South American dreadnought race

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to the British government. However, the British ambassador to Brazil was opposed to the planned naval expansion due to its large cost and negative impact on relations between Brazil and Argentina. He saw it as "an embodiment of national vanity, combined with personal motives of a pecuniary character." The US ambassador to Brazil also spoke out against the purchase and warned his Department of State of the regional destabilization that could occur if the situation devolved into a full naval arms race. The US government attempted to diplomatically coerce the Brazilians into canceling their ships, but these attempts were dismissed; the Baron of Rio Branco remarked that caving to the American demands would render Brazil as powerless as Cuba, whose

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naval men of all nations suspect that they are meant for some government other than Brazil's. In the event of war, the government which would first be able to secure these vessels… would immediately place the odds of naval supremacy in its favor. England, no matter how many Dreadnoughts she has, would be compelled to buy them to keep them from some lesser power. They bring a new question into international politics. They may be leaders of a great fleet which minor government are said to be preparing to build; or, to put it more accurately, to stand sponsors for. Some Machiavellian hand may be at work in this new game of international politics and the British Admiralty is suspected. But every statesmen and naval student may make his own guess.

1583:. In June 1908, Zeballos presented a plan to the Argentine Congress where they would offer the Brazilian government a chance to give one of their two unfinished dreadnoughts to Argentina. This would allow the two countries a chance to enjoy relative naval parity. Should the Brazilians refuse, Zeballos planned to issue an ultimatum: if they did not comply in eight days, the mobilized Argentine Army would invade what the army and navy ministers claimed was a defenseless Rio de Janeiro. Unfortunately for Zeballos, his plan was leaked to the media, and the resulting public outcry—Argentine citizens happened to not be in favor of their government borrowing large sums of money to mobilize the army and go to war—ensured his resignation. 1350:, in the influential post of minister of the navy; and the Brazilian press. Still, these changes were made with the stipulation that the total price of the new naval program not exceed the original limit, so the increase in battleship tonnage was bought with the previous elimination of armored cruisers and decreasing the number of destroyer-type warships. The three battleships on which construction had begun were scrapped beginning on 7 January 1907, and the design for the new dreadnoughts was approved on 20 February. Newspapers began covering the Brazilian warship order in March, and Armstrong laid down the first dreadnought on 17 April. The full order—including all three dreadnoughts and the two cruisers—was reported by the 1652:

presumed that everything that was good in the first proposals had been seized upon by the Argentine authorities and asked for in the new design. This second request went not only to British builders but to all the builders of the world, and in this way it is exceedingly probable that a serious leakage of ideas and practice of our ships was disseminated through the world by the Argentine government. ... The third inquiry that was issued showed to all the builders of the world what has been eliminated or modified in the second inquiry; and so the process of leakage went merrily on, and with it that of the education of foreign builders and the Argentine government.

3841: 3540: 22: 1254: 1243: 1232: 2441:). Armstrong agreed to construct the ship without any further payments from Brazil. They replied with at least fourteen designs, six from Vickers (December 1913 through March 1914) and eight from Armstrong (February 1914). Vickers' designs varied between eight and ten 15-inch and eight 16-inch guns, with speeds between 22 and 25 knots (the lower-end ships having mixed firing, the higher using oil), and displacements between 26,000 tonnes (26,000 long tons) and 30,500 tonnes (30,000 long tons). Armstrong took two basic designs, one with eight and the other with ten 15-inch guns, and varied their speed and firing. 4130:

now-famous Telegram no. 9. This communication, sent from the Brazilian government to their representatives in Chile, was intercepted by the Argentine government and supposedly decoded in Zeballos' last days as minister. It was read in a congressional session one day after Zeballos' departure, and the new Minister of Foreign Affairs claimed it was proof of intended Brazilian aggression against Argentina. The full but fraudulent contents of the telegram were released by Zeballos to the press, which kindled international disenchantment with Brazil. However, in a public relations coup, Rio Branco released the

1036: 997: 977: 955: 906: 1028: 935: 886: 2654:. Their crews were in a state of flux at the time: with nearly half of the navy's enlisted men in Rio at that time in open revolt, naval officers were suspicious of even those who remained loyal to the government. These suspicions were perhaps well-placed, given that radio operators on loyal ships passed on operational plans to the mutineers. Enlisted men on ships that remained in government hands were reduced wherever possible, and officers took over all of the positions that would be involved in direct combat. Further complicating matters were weapon supplies, such as the destroyer's 1520: 3817: 3599: 3533: 3490: 3433: 2752:

apprehension was heightened by Barbosa's speech given before the revolt's end, as he also used the occasion to attack the government, or what he called the "brutal militaristic regime". Still, the Brazilians ordered Armstrong to cease working towards laying down their third dreadnought, which induced the Argentine government to not pick up their contractual option for a third dreadnought, and the United States' ambassador to Brazil cabled home to state that the Brazilian desire for naval preeminence in Latin America was quelled, though this proved to be short-lived.

1897: 9145: 9127: 9043: 9025: 9007: 8989: 8968: 8950: 8925: 8907: 8889: 8853: 8835: 8817: 8799: 8781: 8738: 8718: 8698: 8639: 8621: 8601: 8552: 8530: 8497: 8475: 8453: 8431: 8409: 8387: 8332: 8266: 8244: 8222: 8188: 8166: 8100: 8056: 8035: 8013: 7995: 7973: 7951: 7929: 7907: 7885: 7863: 7841: 7817: 7793: 7770: 7744: 7718: 7689: 7667: 7488: 7253: 6108: 1452:, asserted that Germany had stepped up its building schedule and would complete thirteen dreadnoughts in 1911—four more than previously estimated. Naturally, the subject of purchasing the Brazilian dreadnoughts already being built was brought up, and McKenna had to officially deny that the government was planning to tender an offer for the warships. He also stated that a sale to a foreign nation would be inconsequential, as "our present superiority in strength in 1909–10 is so great that no alarm would be created in the mind of the Board of Admiralty." 2848: 2549:, an experienced sailor, as their leader. The mutiny was delayed several times by disagreements among the participants. In a major meeting on 13 November, some of the revolutionaries expressed a desire to revolt when the president would be inaugurated (15 November), but another leader, Francisco Dias Martins, talked them out of the idea, insisting that their demands would be overshadowed by a perceived rebellion against the political system as a whole. The immediate catalyst for their revolt came on 21 November 1910, when an Afro-Brazilian sailor, 8761: 8677: 8659: 8354: 8310: 8288: 8144: 8122: 8078: 1473:] did not oppose the details of representation on the international arbitral tribunal out of antipathy to the United States, but because he believed that the sovereignty of Brazil was at least equal to that of any other sovereign nation, and because he was convinced that unequal representation on that tribunal would result in the establishment of 'categories of sovereignty'—a thing utterly opposed to the philosophy of equal sovereign rights. And as in international law ... so in her navy, Brazil seeks to demonstrate its sovereign rank. 2741: 2116:), two other ships being built for a foreign navy, as a result of Chile's "friendly neutral" status with the United Kingdom. The British needed to maintain this relationship owing to their dependence on Chilean nitrate imports, which were vital to the British armament industry. The former Chilean ship—the largest vessel built by Armstrong up to that time—was completed on 30 September 1915, commissioned into the Royal Navy on 15 October, and served in that navy in the First World War. Work on the other battleship, 1509: 2936: 3849: 3775: 3719: 3548: 1684: 2329: 2384:, were interested in purchasing the ship. While Russia quickly dropped out, the Italians seemed close to purchasing the ship until the French government decided to back the Greeks—rather than allow the Italians, who were the principal naval rivals of the French, to obtain the ship. The Greek government made an offer for the original purchase price plus an additional £50,000, but as the Greeks worked to obtain an initial installment, the Ottoman government was also making offers. 2736:

republic. Civil war has come many times, armed by these very weapons which we have so vainly prepared for our defense against a foreign enemy. Let us do away with these ridiculous and perilous great armaments, securing international peace by means rather of just and equitable relations with our neighbors. On the American continent, at least, it is not necessary to maintain a 'peace armada'; that hideous cancer which is devouring continuously the vitals of the nations of Europe.

