Knowledge

Train Protection & Warning System

Source 📝

321:. Although loops are standard, buffer stops may be fitted with 'mini loops', due to the very low approach speed, usually 10 mph. When buffer stops were originally fitted with TPWS using standard loops there were many instances of false applications, causing delays whilst it reset, with trains potentially blocking the station throat, plus the risk of passengers standing to alight being thrown over by the sudden braking. This problem arose when a train passed over the arming loop so slowly that it was still detected by the train's receiver after the on-board timer had completed its cycle. The timer would reset and begin timing again, and the trigger loop then being detected within this second timing cycle would lead to a false intervention. As a temporary solution, drivers were instructed to pass the buffer stop OSSs at 5 mph, eliminating the problem, but meaning that trains no longer had the momentum to roll to the normal stopping point and requiring drivers to apply power beyond the OSS, just a short distance from the buffers, arguably making a buffer stop collision more likely than before TPWS was fitted. The redesigned 'mini loops', roughly a third the length of the standard ones, eliminate this problem, although due to the low speed and low margin, buffer stop OSSs are still a major cause of TPWS trips. 255: 155: 414:, where a driver repeatedly cancelled the AWS warning without applying the brakes, passing the danger signal at high speed. Purley was one of several high profile SPAD crashes in the late 1980s, that led to the initial plan in the 1990s for the mass rollout of ATP, that was subsequently canceled in 1994 to be replaced by TPWS. 189:
would be nominated the ‘normal direction’ and fitted with ‘ND’ equipment. The other signal would be nominated the ‘opposite direction’ and fitted with ‘OD’ equipment. Opposite direction TPWS transmission frequencies are slightly different, working at 64.75 (OSS arming), 66.75 (TSS arming), and 65.75 kHz (common trigger).
287:
Temporarily isolating the TPWS does not affect the AWS. The driver must reinstate the TPWS immediately at the point where normal working is resumed. As a safety feature, if they forget to do this, the TPWS will be reinstated on the next occasion that the driver's desk is shut down and then opened up again.
417:
Supporters of TPWS claim that even where it could not prevent accidents due to SPADs, it would likely reduce the impact, and reduce or eliminate fatalities, by at least slowing the train down. However, it is likely that in those cases the driver would have applied the emergency brakes well before the
304:
system causes. The first known installation of such a system is at Ilford Depot. TPWS equipped depot protection systems are suitable only for locations where vehicles are driven in and out of the maintenance building from a leading driving cab - they are not suitable for use with loose coaching stock
299:
is to equip the system with TPWS. This equipment safeguards staff from unauthorised movements by using the TPWS equipment. Any unplanned movement will cause the train to automatically come to a stand when it has passed the relevant signal set at danger. This has the added benefit of preventing damage
406:
remarked that TPWS was "in terms of avoiding “ATP preventable accidents” it is about 70% effective.", highlighting the speed limitation. That 2000 study did still conclude that TPWS was good solution for the short term of 10–15 years, but stressed that European Train Control system was the long term
241:
If the loops are energised, an aerial on the underside of the train picks up the radio frequency signal and passes it to the receiver. A timer measures how long it takes to pass between the arming and trigger loops. This time is used to check the speed, and if it is higher than the TPWS 'set speed',
166:
The first pair, the Overspeed Sensor System (OSS), is sited at a position determined by line speed and gradient. The loops are separated by a distance that should not be traversed within less than a pre-determined period of time of about one second if the train is running at a safe speed approaching
286:
There is also a separate TPWS Temporary Isolation Switch located out of reach of the driver's desk. This is operated by the driver when the train is being worked in degraded conditions such as Temporary Block Working where multiple signals need to be passed at danger with the signalman's authority.
