208:. The reporting of what became a debacle for the South Vietnamese military, and the condemnation heaped upon it by the Western press became a controversial issue that then attracted a great deal of public attention. Both the US mission and Washington condemned the reports and questioned the motives of the correspondents involved. The Kennedy administration then went on the offensive, bombarding news editors in the US with complaints concerning the accuracy of the reporting of the Saigon press corps. The chain of events led to the interesting conundrum of American periodicals attacking the accuracy of their own on-the-spot reporters. The correspondents, however, did not question the black-and-white assumptions of the time that the war was a part of the larger struggle between the free world and totalitarianism or whether the war was beyond America's ability to win. They perceived their issues with the Saigon government as a conflict over tactics, not principles. Diem's government and military were hindering a positive solution to the problem. According to the reporters, the solution was for the US either to get rid of Diem or to take over direct control of the war itself.
592:
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disagreed with the policy of supporting Diem, were not. They leaked information from discussions with Diem to the press, embarrassing him and thwarting the embassy's vigorous efforts to win an end to the anti-Buddhist repressions. Once again, however, despite occasional factual errors and conflict between the press and the embassy, most of the news commentaries were reasonably accurate. The US Army's official history of military-media relations reported, "Although marred at times by rhetoric and mistaken facts, they often probed to the heart of the crisis." During the
Buddhist Crisis, the number of correspondents in South Vietnam swelled from an original nucleus of eight to a contingent of over 60.
398:; one of the points of attack was the U.S. Embassy in Saigon. Though US troops were able to fend off the Viet Cong and ultimately prevailed militarily, the attack signaled a turning point in both the US troops' morale and in the public trust of the government's reports on the progress of the war, as many Americans had no idea that the VC were capable of infiltrating American and South Vietnamese headquarters in the way that they did. Many Americans were unaware of the extent of the brutality involved in the war, but the Tet Offensive changed that, and American television cameras were available firsthand to record footage of the bombing of cities and the execution of prisoners of war.
261:
Buddhists, and the Viet Cong) were trying to manipulate them. It did not help matters that JUSPAO was also MACV's propaganda arm, a fact that was well known to news correspondents. The
American public was also dissatisfied with the course of events in South Vietnam. A January 1965 Gallup poll indicated that two out of three Americans agreed that the country would never form a stable government and that four out of five Americans felt that the communists were winning. Few, however, wanted a unilateral US withdrawal and 50 percent believed that the US was obliged to defend independent nations from communist aggression.
329:
thirty-one years old, and 60 of them were over the age of thirty-six. The same was true of the 143 non-Americans. Correspondents with valid accreditations had to show their credentials to receive a card that gave them access to military transportation and facilities. All other correspondents had to present a letter from their editors stating that they represented a bona fide newsgathering organization, which would take responsibility for their conduct. Freelance correspondents were required to produce a letter from one of their clients affirming that agency's willingness to purchase their work.
1225:
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more interviews, and publishing more analytical essays. There was also an increase in the number of
American homes with televisions (which led to a rise in people gaining their knowledge of the war from television). The media never became "acutely critical… but soberer, and more skeptical It did not, however, examine or reexamine its basic assumptions about the nature of the war it had helped to propagate. Never, for example, did historian Daniel Hallin hear an American correspondent or commentator utter the word
356:, MACV, and the press; publicized information to refute erroneous and misleading news stories; and sought to assist the Saigon correspondents in covering the side of the war most favorable to the policies of the U.S. government. Zorthian possessed both experiences with the media and a great deal of patience and tact while maintaining reasonably good relations with the press corps. Media correspondents were invited to attend nightly MACV briefings covering the day's events that became known as the
382:
670:, an extensive aerial campaign that began on 16 December 1972. Nixon, in an effort to conceal the breakdown of talks, ordered that the public explanation for the bombing be linked to "a possible enemy offensive in the South." With no information flowing from the White House, the Pentagon, or MACV, North Vietnam's propaganda was all that correspondents had to go on and it was extensively reported by the media. The American people, however, were unconvinced. According to a
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American troops. These stories increased in number as U.S. soldiers "began to worry about being the last casualty in the lame-duck war." The U.S. military resented the attention and at first, refused to believe that the problems were as bad as correspondents portrayed them. The media demonstrated, however, "that the best reporters, by virtue of their many contacts, had a better grasp of the war's unmanageable human element than the policy makers supposedly in control."
102:
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development of television journalism contributed to the undermining of governmental authority." Although this report was commissioned on the heels of the messy conflict of the war itself, the sentiment that the development of new journalistic media such as television supplanted governmental authority in attaining the support of the
American public during the Vietnam War has been accepted and upheld by many scholars through present day.
545:
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warlike". Most depictions of employed hateful imagery or reinforced racial stereotypes of the era associated with Asians." Asian stereotypes extended to the
American soldiers' view of their South Vietnamese allies too; most effectively never met a South Vietnamese soldier or really knew the farmer and peasant in the field. Southern guerilla forces were referred to as
674:, fewer than 50 percent agreed that it was "inhuman and immoral for the U.S. to have bombed Hanoi's civilian center" and 71 percent believed "what we did in bombing Hanoi was no worse than what the communists have done in the Vietnam War." Following the campaign, Hanoi returned to the negotiating table and (after some wrangling with the Saigon government) the
486:"across the political spectrum, the relation between the media and the government during Vietnam was in fact one of conflict: the media contradicted the more positive view of the war officials sought to project, and for better or for worse it was the journalists' view that prevailed with the public, whose disenchantment forced an end to American involvement."
