759:(the absence of a central authority capable of enforcing rules and punishing aggressors) and uncertainty as to state intentions and available offensive military capabilities leads states to constantly fear each other and resort to self-help mechanisms to provide for their survival. In order to alleviate this fear of aggression each holds of the other, states always seek to maximise their own relative power, defined in terms of material capabilities. As Mearsheimer puts it: "they look for opportunities to alter the balance of power by acquiring additional increments of power at the expense of potential rivals", since "the greater the military advantage one state has over other states, the more secure it is". States seek to increase their military strength to the detriment of other states within the system with
877:
exercise influence beyond its own neighbourhood. As Layne states, "apparently water stops the United States from imposing its powers on others in distant regions, but it does not stop them from threatening
American primacy in the Western Hemisphere". Moreover, he finds offensive realism's classification of regional hegemons as status quo powers difficult to reconcile with the theory's emphasis on great powers as relentless power-maximizers. In this sense, Layne questions the ability of the water constraint to transform a power-maximizing state into a status quo power and contradicts Mearsheimer by arguing that a regional hegemon remains subjected to the quest for security, thereby striving to attain global hegemony.
808:
whether the anarchic international system is of a bipolar, balanced, or unbalanced multipolar architecture. On another hand, state geographic location in terms of border sharing and stopping power of water also influences great powers' strategy preference. Combined, these two variables allow him to establish that great powers tend to favor—to the contrary of defensive neorealism predictions—buck-passing over balancing in all instances of multipolarity except for those that include a potential hegemon.
834:
bias pertaining to defensive neorealism by arguing that anarchy can also generate incentives for states to maximize their share of power, offensive neorealism solves some anomalies that Waltz's theory fails to explain. Mainly, the theory is able to provide an explanation for the amount of conflict occurring among states in the international system. As Snyder states, Mearsheimer's offensive neorealism "enlarges the scope of neorealist theory by providing a theoretical rationale for the behaviour of
2410:
812:
power that has achieved regional hegemony. This lack of balancing is best explained by the regional hegemon's newly acquired status quo stance, which follows from the geographical constraints on its power projection capability. Instead of relying on offensive actions, a regional hegemon finds itself in a defensive position seeking to avert threats to its hegemonic status by preventing the rise of any peer competitors in other areas. As such it will behave as an
542:
870:. According to him, the inclusion of the non-structural geography variable to explain great power behaviour shifts the theory's focal point of analysis from system-wide dynamics to regional ones. Considering the theory's regional security analyses, he further argues that offensive neorealism fails to clearly define what constitutes a region with "entities like Europe or North-East Asia (taken) for granted", leaving room for scholarly disapproval.
791:—states shouldering direct responsibility to maintain the existing balance of power—against threatening power-seeking states, which may in turn succeed in "jeopardiz the very survival of the maximizing state". This argument also applies to state behavior towards the most powerful state in the international system, as defensive neorealists note that an excessive concentration of power is self-defeating, triggering balancing countermoves.
881:
role in a state's decision-making process, in turn influencing its behaviour in international politics. Moreover, Snyder argues that no consideration is given to transnational threats such as terrorism, and that
Mearsheimer's emphasis on security makes him ignore states' non-security interests such as ideology, national unification and human rights as an essential aspect of international politics alongside power competition.
770:
it already had sufficient power to survive." Accordingly, offensive neorealists such as
Mearsheimer believe that a state's best strategy to increase its relative power to the point of achieving hegemony is to rely on offensive tactics. Provided that it is rational for them to act aggressively, great powers will likely pursue expansionist policies, which will bring them closer to hegemony.
842:
these scholars uphold the argument that
Mearsheimer's offensive neorealism significantly contributes to foreign policy theory and alliance theory. More specifically, Mearsheimer's theory goes a step further than structural defensive realism by successfully theorising both international politics and foreign policy.
752:, offensive neorealism claims that states are in fact power-maximising revisionists harbouring aggressive intentions. Indeed, in offensive neorealism, the international system provides great powers with strong incentives to resort to offensive action in order to increase their security and assure their survival.
675:, it departs completely from this branch by using positivism as a philosophy of science and by adding a system-centric approach to the study of state behaviour in international politics based on the structure of the international system. Accordingly, his offensive neorealism pertains to the sub-branch of
906:
than rely on cooperative mechanisms. They similarly contradict
Mearsheimer's arguments regarding the United States. Firstly, weak opposition or balancing inefficiencies rather than geographical constraints are taken as explanations for the uniqueness of the United States' regional hegemonic position.
