3663:
the process of increasing societal productivity. It is possible for a society to have Pareto efficiency while also have high levels of inequality. Consider the following scenario: there is a pie and three persons; the most equitable way would be to divide the pie into three equal portions. However, if the pie is divided in half and shared between two people, it is considered Pareto efficient – meaning that the third person does not lose out (despite the fact that he does not receive a piece of the pie). When making judgments, it is critical to consider a variety of aspects, including social efficiency, overall welfare, and issues such as diminishing marginal value.
3672:
market failure, it is a circumstance in which the conclusion of the first fundamental theorem of welfare is erroneous; that is, when the allocations made through markets are not efficient. In a free market, market failure is defined as an inefficient allocation of resources. Due to the fact that it is feasible to improve, market failure implies Pareto inefficiency. For example, excessive consumption of depreciating items (drugs/tobacco) results in external costs to non-smokers, as well as premature death for smokers who do not quit. An increase in the price of cigarettes could motivate people to quit smoking while also raising funds for the treatment of smoking-related ailments.
53:
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4523:"The main difficulty is that, in contrast to the single-objective case where there is a total order relation between solutions, Pareto dominance is a partial order, which leads to solutions (and solution sets) being incomparable" Li, M., López-Ibáñez, M., & Yao, X. (Accepted/In press). Multi-Objective Archiving. IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation.
4022:
Therefore, the significance of the two welfare theorems of economics is in their ability to generate a framework that has dominated neoclassical thinking about public policy. That framework is that the welfare economics theorems allow the political economy to be studied in the following two situations: "market failure" and "the problem of redistribution".
4081:
equitable, because none of the recipients could be made better off without decreasing someone else's share; and there are many other such distribution examples. An example of a Pareto-inefficient distribution of the pie would be allocation of a quarter of the pie to each of the three, with the remainder discarded.
996:. Each option is first assessed, under multiple criteria, and then a subset of options is identified with the property that no other option can categorically outperform the specified option. It is a statement of impossibility of improving one variable without harming other variables in the subject of
4029:
Analysis of "the problem with redistribution" deals with the observed political question of how income or commodity taxes should be utilized. The theorem tells us that no taxation is Pareto-efficient and that taxation with redistribution is Pareto-inefficient. Because of this, most of the literature
3334:
An example is of a setting where individuals have private information (for example, a labor market where the worker's own productivity is known to the worker but not to a potential employer, or a used-car market where the quality of a car is known to the seller but not to the buyer) which results in
3330:
is a weakening of Pareto optimality, accounting for the fact that a potential planner (e.g., the government) may not be able to improve upon a decentralized market outcome, even if that outcome is inefficient. This will occur if it is limited by the same informational or institutional constraints as
1051:
Formally, a state is Pareto-optimal if there is no alternative state where at least one participant's well-being is higher, and nobody else's well-being is lower. If there is a state change that satisfies this condition, the new state is called a "Pareto improvement". When no Pareto improvements are
4080:
can be Pareto-efficient. A simple example is the distribution of a pie among three people. The most equitable distribution would assign one third to each person. However, the assignment of, say, a half section to each of two individuals and none to the third is also Pareto-optimal despite not being
3662:
Although an outcome may be a Pareto improvement, this does not imply that the outcome is equitable. It is possible that inequality persists even after a Pareto improvement. Despite the fact that it is frequently used in conjunction with the idea of Pareto optimality, the term "efficiency" refers to
1848:
A society may be Pareto efficient but have significant levels of inequality. The most equitable course of action would be to split the pie into three equal portions if there were three persons and a pie. The third person does not lose out (even if he does not partake in the pie), hence splitting it
4021:
However, because the Pareto-efficient outcome is difficult to assess in the real world when issues including asymmetric information, signalling, adverse selection, and moral hazard are introduced, most people do not take the theorems of welfare economics as accurate descriptions of the real world.
4072:
Some commentators contest that Pareto efficiency could potentially serve as an ideological tool. With it implying that capitalism is self-regulated thereof, it is likely that the embedded structural problems such as unemployment would be treated as deviating from the equilibrium or norm, and thus
3671:
In order to fully understand market failure, one must first comprehend market success, which is defined as the ability of a set of idealized competitive markets to achieve an equilibrium allocation of resources that is Pareto-optimal in terms of resource allocation. According to the definition of
3302:
Any strong Pareto improvement is also a weak Pareto improvement. The opposite is not true; for example, consider a resource allocation problem with two resources, which Alice values at {10, 0}, and George values at {5, 5}. Consider the allocation giving all resources to Alice, where the
1055:
In other words, Pareto efficiency is when it is impossible to make one party better off without making another party worse off. This state indicates that resources can no longer be allocated in a way that makes one party better off without harming other parties. In a state of Pareto
Efficiency,
4025:
Analysis of "market failure" can be understood by the literature surrounding externalities. When comparing the "real" economy to the complete contingent markets economy (which is considered efficient), the inefficiencies become clear. These inefficiencies, or externalities, are then able to be
4005:
Modern microeconomic theory has drawn heavily upon the concept of Pareto efficiency for inspiration. Pareto and his successors have tended to describe this technical definition of optimal resource allocation in the context of it being an equilibrium that can theoretically be achieved within an
4063:
concept, which is a matter of interpretation that typically would account for the consequence of degrees of inequality of distribution. An example would be the interpretation of one school district with low property tax revenue versus another with much higher revenue as a sign that more equal
3343:
and a sub-optimal outcome. In such a case, a planner who wishes to improve the situation is unlikely to have access to any information that the participants in the markets do not have. Hence, the planner cannot implement allocation rules which are based on the idiosyncratic characteristics of
1844:
A Pareto improvement may be seen, but this does not always imply that the result is desirable or equitable. After a Pareto improvement, inequality could still exist. However, it does imply that any change will violate the "do no harm" principle, because at least one person will be worse off.
1760:. Here, in this simple economy, "feasibility" refers to an allocation where the total amount of each good that is allocated sums to no more than the total amount of the good in the economy. In a more complex economy with production, an allocation would consist both of consumption
3513:
The opposite is not true: ex-ante PE is stronger that ex-post PE. For example, suppose there are two objects – a car and a house. Alice values the car at 2 and the house at 3; George values the car at 2 and the house at 9. Consider the following two lotteries:
1852:
On a frontier of production possibilities, Pareto efficiency will happen. It is impossible to raise the output of products without decreasing the output of services when an economy is functioning on a basic production potential frontier, such as at point A, B, or C.
3414:
As an example, consider an item allocation problem with two items, which Alice values at {3, 2} and George values at {4, 1}. Consider the allocation giving the first item to Alice and the second to George, where the utility profile is (3, 1):
3422:
However, it is not fractionally Pareto-efficient, since it is Pareto-dominated by the allocation giving to Alice 1/2 of the first item and the whole second item, and the other 1/2 of the first item to George – its utility profile is
4891:
Moore, J. H., Hill, D. P., Sulovari, A., & Kidd, L. C., "Genetic
Analysis of Prostate Cancer Using Computational Evolution, Pareto-Optimization and Post-processing", in R. Riolo, E. Vladislavleva, M. D. Ritchie, & J. H. Moore (eds.),
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acts to push highly expressed genes towards the Pareto frontier for resource use and translational efficiency. Genes near the Pareto frontier were also shown to evolve more slowly (indicating that they are providing a selective advantage).
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formalizes the idea of an outcome being "better in every possible way". A change is called a Pareto improvement if it leaves everyone in a society better-off (or at least as well-off as they were before). A situation is called
3294:
is defined as a situation in which all agents are strictly better-off (in contrast to just "Pareto improvement", which requires that one agent is strictly better-off and the other agents are at least as good). A situation is
3310:
But it is not a strong PO, since the allocation in which George gets the second resource is strictly better for George and weakly better for Alice (it is a weak Pareto improvement) – its utility profile is
985:: a set of outputs of goods is Pareto-efficient if there is no feasible re-allocation of productive inputs such that output of one product increases while the outputs of all other goods either increase or remain the same.
3410:
if it is not Pareto-dominated even by an allocation in which some items are split between agents. This is in contrast to standard Pareto efficiency, which only considers domination by feasible (discrete) allocations.
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3385:, then they get a subsidy of ten dollars, and nothing otherwise". If there exists no allowed rule that can successfully improve upon the market outcome, then that outcome is said to be "constrained Pareto-optimal".
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is focused on finding solutions where given there is a tax structure, how can the tax structure prescribe a situation where no person could be made better off by a change in available taxes.
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if all possible Pareto improvements have already been made; in other words, there are no longer any ways left to make one person better-off, without making some other person worse-off.
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1039:: Pareto's concept more closely aligns with an idea of "efficiency", because it does not identify a single "best" (optimal) outcome. Instead, it only identifies a set of outcomes that
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professor Ben
Lockwood argues, one possible reason is that any other efficiency criteria established in the neoclassical domain will reduce to Pareto efficiency at the end.
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Pareto efficiency does not require a totally equitable distribution of wealth, which is another aspect that draws in criticism. An economy in which a wealthy few hold the
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Ledyard, J. O. (1989). Market
Failure. In: Eatwell, J., Milgate, M., Newman, P. (eds.) Allocation, Information and Markets. The New Palgrave. Palgrave Macmillan, London.
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is an adaptation of Pareto efficiency to settings in which players report only rankings on individual items, and we do not know for sure how they rank entire bundles.
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and production vectors, and feasibility would require that the total amount of each consumed good is no greater than the initial endowment plus the amount produced.
5002:
Paulsen, M. B., "The
Economics of the Public Sector: The Nature and Role of Public Policy in the Finance of Higher Education", in M. B. Paulsen, J. C. Smart (eds.)
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shows that when people have preferences about what other people do, the goal of Pareto efficiency can come into conflict with the goal of individual liberty.
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For instance, excessive use of negative commodities (such as drugs and cigarettes) results in expenses to non-smokers as well as early mortality for smokers.
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A special case of a state is an allocation of resources. The formal presentation of the concept in an economy is the following: Consider an economy with
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is essentially the reverse of the first welfare theorem. It states that under similar, ideal assumptions, any Pareto optimum can be obtained by some
3993:) is the set of choices that are Pareto-efficient. By restricting attention to the set of choices that are Pareto-efficient, a designer can make
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4538:
Emmerich, M.T.M., Deutz, A.H. A tutorial on multiobjective optimization: fundamentals and evolutionary methods. Nat Comput 17, 585–609 (2018).
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With probability 1, give car to Alice, then with probability 1/3 give the house to Alice, otherwise give it to George. The expected utility is
3526:
for George. Both allocations are ex-post PE, since the one who got the car cannot be made better-off without harming the one who got the house.
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With probability 1/2, give car to Alice and house to George; otherwise, give car to George and house to Alice. The expected utility is
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utilities. That is: no other lottery gives a higher expected utility to one agent and at least as high expected utility to all agents.
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4127:
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is an adaptation of Pareto efficiency to settings in which players have incomplete information regarding the types of other players.
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is Pareto-efficient: since all weights are positive, any Pareto improvement would increase the sum, contradicting the definition of
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with probability 1/3 each is not ex-ante PE, since it gives an expected utility of 1/3 to each voter, while the lottery selecting
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Nicola. (2013). Efficiency and Equity in
Welfare Economics (1st ed. 2013). Springer Berlin Heidelberg : Imprint: Springer.
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Lastly, it is proposed that Pareto efficiency to some extent inhibited discussion of other possible criteria of efficiency. As
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While both lotteries are ex-post PE, the lottery 1 is not ex-ante PE, since it is Pareto-dominated by lottery 2.
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1783:. However, the result only holds under the assumptions of the theorem: markets exist for all possible goods, there are no
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2051:. In this case, various solutions can be "incomparable" as there is no total order relation to facilitate the comparison
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It is a weak PO, since no other allocation is strictly better to both agents (there are no strong Pareto improvements).
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The notion of Pareto efficiency has been used in engineering. Given a set of choices and a way of valuing them, the
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Efficiency is an important criterion for judging behavior in a game. In a notable and often analyzed game known as
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In the absence of perfect information or complete markets, outcomes will generally be Pareto-inefficient, per the
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if no other outcome gives all agents at least the same utility, and one agent a utility at least (1 +
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It is Pareto-efficient, since any other discrete allocation (without splitting items) makes someone worse-off.
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4388:; Whinston, Michael D.; Green, Jerry R. (1995), "Chapter 16: Equilibrium and its Basic Welfare Properties",
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It would be incorrect to treat Pareto efficiency as equivalent to societal optimization, as the latter is a
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4928:"Selection-driven cost-efficiency optimization of transcripts modulates gene evolutionary rate in bacteria"
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https://global.oup.com/academic/product/manual-of-political-economy-9780199607952?cc=ca&lang=en&
4752:
Negishi, Takashi (1960). "Welfare
Economics and Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy".
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may help individuals stop smoking while also raising money to address ailments brought on by smoking.