2499: 2236:, was appointed to replace de Alencar—an important development, as the contract stipulated that the design could proceed only with the approval of the new Minister. Again, however, the Brazilian Navy found itself torn between two schools of thought: Leão and others in the navy favored a reversion to the 12-inch gun, but others, led by the outgoing Minister of the Navy (de Alencar) and the head of the Brazilian naval commission in the United Kingdom (Rear Admiral 7143: 3825: 3682: 3638: 658: 606: 587: 513: 484: 444: 424: 402: 384: 364: 337: 2727:, to question the use of the new ships and support their sale to a foreign country. The British ambassador to Brazil, W.H.D. Haggard, was ecstatic at Rio Branco's about-face, saying "This is indeed a wonderful surrender on the part of the man who was answerable for the purchase and who looked upon them as the most cherished offspring of his policy." Shortly before the vote on the amnesty bill, Ruy Barbosa emphatically outlined his opposition to the ships: 3007: 2961: 1564:, remarked that any one of the new Brazilian vessels could destroy the entire Argentine and Chilean fleets. Despite the seeming hyperbole, his statement—made before the Brazilian government reordered the ships as dreadnoughts—ended up being close to the truth: in 1910, at least, the new Brazilian warships were seemingly stronger than any other vessel in the world, let alone any one ship in the Argentine or Chilean fleets. With this in mind, the 1612:, attempted to ease the tensions with a message warning the Brazilians of a naval arms race should they continue on their present course. The Brazilian government replied with reasoning similar to Pena's speech in 1906, in that they believed the ships were necessary to replace the antiquated equipment left by the long-term neglect of the Brazilian Navy, and they repeatedly insisted that the ships were not meant for use against Argentina. 3833: 3768: 3712: 650: 626: 560: 531: 466: 315: 281: 2180: 2679: 4105:, based his counter-argument in the close relationship between Brazilian and American governments, saying "The old and cordial friendship between our countries is known, as well as the excellent relations existing between their governments. Every sensible person will understand that an honest and respectable government would not lend itself to play the part attributed to Brazil by the inventor of the news." 2732:

second is that the policy of great armaments has no place on the American continent. At least on our part and the part of the nations which surround us, the policy which we ought to follow with joy and hope is that of drawing closer international ties through the development of commercial relations, the peace and friendship of all the peoples who inhabit the countries of America.

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that designs were submitted after that date and that one, bearing little resemblance to anything uncovered by Vanterpool, was ordered. Topliss, on whose research this paragraph is largely based, appears to have expanded upon Sturton's work, but does not include the designs detailed by Vanterpool, even though his article is listed in Topliss' sources.

1842:. The Peruvian government paid one of a planned three planned installments, but the purchase came under criticism at home for not being able to change any balance of power with Chile. When a potential cruiser purchase by Ecuador fell through, the Peruvians quit paying for the ship, which was later converted to a merchant ship and scrapped in 1923. 2307:, with an armament of 14-inch guns. Considerations of every kind pointed to the inconvenience of acquiring such a vessel and to the revision of the contract in the sense of reducing the tonnage. This was done, and we shall possess a powerful unit which will not be built on exaggerated lines such as have not as yet stood the time of experience. 3141:, which placed restrictions on the sale of used warships to foreign countries. The Brazilians eventually contracted for six destroyers from the United Kingdom. In the interim, a plan to lease six destroyers from the United States was abandoned after it was met with strong opposition from both international and American institutions. Three 4379:. This surprise was allegedly a reason why Russia was keen to start a conflict to break up the Ottoman state as soon as 1914: they wanted to strike before they lost naval supremacy in the Black Sea. However, documentary evidence shows that the ships were never particularly close to being sold despite legitimate attempts to purchase them. 4135:

was no definitive proof; it may have been his secretary. Whatever Zeballos' culpability, his actions in that June may have been motivated by a personal vendetta against Rio Branco, who had bested Zeballos on several occasions since 1875, most notably during a border dispute arbitrated by American President Grover Cleveland (the

3922:, the Baron of Rio Branco was named as Brazil's Foreign Minister in 1902 after a distinguished career as a diplomat, and served there until his death in 1912. In that time, he oversaw the signing of many treaties and mediated territorial disputes between Brazil and its neighbors, and became a famous name in his own right. 1664:—and was awarded the contract. This aroused further suspicion in the European bidders, who had previously believed that the United States was a non-contender, though Argentina did order twelve destroyers from British, French, and German shipyards to soften the blow. These bidders, along with newspapers like the 2397:

going to Brazil, presumably with some amount of money. The Brazilian government would accept only a monetary offer. Lacking this, the Ottomans were forced to find a loan. Fortunately for them, they were able to obtain one from a French banker acting independent of his government, and the Ottoman Navy

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opined that without anything short of a revolution the contracts were destined for the United Kingdom. The Chilean Navy had cultivated extensive ties with the United Kingdom's Royal Navy since the 1830s, when Chilean naval officers were given places on British ships to receive training and experience

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British industrial interests welcomed the lucrative contracts. Much of the British Admiralty and establishment argued in favour of exports, especially to nations unlikely to become hostile to the U.K., since they would allow Great Britain to expand her own shipbuilding capacity at essentially no cost

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in 1911, respectively. Each were larger and more powerful than preceding dreadnoughts ordered during the arms race. The Argentine ships were particularly controversial, facing both political opposition and shipbuilder outrage from the multi-round bidding process used to select the design of their new

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There is some scholarly confusion over the exact date of Menezes' lashing. Morgan (2003) says that it occurred at dawn on 16 November and the span between whipping and revolt was due to the need for additional planning and organization. Love (2012), the account followed here, states that Menezes was

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to assist the United States in any war, naval historian Robert Scheina argues that the American government also used the opportunity to significantly affect the traditional naval rivalry among the three countries. The warships sold unilaterally changed the naval outlook of all three nations, leading

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The Brazilian Navy also made plans to acquire additional ships in the 1920s and 30s, but both were sharply reduced from the original proposals. In 1924, they contemplated constructing a relatively modest number of warships, including a heavy cruiser, five destroyers, and five submarines. In the same

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The United States, worried that its neutrality would not be respected and its technology would be released for study to a foreign country, put diplomatic pressure on the Argentine government to keep the ships, which it eventually did. Meanwhile, news outlets also reported in late 1913 and early 1914

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class remained in Brazilian hands, the mutiny had a clear detrimental effect on the navy's readiness: by 1912, an Armstrong agent stated that the ships were in terrible condition, with rust already forming on turrets and boilers. The agent believed it would cost the Brazilian Navy around £700,000 to

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The question that is puzzling diplomats the world over is why Brazil should want ferocious leviathans of such size and armament and speed as to place them ten to fifteen years in advance of any other nation besides Great Britain. Although Brazil has denied that these are meant for England or Japan,

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in 1891 and 1893–94. The navy's opposition cost it dearly. Despite the naval expansions in Argentina and Chile and the era's rapidly advancing naval technology, in 1896 the navy had just forty-five percent of its authorized personnel. Moreover, by the end of the century its only modern armored ships

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and actual full contents of the telegram, which proved it contained no reference to belligerent Brazilian intents on Argentina. The actual telegram was then printed in several prominent Argentine newspapers. Zeballos was later accused of deliberately distorting or forging the telegram, though there

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The end of Zeballos' tenure as Foreign Minister was extremely contentious, as another controversy closely linked to him began shortly after his resignation. The Argentine government, fearing a Brazilian–Chilean alliance, paid particular attention to the two countries' communications, leading to the

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In each of the countries involved in the South American dreadnought arms race, movements arose that advocated the sale of the dreadnoughts to redirect the substantial amounts of money involved toward what they viewed as more worthy pursuits. These costs were rightfully viewed as enormous. After the

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D'Eyncourt, who had departed Brazil in October immediately after the contract was signed, returned in March 1911 to display the various design options available to the Brazilian Navy. Armstrong evidently thought the second faction would prevail, so he also took with him everything needed to close a

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after they approved an arbitration treaty and the government made a last-ditch offer to purchase one of the two Brazilian dreadnoughts currently being constructed. The Brazilian government declined, so the bill was reintroduced and passed by the Senate on 17 December 1908 with forty-nine in support

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would cripple the Argentine economy. The acquisition of dreadnoughts to maintain an equal footing with Brazil would, in the words of the Argentine admiral overseeing his countries' dreadnoughts while they were being constructed, avoid a "preponderance of power on the other side, where a sudden gust

