic events, free will would also be precluded. In his view, free will is the control in action required for the
478:. This thesis argues in favor of maintaining the prevailing belief in free will for the sake of preserving moral responsibility and the concept of ethics. However, critics argue that this move renders morality merely another "illusion", or else that this move is simply hypocritical.
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further establishes that if we have free will, then quantum particles also possess free will. This means that starting from the assumption that humans have free will, it is possible to pinpoint the origin of their free will in the quantum particles that constitute their brain.
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can be a source of confusion because arguments with very different (even inconsistent) conclusions are currently lumped together under the umbrella phrase "arguments for incompatibilism". For example, it is easy for the casual reader to overlook that some arguments for
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action more probable in the upcoming critical moment, this act of 'willing' was itself a matter of luck. Kane objects to the validity of the argument from luck because the latter misrepresents the chance as if it is external to the act of choosing. The
249:. Libertarianism is one of the popular solutions to the problem of free will, roughly the problem of settling the question of whether we have free will and the logically prior question of what free will amounts to. The main rivals to libertarianism are
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van
Inwagen, Peter, 'The Problem of Fr** W*ll', in Hugh J. McCann (ed.), Free Will and Classical Theism: The Significance of Freedom in Perfect Being Theology (New York, 2017; online edn, Oxford Academic, 22 Dec. 2016). Open-access copy available at:
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libertarianism is to explain how indeterminism can be compatible with rationality and with appropriate connections between an individual's beliefs, desires, general character and actions. A variety of naturalistic libertarianism is promoted by
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Frankfurt, Harry G., 1969, "Alternate
Possibilities and Moral Responsibility", The Journal of Philosophy, 66(23): 829–839. Reprinted in Fischer 1986, pp. 143–52; in Frankfurt 1988, pp. 1–10; and in Widerker and McKenna 2003, pp. 17–25.
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Mickelson, Kristin, Joe
Campbell, and V. Alan White, "Introduction," in A Companion to Free Will (Campbell, Joe; Mickelson, Kristin M. & White, V. Alan (eds.) (2023). Wiley-Blackwell:1-19. Open-access version available at:
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answers, but when presented with a specific immoral act that a specific person committed, people tend to say that that person is morally responsible for their actions, even if they were determined (that is, people also give
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system that relies explicitly on determinism. A determinist's moral system simply bears in mind that every person's actions in a given situation are, in theory, predicted by the interplay of environment and upbringing.
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to free will or are a total "red herring" in discussions of free will.) Correspondingly, post-classical compatibilism is identical to compossibilism (i.e. on the post-classical redefinition of
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The determinist will add that, even if denying free will does mean morality is incoherent, such a result has no effect on the truth. However, hard determinists often have some sort of
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Mickelson, Kristin (2016). The
Manipulation Argument. In Chapter 14, the Routledge Companion to Free Will (editors: Meghan Griffith, Kevin Timpe & Neil Levy). New York: Routledge.
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Mickelson, Kristin, Joe
Campbell, and V. Alan White, "Introduction," in A Companion to Free Will (Campbell, Joe; Mickelson, Kristin M. & White, V. Alan (eds.) (2023). Wiley-
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Pereboom, Derk (2023). "Meaning in Life and Free Will
Skepticism", in J. Campbell, K. Mickelson, and V. A. White, eds. A Companion to Free Will. Blackwell (2023): 464-476.
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is formed indeterministically (in "self-forming actions"), then our actions can still flow from our character, and yet still be incompatibilistically free.
293:, however; if any such mind is real, an objection can be raised that free will would be impossible if the choosing is shaped merely by luck or chance.
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Mickelson, Kristin M. (2019). Free Will, Self‐Creation, and the
Paradox of Moral Luck. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43 (1):224-256. Available at
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is false; in first-order language, it is the view that we (ordinary humans) have free will and the world does not behave in the way described by
303:. It suggests that we actually do have free will, that it is incompatible with determinism, and that therefore the future is not determined.
178:, it is just an alternative name for incompossibilism, a view which is completely silent on whether determinism-related causal factors are
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to designate the view that both determinism and indeterminism are incompatible with having free will and moral responsibility. Like the
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incompatibilism) is false. Arguments in the last category conclude that people lack free will when determinism is true but not at all
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Alternatively, libertarian view points based upon indeterminism have been proposed without the assumption of naturalism. At the time
121:; they proposed that determinism precludes free will because it precludes the ability to do otherwise. Those who answered "yes" were
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said "Man is free to do what he wills, but he cannot will what he wills." The hard determinist says then, there is no "free will".
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is logically incompatible with the classical thesis of free will. The term was coined in the 1960s, most likely by philosopher
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Levy, Neil (2011). Hard Luck: How Luck
Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
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to reflect their own perspectives on the location of the purported "fundamental divide" among free will theorists, the terms
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Mickelson, Kristin (2015). The Zygote
Argument is invalid: Now what? Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2911-2929. Available at
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333:. By assuming an indeterministic universe, libertarian philosophical constructs can be proposed under the assumption of
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said that philosophers (and scientists) have an "antipathy to chance". Absolute chance, a possible implication of
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incompatibilism on the grounds that the argument does not aim to support the latter's explanatory tenet (a.k.a.
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On one recent taxonomy, there are now at least three substantively different, non-classical uses of the term
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Mele, Alfred. "Manipulation, Moral
Responsibility, and Bullet Biting," Journal of Ethics 17 (2013): 167-184.
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Hagop Sarkissian; Amita Chatterjee; Felipe De Brigard; Joshua Knobe; Shaun Nichols; Smita Sirker (2010).
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have been given a variety of new meanings. At present, then, there is no standard meaning of the term
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Mele, Alfred (2023). "Free Will: Looking Ahead," in J. Campbell, K. Mickelson, and V. A. White, eds.
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1150:(2014). "Acting 'of One's Own Free Will': Modern Reflections on an Ancient Philosophical Problem".
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1679:(2011). "Rethinking Free Will: New Perspectives on an Ancient Problem". In Kane, Robert H. (ed.).
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is the view that the free-will thesis (that we, ordinary humans, have free will) is true and that
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1522:. Vol. 3: Descartes to Gender and Science. London: Taylor & Francis. pp. 743–744.
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De Marco, Gabriel (2016). Rescuing the Zygote Argument. Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1621-1628.