892:
Since those costs in turn make war inefficient, states (even those who do not have hegemony) have incentive to construct bargained settlements. For instance, in a bipolar world with a 70%-to-30% power breakdown, states would prefer an analogously proportioned breakdown in resources rather than having
845:
Contrary to Waltz's rejection of defensive neorealism as a theory capable of explaining foreign policy on top of international politics, offensive neorealism includes explanations of both international outcomes pertaining to the systemic level of analysis and individual state behaviour. Additionally,
841:
Moreover, this complementarity could signify theoretical interrelation with the two theories working in alternation to explain state behaviour, thereby allowing for a "more complete structural realist theory that can more accurately account for both defensive and offensive state behaviour". Secondly,
769:
summed up this view as follows: "great powers recognize that the best way to ensure their security is to achieve hegemony now, thus eliminating any possibility of a challenge by another great power. Only a misguided state would pass up an opportunity to be the hegemon in the system because it thought
786:
The emphasis offensive neorealism puts on hegemony as states' end aim stands in sharp contrast to defensive neorealism's belief that state survival can be guaranteed at some point well short of hegemony. In a defensive neorealist mindset, security increments by power accumulation end up experiencing
909:
Toft and Layne go a step further by asserting that
Mearsheimer misjudges the United States as a regional hegemon engaged in offshore balancing. Instead of being a regional hegemon with the strategic aim of dominating the Western hemisphere while preventing the rise of peer competitors in Europe and
900:
Most importantly, there have been questions about the theory's empirical validity and prediction ability, which in turn can negatively affect the validity of offensive neorealism's prescriptions for state behaviour in international politics. In addition to mentioning the theory's failure to account
824:
Mearsheimer's offensive neorealism represents an important contribution to international relations theory yet also generated important criticism. While the inputs and critics below provide a good sample of the theory's contributions and the kind of arguments that have been addressed against it, the
811:
Responding to defensive neorealists' posture on state behaviour towards the most powerful state in the international system, Mearsheimer believes that threatened states will reluctantly engage in balancing against potential hegemons but that balancing coalitions are unlikely to form against a great
905:
in the post-Cold war era, critics have also expressed serious doubts regarding offensive neorealist views on China's rising power and U.S. regional hegemony. According to them, there is no reason to believe that China as a rational power which wants to ensure its survival will seek hegemony rather
880:
A second group of criticisms addresses the issue of offensive neorealism's restrictive focuses. Mearsheimer's theory has been criticised for failing to take into account domestic politics. No attention is paid to a rising power's internal political functioning, its economy or society, which play a
876:
further highlights problems associated with the geographic variable. He criticizes
Mearsheimer's reasoning according to which the "stopping power of water" prevents a great power from achieving global hegemony as this constraint does not seem to apply to the case of an emerging rival's capacity to
833:
Firstly, some scholars believe that
Mearsheimer's offensive neorealism provides an alternative complement to Waltz's defensive neorealism. The theory adds to defensive neorealists' argument that the structure of the international system constrains state behaviour. Setting to rectify the status quo
807:
In order to determine the circumstances in which great powers behave according to one or the other, Mearsheimer builds on Waltz's defensive neorealism by including a second variable—geography—alongside the distribution of power. On one hand, the choice between balancing and buck-passing depends on
862:
removes the central proposition—uncertainty about other states' intentions—on which the whole concept of security dilemma is grounded. Aggressive great powers' measures to maximize their security threaten others which leads to an actual justified security competition between states rather than an
730:
international system in which rational great powers uncertain of other states' intentions and capable of military offensive strive to survive. Although initially developed from similar propositions to those of defensive neorealism, Mearsheimer's offensive neorealism advances drastically different
747:
John
Mearsheimer's offensive neorealism intends to fix the "status quo bias" of Kenneth Waltz's defensive neorealism. While both neorealist variants argue that states are primarily concerned with maximising their security, they disagree over the amount of power required in the process. To the
738:
a state needs to possess to ensure its security and the issuing of strategy states pursue to meet this satisfactory level of security. Ultimately, Mearsheimer's offensive neorealism draws a much more pessimistic picture of international politics characterised by dangerous inter-state security
888:
for territorial conquest "implies a risk that his analyses miss a host of other ways of gaining and exercising influence". Similarly, political scientists whose primary focus is bargaining models of international conflict note that offensive neorealism ignores the fact that war is costly.
910:
Northeast Asia, these scholars believe that empirical data points to the fact that the United States has sought and achieved global hegemony, which in turn biases
Mearsheimer's predictions regarding future U.S. strategic behavior, mainly in terms of its military involvement overseas.
1157:
Shiping Tang, "From Offensive to Defensive Realism: A Social Evolutionary Interpretation of China's Security Strategy", 148–149, in China's Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics, edited by Robert Ross and Zhu Feng. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1775:. "From Offensive to Defensive Realism: A Social Evolutionary Interpretation of China's Security Strategy." In China's Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics, edited by Robert Ross and Zhu Feng, 141–162. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008.
777:
dominating its own geographical area. This relentless quest for power inherently generates a state of "constant security competition, with the possibility of war always in the background". Only once regional hegemony is attained do great powers become status quo states.
794:
Mearsheimer challenges these claims by making the argument that it is rather difficult to estimate when states have reached a satisfactory amount of power short of hegemony and costly to rely extensively on balancing as an efficient power-checking method due to
2493:
846:
the inclusion of new variables such as geography alongside the distribution of power enhances offensive neorealism's potential to make specific assumptions about states' pursuit of aggressive actions and resort to balancing and buck-passing.
799:
issues. According to him, when a great power finds itself in a defensive posture trying to prevent rivals from gaining power at its expense, it can choose to engage in balancing or intervene by favoring
1769:
Rynning, Sten and Jens Ringsmose. "Why Are Revisionist States Revisionist? Reviving Classical Realism as an Approach to Understanding International Change." International Politics 45 (2008): 19–39.
773:
Since global hegemony is nearly impossible to attain due to the constraints of power projection across oceans and retaliation forces, the best end game status states can hope to reach is that of a
1233:; Sten Rynning and Jens Ringsmose, "Why Are Revisionist States Revisionist? Reviving Classical Realism as an Approach to Understanding International Change", International Politics 45 (2008): 26.