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Besides economics, the notion of Pareto efficiency has also been applied to selecting alternatives in
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abstract model of market competition. It has therefore very often been treated as a corroboration of
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leads to a Pareto-efficient outcome. This result was first demonstrated mathematically by economists
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Sandomirskiy, Fedor; Segal-Halevi, Erel (2022). "Efficient Fair
Division with Minimal Sharing".
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Bendor, Jonathan; Mookherjee, Dilip (April 2008). "Communitarian versus
Universalistic norms".
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Ex-post Pareto efficiency means that any outcome of the random process is Pareto-efficient.
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1829:. Given that there is room for improvement, market failure implies Pareto inefficiency.
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Pareto efficiency is mathematically represented when there is no other strategy profile
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3600:. All five outcomes are PE, so every lottery is ex-post PE. But the lottery selecting
2463:{\displaystyle \exists j\in {1,\dots m}:{\vec {y}}_{j}^{(1)}<{\vec {y}}_{j}^{(2)}.}
2354:{\displaystyle \forall i\in {1,\dots m}:{\vec {y}}_{i}^{(1)}\leq {\vec {y}}_{i}^{(2)}}
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8035:
7992:
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Pareto originally used the word "optimal" for the concept, but this is somewhat of a
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were shown to be either inexpensive to make (resource-efficient) or easier to read (
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3370:). Essentially, only anonymous rules are allowed (of the sort "Everyone pays price
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is not Pareto-efficient. Furthermore, neither of the remaining strategy profiles,
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3695:) higher. This captures the notion that improvements smaller than (1 +
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Why economic theory has little to say about the causes and effects of inequality
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Pareto optimisation has also been studied in biological processes. In bacteria,
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4423:
Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
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in half and giving it to two individuals would be considered Pareto efficient.
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6041:
4704:
4485:"Externalities in economies with imperfect information and incomplete markets"
538:
8235:
7774:
7343:
7333:
7288:
7273:
7253:
7024:
6999:
6871:
6841:
6831:
6818:
6718:
6660:
6595:
6528:
6271:
6261:
6236:
6176:
6171:
6166:
6146:
6136:
6106:
6096:
6001:
5901:
5874:
5638:
5255:
4712:
4279:
3057:
2669:
2665:
1833:
1776:
768:
758:
733:
673:
668:
663:
643:
633:
603:
593:
498:
401:
4539:
3997:
within this set, rather than considering the full range of every parameter.
1118:, this concept of efficiency can be observed, in that the strategy profile (
52:
7789:
7730:
7318:
7313:
7168:
6738:
6301:
6246:
6141:
6131:
6126:
6051:
5896:
5421:
5349:
5174:
4662:
4627:
EC '18: Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
4462:
4283:
4167:
3981:
3336:
1761:
884:
798:
743:
638:
628:
623:
548:
96:
5226:
Mathur, Vijay K. (Spring 1991). "How well do we know Pareto optimality?".
4435:
3620:
with probability 1/2 each gives an expected utility of 1/2 to each voter.
2762:{\displaystyle {\vec {f}}({\vec {x}}_{1})\prec {\vec {f}}({\vec {x}}_{2})}
8172:
7935:
7874:
7794:
7690:
7435:
7238:
7233:
7213:
7009:
6994:
6803:
6773:
6703:
6693:
6523:
6458:
6434:
6276:
6266:
6056:
5935:
5879:
5354:
5151:
5143:
5093:
4224:
4089:
4026:
addressed by mechanisms, including property rights and corrective taxes.
2920:
2022:
1810:
1784:
989:
773:
763:
553:
188:
6402:
5075:
Pareto, V (1906). Manual of Political Economy. Oxford University Press.
4801:
7945:
7881:
7565:
7064:
6713:
6186:
5986:
5763:
5285:
5247:
5021:
Farm to Fingers: The Culture and Politics of Food in Contemporary India
5004:
The Finance of Higher Education: Theory, Research, Policy, and Practice
4978:
4824:
4524:
4510:
4007:
3968:
3944:
proved that, under certain assumptions, the opposite is also true: for
959:) prefers A to B, society as a whole also non-strictly prefers A to B.
683:
483:
3699:) are negligible and should not be considered a breach of efficiency.
1825:
An ineffective distribution of resources in a free market is known as
8182:
8177:
6969:
6889:
6708:
6036:
5966:
5323:
5103:
4953:
4849:
4444:
4060:
3994:
2131:{\displaystyle {\vec {f}}({\vec {x}}^{*})\geq {\vec {f}}({\vec {x}})}
1021:
533:
464:
44:
7609:
5277:
5239:
4501:
4484:
8002:
7404:
6904:
5815:
4853:
4653:
4622:
2770:
1814:
1036:
7481:
3845:
be an allocation that maximizes the welfare over all allocations:
3463:
determined by the process is Pareto-efficient with respect to the
1787:, markets are perfectly competitive, and market participants have
7864:
7125:
7115:
6793:
4779:
Varian, Hal R. (1976). "Two problems in the theory of fairness".
4684:
Bogomolnaia, Anna; Moulin, Hervé; Stong, Richard (June 1, 2005).
3374:") or rules based on observable behavior; "if any person chooses
993:
973:, the concept of Pareto efficiency also arises in the context of
4817:
Introduction to Optimization Analysis in Hydrosystem Engineering
4064:
distribution occurs with the help of government redistribution.
8152:
4820:
2644:
in any goal but is better (since smaller) in at least one goal
867:
6894:
3702:
2910:{\displaystyle {\vec {x}}_{1}\prec _{\vec {f}}{\vec {x}}_{2}}
5292:
1056:
resources are allocated in the most efficient way possible.
4039:
4014:" notion. More specifically, it motivated the debate over "
3402:
is a strengthening of Pareto efficiency in the context of
1914:) exist, combined into a vector-valued objective function
3666:
4638:
5183:. Basingstoke, Hampshire New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
4384:
3828:{\displaystyle W_{a}(x):=\sum _{i=1}^{n}a_{i}u_{i}(x).}
3212:
in the Pareto order (which seeks to minimize the goals
2999:
in the Pareto order (which seeks to minimize the goals
1820:
4683:
2533:{\displaystyle {\vec {y}}^{(1)}\prec {\vec {y}}^{(2)}}
5209:, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, pp. 6–7,
3854:
3749:
3245:
3218:
3180:
3142:
3104:
3066:
3032:
3005:
2967:
2929:
2851:
2815:
2779:
2681:
2650:
2608:
2566:
2546:
2476:
2367:
2261:
2204:
2147:
2057:
2031:
2021:
becomes challenging. This is due to the absence of a
1991:
1920:
1894:
1867:
1746:
1671:
1627:
1552:
1532:
1505:
1447:
1397:
1345:
1325:
1305:
4815:
Goodarzi, E., Ziaei, M., & Hosseinipour, E. Z.,
4591:, Australia, 21 February 2013, RePEc:qld:uq2004:476.
4306:
4304:
4302:
4300:
3283:
is a situation that cannot be strictly improved for
2248:{\displaystyle {\vec {y}}^{(2)}\in \mathbb {R} ^{n}}
2191:{\displaystyle {\vec {y}}^{(1)}\in \mathbb {R} ^{n}}
4844:Jahan, A., Edwards, K. L., & Bahraminasab, M.,
4621:Barman, S., Krishnamurthy, S. K., & Vaish, R.,
4290:, 5th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017),
3537:
for George. Again, both allocations are ex-post PE.
5180:Welfare economics towards a more complete analysis
4389:
3908:
3827:
3736:as the weighted sum of utilities of all agents in
3344:individuals; for example, "if a person is of type
3258:
3231:
3204:
3166:
3128:
3090:
3045:
3018:
2991:
2953:
2909:
2837:
2801:
2761:
2656:
2636:
2594:
2552:
2532:
2462:
2353:
2247:
2190:
2130:
2043:
2013:
1978:{\displaystyle {\vec {f}}=(f_{1},\dots f_{n})^{T}}
1977:
1906:
1880:
1752:
1732:
1657:
1613:
1538:
1518:
1491:
1425:
1383:
1331:
1311:
5197:
4686:"Collective choice under dichotomous preferences"
4551:Mock, William B. T. (2011). "Pareto Optimality".
4475:
4297:
3657:
8233:
5201:; Osborne, Martin J. (1994), "Introduction", in
5127:
3909:{\displaystyle x_{a}\in \arg \max _{x}W_{a}(x).}
3875:
3675:
3432:When the decision process is random, such as in
3322:
5254:
5088:
5040:(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006),
5023:(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018),
4534:
4532:
3388:
2141:Consider a vector-valued minimization problem:
1839:
1043:be considered optimal, by at least one person.
4950:Essays on Economic Decisions Under Uncertainty
1614:{\displaystyle u_{i}(x_{i}')\geq u_{i}(x_{i})}
7625:
7497:
6418:
5308:
4380:
4378:
3623:
3491:. Then, by moving some probability mass from
1733:{\displaystyle u_{i}(x_{i}')>u_{i}(x_{i})}
966:consists of all Pareto-efficient situations.
904:
8082:Independence of Smith-dominated alternatives
5038:Economic Foundations of Law and Organization
4529:
4315:(2nd ed.). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
4160:, when a market result is not Pareto-optimal
3640:
3572:and 6 voters. The voters' approval sets are
3427:
1652:
1634:
1486:
1448:
1378:
1346:
969:In addition to the context of efficiency in
4870:
4868:
4866:
3479:: suppose that one of the ex-post outcomes
3475:is ex-ante PE, then it is also ex-post PE.
1052:possible, the state is a "Pareto optimum".
947:, the same concept is sometimes called the
7632:
7618:
7504:
7490:
6425:
6411:
5315:
5301:
5163:Journal of Social and Economic Development
4419:"Valuation Equilibrium and Pareto Optimum"
4375:
3703:Pareto-efficiency and welfare-maximization
3487:is Pareto-dominated by some other outcome
3408:fractionally Pareto-efficient (fPE or fPO)
911:
897:
6432:
5262:(January 1984). "Pareto inferior trade".
4894:Genetic Programming Theory and Practice X
4800:
4652:
4583:Markey‐Towler, Brendan and John Foster. "
4540:https://doi.org/10.1007/s11047-018-9685-y
4500:
4452:
4434:
4371:(3rd ed.). W. W. Norton and Company.
4128:Fundamental theorems of welfare economics
3459:Ex-ante Pareto efficiency means that the
3299:if it has no strong Pareto improvements.
3275:
2235:
2178:
1441:if there is no other feasible allocation
1426:{\displaystyle x_{i}\in \mathbb {R} ^{k}}
1413:
1024:, who used the concept in his studies of
4975:The Elgar Companion to Law and Economics
4880:The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics
4863:
4623:"Finding Fair and Efficient Allocations"
4369:Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory
4313:The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics
4310:
4054:
3406:. An allocation of indivisible items is
3056:
2919:
1492:{\displaystyle \{x_{1}',\dots ,x_{n}'\}}
8077:Independence of irrelevant alternatives
7855:Sequential proportional approval voting
4751:
4000:
3919:It is easy to show that the allocation
2138:. Only the Pareto order is applicable:
1813:system, although it may also require a
1103:represents the utility or benefit, and
14:
8234:
5225:
5150:
5131:Quarterly Journal of Political Science
4911:Introduction to Evolutionary Computing
4778:
4416:
4366:
4248:
1985:, generally, finding a unique optimum
1384:{\displaystyle \{x_{1},\dots ,x_{n}\}}
27:Weakly optimal allocation of resources
7639:
7613:
7485:
6406:
5296:
4913:(Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer, 2003),
4896:(Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer, 2013),
3974:
2560:is the Pareto order. This means that
1296:, every outcome is Pareto-efficient.
4550:
4525:https://arxiv.org/pdf/2303.09685.pdf
4362:
4360:
4334:
4332:
3667:Pareto efficiency and market failure
1821:Pareto efficiency and market failure
7887:Indirect single transferable voting
7511:
5392:Agent-based computational economics
4677:
4194:Social Choice and Individual Values
4188:Pareto-efficient envy-free division
3709:Pareto-efficient envy-free division
1658:{\displaystyle i\in \{1,\dots ,n\}}
24:
6474:First-player and second-player win
5173:
5082:
4909:Eiben, A. E., & Smith, J. E.,
4766:10.1111/j.1467-999X.1960.tb00275.x
4615:
2368:
2262:
25:
8288:
5228:The Journal of Economic Education
5006:(New York: Agathon Press, 2001),
4357:
4329:
4197:for the "(weak) Pareto principle"
4033:
3967:. A shorter proof is provided by
3952:, there exists a positive vector
3319:to get to a weak Pareto optimum.
3303:utility profile is (10, 0):
2809:Pareto dominates the alternative
2672:(neither non-strict nor strict).
1137:
1099:represents the strategy profile,
6581:Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium
5850:neoclassical–Keynesian synthesis
4926:Seward, E. A., & Kelly, S.,
4878:. In: Palgrave Macmillan (eds.)