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determined by an unbroken chain of prior occurrences. According to this philosophy, no wholly
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1112:(1999). "Responsibility, Luck, and Chance: Reflections on Free Will and Indeterminism".
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Pereboom, Derk (2001). Living Without Free Will. New York: Cambridge University Press.
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Hard incompatibilism, like hard determinism, is a type of skepticism about free will.
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view of the physical universe, under the assumption that the idea of a deterministic,
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Georgiev, Danko D. (2021). "Quantum propensities in the brain cortex and free will".
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Free Will and Classical Theism: The Significance of Freedom in Perfect Being Theology
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Van Inwagen, Peter (1983). An Essay on Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press.
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Debate: Is man a machine? Clarence Darrow, affirmative; Dr. Will Durant, negative
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2086:"Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions"
796:"Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility By Neil Levy"
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As something of a solution to this predicament, one might embrace the so-called
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Mickelson, Kristin M. (2020). The Zygote Argument Is Still Invalid: So What?
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such attributions of desert. The possibility for free will that remains is
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incompatibilism is false on the grounds that its explanatory tenet (a.k.a.
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in the original, classical-analytic sense of the term, now commonly called
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2014:
Eddy Nahmias; Stephen G. Morris; Thomas Nadelhoffer; Jason Turner (2006).
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van Inwagen, Peter, 'The Problem of Fr** W*ll', in Hugh J. McCann (ed.),
467:, hard determinism may imply disastrous consequences for their theory of
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1188:(2016). "Moral Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes and Freedom of Will".
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Strawson, Galen (1994). "The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility".
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651:. Brown University ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 1960. 6205755.
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https://naturalism.org/philosophy/free-will/luck-swallows-everything
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1683:(2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 381–404.
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incompatibilism (a.k.a. incompossibilism) are not arguments for
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1641:"Why Naturalists Should Mind about Physicalism, and Vice Versa"
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There are libertarian view points based upon indeterminism and
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631:(New York, 2017; online edn, Oxford Academic, 22 Dec. 2016),
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Quantum Information and Consciousness: A Gentle Introduction
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incompatibilism (a.k.a. incompossibilism) but conclude that
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The Will to Believe: And Other Essays in Popular Philosophy
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Causes, Laws, and Free Will: Why Determinism Doesn't Matter
635:, accessed 20 Aug. 2023. Open-access article available at:
471:, resulting in a domino theory of moral nonresponsibility.
1236:"Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will"
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The Free Will Show Episode 9: Moral Luck with Dana Nelkin
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https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190611200.003.0001
1238:. In Edward N. Zalta; Uri Nodelman; Colin Allen (eds.).
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However, many libertarian view points now rely upon an
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in the original sense of the term, now commonly called
887:
Manipulated Agents: A Window to Moral Responsibility
773:"Free Will is Impossible. Interview with Derk Pe..."
1778:. London: Longmans, Green and Co. pp. 145–183.
463:Since many believe that free will is necessary for
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800:Free Unlimited Books PDF eBook or Kindle ePUB free
1885:(2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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1069:Free Will: New Perspectives on an Ancient Problem
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206:incompatibilism). Other arguments support
16:Contradiction of free will and determinism
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1152:Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
1048:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
489:
451:, supports the existence of indefinite
4211:
1955:Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life
1855:
1772:(1912). "The Dilemma of Determinism".
1234:Randolph Clarke, Justin Capes (2017).
419:Those who reject free will and accept
306:One famous proponent of this view was
3874:
2616:
2154:
2116:
1768:
1711:
999:
458:
81:Classical incompatibilists hold that
2084:Shaun Nichols, Joshua Knobe (2007).
1875:
1675:
1520:Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy
1252:
1184:
1146:
1108:
1006:Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy
842:"Free Will and Moral Responsibility"
821:https://philarchive.org/rec/CAMWCT-2
678:https://philarchive.org/rec/CAMWCT-2
18:
1957:. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
1748:. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
1240:Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
712:Daniel Dennett - What is Free Will?
397:
289:Such philosophical stance risks an
186:, it denotes mere compossibilism).
13:
2032:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00603.x
968:https://philarchive.org/rec/MICFWS
14:
4240:
1588:Georgiev, Danko D. (2017-12-06).
1459:Libertarian Accounts of Free Will
1298:(2006). "The Free Will Theorem".
913:https://philpapers.org/rec/MICLFT
226:
4192:
4191:
4178:
2103:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00666.x
2071:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2010.01393.x
2000:10.1111/j.1475-4975.2005.00114.x
1983:"Defending Hard Incompatibilism"
1882:The Oxford Handbook of Free Will
1681:The Oxford Handbook of Free Will
1429:10.1016/j.biosystems.2021.104474
1164:10.1111/j.1467-9264.2014.00363.x
889:. Oxford University Press, 2019.
23:
2016:"Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?"
1451:
1081:
1060:
1035:
993:
972:
960:
948:
939:
926:
917:
905:
892:
879:
870:
834:
825:
812:
788:
765:
756:
301:like-named political philosophy
98:is the view that the thesis of
2142:
1360:"The Strong Free Will Theorem"
746:
733:
724:
703:
682:
667:
663:https://andrewmbailey.com/pvi/
654:
641:
637:https://andrewmbailey.com/pvi/
621:
432:, spontaneous, mysterious, or
344:, which is closely related to
1:
3875:
1987:Midwest Studies in Philosophy
1723:. HarperCollins. p. 24.
743:. New York, NY, USA: Oup Usa.
647:Lehrer, Keith Edward (1960).
615:
357:, who emphasizes that if our
160:
3664:Ordinary language philosophy
2155:
1879:(2011). Kane, Robert (ed.).
1571:Munro, Hugh Andrew Johnstone
1528:10.4324/9780415249126-V014-1
1014:10.4324/9780415249126-s036-2
385:Others may use some form of
266:Oxford Handbook of Free Will
233:Libertarianism (metaphysics)
34:may contain improper use of
7:
3714:Contemporary utilitarianism
3629:Internalism and externalism
1639:Williams, Peter S. (2002).
543:
10:
4245:
2978:Svatantrika and Prasangika
2617:
412:
230:
119:classical incompatibilists
4172:
4124:
4024:
3986:
3933:
3900:
3891:
3887:
3870:
3820:
3732:
3570:
3561:
3494:
3277:
3268:
3246:
3201:
3143:
3095:
3049:
3040:
3003:
2874:
2739:
2686:
2677:
2627:
2623:
2612:
2551:
2523:
2480:
2432:
2389:
2342:
2314:
2266:
2238:
2200:Philosophy of mathematics
2190:Philosophy of information
2165:
2161:
2150:
1594:. Boca Raton: CRC Press.