342:
Standard TPWS installations can only bring a train to a stop prior to passing a red signal, at 74 miles per hour (119 km/h). In 2001, it was observed that roughly one-third of the UK railway allows for a speed above 75 miles per hour (121 km/h). Further this assumes the train's brakes is
188:
Where trains are signalled in opposite directions on an individual line it could be possible for an unwarranted TPWS intervention to occur as a train travelled between an OSS arming and either trigger loops that were in fact associated with different signals. To cater for this situation one signal
177:
The other pair of loops is back to back at the signal, and is called a Train Stop System (TSS). The 'arming' and 'trigger' loops work at 66.25 kHz and 65.25 kHz respectively. The brakes will be applied if the on-train equipment detects both frequencies together after having detected the
76:
is installed with a third transmitter further in rear of the signal increasing the effectiveness to 100 mph (160 km/h). When installed in conjunction with signal controls such as 'double blocking' (i.e. two red signal aspects in succession), TPWS can be fully effective at any realistic
328:
protection techniques, used TPWS with outer home signals that protect converging junctions with a higher than average risk by controlling the speed of an approaching train an extra signal section in rear of the junction. If this fails the resultant TPWS application of brakes will stop the train
369:
why a driver might be required to pass a signal at danger with authority. The signaller will advise the driver to pass the signal at danger, proceed with caution, be prepared to stop short of any obstruction, and then obey all other signals. Immediately before moving, the driver will press the
68:
A standard installation consists of an on-track transmitter adjacent to a signal, activated when the signal is at danger. A train that passes the signal will have its emergency brake activated. If the train is travelling at speed, this may be too late to stop it before the point of collision,
421:
While it has been noted that there have been very few fatalities since the fitting of TPWS that would have been prevented had ATP been fitted instead. This overlooks that during the delay between the decision to cancel ATP and replace it with TPWS and the actual roll out of TPWS that
262:
Every driving cab has a TPWS control panel, located where the driver can see it from their desk. There are two types of panel; the original 'standard' type, and a more recent 'enhanced' version, which gives separate indications for a brake demand caused by a SPAD, Overspeed or AWS.
242:
an emergency brake application is initiated. If the train is travelling slower than the TPWS set speed, but then passes the signal at danger, the aerial will receive the signal from the energised Train Stop System loops, and the brake will be applied to stop the train within the
162:
In a standard installation there are two pairs of loops, colloquially referred to as "grids" or "toast racks". Both pairs consist of an 'arming' and a 'trigger' loop. If the signal is at danger the loops will be energised. If the signal is clear, the loops will de-energise.
178:
arming frequency alone. Thus, an energised TSS is effective at any speed, but only if a train passes it in the right direction. Since a train may be required to pass a signal at danger during failure etc., the driver has the option to override a TSS, but not an OSS.
305:
or wagon maintenance, where vehicle movements are undertaken by a propelling shunting loco (in this case the lead vehicles would not be equipped with the relevant TPWS safety equipment), nor will it prevent a run-away vehicle from entering a protected work area.
167:
the signal at danger. The exact timings are 974 milliseconds for passenger trains and 1218 milliseconds for freight trains, determined by equipment on the train. Freight trains use the 1.25 times longer timing because of their different braking characteristics.
197:
At the lineside there are two modules associated with each set of loops: a Signal Interface Module (SIM) and an OSS or TSS module. These generate the frequencies for the loops, and prove the loops are intact. They interface with the signalling system.
142:. When the train's TPWS receiver passes over the first loop a timer begins to count down. If the second loop is passed before the timer has reached zero, the TPWS will activate. The greater the line speed, the more widely spaced the two loops will be. 246:. Multiple unit trains have an aerial at each end. Vehicles that can operate singly (single car DMUs and locomotives) only have one aerial. This would be either at the front or rear of it depending on the direction the vehicle was moving in. 57:, the purpose of TPWS is to stop a train by automatically initiating a brake demand, where TPWS track equipment is fitted, if the train has: passed a signal at danger without authority; approached a signal at danger too fast; approached a 108:
system was not economical, costing ÂŁ600,000,000 equivalent to ÂŁ979,431,929 in 2019 to implement, compared to value in lives saved: ÂŁ3-ÂŁ4 million (4,897,160 - 6,529,546 in 2019), per life saved, which was estimated to be 2.9 per year.
137:
A pair of electronic loops are placed 50–450 metres on the approach side of the signal, energized when it is at danger. The distance between the loops determines the minimum speed at which the on board equipment will apply the train's
398:
Critics, such as those representing victims of the Ladbroke Grove and Southhall rail crashes, and ASLEF and RMT rail unions pushed for the abandonment of TPWS in the late 1990s in favor of continuing with British Rail's ATP project.
515:
Braking capability is "conventionally measured as a percentage of “reverse acceleration” represented by gravity (g)." In 2001, the best braking available was "enhanced emergency" braking" producing a braking force equivalent to
69:
therefore a second transmitter may be placed on the approach to the signal that applies the brakes on trains going too quickly to stop at the signal, positioned to stop trains approaching at up to 75 mph (120 km/h).