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Topliss (1985), in writing a design history of the four Brazilian dreadnoughts, makes no mention of Vanterpool's (1969) article, which detailed four substantially different designs prepared in October 1913 by Armstrong. Sturton (1970), whose article was written in direct reply to Vanterpool, found

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of 1906 caused nearly 4,000 deaths, a tsunami, and a wide swath of destruction over the Chilean capital and surrounding areas. Given this, and at least one primary source's confirmation that the plans were delayed by the Valparaíso earthquake, it seems likely that Livermore's 1908 earthquake was a

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During the Second World War, the three major South American navies found themselves unable to acquire major warships; they were able to do so again only after the conflict, when the United States and United Kingdom had many unnecessary or surplus warships. The war had proved the obsolete status of

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Chile began to seek additional ships to bolster its fleet in 1919, and the United Kingdom eagerly offered many of its surplus warships. This action worried nearby nations, who feared that a Chilean attempt to become the region's most powerful navy would destabilize the area and start another naval

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The First World War effectively ended the dreadnought race, as all three countries suddenly found themselves unable to acquire additional warships. After the conflict, the race never resumed, but many plans for post-war naval expansions and improvements were postulated by the Argentine, Brazilian,

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The experience of Brazil in this respect is decisive. All of the forces employed for twenty years in the perfecting of the means of our national defense have served, after all, to turn upon our own breasts these successive attempts at revolt. International war has not yet come to the doors of our

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coupled with warming relations with Argentina—and economic reasons. After much negotiating and attempts from Armstrong to hold the Brazilian government to the contract, the Brazilians relented, due in part to lower bond rates that made it possible for the government to borrow the necessary money.

2721:. The revolt and consequent state of the navy, which was essentially unable to operate for fear of another rebellion, caused many leading Brazilians, including the president, prominent politicians like Barbosa and the Baron of Rio Branco, and the editor of the most respected newspaper in Brazil, 2665:

Felisberto and his fellow sailors demanded an end to what they called the "slavery" being practised by the navy, most notably the continued use of whipping despite its ban in every other Western nation. Though navy officers and the president were staunchly opposed to any sort of amnesty and made

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fretted over the battleships' possible destinations, though the Admiralty consistently stated that they did not believe any sale would occur. In mid-July and September 1908, the Commons discussed purchasing the ships to bolster the Royal Navy and ensure they would not be sold to a foreign rival,

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Let me, in conclusion, point out two profound lessons of the bitter situation in which we find ourselves. The first is that a military government is not one whit more able to save the country from the vicissitudes of war nor any braver or resourceful in meeting them than a civil government. The

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Some newspapers and journals located around the world speculated that Brazil was acting as a proxy for a stronger country which would take possession of the two dreadnoughts soon after completion, as they did not believe that a previously insignificant geopolitical power would contract for such

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were signed on 28 May 1902. The third pact limited the naval armaments of both countries; both were barred from acquiring any further warships for five years without giving the other eighteen month's notice. The warships ordered in 1901 were sold: Chile's battleships became the United Kingdom's

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inactivation in the early 1930s. In the late 1930s, the Chilean government inquired into the possibility of constructing an 8,600-long-ton (8,700 t) cruiser in the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, or Sweden, but this did not lead to an order. A second plan to acquire two small cruisers was

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was purchased by the Ottoman Empire, the Argentine government bowed to popular demand and began to seek a buyer for their two dreadnoughts. The money received in return would have been devoted to internal improvements. Three bills directing that the battleships be sold were introduced into the

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In the end, the president and cabinet decided against selling the ships because they feared it would hurt them politically. This came despite a consensus agreeing that the ships should be disposed of, possibly to fund smaller warships capable of traversing Brazil's many rivers. The executive's

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We may assume that the British battleships embody good ideas and good practice—in all probability the very best. These cannot fail, in a greater or less degree, to become part of the design which the British shipbuilder first submits to the Argentine Government. In the second inquiry it may be

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Brazil begins to feel the importance of her great position, the part she may play in the world, and is taking measures in a beginner's degree commensurate with that realization. Her battle-ship-building is one with her attitude at The Hague, and these together are but part and parcel, not of a

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In late November 1910, a large naval revolt, later named the Revolt of the Lash, broke out in Rio de Janeiro. The tension was kindled by the racial makeup of the navy's regular crewmembers, who were heavily black or mixed-race, whereas their officers were mostly white. The Baron of Rio Branco

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The Brazilian order for what contemporary commentators called "the most powerful battleship in the world" came at a time when few countries in the world had contracted for such armament. Brazil was the third country to have a dreadnought under construction, behind the United Kingdom, with

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By 1906, the Brazilian Navy lagged far behind its Argentine and Chilean counterparts in both quality and total tonnage. In terms of the latter, the Chilean Navy's ships totaled 36,896 long tons (37,488 t), Argentina's 34,425 long tons (34,977 t), and Brazil's 27,661 long tons

1722:, cabled back to the United States that "this newspaper rivalry promises the early conclusion of a movement which means a third battleship whether by public subscription or by Government funds." On 31 December 1910, the Argentine government decided against constructing the ship, after 2379:

Armstrong studied whether replacing the 12-inch guns with seven 15-inch guns would be feasible, but Brazil was probably already attempting to sell the ship. In the tension building up to the First World War, many countries, including Russia, Italy, and the two participants in the

213:, before construction began, while the two Chilean dreadnoughts were purchased by the British; one was re-acquired by Chile after the war. Argentina's two dreadnoughts avoided this fate by being built in the then-neutral United States, and they were commissioned in 1914 and 1915. 2922:: "Since the naval rivalry began in 1910, financial conditions, which were none too good then, have grown worse; and as time approaches for the final payment, feeling has been growing in these countries that perhaps they are much more in need of money than of battleships." 4221:

was sent on ten-week South American voyage in 1911 to support these efforts. The efforts to win the Argentine and Chilean battleship orders came as part of a widespread and mostly unsuccessful effort to obtain naval contracts from countries from China to Europe to Latin

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market in 1907, but these economic problems were not enough to stop them from countering the dreadnoughts purchased by their traditional rival Argentina. While Argentina's principal concern was with Brazil, Chile also wished to respond to Peruvian military acquisitions.

2213:, 32,000-long-ton (33,000 t) ship mounting twelve 14-inch guns and costing near £3,000,000. The many requests made by the Brazilian Navy for minor changes delayed the contract signing until 10 October 1910, and the battleship's keel laying was delayed further by a 2367:

to British plantations in the Far East. The price of coffee declined by 20 percent and Brazilian exports of it dropped 12.5 percent between 1912 and 1913; rubber saw a similar decline of 25 and 36.6 percent, respectively. The Brazilian Navy later claimed that selling

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D'Eyncourt probably avoided proposing any design with 16-inch guns when he saw the political situation. In meetings with Leão, designs of only ten 12-inch guns mounted on the centerline were quickly rejected, even though their broadside was as strong as that of the

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and enter the First World War, but historians have disputed this claim, using as evidence the signing of a secret alliance between the German and Ottoman Empires on 2 August 1914 and the lack of any response to the United Kingdom's offer of compensation for the

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in mid-1914, but all were defeated. Still, the British and Germans expressed worries that the ships could be sold to a belligerent nation, while the Russian, Austrian, Ottoman, Italian, and Greek governments were all reportedly interested in buying both ships.