1518:. In Edward Craig (ed.).
1457:Clarke, Randolph (2003).
1330:10.1007/s10701-006-9068-6
1202:10.1007/s10892-016-9234-9
1114:The Journal of Philosophy
1927:10.1017/cbo9780511498824
1919:Living without Free Will
1744:Smilansky, Saul (2000).
1514:Strawson, Galen (1998).
1090:The Problem of Free Will
1000:Wolff, Jonathan (2016),
900:A Companion to Free Will
739:Vihvelin, Kadri (2013).
127:classical compatibilists
3669:Postanalytic philosophy
3610:Experimental philosophy
1566:On the Nature of Things
593:On the Nature of Things
528:experimental philosophy
476:"illusion" of free will
449:indeterminacy principle
3802:Social constructionism
2814:Hellenistic philosophy
2230:Theoretical philosophy
2205:Philosophy of religion
2195:Philosophy of language
1746:Free Will and Illusion
1575:George Bell & Sons
1356:Kochen, Simon Bernhard
1300:Foundations of Physics
1296:Kochen, Simon Bernhard
1126:10.5840/jphil199996537
410:
348:. A major problem for
90:
4185:Philosophy portal
3704:Scientific skepticism
3684:Reformed epistemology
2210:Philosophy of science
1600:10.1201/9780203732519
1473:Philosophical Studies
1190:The Journal of Ethics
1008:, London: Routledge,
902:. Blackwell: 477-490.
649:Ifs, Cans, and Causes
522:Experimental research
405:
80:
3605:Critical rationalism
3312:Edo neo-Confucianism
3156:Acintya bheda abheda
3135:Renaissance humanism
2846:School of the Sextii
2220:Practical philosophy
2215:Political philosophy
1713:Lewis, Clive Staples
604:Philosophical zombie
498:is a term coined by
496:Hard incompatibilism
490:Hard incompatibilism
465:moral responsibility
329:since the advent of
3176:Nimbarka Sampradaya
3087:Korean Confucianism
2834:Academic Skepticism
2059:Mind & Language
1803:2014NatPh..10..259B
1421:2021BiSys.20804474G
1352:Conway, John Horton
1322:2006FoPh...36.1441C
1292:Conway, John Horton
753:doi:10.2307/2023833
153:(or its complement
85:leaves no room for
3797:Post-structuralism
3699:Scientific realism
3654:Quinean naturalism
3634:Logical positivism
3590:Analytical Marxism
2809:Peripatetic school
2721:Chinese naturalism
2248:Aesthetic response
2175:Applied philosophy
1485:10.1007/bf00989879
1367:Notices of the AMS
459:Moral implications
411:
323:clockwork universe
91:
4206:
4205:
4168:
4167:
4164:
4163:
4160:
4159:
3866:
3865:
3862:
3861:
3858:
3857:
3585:Analytic feminism
3557:
3556:
3519:Kierkegaardianism
3481:Transcendentalism
3441:Neo-scholasticism
3287:Classical Realism
3264:
3263:
3036:
3035:
2851:Neopythagoreanism
2608:
2607:
2604:
2603:
2225:Social philosophy
1811:10.1038/nphys2930
1306:(10): 1441–1473.
445:quantum mechanics
376:quantum mechanics
331:quantum mechanics
275:free will theorem
189:The ambiguity of
75:
74:
67:
4236:
4195:
4194:
4183:
4182:
4181:
3898:
3897:
3889:
3888:
3872:
3871:
3762:Frankfurt School
3709:Transactionalism
3659:Normative ethics
3639:Legal positivism
3615:Falsificationism
3600:Consequentialism
3595:Communitarianism
3568:
3567:
3436:New Confucianism
3275:
3274:
3082:Neo-Confucianism
3047:
3046:
2856:Second Sophistic
2841:Middle Platonism
2684:
2683:
2625:
2624:
2614:
2613:
2457:Epiphenomenalism
2324:Consequentialism
2258:Institutionalism
2163:
2162:
2152:
2151:
2137:
2130:
2123:
2114:
2113:
2108:
2107:
2105:
2081:
2075:
2074:
2050:
2044:
2043:
2011:
2005:
2004:
2002:
1975:
1969:
1968:
1947:
1941:
1940:
1911:
1905:
1904:
1873:
1867:
1866:
1853:
1847:
1846:
1833:Darrow, Clarence
1829:
1823:
1822:
1786:
1780:
1779:
1766:
1760:
1759:
1741:
1735:
1734:
1722:
1709:
1703:
1702:
1673:
1667:
1666:
1664:
1663:
1636:
1630:
1629:
1585:
1579:
1578:
1569:. Translated by
1557:
1548:
1547:
1545:
1544:
1511:
1505:
1504:
1468:
1462:
1455:
1449:
1448:
1414:
1394:
1385:
1384:
1382:
1364:
1348:
1342:
1341:
1315:
1313:quant-ph/0604079
1288:
1282:
1281:
1250:
1244:
1243:
1231:
1222:
1221:
1196:(1–3): 229–246.
1182:
1176:
1175:
1144:
1138:
1137:
1106:
1100:
1099:
1098:
1097:
1085:
1079:
1078:
1077:
1076:
1064:
1058:
1057:
1056:
1055:
1044:"Libertarianism"
1039:
1033:
1032:
1031:
1030:
1002:"Libertarianism"
997:
991:
990:
989:
988:
976:
970:
964:
958:
952:
946:
943:
937:
930:
924:
921:
915:
909:
903:
896:
890:
883:
877:
874:
868:
865:
856:
855:
853:
852:
838:
832:
829:
823:
816:
810:
809:
807:
806:
792:
786:
785:
783:
782:
769:
763:
760:
754:
750:
744:
737:
731:
728:
722:
721:
720:
719:
707:
701:
700:
699:
698:
686:
680:
671:
665:
658:
652:
645:
639:
625:
504:hard determinist
415:Hard determinism
398:Hard determinism
394:not determined.