119:
report found that TPWS had a number of limitations, and that while it provided a relatively cheap stop-gap prior to the widescale introduction of ATP and ERTMS, nothing should impede the installation of the much more capable
145:
There is another pair of loops at the signal, also energised when the signal is at danger. These are end to end, and thus will initiate a brake application on a train about to pass a signal at danger regardless of speed.
373:
The driver must then proceed at a speed which enables them to stop within the distance that they can see to be clear. Even if it appears that the section is clear to the next signal, they must still exercise caution.
273:. It ignores the TPWS TSS loops for approximately 20 seconds (generally for passenger trains) or 60 seconds (generally for slower accelerating freight trains) or until the loops have been passed, whichever is sooner. 1454: 115:
The rollout of TPWS accelerated when the Railway Safety Regulations 1999 came into force in 2003, requiring the installation of train stops at a number of types of location. However, in March 2001 the
536: 283:
The "Temporary Isolation/Fault" indicator lamp will flash if there is a TPWS system fault, or will show a steady illumination if the "Temporary Isolation Switch" has been activated.
1652: 347:
were not capable of doing, despite having a top speed of 125 miles per hour (201 km/h). TPWS-A was capable of stopping a train up to 100 miles per hour (160 km/h).
430:
both occurred, accidents that were ATP preventable, and occurred on the Great Western line, which had been outfitted with ATP as part of the pilot studies in the early-90s.
270: 390:
produced wheel slide and the train therefore was not brought to a stop prior to the collision point. (ATP would not have prevented this circumstance either).
313:
Certain signals may have multiple OSSes fitted. Alternatively, usually due to low line speeds, an OSS may not be fitted. An example of this is a terminal
594: 861: 280:
system and the TPWS system are inter-linked and if either of these has initiated a brake application, the "Brake Demand" indicator lamp will flash.
544: 112:
Trial installations of track side and train mounted equipment were made in 1997, with trials and development continuing over the next two years.
65:(SPADs) but to mitigate the consequences of a SPAD, by preventing a train that has had a SPAD from reaching a conflict point after the signal. 366: 356: 1409: 1319: 1104: 185:
associated with a main aspect signal is cleared for a shunting movement, the TSS loops are de-energised, but the OSS loops remain active.
1399: 1344: 495: 105: 892: 370:"Trainstop Override" button on the TPWS panel, so that the train can pass the signal without triggering the TPWS to apply the brakes. 1026: 921: 821: 714: 1672: 1309: 17: 477: 473: 1667: 1626: 1202: 658: 84:
which accomplish a similar task using electro-mechanical technology. Buffer stop protection using train stops is known as ‘
1464: 1414: 1384: 362:. However, on those occasions there are strict rules governing the actions of drivers, train speed, and the use of TPWS. 1657: 1144: 1389: 1077: 1814: 1763: 1758: 1647: 1043: 1003: 963: 838: 731: 633: 296: 1359: 1616: 1097: 785: 757: 566: 1434: 1682: 1662: 1255: 54: 182: 1484: 1449: 1245: 602: 58: 1713: 1698: 1154: 121: 85: 868: 1374: 1164: 679: 243: 1768: 1139: 1090: 1778: 1743: 1733: 1723: 1718: 1708: 1339: 1169: 935:. Health & Safety Commission. pp. 10, 54–55, 70, 86, 1 05 (PDF Page 25, 69–70, 85, 101, 120). 1773: 1728: 1631: 1489: 1334: 1286: 1134: 1129: 423: 411: 383: 43: 1030: 1783: 1753: 1748: 1738: 1703: 1621: 1429: 1354: 1260: 1222: 990: 489: 461: 447: 277: 1819: 1788: 1586: 1571: 1329: 1301: 1121: 925: 825: 718: 469: 325: 139: 62: 39: 468:
Since 1996, an older variant of TPWS, called the Auxiliary Warning System, has been used by the
1566: 1556: 1505: 1424: 1419: 1149: 329:
before the point of conflict is reached. This system is referred to as TPWS OS (Outer Signal).
950: 1793: 1227: 1217: 1179: 1174: 387: 893:"Collision between passenger trains at Salisbury Tunnel Junction. Wiltshire 31 October 2021" 317:
starting signal. An OSS on its own may be used to protect a permanent speed restriction, or
1349: 789: 761: 570: 453: 47: 687:
Signal passed at danger and subsequent near miss at Didcot North junction (22 August 2007)
8: 1576: 1459: 427: 410:
Notably, the combination of TPWS and AWS is least effective in accidents like the one at
1189: 1113: 343:
capable of providing a brake force of 12%g. A number of train types, most notably, the
1611: 1515: 1291: 1039: 999: 959: 834: 727: 654: 629: 266:
The standard type consists of two circular indicator lamps and a square push button.