240:. Instead of paving the way for political stability, however, Diem's demise only unleashed a maelstrom of political unrest. Coup followed coup as South Vietnamese generals vied for power. There were seven governments in Saigon during 1964: three between 16 August and 3 September alone. The war in South Vietnam ground on, and the
444:. Burchett made no pretense of his communist sympathies, but his reporting of communist schools, arsenals, hospitals, administrative structure, and logistics made what Phillip Knightley called "intriguing reading." Because he reported from the communist side, Burchett was regarded by many in Australia as a traitor and was
212:
controversy surrounding it, however, marked a permanent divide in the relations between the official US position and the news media in South
Vietnam. Before the battle, the media had criticized Diem and argued for more US control of the war, but they were still agreeable to the position of the diplomats and
151:. In asking how the United States got into Vietnam, attention must be paid to the enormous strength of the Cold War consensus in the early 1960s shared by journalists and policymakers alike and due to the great power of the administration to control the agenda and the framing of foreign affairs reporting.
587:
or Hill 937). The high number of
American casualties (70 dead and 372 wounded) produced an unusual burst of explicit questioning of military tactics from correspondents in the field and from Congressmen in Washington. After the battle's conclusion, major battles of attrition involving American ground
494:
Many
Americans felt betrayed by the government for withholding or deliberately manipulating information about the progress of the war, and once they saw on their televisions and read in their newspapers firsthand a less optimistic version of the war than the government had painted, public pressure to
485:
The media's role in bringing a strikingly different depiction of the war into
American homes from that of the government signaled a shift in where the American public lay its trust, increasingly toward media reports about the war and away from federal reports about it. Many researchers now agree that
269:
offered a brief introductory course for journalists on the history and the culture of
Vietnam, few attended it. Meanwhile, none of the networks trained their correspondents to understand military matters. Although the "pacification" of South Vietnam's villages was the continuously touted supreme goal
264:
From the early stages of the war and until its end, the South Vietnamese people were regularly viewed by the media with condescension, contempt, and disdain. The media exhibited the "Cold War myopia, ethnocentrism, cultural bias, and racism embedded in American ideology." American journalists arrived
560:
The gradual dissipation of American support for the war was apparent in changes in the source of news stories. The traditional sources – press conferences, official news releases, and reports of official proceedings were less utilized than ever before. Reporters were doing more research, conducting
539:
like watching a film running backward. American troops were leaving until there were only a handful of advisers left. The communists were once again on the advance, spreading their influence closer and closer to the major cities. The South Vietnamese military was once again on the defensive, and the
410:
became the first correspondent from a major US newspaper to go to North Vietnam. His reporting of the bombing damage to civilian targets forced the Pentagon to admit that accidents and "collateral damage" had occurred during the bombing campaign. For his effort, Salisbury received heavy condemnation
571:
Television's image of the war, however, had been permanently altered: the "guts and glory" image of the pre-Tet period was gone forever. For the most part, television remained a follower rather than a leader. According to Daniel Hallin, It was not until the collapse of consensus was well under way
575:
As the American commitment waned there was an increasing media emphasis on Vietnamization, the South Vietnamese government, and casualties – both American and Vietnamese. There was also increasing coverage of the collapse of morale, interracial tensions, drug abuse, and disciplinary problems among
367:
According to Daniel Hallin, the dramatic structure of the uncensored "living room war" as reported during 1965–67 remained simple and traditional: "the forces of good were locked in battle once again with the forces of evil. What began to change in 1967… was the conviction that the forces of good
328:
in South Vietnam had grown to 282 by January 1966. By August that number had jumped to 419. Of the 282 at the beginning of the year, only 110 were Americans, and 67 were South Vietnamese, 26 Japanese, 24 British, 13 Korean, 11 French, and seven German. Of the Americans present, 72 were more than
260:
was a welcome relief for correspondents, it did not halt the media's dubiousness concerning the efficacy of the Saigon government or further American involvement with it. Reporters had also become quite aware that all sides (the South Vietnamese and American governments, the US mission, MACV, the
634:
As the war lengthened and the withdrawals continued, the two sides became more and more antagonistic toward one another and they battled constantly over the issues of combat refusals and the drug and morale problems of American troops. Fatigue with the war and each other have been cited for this
372:
of 1966 that the military should leave the justification of the war to elected officials in Washington. The military found itself drawn progressively into politics to the point that it had become as involved in "selling" the war to the American public as the political appointees it served. That
211:
Although the US mission was irate over the reporting of the battle, even the US Public Information Office (PIO) in Saigon had to admit, from partial information on an emotional subject, the reporting was "two-thirds accurate" and that the correspondents had done quite respectably. Ap Bac and the
62:
By the mid-1960s, it was becoming increasingly clear that the war was not going well for the U.S. and South Vietnam, despite the optimism of official accounts. As reports from the field became increasingly accessible to citizens, public opinion began to turn against U.S. involvement, though many
498:
A study authorized by the Trilateral Commission in 1975 to examine the "governability" of American democracy found that "the most notable new source of national power in 1970, as compared to 1950, was the national media," suggesting also that there was "considerable evidence to suggest that the
470:
After visiting South Vietnam during the Tet Offensive, Cronkite said in an editorial on 27 February 1968, "To say that we are closer to victory today is to believe, in the face of the evidence, the optimists who have been wrong in the past. To suggest we are on the edge of defeat is to yield to
336:, a large-scale search-and-destroy mission conducted during the escalation phase of 1965. Although highly successful, the operation would see a resupply convoy: Column 21, disabled and pinned down under heavy enemy fire. Although the ambushers would be forced back and the survivors rescued, the
228:
of May 1963, when the Diem government considered the foreign press as its enemy and was unwilling to communicate its side of the story effectively. While the top levels of the US mission in Saigon were inordinately closemouthed around reporters during this period, others, especially those who
654:
By the end of 1971, the number of accredited American correspondents had declined to fewer than 200. By September 1973 that number had dwindled to only 59. As the war became more and more a South Vietnamese affair, the Saigon government tried to silence unofficial news sources, tightening its
282:
was utilized to justify the American intervention in order to prevent regional domination by China, overlooking centuries of hostility between the Vietnamese and the Chinese. Throughout the war PAVN/VC troops were continuously portrayed as "brutal, cruel, fanatic, sinister, untrustworthy, and
265:
in Vietnam with almost no knowledge of its culture, history, society, or language, and they did not attempt to learn. One reason was that most journalists spent on rotation only six to twelve months in South Vietnam, providing little incentive for reporters to learn the language. Although the
34:
has been widely noted. Intense levels of graphic news coverage correlated with dramatic shifts of public opinion regarding the conflict, and there is controversy over what effect journalism had on support or opposition to the war, as well as the decisions that policymakers made in response.