4846:Multi-criteria Decision Analysis
3548:. There are 5 possible outcomes
3444:, there is a difference between
2637:{\displaystyle {\vec {y}}^{(2)}}
2595:{\displaystyle {\vec {y}}^{(1)}}
1221:Using the definition above, let
878:
866:
51:
7529:The Rise and Fall of the Elites
5047:
5030:
5013:
4996:
4967:
4939:
4920:
4903:
4885:
4838:
4809:
4772:
4745:
4728:
4719:
4632:
4594:
4577:
4544:
4517:
2773:in the search space and we say
2664:. The Pareto order is a strict
1856:
1277:, is a Pareto improvement over
153:Concepts, theory and techniques
7998:Mixed ballot transferable vote
6591:Evolutionarily stable strategy
5265:The Review of Economic Studies
4553:Encyclopedia of Global Justice
4489:Quarterly Journal of Economics
4469:
4410:
4273:
4242:
4217:
3900:
3894:
3819:
3813:
3766:
3760:
3717:is assigned a positive weight
3506:that ex-ante Pareto-dominates
3499:, one attains another lottery
3323:Constrained Pareto efficiency
3199:
3193:
3187:
3161:
3155:
3149:
3123:
3117:
3111:
3085:
3079:
3073:
2986:
2980:
2974:
2948:
2942:
2936:
2895:
2881:
2859:
2838:{\displaystyle {\vec {x}}_{2}}
2823:
2802:{\displaystyle {\vec {x}}_{1}}
2787:
2756:
2744:
2734:
2728:
2716:
2704:
2694:
2688:
2629:
2623:
2616:
2587:
2581:
2574:
2525:
2519:
2512:
2497:
2491:
2484:
2452:
2446:
2434:
2419:
2413:
2401:
2346:
2340:
2328:
2313:
2307:
2295:
2225:
2219:
2212:
2168:
2162:
2155:
2125:
2119:
2110:
2104:
2092:
2080:
2070:
2064:
2014:{\displaystyle {\vec {x}}^{*}}
1999:
1966:
1936:
1927:
1727:
1714:
1698:
1682:
1608:
1595:
1579:
1563:
13:
1:
6519:Simultaneous action selection
5786:Critique of political economy
5322:
5205:; Osborne, Martin J. (eds.),
4882:. Palgrave Macmillan, London.
4561:10.1007/978-1-4020-9160-5_341
4211:
4118:Arrow's impossibility theorem
3684:> 0, an outcome is called
3676:Approximate Pareto efficiency
3328:Constrained Pareto efficiency
3205:{\displaystyle {\vec {f}}(x)}
3167:{\displaystyle {\vec {f}}(y)}
3129:{\displaystyle {\vec {f}}(y)}
3091:{\displaystyle {\vec {f}}(x)}
2992:{\displaystyle {\vec {f}}(y)}
2954:{\displaystyle {\vec {f}}(x)}
1767:Under the assumptions of the
1261:is a Pareto improvement over
8199:Comparison of voting systems
8041:Satisfaction approval voting
8026:Single non-transferable vote
7845:Proportional approval voting
7456:List of games in game theory
6631:Quantal response equilibrium
6621:Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
6556:Bayes correlated equilibrium
5102:. Cambridge, Massachusetts:
4793:10.1016/0047-2727(76)90018-9
4740:10.1007/978-1-349-20215-7_19
4606:Theory of Incomplete Markets
4178:Multi-objective optimization
4067:
3948:Pareto-efficient allocation
3658:Pareto efficiency and equity
3400:Fractional Pareto efficiency
3395:Fractional Pareto efficiency
3389:Fractional Pareto efficiency
1840:Pareto efficiency and equity
1499:where, for utility function
998:multi-objective optimization
7:
7805:Graduated majority judgment
6925:Optional prisoner's dilemma
6651:Self-confirming equilibrium
4781:Journal of Public Economics
4396:, Oxford University Press,
4344:Corporate Finance Institute
4102:
3270:
1046:
1012:The concept is named after
10:
8293:
8057:Condorcet winner criterion
7748:First-past-the-post voting
7390:Principal variation search
7106:Aumann's agreement theorem
6769:Strategy-stealing argument
6676:Trembling hand equilibrium
6606:Markov perfect equilibrium
6601:Mertens-stable equilibrium
5924:Real business-cycle theory
4958:Cambridge University Press
4693:Journal of Economic Theory
4078:vast majority of resources
3706:
3644:
3627:
3624:Bayesian Pareto efficiency
3442:fractional approval voting
3392:
3315:A market does not require
1796:Greenwald–Stiglitz theorem
1339:goods. Then an allocation
1126:) is more efficient than (
1007:
8272:Electoral system criteria
8267:Mathematical optimization
8212:
8204:Voting systems by country
8191:
8145:
8107:Mutual majority criterion
8062:Condorcet loser criterion
8049:
8016:
8008:Vote linkage mixed system
7963:
7928:
7920:Largest remainders method
7895:
7822:
7813:
7664:
7647:
7598:Italian school of elitism
7589:
7550:
7519:
7426:Combinatorial game theory
7413:
7372:
7154:
7098:
7085:Princess and monster game
6880:
6782:
6684:
6636:Quasi-perfect equilibrium
6561:Bayesian Nash equilibrium
6542:
6441:
6364:
6322:
5964:
5698:
5447:
5412:
5330:
4705:10.1016/j.jet.2004.05.005
4288:A Dictionary of Economics
4073:neglected or discounted.
3652:Ordinal Pareto efficiency
3647:Ordinal Pareto efficiency
3641:Ordinal Pareto efficiency
3544:Another example involves
3450:ex-ante Pareto efficiency
3428:Ex-ante Pareto efficiency
3292:strong Pareto improvement
1194:
1169:
1162:
1157:
8097:Majority loser criterion
7983:Additional member system
7941:Hagenbach-Bischoff quota
7860:Single transferable vote
7785:Positional voting system
7721:Minimax Condorcet method
7679:Combined approval voting
7441:Evolutionary game theory
7174:Antoine Augustin Cournot
7060:Guess 2/3 of the average
6857:Strictly determined game
6646:Satisfaction equilibrium
6464:Escalation of commitment
4589:University of Queensland
4587:", School of Economics,
4109:Admissible decision rule
3136:in the Pareto order and
1016:(1848–1923), an Italian
976:efficiency in production
141:JEL classification codes
8122:Resolvability criterion
8112:Participation criterion
8087:Later-no-harm criterion
7903:Highest averages method
7446:Glossary of game theory
7045:Stackelberg competition
6666:Strong Nash equilibrium
5564:Industrial organization
5387:Computational economics
5207:A course in game theory
5055:Rationality and Freedom
4417:Gerard, Debreu (1959).
4148:Kaldor–Hicks efficiency
3724:. For every allocation
3546:dichotomous preferences
3331:are individual agents.
1807:competitive equilibrium
1107:represents the player.
327:Industrial organization
184:Computational economics
8163:First-preference votes
8102:Monotonicity criterion
8072:Independence of clones
7775:Simple majoritarianism
7471:Tragedy of the commons
7451:List of game theorists
7431:Confrontation analysis
7141:Sprague–Grundy theorem
6656:Sequential equilibrium
6576:Correlated equilibrium
5769:Modern monetary theory
5434:Experimental economics
5404:Pluralism in economics
5377:Mathematical economics
4663:10.1287/opre.2022.2279
3910:
3829:
3792:
3434:fair random assignment
3281:Weak Pareto efficiency
3276:Weak Pareto efficiency
3267:
3260:
3233:
3206:
3168:
3130:
3092:
3054:
3047:
3020:
2993:
2955:
2911:
2839:
2803:
2769:, then this defines a
2763:
2658:
2638:
2596:
2554:
2553:{\displaystyle \prec }
2534:
2464:
2355:
2255:if and only if: :
2249:
2192:
2132:
2045:
2044:{\displaystyle n>1}
2015:
1979:
1908:
1907:{\displaystyle i>1}
1882:
1861:If multiple sub-goals
1803:second welfare theorem
1754:
1734:
1659:
1615:
1540:
1520:
1493:
1427:
1385:
1333:
1313:
1139:The Prisoner's Dilemma
1114:, depicted below as a
179:Experimental economics
8067:Consistency criterion
7988:Alternative vote plus
7753:Instant-runoff voting
7559:Circulation of elites
7244:Jean-François Mertens
5154:(January–June 2005).
4936:, Vol. 19, 2018.
4436:10.1073/pnas.40.7.588
4367:Watson, Joel (2013).
4311:Lockwood, B. (2008).
4229:economics.utoronto.ca
4173:Maxima of a point set
4055:Common misconceptions
3911:
3830:
3772:
3297:weak Pareto-efficient
3261:
3259:{\displaystyle f_{2}}
3234:
3232:{\displaystyle f_{1}}
3207:
3169:
3131:
3093:
3060:
3048:
3046:{\displaystyle f_{2}}
3021:
3019:{\displaystyle f_{1}}
2994:
2956:
2923:
2912:
2840:
2804:
2764:
2668:, though it is not a
2659:
2639:
2597:
2555:
2535:
2465:
2356:
2250:
2193:
2133:
2046:
2016:
1980:
1909:
1883:
1881:{\displaystyle f_{i}}
1769:first welfare theorem
1755:
1735:
1660:
1616:
1541:
1521:
1519:{\displaystyle u_{i}}
1494:
1428:
1386:
1334:
1314:
1289:is Pareto-efficient.
951:, which says that if
8137:Seats-to-votes ratio
7908:Webster/Sainte-Laguë
7539:The Mind and Society
7373:Search optimizations
7249:Jennifer Tour Chayes
7136:Revelation principle
7131:Purification theorem
7070:Nash bargaining game
7035:Bertrand competition
7020:El Farol Bar problem
6985:Electronic mail game
6950:Lewis signaling game
6489:Hierarchy of beliefs
5643:Social choice theory
5399:Behavioral economics
5382:Complexity economics
5144:10.1561/100.00007028
4555:. pp. 808–809.
4392:Microeconomic Theory
4261:on February 26, 2020
4143:Highest and best use
4001:Use in public policy
3852:
3747:
3438:random social choice
3404:fair item allocation
3243:
3216:
3178:
3140:
3102:
3064:
3030:
3003:
2965:
2927:
2849:
2813:
2777:
2679:
2648:
2606:
2564:
2544:
2474:
2365:
2259:
2202:
2145:
2055:
2029:
1989:
1918:
1892:
1865:
1817:transfer of wealth.
1744:
1669:
1625:
1550:
1530:
1503:
1445:
1395:
1343:
1323:
1303:
945:social choice theory
406:Social choice theory
8117:Plurality criterion
7716:Kemeny–Young method
7421:Bounded rationality
7040:Cournot competition
6990:Rock paper scissors
6965:Battle of the sexes
6955:Volunteer's dilemma
6827:Perfect information
6754:Dominant strategies
6586:Epsilon-equilibrium
6469:Extensive-form game
5727:American (National)
5427:Economic statistics
5260:Stiglitz, Joseph E.
5256:Newbery, David M.G.