1677: 1606: 1581: 1561: 1379: 344: 314: 498:- A cab signaling and train control system that was not adopted for widespread use 158:
A TPWS transmitter loop, one of a pair that form an Overspeed Sensor System (OSS)
1404: 1250: 1237: 443: 1808: 1591: 1479: 1281: 61:
too fast; approached buffer stops too fast. TPWS is not designed to prevent
1525: 1369: 1276: 1207: 1159: 1068: 827:
The Southall and Ladbroke Grove Joint Inquiry into Train Protection Systems
720:
The Southall and Ladbroke Grove Joint Inquiry into Train Protection Systems
97: 1551: 1212: 318: 1601: 1474: 1439: 1197: 833:. Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. pp. 99–100 (PDF Page 114–115). 81: 952:
Automatic Train Protection for the Railway Network in Britain: A study
862:"Rulebook Master: Module S5. Section 4.2 "Passing a signal at danger"" 1510: 1082: 457: 101: 680:"Appendix E - History of the Train Protection Warning System (TPWS)" 1596: 1520: 986: 917: 817: 710: 1541: 1444: 386:, because although the train went to full emergency braking, the 324:
Recent applications in the UK have, in conjunction with advanced
174:. The second, 'trigger', loop has a frequency of 65.25 kHz. 1546: 1394: 1364: 649:
Vaughan, Adrian (2009). "9 - 'Safety is justified as safety'".
301: 567:"AWS & TPWS Handbook: Section 2.1.2 "The purpose of TPWS"" 1324: 492:- A British Rail developed warning system used alongside TPWS 254: 171: 300:
to the infrastructure and traction and rolling stock that a
154: 1314: 350: 537:"Step Change in Safety Delivered On Time and Under Budget" 404:
Automatic Train Protection for the rail network in Britain
170:
The first, 'arming', loop emits a frequency of 64.25 
27:
Train protection system in the UK and Victoria, Australia
653:(1st ed.). Ian Allan Publishing. pp. 102–107. 269:
The push switch marked "Train Stop Override" is used to
104:, following a determination in 1994 that British Rail's 626:
British Rail 1974–97: From Integration to Privatisation
628:. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 355–360. 393: 290: 949:
Davies, David (February 2000). "Executive Summary".
355:
TPWS has no ability to regulate speed after a train
867:. Rail Safety & Standards Board. Archived from 786:"AWS & TPWS Handbook, 2.3.3 TPWS Control Panel" 705: 703: 228:TPWS control panel (standard or enhanced version). 926:"The Joint Inquiry into Train Protection Systems" 898:. Rail Accidents Investigation Branch. p. 90 1806: 700: 543:. Network Rail. 29 December 2003. Archived from 1032:The Ladbroke Grove Rail Inquiry - Part 1 Report 812: 810: 1098: 944: 942: 674: 672: 670: 1410:Interoperable Communications Based Signaling 1069:Train Protection & Warning System (TPWS) 807: 1345:Automatic Train Protection (United Kingdom) 958:. Royal Academy of Engineering. p. 5. 910: 854: 117:Joint Inquiry Into Train Protection Systems 1105: 1091: 939: 752: 750: 667: 992:The Southall Rail Accident Inquiry Report 816: 709: 623: 351:Signals passed at danger with permission 253: 153: 1310:Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System 747: 648: 617: 559: 210:ND OSS Modules are colour coded yellow 14: 1807: 1112: 1025: 948: 271:pass a signal at danger with authority 221:Every traction unit is fitted with a: 207:OD TSS Modules are colour coded brown 204:ND TSS Modules are colour coded green 42:used throughout the British passenger 1470:Train Protection & Warning System 1086: 916: 885: 464:magnets and with full-length overlaps 295:An alternative to using derailers in 216: 213:OD OSS Modules are colour coded blue 192: 149: 32:Train Protection & Warning System 1203:Integrated Electronic Control Centre 642: 258:'Standard' TPWS panel in driving cab 1465:Train automatic stopping controller 1385:Continuous Automatic Warning System 1038:. Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. 998:. Her Majesty's Stationery Office. 985: 726:. Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. 433: 377: 249: 72:At around 400 high-risk locations, 24: 1145:Communications-based train control 394:Compared with other safety systems 297:Depot Personnel Protection Systems 291:TPWS use in depot personnel safety 25: 1831: 1062: 201:SIM Modules are colour coded red 758:"AWS & TPWS Handbook, 2.2.3" 601:. 6 October 2004. Archived from 234:TPWS temporary isolation switch. 231:AWS/TPWS acknowledgement button. 1627:Westinghouse Brake & Signal 1390:ContrĂ´le de vitesse par balises 1256:North American railroad signals 1019: 979: 595:"TPWS PLUS GETS OFF THE GROUND" 509: 450:magnets and with short overlaps 237:AWS/TPWS full isolation switch. 127: 55:Rail Safety and Standards Board 1485:Transmission balise-locomotive 1450:Sistema Controllo Marcia Treno 1360:Automatische treinbeĂŻnvloeding 1246:Application of railway signals 778: 587: 529: 332: 59:reduction in permissible speed 13: 1: 1435:PunktfĂśrmige Zugbeeinflussung 1155:European Train Control System 523: 308: 122:European Train Control System 1375:Chinese Train Control System 1165:Radio Electronic Token Block 651:The Greatest Railway Blunder 541:networkrailmediacentre.co.uk 438:The TPWS system is used in: 7: 1140:Centralized traffic control 689:. November 2008. p. 62 483: 382:TPWS failed to prevent the 132: 10: 1836: 1340:Automatic train protection 496:Automatic Train Protection 357:passes a signal at danger 106:Automatic Train Protection 91: 1691: 1640: 1632:Westinghouse Rail Systems 1534: 1498: 1490:Transmission Voie-Machine 1335:Automatic train operation 1300: 1287:Track circuit interrupter 1269: 1236: 1188: 1135:Automatic block signaling 1130:Absolute block signalling 1120: 599:Network Rail Media Centre 384:2021 Salisbury rail crash 88:' or 'Moorgate control’. 44:main-line railway network 1815:Train protection systems 1430:Pulse code cab signaling 1355:Automatic Warning System 1261:Railway semaphore signal 1223:Solid State Interlocking 624:Gourvish, Terry (2002). 502: 490:Automatic Warning System 337: 80:TPWS is not the same as 63:signals passed at danger 1330:Automatic train control 470:Mumbai Suburban Railway 40:train protection system 18:Overspeed Sensor System 1506:Level crossing signals 1425:Positive Train Control 1420:Linienzugbeeinflussung 1150:Direct traffic control 1078:Slideshow on TPWS v1.3 569:. RSSB. Archived from 259: 159: 96:TPWS was developed by 1228:Westlock Interlocking 1218:Rail operating centre 1180:Train order operation 1175:Track Warrant Control 257: 157: 1350:Automatic train stop 989:(24 February 2000). 547:on 28 September 2007 53:According to the UK 428:Southall rail crash 86:Moorgate protection 1190:Signalling control 1114:Railway signalling 795:on 5 December 2016 418:overspeed sensor. 