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A series of rumors supporting the Japanese theory, where Brazil was alleged to have placed large armament orders in the United Kingdom on behalf of Japan for use against the United States, was strongly denied by the Brazilian government. Rio Branco, through a

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After the Argentine government sent a naval delegation to Europe to solicit and evaluate armament companies' offers, they received tenders from fifteen shipyards in five countries (the United States, Great Britain, Germany, France, and Italy), and conducted a

2772:, some historians credit the rebellion, combined with the Baron of Rio Branco's death in 1912, as major factors in the Brazilian government's decision (which was possibly made by January 1913, but certainly by September) to sell the ship to the Ottomans. 1726:, who had been making entreaties to Brazil to end the expensive naval race, was elected to the Presidency. In addition, the intended target of the third Argentine dreadnought, the third Brazilian dreadnought, had already been canceled multiple times. 4086:

However, on the eve of the First World War, the Russian government—a country rarely mentioned in these news articles—actually did make offers to the Brazilian and Argentine governments for their dreadnoughts, possibly to preempt the Ottomans. Both

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even remarking that "Brazil had not selected from the four design variations," the Brazilian government chose what was labeled as Design 781, the first of the eight 15-inch designs tendered by Armstrong, which also shared characteristics with the

1632:. The Argentine delegation rejected all of the bids twice, each time recycling the best technical aspects of the tendered designs when crafting new bidding requirements. The reason given for the first rejection was the appearance of the first 2909:

In addition, the nationalistic sentiments that exacerbated the naval arms race gave way to slowing economies and negative public opinions which came to support investing inside the country instead. Commenting on this, the United States'

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from a large naval revolt in November 1910 (the Revolt of the Lash), which had seen three of the new vessels just purchased by the navy, along with one older coast-defense ship, mutiny against the use of corporal punishment in the navy.

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s keel was laid for the fourth time on 14 September. It did not take long for the Brazilian government to reconsider their decision again; by mid-1912, battleships with 14-inch guns were under construction, and suddenly it seemed that

705:, the southernmost region in South America, began in the mid-19th century. When the two nations nearly went to war over it in the late 1870s, three major new warships were ordered by both nations: the Chileans added the world's first 3246:

and four destroyers in April 1920—all ships that had been ordered from British yards by the Chilean government before 1914 but were purchased by the Royal Navy after the British entered the First World War—for relatively low prices.

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marked the end of the South American naval arms race, as the countries involved found themselves effectively unable to purchase additional capital ships abroad. The conflict forced the cancellation of a Brazilian super-dreadnought,

780:(1891). The two countries alternated cruiser orders over the next few years, with each order featuring an increase in capabilities; the race escalated in the middle of the decade when both countries instead began ordering powerful 802:

The growing dispute disturbed the British government, as an armed conflict would disrupt the country's extensive commercial interests in the region. The British mediated negotiations between Argentina and Chile, and the resulting

3158:, were laid down in Brazil with six minelayers, all of which were launched between 1939 and 1941. Though both programs required foreign assistance and were consequently delayed by the war, all nine ships were completed by 1944. 2662:, yet the caps were not where they were supposed to be. When they were located and delivered, they did not fit the newer torpedoes on board the destroyers. The correct caps were fitted only 48 hours after the rebellion began. 1222:

in 1906. The hallmark of this new warship type was its "all-big-gun" armament, which utilized many more heavy-caliber weapons than previous battleships, and it rendered the Brazilian ships obsolete before they were completed.

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alone, which would have netted them a large profit over the original construction cost of the ships ($ 12 million). The Greek appetite to acquire one of these ships only grew after the surprise Ottoman acquisition of

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Despite the plethora of rumors, the Brazilian government was not planning to sell their ships. Dreadnoughts formed an important role in Rio Branco's goal of raising Brazil's international status, according to the New York

4245:), the Brazilian government canceled it on 7 May and asked Armstrong to prepare a new design. The new contract was signed in October, but by November a new naval minister was appointed who had a different design in mind. 2478:

was officially suspended on 14 January 1915 and canceled on 13 May 1915, although at least one contemporary source stated that there was a "temporarily suspended" contract for the fourth dreadnought still out as of 1922.

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after its second modernization in the 1930s. The ship was converted to full oil firing during the 1930s, and the consequent loss in boilers, from eighteen to six, allowed the exhaust to be trunked into a single funnel.

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12-inch guns emerged as the frontrunner. Author David Topliss attributes this to political necessity, as he believed the Minister of the Navy could not validate purchasing a seemingly less-powerful dreadnought than the

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to cancel the design with twelve 14-inch guns in favor of a smaller ship. The credit may not have laid with Leão alone, though; da Fonseca was already dealing with multiple issues. Most importantly, he had to deal with

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Money for a naval building program was allocated in 1910. Although the Chilean government solicited bids from several armament companies, nearly all believed that a British company would win the contract; the American

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were dropped due to the ship's poor material condition. During the same period, the Brazilian government looked into purchasing cruisers from the United States Navy but ran into the restrictions of the Washington and

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were still in active service; the former had been decommissioned and the latter undergoing repairs. With the influx of the modern cruisers, frigates, and corvettes, however, the battleships were quickly sold for

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At first, the smaller warships faction prevailed. After Law no. 1452 was passed on 30 December 1905, which authorized £4,214,550 for new warship construction (£1,685,820 in 1906), three small battleships, three

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In 1904, the Brazilian legislature allocated substantial funds to improve the country's naval forces. Proponents of this plan believed that they needed a strong navy to become an international power and combat

3323:

saw six American light cruisers be evenly split between Argentina, Brazil, and Chile in January 1951. While this bolstered the navies of important South American allies of the United States, which would be

3169:, the newest major warship had been constructed at the end of the nineteenth century. The Argentine government recognized this, and as part of holding on to their naval superiority in the region, they sent 2864:. Despite a developing sentiment within Chile to sell one or both of the dreadnoughts, no deal was struck; the Chilean government baldly stated that they believed they had a strategic need for the vessels. 160:. These warships, the most powerful in the world, entered service at a time when dreadnoughts were an important factor in a nation's international prestige and therefore brought global attention to Brazil. 1444:," though in March and late July 1908, the Brazilian government officially denied any sale was planned. In March 1909, the British press and House of Commons began pushing for more dreadnoughts after the 3898:

deprecated it in favor of "Minas Gerais". Primary sources use the former, having been created before the orthographical change, but there is no consensus spelling in secondary sources. This article uses

7436: 1549:

Argentina was highly alarmed by the Brazilian move, and they quickly moved to nullify the remaining months of the naval-limiting restrictions in the 1902 pact with Chile. In November 1906, Argentina's

2347:

After numerous requests for design alterations from the Brazilian Navy were accommodated or rejected, a contract was signed for a ship with fourteen 12-inch guns on 3 June 1911 for £2,675,000, and

295: 1133:(which eventually received the order), favored a fleet centered around a small number of large warships. The other, supported by Rio Branco, preferred a larger navy composed of smaller warships. 2247:), were strongly in favor of obtaining the ship with the largest armament—in this case, a design drawn up by Bacellar, carrying eight 16-inch guns, six 9.4-inch guns, and fourteen 6-inch guns. 2884:

6,110,100 without accounting for ammunition, which was £605,520, or necessary upgrades to docks, which was £832,000. Costs for maintenance and related issues, which in the first five years of

1412:

today—that is, regardless of a state's need for such equipment, simply ordering and possessing a dreadnought increased the owner's prestige—the order caused a stir in international relations.

1129:

passed a large naval acquisition program on 14 December 1904, but the navy divided itself into two factions over what ships should be purchased. One, supported by the British armament company

2237: 1598:

supported the purchases, they initially faced public resistance for such expensive acquisitions. An influx of inflammatory newspaper editorials supporting new dreadnoughts, especially from

1333: 9483: 2794: 2381: 1643:. Still, the shipbuilders were furious, as the process of designing a major warship took large amounts of time and money, and they believed the Argentine tactic revealed their individual 765:

These naval acquisitions were a major cause for concern for the Argentine government, which still had overlapping claims to Patagonia and had just watched the Chileans decisively win the

2226: 1200:

After construction began on Brazil's three new small battleships, the Brazilian government proceeded to reconsider their order and chosen battleship design (something that would happen

1624:

to thirteen opposed, over socialist objections that the country needed to be populated and the large sum of money (£14,000,000) could be better spent in other areas of the government.

826:

and two Argentine armored cruisers were disarmed with the exception of their main batteries, as there was no crane in Argentina that was capable of removing the cruisers' gun turrets.

5495: 5277: 5260: 5143: 4904: 4008: 3087:

to continue the voyage. The two cruisers were in poor condition and were only able to steam at a top speed of 18 knots (21 mph; 33 km/h) thanks to a desperate need for new

2579: 2051:

was laid down on 10 July 1910 and launched on 23 September 1911. Construction on both ships took longer than usual, and there were further delays during their sea trials when one of

220:

called for acquiring additional dreadnought-type warships, none were ever constructed. The five dreadnoughts that made it to South American navies would be scrapped in the 1950s.