4874:Lockwood B. (2008)
4641:Operations Research
4608:, MIT Press, 2002,
4340:"Pareto Efficiency"
4225:"Martin J. Osborne"
4138:Economic efficiency
4123:Bayesian efficiency
3713:Suppose each agent
3635:Bayesian efficiency
3630:Bayesian efficiency
2456:
2423:
2350:
2317:
1789:perfect information
1697:
1578:
1485:
1463:
1265:, which means that
1141:
1095:. In this equation
1030:income distribution
1026:economic efficiency
1002:Pareto optimization
949:unanimity principle
873:Business portal
194:Operations research
174:National accounting
8158:Election threshold
8092:Majority criterion
7768:Supplementary vote
7400:Paranoid algorithm
7380:Alpha–beta pruning
7259:John Maynard Smith
7090:Rendezvous problem
6930:Traveler's dilemma
6920:Gift-exchange game
6915:Prisoner's dilemma
6832:Large Poisson game
6799:Bargaining problem
6699:Backward induction
6671:Subgame perfection
6626:Proper equilibrium
5156:"Pareto's revenge"
5019:Bhushi, K. (ed.),
4600:Magill, M., &
4282:, Hashimzade, N.,
3975:Use in engineering
3906:
3883:
3825:
3317:local nonsatiation
3268:
3256:
3229:
3202:
3174:does not dominate
3164:
3126:
3098:does not dominate
3088:
3055:
3043:
3016:
2989:
2951:
2907:
2835:
2799:
2759:
2654:
2634:
2602:is not worse than
2592:
2550:
2530:
2460:
2427:
2394:
2351:
2321:
2288:
2245:
2188:
2128:
2041:
2011:
1975:
1904:
1878:
1773:competitive market
1750:
1730:
1685:
1655:
1611:
1566:
1536:
1516:
1489:
1473:
1451:
1423:
1381:
1329:
1309:
1112:Prisoner's Dilemma
929:Pareto improvement
204:Industrial complex
199:Middle income trap
8262:Management theory
8257:Welfare economics
8252:Law and economics
8242:Pareto efficiency
8229:
8228:
8127:Reversal symmetry
8036:Cumulative voting
8018:Semi-proportional
7993:Mixed single vote
7959:
7958:
7835:Mixed single vote
7743:Exhaustive ballot
7706:Copeland's method
7701:Condorcet methods
7641:Electoral systems
7607:
7606:
7573:Pareto efficiency
7479:
7478:
7385:Aspiration window
7354:Suzanne Scotchmer
7309:Oskar Morgenstern
7204:Donald B. Gillies
7146:Zermelo's theorem
7075:Induction puzzles
7030:Fair cake-cutting
7005:Public goods game
6935:Coordination game
6809:Intransitive game
6734:Forward induction
6616:Pareto efficiency
6596:Gibbs equilibrium
6566:Berge equilibrium
6514:Simultaneous game
6400:
6399:
5931:New institutional
5203:Rubinstein, Ariel
5199:Rubinstein, Ariel
4973:Backhaus, J. G.,
4876:Pareto Efficiency
4570:978-1-4020-9159-9
4403:978-0-19-510268-0
4322:978-1-349-95121-5
4206:Welfare economics
4048:Natural selection
3874:
3689:-Pareto-efficient
3524:(2/2 + 9/2) = 5.5
3520:(2/2 + 3/2) = 2.5
3359:, they pay price
3355:, but if of type
3348:, they pay price
3341:adverse selection
3190:
3152:
3114:
3076:
2977:
2939:
2898:
2884:
2862:
2826:
2790:
2747:
2731:
2707:
2691:
2657:{\displaystyle j}
2619:
2577:
2515:
2487:
2437:
2404:
2331:
2298:
2215:
2198:Pareto dominates
2158:
2122:
2107:
2083:
2067:
2002:
1930:
1753:{\displaystyle i}
1539:{\displaystyle i}
1332:{\displaystyle k}
1312:{\displaystyle n}
1219:
1218:
1075:for every player
925:welfare economics
921:
920:
18:Pareto-optimality
16:(Redirected from
8284:
8168:Liquid democracy
7820:
7819:
7800:Two-round system
7711:Dodgson's method
7634:
7627:
7620:
7611:
7610:
7600:
7582:
7580:Pareto principle
7575:
7568:
7561:
7543:
7533:
7506:
7499:
7492:
7483:
7482:
7466:Topological game
7461:No-win situation
7359:Thomas Schelling
7339:Robert B. Wilson
7299:Merrill M. Flood
7269:John von Neumann
7179:Ariel Rubinstein
7164:Albert W. Tucker
7015:War of attrition
6975:Matching pennies
6749:Pairing strategy
6611:Nash equilibrium
6534:Mechanism design
6499:Normal-form game
6454:Cooperative game
6427:
6420:
6413:
6404:
6403:
5604:Natural resource
5439:Economic history
5365:Mechanism design
5317:
5310:
5303:
5294:
5293:
5289:
5251:
5219:
5194:
5170:
5160:
5147:
5121:
5070:
5051:
5045:
5034:
5028:
5017:
5011:
5000:
4994:
4971:
4965:
4962:pp. 358–364
4943:
4937:
4924:
4918:
4907:
4901:
4889:
4883:
4872:
4861:
4848:, 2nd ed. (
4842:
4836:
4833:pp. 111–148
4813:
4807:
4806:
4804:
4787:(3–4): 249–260.
4776:
4770:
4769:
4749:
4743:
4732:
4726:
4723:
4717:
4716:
4690:
4681:
4675:
4674:
4656:
4647:(3): 1762–1782.
4636:
4630:
4619:
4613:
4598:
4592:
4581:
4575:
4574:
4548:
4542:
4536:
4527:
4521:
4515:
4514:
4504:
4473:
4467:
4466:
4456:
4438:
4414:
4408:
4406:
4395:
4382:
4373:
4372:
4364:
4355:
4354:
4352:
4350:
4336:
4327:
4326:
4308:
4295:
4277:
4271:
4270:
4268:
4266:
4257:. Archived from
4246:
4240:
4239:
4237:
4235:
4221:
4183:Nash equilibrium
4153:Marginal utility
4018:" in the 1930s.
4016:market socialism
3915:
3913:
3912:
3907:
3893:
3892:
3882:
3864:
3863:
3834:
3832:
3831:
3826:
3812:
3811:
3802:
3801:
3791:
3786:
3759:
3758:
3599:
3571:
3536:
3532:
3525:
3521:
3504:
3471:If some lottery
3265:
3263:
3262:
3257:
3255:
3254:
3238:
3236:
3235:
3230:
3228:
3227:
3211:
3209:
3208:
3203:
3192:
3191:
3183:
3173:
3171:
3170:
3165:
3154:
3153:
3145:
3135:
3133:
3132:
3127:
3116:
3115:
3107:
3097:
3095:
3094:
3089:
3078:
3077:
3069:
3052:
3050:
3049:
3044:
3042:
3041:
3025:
3023:
3022:
3017:
3015:
3014:
2998:
2996:
2995:
2990:
2979:
2978:
2970:
2960:
2958:
2957:
2952:
2941:
2940:
2932:
2916:
2914:
2913:
2908:
2906:
2905:
2900:
2899:
2891:
2887:
2886:
2885:
2877:
2870:
2869:
2864:
2863:
2855:
2844:
2842:
2841:
2836:
2834:
2833:
2828:
2827:
2819:
2808:
2806:
2805:
2800:
2798:
2797:
2792:
2791:
2783:
2768:
2766:
2765:
2760:
2755:
2754:
2749:
2748:
2740:
2733:
2732:
2724:
2715:
2714:
2709:
2708:
2700:
2693:
2692:
2684:
2663:
2661:
2660:
2655:
2643:
2641:
2640:
2635:
2633:
2632:
2621:
2620:
2612:
2601:
2599:
2598:
2593:
2591:
2590:
2579:
2578:
2570:
2559:
2557:
2556:
2551:
2539:
2537:
2536:
2531:
2529:
2528:
2517:
2516:
2508:
2501:
2500:
2489:
2488:
2480:
2469:
2467:
2466:
2461:
2455:
2444:
2439:
2438:
2430:
2422:
2411:
2406:
2405:
2397:
2390:
2360:
2358:
2357:
2352:
2349:
2338:
2333:
2332:
2324:
2316:
2305:
2300:
2299:
2291:
2284:
2254:
2252:
2251:
2246:
2244:
2243:
2238:
2229:
2228:
2217:
2216:
2208:
2197:
2195:
2194:
2189:
2187:
2186:
2181:
2172:
2171:
2160:
2159:
2151:
2137:
2135:
2134:
2129:
2124:
2123:
2115:
2109:
2108:
2100:
2091:
2090:
2085:
2084:
2076:
2069:
2068:
2060:
2050:
2048:
2047:
2042:
2020:
2018:
2017:
2012:
2010:
2009:
2004:
2003:
1995:
1984:
1982:
1981:
1976:
1974:
1973:
1964:
1963:
1948:
1947:
1932:
1931:
1923:
1913:
1911:
1910:
1905:
1887:
1885:
1884:
1879:
1877:
1876:
1759:
1757:
1756:
1751:
1739:
1737:
1736:
1731:
1726:
1725:
1713:
1712:
1693:
1681:
1680:
1664:
1662:
1661:
1656:
1620:
1618:
1617:
1612:
1607:
1606:
1594:
1593:
1574:
1562:
1561:
1545:
1543:
1542:
1537:
1525:
1523:
1522:
1517:
1515:
1514:
1498:
1496:
1495:
1490:
1481:
1459:
1432:
1430:
1429:
1424:
1422:
1421:
1416:
1407:
1406:
1390:
1388:
1387:
1382:
1377:
1376:
1358:
1357:
1338:
1336:
1335:
1330:
1318:
1316:
1315:
1310:
1215:
1211:
1206:
1202:
1197:
1190:
1186:
1181:
1177:
1172:
1165:
1160:
1154:
1148:
1142:
1136:
1116:normal-form game
1091:for some player
934:Pareto efficient
913:
906:
899:
885:Money portal
883:
882:
881:
871:
870:
367:Natural resource
159:Economic systems
55:
32:
31:
21:
8292:
8291:
8287:
8286:
8285:
8283:
8282:
8281:
8277:Vilfredo Pareto
8232:
8231:
8230:
8225:
8208:
8187:
8141:
8132:Smith criterion
8045:
8012:
7973:Parallel voting
7955:
7951:Imperiali quota
7924:
7891:
7809:
7763:Contingent vote
7726:Nanson's method
7684:Unified primary
7674:Approval voting
7660:
7643:
7638:
7608:
7603:
7596:
7585:
7578:
7571:
7564:
7557:
7546:
7536:
7526:
7515:
7513:Vilfredo Pareto
7510:
7480:
7475:
7409:
7395:max^n algorithm
7368:
7364:William Vickrey
7324:Reinhard Selten
7279:Kenneth Binmore
7194:David K. Levine
7189:Daniel Kahneman
7156:
7150:
7126:Negamax theorem
7116:Minimax theorem
7094:
7055:Diner's dilemma
6910:All-pay auction
6876:
6862:Stochastic game
6814:Mean-field game
6785:
6778:
6744:Markov strategy
6680:
6546:
6538:
6509:Sequential game
6494:Information set
6479:Game complexity
6449:Congestion game
6437:
6431:
6401:
6396:
6393:Business portal
6360:
6359:
6358:
6318:
6082:von Böhm-Bawerk
5970:
5969:
5960:
5732:Ancient thought
5710:
5709:
5703:
5694:
5693:
5692:
5443:
5408:
5360:Contract theory
5345:Decision theory
5326:
5321:
5278:10.2307/2297701
5240:10.2307/1182422
5217:
5191:
5158:
5118:
5090:Fudenberg, Drew
5085:
5083:Further reading
5073:
5052:
5048:
5035:
5031:
5018:
5014:
5001:
4997:
4983:Northampton, MA
4972:
4968:
4944:
4940:
4925:
4921:
4908:
4904:
4898:pp. 87–102
4890:
4886:
4873:
4864:
4843:
4839:
4814:
4810:
4777:
4773:
4750:
4746:
4733:
4729:
4724:
4720:
4688:
4682:
4678:
4637:
4633:
4620:
4616:
4599:
4595:
4582:
4578:
4571:
4549:
4545:
4537:
4530:
4522:
4518:
4502:10.2307/1891114
4481:Stiglitz, J. E.