260: 217:On-train equipment 193:Location equipment 160: 150:On-track equipment 100:and its successor 1802: 1801: 1612:Smith and Yardley 824:(29 March 2001). 717:(29 March 2001). 472:in India, on the 183:subsidiary signal 16:(Redirected from 1827: 1678:Transport Canada 1562:General Electric 1499:Crossing signals 1380:Cityflo 650 CBTC 1302:Train protection 1107: 1100: 1093: 1084: 1083: 1057: 1056: 1054: 1052: 1037: 1029:(19 June 2001). 1023: 1017: 1016: 1014: 1012: 997: 983: 977: 976: 974: 972: 957: 946: 937: 936: 933:Railways Archive 930: 914: 908: 907: 905: 903: 897: 889: 883: 882: 880: 879: 873: 866: 858: 852: 851: 849: 847: 832: 814: 805: 804: 802: 800: 794: 788:. Archived from 782: 776: 775: 773: 772: 766: 760:. Archived from 754: 745: 744: 742: 740: 725: 707: 698: 697: 695: 694: 684: 676: 665: 664: 660:978 07110 3274 3 646: 640: 639: 621: 615: 614: 612: 610: 591: 585: 584: 582: 581: 575: 563: 557: 556: 554: 552: 533: 517: 513: 434:Locations in use 388:slick conditions 378:Track conditions 315:station platform 250:In-cab equipment 21: 1835: 1834: 1830: 1829: 1828: 1826: 1825: 1824: 1805: 1804: 1803: 1798: 1687: 1636: 1530: 1494: 1296: 1270:Train detection 1265: 1232: 1184: 1116: 1111: 1065: 1060: 1050: 1048: 1046: 1035: 1027:Cullen, William 1024: 1020: 1010: 1008: 1006: 995: 984: 980: 970: 968: 966: 955: 947: 940: 928: 922:Cullen, William 915: 911: 901: 899: 895: 891: 890: 886: 877: 875: 871: 864: 860: 859: 855: 845: 843: 841: 830: 822:Cullen, William 815: 808: 798: 796: 792: 784: 783: 779: 770: 768: 764: 756: 755: 748: 738: 736: 734: 723: 715:Cullen, William 708: 701: 692: 690: 682: 678: 677: 668: 661: 647: 643: 636: 622: 618: 608: 606: 593: 592: 588: 579: 577: 573: 565: 564: 560: 550: 548: 535: 534: 530: 526: 521: 520: 514: 510: 505: 486: 436: 396: 380: 353: 340: 335: 311: 293: 252: 219: 195: 152: 140:emergency brake 135: 130: 94: 28: 23: 22: 15: 12: 11: 5: 1833: 1823: 1822: 1820:Railway safety 1817: 1800: 1799: 1797: 1796: 1794:United Kingdom 1791: 1786: 1781: 1776: 1771: 1766: 1761: 1756: 1751: 1746: 1741: 1736: 1731: 1726: 1721: 1716: 1711: 1706: 1701: 1695: 1693: 1689: 1688: 1686: 1685: 1680: 1675: 1670: 1665: 1660: 1655: 1650: 1644: 1642: 1638: 1637: 1635: 1634: 1629: 1624: 1619: 1614: 1609: 1604: 1599: 1594: 1589: 1584: 1579: 1574: 1569: 1564: 1559: 1554: 1549: 1544: 1538: 1536: 1532: 1531: 1529: 1528: 1523: 1518: 1513: 1508: 1502: 1500: 1496: 1495: 1493: 1492: 1487: 1482: 1477: 1472: 1467: 1462: 1457: 1452: 1447: 1442: 1437: 1432: 1427: 1422: 1417: 1412: 1407: 1405:Integra-Signum 1402: 1397: 1392: 1387: 1382: 1377: 1372: 1367: 1362: 1357: 1352: 1347: 1342: 1337: 1332: 1327: 1322: 1317: 1312: 1306: 1304: 1298: 1297: 1295: 1294: 1289: 1284: 1279: 1273: 1271: 1267: 1266: 1264: 1263: 1258: 1253: 1251:Cab signalling 1248: 1242: 1240: 1234: 1233: 1231: 1230: 1225: 1220: 1215: 1210: 1205: 1200: 1194: 1192: 1186: 1185: 1183: 1182: 1177: 1172: 1167: 1162: 1157: 1152: 1147: 1142: 1137: 1132: 1126: 1124: 1118: 1117: 1110: 1109: 1102: 1095: 1087: 1081: 1080: 1075: 1064: 1063:External links 1061: 1059: 1058: 1044: 1018: 1004: 978: 964: 938: 909: 884: 853: 839: 806: 777: 746: 732: 699: 666: 659: 641: 634: 616: 605:on 5 June 2016 586: 558: 527: 525: 522: 519: 518: 507: 506: 504: 501: 500: 499: 493: 485: 482: 466: 465: 451: 444:United Kingdom 435: 432: 424:Ladbroke Grove 402:A 2000 study, 395: 392: 379: 376: 359:with authority 352: 349: 339: 336: 334: 331: 310: 307: 292: 289: 251: 248: 239: 238: 235: 232: 229: 226: 225:TPWS receiver. 