1963: 920: 2666:

plans to attack the rebel-held ships, many legislators were supportive. Over the next three days, both houses of the Brazilian National Congress, led by the influential senator

1416:

armament. Many American, British, and German sources variously accused the Americans, British, German, or Japanese governments of secretly plotting to purchase the vessels. The

795:

to British arbitration. However, this detente broke down just three years later when the Argentine Navy bought two armored cruisers from Italy and the Chilean Navy ordered two

1832:

None of these plans came to fruition. The closest major expansion came in 1912, when the Peruvian Navy had an agreement to acquire an obsolete French armored cruiser in 1912 (

1554: 2550: 3232:, the two battleships they ordered before the war, but the cost of converting the latter back to a battleship was too high. Planned replacements included the two remaining 1550: 769:. Furthermore, while the country did possess more warships than the Chileans, their vessels were smaller and their crews less experienced than the battle-tested Chileans. 1169:, who told the National Congress of Brazil in November 1906 that the ships were necessary to replace the antiquated vessels composing the current navy and the battleship 4341:

whipped on the night of 21 November, with the revolt starting around 10 p.m. on the 22nd. Both, however, agree that the incident was the immediate cause of the uprising.

3124:

By the 1930s, the international community believed that the bulk of the Brazilian Navy was "obsolete" and were old enough to no longer be "considered effective". Still,

2363:

in August 1913 reduced Brazil's ability to obtain foreign loans. This coincided with a collapse in Brazil's coffee and rubber exports, the latter due to the loss of the

3301:

battleships, so the South American navies were seeking cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, yet they ran into political difficulties in acquiring anything larger than

4166: 3107:, divided between battleships (70,000), cruisers (60,000), destroyers (15,000), and submarines (6,000). The United States' State Department, led by Secretary of State 3242:, but a leak to the press of the secret negotiations to acquire them caused an uproar within Chile itself over the value of such ships. In the end, Chile bought only 2194:

By May, the Brazilian government asked Armstrong to stop work on the new warship and to submit new designs which took in the most recent advance in naval technology,

1676:" policy had led his State Department to go to great lengths to obtain the contracts. Their reactions may have been justified: Taft boasted in the high-profile 1910 1760:

was requested by Chile and sent in 1911. Still, the American and German governments attempted to swing sentiment to their side by dispatching modern naval vessels (

2276:, income in the country rose from $ 718 in 1905 to a high of $ 836 in 1911 before declining over the next three years to a low of $ 780 in 1914 (both measured in 2434: 4211:

for use on the Argentine ships, and promises for additional concessions if American shipbuilders were selected. American bankers were also persuaded to offer a

2402:

on 29 December 1913 for £1,200,000 as-is. As part of the purchase contract, the remainder of the ship was constructed with £2,340,000 in Ottoman money. Renamed

1586:

The Argentine government was also deeply concerned with the possible effect on the country's large export trade, as a Brazilian blockade of the entrance to the

1647:. A British naval architect published a scathing condemnation of the Argentine tactics, albeit only after the contracts were not awarded to a British company: 1660:

tendered the lowest bid—in part owing to the availability of cheap steel, though they were accused of quoting an unprofitable price so the ships could act as

9329: 9280: 9241: 5306: 5115: 4726: 4065: 2167:, was launched, the Brazilian government began an extended campaign to remove the third dreadnought from the contract because of political—backlash from the 2128:

was the only large and fast hull which was immediately available and capable of being modified into a carrier without major reconstruction. Low priority and

5243: 3055:, between 1918 and 1926. This was sorely needed, as all four ships were not ready to fight a modern war. Although the Brazilian government intended to send 1165:, signed a contract with Armstrong Whitworth for the planned battleships on 23 July 1906. The acquisition was supported by the incoming Brazilian president 8705: 4261:

Livermore and Grant, who cites Livermore's work, both attribute part of this delay to a 1908 earthquake, but no major earthquake hit Chile in that year,

4046: 1967: 5993: 34:, the ship that began the dreadnought race. Here, all guns capable of training to the port side were fired, forming what was at that time the heaviest 5722: 4367:

In an assertion later disproven by historian Matthew S. Seligmann, Sean McMeekin argued in 2011 that the Ottoman Empire had struck a deal to purchase

2902:

s were purchased for nearly a fifth of the Argentine government's yearly income, a figure which did not include the later in-service costs. Historian

5880: 5853: 3075:

was sent to New York for modernization: fourteen of its eighteen boilers broke down, and the ship required the assistance of the American battleship

1998:

upper turrets would not injure crewmen in the lower turrets. The ship itself managed to reach 21.432 knots (24.664 mph; 39.692 km/h) on an

7826: 5836: 4862: 5905: 3115:, was not keen on seeing another dreadnought race, so Hughes quickly moved to thwart the efforts of the mission. Only one Italian-built submarine, 2006:

followed its classmate in July, after its own trials at the end of May, where the ship reached 21.623 knots (24.883 mph; 40.046 km/h) at

1718:, heavily advocated for a third ship; the latter even started a petition to raise money for a new battleship. The American minister to Argentina, 8151: 2199: 9032: 9014: 8996: 8957: 5386: 4118: 2105: 984: 4136: 3325: 1083: 1706:

for a third dreadnought in case the Brazilian government adhered to its contractual obligations to order a third dreadnought. Two newspapers,

9537: 8978: 6651:

Kaldis, "Background for Conflict," D1135; Livermore, "Battleship Diplomacy," 45; Seligmann, "Keeping the Germans Out of the Straits," 27–28.

1161:

were ordered. Though the Brazilian government later eliminated the armored cruisers for monetary reasons, the Minister of the Navy, Admiral

8002: 5730: 2625:. The crews of the smaller warships made up only two percent of the mutineers, and some moved to the largest ships after the revolt began. 8215: 1680:

that the Argentine dreadnought order was awarded to American manufacturers "largely through the good offices of the Department of State."

4172:

would go on to serve in the Argentine Navy. Of the other eight, the British-built destroyers were purchased by Greece shortly before the

2687: 1780:

Other South American navies, having limited resources and little expertise in operating large warships, were in no state to respond. The

2526:, without preparation of any sort. Ex-slaves and the sons of slaves make up our ships' crews, most of them dark-skinned or dark-skinned 2251:

deal on Bacellar's design. By mid-March, Armstrong's contacts in Brazil reported that Leão had convinced the recently elected President

2203: 1772:, respectively) to Chilean ports. Their efforts were futile, and the design tendered by Armstrong Whitworth was chosen on 25 July 1911. 1342:

This move was made with the large-scale support of Brazilian politicians, including Pinheiro Machado and a nearly unanimous vote in the

9562: 9557: 6486: 3522: 2629: 2111: 962: 164: 3017: 9322: 8896: 8878: 3262: 2283:). It did not fully recover until after the First World War. At the same time, Brazil's external and internal debt reached $ 500 and 1879: 6097: 2433:, the Brazilian government asked Armstrong and Vickers to prepare designs for a new battleship, something strongly supported by the 1825:-like pre-dreadnoughts, three armored cruisers, six destroyers, and numerous smaller warships, all acquired as part of a nine-year, 538: 2872:

class was ordered, a Brazilian newspaper equated the initial purchase cost for the original three ships as equaling 3,125 miles of

1785: 3919: 3329:

them to accept parity (as opposed to the Argentine pre-war stipulation that its fleet be equal to Brazil's and Chile's combined).

9567: 8914: 7067:

Austin, "Brazil: Small, Modern Ships," 16; Austin, "Largest South American Navy," 14; Austin, "The Fleets of Chile and Peru," 25.

5351:, 19; Livermore, "Battleship Diplomacy," 33; Di Biassi, "Ley de Armamento Naval Nº 6283"; "The Status of South American Navies," 3297:, probably because the Chilean Navy had a reputation for keeping its ships in top-quality condition, but the offer was rejected. 2406:, it was eventually taken over by the British shortly after the beginning of the First World War, serving with the Royal Navy as 1011: 302: 8939: 7755: 7729: 7699: 2522:

commented: "For the recruitment of marines and enlisted men, we bring aboard the dregs of our urban centers, the most worthless

2444:

While most secondary sources do not mention that Brazil ordered a battleship, with the ship's entry in the warship encyclopedia

9572: 9542: 5135: 2573: 2242: 1436: 1122:

and Rio Branco the opportunity to construct a strong navy to achieve their goal of being recognized as an international power.