4474:
4470:
4415:
4411:
4404:
4383:
4376:
4365:
4358:
4348:
4346:
4338:
4337:
4330:
4323:
4309:
4298:
4278:
4274:
4264:
4262:
4247:
4243:
4233:
4231:
4223:
4222:
4218:
4214:
4164:Maximal element
4133:Deadweight loss
4113:decision theory
4105:
4086:liberal paradox
4070:
4057:
4036:
4003:
3991:Pareto frontier
3977:
3965:
3942:Takashi Negishi
3931:
3924:
3888:
3884:
3878:
3859:
3855:
3853:
3850:
3849:
3843:
3807:
3803:
3797:
3793:
3787:
3776:
3754:
3750:
3748:
3745:
3744:
3722:
3711:
3705:
3678:
3669:
3660:
3649:
3643:
3632:
3626:
3573:
3549:
3534:
3530:
3523:
3519:
3502:
3430:
3397:
3391:
3383:
3365:
3354:
3325:
3278:
3273:
3250:
3246:
3244:
3241:
3240:
3223:
3219:
3217:
3214:
3213:
3182:
3181:
3179:
3176:
3175:
3144:
3143:
3141:
3138:
3137:
3106:
3105:
3103:
3100:
3099:
3068:
3067:
3065:
3062:
3061:
3037:
3033:
3031:
3028:
3027:
3010:
3006:
3004:
3001:
3000:
2969:
2968:
2966:
2963:
2962:
2931:
2930:
2928:
2925:
2924:
2901:
2890:
2889:
2888:
2876:
2875:
2871:
2865:
2854:
2853:
2852:
2850:
2847:
2846:
2829:
2818:
2817:
2816:
2814:
2811:
2810:
2793:
2782:
2781:
2780:
2778:
2775:
2774:
2750:
2739:
2738:
2737:
2723:
2722:
2710:
2699:
2698:
2697:
2683:
2682:
2680:
2677:
2676:
2649:
2646:
2645:
2622:
2611:
2610:
2609:
2607:
2604:
2603:
2580:
2569:
2568:
2567:
2565:
2562:
2561:
2545:
2542:
2541:
2518:
2507:
2506:
2505:
2490:
2479:
2478:
2477:
2475:
2472:
2471:
2445:
2440:
2429:
2428:
2412:
2407:
2396:
2395:
2377:
2366:
2363:
2362:
2339:
2334:
2323:
2322:
2306:
2301:
2290:
2289:
2271:
2260:
2257:
2256:
2239:
2234:
2233:
2218:
2207:
2206:
2205:
2203:
2200:
2199:
2182:
2177:
2176:
2161:
2150:
2149:
2148:
2146:
2143:
2142:
2114:
2113:
2099:
2098:
2086:
2075:
2074:
2073:
2059:
2058:
2056:
2053:
2052:
2030:
2027:
2026:
2005:
1994:
1993:
1992:
1990:
1987:
1986:
1969:
1965:
1959:
1955:
1943:
1939:
1922:
1921:
1919:
1916:
1915:
1893:
1890:
1889:
1872:
1868:
1866:
1863:
1862:
1859:
1842:
1834:Cigarette taxes
1823:
1745:
1742:
1741:
1721:
1717:
1708:
1704:
1689:
1676:
1672:
1670:
1667:
1666:
1626:
1623:
1622:
1602:
1598:
1589:
1585:
1570:
1557:
1553:
1551:
1548:
1547:
1531:
1528:
1527:
1526:for each agent
1510:
1506:
1504:
1501:
1500:
1477:
1455:
1446:
1443:
1442:
1417:
1412:
1411:
1402:
1398:
1396:
1393:
1392:
1372:
1368:
1353:
1349:
1344:
1341:
1340:
1324:
1321:
1320:
1304:
1301:
1300:
1250:
1242:
1213:
1209:
1204:
1200:
1195:
1188:
1184:
1179:
1175:
1170:
1163:
1158:
1155:
1152:
1151:
1149:
1146:
1088:
1084:
1072:
1068:
1049:
1014:Vilfredo Pareto
1010:
917:
879:
877:
865:
858:
857:
828:
818:
817:
816:
815:
579:von Böhm-Bawerk
467:
456:
455:
217:
209:
208:
164:Economic growth
154:
146:
145:
87:
85:classifications
28:
23:
22:
15:
12:
11:
5:
8290:
8280:
8279:
8274:
8269:
8264:
8259:
8254:
8249:
8244:
8227:
8226:
8213:
8210:
8209:
8207:
8206:
8201:
8195:
8193:
8189:
8188:
8186:
8185:
8180:
8175:
8170:
8165:
8160:
8155:
8149:
8147:
8143:
8142:
8140:
8139:
8134:
8129:
8124:
8119:
8114:
8109:
8104:
8099:
8094:
8089:
8084:
8079:
8074:
8069:
8064:
8059:
8053:
8051:
8047:
8046:
8044:
8043:
8038:
8033:
8031:Limited voting
8028:
8022:
8020:
8014:
8013:
8011:
8010:
8005:
8000:
7995:
7990:
7985:
7980:
7975:
7969:
7967:
7961:
7960:
7957:
7956:
7954:
7953:
7948:
7943:
7938:
7932:
7930:
7926:
7925:
7923:
7922:
7917:
7916:
7915:
7910:
7899:
7897:
7893:
7892:
7890:
7889:
7884:
7879:
7878:
7877:
7872:
7867:
7857:
7852:
7847:
7842:
7837:
7832:
7826:
7824:
7817:
7811:
7810:
7808:
7807:
7802:
7797:
7792:
7787:
7782:
7777:
7772:
7771:
7770:
7765:
7760:
7758:Coombs' method
7750:
7745:
7740:
7739:
7738:
7736:Schulze method
7733:
7728:
7723:
7718:
7713:
7708:
7698:
7696:Bucklin voting
7693:
7688:
7687:
7686:
7681:
7670:
7668:
7662:
7661:
7648:
7645:
7644:
7637:
7636:
7629:
7622:
7614:
7605:
7604:
7602:
7601:
7593:
7591:
7587:
7586:
7584:
7583:
7576:
7569:
7562:
7554:
7552:
7548:
7547:
7545:
7544:
7534:
7523:
7521:
7517:
7516:
7509:
7508:
7501:
7494:
7486:
7477:
7476:
7474:
7473:
7468:
7463:
7458:
7453:
7448:
7443:
7438:
7433:
7428:
7423:
7417:
7415:
7411:
7410:
7408:
7407:
7402:
7397:
7392:
7387:
7382:
7376:
7374:
7370:
7369:
7367:
7366:
7361:
7356:
7351:
7346:
7341:
7336:
7331:
7329:Robert Axelrod
7326:
7321:
7316:
7311:
7306:
7304:Olga Bondareva
7301:
7296:
7294:Melvin Dresher
7291:
7286:
7284:Leonid Hurwicz
7281:
7276:
7271:
7266:
7261:
7256:
7251:
7246:
7241:
7236:
7231:
7226:
7221:
7219:Harold W. Kuhn
7216:
7211:
7209:Drew Fudenberg
7206:
7201:
7199:David M. Kreps
7196:
7191:
7186:
7184:Claude Shannon
7181:
7176:
7171:
7166:
7160:
7158:
7152:
7151:
7149:
7148:
7143:
7138:
7133:
7128:
7123:
7121:Nash's theorem
7118:
7113:
7108:
7102:
7100:
7096:
7095:
7093:
7092:
7087:
7082:
7077:
7072:
7067:
7062:
7057:
7052:
7047:
7042:
7037:
7032:
7027:
7022:
7017:
7012:
7007:
7002:
6997:
6992:
6987:
6982:
6980:Ultimatum game
6977:
6972:
6967:
6962:
6960:Dollar auction
6957:
6952:
6947:
6945:Centipede game
6942:
6937:
6932:
6927:
6922:
6917:
6912:
6907:
6902:
6900:Infinite chess
6897:
6892:
6886:
6884:
6878:
6877:
6875:
6874:
6869:
6867:Symmetric game
6864:
6859:
6854:
6852:Signaling game
6849:
6847:Screening game
6844:
6839:
6837:Potential game
6834:
6829:
6824:
6816:
6811:
6806:
6801:
6796:
6790:
6788:
6780:
6779:
6777:
6776:
6771:
6766:
6764:Mixed strategy
6761:
6756:
6751:
6746:
6741:
6736:
6731:
6726:
6721:
6716:
6711:
6706:
6701:
6696:
6690:
6688:
6682:
6681:
6679:
6678:
6673:
6668:
6663:
6658:
6653:
6648:
6643:
6641:Risk dominance
6638:
6633:
6628:
6623:
6618:
6613:
6608:
6603:
6598:
6593:
6588:
6583:
6578:
6573:
6568:
6563:
6558:
6552:
6550:
6540:
6539:
6537:
6536:
6531:
6526:
6521:
6516:
6511:
6506:
6501:
6496:
6491:
6486:
6484:Graphical game
6481:
6476:
6471:
6466:
6461:
6456:
6451:
6445:
6443:
6439:
6438:
6430:
6429:
6422:
6415:
6407:
6398:
6397:
6395:
6390:
6385:
6380:
6375:
6370:
6365:
6362:
6361:
6357:
6356:
6351:
6341:
6336:
6330:
6329:
6328:
6326:
6320:
6319:
6317:
6316:
6309:
6304:
6299:
6294:
6289:
6284:
6279:
6274:
6269:
6264:
6259:
6254:
6249:
6244:
6239:
6234:
6229:
6224:
6219:
6214:
6209:
6204:
6199:
6194:
6189:
6184:
6179:
6174:
6169:
6164:
6159:
6154:
6149:
6144:
6139:
6134:
6129:
6124:
6119:
6114:
6109:
6104:
6099:
6094:
6089:
6084:
6079:
6074:
6069:
6064:
6059:
6054:
6049:
6044:
6039:
6034:
6029:
6024:
6019:
6014:
6009:
6004:
5999:
5994:
5989:
5984:
5979:
5973:
5971:
5965:
5962:
5961:
5959:
5958:
5953:
5948:
5943:
5938:
5933:
5928:
5927:
5926:
5916:
5915:
5914:
5904:
5899:
5894:
5893:
5892:
5882:
5877:
5872:
5871:
5870:
5869:
5868:
5858:
5853:
5838:
5833:
5828:
5823:
5818:
5813:
5808:
5803:
5798:
5796:Disequilibrium
5793:
5788:
5783:
5778:
5773:
5772:
5771:
5761:
5756:
5751:
5746:
5745:
5744:
5734:
5729:
5724:
5719:
5713:
5711:
5699:
5696:
5695:
5691:
5690:
5685:
5680:
5675:
5670:
5665:
5660:
5655:
5650:
5645:
5636:
5631:
5626:
5621:
5616:
5611:
5609:Organizational
5606:
5601:
5596:
5591:
5586:
5581:
5576:
5571:
5566:
5561:
5556:
5551:
5546:
5541:
5536:
5531:
5526:
5521:
5516:
5511:
5506:
5501:
5496:
5491:
5486:
5481:
5476:
5471:
5466:
5461:
5455:
5454:
5453:
5451:
5445:
5444:
5442:
5441:
5436:
5431:
5430:
5429:
5418:
5416:
5410:
5409:
5407:
5406:
5401:
5396:
5395:
5394:
5384:
5379:
5374:
5372:Macroeconomics
5369:
5368:
5367:
5362:
5357:
5352:
5347:
5340:Microeconomics
5336:
5334:
5328:
5327:
5320:
5319:
5312:
5305:
5297:
5291:
5290:
5252:
5234:(2): 172–178.
5223:
5215:
5195:
5189:
5171:
5148:
5125:
5116:
5084:
5081:
5072:
5071:
5067:pp. 92–94
5046:
5029:
5012:
4995:
4991:pp. 10–15
4979:Cheltenham, UK
4966:
4938:
4933:Genome Biology
4919:
4902:
4884:
4862:
4858:pp. 63–65
4837:
4808:
4771:
4760:(2–3): 92–97.
4754:Metroeconomica
4744:
4727:
4718:
4699:(2): 165–184.
4676:
4631:
4614:
4593:
4576:
4569:
4543:
4528:
4516:
4495:(2): 229–264.
4468:
4429:(7): 588–592.
4409:
4402:
4386:Mas-Colell, A.
4374:
4356:
4328:
4321:
4296:
4272:
4255:www.cenaero.be
4251:"Pareto Front"
4241:
4215:
4213:
4210:
4209:
4208:
4203:
4198:
4190:
4185:
4180:
4175:
4170:
4161:
4158:Market failure
4155:
4150:
4145:
4140:
4135:
4130:
4125:
4120:
4115:
4104:
4101:
4097:Wharton School
4088:elaborated by
4069:
4066:
4056:
4053:
4035:
4034:Use in biology
4032:
4012:invisible hand
4002:
3999:
3976:
3973:
3963:
3929:
3922:
3917:
3916:
3905:
3902:
3899:
3896:
3891:
3887:
3881:
3877:
3873:
3870:
3867:
3862:
3858:
3841:
3836:
3835:
3824:
3821:
3818:
3815:
3810:
3806:
3800:
3796:
3790:
3785:
3782:
3779:
3775:
3771:
3768:
3765:
3762:
3757:
3753:
3720:
3704:
3701:
3677:
3674:
3668:
3665:
3659:
3656:
3645:Main article:
3642:
3639:
3628:Main article:
3625:
3622:
3539:
3538:
3533:for Alice and
3527:
3522:for Alice and
3469:
3468:
3457:
3429:
3426:
3425:
3424:
3423:(3.5, 2).