218: 215: 194: 191: 151: 148: 134: 131: 129: 126: 93: 90: 26: 9: 6: 4: 3: 2: 1832: 1821: 1818: 1816: 1813: 1812: 1810: 1795: 1792: 1790: 1787: 1785: 1782: 1780: 1777: 1775: 1772: 1770: 1767: 1765: 1764:North America 1762: 1760: 1757: 1755: 1752: 1750: 1747: 1745: 1742: 1740: 1737: 1735: 1732: 1730: 1727: 1725: 1722: 1720: 1717: 1715: 1712: 1710: 1707: 1705: 1702: 1700: 1697: 1696: 1694: 1690: 1684: 1681: 1679: 1676: 1674: 1671: 1669: 1666: 1664: 1661: 1659: 1656: 1654: 1651: 1649: 1646: 1645: 1643: 1641:Organisations 1639: 1633: 1630: 1628: 1625: 1623: 1620: 1618: 1615: 1613: 1610: 1608: 1605: 1603: 1600: 1598: 1595: 1593: 1592:Progress Rail 1590: 1588: 1585: 1583: 1580: 1578: 1575: 1573: 1570: 1568: 1565: 1563: 1560: 1558: 1555: 1553: 1550: 1548: 1545: 1543: 1540: 1539: 1537: 1535:Manufacturers 1533: 1527: 1524: 1522: 1519: 1517: 1514: 1512: 1509: 1507: 1504: 1503: 1501: 1497: 1491: 1488: 1486: 1483: 1481: 1480:Trainguard MT 1478: 1476: 1473: 1471: 1468: 1466: 1463: 1461: 1458: 1456: 1453: 1451: 1448: 1446: 1443: 1441: 1438: 1436: 1433: 1431: 1428: 1426: 1423: 1421: 1418: 1416: 1413: 1411: 1408: 1406: 1403: 1401: 1398: 1396: 1393: 1391: 1388: 1386: 1383: 1381: 1378: 1376: 1373: 1371: 1368: 1366: 1363: 1361: 1358: 1356: 1353: 1351: 1348: 1346: 1343: 1341: 1338: 1336: 1333: 1331: 1328: 1326: 1323: 1321: 1318: 1316: 1313: 1311: 1308: 1307: 1305: 1303: 1299: 1293: 1290: 1288: 1285: 1283: 1282:Track circuit 1280: 1278: 1275: 1274: 1272: 1268: 1262: 1259: 1257: 1254: 1252: 1249: 1247: 1244: 1243: 1241: 1239: 1235: 1229: 1226: 1224: 1221: 1219: 1216: 1214: 1211: 1209: 1206: 1204: 1201: 1199: 1196: 1195: 1193: 1191: 1187: 1181: 1178: 1176: 1173: 1171: 1168: 1166: 1163: 1161: 1158: 1156: 1153: 1151: 1148: 1146: 1143: 1141: 1138: 1136: 1133: 1131: 1128: 1127: 1125: 1123: 1122:Block systems 1119: 1115: 1108: 1103: 1101: 1096: 1094: 1089: 1088: 1085: 1079: 1076: 1074: 1070: 1067: 1066: 1047: 1045:0 7176 2056 5 1041: 1034: 1033: 1028: 1022: 1007: 1005:0 7176 1757 2 1001: 994: 993: 988: 982: 967: 965:1 871634 88 1 961: 954: 953: 945: 943: 934: 927: 923: 919: 913: 894: 888: 874:on 2018-08-10 870: 863: 857: 842: 840:0 7176 1998 2 836: 829: 828: 823: 819: 813: 811: 791: 787: 781: 767:on 2016-12-05 763: 759: 753: 751: 735: 733:0 7176 1998 2 729: 722: 721: 716: 712: 706: 704: 688: 681: 675: 673: 671: 662: 656: 652: 645: 637: 635:0-19-925005-7 631: 627: 620: 604: 600: 596: 590: 576:on 2016-12-05 572: 568: 562: 546: 542: 538: 532: 528: 512: 508: 497: 494: 491: 488: 487: 481: 479: 475: 471: 463: 459: 455: 452: 449: 445: 441: 440: 439: 431: 429: 425: 419: 415: 413: 408: 405: 400: 391: 389: 385: 375: 371: 368: 363: 361: 360: 348: 346: 330: 327: 322: 320: 316: 306: 303: 298: 288: 284: 281: 279: 274: 272: 267: 264: 256: 247: 245: 236: 233: 230: 227: 224: 223: 222: 214: 211: 208: 205: 202: 199: 190: 186: 184: 179: 175: 173: 168: 164: 156: 147: 143: 141: 125: 123: 118: 113: 110: 107: 103: 99: 89: 87: 83: 78: 75: 70: 66: 64: 60: 56: 51: 50:, Australia. 