391:anomalous monism
291:infinite regress
255:hard determinism
251:soft determinism
115:incompatibilists
70:
63:
59:
56:
50:
27:
26:
19:
4244:
4243:
4239:
4238:
4237:
4235:
4234:
4233:
4209:
4208:
4207:
4202:
4179:
4177:
4156:
4120:
4020:
3982:
3929:
3883:
3882:
3854:
3843:Russian cosmism
3816:
3812:Western Marxism
3777:New Historicism
3742:Critical theory
3728:
3724:Wittgensteinian
3620:Foundationalism
3553:
3490:
3471:Social contract
3327:Foundationalism
3260:
3242:
3226:Illuminationism
3211:Aristotelianism
3197:
3186:Vishishtadvaita
3139:
3091:
3032:
2999:
2870:
2799:Megarian school
2794:Eretrian school
2735:
2696:Agriculturalism
2673:
2619:
2600:
2547:
2519:
2476:
2428:
2385:
2369:Incompatibilism
2338:
2310:
2262:
2234:
2157:
2146:
2141:
2111:
2082:
2078:
2051:
2047:
2012:
2008:
1976:
1972:
1965:
1948:
1944:
1937:
1912:
1908:
1901:
1877:Kane, Robert H.
1874:
1870:
1854:
1850:
1830:
1826:
1787:
1783:
1767:
1763:
1756:
1742:
1738:
1731:
1710:
1706:
1699:
1677:Kane, Robert H.
1674:
1670:
1661:
1659:
1637:
1633:
1610:
1586:
1582:
1558:
1551:
1542:
1540:
1538:
1512:
1508:
1469:
1465:
1456:
1452:
1395:
1388:
1362:
1349:
1345:
1289:
1285:
1270:10.2307/2107958
1254:Kane, Robert H.
1251:
1247:
1232:
1225:
1186:Kane, Robert H.
1183:
1179:
1148:Kane, Robert H.
1145:
1141:
1110:Kane, Robert H.
1107:
1103:
1095:
1093:
1087:
1086:
1082:
1074:
1072:
1066:
1065:
1061:
1053:
1051:
1040:
1036:
1028:
1026:
1024:
998:
994:
986:
984:
978:
977:
973:
965:
961:
953:
949:
944:
940:
936:49 (2):705-722.
931:
927:
922:
918:
910:
906:
897:
893:
884:
880:
875:
871:
866:
859:
850:
848:
846:Serious Science
840:
839:
835:
830:
826:
817:
813:
804:
802:
794:
793:
789:
780:
778:
771:
770:
766:
761:
757:
751:
747:
738:
734:
729:
725:
717:
715:
709:
708:
704:
696:
694:
688:
687:
683:
672:
668:
659:
655:
646:
642:
626:
622:
618:
613:
578:Frankfurt cases
561:Freedom Evolves
546:
533:incompatibilist
524:
516:agent causation
492:
461:
417:
400:
387:Donald Davidson
319:indeterministic
283:Simon B. Kochen
264:(editor of the
235:
229:
191:incompatibilism
176:incompatibilism
167:incompatibilism
163:
151:incompatibilism
143:incompatibilism
135:incompatibilism
95:Incompatibilism
71:
60:
54:
51:
40:
28:
24:
17:
12:
11:
5:
4242:
4232:
4231:
4226:
4221:
4204:
4203:
4201:
4200:
4188:
4173:
4170:
4169:
4166:
4165:
4162:
4161:
4158:
4157:
4155:
4154:
4149:
4144:
4139:
4134:
4128:
4126:
4122:
4121:
4119:
4118:
4113:
4108:
4103:
4098:
4093:
4088:
4083:
4078:
4073:
4068:
4063:
4058:
4053:
4052:
4051:
4041:
4036:
4030:
4028:
4022:
4021:
4019:
4018:
4013:
4008:
4003:
3998:
3992:
3990:
3988:Middle Eastern
3984:
3983:
3981:
3980:
3975:
3970:
3965:
3960:
3955:
3950:
3945:
3939:
3937:
3931:
3930:
3928:
3927:
3922:
3917:
3912:
3906:
3904:
3895:
3885:
3884:
3881:
3880:
3876:
3868:
3867:
3864:
3863:
3860:
3859:
3856:
3855:
3853:
3852:
3845:
3840:
3835:
3830:
3824:
3822:
3818:
3817:
3815:
3814:
3809:
3804:
3799:
3794:
3789:
3784:
3779:
3774:
3769:
3764:
3759:
3754:
3752:Existentialism
3749:
3747:Deconstruction
3744:
3738:
3736:
3730:
3729:
3727:
3726:
3721:
3716:
3711:
3706:
3701:
3696:
3691:
3686:
3681:
3676:
3671:
3666:
3661:
3656:
3651:
3646:
3641:
3636:
3631:
3626:
3617:
3612:
3607:
3602:
3597:
3592:
3587:
3582:
3580:Applied ethics
3576:
3574:
3565:
3559:
3558:
3555:
3554:
3552:
3551:
3546:
3544:Nietzscheanism
3541:
3536:
3531:
3526:
3521:
3516:
3515:
3514:
3504:
3498:
3496:
3492:
3491:
3489:
3488:
3486:Utilitarianism
3483:
3478:
3473:
3468:
3463:
3458:
3453:
3448:
3443:
3438:
3433:
3428:
3423:
3418:
3413:
3408:
3403:
3398:
3393:
3388:
3387:
3386:
3384:Transcendental
3381:
3376:
3371:
3366:
3361:
3351:
3350:
3349:
3339:
3334:
3329:
3324:
3322:Existentialism
3319:
3314:
3309:
3304:
3299:
3294:
3289:
3284:
3278:
3272:
3266:
3265:
3262:
3261:
3259:
3258:
3252:
3250:
3244:
3243:
3241:
3240:
3235:
3228:
3223:
3218:
3213:
3207:
3205:
3199:
3198:
3196:
3195:
3190:
3189:
3188:
3183:
3178:
3173:
3168:
3163:
3158:
3147:
3145:
3141:
3140:
3138:
3137:
3132:
3127:
3122:
3117:
3112:
3110:Augustinianism
3107:
3101:
3099:
3093:
3092:
3090:
3089:
3084:
3079:
3074:
3069:
3064:
3059:
3053:
3051:
3044:
3038:
3037:
3034:
3033:
3031:
3030:
3025:
3023:Zoroastrianism
3020:
3015:
3009:
3007:
3001:
3000:
2998:
2997:
2996:
2995:
2990:
2985:
2980:
2975:
2970:
2965:
2960:
2955:
2945:
2944:
2943:
2938:
2928:
2927:
2926:
2921:
2916:
2911:
2906:
2901:
2896:
2891:
2880:
2878:
2872:
2871:
2869:
2868:
2866:Church Fathers
2863:
2858:
2853:
2848:
2843:
2838:
2837:
2836:
2831:
2826:
2821:
2811:
2806:
2801:
2796:
2791:
2786:
2781:
2780:
2779:
2774:
2769:
2764:
2759:
2748:
2746:
2737:
2736:
2734:
2733:
2728:
2723:
2718:
2713:
2708:
2703:
2698:
2692:
2690:
2681:
2675:
2674:
2672:
2671:
2670:
2669:
2664:
2659:
2654:
2649:
2639:
2633:
2631:
2621:
2620:
2610:
2609:
2606:
2605:
2602:
2601:
2599:
2598:
2593:
2588:
2583:
2578:
2573:
2568:
2563:
2557:
2555:
2549:
2548:
2546:
2545:
2540:
2535:
2529:
2527:
2521:
2520:
2518:
2517:
2512:
2507:
2502:
2497:
2492:
2486:
2484:
2478:
2477:
2475:
2474:
2469:
2464:
2459:
2454:
2449:
2444:
2438:
2436:
2430:
2429:
2427:
2426:
2421:
2416:
2411:
2406:
2401:
2395:
2393:
2387:
2386:
2384:
2383:
2381:Libertarianism
2378:
2377:
2376:
2366:
2365:
2364:
2354:
2348:
2346:
2340:
2339:
2337:
2336:
2331:
2326:
2320:
2318:
2312:
2311:
2309:
2308:
2303:
2298:
2293:
2288:
2283:
2278:
2272:
2270:
2264:
2263:
2261:
2260:
2255:
2250:
2244:
2242:
2236:
2235:
2233:
2232:
2227:
2222:
2217:
2212:
2207:
2202:
2197:
2192:
2187:
2185:Metaphilosophy
2182:
2177:
2171:
2169:
2159:
2158:
2148:
2147:
2140:
2139:
2132:
2125:
2117:
2110:
2109:
2096:(4): 663–685.
2076:
2065:(3): 346–358.
2045:
2006:
1993:(1): 228–247.
1979:Pereboom, Derk
1970:
1963:
1951:Pereboom, Derk
1942:
1935:
1915:Pereboom, Derk
1906:
1899:
1868:
1857:Swartz, Norman
1848:
1824:
1797:(4): 259–263.
1791:Nature Physics
1781:
1770:James, William
1761:
1754:
1736:
1729:
1704:
1697:
1668:
1631:
1608:
1580:
1549:
1536:
1506:
1463:
1450:
1386:
1373:(2): 226–232.
1343:
1283:
1264:(2): 219–254.
1245:
1223:
1177:
1139:
1120:(5): 217–240.
1101:
1080:
1059:
1034:
1022:
992:
971:
959:
947:
938:
925:
916:
904:
891:
885:Mele, Alfred.
878:
869:
857:
833:
824:
811:
787:
776:hardproblem.ru
764:
755:
745:
732:
723:
702:
681:
666:
653:
640:
619:
617:
614:
612:
611:
606:
601:
596:
585:
580:
575:
567:Daniel Dennett
564:
556:Daniel Dennett
553:
547:
545:
542:
523:
520:
491:
488:
460:
457:
413:Main article:
399:
396:
378:(and physical
297:Libertarianism
279:John H. Conway
239:libertarianism
231:Main article:
228:
227:Libertarianism
225:
216:anti-classical
208:post-classical
204:anti-classical
196:post-classical
162:
159:
123:compatibilists
73:
72:
31:
29:
22:
15:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
4241:
4230:
4227:
4225:
4222:
4220:
4217:
4216:
4214:
4199:
4198:
4189:
4187:
4186:
4175:
4174:
4171:
4153:
4150:
4148:
4145:
4143:
4140:
4138:
4135:
4133:
4130:
4129:
4127:
4125:Miscellaneous
4123:
4117:
4114:
4112:
4109:
4107:
4104:
4102:
4099:
4097:
4094:
4092:
4089:
4087:
4084:
4082:
4079:
4077:
4074:
4072:
4069:
4067:
4064:
4062:
4059:
4057:
4054:
4050:
4047:
4046:
4045:
4042:
4040:
4037:
4035:
4032:
4031:
4029:
4027:
4023:
4017:
4014:
4012:
4009:
4007:
4004:
4002:
3999:
3997:
3994:
3993:
3991:
3989:
3985:
3979:
3976:
3974:
3971:
3969:
3966:
3964:
3961:
3959:
3956:
3954:
3951:
3949:
3946:
3944:
3941:
3940:
3938:
3936:
3932:
3926:
3923:
3921:
3918:
3916:
3913:
3911:
3908:
3907:
3905:
3903:
3899:
3896:
3894:
3890:
3886:
3878:
3877:
3873:
3869:
3851:
3850:
3846:
3844:
3841:
3839:
3836:
3834:
3831:
3829:
3826:
3825:
3823:
3821:Miscellaneous
3819:
3813:
3810:
3808:
3807:Structuralism
3805:
3803:
3800:
3798:
3795:
3793:
3792:Postmodernism
3790:
3788:
3785:
3783:
3782:Phenomenology
3780:
3778:
3775:
3773:
3770:
3768:
3765:
3763:
3760:
3758:
3755:
3753:
3750:
3748:
3745:
3743:
3740:
3739:
3737:
3735:
3731:
3725:
3722:
3720:
3719:Vienna Circle
3717:
3715:
3712:
3710:
3707:
3705:
3702:
3700:
3697:
3695:
3692:
3690:
3687:
3685:
3682:
3680:
3677:
3675:
3672:
3670:
3667:
3665:
3662:
3660:
3657:
3655:
3652:
3650:
3649:Moral realism
3647:
3645:
3642:
3640:
3637:
3635:
3632:
3630:
3627:
3625:
3621:
3618:
3616:
3613:
3611:
3608:
3606:
3603:
3601:
3598:
3596:
3593:
3591:
3588:
3586:
3583:
3581:
3578:
3577:
3575:
3573:
3569:
3566:
3564:
3560:
3550:
3547:
3545:
3542:
3540:
3537:
3535:
3532:
3530:
3527:
3525:
3522:
3520:
3517:
3513:
3510:
3509:
3508:
3505:
3503:
3500:
3499:
3497:
3493:
3487:
3484:
3482:
3479:
3477:
3474:
3472:
3469:
3467:
3464:
3462:
3459:
3457:
3454:
3452:
3451:Phenomenology
3449:
3447:
3444:
3442:
3439:
3437:
3434:
3432:
3429:
3427:
3424:
3422:
3419:
3417:
3414:
3412:
3409:
3407:
3404:
3402:
3399:
3397:
3394:
3392:
3391:Individualism
3389:
3385:
3382:
3380:
3377:
3375:
3372:
3370:
3367:
3365:
3362:
3360:
3357:
3356:
3355:
3352:
3348:
3345:
3344:
3343:
3340:
3338:
3335:
3333:
3330:
3328:
3325:
3323:
3320:
3318:
3315:
3313:
3310:
3308:
3305:
3303:
3300:
3298:
3295:
3293:
3290:
3288:
3285:
3283:
3280:
3279:
3276:
3273:
3271:
3267:
3257:
3256:Judeo-Islamic
3254:
3253:
3251:
3249:
3245:
3239:
3236:
3234:
3233:
3232:ʿIlm al-Kalām
3229:
3227:
3224:
3222:
3219:
3217:
3214:
3212:
3209:
3208:
3206:
3204:
3200:
3194:
3191:
3187:
3184:
3182:
3181:Shuddhadvaita
3179:
3177:
3174:
3172:
3169:
3167:
3164:
3162:
3159:
3157:
3154:
3153:
3152:
3149:
3148:
3146:
3142:
3136:
3133:
3131:
3128:
3126:
3123:
3121:
3118:
3116:
3115:Scholasticism
3113:
3111:
3108:
3106:
3103:
3102:
3100:
3098:
3094:
3088:
3085:
3083:
3080:
3078:
3075:
3073:
3070:
3068:
3065:
3063:
3060:
3058:
3055:
3054:
3052:
3048:
3045:
3043:
3039:
3029:
3026:
3024:
3021:
3019:
3016:
3014:
3011:
3010:
3008:
3006:
3002:
2994:
2991:
2989:
2986:
2984:
2981:
2979:
2976:
2974:
2971:
2969:
2966:
2964:
2961:
2959:
2956:
2954:
2951:
2950:
2949:
2946:
2942:
2939:
2937:
2934:
2933:
2932:
2929:
2925:
2922:
2920:
2917:
2915:
2912:
2910:
2907:
2905:
2902:
2900:
2897:
2895:
2892:
2890:
2887:
2886:
2885:
2882:
2881:
2879:
2877:
2873:
2867:
2864:
2862:
2859:
2857:
2854:
2852:
2849:
2847:
2844:
2842:
2839:
2835:
2832:
2830:
2827:
2825:
2822:
2820:
2817:
2816:
2815:
2812:
2810:
2807:
2805:
2802:
2800:
2797:
2795:
2792:
2790:
2787:
2785:
2782:
2778:
2775:
2773:
2770:
2768:
2765:
2763:
2760:
2758:
2755:
2754:
2753:
2750:
2749:
2747:
2745:
2742:
2738:
2732:
2729:
2727:
2724:
2722:
2719:
2717:
2714:
2712:
2709:
2707:
2704:
2702:
2699:
2697:
2694:
2693:
2691:
2689:
2685:
2682:
2680:
2676:
2668:
2665:
2663:
2660:
2658:
2655:
2653:
2650:
2648:
2645:
2644:
2643:
2640:
2638:
2635:
2634:
2632:
2630:
2626:
2622:
2615:
2611:
2597:
2594:
2592:
2589:
2587:
2584:
2582:
2579:
2577:
2574:
2572:
2569:
2567:
2566:Conceptualism
2564:
2562:
2559:
2558:
2556:
2554:
2550:
2544:
2541:
2539:
2536:
2534:
2531:
2530:
2528:
2526:
2522:
2516:
2513:
2511:
2508:
2506:
2503:
2501:
2498:
2496:
2495:Particularism
2493:
2491:
2488:
2487:
2485:
2483:
2479:
2473:
2470:
2468:
2465:
2463:
2462:Functionalism
2460:
2458:
2455:
2453:
2450:
2448:
2447:Eliminativism
2445:
2443:
2440:
2439:
2437:
2435:
2431:
2425:
2422:
2420:
2417:
2415:
2412:
2410:
2407:
2405:
2402:
2400:
2397:
2396:
2394:
2392:
2388:
2382:
2379:
2375:
2372:
2371:
2370:
2367:
2363:
2360:
2359:
2358:
2355:
2353:
2352:Compatibilism
2350:
2349:
2347:
2345:
2341:
2335:
2332:
2330:
2327:
2325:
2322:
2321:
2319:
2317:
2313:
2307:
2304:
2302:
2299:
2297:
2294:
2292:
2291:Particularism
2289:
2287:
2284:
2282:
2279:
2277:
2274:
2273:
2271:
2269:
2265:
2259:
2256:
2254:
2251:
2249:
2246:
2245:
2243:
2241:
2237:
2231:
2228:
2226:
2223:
2221:
2218:
2216:
2213:
2211:
2208:
2206:
2203:
2201:
2198:
2196:
2193:
2191:
2188:
2186:
2183:
2181:
2178:
2176:
2173:
2172:
2170:
2168:
2164:
2160:
2153:
2149:
2145:
2138:
2133:
2131:
2126:
2124:
2119:
2118:
2115:
2104:
2099:
2095:
2091:
2087:
2080:
2072:
2068:
2064:
2060:
2056:
2049:
2041:
2037:
2033:
2029:
2025:
2021:
2017:
2010:
2001:
1996:
1992:
1988:
1984:
1980:
1974:
1966:
1964:9780199685516
1960:
1956:
1952:
1946:
1938:
1936:9780521029964
1932:
1928:
1924:
1920:
1916:
1910:
1902:
1900:9780195399691
1896:
1892:
1888:
1884:
1883:
1878:
1872:
1864:
1863:
1858:
1852:
1844:
1843:
1838:
1834:
1828:
1820:
1816:
1812:
1808:
1804:
1800:
1796:
1792:
1785:
1777:
1776:
1771:
1765:
1757:
1755:9780198250180
1751:
1747:
1740:
1732:
1730:0-688-17369-1
1726:
1721:
1720:
1714:
1708:
1700:
1698:9780195399691
1694:
1690:
1686:
1682:
1678:
1672:
1658:
1654:
1650:
1646:
1642:
1635:
1627:
1623:
1619:
1615:
1611:
1609:9781138104488
1605:
1601:
1597:
1593:
1592:
1584:
1576:
1572:
1568:
1567:
1562:
1556:
1554:
1539:
1537:9780415250696
1533:
1529:
1525:
1521:
1517:
1510:
1502:
1498:
1494:
1490:
1486:
1482:
1479:(1–2): 5–24.