642:
of 1972 (a conventional North Vietnamese invasion of South Vietnam) was generally depicted by MACV and Washington as a "true test" of the policy of Vietnamization. It was also readily apparent to the media that American airpower had saved the day. The press reported heavily on the "mixed"
90:
and American troops). The Viet Cong would never again fight effectively as a cohesive force. These reversals on the battlefield failed to register on the American home front, as shocking photos and television imagery, along with critical appraisals by influential commentators like CBS
572:
that coverage began to turn around; and when it did turn, it only turned so far. The later years of Vietnam were "a remarkable testimony to the restraining power of the routines and ideology of objective journalism… 'advocacy journalism' made no real inroads into network television."
315:
dealing with an acute summary of the main war concerns of the U.S. as seen at that time: "(1) What are the justifications for the American presence in Vietnam – why are we there? (2) What is the fundamental nature of this war? Is it aggression from North Vietnam or is it basically, a
389:
By 1968, America had officially been at war in Vietnam for four years, but US involvement in Vietnamese affairs had gone back as far as the early 1950s, when France required aid from the US and South Vietnam, essentially a puppet state of the US in maintaining control over
340:
would deny the Column's existence just the very next day, preferring to focus on the operation's success instead, much to the ire of the reporting journalists, who had risked their lives to help load the column's many casualties onto their impromptu evacuation helicopter.
510:) and held out a plan for the withdrawal of American combat troops. This "silent majority" speech, not the Tet Offensive, marked the real watershed of the American involvement. In it, Nixon permanently altered the nature of the issue. "No longer was the question
401:
Although access to North Vietnam by western correspondents was difficult, it was possible, especially when the authorities, who heavily oversaw and restricted any such visit, saw an advantage in the situation. During a bombing halt in September 1967,
567:
in connection with the U.S. commitment on television. On those rare occasions when the underlying reasons for the American intervention were explicitly questioned, journalists continued to defend the honorableness of American motives.
621:
antitrust lawsuits against major television networks and newspapers that could be accused of monopolistic business practices, and the monitoring incidents of "unfairness" by television broadcasters that would be turned over to the
612:
and the Nixon administration only increased as the war dragged on. In September and October 1969, members of the administration openly discussed methods by which the media could be coerced into docility. Possible methods included
320:
between the peoples of South Vietnam? (3) What are the implications of this Vietnam struggle in terms of Communist China's power and aims and future actions? And (4) What are the alternatives to our present policy in Vietnam?"
522:." Nixon's policy toward the media was to reduce as far as possible the American public's interest in and knowledge of the war in Vietnam. He began by sharply limiting the press's access to information within Vietnam itself.
270:
of the Saigon government, the U.S. Mission, MACV, and the media, there was little real discussion within the media as to why it was so difficult to convince the Vietnamese peasantry to join the side of the Saigon government.
58:
during the war were not primarily interested in the culture or the way of life practiced there, but on the conduct of the war and the disparity between official accounts of it and what journalists were seeing on the ground.
530:
The peace talks in Paris, the viability of South Vietnam, of its military and its government, and its effect on American disengagement, became the prime stories during this period for the news media. The reportage of the
635:
escalating antagonism. Although MACV officially remained dedicated to providing evenly balanced public affairs information, the situation was exacerbated by the manpower drawdowns at the Public Affairs Office itself.