49: 45: 41: 37: 33: 19: 1622:Union Switch 1526:Wayside horn 1469: 1370:Catch points 1277:Axle counter 1208:Interlocking 1160:Moving block 1073:Railsigns.uk 1072: 1049:. Retrieved 1031: 1021: 1009:. Retrieved 991: 981: 969:. Retrieved 951: 932: 912: 900:. Retrieved 887: 876:. Retrieved 869:the original 856: 844:. Retrieved 826: 797:. Retrieved 790:the original 780: 769:. Retrieved 762:the original 737:. Retrieved 719: 691:. Retrieved 686: 650: 644: 625: 619: 607:. Retrieved 603:the original 598: 589: 578:. Retrieved 571:the original 561: 549:. Retrieved 545:the original 540: 531: 511: 478:Central Line 474:Western Line 467: 437: 420: 416: 409: 403: 401: 397: 381: 372: 367:many reasons 364: 358: 354: 341: 323: 312: 294: 285: 282: 275: 268: 265: 261: 240: 220: 212: 209: 206: 203: 200: 196: 187: 180: 176: 169: 165: 161: 144: 136: 128:How it works 116: 114: 111: 98:British Rail 95: 79: 73: 71: 67: 52: 35: 31: 29: 1784:Switzerland 1759:New Zealand 1754:Netherlands 1460:Slide fence 1213:Lever frame 1011:31 December 333:Limitations 319:buffer stop 82:train stops 1809:Categories 1692:By country 1475:Train stop 1440:RS4 Codici 1198:Block post 902:24 October 878:2017-02-07 771:2017-02-06 693:2013-03-18 580:2017-02-06 524:References 460:, without 407:solution. 365:There are 309:Variations 1699:Australia 1552:AĹ˝D Praha 1511:Crossbuck 1415:Crocodile 1051:1 January 987:Uff, John 971:1 January 918:Uff, John 846:1 January 818:Uff, John 799:4 October 739:1 January 711:Uff, John 551:1 January 458:Australia 102:Railtrack 46:, and in 1789:Thailand 1597:Safetran 1587:Magnetic 1572:Griswold 1521:E-signal 484:See also 454:Victoria 302:derailer 133:Overview 48:Victoria 1734:Germany 1724:Finland 1709:Belgium 1704:Bavaria 1607:Siemens 1582:Hitachi 1557:Federal 1542:Adtranz 1445:SelTrac 1292:Treadle 1238:Signals 609:31 July 446:, with 244:overlap 181:When a 92:History 77:speed. 38:) is a 1779:Sweden 1774:Poland 1769:Norway 1739:Greece 1729:France 1714:Canada 1617:Thales 1547:Alstom 1516:Wigwag 1395:EBICAB 1365:Balise 1042:  1002:  962:  837:  730:  657:  632:  412:Purley 1749:Japan 1744:Italy 1719:China 1653:AREMA 1602:Saxby 1455:SACEM 1400:IIATS 1325:ATACS 1170:Token 1036:(PDF) 996:(PDF) 956:(PDF) 929:(PDF) 896:(PDF) 872:(PDF) 865:(PDF) 831:(PDF) 793:(PDF) 765:(PDF) 724:(PDF) 683:(PDF) 574:(PDF) 516:12%g. 503:Notes 338:Speed 74:TPWS+ 1673:IRSE 1668:HMRI 1577:Hall 1320:ASFA 1315:ALSN 1053:2024 1040:ISBN 1013:2023 1000:ISBN 973:2024 960:ISBN 904:2023 848:2024 835:ISBN 801:2017 741:2024 728:ISBN 655:ISBN 630:ISBN 611:2019 553:2024 476:and 442:The 426:and 345:HSTs 326:SPAD 276:The 36:TPWS 30:The 1683:UIC 1663:FRA 1658:ERA 1648:AAR 1567:GRS 1071:at 462:AWS 448:AWS 278:AWS 172:kHz 1811:: 941:^ 931:. 924:. 920:; 820:; 809:^ 749:^ 713:; 702:^ 685:. 669:^ 597:. 539:. 480:. 456:, 124:. 1106:e 1099:t 1092:v 1055:. 1015:. 975:. 906:. 881:. 850:. 803:. 774:. 743:. 696:. 663:. 638:. 613:. 583:. 555:. 34:( 20:)

Index

Overspeed Sensor System
train protection system
main-line railway network
Victoria
Rail Safety and Standards Board
reduction in permissible speed
signals passed at danger
train stops
Moorgate protection
British Rail
Railtrack
Automatic Train Protection
European Train Control System
emergency brake

kHz
subsidiary signal
overlap

pass a signal at danger with authority
AWS
Depot Personnel Protection Systems
derailer
station platform
buffer stop
SPAD
HSTs
passes a signal at danger with authority
many reasons
2021 Salisbury rail crash

Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License. Additional terms may apply.

↑