1478:
1474:
1467:
1460:
1454:
1446:
1442:
1438:
1434:
1430:
1426:
1422:
1418:
1413:
1408:
1404:
1400:
1393:
1391:
1381:
1376:
1372:
1368:
1361:
1357:
1353:
1347:
1339:
1335:
1331:
1327:
1323:
1319:
1314:
1309:
1305:
1301:
1297:
1293:
1287:
1279:
1275:
1271:
1267:
1263:
1259:
1255:
1249:
1241:
1237:
1230:
1228:
1219:
1215:
1211:
1207:
1203:
1199:
1195:
1191:
1187:
1181:
1173:
1169:
1165:
1161:
1157:
1153:
1149:
1143:
1135:
1131:
1127:
1123:
1119:
1115:
1111:
1105:
1092:
1091:
1084:
1071:
1070:
1063:
1049:
1045:
1038:
1025:
1023:9780415250696
1019:
1015:
1011:
1007:
1003:
996:
983:
982:
975:
969:
963:
957:
951:
942:
935:
929:
920:
914:
908:
901:
895:
888:
882:
873:
864:
862:
847:
843:
837:
828:
822:
815:
801:
797:
791:
777:
774:
768:
759:
749:
742:
736:
727:
714:
713:
706:
693:
692:
685:
679:
676:
670:
664:
657:
650:
644:
638:
634:
630:
624:
620:
610:
607:
605:
602:
600:
597:
595:
594:
589:
586:
584:
583:Indeterminism
581:
579:
576:
574:
573:
568:
565:
563:
562:
557:
554:
552:
549:
548:
541:
539:
538:compatibilist
534:
529:
519:
517:
514:
509:
505:
501:
500:Derk Pereboom
497:
487:
484:
479:
477:
472:
470:
466:
456:
454:
450:
446:
442:
441:William James
438:
435:
431:
427:
422:
416:
408:
404:
395:
392:
388:
383:
381:
380:indeterminism
377:
373:
372:
367:
362:
360:
356:
351:
347:
343:
338:
336:
332:
328:
324:
320:
315:
313:
309:
304:
302:
298:
294:
292:
287:
284:
280:
276:
271:
267:
263:
258:
256:
252:
248:
244:
240:
234:
224:
221:
217:
213:
212:neo-classical
209:
205:
201:
200:neo-classical
197:
192:
187:
185:
184:compatibilism
181:
177:
172:
168:
158:
156:
155:compatibilism
152:
148:
147:compatibilism
144:
140:
139:compatibilism
136:
130:
128:
124:
120:
116:
111:
110:
109:compatibilism
105:
101:
97:
96:
88:
84:
79:
69:
66:
58:
48:
44:
39:
37:
32:This article
30:
21:
20:
4190:
4176:
3847:
3838:Postcritique
3828:Kyoto School
3787:Posthumanism
3767:Hermeneutics
3622: /
3563:Contemporary
3539:Newtonianism
3502:Cartesianism
3461:Reductionism
3297:Conservatism
3292:Collectivism
3230:
2958:Sarvāstivadā
2936:Anekantavada
2861:Neoplatonism
2829:Epicureanism
2762:Pythagoreans
2701:Confucianism
2667:Contemporary
2657:Early modern
2561:Anti-realism
2515:Universalism
2472:Subjectivism
2368:
2268:Epistemology
2093:
2089:
2079:
2062:
2058:
2048:
2026:(1): 28–53.
2023:
2019:
2009:
1990:
1986:
1973:
1954:
1945:
1918:
1909:
1881:
1871:
1861:
1851:
1841:
1837:Durant, Will
1827:
1794:
1790:
1784:
1774:
1764:
1745:
1739:
1718:
1707:
1680:
1671:
1660:. Retrieved
1648:
1644:
1634:
1590:
1583:
1565:
1541:. Retrieved
1519:
1509:
1476:
1472:
1466:
1458:
1453:
1402:
1398:
1370:
1366:
1346:
1303:
1299:
1286:
1261:
1257:
1248:
1239:
1193:
1189:
1180:
1158:(1): 35–55.
1155:
1151:
1142:
1117:
1113:
1104:
1094:, retrieved
1089:
1083:
1073:, retrieved
1068:
1062:
1052:, retrieved
1047:
1037:
1027:, retrieved
1005:
995:
985:, retrieved
980:
974:
962:
950:
941:
933:
928:
919:
907:
899:
894:
886:
881:
872:
849:. Retrieved
845:
836:
827:
814:
803:. Retrieved
799:
790:
779:. Retrieved
775:
767:
758:
748:
740:
735:
726:
716:, retrieved
711:
705:
695:, retrieved
690:
684:
674:
669:
656:
648:
643:
628:
623:
591:
570:
559:
537:
532:
525:
495:
493:
480:
473:
462:
455:structures.
439:
418:
407:Schopenhauer
384:
369:
363:
358:
350:naturalistic
339:
316:
305:
295:
288:
269:
265:
260:Libertarian
259:
236:
219:
215:
211:
207:
203:
199:
195:
190:
188:
183:
179:
175:
170:
166:
164:
154:
150:
146:
142:
138:
134:
131:
126:
122:
118:
114:
107:
104:Keith Lehrer
94:
93:
92:
61:
52:
33:
4219:Determinism
3833:Objectivism
3772:Neo-Marxism
3734:Continental
3644:Meta-ethics
3624:Coherentism
3529:Hegelianism
3466:Rationalism
3426:Natural law
3406:Materialism
3332:Historicism
3302:Determinism
3193:Navya-Nyāya
2968:Sautrāntika
2963:Pudgalavada
2899:Vaisheshika
2752:Presocratic
2652:Renaissance
2591:Physicalism
2576:Materialism
2482:Normativity
2467:Objectivism
2452:Emergentism
2442:Behaviorism
2391:Metaphysics
2357:Determinism
2296:Rationalism
1516:"Free will"
934:Philosophia
513:libertarian
421:determinism
366:C. S. Lewis
355:Robert Kane
342:physicalism
335:physicalism
325:has become
262:Robert Kane
247:determinism
243:determinism
106:. The term
100:determinism
83:determinism
55:August 2023
4229:Randomness
4213:Categories
4132:Amerindian
4039:Australian
3978:Vietnamese
3958:Indonesian
3507:Kantianism
3456:Positivism
3446:Pragmatism
3421:Naturalism
3401:Liberalism
3379:Subjective
3317:Empiricism
3221:Avicennism
3166:Bhedabheda
3050:East Asian
2973:Madhyamaka
2953:Abhidharma
2819:Pyrrhonism
2586:Nominalism
2581:Naturalism
2510:Skepticism
2500:Relativism
2490:Absolutism
2419:Naturalism
2329:Deontology
2301:Skepticism
2286:Naturalism
2276:Empiricism
2240:Aesthetics
2144:Philosophy
1662:2021-07-28
1626:1390.81001
1618:1003273264
1573:. London:
1543:2021-07-29
1412:2107.06572
1405:: 104474.