748:
contrary of defensive neorealism according to which states are status quo powers seeking only to preserve their respective positions in the international system by maintaining the prevailing
2387:
519:
2438:
1735:
1740:
Lee, Gerald Geunwook. "To be Long or Not to Be Long—That is the Question: The Contradiction of Time-Horizon in Offensive Realism." Security Studies 12:2 (2002/2003): 196–217.
1121:
Mearsheimer, J. (2005). Structural Realism, in T. Dunne, M. Kurki & S. Smith, International Relations Theory: Discipline and Diversity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
787:
diminishing marginal returns where costs eventually outweigh benefits. Defensive neorealism posits that under anarchy there is a strong propensity for states to engage in
1603:
On Bargaining Theory see David A. Lake, "Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory: Assessing Rationalist Explanations of the Iraq War," International Security 35:3 (2010/11): 15.
897:—the constant fighting Mearsheimer proposes would actually make states less secure because the repeated costs of fighting eventually deplete all of that state's power.
1057:
Gerald Geunwook Lee, "To Be Long or Not to Be Long–That is the Question: The Contradiction of Time-Horizon in Offensive Realism", Security Studies 12:2 (2003): 196.
1897:
570:
2180:
1743:
Levy, Jack S. and William R. Thompson. "Balancing on Land and at Sea: Do States Ally Against the Leading Global Power?" International Security 35:1 (2010): 7–43.
306:
1725:
Kirshner, Jonathan. "The Tragedy of Offensive Realism: Classical Realism and the Rise of China." European Journal of International Relations 18:1 (2012): 53–75.
1639:
Colin Elman, "Extending Offensive Realism: The Louisiana Purchase and America's Rise to Regional Hegemony", American Political Science Review 98:4 (2004): 563.
1621:
Jonathan Kirshner, "The Tragedy of Offensive Realism: Classical Realism and the Rise of China", European Journal of International Relations 18:1 (2010): 59–61.
1438:
Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, "Balancing on Land and at Sea: Do States Ally Against the Leading Global Power?" International Security 35:1 (2010): 11.
1564:
David C. Hendrickson, "The Lion and the Lamb: Realism and Liberalism Reconsidered", World Policy Journal 20:1 (2003): 97; Snyder, Mearsheimer's World, 172.
634:. The theory brings important alternative contributions for the study and understanding of international relations but remains the subject of criticism.
1331:
Peter Toft, "John J. Mearsheimer: An Offensive Realist Between Geopolitics and Power", Journal of International Relations and Development 8 (2005): 390.
1778:
Snyder, Glenn H. "Mearsheimer's World—Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security: A Review Essay." International Security 27:1 (2002): 149–173.
2077:
1731:
Lake, David A. "Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory: Assessing Rationalist Explanations of the Iraq War." International Security 35:3 (2010/11): 7–52.
201:
1075:
Glenn H. Snyder, "Mearsheimer's World—Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security: A Review Essay", International Security 27:1 (2002): 151.
1714:
1095:
1746:
Lieber, Keir A. and Gerard Alexander. "Waiting for Balancing Why the World Is Not Pushing Back." International Security 30:1 (2005): 109–139.
1681:
978:
1429:
Keir A. Lieber and Gerard Alexander, "Waiting for Balancing Why the World Is Not Pushing Back", International Security 30:1 (2005): 111–112.
1890:
563:
2112:
2011:
749:
672:
236:
133:
2445:
2142:
1869:
Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In", International Security 19 :1 (1994): 72–107.
658:. Yet, to date, the most important variant of offensive neorealism, developed after Kenneth Waltz's defensive neorealism, is that of
266:
2477:
2158:
1914:
284:
31:
2537:
2174:
2127:
2117:
2072:
1883:
1872:
Fareed Zarkaria, From Wealth to Power: the Unusual Origins of America's World Role (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).
1546:
Christopher Layne, "The Poster Child for Offensive Realism: America as a Global Hegemon", Security Studies 12:2 (2002/2003): 127.
556:
300:
251:
241:
196:
854:
Some scholars have pointed out logical issues with Mearsheimer's offensive neorealism. Snyder rejects Mearsheimer's view of the
1970:
91:
2163:
1709:
Hendrickson, David C. "The Lion and the Lamb: Realism and Liberalism Reconsidered." World Policy Journal 20:1 (2003): 93–102.
289:
2132:
2021:
1932:
788:
676:
627:
591:
256:
143:
51:
2469:
2097:
1940:
664:
221:
58:
1260:
John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions", International Security 19:3 (1994–1995): 11–12.
756:
727:
603:
1760:
Mearsheimer, John J. "The False Promise of International Institutions." International Security 19:3 (1994–1995): 5–49.
1130:
Mearsheimer, John J. "The false promise of international institutions." International Security 19, no. 3 (1994): 5–49.
2003:
1754:
643:
126:
2394:
1784:
1015:
735:
646:, which includes various sub-trends characterised by the different perspectives of representative scholars such as
526:
1736:"The Poster Child for Offensive Realism: America as a Global Hegemon." Security Studies 12:2 (2002/2003): 120–163.
1148:
Eric J. Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims", Security Studies 6:4 (1997): 7–8.
2092:
1988:
1728:
Labs, Eric. "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims." Security Studies 6:4 (1997): 1–49.
816:, passing the buck to local neighbours of the potential hegemon and engaging in balancing only as a last resort.