1004: 835: 5259:

Livermore, "Battleship Diplomacy," 33; Heinsfeld, "Falsificando telegramas," 1; Di Biassi, "Ley de Armamento Naval Nº 6283"; "

3997: 2564:

at around 10 pm on 22 November; the ship's commander and several loyal crewmen were murdered in the process. Soon after,

9471: 9383: 9254: 9090: 3758: 3589: 3177:

to the United States in 1924 and 1926 to be modernized. In addition, in 1926 the Argentine Congress allotted 75 million

2424: 792: 234: 208: 140: 93: 6365: 2231: 1605: 1096: 9444: 9315: 6934: 5938: 5930: 5922: 5888: 4054: 3702: 3129: 2605:

all revolted with relatively little violence. The first four ships represented the newest and strongest ships in the navy;

2541:

for even minor offenses, meant that relations between the black crews and white officers was tepid at best. Crewmen aboard

2120:, was halted after the outbreak of war. The British purchased the incomplete hulk on 28 February 1918 for conversion to an 2077: 2019:

was built by the Fore River Ship and Engine Company at its shipyard in Massachusetts. As called for in the final contract,

9039:. Diretoria do Patrimônio Histórico e Documentação da Marinha, Departamento de História Marítima. Accessed 30 March 2016. 9021:. Diretoria do Patrimônio Histórico e Documentação da Marinha, Departamento de História Marítima. Accessed 30 March 2016. 9003:. Diretoria do Patrimônio Histórico e Documentação da Marinha, Departamento de História Marítima. Accessed 30 March 2016. 8964:. Diretoria do Patrimônio Histórico e Documentação da Marinha, Departamento de História Marítima. Accessed 30 March 2016. 2898:

s commissioned lives was about 60 percent of the initial cost, only added to the already staggering sum of money. The two

2041:

was laid down on 25 May 1910—one hundred years after the establishment of the first independent Argentine government, the

9577: 9547: 8009:. Proceedings from the IX Encontro Estadual de História of the Associação Nacional de História, Seção Rio Grande do Sul. 4744:

Foreign Office, British National Archives 371/201, General Report on Brazil for the Year 1906, W.H.D. Haggard, in Grant,

3050: 2860:

that Greece had reached an accord to purchase Chile's first battleship as a counterbalance to the Ottoman acquisition of

2642: 2588: 1982:

of the speed, endurance, efficiency, and weaponry of the ship in September, including what was at that time the heaviest

1807:), scout cruisers delivered in 1906 and 1907. They were augmented by two submarines and a destroyer ordered from France. 913: 747: 322: 4775:, 81; Topliss, "Brazilian Dreadnoughts", 246; "Brazilian Battleship 'Minas Geraes'—Most Powerful Fighting Ship Afloat", 163:

Although the first two dreadnoughts were completed and delivered, the third faced a different fate. Preliminarily named

9552: 9436: 5683:

Schenia, "Ecuador," 414; Schenia, "Uruguay," 424–25; Schenia, "Venezuela," 425; "The Status of South American Navies,"

4235:, was laid down on 16 March 1910. As the ship had already been eclipsed by new naval technology (chiefly the advent of 2760:

address these issues. Haggard tersely commented, "These ships are absolutely useless to Brazil", a sentiment echoed by

1490: 799:

battleships from British shipyards. The Argentines reacted by signing letters of intent to buy two larger battleships.

192: 78: 8194:

Montenegro, Guillermo J. "An Argentinian Naval Buildup in the Disarmament Era: The Naval Procurement Act of 1926." In

5000:, 144–50; Martins, "Colossos do mares", 77; Mead, "Reaction", 238; "The Mystery of the Great Brazilian Dreadnoughts", 3648: 737: 288: 9532: 9360: 9187: 9164: 9105: 9065: 8203: 7634: 7604: 7564: 7503: 7464: 7445: 7422: 7385: 7344: 7325: 7306: 7287: 7268: 7228: 7187: 3891: 3423: 3379:, inactive and unrepaired after a 1951 explosion in its engine room, was decommissioned in October 1958 and followed 3254:

Over the next several years, the Chileans continued to acquire more ships from the British, like six destroyers (the

3182: 2911: 2364: 2218: 1921: 29: 9367: 4291:

This acquisition alarmed the Greek government, who redoubled efforts to acquire another South American dreadnought.

3866:, 321–22; Scheina, "Argentina," 401; Scheina, "Brazil," 404; Topliss, "Brazilian Dreadnoughts," 249–51, 281–83, 286. 3480: 2812:

gave them what one contemporary commentator called "assure naval superiority". To them, the problem was clear: with

2264:

To make matters worse, the dreadnoughts' expense combined with loan payments and a worsening economy led to growing

2065:

s turbines failed. The two were only officially completed in December 1914 and February 1915. Even the departure of

1938: 1604:, and renewed border disputes, particularly Brazilian assertions that the Argentines were attempting to restore the 9477: 2450: 1719: 1432: 1358: 753: 710: 633: 574: 567: 3142: 1170: 942: 7358:. New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1975. First published in 1964 by Michael Joseph and Macmillan Publishing. OCLC 6575: 5094: 4870: 4076: 3214: 3092: 1559: 1386: 472: 5819: 4402: 4199:

The United States offered Argentina certain economic and military concessions: the removal of import tariffs on

3952:

In reality, the first German dreadnought was commissioned on 1 October 1909, about three months before Brazil's

3178: 1833: 9157:

The World of the Battleship: The Lives and Careers of Twenty-One Capital Ships of the World's Navies, 1880–1990

8683: 4916: 4030: 3233: 1865: 1629: 893: 390: 184:

To combat the Brazilian acquisitions, the Argentine and Chilean governments ordered two dreadnoughts each: the

6308:

Topliss, "Brazilian Dreadnoughts," 285–86; Sturton, "Re: The Riachuelo," 205; Gill, "Professional Notes," 192.

3251:, for instance, was sold for just £1,000,000, less than half of what had been required to construct the ship. 3116: 2648: 2392: 2099: 1309: 9522: 9352: 8273: 3320: 2803:

reported in late April 1913 that the Argentine government had rejected a Greek $ 17.5 million offer for

2091: 1616: 1392:. This meant that Brazil was in line to have a dreadnought before many of the world's perceived powers, like 1319: 1192: 1119: 736:

A decade later, the Chilean government significantly increased their naval budget and ordered the battleship

151: 60: 6635: 4269: 2299:

When I assumed office, I found that my predecessor had signed a contract for the building of the battleship

1739: 9527: 9495: 6600: 6583: 5870: 4265: 4019: 3277: 3208: 2717:

In the aftermath of the revolt, the two Brazilian dreadnoughts were disarmed by the removal of their guns'

2696: 2553:, was brutally flogged 250 times for insubordination. A Brazilian government observer, former navy captain 2546: 1802: 1789: 1543:

were constructed in the United States, and were the only American dreadnoughts built for a foreign country.

1379: 1347: 8251: 6616:

Kaldis, "Background for Conflict," D1135, D1139; Mach, "Greece," 384; Gill, "Professional Notes," 1217–18.

4183:), and the French-built ships were taken over by that country at the outbreak of the First World War (the 3067:

had not been modernized since entering service, meaning they were without essential equipment like modern

1850:

Other South American navies also added smaller vessels to their naval forces in the same time period. The

1788:

against Chile (1879–83). It took the Peruvian government more than twenty years to order new warships—the

9208: 3351:. The Brazilian Navy was the first to dispose of its dreadnoughts, the oldest in the world by that time. 2786: 1445: 1162: 1126: 772:

Facing these challenges, Argentine government quickly moved to order two battleships. This began a naval

545: 451: 21: 7459:, edited by Christopher M. Bell and Bruce A. Elleman, 32–53. Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003. 1467:

vainglorious striving after position, but of a just conception of her future. Dr. Ruy Barboza [

1103:, opined that Brazil's only remaining protection was "the moral force and old prestige still left" from 9401: 9271: 8665: 4184: 3332:

The venerable dreadnoughts of South America soldiered on for a short time after the war. The US Navy's

2462:

then being built for the United Kingdom. They placed an order for one ship of this design, to be named

1820: 1677: 1483: 1100: 809: 796: 722: 665: 185: 68: 9233: 9134: 8003:

Falsificando telegramas: Estanislau Severo Zeballos e as relações Brasil-Argentina no início século XX

6708:

Fletcher to Bryan, No. 454, 16 February 1914, S.D.F., Chile, in Livermore, "Battleship Diplomacy," 45.