53:
As more American households obtained television sets, it became easier for citizens to keep up with the war. The media played an immense role in what the American people saw and believed. Many journalists who visited
720:
in the four months preceding the crisis, only three could have been said to have dealt primarily with South Vietnamese politics. None dealt with the noncommunist opposition to the Diem regime. The four months were
273:
As for the PAVN and VC, American readers rarely encountered the argument that they were waging a war of reunification, rather than "a campaign to further the interests of a communist conspiracy masterminded by the
360:, most correspondents considering the briefings to be a waste of time. The Saigon bureau chiefs were also often invited to closed sessions at which presentations would be made by a briefing officer, the
63:
Americans continued to support it. Others felt betrayed by their government for not being truthful about the war. This led to an increase in public pressure to end the war. By early February 1968, a
411:
and criticism from his peers, the administration, and the Pentagon. Other correspondents who later made the journey to North Vietnam included Mary McCarthy, Anthony Lewis, Michael McLear from the
164:, who became South Vietnam's president in 1955, media in the United States ignored the new leader's despotic tendencies and instead highlighted his anti-communism. The death of civilians in an
1417:
244:
was making serious headway. Following the recommendations of an internal report, MACV made the decision that since news correspondents were "thoroughly knowledgeable" about the war, its
216:(MACV). After it, correspondents became steadily more convinced that they (and, by extension, the American people) were being lied to and withdrew, embittered, into their own community.
196:
conceived of the American role in the war. Under that framework, the Americans' role in South Vietnam was only to render advice and support in its war against the Communists.
471:
unreasonable pessimism. To say that we are mired in stalemate seems the only realistic, yet unsatisfactory, conclusion." Following Cronkite's editorial report, President
364:
station chief, or an official from the embassy who would present background or off-the-record information on upcoming military operations or Vietnamese political events.
352:
on public affairs matters and who had a theoretical responsibility under the ambassador for the development of all information policy. He maintained liaison between the
730:
These numbers, however, were deceiving. Fully half of those accredited were not reporters but instead technicians, secretaries, drivers, translators, and wives.
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with the Australian government, but he also possessed extraordinary information. He was later joined by Madeleine Riffaud, of the French communist newspaper
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period had been unique, and after it was over reportage settled back into its normal routines. According to Clarence Wyatt, the American disengagement was:
86:(VC) troops throughout the South attacked in force for the first time in the war; over the course of the offensive, 50,000 of these troops were killed (by
17:
1425:
394:, and public support of the war had begun to wane. In January 1968, Viet Cong troops launched a surprise attack in South Vietnam, known as the
1758:
716:
Diem's beliefs and accusations against the press, however, had little basis in fact. Of 33 stories with Vietnam datelines appearing in the
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leadership of the nation was isolated and increasingly paranoid… Nixon's goal, like Kennedy's, was for the press to have nothing to report.
506:
made a televised speech laying out his policy toward Vietnam. He promised to continue to support the South Vietnamese government (through
42:
in the early years of the conflict, the U.S. media eventually began to change its main source of information. Journalists focused more on
78:, the North Vietnamese government erred in its certainty that widespread assaults would trigger a supportive uprising of the population.
1996:
467:. Adams won a prize for his iconic photo, which was said to be more influential than the video that was released of the same execution.
2198:
248:(JUSPAO) would attempt to woo reporters by providing them with "up to date, factual information on current operations and policies."
245:
1931:
Hallin, Daniel C (1984). "The Media, the War in Vietnam, and Political Support: a Critique of the Thesis of an Oppositional Media".
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Support for the war plummeted, and though 200,000 troops were requested at the beginning of the Offensive, the request was denied.
192:. The basic policy governing how the US mission in Saigon handled the reporters reflected the way the administration of President
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213:
1985:——— (2006), "The 'Living-Room War': Media and Public Opinion in A Limited War", in Weist, Andrew (ed.),
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Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington
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The U.S. Mission and MACV also installed an "information czar", the U.S. Mission's Minister-Counselor for Public Affairs,
332:
An early divide between the personalities of the US government and the Saigon press corps can be seen in the aftermath of
777:
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Perhaps the most famous image of the Tet Offensive, a photo that was taken by Eddie Adams, was the photograph that of a
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information guidelines and stringently punishing any who violated them. Even as the Easter Offensive waned, President
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would inevitably prevail." During late 1967, MACV had also begun to disregard the decision that it had made at the
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An American man and woman watching footage of the Vietnam War on television in their living room, February 1968
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capabilities of the South Vietnamese defense and on the retaliatory U.S. bombing effort in North Vietnam,
79:
2058:
Lichty, Lawrence W, "Comments on the Influence of Television on Public Opinion" in Peter Braestrup, ed.
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decree that made circulating news or images "detrimental to the national security" a criminal offense.
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forces became rare – as did commentaries from correspondents like those surrounding Hamburger Hill.
614:
580:
266:
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at the end of 1960 started to change how South Vietnam was viewed by the media. As a result, the
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1969:
1772:, United States Army in Vietnam, Washington, DC: United States Army Center of Military History,
1195:
2004:
403:
430:, an Australian who had begun reporting on the war in 1963. He freelanced for the Japanese
71:’s handling of the war and 57 percent disapproved. The remaining 11 percent had no opinion.
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420:
349:
181:
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2045:
The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero and Myth-Maker from the Crimea to Kosovo
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declined to criticize the negative reporting, which he described as "generally balanced."
8:
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27:
The role of the news media in the perception of the Vietnam war among the American people
678:
were signed on 27 January 1973. For the United States, the Vietnam War was almost over.
1956:
1948:
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156:
111:
39:
1916:
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1960:
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176:, the capital of South Vietnam. That was followed by other journalists arriving from
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68:
47:
799:
124th/TGi, document 1.103 (Report). PAVN's Department of warfare. February 11, 1969.
1940:
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479:." Whether that statement was actually made by Johnson has been called into doubt.
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64:
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The highly-dangerous task of reporting with the PAVN/VC in the South was left to
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106:
95:
1899:
Getting It Wrong: Ten of the Greatest Misreported Stories in American Journalism
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With the breakdown of peace negotiations with Hanoi, President Nixon launched
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By 1964, the leadership of both the US and South Vietnam had changed hands.