216:
108:
1906:
1850:
Waltz, Kenneth N. "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory." Journal of International Affairs 44:1 (1990): 21–37.
1212:
Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979): 126.
22:
671:
While Mearsheimer's offensive neorealism theory does reiterate and build on certain assumptions elaborated by
919:
1112:
Kenneth N. Waltz, "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory", Journal of International Affairs 44:1 (1990): 34.
2086:
894:
210:
1847:
Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979).
1782:
Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. (Winter 2000–2001). "Security seeking under anarchy: defensive realism revisited".
1013:
Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. (Winter 2000–2001). "Security seeking under anarchy: defensive realism revisited".
1465:
See Kenneth N. Waltz, "International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy", Security Studies 6:1 (1996): 54–57.
2532:
2107:
901:
for Japan's 20th century territorial acquisitions, NATO's continuation or Germany's non-achievement of
231:
1856:
Wang, Yuan-Kang. "Offensive Realism and the Rise of China." Issues & Studies 40:1 (2004): 173–201.
858:
as "a synoptic statement of offensive realism". He argues that offensive neorealism's positing of all
2431:
2067:
1853:
Waltz, Kenneth N. "International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy." Security Studies 6:1 (1996): 54–57.
191:
884:
Additionally, Toft points out that Mearsheimer's concentration on military capabilities and issuing
2036:
1960:
158:
78:
1340:
Yuan-Kang Wang, "Offensive Realism and the Rise of China", Issues & Studies 40:1 (2004): 177.
642:
Offensive realism is a prominent and important theory of international relations belonging to the
2041:
1983:
1945:
1922:
587:
163:
103:
63:
38:
691:
The theory is grounded on five central assumptions similar to the ones that lie at the core of
1866:
Robert Giplin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
1955:
924:
722:
actors, capable of coming up with sound strategies that maximize their prospects for survival
73:
804:—transferring the responsibility to act onto other states while remaining on the sidelines.
2347:
2297:
2282:
2201:
2196:
2082:
2016:
1993:
1066:
John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 2001).
477:
427:
412:
329:
324:
206:
138:
113:
1763:
Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 2001.
8:
2237:
2211:
367:
339:
1766:
Mearsheimer, John J. "China's Unpeaceful Rise." Current History 105:690 (2006): 160–162.
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some of those resources destroyed over the course of fighting. Due to this inefficiency—
2312:
2232:
1809:
1801:
1698:
1040:
1032:
995:
813:
619:
442:
362:
2031:
1978:
1750:
1242:
John J. Mearsheimer, "China's Unpeaceful Rise", Current History 105: 690 (2006): 160.
902:
873:
867:
859:
835:
796:
774:
680:
651:
599:
153:
98:
1813:
1702:
1044:
999:
2454:
2317:
2272:
2257:
2137:
2121:
2062:
1950:
1834:
1793:
1690:
1024:
987:
956:
855:
766:
699:
Great powers are the main actors in world politics and the international system is
659:
595:
447:
402:
387:
261:
245:
186:
68:
1839:
1822:
961:
944:
606:
nature of the international system is responsible for the promotion of aggressive
2485:
2414:
2362:
2332:
2322:
2307:
1875:
631:
607:
546:
492:
462:
452:
437:
734:
Mainly, it diverges from defensive neorealism in regards to the accumulation of
2342:
2302:
2287:
2252:
885:
655:
472:
432:
417:
382:
2526:
2357:
2337:
2292:
2277:
2262:
2206:
692:
647:
487:
467:
422:
407:
392:
334:
1797:
1028:
2352:
2267:
2168:
2102:
1772:
801:
623:
482:
397:
294:
226:
2391:
1694:
991:
523:
2367:
2242:
2216:
2046:
1823:"John J. Mearsheimer: an offensive realist between geopolitics and power"
1749:
Lim, Y.-H. China's Naval Power, Surrey, New York, Ashgate, 2014, 234 p. (
945:"John J. Mearsheimer: an offensive realist between geopolitics and power"
719:
615:
611:
497:
372:
344:
168:
2409:
763:—being the only great power in the state system—as their ultimate goal.
541:
2372:
2327:
2247:
1805:
1679:
Feng, Liu; Ruizhuan, Zhang (Summer 2006). "The typologies of realism".
1036:
976:
Feng, Liu; Ruizhuan, Zhang (Summer 2006). "The typologies of realism".
731:
predictions regarding great power behaviour in international politics.
614:. The theory fundamentally differs from defensive realism by depicting
502:
457:
377:
2423:
760:
706:
866:
Peter Toft argues that there are flaws in offensive neorealism's
700:
1367:
Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 34–35 and 156–157.
594:
school of thought and was put forward by the political scholar
2494:
The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities
712:
States can never be certain of the intentions of other states
1474:
Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 71–72 and 121–123.
1492:
Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 422 note 60.
1657:.Layne, The Poster Child for Offensive Realism, 162–163.
1269:
Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 21 and 29.
742:
1300:
1298:
1296:
825:
listing should in no case be considered as exhaustive.
726:
Like defensive neorealism, offensive realism posits an
1715:"Why John J. Mearsheimer Is Right (About Some Things)"
1096:"Why John J. Mearsheimer Is Right (About Some Things)"
1220:
1218:
1293:
1176:
Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 32–33.
1139:
Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 30–31.
1555:
Layne, The Poster Child for Offensive Realism, 129.