6417: 2944:

before it was modernized in New York in 1920–21 and in Brazil in 1931–38. The ship was built with two

2832:, scheduled for completion months afterwards (March 1915), and two utterly obsolete pre-dreadnoughts, 2554: 2359:

would be outclassed upon completion. Making matters worse, a European depression after the end of the

2287:(respectively, in contemporaneous dollar amounts) by 1913, partly through rising deficits, which were 1594:

Both countries faced difficulty in financing their own dreadnoughts. Although in Argentina the ruling

8841: 8608: 4731: 4160: 3729: 3609: 3100: 3088: 2600: 2372:

was a tactical decision, so they could have two divisions of battleships: two with 12-inch guns (the

2269: 1944: 1811:

was intended to be the fleet's flagship only until a more powerful warship was purchased; along with

1796: 1595: 1267: 1253: 1242: 1180: 777: 431: 9298: 9289: 9144: 9126: 9042: 9024: 9006: 8988: 8967: 8949: 8924: 8906: 8888: 8852: 8834: 8816: 8798: 8780: 8760: 8737: 8717: 8697: 8676: 8658: 8638: 8620: 8600: 8551: 8529: 8496: 8474: 8452: 8430: 8408: 8386: 8353: 8331: 8309: 8287: 8265: 8243: 8229: 8221: 8187: 8165: 8143: 8121: 8099: 8077: 8055: 8034: 8012: 7994: 7972: 7950: 7928: 7906: 7884: 7862: 7840: 7816: 7792: 7769: 7743: 7717: 7688: 7666: 7487: 7252: 6107: 3181:

for a naval building program. This resulted in the acquisition of three cruisers (the Italian-built

2670:, passed a general bill granting amnesty to all involved and ending the use of corporal punishment. 1756:

they could bring back to their country. This relationship had recently been cemented when a British

5700:, 321; Scheina, "Brazil," 404; Topliss, "Brazilian Dreadnoughts," 249; "The Brazilian Battleship," 3449: 3195: 2827: 2594: 2456: 1851: 1707: 1599: 1035: 996: 976: 954: 905: 839: 498: 351: 8975: 8211: 1609: 127:

in South America—began in the early twentieth century when the Brazilian government ordered three

8515: 8438: 4388:

Other sources give different dates for the modernization, such as 1931 to 1935, and 1934 to 1937.

4282:

Scheina gives 17 November as the launching date, though this appears to be a typographical error.

4231:

The third dreadnought, which was provided for in the original contract and would have been named

3931:

Seventy-five to eighty percent of the world's coffee supply was grown in Brazil, particularly in

3319:

began to strongly affect American and international politics. One of the deals reached under the

3255: 3202: 3112: 3044: 2839: 2833: 2279: 2034: 1869: 1615:

In August, a bill authorizing the Argentine Navy to acquire three dreadnoughts was passed by the

1343: 788: 519: 491: 8482: 8317: 4141: 3071:. Maintenance on the two ships had also been neglected, which was most clearly illustrated when 8085: 7980: 7652: 3940: 3895: 3286: 3189: 3161:

In the 1920s, nearly all of the major warships of the Argentine Navy were obsolete; aside from

2919: 2915: 2873: 2467: 2273: 1855: 1735: 1441: 1373: 1219: 1110:

As the twentieth century began, increasing global demand for coffee and rubber led to Brazil's

144: 8537: 8460: 8416: 8372: 8020: 7958: 7936: 7914: 7892: 7870: 7802: 7778: 7674: 7245: 5013: 4041: 1888:, both around 800 long tons (810 t); two small steamers; and one minor coast guard ship. 150:

prompted the Brazilians to alter these plans and redirect their money into constructing three

9255:"Historia y Arqueología Marítima" (HistArMar) Battleship ARA Rivadavia (1914) – Pictures 9180:

Legacy of the Lash: Race and Corporal Punishment in the Brazilian Navy and the Atlantic World

8587: 8394: 7848: 7475: 4331:

Other English translations include the "Revolt of the Whip" or the "Revolt against the Lash."

4177: 3302: 3152: 2877: 2474:

date of 10 September, but the beginning of the First World War in August 1914 delayed plans.

2030: 1723: 1457: 1393: 1231: 6544:

Foreign Office, British National Archives, 371/1518, Haggard to Grey, 19 June 1913, Brazil,

1999: 1519: 9517: 9376: 8751: 8627: 4216: 3578: 3108: 3076: 2844:, purchased from the United States in May 1914 to avert what seemed to be an imminent war. 2407: 2154: 1761: 1205: 1092: 1047: 816: 728: 716: 86: 9082:

Pelo domínio dos mares do sul: a modernização da Marinha na Primeira República (1891-1930)

7406:. Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1967. First published in 1925 by Johns Hopkins Press. OCLC 3932: 2325:

class: with larger guns ruled out, the only remaining choice was a larger number of guns.

2090:

was halted in August 1914, and it was formally purchased on 9 September after the British

776:

between the two countries which continued through the 1890s, surviving even the expensive

8: 7498:. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990. First published in 1957 by Seeley Service. 4204: 3653: 3458: 3453: 3309: 3138: 3068: 3021: 2987: 2723: 2538: 1896: 1669: 1657: 1580: 1417: 1299: 1130: 1043: 344: 8318:

Keeping the Germans Out of the Straits: The Five Ottoman Dreadnought Thesis Reconsidered

1752: 787:

Tensions briefly cooled beginning in 1898 with the successful American arbitration of a

173:

in 1913 in the face of a slowing economy, significant political opposition after a 1910

9489: 8744: 7618:. São Paulo: Livraria Martins, 1967. First published in 1959 by Livraria Martins. OCLC 6924:, 38–39; Montenegro, "An Argentinian Naval Buildup," 119–20; Scheina, "Argentina," 419. 6372:

4th ed. (Rio de Janeiro: Edições Graal, 1986), 13, in Morgan, "Revolt of the Lash," 37.

3887: 2847: 2493: 2222: 2168: 1695: 1215: 766: 174: 8690: 1990:

was completed and handed over to Brazil on 5 January 1910. The trials proved that the

1587: 1408:. As dreadnoughts were quickly equated with international status, somewhat similar to 9191: 9183: 9168: 9160: 9109: 9101: 9086: 9069: 9061: 8199: 7752: 7726: 7696: 7630: 7600: 7560: 7499: 7460: 7441: 7418: 7381: 7340: 7321: 7302: 7283: 7264: 7224: 7183: 7168: 5520:, No. 415, 11 June 1910, S.D.F., Argentina, in Livermore, "Battleship Diplomacy," 44. 5517: 4533:, 133; Livermore, "Battleship Diplomacy", 32; Topliss, "Brazilian Dreadnoughts", 240. 4236: 3747: 3082: 2975: 2360: 2252: 2195: 2129: 1983: 1633: 1087: 1051: 706: 669: 178: 35: 4307:

This action is commonly cited as a major reason in the Ottoman decision to join the

2470:

on 12 May 1914. Some preliminary gathering of materials was completed for a planned

409: 370: 9451: 9120: 8787: 8768: 7432: 6574:

Livermore, "Battleship Diplomacy," 46–47; Hislam, "Century of Dreadnoughts," 146; "

5875: 4398: 4240: 4173: 3800: 3797: 3294: 2903: 2799: 2387:

The Brazilian government rejected an Ottoman proposal to swap ships, with Brazil's

2133: 2121: 1959: 1767: 1703: 1673: 1637: 1620: 1449: 1329: 1104: 1027: 934: 885: 719: 2816:, the Ottomans would possess two dreadnoughts by the end of 1914 (the other being 8982: 8823: 8806: 8725: 8711: 7759: 7733: 7703: 4546:, 50–51; Martins, "Colossos do mares", 75; Livermore, "Battleship Diplomacy", 32. 4203:

from Argentina, an offer to release the Americans' most technologically advanced

4159:

Four were ordered from each country, but only the German-built destroyers of the

2740: 2265: 2083: 1875: 1405: 1352: 1291:

The money authorized for naval expansion in 1905 was redirected to constructing:

1138: 781: 673: 203: 7205:, edited by Antony Preston, 249–72. Windsor, UK: Profile Publishing, 1973. OCLC 2557:, stated that the sailor's back looked like "a mullet sliced open for salting." 1591:

of popular feeling or injured pride might make a dangerous weapon against us."