1399:Biosystems
1096:2023-08-22
1075:2023-08-22
1054:2023-08-22
1029:2023-08-22
987:2023-08-22
851:2023-08-22
805:2023-08-22
781:2023-08-22
718:2023-08-22
697:2023-08-22
616:References
572:Elbow Room
540:answers).
434:miraculous
346:naturalism
237:Free-will
161:Definition
47:guidelines
4224:Free will
4011:Pakistani
3973:Taiwanese
3920:Ethiopian
3893:By region
3879:By region
3694:Scientism
3689:Systemics
3549:Spinozism
3476:Socialism
3411:Modernism
3374:Objective
3282:Anarchism
3216:Averroism
3105:Christian
3057:Neotaoism
3028:Zurvanism
3018:Mithraism
3013:Mazdakism
2784:Cyrenaics
2711:Logicians
2344:Free will
2306:Solipsism
2253:Formalism
1819:236500884
1657:1526-6575
1645:Quodlibet
1561:Lucretius
1501:170668136
1445:235785726
1380:0807.3286
1218:148066416
588:Lucretius
359:character
308:Lucretius
87:free will
38:material.
4197:Category
4152:Yugoslav
4142:Romanian
4049:Scottish
4034:American
3963:Japanese
3943:Buddhist
3925:Africana
3915:Egyptian
3757:Feminist
3679:Rawlsian
3674:Quietism
3572:Analytic
3524:Krausism
3431:Nihilism
3396:Kokugaku
3359:Absolute
3354:Idealism
3342:Humanism
3130:Occamism
3097:European
3042:Medieval
2988:Yogacara
2948:Buddhist
2941:Syādvāda
2824:Stoicism
2789:Cynicism
2777:Sophists
2772:Atomists
2767:Eleatics
2706:Legalism
2647:Medieval
2571:Idealism
2525:Ontology
2505:Nihilism
2409:Idealism
2167:Branches
2156:Branches
2040:40040991
1981:(2005).
1953:(2014).
1917:(2001).
1859:(2004).
1839:(1927).
1719:Miracles
1715:(1947).
1563:(1908).
1437:34242745
1358:(2009).
1338:12999337
1210:44077329
1172:44122563
599:Molinism
544:See also
447:and the
426:causally
371:Miracles
327:outdated
312:clinamen
180:relevant
43:criteria
36:non-free
4147:Russian
4116:Spanish
4111:Slovene
4101:Maltese
4096:Italian
4076:Finland
4044:British
4026:Western
4016:Turkish
4001:Islamic
3996:Iranian
3948:Chinese
3935:Eastern
3902:African
3849:more...
3534:Marxism
3364:British
3307:Dualism
3203:Islamic
3161:Advaita
3151:Vedanta
3125:Scotism
3120:Thomism
3062:Tiantai
3005:Persian
2993:Tibetan
2983:Śūnyatā
2924:Cārvāka
2914:Ājīvika
2909:Mīmāṃsā
2889:Samkhya
2804:Academy
2757:Ionians
2731:Yangism
2688:Chinese
2679:Ancient
2642:Western
2637:Ancient
2596:Realism
2553:Reality
2543:Process
2424:Realism
2404:Dualism
2399:Atomism
2281:Fideism
1799:Bibcode
1651:(2–3).
1493:4320507
1417:Bibcode
1318:Bibcode
1278:2107958
1134:2564666
609:Tychism
551:Ability
437:works.
220:because
4106:Polish
4086:German
4081:French
4066:Danish
4056:Canada
4006:Jewish
3968:Korean
3953:Indian
3495:People
3416:Monism
3369:German
3337:Holism
3270:Modern
3248:Jewish
3171:Dvaita
3144:Indian
3067:Huayan
2919:Ajñana
2876:Indian
2741:Greco-
2726:Taoism
2716:Mohism
2662:Modern
2629:By era
2618:By era
2533:Action
2414:Monism
2334:Virtue
2316:Ethics
2038:
1961:
1933:
1897:
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1020:
508:desert
469:ethics
453:causal
430:random
368:wrote
4137:Aztec
4091:Greek
4071:Dutch
4061:Czech
3910:Bantu
3347:Anti-
2894:Nyaya
2884:Hindu
2744:Roman
2538:Event
2180:Logic
2036:JSTOR
1815:S2CID
1497:S2CID
1489:JSTOR
1441:S2CID
1407:arXiv
1375:arXiv
1363:(PDF)
1334:S2CID
1308:arXiv
1274:JSTOR
1214:S2CID
1206:JSTOR
1168:JSTOR
1130:JSTOR
483:moral
270:moral
3238:Sufi
3072:Chan
2931:Jain
2904:Yoga
2434:Mind
2374:Hard
2362:Hard
2090:Noûs
1959:ISBN
1931:ISBN
1895:ISBN
1750:ISBN
1725:ISBN
1693:ISBN
1653:ISSN
1614:OCLC
1604:ISBN
1532:ISBN
1433:PMID
1018:ISBN
281:and
253:and
145:and
137:and
45:and
3512:Neo
3077:Zen
2098:doi
2067:doi
2028:doi
1995:doi
1923:doi
1887:doi
1807:doi
1685:doi
1622:Zbl
1596:doi
1524:doi
1481:doi
1425:doi
1403:208
1326:doi
1266:doi
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1160:doi
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1122:doi
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