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The first editorial about the rise of communism in Vietnam was published by
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The next "big story" to come out of Vietnam occurred in May 1969 with the
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563:
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101:
31:
1952:
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The Military/Media Clash and the New Principle of War : Media Spin
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In January 1963, South Vietnamese forces engaged the Viet Cong at the
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132:
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98:, undermined the U.S. position that the Tet Offensive was a failure.
83:
1944:
602:
431:
189:
148:
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291:", which means "Vietnamese Communist," is considered pejorative).
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in January 1955. After the United States threw its weight behind
1635:
1897:
Campbell, W. Joseph (2010). "Debunking the 'Cronkite Moment'".
173:
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showed only 32 percent of the population approved of President
778:"From Vietnam to Iraq: How Americans Have Rated the President"
50:, official news releases and reports of official proceedings.
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Videorecording of entire debate proceedings available at the
556:
which helped expose the massacre four years after it occurred
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is reported to have said, "If I've lost Cronkite, I've lost
1987:
Rolling Thunder in A Gentle Land: The Vietnam War Revisited
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1042:"Democracy and Protracted War: The Impact of Television"
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Critical "failures to convey" occurred. During the 1968
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Paper Soldiers: The American Press and the Vietnam War
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1375:"Cronkite, who defined the role of anchor, dies at 92"
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1128:"Binh Phu: A Lesson in How Viet Cong Village Operates"
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Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1962–1968
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601:, the official U.S. armed forces newspaper, while in
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The Tet Offensive: Politics, War, and Public Opinion
2068:"The My Lai Massacre and Courts-Martial: An Account"
2047:. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
1695:
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Winfrey, Lee; Schaffer, Michael D. (July 17, 2009).
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change would have far-reaching detrimental effects.
1901:. University of California Press. pp. 85–100.
1502:
840:
804:
514:the United States was going to get out, but rather
463:by the Southern Vietnamese Police General, General
2055:. Columbia MO: University of Missouri Press, 2004.
1835:. Two volumes. New York: Library of America, 1998.
1490:
816:
123:The French colonial government set up a system of
1833:Reporting Vietnam: American Journalism, 1959–1975
1807:
1757:, United States Army in Vietnam, Washington, DC:
2185:
2038:. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England.
1848:Inside Television's First War: A Saigon Journal
1415:
595:News from two fronts: American soldier reading
30:The role of the media in the perception of the
1789:Reporting Vietnam: Media & Military at War
423:maintained a bureau there throughout the war.
224:The situation was only exacerbated during the
1875:One Crowded Hour: Neil Davis Combat Cameraman
1759:United States Army Center of Military History
2143:. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006.
1855:
1850:, Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press
1360:"The Vietnam War, Through Eddie Adams' Lens"
1306:College of Architecture, Arts and Humanities
1194:Halberstam, David (November–December 2006).
1040:Venanzi, Gerald S. (January–February 1983).
299:In a key televised debate from 15 May 1965,
2136:. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005.
2103:Tet!: The Turning Point in the Vietnam War
2100:
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1813:
1799:The Weekly War: News magazines and Vietnam
1403:
1193:
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899:sfn error: no target: CITEREFHammond1991 (
234:US President Kennedy had been assassinated
138:
135:to file their reports without constraint.
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44:research, interviews and analytical essays
2053:The Weekly War: Newsmagazines and Vietnam
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1817:War Policy, Public Support, and the Media
1743:The Uncensored War: The Media and Vietnam
1333:
1318:
1243:
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238:murdered during a US-backed military coup
2097:. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973.
2062:. Washington, D.C.: Wilson Center, 1984.
1896:
1472:
590:
543:
489:
380:
294:
100:
2155:
2119:
2033:
1826:
1796:
1786:
1765:
1750:
1725:
1713:
1689:
1677:
1665:
1653:
1641:
1629:
1617:
1351:
1267:
1219:
1181:
1169:
1089:
1077:
1062:
1039:
1030:
1024:
1012:
1000:
985:
973:
961:
925:
913:
894:
858:
846:
834:
810:
14:
2186:
2164:
2090:. Boston: Boston Publishing Co., 1982.
2086:Maitland, Terrence and Stephen Weiss,
1984:
1967:
1930:
1872:
1740:
1605:
1593:
1581:
1569:
1557:
1508:
1496:
1484:
1446:
1345:
1278:
1276:
1255:
1144:
1125:
1113:
1101:
949:
822:
376:
2146:
1977:American Media and Wartime Challenges
1885:. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977.
1701:
1532:
1520:
1372:
1357:
937:
870:
166:attempted coup against President Diem
2141:The Tet Offensive: A Concise History
1968:——— (March 2003),
1866:
1126:Leslie, Jacques (February 2, 1973).
775:
348:, to advise MACV commander, General
214:Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
105:Setting fire to dwelling during the
2095:War, Presidents, and Public Opinion
1801:, USA: University of Missouri Press
1745:, New York: Oxford University Press
1273:
434:group, the British communist daily
24:
18:U.S. news media and the Vietnam War
2065:
1994:
1381:. Associated Press. Archived from
219:
46:to obtain information rather than
25:
2215:
2122:"Show us the truth about Vietnam"
1856:Westmoreland, William C. (1976),
1791:, USA: University Press of Kansas
624:Federal Communications Commission
413:Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
127:, but correspondents traveled to
40:government information management
2199:United States in the Vietnam War
1447:Wicker, Tom (January 26, 1997).