3420:
3393:Main article:
3390:
3387:
3381:
3368:Lindahl prices
3363:
3352:
3324:
3321:
3313:
3312:
3308:
3277:
3274:
3272:
3269:
3253:
3249:
3226:
3222:
3201:
3198:
3195:
3189:
3186:
3163:
3160:
3157:
3151:
3148:
3125:
3122:
3119:
3113:
3110:
3087:
3084:
3081:
3075:
3072:
3040:
3036:
3013:
3009:
2988:
2985:
2982:
2976:
2973:
2950:
2947:
2944:
2938:
2935:
2904:
2897:
2894:
2883:
2880:
2874:
2868:
2861:
2858:
2832:
2825:
2822:
2796:
2789:
2786:
2758:
2753:
2746:
2743:
2736:
2730:
2727:
2721:
2718:
2713:
2706:
2703:
2696:
2690:
2687:
2653:
2631:
2628:
2625:
2618:
2615:
2589:
2586:
2583:
2576:
2573:
2549:
2527:
2524:
2521:
2514:
2511:
2504:
2499:
2496:
2493:
2486:
2483:
2470:We then write
2459:
2454:
2451:
2448:
2443:
2436:
2433:
2426:
2421:
2418:
2415:
2410:
2403:
2400:
2393:
2389:
2386:
2383:
2380:
2376:
2373:
2370:
2348:
2345:
2342:
2337:
2330:
2327:
2320:
2315:
2312:
2309:
2304:
2297:
2294:
2287:
2283:
2280:
2277:
2274:
2270:
2267:
2264:
2242:
2237:
2232:
2227:
2224:
2221:
2214:
2211:
2185:
2180:
2175:
2170:
2167:
2164:
2157:
2154:
2127:
2121:
2118:
2112:
2106:
2103:
2097:
2094:
2089:
2082:
2079:
2072:
2066:
2063:
2040:
2037:
2034:
2008:
2001:
1998:
1972:
1968:
1962:
1958:
1954:
1951:
1946:
1942:
1938:
1935:
1929:
1926:
1903:
1900:
1897:
1875:
1871:
1858:
1855:
1841:
1838:
1827:market failure
1822:
1819:
1749:
1729:
1724:
1720:
1716:
1711:
1707:
1703:
1700:
1696:
1692:
1688:
1684:
1679:
1675:
1654:
1651:
1648:
1645:
1642:
1639:
1636:
1633:
1630:
1610:
1605:
1601:
1597:
1592:
1588:
1584:
1581:
1577:
1573:
1569:
1565:
1560:
1556:
1535:
1513:
1509:
1488:
1484:
1480:
1476:
1472:
1469:
1466:
1462:
1458:
1454:
1450:
1439:Pareto-optimal
1420:
1415:
1410:
1405:
1401:
1380:
1375:
1371:
1367:
1364:
1361:
1356:
1352:
1348:
1328:
1308:
1294:zero-sum games
1287:Both Cooperate
1279:Both Cooperate
1259:Both Cooperate
1248:
1240:
1235:Both Cooperate
1217:
1216:
1207:
1198:
1192:
1191:
1182:
1173:
1167:
1166:
1161:
1156:
1150:
1145:
1086:
1082:
1070:
1066:
1048:
1045:
1018:civil engineer
1009:
1006:
982:x-inefficiency
955:in a society (
938:Pareto optimal
919:
918:
916:
915:
908:
901:
893:
890:
889:
888:
887:
875:
860:
859:
856:
855:
850:
840:
835:
829:
824:
823:
820:
819:
814:
813:
806:
801:
796:
791:
786:
781:
776:
771:
766:
761:
756:
751:
746:
741:
736:
731:
726:
721:
716:
711:
706:
701:
696:
691:
686:
681:
676:
671:
666:
661:
656:
651:
646:
641:
636:
631:
626:
621:
616:
611:
606:
601:
596:
591:
586:
581:
576:
571:
566:
561:
556:
551:
546:
541:
536:
531:
526:
521:
516:
511:
506:
501:
496:
491:
486:
481:
476:
470:
469:
468:
462:
461:
458:
457:
454:
453:
448:
443:
438:
433:
428:
423:
418:
413:
408:
399:
394:
389:
384:
379:
374:
372:Organizational
369:
364:
359:
354:
349:
344:
339:
334:
329:
324:
319:
314:
309:
304:
299:
294:
289:
284:
279:
274:
269:
264:
259:
254:
249:
244:
239:
234:
229:
224:
218:
216:By application
215:
214:
211:
210:
207:
206:
201:
196:
191:
186:
181:
176:
171:
166:
161:
155:
152:
151:
148:
147:
144:
143:
138:
133:
128:
123:
118:
109:
104:
99:
94:
88:
82:
81:
78:
77:
76:
75:
70:
65:
57:
56:
48:
47:
41:
40:
26:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
8289:
8278:
8275:
8273:
8270:
8268:
8265:
8263:
8260:
8258:
8255:
8253:
8250:
8248:
8245:
8243:
8240:
8239:
8237:
8224:
8223:
8218:
8217:
8211:
8205:
8202:
8200:
8197:
8196:
8194:
8190:
8184:
8181:
8179:
8176:
8174:
8171:
8169:
8166:
8164:
8161:
8159:
8156:
8154:
8151:
8150:
8148:
8144:
8138:
8135:
8133:
8130:
8128:
8125:
8123:
8120:
8118:
8115:
8113:
8110:
8108:
8105:
8103:
8100:
8098:
8095:
8093:
8090:
8088:
8085:
8083:
8080:
8078:
8075:
8073:
8070:
8068:
8065:
8063:
8060:
8058:
8055:
8054:
8052:
8048:
8042:
8039:
8037:
8034:
8032:
8029:
8027:
8024:
8023:
8021:
8019:
8015:
8009:
8006:
8004:
8001:
7999:
7996:
7994:
7991:
7989:
7986:
7984:
7981:
7979:
7976:
7974:
7971:
7970:
7968:
7966:
7962:
7952:
7949:
7947:
7944:
7942:
7939:
7937:
7934:
7933:
7931:
7927:
7921:
7918:
7914:
7911:
7909:
7906:
7905:
7904:
7901:
7900:
7898:
7894:
7888:
7885:
7883:
7880:
7876:
7873:
7871:
7868:
7866:
7863:
7862:
7861:
7858:
7856:
7853:
7851:
7848:
7846:
7843:
7841:
7838:
7836:
7833:
7831:
7828:
7827:
7825:
7821:
7818:
7816:
7812:
7806:
7803:
7801:
7798:
7796:
7793:
7791:
7788:
7786:
7783:
7781:
7778:
7776:
7773:
7769:
7766:
7764:
7761:
7759:
7756:
7755:
7754:
7751:
7749:
7746:
7744:
7741:
7737:
7734:
7732:
7729:
7727:
7724:
7722:
7719:
7717:
7714:
7712:
7709:
7707:
7704:
7703:
7702:
7699:
7697:
7694:
7692:
7689:
7685:
7682:
7680:
7677:
7676:
7675:
7672:
7671:
7669:
7667:
7666:Single-winner
7663:
7659:
7657:
7653:
7646:
7642:
7635:
7630:
7628:
7623:
7621:
7616:
7615:
7612:
7599:
7595:
7594:
7592:
7590:Miscellaneous
7588:
7581:
7577:
7574:
7570:
7567:
7563:
7560:
7556:
7555:
7553:
7549:
7541:
7540:
7535:
7531:
7530:
7525:
7524:
7522:
7518:
7514:
7507:
7502:
7500:
7495:
7493:
7488:
7487:
7484:
7472:
7469:
7467:
7464:
7462:
7459:
7457:
7454:
7452:
7449:
7447:
7444:
7442:
7439:
7437:
7434:
7432:
7429:
7427:
7424:
7422:
7419:
7418:
7416:
7414:Miscellaneous
7412:
7406:
7403:
7401:
7398:
7396:
7393:
7391:
7388:
7386:
7383:
7381:
7378:
7377:
7375:
7371:
7365:
7362:
7360:
7357:
7355:
7352:
7350:
7349:Samuel Bowles
7347:
7345:
7344:Roger Myerson
7342:
7340:
7337:
7335:
7334:Robert Aumann
7332:
7330:
7327:
7325:
7322:
7320:
7317:
7315:
7312:
7310:
7307:
7305:
7302:
7300:
7297:
7295:
7292:
7290:
7289:Lloyd Shapley
7287:
7285:
7282:
7280:
7277:
7275:
7274:Kenneth Arrow
7272:
7270:
7267:
7265:
7262:
7260:
7257:
7255:
7254:John Harsanyi
7252:
7250:
7247:
7245:
7242:
7240:
7237:
7235:
7232:
7230:
7227:
7225:
7224:Herbert Simon
7222:
7220:
7217:
7215:
7212:
7210:
7207:
7205:
7202:
7200:
7197:
7195:
7192:
7190:
7187:
7185:
7182:
7180:
7177:
7175:
7172:
7170:
7167:
7165:
7162:
7161:
7159:
7153:
7147:
7144:
7142:
7139:
7137:
7134:
7132:
7129:
7127:
7124:
7122:
7119:
7117:
7114:
7112:
7109:
7107:
7104:
7103:
7101:
7097:
7091:
7088:
7086:
7083:
7081:
7078:
7076:
7073:
7071:
7068:
7066:
7063:
7061:
7058:
7056:
7053:
7051:
7048:
7046:
7043:
7041:
7038:
7036:
7033:
7031:
7028:
7026:
7025:Fair division
7023:
7021:
7018:
7016:
7013:
7011:
7008:
7006:
7003:
7001:
7000:Dictator game
6998:
6996:
6993:
6991:
6988:
6986:
6983:
6981:
6978:
6976:
6973:
6971:
6968:
6966:
6963:
6961:
6958:
6956:
6953:
6951:
6948:
6946:
6943:
6941:
6938:
6936:
6933:
6931:
6928:
6926:
6923:
6921:
6918:
6916:
6913:
6911:
6908:
6906:
6903:
6901:
6898:
6896:
6893:
6891:
6888:
6887:
6885:
6883:
6879:
6873:
6872:Zero-sum game
6870:
6868:
6865:
6863:
6860:
6858:
6855:
6853:
6850:
6848:
6845:
6843:
6842:Repeated game
6840:
6838:
6835:
6833:
6830:
6828:
6825:
6823:
6821:
6817:
6815:
6812:
6810:
6807:
6805:
6802:
6800:
6797:
6795:
6792:
6791:
6789:
6787:
6781:
6775:
6772:
6770:
6767:
6765:
6762:
6760:
6759:Pure strategy
6757:
6755:
6752:
6750:
6747:
6745:
6742:
6740:
6737:
6735:
6732:
6730:
6727:
6725:
6722:
6720:
6719:De-escalation
6717:
6715:
6712:
6710:
6707:
6705:
6702:
6700:
6697:
6695:
6692:
6691:
6689:
6687:
6683:
6677:
6674:
6672:
6669:
6667:
6664:
6662:
6661:Shapley value
6659:
6657:
6654:
6652:
6649:
6647:
6644:
6642:
6639:
6637:
6634:
6632:
6629:
6627:
6624:
6622:
6619:
6617:
6614:
6612:
6609:
6607:
6604:
6602:
6599:
6597:
6594:
6592:
6589:
6587:
6584:
6582:
6579:
6577:
6574:
6572:
6569:
6567:
6564:
6562:
6559:
6557:
6554:
6553:
6551:
6549:
6545:
6541:
6535:
6532:
6530:
6529:Succinct game
6527:
6525:
6522:
6520:
6517:
6515:
6512:
6510:
6507:
6505:
6502:
6500:
6497:
6495:
6492:
6490:
6487:
6485:
6482:
6480:
6477:
6475:
6472:
6470:
6467:
6465:
6462:
6460:
6457:
6455:
6452:
6450:
6447:
6446:
6444:
6440:
6436:
6428:
6423:
6421:
6416:
6414:
6409:
6408:
6405:
6394:
6391:
6389:
6386:
6384:
6381:
6379:
6376:
6374:
6371:
6369:
6366:
6363:
6355:
6352:
6349:
6345:
6342:
6340:
6337:
6335:
6332:
6331:
6327:
6325:
6321:
6315:
6314:
6310:
6308:
6305:
6303:
6300:
6298:
6295:
6293:
6290:
6288:
6285:
6283:
6280:
6278:
6275:
6273:
6270:
6268:
6265:
6263:
6260:
6258:
6255:
6253:
6250:
6248:
6245:
6243:
6240:
6238:
6235:
6233:
6230:
6228:
6225:
6223:
6220:
6218:
6215:
6213:
6210:
6208:
6205:
6203:
6200:
6198:
6195:
6193:
6190:
6188:
6185:
6183:
6180:
6178:
6175:
6173:
6170:
6168:
6165:
6163:
6160:
6158:
6155:
6153:
6150:
6148:
6145:
6143:
6140:
6138:
6135:
6133:
6130:
6128:
6125:
6123:
6120:
6118:
6115:
6113:
6110:
6108:
6105:
6103:
6100:
6098:
6095:
6093:
6090:
6088:
6085:
6083:
6080:
6078:
6075:
6073:
6070:
6068:
6065:
6063:
6060:
6058:
6055:
6053:
6050:
6048:
6045:
6043:
6040:
6038:
6035:
6033:
6030:
6028:
6025:
6023:
6020:
6018:
6015:
6013:
6010:
6008:
6005:
6003:
6000:
5998:
5995:
5993:
5990:
5988:
5985:
5983:
5980:
5978:
5977:de Mandeville
5975:
5974:
5972:
5968:
5963:
5957:
5954:
5952:
5949:
5947:
5944:
5942:
5939:
5937:
5934:
5932:
5929:
5925:
5922:
5921:
5920:
5919:New classical
5917:
5913:
5910:
5909:
5908:
5905:
5903:
5900:
5898:
5895:
5891:
5888:
5887:
5886:
5883:
5881:
5878:
5876:
5875:Malthusianism
5873:
5867:
5864:
5863:
5862:
5859:
5857:
5854:
5851:
5847:
5844:
5843:
5842:
5839:
5837:
5836:Institutional
5834:
5832:
5829:
5827:
5824:
5822:
5819:
5817:
5814:
5812:
5809:
5807:
5804:
5802:
5799:
5797:
5794:
5792:
5789:
5787:
5784:
5782:
5779:
5777:
5774:
5770:
5767:
5766:
5765:
5762:
5760:
5757:
5755:
5752:
5750:
5747:
5743:
5740:
5739:
5738:
5735:
5733:
5730:
5728:
5725:
5723:
5720:
5718:
5715:
5714:
5712:
5707:
5702:
5697:
5689:
5686:
5684:
5681:
5679:
5676:
5674:
5671:
5669:
5666:
5664:
5661:
5659:
5656:
5654:
5651:
5649:
5646:
5644:
5640:
5639:Public choice
5637:
5635:
5632:
5630:
5627:
5625:
5622:
5620:
5617:
5615:
5614:Participation
5612:
5610:
5607:
5605:
5602:
5600:
5597:
5595:
5592:
5590:
5587:
5585:
5582:
5580:
5577:
5575:
5574:Institutional
5572:
5570:
5567:
5565:
5562:
5560:
5557:
5555:
5552:
5550:
5547:
5545:
5542:
5540:
5537:
5535:
5532:
5530:
5527:
5525:
5524:Expeditionary
5522:
5520:
5517:
5515:
5514:Environmental
5512:
5510:
5507:
5505:
5502:
5500:
5497:
5495:
5492:
5490:
5487:
5485:
5482:
5480:
5477:
5475:
5472:
5470:
5467:
5465:
5462:
5460:
5457:
5456:
5452:
5450:
5446:
5440:
5437:
5435:
5432:
5428:
5425:
5424:
5423:
5420:
5419:
5417:
5415:
5411:
5405:
5402:
5400:
5397:
5393:
5390:
5389:
5388:
5385:
5383:
5380:
5378:
5375:
5373:
5370:
5366:
5363:
5361:
5358:
5356:
5353:
5351:
5348:
5346:
5343:
5342:
5341:
5338:
5337:
5335:
5333:
5329:
5325:
5318:
5313:
5311:
5306:
5304:
5299:
5298:
5295:
5287:
5283:
5279:
5275:
5271:
5267:
5266:
5261:
5257:
5253:
5249:
5245:
5241:
5237:
5233:
5229:
5224:
5222:
5221:Book preview.