1519:
Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics 35–36.
1905:
1827:Journal of International Relations and Development
1407:Feng & Z Ruizhuan, Typologies of Realism, 124.
1304:Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 141.
1215:
949:Journal of International Relations and Development
1278:Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 35.
1251:Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 34.
1224:Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 21.
1194:Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 20.
2524:
739:competition likely leading to conflict and war.
1781:
1084:Feng and Zheng, Typologies of Realism, 113–114.
1012:
863:unnecessary one based on hypothetical threats.
819:
2439:
1891:
1682:The Chinese Journal of International Politics
1286:
1284:
979:The Chinese Journal of International Politics
564:
1678:
975:
781:
679:alongside other structural theories such as
16:Structural theory of international relations
1572:
1570:
2446:
2432:
1898:
1884:
1290:Mearsheimer, China's Unpeaceful Rise, 160.
1281:
755:The international system characterised by
715:States have survival as their primary goal
571:
557:
2143:Chinese school of international relations
1838:
960:
267:Chinese school of international relations
2478:The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy
1576:Kagan, Why John J. Mearsheimer is Right.
1567:
2525:
1712:
1093:
637:
630:strategies in their consistent aim to
2427:
1879:
1585:Snyder, Mearsheimer's World, 171–172.
1528:Snyder, Mearsheimer's World, 155–156.
828:
743:Status quo v. power-maximizing states
2453:
1820:
1203:Snyder, Mearsheimer's World,157–158.
942:
849:
695:'s defensive neorealism. These are:
662:as fully developed in his 2001 book
2470:The Tragedy of Great Power Politics
1666:Toft, John J. Mearsheimer, 397–399.
1612:Toft, John J. Mearsheimer, 396–397.
1313:Mearsheimer, The False Promise, 12.
665:The Tragedy of Great Power Politics
602:. Offensive realism holds that the
13:
1860:
1167:Taliaferro, Security Seeking, 134.
705:All states possess some offensive
14:
2549:
1648:Snyder, Mearsheimer's World, 173.
1510:Snyder, Mearsheimer's World, 155.
1447:Snyder, Mearsheimer's World, 158.
1349:Snyder, Mearsheimer's World, 156.
1322:Snyder, Mearsheimer's World, 154.
1185:Snyder, Mearsheimer's World, 153.
632:dominate the international system
2408:
540:
2093:International political economy
1989:Uneven and combined development
1660:
1651:
1642:
1633:
1630:Toft, John J. Mearsheimer, 397.
1624:
1615:
1606:
1597:
1594:Toft, John J. Mearsheimer, 384.
1588:
1579:
1558:
1549:
1540:
1537:Toft, John J. Mearsheimer, 393.
1531:
1522:
1513:
1504:
1501:Toft, John J. Mearsheimer, 401.
1495:
1486:
1483:Toft, John J. Mearsheimer, 389.
1477:
1468:
1459:
1456:Toft, John J. Mearsheimer, 403.
1450:
1441:
1432:
1423:
1418:Tragedy of Great Power Politics
1410:
1401:
1392:
1387:Tragedy of Great Power Politics
1379:
1370:
1361:
1352:
1343:
1334:
1325:
1316:
1307:
1272:
1263:
1254:
1245:
1236:
1227:
1206:
1197:
1188:
1179:
1170:
1161:
1151:
1142:
1133:
1124:
1115:
217:International political economy
109:Uneven and combined development
2538:International relations theory
1907:International relations theory
1106:
1087:
1078:
1069:
1060:
1051:
1006:
969:
936:
686:
23:International relations theory
1:
1840:10.1057/palgrave.jird.1800065
1821:Toft, Peter (December 2005).
1672:
1398:Wang, Offensive Realism, 179.
1376:Wang, Offensive Realism, 178.
962:10.1057/palgrave.jird.1800065
943:Toft, Peter (December 2005).
920:Lesser of two evils principle
2087:liberal intergovernmentalism
211:liberal intergovernmentalism
7:
913:
820:Contributions and criticism
10:
2554:
2108:Hegemonic stability theory
1713:Kaplan, Robert D. (2012).
1094:Kaplan, Robert D. (2012).
586:is a structural theory in
232:Hegemonic stability theory
2504:
2461:
2405:
2381:
2225:
2189:
2151:
2068:Critical security studies
2055:
2002:
1969:
1931:
1913:
1358:Labs, Beyond Victory, 10.
895:war's inefficiency puzzle
782:Balancing v. buck-passing
644:realist school of thought
192:Critical security studies
2037:Territorial peace theory
1961:Liberal institutionalism
1389:, 155, 160, 261 and 272.
930:
626:and self-promotion over
159:Territorial peace theory
79:Liberal institutionalism
2395:International relations
2042:Democratic peace theory
1984:Theories of imperialism
1946:Democratic peace theory
1923:Feminist constructivism
1798:10.1162/016228800560543
1029:10.1162/016228800560543
588:international relations
527:International relations
164:Democratic peace theory
104:Theories of imperialism
64:Democratic peace theory
39:Feminist constructivism
1785:International Security
1023:(3): 128–129 and 134.
1016:International Security
860:states as revisionists
612:international politics
2181:Inter-paradigm debate
1956:Republican liberalism
1719:The Atlantic Magazine
1100:The Atlantic Magazine
925:Cult of the offensive
307:Inter-paradigm debate
74:Republican liberalism
2348:Immanuel Wallerstein
2298:Peter J. Katzenstein
2283:Samuel P. Huntington
2202:Historical sociology
2197:International ethics
2083:Intergovernmentalism
2017:Neoclassical realism
1994:World-systems theory
1734:Layne, Christopher.