1373:Moore, Frazier (July 18, 2009).
1358:Adler, Margot (March 24, 2009).
776:Saad, Lydia (November 4, 2003).
2120:Ramonet, Ignacio (April 2000),
1734:
1538:
1440:
1409:
1366:
1294:
1196:"The Death of Supply Column 21"
1187:
1150:
1119:
724:
710:
688:Media bias in the United States
495:withdraw from Vietnam mounted.
461:Viet Cong member being executed
88:Army of the Republic of Vietnam
1808:Published government documents
1787:——— (1998),
1766:——— (1996),
1158:Museum of Radio and Television
1134:– via JacquesLeslie.com.
792:
769:
743:
698:Media coverage of the Iraq War
693:Media coverage of the Gulf War
502:On 3 November 1969, President
13:
1:
2160:. Novato, CA: Presidio Press.
2023:. New York: Grove Press, 1997
1751:Hammond, William M. (1990) ,
737:
629:
307:, conducted a debate between
7:
2194:Media coverage of conflicts
2043:Knightley, Phillip (2002).
1814:William H., Darley (2005),
681:
626:for possible legal action.
490:Withdrawal, 1969–1973
295:Escalation, 1965–1967
278:and the Soviet Union." The
251:
172:sent the first reporter to
10:
2220:
1741:Hallin, Daniel C. (1986),
1200:Columbia Journalism Review
525:
338:United States Marine Corps
287:(despite its wide usage, "
276:People's Republic of China
2204:Vietnam War and the media
2165:Zimmer, Louis B. (2011).
2034:Kinnard, Douglas (1977).
1644:, pp. 102 & 191.
1422:The Philadelphia Inquirer
199:
2156:Zaffiri, Samuel (1988).
2147:Wyatt, Clarence (1993).
2101:Oberdorfer, Don (2001).
2030:. New York Viking, 1983.
703:
615:Internal Revenue Service
581:Battle of Hamburger Hill
267:US Department of Defense
143:The news then reflected
80:People's Army of Vietnam
1997:"Vietnam on Television"
1995:———,
1933:The Journal of Politics
1846:Stienmann, Ron (2002),
1840:Memoirs and biographies
1797:Landers, James (2004),
668:Operation Linebacker II
647:. Secretary of Defense
139:Early US war, 1955–1965
119:Last days of French war
2167:The Vietnam War Debate
1989:, London: Osprey Press
1917:10.1525/j.ctt1ppncz.10
1418:"Walter Cronkite dies"
751:"Vietnam War Protests"
605:
557:
542:
386:
115:
38:Heavily influenced by
2126:Le Monde Diplomatique
1860:, New York: Doubleday
1046:Air University Review
608:Tensions between the
594:
547:
537:
404:Harrison E. Salisbury
384:
324:From 40 in 1964, the
246:Public Affairs Office
104:
2139:Willbanks, James H,
2074:. UMKC School of Law
1873:Bowden, Tim (1987).
1827:Document collections
1656:, pp. 161, 231.
645:Operation Linebacker
421:Agence France Presse
358:Five O'Clock Follies
350:William Westmoreland
236:, and Diem had been
2169:. Lexington Books.
2151:. New York: Norton.
1535:, pp. 198–199.
1428:on October 16, 2012
1385:on November 6, 2013
1321:, pp. 457–458.
1284:"The Tet Offensive"
928:, pp. 126–127.
885:, pp. 416–417.
873:, pp. 105–110.
757:. February 22, 2010
755:The History Channel
676:Paris Peace Accords
552:'s photos taken at
440:, and the American
377:Tet Offensive: 1968
370:Honolulu Conference
2132:Schmitz, David F,
2088:Raising the Stakes
2060:Vietnam as History
2028:Vietnam: A History
1881:Braestrup, Peter,
1877:. Sydney: Collins.
1680:, pp. 525–89.
1453:The New York Times
1052:on April 24, 2007.
619:Justice Department
606:
558:
533:Battle of Khe Sanh
387:
334:Operation Starlite
157:The New York Times
116:
112:Ronald L. Haeberle
2112:978-0-801-86703-3
2093:Mueller, John E,
2026:Karnow, Stanley,
2019:Kaiser, Charles,
1908:978-0-52026-209-6
1867:Secondary sources
1858:A Soldier Reports
1160:in New York City.
1147:, pp. 53–54.