5218:
5216:9780262650403
5212:
5208:
5204:
5200:
5196:
5192:
5190:9780333971215
5186:
5182:
5181:
5176:
5175:Ng, Yew-Kwang
5172:
5168:
5164:
5157:
5153:
5149:
5145:
5141:
5137:
5133:
5132:
5126:
5124:
5123:Book preview.
5119:
5117:9780262061414
5113:
5109:
5105:
5101:
5100:
5095:
5091:
5087:
5086:
5080:
5078:
5068:
5064:
5063:Belknep Press
5060:
5059:Cambridge, MA
5056:
5050:
5043:
5039:
5036:Wittman, D.,
5033:
5026:
5022:
5016:
5009:
5005:
4999:
4992:
4988:
4984:
4980:
4976:
4970:
4963:
4959:
4955:
4951:
4947:
4942:
4935:
4934:
4929:
4923:
4916:
4912:
4906:
4899:
4895:
4888:
4881:
4877:
4871:
4869:
4867:
4859:
4855:
4851:
4847:
4841:
4834:
4830:
4826:
4822:
4818:
4812:
4803:
4798:
4794:
4790:
4786:
4782:
4775:
4767:
4763:
4759:
4755:
4748:
4741:
4737:
4731:
4722:
4714:
4710:
4706:
4702:
4698:
4694:
4687:
4680:
4672:
4668:
4664:
4660:
4655:
4650:
4646:
4642:
4635:
4628:
4624:
4618:
4611:
4607:
4603:
4597:
4590:
4586:
4580:
4572:
4566:
4562:
4558:
4554:
4547:
4541:
4535:
4533:
4526:
4520:
4512:
4508:
4503:
4498:
4494:
4490:
4486:
4482:
4478:
4477:Greenwald, B.
4472:
4464:
4460:
4455:
4450:
4446:
4442:
4437:
4432:
4428:
4424:
4420:
4413:
4405:
4399:
4394:
4393:
4387:
4381:
4379:
4370:
4363:
4361:
4345:
4341:
4335:
4333:
4324:
4318:
4314:
4307:
4305:
4303:
4301:
4293:
4289:
4285:
4281:
4276:
4260:
4256:
4252:
4245:
4230:
4226:
4220:
4216:
4207:
4204:
4202:
4199:
4196:
4195:
4191:
4189:
4186:
4184:
4181:
4179:
4176:
4174:
4171:
4169:
4166:, concept in
4165:
4162:
4159:
4156:
4154:
4151:
4149:
4146:
4144:
4141:
4139:
4136:
4134:
4131:
4129:
4126:
4124:
4121:
4119:
4116:
4114:
4110:
4107:
4106:
4100:
4098:
4093:
4091:
4087:
4082:
4079:
4074:
4065:
4062:
4052:
4049:
4046:-efficient).
4045:
4041:
4031:
4027:
4023:
4019:
4017:
4013:
4009:
3998:
3996:
3992:
3988:
3984:
3983:
3972:
3970:
3966:
3959:
3955:
3951:
3947:
3943:
3939:
3936:Japanese neo-
3934:
3932:
3925:
3903:
3897:
3889:
3885:
3879:
3871:
3868:
3865:
3860:
3856:
3848:
3847:
3846:
3844:
3822:
3816:
3808:
3804:
3798:
3794:
3788:
3783:
3780:
3777:
3773:
3769:
3763:
3755:
3751:
3743:
3742:
3741:
3739:
3735:
3731:
3728:, define the
3727:
3723:
3716:
3710:
3700:
3698:
3694:
3690:
3688:
3683:
3673:
3664:
3655:
3653:
3648:
3638:
3636:
3631:
3621:
3619:
3615:
3611:
3607:
3603:
3597:
3593:
3589:
3585:
3581:
3577:
3569:
3565:
3561:
3557:
3553:
3547:
3542:
3535:(9 × 2/3) = 6
3531:(2 + 3/3) = 3
3528:
3517:
3516:
3515:
3511:
3509:
3505:
3498:
3494:
3490:
3486:
3482:
3478:
3474:
3466:
3462:
3458:
3455:
3454:
3453:
3451:
3447:
3443:
3439:
3435:
3421:
3418:
3417:
3416:
3412:
3409:
3405:
3401:
3396:
3386:
3384:
3377:
3373:
3369:
3362:
3358:
3351:
3347:
3342:
3338:
3332:
3329:
3320:
3318:
3311:(10, 5).
3309:
3306:
3305:
3304:
3300:
3298:
3293:
3288:
3286:
3282:
3251:
3247:
3224:
3220:
3196:
3184:
3158:
3146:
3120:
3108:
3082:
3070:
3059:
3038:
3034:
3011:
3007:
2983:
2971:
2945:
2933:
2922:
2918:
2902:
2892:
2878:
2872:
2866:
2856:
2845:and we write
2830:
2820:
2794:
2784:
2772:
2751:
2741:
2725:
2719:
2711:
2701:
2685:
2673:
2671:
2670:product order
2667:
2666:partial order
2651:
2626:
2613:
2584:
2571:
2547:
2522:
2509:
2502:
2494:
2481:
2457:
2449:
2441:
2431:
2424:
2416:
2408:
2398:
2391:
2387:
2384:
2381:
2378:
2374:
2371:
2343:
2335:
2325:
2318:
2310:
2302:
2292:
2285:
2281:
2278:
2275:
2272:
2268:
2265:
2240:
2230:
2222:
2209:
2183:
2173:
2165:
2152:
2139:
2116:
2101:
2095:
2087:
2077:
2061:
2038:
2035:
2032:
2025:relation for
2024:
2006:
1996:
1970:
1960:
1956:
1952:
1949:
1944:
1940:
1933:
1924:
1901:
1898:
1895:
1873:
1869:
1854:
1850:
1846:
1837:
1835:
1830:
1828:
1818:
1816:
1812:
1808:
1804:
1799:
1797:
1792:
1790:
1786:
1785:externalities
1782:
1781:Gérard Debreu
1778:
1777:Kenneth Arrow
1774:
1770:
1765:
1763:
1747:
1722:
1718:
1709:
1705:
1701:
1694:
1690:
1686:
1677:
1673:
1649:
1646:
1643:
1640:
1637:
1631:
1628:
1603:
1599:
1590:
1586:
1582:
1575:
1571:
1567:
1558:
1554:
1533:
1511:
1507:
1482:
1478:
1474:
1470:
1467:
1464:
1460:
1456:
1452:
1440:
1436:
1418:
1408:
1403:
1399:
1373:
1369:
1365:
1362:
1359:
1354:
1350:
1326:
1306:
1297:
1295:
1290:
1288:
1284:
1280:
1276:
1272:
1268:
1264:
1260:
1256:
1252:
1244:
1236:
1232:
1231:s' = (-1, -1)
1228:
1224:
1208:
1199:
1193:
1183:
1174:
1168:
1144:
1143:
1140:
1135:
1133:
1129:
1125:
1121:
1117:
1113:
1108:
1106:
1102:
1098:
1094:
1090:
1078:
1074:
1062:
1057:
1053:
1044:
1042:
1038:
1033:
1031:
1027:
1023:
1019:
1015:
1005:
1003:
1000:(also termed
999:
995:
991:
986:
984:
983:
978:
977:
972:
967:
965:
960:
958:
954:
950:
946:
941:
939:
935:
930:
926:
914:
909:
907:
902:
900:
895:
894:
892:
891:
886:
876:
874:
869:
864:
863:
862:
861:
854:
851:
848:
844:
841:
839:
836:
834:
831:
830:
827:
822:
821:
812:
811:
807:
805:
802:
800:
797:
795:
792:
790:
787:
785:
782:
780:
777:
775:
772:
770:
767:
765:
762:
760:
757:
755:
752:
750:
747:
745:
742:
740:
737:
735:
732:
730:
727:
725:
722:
720:
717:
715:
712:
710:
707:
705:
702:
700:
697:
695:
692:
690:
687:
685:
682:
680:
677:
675:
672:
670:
667:
665:
662:
660:
657:
655:
652:
650:
647:
645:
642:
640:
637:
635:
632:
630:
627:
625:
622:
620:
617:
615:
612:
610:
607:
605:
602:
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582:
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510:
507:
505:
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492:
490:
487:
485:
482:
480:
477:
475:
474:de Mandeville
472:
471:
466:
460:
459:
452:
449:
447:
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439:
437:
434:
432:
429:
427:
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419:
417:
414:
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409:
407:
403:
402:Public choice
400:
398:
395:
393:
390:
388:
385:
383:
380:
378:
377:Participation
375:
373:
370:
368:
365:
363:
360:
358:
355:
353:
350:
348:
345:
343:
340:
338:
337:Institutional
335:
333:
330:
328:
325:
323:
320:
318:
315:
313:
310:
308:
305:
303:
300:
298:
295:
293:
290:
288:
287:Expeditionary
285:
283:
280:
278:
277:Environmental
275:
273:
270:
268:
265:
263:
260:
258:
255:
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142:
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129:
127:
124:
122:
119:
117:
113:
110:
108:
107:International
105:
103:
100:
98:
95:
93:
90:
89:
86:
83:Branches and
80:
79:
74:
71:
69:
66:
64:
61:
60:
59:
58:
54:
50:
49:
46:
43:
42:
38:
34:
33:
30:
19:
8220:
8214:
7830:Mixed-member
7815:Proportional
7790:Score voting
7731:Ranked pairs
7650:Part of the
7649:
7572:
7537:
7527:
7319:Peyton Young
7314:Paul Milgrom
7229:Hervé Moulin
7169:Amos Tversky
7111:Folk theorem
6822:-player game
6819:
6739:Grim trigger
6615:
6388:Publications
6344:Publications
6311:
5907:Neoclassical
5897:Mercantilism
5806:Evolutionary
5668:Sociological
5641: /
5539:Geographical
5519:Evolutionary
5494:Digitization
5459:Agricultural
5422:Econometrics
5350:Price theory
5269:
5263:
5231:
5227:
5206:
5179:
5166:
5162:
5152:Kanbur, Ravi
5138:(1): 33–61.
5135:
5129:
5098:
5094:Tirole, Jean
5074:
5054:
5049:
5037:
5032:
5020:
5015:
5003:
4998:
4987:Edward Elgar
4974:
4969:
4949:
4941:
4931:
4922:
4910:
4905:
4893:
4887:
4879:
4875:
4845:
4840:
4816:
4811:
4802:1721.1/64180
4784:
4780:
4774:
4757:
4753:
4747:
4730:
4721:
4696:
4692:
4679:
4644:
4640:
4634:
4629:, June 2018.
4626:
4617:
4605:
4596:
4579:
4552:
4546:
4519:
4492:
4488:
4471:
4426:
4422:
4412:
4391:
4368:
4349:December 10,
4347:. Retrieved
4343:
4312:
4287:
4280:Black, J. D.
4275:
4263:. Retrieved
4259:the original
4254:
4249:proximedia.