618:as power-maximizing
590:that belongs to the
478:Immanuel Wallerstein
428:Peter J. Katzenstein
413:Samuel P. Huntington
330:Historical sociology
325:International ethics
207:Intergovernmentalism
139:Neoclassical realism
114:World-systems theory
2415:Politics portal
2238:Zbigniew Brzezinski
2212:State cartel theory
1695:10.1093/cjip/pol006
992:10.1093/cjip/pol006
660:John J. Mearsheimer
654:, Eric J. Labs and
638:Theoretical origins
547:Politics portal
368:Zbigniew Brzezinski
340:State cartel theory
2313:Stephen D. Krasner
986:(1): 124 and 126.
836:revisionist states
829:Theoretical inputs
673:classical realists
443:Stephen D. Krasner
2533:Political realism
2520:
2519:
2512:Offensive realism
2421:
2420:
2113:Copenhagen School
2032:Defensive realism
2027:Offensive realism
2012:Classical realism
1979:Dependency theory
903:regional hegemony
874:Christopher Layne
868:level of analysis
850:Theoretical flaws
814:offshore balancer
797:collective action
681:defensive realism
652:Randall Schweller
600:defensive realism
584:Offensive realism
581:
580:
237:Copenhagen School
154:Defensive realism
149:Offensive realism
134:Classical realism
99:Dependency theory
2545:
2455:John Mearsheimer
2448:
2441:
2434:
2425:
2424:
2413:
2412:
2393:
2318:John Mearsheimer
2273:Martha Finnemore
2258:Michael W. Doyle
2190:Other approaches
2138:Intercommunalism
2122:neofunctionalism
2063:Neo-Gramscianism
1951:Capitalist peace
1900:
1893:
1886:
1877:
1876:
1844:
1842:
1817:
1722:
1706:
1667:
1664:
1658:
1655:
1649:
1646:
1640:
1637:
1631:
1628:
1622:
1619:
1613:
1610:
1604:
1601:
1595:
1592:
1586:
1583:
1577:
1574:
1565:
1562:
1556:
1553:
1547:
1544:
1538:
1535:
1529:
1526:
1520:
1517:
1511:
1508:
1502:
1499:
1493:
1490:
1484:
1481:
1475:
1472:
1466:
1463:
1457:
1454:
1448:
1445:
1439:
1436:
1430:
1427:
1421:
1414:
1408:
1405:
1399:
1396:
1390:
1383:
1377:
1374:
1368:
1365:
1359:
1356:
1350:
1347:
1341:
1338:
1332:
1329:
1323:
1320:
1314:
1311:
1305:
1302:
1291:
1288:
1279:
1276:
1270:
1267:
1261:
1258:
1252:
1249:
1243:
1240:
1234:
1231:
1225:
1222:
1213:
1210:
1204:
1201:
1195:
1192:
1186:
1183:
1177:
1174:
1168:
1165:
1159:
1155:
1149:
1146:
1140:
1137:
1131:
1128:
1122:
1119:
1113:
1110:
1104:
1103:
1091:
1085:
1082:
1076:
1073:
1067:
1064:
1058:
1055:
1049:
1048:
1010:
1004:
1003:
973:
967:
966:
964:
940:
856:security dilemma
775:regional hegemon
767:John Mearsheimer
750:balance of power
596:John Mearsheimer
573:
566:
559:
545:
544:
525:
448:John Mearsheimer
403:Martha Finnemore
388:Michael W. Doyle
319:Other approaches
262:Intercommunalism
246:neofunctionalism
187:Neo-Gramscianism
69:Capitalist peace
19:
18:
2553:
2552:
2548:
2547:
2546:
2544:
2543:
2542:
2523:
2522:
2521:
2516:
2500:
2486:Why Leaders Lie
2457:
2452:
2422:
2417:
2407:
2401:
2400:
2399:
2398:
2397:
2390:
2377:
2363:Alexander Wendt
2333:Kathryn Sikkink
2323:Hans Morgenthau
2308:Henry Kissinger
2233:Michael Barnett
2221:
2185:
2152:Classifications
2147:
2133:Postcolonialism
2073:Critical theory
2051:
1998:
1965:
1927:
1909:
1904:
1863:
1861:Further reading
1675:
1670:
1665:
1661:
1656:
1652:
1647:
1643:
1638:
1634:
1629:
1625:
1620:
1616:
1611:
1607:
1602:
1598:
1593:
1589:
1584:
1580:
1575:
1568:
1563:
1559:
1554:
1550:
1545:
1541:
1536:
1532:
1527:
1523:
1518:
1514:
1509:
1505:
1500:
1496:
1491:
1487:
1482:
1478:
1473:
1469:
1464:
1460:
1455:
1451:
1446:
1442:
1437:
1433:
1428:
1424:
1415:
1411:
1406:
1402:
1397:
1393:
1384:
1380:
1375:
1371:
1366:
1362:
1357:
1353:
1348:
1344:
1339:
1335:
1330:
1326:
1321:
1317:
1312:
1308:
1303:
1294:
1289:
1282:
1277:
1273:
1268:
1264:
1259:
1255:
1250:
1246:
1241:
1237:
1232:
1228:
1223:
1216:
1211:
1207:
1202:
1198:
1193:
1189:
1184:
1180:
1175:
1171:
1166:
1162:
1156:
1152:
1147:
1143:
1138:
1134:
1129:
1125:
1120:
1116:
1111:
1107:
1092:
1088:
1083:
1079:
1074:
1070:
1065:
1061:
1056:
1052:
1011:
1007:
974:
970:
941:
937:
933:
916:
852:
831:
822:
784:
745:
689:
640:
598:in response to
577:
539:
534:
533:
532:
531:
530:
529:
522:
516:
508:
507:
493:Alexander Wendt
463:Kathryn Sikkink
453:Hans Morgenthau
438:Henry Kissinger
363:Michael Barnett
358:
350:
349:
320:
312:
311:
280:
279:Classifications
272:
271:
257:Postcolonialism
197:Critical theory
182:
174:
173:
129:
119:
118:
94:
84:
83:
54:
44:
43:
34:
17:
12:
11:
5:
2551:
2541:
2540:
2535:
2518:
2517:
2515:
2514:
2508:
2506:
2502:
2501:
2499:
2498:
2490:
2482:
2474:
2465:
2463:
2459:
2458:
2451:
2450:
2443:
2436:
2428:
2419:
2418:
2406:
2403:
2402:
2389:
2388:
2386:
2385:
2383:
2379:
2378:
2376:
2375:
2370:
2365:
2360:
2355:
2350:
2345:
2343:J. Ann Tickner
2340:
2335:
2330:
2325:
2320:
2315:
2310:
2305:
2303:Robert Keohane
2300:
2295:
2290:
2288:John Ikenberry
2285:
2280:
2275:
2270:
2265:
2260:
2255:
2253:Daniel Deudney
2250:
2245:
2240:
2235:
2229:
2227:
2223:
2222:
2220:
2219:
2214:
2209:
2204:
2199:
2193:
2191:
2187:
2186:
2184:
2183:
2178:
2171:
2166:
2161:
2159:Postpositivism
2155:
2153:
2149:
2148:
2146:
2145:
2140:
2135:
2130:
2125:
2115:
2110:
2105:
2100:
2095:
2090:
2080:
2078:English School
2075:
2070:
2065:
2059:
2057:
2056:Other theories
2053:
2052:
2050:
2049:
2044:
2039:
2034:
2029:
2024:
2019:
2014:
2008:
2006:
2000:
1999:
1997:
1996:
1991:
1986:
1981:
1975:
1973:
1967:
1966:
1964:
1963:
1958:
1953:
1948:
1943:
1937:
1935:
1929:
1928:
1926:
1925:
1919:
1917:
1915:Constructivism
1911:
1910:
1903:
1902:
1895:
1888:
1880:
1874:
1873:
1870:
1867:
1862:
1859:
1858:
1857:
1854:
1851:
1848:
1845:
1833:(4): 381–408.
1818:
1792:(3): 128–161.
1779:
1776:
1770:
1767:
1764:
1761:
1758:
1747:
1744:
1741:
1738:
1732:
1729:
1726:
1723:
1710:
1707:
1689:(1): 109–134.
1674:
1671:
1669:
1668:
1659:
1650:
1641:
1632:
1623:
1614:
1605:
1596:
1587:
1578:
1566:
1557:
1548:
1539:
1530:
1521:
1512:
1503:
1494:
1485:
1476:
1467:
1458:
1449:
1440:
1431:
1422:
1420:, 271 and 345.
1409:
1400:
1391:
1378:
1369:
1360:
1351:
1342:
1333:
1324:
1315:
1306:
1292:
1280:
1271:
1262:
1253:
1244:
1235:
1226:
1214:
1205:
1196:
1187:
1178:
1169:
1160:
1150:
1141:
1132:
1123:
1114:
1105:
1086:
1077:
1068:
1059:
1050:
1005:
968:
955:(4): 381–408.