1132:Los Angeles Times
598:Stars and Stripes
447:persona non grata
442:National Guardian
93:television anchor
69:Lyndon B. Johnson
48:press conferences
16:(Redirected from
2211:
2180:
2176:978-0-73913769-7
2161:
2152:
2128:
2116:
2083:
2081:
2079:
2051:Landers, James,
2048:
2039:
2036:The War Managers
2015:
2014:
2012:
2007:on June 28, 2011
2003:, archived from
1990:
1980:
1974:
1964:
1920:
1878:
1861:
1851:
1821:
1802:
1792:
1782:
1761:
1746:
1729:
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1615:
1609:
1603:
1597:
1591:
1585:
1579:
1573:
1567:
1561:
1555:
1549:
1546:Media Conference
1542:
1536:
1530:
1524:
1518:
1512:
1506:
1500:
1494:
1488:
1482:
1476:
1470:
1464:
1463:
1461:
1459:
1449:"Broadcast News"
1444:
1438:
1437:
1435:
1433:
1424:. Archived from
1413:
1407:
1401:
1395:
1394:
1392:
1390:
1370:
1364:
1363:
1355:
1349:
1343:
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1117:
1111:
1105:
1099:
1093:
1087:
1081:
1075:
1066:
1060:
1054:
1053:
1048:. Archived from
1037:
1028:
1022:
1016:
1010:
1004:
998:
989:
983:
977:
971:
965:
959:
953:
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917:
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905:
904:
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868:
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844:
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832:
826:
820:
814:
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796:
790:
789:
787:
785:
773:
767:
766:
764:
762:
747:
731:
728:
722:
714:
657:Nguyễn Văn Thiệu
640:Easter Offensive
504:Richard M. Nixon
465:Nguyen Ngoc Loan
437:The Morning Star
428:Wilfred Burchett
392:French Indochina
303:, reporting for
258:Operation Candor
206:Battle of Ap Bac
21:
2219:
2218:
2214:
2213:
2212:
2210:
2209:
2208:
2184:
2183:
2177:
2113:
2077:
2075:
2021:1968 In America
2010:
2008:
1972:
1945:10.2307/2130432
1909:
1869:
1842:
1829:
1810:
1780:
1737:
1732:
1724:
1720:
1712:
1708:
1700:
1696:
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1600:
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1543:
1539:
1531:
1527:
1519:
1515:
1507:
1503:
1495:
1491:
1483:
1479:
1471:
1467:
1457:
1455:
1445:
1441:
1431:
1429:
1414:
1410:
1404:Oberdorfer 2001
1402:
1398:
1388:
1386:
1371:
1367:
1356:
1352:
1344:
1340:
1332:
1325:
1317:
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1300:
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1274:
1266:
1262:
1254:
1250:
1242:
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1230:
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1124:
1120:
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1096:
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1076:
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1031:
1023:
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1011:
1007:
999:
992:
984:
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972:
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948:
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936:
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898:
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869:
865:
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845:
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833:
829:
821:
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809:
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798:
797:
793:
783:
781:
774:
770:
760:
758:
749:
748:
744:
740:
735:
734:
729:
725:
715:
711:
706:
684:
632:
550:Ronald Haeberle
528:
492:
379:
313:Hans Morgenthau
297:
254:
226:Buddhist Crisis
222:
220:Buddhist Crisis
202:
194:John F. Kennedy
141:
121:
110:(photograph by
109:
107:My Lai Massacre
96:Walter Cronkite
28:
23:
22:
15:
12:
11:
5:
2217:
2207:
2206:
2201:
2196:
2182:
2181:
2175:
2162:
2158:Hamburger Hill
2153:
2144:
2137:
2130:
2117:
2111:
2098:
2091:
2084:
2066:Linder, Doug.
2063:
2056:
2049:
2040:
2031:
2024:
2017:
1992:
1982:
1970:"Presentation"
1965:
1928:
1923:Felman, Marc,
1921:
1907:
1894:
1879:
1868:
1865:
1864:
1863:
1853:
1841:
1838:
1837:
1836:
1828:
1825:
1824:
1823:
1809:
1806:
1805:
1804:
1794:
1784:
1778:
1763:
1748:
1736:
1733:
1731:
1730:
1728:, p. 610.
1718:
1716:, p. 603.
1706:
1704:, p. 206.
1694:
1692:, p. 548.
1682:
1670:
1668:, p. 141.
1658:
1646:
1634:
1632:, p. 272.
1622:
1620:, p. 215.
1610:
1608:, p. 179.
1598:
1596:, p. 163.
1586:
1584:, p. 174.
1574:
1572:, p. 208.
1562:
1560:, p. 210.
1550:
1537:
1525:
1523:, p. 192.
1513:
1501:
1489:
1477:
1465:
1439:
1408:
1406:, p. 251.
1396:
1365:
1350:
1348:, p. 187.
1338:
1336:, p. 458.
1334:Knightley 2002
1323:
1319:Knightley 2002
1311:
1293:
1272:
1270:, p. 387.
1260:
1258:, p. 158.
1248:
1244:Stienmann 2002
1236:
1232:Knightley 2002
1224:
1212:
1186:
1184:, p. 234.
1174:
1172:, p. 197.
1162:
1149:
1137:
1118:
1116:, p. 177.
1106:
1104:, p. 175.
1094:
1092:, p. 256.
1082:
1080:, p. 254.
1067:
1065:, p. 236.
1055:
1029:
1027:, p. 228.
1017:
1015:, p. 124.
1005:
1003:, p. 102.
990:
978:
966:
954:
942:
940:, p. 109.
930:
918:
906:
887:
883:Knightley 2002
875:
863:
851:
839:
827:
815:
803:
791:
768:
741:
739:
736:
733:
732:
723:
718:New York Times
708:
707:
705:
702:
701:
700:
695:
690:
683:
680:
631:
628:
527:
524:
508:Vietnamization
491:
488:
477:Middle America
473:Lyndon Johnson
417:R. K. Karanjia
408:New York Times
378:
375:
346:Barry Zorthian
309:McGeorge Bundy
296:
293:
253:
250:
221:
218:
201:
198:
170:New York Times
140:
137:
120:
117:
26:
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
2216:
2205:
2202:
2200:
2197:
2195:
2192:
2191:
2189:
2178:
2172:
2168:
2163:
2159:
2154:
2150:
2145:
2142:
2138:
2135:
2131:
2127:
2123:
2118:
2114:
2108:
2105:. JHU Press.