4244:
4234:December 10,
4232:. Retrieved
4228:
4219:
4192:
4168:order theory
4111:, analog in
4094:
4083:
4075:
4071:
4058:
4037:
4028:
4024:
4020:
4004:
3990:
3986:
3982:Pareto front
3980:
3978:
3961:
3957:
3953:
3949:
3945:
3935:
3927:
3920:
3918:
3839:
3837:
3737:
3733:
3729:
3725:
3718:
3714:
3712:
3696:
3692:
3686:
3685:
3681:
3679:
3670:
3661:
3651:
3650:
3634:
3633:
3617:
3613:
3609:
3605:
3601:
3595:
3591:
3587:
3583:
3579:
3575:
3567:
3563:
3559:
3555:
3551:
3543:
3540:
3512:
3507:
3500:
3496:
3492:
3488:
3484:
3480:
3476:
3472:
3470:
3464:
3460:
3449:
3445:
3431:
3413:
3407:
3399:
3398:
3379:
3375:
3371:
3360:
3356:
3349:
3345:
3337:moral hazard
3333:
3327:
3326:
3314:
3301:
3296:
3291:
3290:Formally, a
3289:
3287:individual.
3284:
3280:
3279:
2674:
2140:
1860:
1857:Pareto order
1851:
1847:
1843:
1831:
1824:
1800:
1793:
1766:
1438:
1434:
1298:
1291:
1286:
1282:
1278:
1274:
1270:
1266:
1262:
1258:
1254:
1246:
1238:
1234:
1230:
1226:
1223:s = (-2, -2)
1222:
1220:
1138:
1131:
1127:
1123:
1119:
1109:
1104:
1100:
1096:
1092:
1080:
1076:
1064:
1060:
1058:
1054:
1050:
1040:
1034:
1011:
1001:
987:
980:
975:
970:
968:
964:Pareto front
961:
957:non-strictly
952:
948:
942:
937:
933:
928:
922:
843:Publications
808:
431:Sociological
404: /
302:Geographical
282:Evolutionary
257:Digitization
222:Agricultural
126:Mathematical
97:Econometrics
29:
8247:Game theory
8173:Spoilt vote
7936:Droop quota
7875:Schulze STV
7850:Rural–urban
7795:STAR voting
7691:Borda count
7436:Coopetition
7239:Jean Tirole
7234:John Conway
7214:Eric Maskin
7010:Blotto game
6995:Pirate game
6804:Global game
6774:Tit for tat
6704:Bid shading
6694:Appeasement
6544:Equilibrium
6524:Solved game
6459:Determinacy
6442:Definitions
6435:game theory
6182:von Neumann
5951:Supply-side
5936:Physiocracy
5880:Marginalism
5569:Information
5509:Engineering
5489:Development
5484:Demographic
5355:Game theory
5332:Theoretical
5272:(1): 1–12.
5106:. pp.
5099:Game Theory
5025:p. 222
4915:pp. 166–169
4602:Quinzii, M.
4292:p. 459
4090:Amartya Sen
4044:translation
3680:Given some
2023:total order
1811:free market
1319:agents and
1267:Both Defect
1263:Both Defect
1227:Both Defect
1085:(s') > u
990:engineering
679:von Neumann
332:Information
272:Engineering
252:Development
247:Demographic
189:Game theory
131:Methodology
8236:Categories
8192:Comparison
7946:Hare quota
7896:Allocation
7882:Spare vote
7870:Hare-Clark
7840:Party-list
7566:Ophelimity
7080:Trust game
7065:Kuhn poker
6729:Escalation
6724:Deterrence
6714:Cheap talk
6686:Strategies
6504:Preference
6433:Topics of
6339:Economists
6212:Schumacher
6117:Schumpeter
6087:von Wieser
6007:von Thünen
5967:Economists
5866:Circuitism
5831:Humanistic
5826:Historical
5801:Ecological
5791:Democratic
5764:Chartalism
5754:Behavioral
5717:Mainstream
5678:Statistics
5673:Solidarity
5594:Managerial
5559:Humanistic
5554:Historical
5499:Ecological
5464:Behavioral
5169:(1): 1–11.
5061:/ London:
5042:p. 18
5008:pp. 95–132
4825:Heidelberg
4654:1908.01669
4265:October 8,
4212:References
4008:Adam Smith
3995:trade-offs
3987:Pareto set
3969:Hal Varian
3960:maximizes
3956:such that
3940:economist
3707:See also:
2961:dominates
1283:-5 < -1
1063:such that
971:allocation
838:Economists
709:Schumacher
614:Schumpeter
584:von Wieser
504:von Thünen
465:economists
441:Statistics
436:Solidarity
357:Managerial
322:Humanistic
317:Historical
262:Ecological
227:Behavioral
121:Mainstream
8183:Unseating
8178:Sortition
7780:Plurality
7656:Economics
7264:John Nash
6970:Stag hunt
6709:Collusion
6257:Greenspan
6222:Samuelson
6202:Galbraith
6172:Tinbergen
6112:von Mises
6107:Heckscher
6067:Edgeworth
5946:Stockholm
5941:Socialist
5841:Keynesian
5821:Happiness
5781:Classical
5742:Mutualism
5737:Anarchist
5722:Heterodox
5619:Personnel
5579:Knowledge
5544:Happiness
5534:Financial
5504:Education
5479:Democracy
5414:Empirical
5324:Economics
5104:MIT Press
5065:, 2004),
5053:Sen, A.,
4989:, 2005),
4960:, 1987),
4954:Cambridge
4946:Drèze, J.
4856:, 2013),
4850:Amsterdam
4831:, 2014),
4713:0022-0531
4671:247922344
4284:Myles, G.
4068:Criticism
4061:normative
3938:Walrasian
3872:
3866:∈
3774:∑
3378:at price
3188:→
3150:→
3112:→
3074:→
2975:→
2937:→
2896:→
2882:→
2873:≺
2860:→
2824:→
2788:→
2745:→
2729:→
2720:≺
2705:→
2689:→
2617:→
2575:→
2548:≺
2513:→
2503:≺
2485:→
2435:→
2402:→
2385:…
2375:∈
2369:∃
2329:→
2319:≤
2296:→
2279:…
2269:∈
2263:∀
2231:∈
2213:→
2174:∈
2156:→
2120:→
2105:→
2096:≥
2088:∗
2081:→
2065:→
2007:∗
2000:→
1953:…
1928:→
1740:for some
1644:…
1632:∈
1583:≥
1468:…
1409:∈
1363:…
1171:Cooperate
1159:Cooperate
1124:Cooperate
1120:Cooperate
1022:economist
754:Greenspan
719:Samuelson
699:Galbraith
669:Tinbergen
609:von Mises
604:Heckscher
564:Edgeworth
382:Personnel
342:Knowledge
307:Happiness
297:Financial
267:Education
242:Democracy
136:Political
102:Heterodox
45:Economics
8050:Criteria
8003:Scorporo
7652:politics
7551:Concepts
7405:Lazy SMP
7099:Theorems
7050:Deadlock
6905:Checkers
6786:of games
6548:concepts
6368:Category
6348:journals
6334:Glossary
6287:Stiglitz
6252:Rothbard
6232:Buchanan
6217:Friedman
6207:Koopmans
6197:Leontief
6177:Robinson
6062:Marshall
5912:Lausanne
5816:Georgism
5811:Feminist
5759:Buddhist
5749:Austrian
5648:Regional
5624:Planning
5599:Monetary
5529:Feminist
5474:Cultural
5469:Business
5177:(2004).
5096:(1991).
4854:Elsevier
4829:Springer
4483:(1986).
4463:16589528
4286:(eds.),
4103:See also
3465:expected
3271:Variants
2771:preorder
2540:, where
1815:lump-sum
1695:′
1621:for all
1576:′
1483:′
1461:′
1433:for all
1391:, where
1281:, since
1253:for all
1237:). Then
1153:Player 1
1147:Player 2
1069:(s') ≥ u
1047:Overview
1037:misnomer
953:everyone
847:journals
833:Glossary
784:Stiglitz
749:Rothbard
729:Buchanan
714:Friedman
704:Koopmans
694:Leontief
674:Robinson
559:Marshall
463:Notable
411:Regional
387:Planning
362:Monetary
292:Feminist
237:Cultural
232:Business
37:a series
35:Part of
8222:Project
7913:D'Hondt
7865:CPO-STV
7823:Systems
7157:figures
6940:Chicken
6794:Auction
6784:Classes
6383:Outline
6354:Schools
6346: (
6307:Piketty
6302:Krugman
6167:Kuznets
6157:Kalecki
6132:Polanyi
6022:Cournot
6017:Bastiat
6002:Ricardo
5992:Malthus
5982:Quesnay
5885:Marxian
5776:Chicago
5706:history
5701:Schools
5688:Welfare
5658:Service
5449:Applied
5286:2297701
5248:1182422
4511:1891114
3730:welfare
3461:lottery
3446:ex-post
3366:" (see
1762:vectors
1285:. Thus
1275:(-5, 0)
1271:(0, -5)
1257:. Thus
1008:History
994:biology
853:Schools
845: (
804:Piketty
799:Krugman
664:Kuznets
654:Kalecki
629:Polanyi
519:Cournot
514:Bastiat
499:Ricardo
489:Malthus
479:Quesnay
451:Welfare
421:Service
92:Applied
68:Outline
63:History
8216:Portal
8153:Ballot
7929:Quotas
7658:series
7542:(1916)
7532:(1900)
6292:Thaler
6272:Ostrom
6267:Becker
6262:Sowell
6242:Baumol
6147:Myrdal
6142:Sraffa
6137:Frisch
6127:Knight
6122:Keynes
6097:Fisher
6092:Veblen
6077:Pareto
6057:Menger
6052:George
6047:Jevons
6042:Walras
6032:Gossen
5956:Thermo
5634:Public
5629:Policy
5584:Labour
5549:Health
5284:
5246:
5213:
5187:
5114:
4821:Berlin
4711:
4669:
4610:p. 104
4567:
4509:
4461:
4454:528000
4451:
4443:
4400:
4319:
4201:TOTREP
3339:or an
1888:(with
1229:) and
1196:Defect
1164:Defect
1132:Defect
1128:Defect
789:Thaler
769:Ostrom
764:Becker
759:Sowell
739:Baumol
644:Myrdal
639:Sraffa
634:Frisch
624:Knight
619:Keynes
594:Fisher
589:Veblen
574:Pareto
554:Menger
549:George
544:Jevons
539:Walras
529:Gossen
397:Public
392:Policy
347:Labour
312:Health
169:Market
8146:Other
7965:Mixed
7520:Books
6895:Chess
6882:Games
6378:Lists
6373:Index
6324:Lists
6297:Hoppe
6282:Lucas
6247:Solow
6237:Arrow
6227:Simon
6192:Lange
6187:Hicks
6162:Röpke
6152:Hayek
6102:Pigou
6072:Clark
5987:Smith
5902:Mixed
5861:Post-
5683:Urban
5663:Socio
5653:Rural
5282:JSTOR
5244:JSTOR
5159:(PDF)
5108:18–23
4689:(PDF)
4667:S2CID
4649:arXiv
4507:JSTOR
4445:89325
4441:JSTOR
4040:genes
3946:every
3503:'
3477:Proof
3285:every
1809:, or
1665:with
1437:, is
1245:>
1041:might
826:Lists
794:Hoppe
779:Lucas
744:Solow
734:Arrow
724:Simon
689:Lange
684:Hicks
659:Röpke
649:Hayek
599:Pigou
569:Clark
484:Smith
446:Urban
426:Socio
416:Rural
116:Macro
112:Micro
73:Index
7654:and
6571:Core
6313:more
6037:Marx
6027:Mill
6012:List
5890:Neo-
5846:Neo-
5211:ISBN
5185:ISBN
5112:ISBN
4709:ISSN
4565:ISBN
4459:PMID
4398:ISBN
4351:2022
4317:ISBN
4267:2018
4236:2022
4084:The
4010:'s "
3985:(or
3838:Let
3448:and
3239:and
3026:and
2425:<
2361:and
2036:>
1899:>
1801:The
1779:and
1771:, a
1702:>
1243:(s')
1079:and
1028:and
1020:and
992:and
979:vs.
962:The
927:, a
810:more
534:Marx
524:Mill
509:List
7978:MMP
7155:Key
6277:Sen
5997:Say
5856:New
5589:Law
5274:doi
5236:doi
5140:doi
4797:hdl
4789:doi
4762:doi
4736:doi
4701:doi
4697:122
4659:doi
4557:doi
4497:doi
4493:101
4449:PMC
4431:doi
3989:or
3876:max
3869:arg
3732:of
3495:to
3483:of
3440:or
3436:or
2675:If
1292:In
1273:or
1251:(s)
1134:).
1089:(s)
1073:(s)
1004:).
943:In
936:or
923:In
774:Sen
494:Say
352:Law
8238::
8219:—
6890:Go
5280:.
5270:51
5268:.
5258:;
5242:.
5232:22
5230:.
5165:.
5161:.
5134:.
5110:.
5092:;
5079:.
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4981:/
4956::
4948:,
4930:,
4865:^
4852::
4827::
4795:.
4783:.
4758:12
4756:.
4707:.
4695:.
4691:.
4665:.
4657:.
4645:70
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4505:.
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4479:;
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4299:^
4253:.
4227:.
3971:.
3933:.
3770::=
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3608:,
3604:,
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3570:)
3568:e
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849:)
20:)
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