934:
932:
929:
928:
927:
922:
915:
912:
886:state capacity
851:
848:
830:
827:
821:
818:
783:
780:
744:
741:
724:
723:
716:
713:
710:
703:
688:
685:
656:Fareed Zakaria
639:
636:
579:
578:
576:
575:
568:
561:
553:
550:
549:
536:
535:
521:
520:
518:
517:
514:
513:
510:
509:
506:
505:
500:
495:
490:
485:
480:
475:
473:J. Ann Tickner
470:
465:
460:
455:
450:
445:
440:
435:
433:Robert Keohane
430:
425:
420:
418:John Ikenberry
415:
410:
405:
400:
395:
390:
385:
383:Daniel Deudney
380:
375:
370:
365:
359:
356:
355:
352:
351:
348:
347:
342:
337:
332:
327:
321:
318:
317:
314:
313:
310:
309:
304:
297:
292:
287:
285:Postpositivism
281:
278:
277:
274:
273:
270:
269:
264:
259:
254:
249:
239:
234:
229:
224:
219:
214:
204:
202:English School
199:
194:
189:
183:
181:Other theories
180:
179:
176:
175:
172:
171:
166:
161:
156:
151:
146:
141:
136:
130:
125:
124:
121:
120:
117:
116:
111:
106:
101:
95:
90:
89:
86:
85:
82:
81:
76:
71:
66:
61:
55:
50:
49:
46:
45:
42:
41:
35:
32:Constructivism
30:
29:
26:
25:
15:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
2550:
2539:
2536:
2534:
2531:
2530:
2528:
2513:
2510:
2509:
2507:
2503:
2496:
2495:
2491:
2488:
2487:
2483:
2480:
2479:
2475:
2472:
2471:
2467:
2466:
2464:
2460:
2456:
2449:
2444:
2442:
2437:
2435:
2430:
2429:
2426:
2416:
2411:
2404:
2396:
2392:
2384:
2380:
2374:
2371:
2369:
2366:
2364:
2361:
2359:
2358:Kenneth Waltz
2356:
2354:
2351:
2349:
2346:
2344:
2341:
2339:
2338:Susan Strange
2336:
2334:
2331:
2329:
2326:
2324:
2321:
2319:
2316:
2314:
2311:
2309:
2306:
2304:
2301:
2299:
2296:
2294:
2293:Robert Jervis
2291:
2289:
2286:
2284:
2281:
2279:
2278:Robert Gilpin
2276:
2274:
2271:
2269:
2266:
2264:
2263:Cynthia Enloe
2261:
2259:
2256:
2254:
2251:
2249:
2246:
2244:
2241:
2239:
2236:
2234:
2231:
2230:
2228:
2224:
2218:
2215:
2213:
2210:
2208:
2207:Regime theory
2205:
2203:
2200:
2198:
2195:
2194:
2192:
2188:
2182:
2179:
2176:
2175:Great Debates
2172:
2170:
2167:
2165:
2162:
2160:
2157:
2156:
2154:
2150:
2144:
2141:
2139:
2136:
2134:
2131:
2129:
2128:Postmodernism
2126:
2123:
2119:
2118:Functionalism
2116:
2114:
2111:
2109:
2106:
2104:
2101:
2099:
2096:
2094:
2091:
2088:
2084:
2081:
2079:
2076:
2074:
2071:
2069:
2066:
2064:
2061:
2060:
2058:
2054:
2048:
2045:
2043:
2040:
2038:
2035:
2033:
2030:
2028:
2025:
2023:
2020:
2018:
2015:
2013:
2010:
2009:
2007:
2005:
2001:
1995:
1992:
1990:
1987:
1985:
1982:
1980:
1977:
1976:
1974:
1972:
1968:
1962:
1959:
1957:
1954:
1952:
1949:
1947:
1944:
1942:
1939:
1938:
1936:
1934:
1930:
1924:
1921:
1920:
1918:
1916:
1912:
1908:
1901:
1896:
1894:
1889:
1887:
1882:
1881:
1878:
1871:
1868:
1865:
1864:
1855:
1852:
1849:
1846:
1841:
1836:
1832:
1828:
1824:
1819:
1815:
1811:
1807:
1803:
1799:
1795:
1791:
1787:
1786:
1780:
1777:
1774:
1771:
1768:
1765:
1762:
1759:
1756:
1755:9781409451846
1752:
1748:
1745:
1742:
1739:
1737:
1733:
1730:
1727:
1724:
1720:
1716:
1711:
1708:
1704:
1700:
1696:
1692:
1688:
1684:
1683:
1677:
1676:
1663:
1654:
1645:
1636:
1627:
1618:
1609:
1600:
1591:
1582:
1573:
1571:
1561:
1552:
1543:
1534:
1525:
1516:
1507:
1498:
1489:
1480:
1471:
1462:
1453:
1444:
1435:
1426:
1419:
1416:Mearsheimer,
1413:
1404:
1395:
1388:
1385:Mearsheimer,
1382:
1373:
1364:
1355:
1346:
1337:
1328:
1319:
1310:
1301:
1299:
1297:
1287:
1285:
1275:
1266:
1257:
1248:
1239:
1230:
1221:
1219:
1209:
1200:
1191:
1182:
1173:
1164:
1154:
1145:
1136:
1127:
1118:
1109:
1101:
1097:
1090:
1081:
1072:
1063:
1054:
1046:
1042:
1038:
1034:
1030:
1026:
1022:
1018:
1017:
1009:
1001:
997:
993:
989:
985:
981:
980:
972:
963:
958:
954:
950:
946:
939:
935:
926:
923:
921:
918:
917:
911:
907:
904:
898:
896:
890:
887:
882:
878:
875:
871:
869:
864:
861:
857:
847:
843:
839:
837:
826:
817:
815:
809:
805:
803:
798:
792:
790:
779:
776:
771:
768:
764:
762:
758:
753:
751:
740:
737:
732:
729:
721:
717:
714:
711:
708:
704:
702:
698:
697:
696:
694:
693:Kenneth Waltz
684:
682:
678:
674:
669:
667:
666:
661:
657:
653:
649:
648:Robert Gilpin
645:
635:
633:
629:
625:
621:
617:
613:
609:
605:
601:
597:
593:
589:
585:
574:
569:
567:
562:
560:
555:
554:
552:
551:
548:
543:
538:
537:
528:
524:
512:
511:
504:
501:
499:
496:
494:
491:
489:
488:Kenneth Waltz
486:
484:
481:
479:
476:
474:
471:
469:
468:Susan Strange
466:
464:
461:
459:
456:
454:
451:
449:
446:
444:
441:
439:
436:
434:
431:
429:
426:
424:
423:Robert Jervis
421:
419:
416:
414:
411:
409:
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2527:Categories
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