2104:
2099:
2096:
2092:
2089:
2085:
2073:
2072:Famous Trials
2069:
2064:
2061:
2057:
2054:
2050:
2046:
2041:
2037:
2032:
2029:
2025:
2022:
2018:
2006:
2002:
1998:
1993:
1988:
1983:
1978:
1971:
1966:
1962:
1958:
1954:
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1938:
1934:
1929:
1926:
1922:
1918:
1914:
1910:
1904:
1900:
1895:
1892:
1891:0-89158-012-3
1888:
1884:
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1859:
1854:
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1843:
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1779:0-16-048696-3
1775:
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1534:
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1522:
1517:
1510:
1505:
1498:
1493:
1486:
1481:
1474:
1473:Campbell 2010
1469:
1454:
1450:
1443:
1427:
1423:
1419:
1412:
1405:
1400:
1384:
1380:
1379:News Observer
1376:
1369:
1361:
1354:
1347:
1342:
1335:
1330:
1328:
1320:
1315:
1307:
1303:
1297:
1289:
1285:
1279:
1277:
1269:
1264:
1257:
1252:
1246:, p. 33.
1245:
1240:
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1228:
1221:
1216:
1201:
1197:
1190:
1183:
1178:
1171:
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1110:
1103:
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1079:
1074:
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1059:
1051:
1047:
1043:
1036:
1034:
1026:
1021:
1014:
1009:
1002:
997:
995:
988:, p. 75.
987:
982:
976:, p. 46.
975:
970:
964:, p. 44.
963:
958:
952:, p. 45.
951:
946:
939:
934:
927:
922:
916:, p. 36.
915:
910:
902:
897:, p. 35.
896:
891:
884:
879:
872:
867:
861:, p. 43.
860:
855:
848:
843:
836:
831:
824:
819:
812:
807:
795:
779:
772:
756:
752:
746:
742:
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719:
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541:
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448:
443:
439:
438:
433:
429:
424:
422:
419:from India.
418:
414:
409:
405:
399:
397:
396:Tet Offensive
393:
383:
374:
371:
365:
363:
359:
355:
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342:
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335:
330:
327:
322:
319:
314:
310:
306:
302:
301:Eric Sevareid
292:
290:
286:
281:
280:domino theory
277:
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162:Ngo Dinh Diem
159:
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136:
134:
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103:
99:
97:
94:
89:
85:
81:
77:
76:Tet Offensive
72:
70:
66:
60:
57:
56:South Vietnam
51:
49:
45:
41:
36:
33:
19:
2166:
2157:
2148:
2140:
2133:
2125:
2102:
2094:
2087:
2076:. Retrieved
2071:
2059:
2052:
2044:
2035:
2027:
2020:
2009:, retrieved
2005:the original
2000:
1986:
1979:(Conference)
1976:
1936:
1932:
1924:
1898:
1882:
1874:
1857:
1847:
1832:
1820:, Parameters
1816:
1798:
1788:
1768:
1753:
1742:
1735:Bibliography
1726:Hammond 1996
1721:
1714:Hammond 1996
1709:
1697:
1690:Hammond 1996
1685:
1678:Hammond 1996
1673:
1666:Hammond 1996
1661:
1654:Hammond 1996
1649:
1642:Landers 2004
1637:
1630:Zaffiri 1988
1625:
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847:Hammond 1998
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818:
813:, p. 1.
811:Hammond 1998
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1497:Hallin 1984
1487:, p. .
1485:Hallin 1986
1389:October 31,
1346:Bowden 1987
1256:Hallin 1986
1234:, p. .
1145:Zimmer 2011
1114:Bowden 1987
1102:Bowden 1987
950:Hallin 1986
837:, p. .
823:Hallin 1986
672:Harris poll
661:martial law
585:Dong Ap Bia
564:imperialism
326:press corps
82:(PAVN) and
65:Gallup poll
32:Vietnam War
2188:Categories
1702:Wyatt 1993
1533:Wyatt 1993
1521:Wyatt 1993
1308:. Clemson.
1288:US History
938:Wyatt 1993
871:Wyatt 1993
738:References
630:Last years
610:news media
453:L'Humanité
354:US embassy
125:censorship
2001:TV Museum
1961:154293972
1302:"History"
761:March 13,
659:passed a
318:civil war
289:Viet Cong
285:Viet Cong
256:Although
242:Viet Cong
145:communism
133:Hong Kong
129:Singapore
84:Viet Cong
1544:Hallin,
1432:July 18,
780:. Gallup
721:typical.
682:See also
617:audits,
603:Cambodia
520:how fast
432:Mainichi
252:Problems
190:Newsweek
149:Cold War
147:and the
1953:2130432
548:One of
526:Changes
512:whether
406:of the
178:Reuters
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2011:May 2,
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1362:. NPR.
554:My Lai
200:Ap Bac
174:Saigon
1973:(PDF)
1957:S2CID
1949:JSTOR
1913:JSTOR
704:Notes
2171:ISBN
2107:ISBN
2080:2020
2013:2020
1903:ISBN
1887:ISBN
1774:ISBN
1460:2009
1434:2009
1391:2013
1207:2018
901:help
786:2018
763:2019
638:The
531:Tet/
518:and
415:and
311:and
188:and
186:Time
1941:doi
516:how
362:CIA
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182:AFP
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