1295:

three dreadnoughts (with the third to be laid down after the first was launched)

8646: 4308: 4102: 3848: 3840: 3774: 3718: 3574: 3547: 3539: 3273: 2881: 2797:, was particularly keen to acquire one of the South American dreadnoughts. The 2659: 2508: 2210: 1884:, a torpedo gunboat bought from Chile, in 1907, complementing its fleet of two 1508: 1409: 1401: 1154: 1061: 170: 9307: 9259: 9224: 9218: 9135:

Las carreras armamentistas navales entre Argentina, Chile y Brasil (1891–1923)

2935: 1683: 9511: 9409: 8652: 6230: 5356: 5331: 5323: 5298: 4924: 4878: 3628: 3472: 3348: 3239: 2979: 2945: 2585: 2328: 2187: 2043: 2026: 2014: 1951: 1781: 1757: 1529: 1397: 1274:

on 10 September 1908. As the ship has not been completed (or in naval terms,

1158: 613: 124: 41: 4296:

South American dreadnought race § Attempted foreign purchases and sales

1263: 9172: 8325: 7437:

Castles of Steel: Britain, Germany, and the Winning of the Great War at Sea

6168:, 133; Vanterpool, "The 'Riachuelo'," 140; Gill, "Professional Notes," 492. 4208: 3956:

was completed, despite being laid down two months after the Brazilian ship.

3936: 2995: 2214: 1991: 1909: 1839: 1644: 1146: 1111: 804: 743: 9195: 9073: 8303: 8181: 8064:

Background for Conflict: Greece, Turkey, and the Aegean Islands, 1912–1914

7608: 7468: 7426: 7407: 7389: 7348: 7291: 7206: 6416:

Presentation to Federal Congress by Federal Deputy for Rio Grande do Sul,

6098:

The First Update of the Maddison Project; Re-Estimating Growth Before 1820

2498: 2132:

slowed completion of the ship; it was commissioned into the Royal Navy as

1943:

followed on 30 April at Vickers. Completion of the partial hull needed to

1713: 9113: 8490: 8347: 8207: 8198:, edited by Antony Preston, 116–25. London: Conway Maritime Press, 2003. 8159: 8137: 8115: 8071: 7711: 7638: 7568: 7507: 7449: 7329: 7272: 7232: 7191: 7150: 4653:, 156–58; Scheina, "Brazil", 403; Topliss, "Brazilian Dreadnoughts", 240. 4250:

South American dreadnought race § Reciprocation: Brazil orders again

4200: 3060: 2991: 2983: 2906:

rounded the figure to a full quarter of each government's annual income.

2718: 2667: 2534: 2471: 2186:

depicted prior to its British modifications, which included removing the

1971: 1935: 1931: 1661: 1275: 1214:

concept, which was represented by the surprisingly fast construction and

1211: 1166: 1115: 157: 128: 26: 9265: 9121:

The 'Loose Dreadnoughts': South America's Struggle for Naval Preeminence

8985:." Departamento de Estudios Históricos Navales. Accessed 30 March 2016. 8574: 8563: 8545: 8523: 8508: 8468: 8446: 8424: 8402: 8380: 8365: 8281: 8259: 8237: 8173: 8093: 8050: 8028: 7988: 7966: 7944: 7922: 7900: 7878: 7856: 7834: 7810: 7786: 7682: 7660: 7481: 7370: 7359: 7337:

Rulers, Guns, and Money: The Global Arms Trade in the Age of Imperialism

7310: 7142: 6208:

Topliss, "Brazilian Dreadnoughts," 284; Gill, "Professional Notes," 555.

5101:(Wellington), 12 September 1908, 13; "Naval and Military Intelligence," 3091:

and boiler tubes. With repairs, both participated in the war as part of

2628:

Key warships that remained in government hands included the old cruiser

1668:(London), turned their anger on the American government under President 822:; plans for Argentina's larger battleships were discarded. In addition, 135:

whose capabilities far outstripped older vessels in the world's navies.

9416: 8731: 8295: 8129: 8107: 8063: 8042: 7619: 7172: 3672: 2020: 1891: 1608:, swayed the public to support the purchases. The Argentine President, 1538: 223: 132: 8339: 7827:

Brazilian Battleship 'Minas Geraes'—Most Powerful Fighting Ship Afloat

2622: 2517:, probably during the ship's visit to the United States in early 1913. 1868:

bought an ex-Spanish 1,125-long-ton (1,143 t) protected cruiser,

8859: 8774: 8614: 7457:

Naval Mutinies of the Twentieth Century: An International Perspective

6601:

Argentine Pride Outweighs $ 6,000,000 Profit Greece Offers for Moreno

6584:

Argentine Pride Outweighs $ 6,000,000 Profit Greece Offers for Moreno

4273:

simple typographical error inadvertently repeated in Grant's account.

3965:

Many contemporary sources reported the varying versions, including:

3824: 3681: 3637: 3334: 3316: 3148: 3006: 2960: 2295:

by 1912. In May, the president commented negatively on the new ship:

2179: 1995: 1979: 1927: 1579:

The Argentine government's alarm continued under de Oca's successor,

1363: 1150: 1142: 773: 702: 657: 605: 586: 512: 483: 443: 423: 401: 383: 363: 336: 112: 108: 7249:. 11th ed. 29 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1910–11. 3099:

year, the newly arrived American naval mission, led by Rear Admiral

1619:

seventy-two to thirteen. Three months later, it was defeated in the

1210:

in 1913). This was wrought by the debut of the United Kingdom's new

4098: 3305: 3285:

dropped with the beginning of the Second World War. Soon after the

2821: 2033:

of New Jersey. The steel for the ships was largely supplied by the

1734:

The Chilean government delayed their naval plans after a financial

1691: 1281: 1071:

Information compiled from Scheina, "Brazil", in Gardiner and Gray,

241:

Major Argentine and Chilean warship purchases and orders, 1887–1902

4215:

loan to the Argentine government. Furthermore, the United States'

4119:

Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 § Hague Convention of 1907

3499: 3312: 3132:

from June 1931 to April 1938. Plans to give similar treatment to

2948:

to release the exhaust from the dual-burning (both coal and oil)

2655: 2527: 1784:, fourth largest on the continent, had been decimated during the 1743: 683:

The dates refer to when ships were ordered from the constructors.

7167:. Translated by Alfred Kurti. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1973. 6485:

Foreign Office, British National Archives, 371/1051, Haggard to

1440:

which would disrupt the British naval plan set in place by the "

9281:"Historia y Arqueología Marítima" (HistArMar) – Battleship ARA 8212:

Universidad del Centro de Estudios Macroeconómicos de Argentina

6933:

Livermore, "Battleship Diplomacy," 48; Graser Schornstheimer, "

6317:

Topliss, "Brazilian Dreadnoughts," 285–86; "E Rio de Janeiro,"

5089:(London), 14 July 1908, 8c; "Naval and Military Intelligence," 4131: 3816: 3598: 3532: 3489: 3432: 3356: 2949: 2678: 1819:

reported in 1905 that this new navy would be composed of three

1183:

allowed the American government to intervene in Cuban affairs.

746:. These ships would be added to two central battery ironclads, 116: 16:

Early 20th century arms race among Argentina, Brazil, and Chile

9242:"Historia y Arqueología Marítima" (HistArMar) Battleships ARA 9212: 6784:

Serviço de Documentação da Marinha – Histórico de Navios.

3272:

was modernized in the United Kingdom from 1929 to 1931 at the

2707:); João Cândido handing control of the ship back to the navy ( 1860:

in 1908 and the 1,400-long-ton (1,422 t) torpedo gunboat

9037: