938:
73:
913:
1375:, where candidates are compared in one-on-one matchups to determine relative preference. For each pair of candidates, there is a count for how many voters prefer the first candidate in the pair to the second candidate The resulting table of pairwise counts eliminates the step-by-step redistribution of votes, which is usually the cause for spoilers in other methods. This pairwise comparison means that spoilers can only occur when there is a
1587:
1696:
1642:
925:
1770:
1547:, often leads to a third-party that underperforms its poll numbers with voters wanting to make sure their least favorite candidate is not in power. Third-party campaigns are more likely to result in the candidate a third party voter least wants in the White House. Third-party candidates prefer to focus on their platform than on their impact on the frontrunners.
1003:. Often times the term spoiler will be applied to candidates or situations which do not meet the full definition, typically in real-world scenarios where the introduction of a new candidate can cause voters to change their opinions, either through their campaign or merely by existing. A voting system that is not affected by spoilers is called
1323:. In these systems, the presence of many ideologically-similar candidates causes their vote total to be split between them, placing these candidates at a disadvantage. This is most visible in elections where a minor candidate draws votes away from a major candidate with similar politics, thereby causing a strong opponent of both to win.
2859:
2691:
IRV is subject to something called the "center squeeze." A popular moderate can receive relatively few first-place votes through no fault of her own but because of vote splitting from candidates to the right and left. ... Approval voting thus appears to solve the problem of vote splitting simply and
2285:
IRV is subject to something called the "center squeeze." A popular moderate can receive relatively few first-place votes through no fault of her own but because of vote splitting from candidates to the right and left. ... Approval voting thus appears to solve the problem of vote splitting simply and
1415:
The outcome of rated voting depends on the scale used by the voter or assumed by the mechanism. If the voters use relative scales, i.e. scales that depend on what candidates are running, then the outcome can change if candidates who don't win drop out. Empirical results from panel data suggest that
1411:
are the two most prominent examples of rated voting rules. Whenever voters rate candidates independently, the rating given to one candidate does not affect the ratings given to the other candidates. Any new candidate cannot change the winner of the race without becoming the winner themselves, which
3380:
to the election if A beats B in a head-to-head majority vote. For example, although the 2000 U.S. Presidential
Election in Florida did not use ranked ballots, it is plausible (see Magee 2003) that Al Gore (A) would have won without Ralph Nader (B) in the election, and Gore would have beaten Nader
2604:
to the election if A beats B in a head-to-head majority vote. For example, although the 2000 U.S. Presidential
Election in Florida did not use ranked ballots, it is plausible (see Magee 2003) that Al Gore (A) would have won without Ralph Nader (B) in the election, and Gore would have beaten Nader
4079:
there are signs across the country that groups are trying to affect the outcome by using deceptive means β and in most cases in ways that would benefit
Republican Donald Trump. Their aim is to whittle away President Joe Biden's standing with the Democratic Party's base by offering left-leaning,
3121:
plurality-rule voting is seriously vulnerable to vote-splitting ... runoff voting ... as French history shows, it too is highly subject to vote-splitting. ... majority rule avoids such vote-splitting debacles because it allows voters to rank the candidates and candidates are compared
2328:
the 'squeeze effect' that tends to reduce
Condorcet efficiency if the relative dispersion (RD) of candidates is low. This effect is particularly strong for the plurality, runoff, and Hare systems, for which the garnering of first-place votes in a large field is essential to
2035:
In the wake of the election, a poll found 54% of
Alaskans, including a third of Peltola voters, supported a repeal of RCV. Observers noted such pathologies would have occurred under Alaska's previous primary system as well, leading several to suggest Alaska adopt any one of
3952:
The perception that
Johnson and Stein 'stole' the 2016 presidential election from Clinton is widespread...Our analysis indicates that Johnson and Stein did not deprive Clinton of an Electoral College majority, nor Trump the legitimacy of winning the national popular
1343:. Compared to plurality without primaries, the elimination of weak candidates in earlier rounds reduces their effect on the final results; however, spoiled elections remain common compared to other systems. As a result, instant-runoff voting still tends towards
4050:
Republicans and
Democrats view third-party candidates as a threat to siphon critical support from their nominees, especially considering that Pennsylvania was decided by margins of tens of thousands of votes both in 2020 for Democrat Joe Biden and in 2016 for
4215:
And despite the contenders' claims that the nation deserves an alternative to two unpopular major party choices, the reality, experts say, is that these back-of-the-pack candidates may well cement the election of the candidate they least want in the White
3996:
Four years ago, the Green Party candidate played a significant role in several crucial battleground states, drawing a vote total in three of them β Wisconsin, Michigan and
Pennsylvania β that exceeded the margin between Donald J. Trump and Hillary
1416:
judgments are at least in part relative. Thus, rated methods, as used in practice, may exhibit an indirect spoiler effect caused by the interaction between the voters and the system, even if the system itself passes IIA given an absolute scale.
3536:
The Smith criterion and Smith-IIA (where IIA means "independence of irrelevant alternatives") say that weak alternatives should have no impact on the result of the elections ... the
Schulze method, as defined in section 2.2, satisfies
1133:
A man is deciding whether to order apple, blueberry, or cherry pie before settling on apple. The waitress informs him that the cherry pie is very good and a favorite of most customers. The man replies "in that case, I'll have the
3511:
The 2021 Minneapolis election for city council seat in Ward 2 contained three candidates, each of whom has a legitimate claim to be the winner, the first known example of an
American political election without a Condorcet winner
1162:, which lets any party "clone their way to victory" by running a large number of candidates. This famously forced de Borda to concede that "my system is meant only for honest men," and eventually led to its abandonment by the
1486:
A spoiler campaign in the United States is often one that cannot realistically win but can still determine the outcome by pulling support from a more competitive candidate. The two major parties in the United States, the
3629:
At best, it is contended that, for an individual, his utility function is uniquely determined up to a linear transformation ... the value of the aggregate (say a sum) are dependent on how the choice is made for each
1382:
Theoretical models suggest that somewhere between 90% and 99% of real-world elections have a Condorcet winner, and the first Condorcet cycle in a ranked American election was found in 2021. Some systems like the
1412:
would disqualify them from the definition of a spoiler. For this to hold, in some elections, some voters must use less than their full voting power despite having meaningful preferences among viable candidates.
4319:
There is a Condorcet ranking according to distance from the center, but Condorcet winner M, the most central candidate, was squeezed between the two others, got the smallest primary support, and was eliminated.
2978:
2960:
Rather, the U.S. has an unusual two-round system in which the first round winnows the field. This usually is at the intraparty level, although sometimes it is without regard to party (e.g. in Alaska and
4257:
4151:
3861:
Herron, Michael C.; Lewis, Jeffrey B. (April 24, 2006). "Did Ralph Nader spoil Al Gore's Presidential bid? A ballot-level study of Green and Reform Party voters in the 2000 Presidential election".
3216:
IRV is excellent for preventing classic spoilers-minor candidates who tip the election from one major candidate to another. It is not so good when the 'spoiler' has a real chance of winning
2099:
Strategic voting can sometimes create spoiler-like behavior, including in elections using cardinal methods. However, this does not substantially affect the general order described here.
896:
4282:
1851:
1360:
1177:
have the opposite problem: because running many similar candidates at once makes it difficult for them to win the election, these systems tend to concentrate power in the hands of
4176:
3079:
Those votes that are cast for minor party candidates are perceived as taking away pivotal votes from major party candidates. ... This phenomenon is known as the 'spoiler effect'.
1352:
580:
3182:
Candidates C and D spoiled the election for B ... With them in the running, A won, whereas without them in the running, B would have won. ... Instant runoff voting ... does
2401:
Candidates C and D spoiled the election for B ... With them in the running, A won, whereas without them in the running, B would have won. ... Instant runoff voting ... does
1203:
In some situations, a spoiler can extract concessions from other candidates by threatening to remain in the race unless they are bought off, typically with a promise of a
1519:
on battleground ballots. Democrats have helped some right-leaning third-parties gain ballot access while challenging ballot access of left-leaning third-parties like the
4542:
Clelland, Jeanne N. (2023-02-28). "Ranked Choice Voting And the Center Squeeze in the Alaska 2022 Special Election: How Might Other Voting Methods Compare?". p. 6.
1539:
candidates are always controversial because almost anyone could play spoiler. This is especially true in close elections where the chances of a spoiler effect increase.
599:
3095:
1811:
Montroll was therefore preferred over Kiss by 54% of voters, over Wright by 56%, and over Smith by 60%. Had Wright not run, Montroll would have won instead of Kiss.
1304:, where many similar candidates run against each other. The purpose of a primary election is to eliminate vote splitting among candidates from the same party in the
1495:, have regularly won 98% of all state and federal seats. The US presidential elections most consistently cited as having been spoiled by third-party candidates are
4404:
Since Begich wins both β¦ he is the Condorcet winner of the election β¦ AK election also contains a Condorcet loser: Sarah Palin. β¦ she is also a spoiler candidate
2343:"How an Ideologically Concentrated Minority Can Trump a Dispersed Majority: Nonmedian Voter Results for Plurality, Run-off, and Sequential Elimination Elections"
1579:, despite the election results showing most voters preferred Montroll to Kiss. The results of every possible one-on-one election can be completed as follows:
2922:
3916:"Did Gary Johnson and Jill Stein Cost Hillary Clinton the Presidency? A Counterfactual Analysis of Minor Party Voting in the 2016 US Presidential Election"
3881:
3152:
a spoiler effect occurs when entry by a third-party candidate causes party A to defeat party B even though Party B would have won in a two-candidate race.
2946:(where multiparty competition is in fact nationwide). Whether the U.S. should be called 'FPTP' itself is dubious, and not only because some states (e.g.
1403:
Rated voting methods ask voters to assign each candidate a score on a scale (e.g. rating them from 0 to 10), instead of listing them from first to last.
966:
803:
1059:
are not subject to Arrow's theorem, allowing many such systems to be spoilerproof, so long as a defining assumption about voter opinions remains valid.
4612:
4206:
2938:(FPTP) elections (given no primaries), none with an assembly larger than Jamaica's (63) has a strict two-party system. These countries include the
2768:
1814:
Because all ballots were fully released, it is possible to reconstruct the winners under other voting methods. While Wright would have won under
1572:
4126:
3744:
Perot was running what is commonly referred to as a "spoiler campaign," a campaign that cannot win the election but still impacts its outcome.
31:
4582:
3973:
1185:. Under these rules, parties can help their candidates win by clearing the field of potential competitors. In the United States, this leads
2059:
1544:
1023:
are vulnerable to the spoiler effect. However, the frequency and severity of spoiler effects depends substantially on the voting method.
657:
4392:
Graham-Squire, Adam; McCune, David (2022-09-11). "A Mathematical Analysis of the 2022 Alaska Special Election for US House". p. 2.
1462:
1440:. A new party entering an election causes some seats to shift from one unrelated party to another, even if the new party wins no seats.
1078:. A new party entering an election causes some seats to shift from one unrelated party to another, even if the new party wins no seats.
4258:"Third parties will affect the 2024 campaigns, but election laws written by Democrats and Republicans will prevent them from winning"
4152:"Third parties will affect the 2024 campaigns, but election laws written by Democrats and Republicans will prevent them from winning"
4064:
4035:
3310:
4010:
2137:
A spoiler effect occurs when a single party or a candidate entering an election changes the outcome to favor a different candidate.
1508:
1504:
1500:
1496:
689:
551:
546:
1104:
1005:
959:
652:
38:
1555:
An unintentional spoiler is one that has a realistic chance of winning but falls short and affects the outcome of the election.
3863:
334:
4356:
Graham-Squire, Adam T.; McCune, David (2023-06-12). "An Examination of Ranked-Choice Voting in the United States, 2004β2022".
3796:
3608:
3272:
3033:
3018:
Duverger's Law of Plurality Voting: The Logic of Party Competition in Canada, India, the United Kingdom and the United States
2990:
1481:
4494:
4565:"Voting Paradoxes and Perverse Outcomes: Political Scientist Tony Gierzynski Lays Out A Case Against Instant Runoff Voting"
995:. If a major candidate is perceived to have lost an election because of a minor candidate, the minor candidate is called a
858:
109:
2371:
As with simple plurality elections, it is apparent the outcome will be highly sensitive to the distribution of candidates.
4520:
Ranked Choice Voting And the Center Squeeze in the Alaska 2022 Special Election: How Might Other Voting Methods Compare?
3726:
2869:
1512:
952:
1529:, the GOP effort to prop up possible spoiler candidates in 2024 appears more far-reaching than the Democratic effort.
4564:
3209:
3175:
3145:
3072:
2839:
2751:
2676:
2394:
2270:
2130:
853:
3479:
McCune, David; McCune, Lori (2023-05-24). "The Curious Case of the 2021 Minneapolis Ward 2 City Council Election".
1776:
1702:
1593:
1564:
1520:
1492:
1488:
1016:
991:
is a losing candidate who affects the results of an election simply by participating, a situation that is called a
843:
593:
564:
504:
4229:
4177:"US election: third party candidates can tip the balance in a tight race β here's why Robert F Kennedy Jr matters"
1533:
argues that they have almost no chance of winning the 2024 election but are often motivated by particular issues.
2914:
2709:
2049:
2037:
575:
100:
4093:
638:
17:
702:
280:
265:
250:
3915:
1154:
Voting systems that violate independence of irrelevant alternatives are susceptible to being manipulated by
4620:
3396:"Condorcet's paradox and the likelihood of its occurrence: different perspectives on balanced preferences*"
2829:
2497:"Condorcet's paradox and the likelihood of its occurrence: different perspectives on balanced preferences*"
2419:"Condorcet's paradox and the likelihood of its occurrence: different perspectives on balanced preferences*"
1448:
1086:
516:
439:
360:
3760:
2223:
4080:
third-party alternatives who could siphon off a few thousand protest votes in close swing state contests.
1827:
1536:
1425:
1404:
1257:
1063:
881:
328:
310:
151:
1391:
have stronger spoiler resistance guarantees that limit which candidates can spoil an election without a
3818:
3289:
2997:
American elections become a two-round run-off system with a delay of several months between the rounds.
1859:
1831:
1320:
1309:
1297:
1163:
1032:
772:
755:
722:
486:
474:
444:
245:
203:
136:
4643:
4127:"GOP network props up liberal third-party candidates in key states, hoping to siphon off Harris votes"
2090:, which is equivalent to ranking all candidates and selecting the one with the most first-place votes.
4036:"Democrats get a third-party hopeful knocked off Pennsylvania ballot, as Cornel West tries to get on"
3372:. "This is a kind of stability property of Condorcet winners: you cannot dislodge a Condorcet winner
2790:
2596:. "This is a kind of stability property of Condorcet winners: you cannot dislodge a Condorcet winner
1863:
1648:
1433:
1071:
628:
621:
105:
4456:
and yet with Palin included, Instant Runoff elected the Democrat in the race, making Palin a spoiler
4418:"Split Cycle: a new Condorcet-consistent voting method independent of clones and immune to spoilers"
3229:
2886:
3731:
2934:
Finally, we should not discount the role of primaries. When we look at the range of countries with
1429:
1067:
682:
610:
462:
449:
432:
409:
387:
350:
340:
4684:
4590:
2300:"A statistical model for Condorcet efficiency based on simulation under spatial model assumptions"
1142:
have long argued for the unfairness of spoiler effects. The mathematician and political economist
891:
4065:"Kennedy and West third-party ballot drives are pushed by secretive groups and Republican donors"
3444:
3294:
808:
662:
345:
4331:
4283:"Third-party and independent candidates for president often fall short of early polling numbers"
3013:
777:
4705:
2054:
1743:
1339:
still experience vote-splitting in each round. This produces a kind of spoiler effect called a
837:
717:
647:
454:
1819:
1511:, Republican lawyers and operatives have fought to keep right-leaning third-parties like the
1470:
1336:
1277:
1174:
1040:
745:
585:
469:
275:
254:
186:
164:
4644:"Interacting double monotonicity failure with direction of impact under five voting methods"
3046:
In effect, the primary system means that the USA has a two-round runoff system of elections.
37:"Independence of spoilers" redirects here. For the logical property in decision theory, see
3689:"Intrapersonal and Social Comparison Determinants of Happiness: A Range-Frequency Analysis"
1155:
1143:
1139:
1024:
980:
876:
863:
831:
95:
2149:
8:
3894:
3765:
3400:
2935:
1372:
1272:
have different levels of vulnerability to spoilers. In general, spoilers are common with
1126:
782:
616:
269:
1507:
election is more disputed as to whether it contained spoiler candidates or not. For the
4543:
4523:
4429:
4393:
4361:
3943:
3843:
3663:
3614:
3570:
3525:
3484:
3356:
2947:
2580:
1437:
1308:
by running only one candidate. In a two-party system, party primaries effectively turn
1075:
942:
813:
424:
208:
4310:
1296:
In cases where there are many similar candidates, spoiler effects occur most often in
4663:
4659:
4447:
4101:
3981:
3947:
3935:
3835:
3792:
3708:
3655:
3604:
3562:
3502:
3461:
3417:
3268:
3205:
3171:
3141:
3106:
3068:
3029:
2986:
2865:
2835:
2810:
2806:
2747:
2740:
2682:
2672:
2646:
2555:
2516:
2477:
2438:
2390:
2362:
2319:
2276:
2266:
2243:
2204:
2126:
1348:
1301:
1182:
1170:
1158:. Some systems are particularly infamous for their ease of manipulation, such as the
1052:
937:
848:
818:
740:
677:
511:
238:
213:
196:
64:
3847:
3381:
head-to-head. Thus, Gore should still have won with Nader included in the election."
2605:
head-to-head. Thus, Gore should still have won with Nader included in the election."
4655:
4613:"Instant run-off voting experiment ends in Burlington : Rutland Herald Online"
4439:
4371:
3927:
3872:
3827:
3700:
3494:
3453:
3409:
3260:
3021:
2951:
2802:
2636:
2628:
2547:
2508:
2469:
2430:
2354:
2311:
2235:
2194:
2186:
2083:
1839:
1823:
1815:
1540:
1525:
1392:
1344:
1332:
1313:
1305:
1281:
1273:
1269:
1197:
1193:
1186:
1048:
1036:
1028:
929:
886:
765:
479:
355:
181:
175:
157:
146:
141:
129:
90:
52:
4375:
3498:
1051:
are only rarely affected by spoilers, which are limited to rare situations called
4230:"Why A Third-Party Candidate Might Help Trump β And Spoil The Election For Biden"
3965:
3199:
3165:
3135:
3062:
2384:
2239:
2120:
1858:. The pairwise comparisonβderived from the ballot dataβshows that Begich was the
1845:
1376:
1356:
1178:
1100:
917:
750:
605:
570:
491:
402:
305:
228:
170:
48:
3789:
Third-party matters: politics, presidents, and third parties in American history
3688:
3025:
4443:
3704:
3186:
do away with the spoiler problem entirely, although it ... makes it less likely
2939:
2405:
do away with the spoiler problem entirely, although it ... makes it less likely
2087:
1782:
1757:
1724:
1678:
1631:
1444:
1384:
1340:
1082:
1044:
787:
727:
523:
392:
367:
218:
3813:
3457:
3413:
2692:
elegantly. ... Range voting solves the problems of spoilers and vote splitting
2669:
Gaming the vote : why elections aren't fair (and what we can do about it)
2632:
2551:
2512:
2473:
2434:
2286:
elegantly. ... Range voting solves the problems of spoilers and vote splitting
2263:
Gaming the vote : why elections aren't fair (and what we can do about it)
2190:
4699:
4667:
4451:
4417:
4105:
3985:
3939:
3839:
3831:
3659:
3566:
3506:
3465:
3421:
3110:
2814:
2686:
2650:
2559:
2520:
2481:
2442:
2366:
2323:
2280:
2247:
2208:
1204:
1020:
796:
496:
284:
122:
85:
60:
3439:
2616:
2535:
2457:
2174:
1043:
and TRS less so in some circumstances), and all three rules are affected by
4481:
Hence Begich was the Condorcet winner. β¦ spoiler and Condorcet loser, Palin
4253:
3618:
1835:
1530:
1466:
1408:
1388:
1285:
1253:
1056:
536:
300:
293:
223:
4568:
3931:
3712:
3598:
3395:
3064:
Why Don't Americans Vote? Causes and Consequences: Causes and Consequences
2496:
2418:
72:
3969:
3876:
2776:
Frisch Lecture Delivered to the World Congress of the Econometric Society
2222:
Borodin, Allan; Lev, Omer; Shah, Nisarg; Strangway, Tyrone (2024-04-01).
1855:
1568:
1516:
1159:
1110:
414:
372:
315:
260:
3814:"Ralph Nader's Campaign Strategy in the 2000 U.S. Presidential Election"
3254:
3201:
Gaming the Vote: Why Elections Aren't Fair (and What We Can Do About It)
2704:
2299:
1798:
Montroll β defeats all candidates below, including Kiss (4,064 to 3,476)
912:
3667:
3574:
3264:
3137:
Hiring and Firing Public Officials: Rethinking the Purpose of Elections
2641:
2342:
2315:
2199:
1804:
Wright β defeats all candidates below, including Smith (3,971 to 3,793)
3974:"How Republicans Are Trying to Use the Green Party to Their Advantage"
3643:
3550:
1801:
Kiss β defeats all candidates below, including Wright (4,313 to 4,061)
4548:
4495:"The "Correct" Winner is Squeezed Out in the Alaska Special Election"
4398:
3318:
2064:
382:
377:
4469:
2358:
4528:
4434:
4366:
3899:
3635:
3530:
3489:
3361:
2913:
Santucci, Jack; Shugart, Matthew; Latner, Michael S. (2023-10-16).
2585:
1854:, Nick Begich was defeated in the first round by spoiler candidate
1641:
1576:
984:
633:
3350:
2574:
1807:
Smith β defeats Simpson (5,570 to 721) and the write-in candidates
1695:
1586:
4586:
1300:. For example, in the United States, vote splitting is common in
1121:, should not depend on the quality of a third, unrelated outcome
419:
3167:
Mathematics of Social Choice: Voting, Compensation, and Division
2386:
Mathematics of Social Choice: Voting, Compensation, and Division
4094:"To Beat Trump, Democrats Seek to Help Anti-Abortion Candidate"
3322:
3311:"Why candidates are withdrawing from Alaska's general election"
2943:
2341:
McGann, Anthony J.; Koetzle, William; Grofman, Bernard (2002).
924:
3524:
Schulze, Markus (2018-03-15). "The Schulze Method of Voting".
1846:
2022 Alaska's at-large congressional district special election
1543:, especially prevalent during high stakes elections with high
1379:, where there is no single candidate preferred to all others.
1319:
Vote splitting is the most common cause of spoiler effects in
3642:
Stadt, Huib van de; Kapteyn, Arie; Geer, Sara van de (1985).
3585:
If f satisfies U, I, P, and CNC then there exists a dictator.
2955:
2662:
2660:
1769:
4685:"Third-party voters face a tough choice in a tight election"
32:
Elimination from postseason contention Β§ Spoiler effect
4470:"A simple Condorcet voting method for Final Four elections"
2742:
Fair Representation: Meeting the Ideal of One Man, One Vote
3727:"The Spoiled Election: Independents and the 2024 Election"
2657:
2254:
4689:
4207:"The Promise and the Perils of the Third-Party Candidate"
3326:
1146:
was the first to study the spoiler effect, in the 1780s.
1113:
choice which says that a decision between two outcomes,
3964:
2769:"Individual and social welfare: a Bayesian perspective"
2221:
999:
candidate and the major candidate is said to have been
3686:
3551:"Interpersonal Comparability and Social Choice Theory"
3014:"The United States: A Case of Duvergerian Equilibrium"
3012:
Bowler, Shaun; Grofman, Bernard; Blais, AndrΓ© (2009),
2858:
McLean, Iain; Urken, Arnold B.; Hewitt, Fiona (1995).
2791:"Independence of irrelevant alternatives before Arrow"
3914:
Devine, Christopher J.; Kopko, Kyle C. (2021-09-01).
3644:"The Relativity of Utility: Evidence from Panel Data"
2912:
2671:. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. pp. 168, 197, 234.
2265:. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. pp. 168, 197, 234.
2119:
Heckelman, Jac C.; Miller, Nicholas R. (2015-12-18).
4642:
Felsenthal, Dan S.; Tideman, Nicolaus (2014-01-01).
2666:
2340:
2260:
4391:
4387:
4385:
4355:
3791:. Santa Barbara, Calif: Praeger. pp. 153β154.
3687:Richard H.; Diener, Ed; Wedell, Douglas H. (1989).
3440:"On the empirical relevance of Condorcet's paradox"
2536:"On the empirical relevance of Condorcet's paradox"
2458:"On the empirical relevance of Condorcet's paradox"
1834:, would have won if the ballots were counted using
1558:
1436:of party-list representation, where it is called a
1074:of party-list representation, where it is called a
3011:
2739:
1424:Spoiler effects can also occur in some methods of
1062:Spoiler effects can also occur in some methods of
4641:
3854:
2977:Gallagher, Michael; Mitchell, Paul (2005-09-15).
2976:
2857:
2617:"Reflections on Arrow's theorem and voting rules"
2175:"Reflections on Arrow's theorem and voting rules"
1550:
4697:
4416:Holliday, Wesley H.; Pacuit, Eric (2023-10-01).
4382:
3641:
3349:Holliday, Wesley H.; Pacuit, Eric (2023-02-11),
3061:King, Bridgett A.; Hale, Kathleen (2016-07-11).
2573:Holliday, Wesley H.; Pacuit, Eric (2023-02-11),
1794:This leads to an overall preference ranking of:
1575:in the second round, leading to the election of
1515:off of swing state ballots while working to get
1366:
1196:, where the top-two candidates are nominated by
2738:Balinski, Michel L.; Young, H. Peyton (2001) .
2118:
4605:
4415:
4124:
3348:
2572:
2291:
1419:
1149:
3253:VoliΔ, Ismar (2024-04-02). "Duverger's law".
2915:"Toward a Different Kind of Party Government"
2737:
1291:
960:
4304:
4302:
4008:
3693:Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
3478:
3020:, New York, NY: Springer, pp. 135β146,
2972:
2970:
2060:Independence of Smith-dominated alternatives
4200:
4198:
4196:
4125:Slodysko, Brian; Merica, Dan (2024-09-01).
3913:
3860:
3344:
3342:
3089:
3087:
2908:
2906:
1359:into dropping out to avoid a repeat of the
1351:. A notable example of this can be seen in
3437:
3197:
2533:
2455:
1876:Pairwise comparison matrix by vote totals
1463:List of elections involving vote splitting
1443:This kind of spoiler effect is avoided by
1284:, and mathematically impossible with most
1081:This kind of spoiler effect is avoided by
967:
953:
27:Losing candidate affecting election result
4547:
4527:
4433:
4397:
4365:
4308:
4299:
4091:
3754:
3752:
3529:
3488:
3360:
3094:Sen, Amartya; Maskin, Eric (2017-06-08).
3093:
3007:
3005:
2967:
2834:. Springer Science & Business Media.
2640:
2584:
2566:
2376:
2198:
1565:Burlington, Vermont's second IRV election
1355:, where party elites pressured candidate
1039:are highly sensitive to spoilers (though
4567:. Vermont Daily Briefing. Archived from
4541:
4535:
4517:
4499:League of Women Voters of Boulder County
4467:
4280:
4204:
4193:
4062:
3958:
3603:. Yale University Press. p. 10β11.
3393:
3339:
3287:
3157:
3084:
3060:
2903:
2494:
2416:
1430:single transferable vote (STV or RCV-PR)
1371:Spoiler effects rarely occur when using
1068:single transferable vote (STV or RCV-PR)
4575:
4227:
3892:
3548:
3523:
3517:
3227:
3163:
3133:
3127:
3056:
3054:
2884:
2382:
2297:
1106:independence of irrelevant alternatives
39:Independence of irrelevant alternatives
14:
4698:
4562:
4468:Holliday, Wesley H. (March 13, 2024).
4252:
4149:
3864:Quarterly Journal of Political Science
3811:
3758:
3749:
3648:The Review of Economics and Statistics
3590:
3433:
3431:
3389:
3387:
3002:
2853:
2851:
2831:The Theory of Committees and Elections
2788:
2733:
2731:
2729:
2727:
2614:
2449:
2410:
2172:
1210:
1006:independent of irrelevant alternatives
4492:
4349:
3786:
3782:
3780:
3596:
3308:
3259:. Princeton University Press. Ch. 2.
3252:
2827:
2347:American Journal of Political Science
1482:Electoral fusion in the United States
4174:
4085:
4033:
3542:
3472:
3288:Strassel, Kimberly A. (2024-08-27).
3051:
2782:
2760:
2746:. New Haven: Yale University Press.
2527:
2488:
2122:Handbook of Social Choice and Voting
1049:Majority-rule (or Condorcet) methods
4056:
4002:
3871:(3). Now Publishing Inc.: 205β226.
3812:Burden, Barry C. (September 2005).
3805:
3600:Social Choice and Individual Values
3428:
3394:Gehrlein, William V. (2002-03-01).
3384:
3246:
3230:"We need more (and better) parties"
3221:
3096:"A Better Way to Choose Presidents"
2887:"We need more (and better) parties"
2878:
2848:
2821:
2724:
2697:
2495:Gehrlein, William V. (2002-03-01).
2417:Gehrlein, William V. (2002-03-01).
1456:
30:For the same effect in sports, see
24:
4556:
4518:Clelland, Jeanne N. (2023-02-28),
4205:Milligan, Susan (March 22, 2024).
4092:Schleifer, Theodore (2024-08-29).
3907:
3886:
3777:
3719:
3198:Poundstone, William (2009-02-17).
2766:
2615:Miller, Nicholas R. (2019-04-01).
2608:
2173:Miller, Nicholas R. (2019-04-01).
2166:
1331:Plurality-runoff methods like the
71:
25:
4717:
4678:
4563:Baruth, Philip (March 12, 2009).
3972:; Corasaniti, Nick (2020-09-22).
3438:Van Deemen, Adrian (2014-03-01).
3290:"Ranked Choice May Die in Alaska"
3164:Borgers, Christoph (2010-01-01).
2983:The Politics of Electoral Systems
2534:Van Deemen, Adrian (2014-03-01).
2456:Van Deemen, Adrian (2014-03-01).
2383:Borgers, Christoph (2010-01-01).
2142:
1326:
4660:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.08.001
4619:. April 27, 2010. Archived from
4309:Stensholt, Eivind (2015-10-07).
4228:Skelley, Geoffrey (2023-07-13).
4009:Schreckinger, Ben (2017-06-20).
3140:. Oxford University Press, USA.
2864:. University of Michigan Press.
2086:, ranked voting systems include
1852:Alaska's first-ever IRV election
1768:
1694:
1640:
1585:
1559:2009 Burlington mayoral election
1475:
1298:first-preference plurality (FPP)
936:
923:
911:
859:McKelveyβSchofield chaos theorem
505:Semi-proportional representation
137:First preference plurality (FPP)
4635:
4589:. March 2, 2010. Archived from
4511:
4486:
4461:
4409:
4336:The Center for Election Science
4324:
4274:
4246:
4221:
4168:
4150:Burden, Barry C. (2024-04-30).
4143:
4118:
4027:
3893:Roberts, Joel (July 27, 2004).
3761:"Giving Minor Parties a Chance"
3680:
3481:The College Mathematics Journal
3302:
3281:
3191:
2979:"The American Electoral System"
2925:from the original on 2024-07-16
2710:The Center for Election Science
2154:The Center for Election Science
2093:
2050:Comparison of electoral systems
1398:
1205:high-ranking political position
4583:"Burlington voters repeal IRV"
4311:"What Happened in Burlington?"
4063:Slodysko, Brian (2024-07-16).
3555:The Review of Economic Studies
3134:Buchler, Justin (2011-04-20).
2334:
2215:
2112:
2076:
1551:Notable unintentional spoilers
1109:is a fundamental principle of
1037:winnowing or primary elections
897:Harsanyi's utilitarian theorem
854:Moulin's impossibility theorem
819:Conflicting majorities paradox
13:
1:
4376:10.1080/00344893.2023.2221689
4281:DeSilver, Drew (2024-06-27).
3895:"Nader to crash Dems' party?"
3654:(2). The MIT Press: 179β187.
3549:Roberts, Kevin W. S. (1980).
3499:10.1080/07468342.2023.2212548
3204:. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
2667:Poundstone, William. (2013).
2261:Poundstone, William. (2013).
2105:
1822:, and would have won under a
1367:Tournament (Condorcet) voting
1347:through the process known as
1094:
1017:Arrow's impossibility theorem
723:Frustrated majorities paradox
4648:Mathematical Social Sciences
4493:Ogren, Marcus (2022-10-03).
3309:Early, Wesley (2024-09-05).
2807:10.1016/0165-4896(95)00784-J
2795:Mathematical Social Sciences
2240:10.1016/j.artint.2024.104095
1832:majority-preferred candidate
1169:Vote-splitting systems like
892:Condorcet dominance theorems
832:Social and collective choice
7:
4175:Gift, Thomas (2024-01-11).
3228:Drutman, Lee (2024-09-12).
3026:10.1007/978-0-387-09720-6_9
2985:. OUP Oxford. p. 192.
2885:Drutman, Lee (2024-09-12).
2789:McLean, Iain (1995-10-01).
2224:"Primarily about primaries"
2125:. Edward Elgar Publishing.
2043:
1828:nonpartisan blanket primary
1426:proportional representation
1420:Proportional representation
1409:score (highest mean) voting
1216:Susceptibility to spoilers
1150:Manipulation by politicians
1129:illustrates this principle:
1064:proportional representation
558:By mechanism of combination
329:Proportional representation
10:
4722:
4444:10.1007/s11127-023-01042-3
3819:American Politics Research
3759:Masket, Seth (Fall 2023).
3705:10.1037/0022-3514.56.3.317
3597:Arrow, Kenneth J. (2012).
3376:by adding a new candidate
2950:) hold runoffs or use the
2600:by adding a new candidate
1509:2024 presidential election
1479:
1460:
1292:First-preference plurality
1164:French Academy of Sciences
1025:Ranked-choice voting (RCV)
756:Multiple districts paradox
487:Fractional approval voting
475:Interactive representation
36:
29:
4034:Levy, Marc (2024-08-21).
3787:Green, Donald J. (2010).
3458:10.1007/s11127-013-0133-3
2861:Classics of Social Choice
2633:10.1007/s11127-018-0524-6
2552:10.1007/s11127-013-0133-3
2474:10.1007/s11127-013-0133-3
2191:10.1007/s11127-018-0524-6
1946:Pairwise as a percentage
1862:while Palin was both the
1788:
1763:
1730:
1434:largest remainders method
1189:systems to behave like a
1072:largest remainders method
1033:first-past-the-post (FPP)
1021:rank-based voting systems
703:Paradoxes and pathologies
552:Mixed-member proportional
547:Mixed-member majoritarian
542:By results of combination
433:Approval-based committees
4687:(September 22, 2024) by
4211:US News and World Report
4011:"Jill Stein Isn't Sorry"
3832:10.1177/1532673x04272431
3732:Harvard Political Review
3103:New York Review of Books
2298:Merrill, Samuel (1985).
2070:
1278:plurality-runoff methods
882:Condorcet's jury theorem
683:Double simultaneous vote
658:Ruralβurban proportional
653:Dual-member proportional
615:
604:
571:Parallel (superposition)
463:Fractional social choice
450:Expanding approvals rule
279:
264:
249:
180:
169:
145:
3445:Public Choice (journal)
3414:10.1023/A:1015551010381
3295:The Wall Street Journal
2828:Black, Duncan (1987) .
2513:10.1023/A:1015551010381
2435:10.1023/A:1015551010381
2228:Artificial Intelligence
2040:without this behavior.
1140:social choice theorists
809:Tyranny of the majority
586:Fusion (majority bonus)
403:Quota-remainder methods
4332:"IRV and Core Support"
3256:Making Democracy Count
2055:Independence of clones
1830:. Montroll, being the
1545:political polarization
1136:
1029:two-round system (TRS)
943:Mathematics portal
849:Majority impossibility
838:Impossibility theorems
634:Negative vote transfer
455:Method of equal shares
76:
3932:10.1515/for-2021-0011
1571:knocked out Democrat
1471:Single-issue politics
1449:proportional approval
1361:spoiled 2022 election
1276:, somewhat common in
1131:
1087:proportional approval
746:Best-is-worst paradox
735:Pathological response
470:Direct representation
123:Single-winner methods
75:
3877:10.1561/100.00005039
2705:"The Spoiler Effect"
2150:"The Spoiler Effect"
2038:several alternatives
1733:Spoiler for Montroll
1373:tournament solutions
1286:rated voting methods
1282:majoritarian methods
1175:ranked-choice voting
1156:strategic nomination
1144:Nicolas de Condorcet
1057:Rated voting systems
1047:and vote splitting.
981:social choice theory
930:Economics portal
877:Median voter theorem
96:Comparative politics
4287:Pew Research Center
3401:Theory and Decision
3315:Alaska Public Media
3234:Undercurrent Events
2936:first-past-the-post
2891:Undercurrent Events
2501:Theory and Decision
2423:Theory and Decision
1947:
1877:
1870:
1523:. According to the
1217:
1211:By electoral system
1127:Sidney Morgenbesser
1125:. A famous joke by
918:Politics portal
629:Vote linkage system
600:Seat linkage system
187:Ranked-choice (RCV)
4098:The New York Times
3978:The New York Times
3265:10.2307/jj.7492228
2316:10.1007/bf00127534
1945:
1875:
1869:
1513:Constitution Party
1353:Alaska's 2024 race
1245:Condorcet Methods
1215:
1183:political machines
814:Discursive dilemma
773:Lesser evil voting
648:Supermixed systems
351:Largest remainders
209:Round-robin voting
77:
4617:Rutlandherald.com
4571:on July 26, 2011.
4315:Discussion Papers
4015:POLITICO Magazine
3798:978-0-313-36591-1
3610:978-0-300-17931-6
3274:978-0-691-24882-0
3035:978-0-387-09720-6
2992:978-0-19-153151-4
2919:Protect Democracy
2033:
2032:
2029:
2028:
1941:
1940:
1826:or a traditional
1818:, Kiss won under
1792:
1791:
1624:4064 (Montroll) β
1616:4597 (Montroll) β
1608:4570 (Montroll) β
1600:6262 (Montroll) β
1438:new party paradox
1270:electoral systems
1266:
1265:
1229:Plurality voting
1221:Electoral system
1076:new party paradox
1031:, and especially
977:
976:
864:Gibbard's theorem
804:Dominance paradox
741:Perverse response
445:Phragmen's method
311:Majority judgment
239:Positional voting
197:Condorcet methods
65:electoral systems
16:(Redirected from
4713:
4672:
4671:
4639:
4633:
4632:
4630:
4628:
4623:on March 4, 2016
4609:
4603:
4602:
4600:
4598:
4593:on April 9, 2016
4579:
4573:
4572:
4560:
4554:
4553:
4551:
4539:
4533:
4532:
4531:
4515:
4509:
4508:
4506:
4505:
4490:
4484:
4483:
4478:
4476:
4465:
4459:
4458:
4437:
4413:
4407:
4406:
4401:
4389:
4380:
4379:
4369:
4353:
4347:
4346:
4344:
4342:
4328:
4322:
4321:
4306:
4297:
4296:
4294:
4293:
4278:
4272:
4271:
4269:
4268:
4262:The Conversation
4254:Burden, Barry C.
4250:
4244:
4243:
4241:
4240:
4225:
4219:
4218:
4202:
4191:
4190:
4188:
4187:
4181:The Conversation
4172:
4166:
4165:
4163:
4162:
4156:The Conversation
4147:
4141:
4140:
4138:
4137:
4122:
4116:
4115:
4113:
4112:
4089:
4083:
4082:
4076:
4075:
4060:
4054:
4053:
4047:
4046:
4031:
4025:
4024:
4022:
4021:
4006:
4000:
3999:
3993:
3992:
3966:Haberman, Maggie
3962:
3956:
3955:
3911:
3905:
3904:
3890:
3884:
3880:
3858:
3852:
3851:
3809:
3803:
3802:
3784:
3775:
3774:
3756:
3747:
3746:
3741:
3740:
3735:. April 18, 2024
3723:
3717:
3716:
3684:
3678:
3677:
3675:
3674:
3639:
3633:
3632:
3626:
3625:
3594:
3588:
3587:
3582:
3581:
3561:(2). : 421β439.
3546:
3540:
3539:
3533:
3521:
3515:
3514:
3492:
3476:
3470:
3469:
3435:
3426:
3425:
3391:
3382:
3371:
3370:
3369:
3364:
3346:
3337:
3336:
3334:
3333:
3306:
3300:
3299:
3285:
3279:
3278:
3250:
3244:
3243:
3241:
3240:
3225:
3219:
3218:
3195:
3189:
3188:
3161:
3155:
3154:
3131:
3125:
3124:
3118:
3117:
3100:
3091:
3082:
3081:
3058:
3049:
3048:
3043:
3042:
3009:
3000:
2999:
2974:
2965:
2964:
2952:alternative vote
2931:
2930:
2910:
2901:
2900:
2898:
2897:
2882:
2876:
2875:
2855:
2846:
2845:
2825:
2819:
2818:
2786:
2780:
2779:
2773:
2764:
2758:
2757:
2745:
2735:
2722:
2721:
2719:
2718:
2701:
2695:
2694:
2664:
2655:
2654:
2644:
2612:
2606:
2595:
2594:
2593:
2588:
2570:
2564:
2563:
2531:
2525:
2524:
2492:
2486:
2485:
2453:
2447:
2446:
2414:
2408:
2407:
2380:
2374:
2373:
2338:
2332:
2331:
2295:
2289:
2288:
2258:
2252:
2251:
2219:
2213:
2212:
2202:
2170:
2164:
2163:
2161:
2160:
2146:
2140:
2139:
2116:
2100:
2097:
2091:
2084:election science
2080:
1948:
1944:
1878:
1874:
1871:
1868:
1860:Condorcet winner
1840:Condorcet method
1772:
1698:
1644:
1589:
1582:
1581:
1541:Strategic voting
1526:Associated Press
1493:Democratic Party
1489:Republican Party
1457:Spoiler campaign
1393:Condorcet winner
1333:two-round system
1314:two-round system
1306:general election
1274:plurality voting
1218:
1214:
1194:two-round system
1187:plurality voting
1138:Politicians and
969:
962:
955:
941:
940:
928:
927:
916:
915:
871:Positive results
766:Strategic voting
663:Majority jackpot
620:
609:
480:Liquid democracy
356:National remnant
346:Highest averages
283:
268:
253:
185:
176:Alternative vote
174:
158:Partisan primary
150:
91:Mechanism design
44:
43:
21:
4721:
4720:
4716:
4715:
4714:
4712:
4711:
4710:
4696:
4695:
4681:
4676:
4675:
4640:
4636:
4626:
4624:
4611:
4610:
4606:
4596:
4594:
4581:
4580:
4576:
4561:
4557:
4540:
4536:
4516:
4512:
4503:
4501:
4491:
4487:
4474:
4472:
4466:
4462:
4414:
4410:
4390:
4383:
4354:
4350:
4340:
4338:
4330:
4329:
4325:
4307:
4300:
4291:
4289:
4279:
4275:
4266:
4264:
4251:
4247:
4238:
4236:
4234:FiveThirtyEight
4226:
4222:
4203:
4194:
4185:
4183:
4173:
4169:
4160:
4158:
4148:
4144:
4135:
4133:
4123:
4119:
4110:
4108:
4090:
4086:
4073:
4071:
4061:
4057:
4044:
4042:
4032:
4028:
4019:
4017:
4007:
4003:
3990:
3988:
3963:
3959:
3912:
3908:
3891:
3887:
3859:
3855:
3810:
3806:
3799:
3785:
3778:
3757:
3750:
3738:
3736:
3725:
3724:
3720:
3685:
3681:
3672:
3670:
3640:
3636:
3623:
3621:
3611:
3595:
3591:
3579:
3577:
3547:
3543:
3522:
3518:
3477:
3473:
3436:
3429:
3392:
3385:
3367:
3365:
3347:
3340:
3331:
3329:
3307:
3303:
3286:
3282:
3275:
3251:
3247:
3238:
3236:
3226:
3222:
3212:
3196:
3192:
3178:
3162:
3158:
3148:
3132:
3128:
3115:
3113:
3098:
3092:
3085:
3075:
3059:
3052:
3040:
3038:
3036:
3010:
3003:
2993:
2975:
2968:
2928:
2926:
2911:
2904:
2895:
2893:
2883:
2879:
2872:
2856:
2849:
2842:
2826:
2822:
2787:
2783:
2771:
2767:Pearce, David.
2765:
2761:
2754:
2736:
2725:
2716:
2714:
2703:
2702:
2698:
2679:
2665:
2658:
2613:
2609:
2591:
2589:
2571:
2567:
2532:
2528:
2493:
2489:
2454:
2450:
2415:
2411:
2397:
2381:
2377:
2359:10.2307/3088418
2339:
2335:
2296:
2292:
2273:
2259:
2255:
2220:
2216:
2171:
2167:
2158:
2156:
2148:
2147:
2143:
2133:
2117:
2113:
2108:
2103:
2098:
2094:
2081:
2077:
2073:
2046:
1866:and a spoiler:
1864:Condorcet loser
1848:
1775:James Simpson (
1717:3971 (Wright) β
1712:1310 (Simpson)
1709:5270 (Wright) β
1592:Andy Montroll (
1561:
1553:
1484:
1478:
1473:
1459:
1445:divisor methods
1422:
1401:
1377:Condorcet cycle
1369:
1357:Nancy Dahlstrom
1329:
1294:
1237:Runoffs or RCV
1224:Spoiler effect
1213:
1198:party primaries
1152:
1101:decision theory
1097:
1083:divisor methods
1019:shows that all
973:
935:
934:
922:
910:
902:
901:
868:
844:Arrow's theorem
834:
824:
823:
792:
762:
751:No-show paradox
732:
718:Cloning paradox
708:Spoiler effects
705:
695:
694:
669:
556:
539:
529:
528:
501:
492:Maximal lottery
459:
440:Thiele's method
429:
399:
331:
321:
320:
306:Approval voting
294:Cardinal voting
290:
235:
229:Maximal lottery
193:
125:
115:
42:
35:
28:
23:
22:
15:
12:
11:
5:
4719:
4709:
4708:
4694:
4693:
4680:
4679:External links
4677:
4674:
4673:
4634:
4604:
4574:
4555:
4534:
4510:
4485:
4460:
4408:
4381:
4358:Representation
4348:
4323:
4298:
4273:
4256:(2024-04-30).
4245:
4220:
4192:
4167:
4142:
4117:
4084:
4055:
4026:
4001:
3957:
3926:(2): 173β201.
3906:
3885:
3853:
3826:(5): 672β699.
3804:
3797:
3776:
3748:
3718:
3699:(3): 317β325.
3679:
3634:
3609:
3589:
3541:
3516:
3471:
3452:(3): 311β330.
3427:
3408:(2): 171β199.
3383:
3338:
3301:
3280:
3273:
3245:
3220:
3210:
3190:
3176:
3156:
3146:
3126:
3083:
3073:
3050:
3034:
3001:
2991:
2966:
2940:United Kingdom
2902:
2877:
2871:978-0472104505
2870:
2847:
2840:
2820:
2801:(2): 107β126.
2781:
2759:
2752:
2723:
2696:
2677:
2656:
2627:(1): 113β124.
2607:
2565:
2546:(3): 311β330.
2526:
2507:(2): 171β199.
2487:
2468:(3): 311β330.
2448:
2429:(2): 171β199.
2409:
2395:
2375:
2353:(1): 134β147.
2333:
2310:(2): 389β403.
2290:
2271:
2253:
2214:
2185:(1): 113β124.
2165:
2141:
2131:
2110:
2109:
2107:
2104:
2102:
2101:
2092:
2088:plurality rule
2074:
2072:
2069:
2068:
2067:
2062:
2057:
2052:
2045:
2042:
2031:
2030:
2027:
2026:
2023:
2020:
2015:
2012:
2006:
2005:
2002:
1999:
1994:
1991:
1985:
1984:
1981:
1978:
1973:
1970:
1964:
1963:
1960:
1957:
1954:
1952:
1942:
1939:
1938:
1935:
1932:
1929:
1925:
1924:
1919:
1916:
1913:
1909:
1908:
1903:
1898:
1895:
1891:
1890:
1887:
1884:
1881:
1847:
1844:
1838:(or any other
1824:two-round vote
1809:
1808:
1805:
1802:
1799:
1790:
1789:
1787:
1780:
1773:
1765:
1764:
1762:
1755:
1753:721 (Simpson)
1750:5570 (Smith) β
1747:
1740:
1737:
1736:
1729:
1722:
1714:
1706:
1699:
1691:
1690:
1683:
1676:
1674:4061 (Wright)
1668:
1660:
1658:844 (Simpson)
1652:
1645:
1637:
1636:
1629:
1621:
1619:3664 (Wright)
1613:
1605:
1603:591 (Simpson)
1597:
1590:
1560:
1557:
1552:
1549:
1477:
1474:
1458:
1455:
1428:, such as the
1421:
1418:
1405:Highest median
1400:
1397:
1385:Schulze method
1368:
1365:
1349:Duverger's law
1345:two-party rule
1341:center squeeze
1328:
1327:Runoff systems
1325:
1293:
1290:
1264:
1263:
1260:
1250:
1249:
1246:
1242:
1241:
1238:
1234:
1233:
1230:
1226:
1225:
1222:
1212:
1209:
1151:
1148:
1096:
1093:
1066:, such as the
1045:center-squeeze
993:spoiler effect
975:
974:
972:
971:
964:
957:
949:
946:
945:
933:
932:
920:
907:
904:
903:
900:
899:
894:
889:
884:
879:
867:
866:
861:
856:
851:
846:
835:
830:
829:
826:
825:
822:
821:
816:
811:
806:
791:
790:
788:Turkey-raising
785:
780:
775:
761:
760:
759:
758:
748:
743:
731:
730:
728:Center squeeze
725:
720:
715:
713:Spoiler effect
706:
701:
700:
697:
696:
693:
692:
687:
686:
685:
672:By ballot type
668:
667:
666:
665:
660:
655:
645:
644:
643:
642:
641:
636:
626:
625:
624:
613:
590:
589:
588:
583:
578:
573:
555:
554:
549:
540:
535:
534:
531:
530:
527:
526:
524:Limited voting
521:
520:
519:
500:
499:
494:
489:
484:
483:
482:
477:
458:
457:
452:
447:
442:
428:
427:
422:
417:
412:
398:
397:
396:
395:
393:Localized list
390:
385:
380:
375:
365:
364:
363:
361:Biproportional
358:
353:
348:
332:
327:
326:
323:
322:
319:
318:
313:
308:
303:
289:
288:
273:
258:
234:
233:
232:
231:
226:
221:
216:
206:
192:
191:
190:
189:
178:
165:Instant-runoff
162:
161:
160:
152:Jungle primary
139:
128:Single vote -
126:
121:
120:
117:
116:
114:
113:
103:
98:
93:
88:
82:
79:
78:
68:
67:
57:
56:
26:
18:Vote-splitting
9:
6:
4:
3:
2:
4718:
4707:
4706:Voting theory
4704:
4703:
4701:
4692:
4691:
4686:
4683:
4682:
4669:
4665:
4661:
4657:
4653:
4649:
4645:
4638:
4622:
4618:
4614:
4608:
4592:
4588:
4584:
4578:
4570:
4566:
4559:
4550:
4545:
4538:
4530:
4525:
4521:
4514:
4500:
4496:
4489:
4482:
4471:
4464:
4457:
4453:
4449:
4445:
4441:
4436:
4431:
4427:
4423:
4422:Public Choice
4419:
4412:
4405:
4400:
4395:
4388:
4386:
4377:
4373:
4368:
4363:
4359:
4352:
4337:
4333:
4327:
4320:
4316:
4312:
4305:
4303:
4288:
4284:
4277:
4263:
4259:
4255:
4249:
4235:
4231:
4224:
4217:
4212:
4208:
4201:
4199:
4197:
4182:
4178:
4171:
4157:
4153:
4146:
4132:
4128:
4121:
4107:
4103:
4099:
4095:
4088:
4081:
4070:
4066:
4059:
4052:
4041:
4037:
4030:
4016:
4012:
4005:
3998:
3987:
3983:
3979:
3975:
3971:
3967:
3961:
3954:
3949:
3945:
3941:
3937:
3933:
3929:
3925:
3921:
3917:
3910:
3902:
3901:
3896:
3889:
3883:
3878:
3874:
3870:
3866:
3865:
3857:
3849:
3845:
3841:
3837:
3833:
3829:
3825:
3821:
3820:
3815:
3808:
3800:
3794:
3790:
3783:
3781:
3772:
3768:
3767:
3762:
3755:
3753:
3745:
3734:
3733:
3728:
3722:
3714:
3710:
3706:
3702:
3698:
3694:
3690:
3683:
3669:
3665:
3661:
3657:
3653:
3649:
3645:
3638:
3631:
3620:
3616:
3612:
3606:
3602:
3601:
3593:
3586:
3576:
3572:
3568:
3564:
3560:
3556:
3552:
3545:
3538:
3532:
3527:
3520:
3513:
3508:
3504:
3500:
3496:
3491:
3486:
3482:
3475:
3467:
3463:
3459:
3455:
3451:
3447:
3446:
3441:
3434:
3432:
3423:
3419:
3415:
3411:
3407:
3403:
3402:
3397:
3390:
3388:
3379:
3375:
3363:
3358:
3354:
3353:
3352:Stable Voting
3345:
3343:
3328:
3324:
3320:
3316:
3312:
3305:
3297:
3296:
3291:
3284:
3276:
3270:
3266:
3262:
3258:
3257:
3249:
3235:
3231:
3224:
3217:
3213:
3211:9781429957649
3207:
3203:
3202:
3194:
3187:
3185:
3179:
3177:9780898716955
3173:
3169:
3168:
3160:
3153:
3149:
3147:9780199759965
3143:
3139:
3138:
3130:
3123:
3112:
3108:
3104:
3097:
3090:
3088:
3080:
3076:
3074:9781440841163
3070:
3066:
3065:
3057:
3055:
3047:
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3031:
3027:
3023:
3019:
3015:
3008:
3006:
2998:
2994:
2988:
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2980:
2973:
2971:
2963:
2962:
2957:
2953:
2949:
2945:
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2937:
2924:
2920:
2916:
2909:
2907:
2892:
2888:
2881:
2873:
2867:
2863:
2862:
2854:
2852:
2843:
2841:9780898381894
2837:
2833:
2832:
2824:
2816:
2812:
2808:
2804:
2800:
2796:
2792:
2785:
2777:
2770:
2763:
2755:
2753:0-300-02724-9
2749:
2744:
2743:
2734:
2732:
2730:
2728:
2712:
2711:
2706:
2700:
2693:
2688:
2684:
2680:
2678:9781429957649
2674:
2670:
2663:
2661:
2652:
2648:
2643:
2638:
2634:
2630:
2626:
2622:
2621:Public Choice
2618:
2611:
2603:
2599:
2587:
2582:
2578:
2577:
2576:Stable Voting
2569:
2561:
2557:
2553:
2549:
2545:
2541:
2540:Public Choice
2537:
2530:
2522:
2518:
2514:
2510:
2506:
2502:
2498:
2491:
2483:
2479:
2475:
2471:
2467:
2463:
2462:Public Choice
2459:
2452:
2444:
2440:
2436:
2432:
2428:
2424:
2420:
2413:
2406:
2404:
2398:
2396:9780898716955
2392:
2388:
2387:
2379:
2372:
2368:
2364:
2360:
2356:
2352:
2348:
2344:
2337:
2330:
2325:
2321:
2317:
2313:
2309:
2305:
2304:Public Choice
2301:
2294:
2287:
2282:
2278:
2274:
2272:9781429957649
2268:
2264:
2257:
2249:
2245:
2241:
2237:
2233:
2229:
2225:
2218:
2210:
2206:
2201:
2196:
2192:
2188:
2184:
2180:
2179:Public Choice
2176:
2169:
2155:
2151:
2145:
2138:
2134:
2132:9781783470730
2128:
2124:
2123:
2115:
2111:
2096:
2089:
2085:
2079:
2075:
2066:
2063:
2061:
2058:
2056:
2053:
2051:
2048:
2047:
2041:
2039:
2024:
2021:
2019:
2016:
2013:
2011:
2008:
2007:
2003:
2000:
1998:
1995:
1992:
1990:
1987:
1986:
1982:
1979:
1977:
1974:
1971:
1969:
1966:
1965:
1961:
1958:
1955:
1953:
1950:
1949:
1943:
1936:
1933:
1930:
1927:
1926:
1923:
1920:
1917:
1914:
1911:
1910:
1907:
1904:
1902:
1899:
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1892:
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1885:
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1880:
1879:
1873:
1872:
1867:
1865:
1861:
1857:
1853:
1843:
1841:
1837:
1833:
1829:
1825:
1821:
1817:
1812:
1806:
1803:
1800:
1797:
1796:
1795:
1786:
1785:
1781:
1778:
1774:
1771:
1767:
1766:
1761:
1760:
1756:
1754:
1751:
1748:
1745:
1741:
1739:
1738:
1735:
1734:
1728:
1727:
1723:
1721:
1720:3793 (Smith)
1718:
1715:
1713:
1710:
1707:
1704:
1701:Kurt Wright (
1700:
1697:
1693:
1692:
1689:
1688:
1684:
1682:
1681:
1677:
1675:
1672:
1671:4313 (Kiss) β
1669:
1667:
1666:3576 (Smith)
1664:
1663:3944 (Kiss) β
1661:
1659:
1656:
1655:5514 (Kiss) β
1653:
1650:
1646:
1643:
1639:
1638:
1635:
1634:
1630:
1628:
1625:
1622:
1620:
1617:
1614:
1612:
1611:2997 (Smith)
1609:
1606:
1604:
1601:
1598:
1595:
1591:
1588:
1584:
1583:
1580:
1578:
1574:
1573:Andy Montroll
1570:
1566:
1556:
1548:
1546:
1542:
1538:
1534:
1532:
1528:
1527:
1522:
1518:
1514:
1510:
1506:
1502:
1498:
1494:
1490:
1483:
1476:United States
1472:
1468:
1464:
1454:
1453:
1450:
1446:
1442:
1439:
1435:
1431:
1427:
1417:
1413:
1410:
1406:
1396:
1394:
1390:
1386:
1380:
1378:
1374:
1364:
1362:
1358:
1354:
1350:
1346:
1342:
1338:
1334:
1324:
1322:
1317:
1315:
1311:
1307:
1303:
1299:
1289:
1287:
1283:
1279:
1275:
1271:
1261:
1259:
1255:
1252:
1251:
1247:
1244:
1243:
1239:
1236:
1235:
1231:
1228:
1227:
1223:
1220:
1219:
1208:
1206:
1201:
1199:
1195:
1192:
1188:
1184:
1180:
1176:
1172:
1167:
1165:
1161:
1157:
1147:
1145:
1141:
1135:
1130:
1128:
1124:
1120:
1116:
1112:
1108:
1107:
1102:
1092:
1091:
1088:
1084:
1080:
1077:
1073:
1069:
1065:
1060:
1058:
1054:
1050:
1046:
1042:
1038:
1034:
1030:
1026:
1022:
1018:
1014:
1012:
1008:
1007:
1002:
998:
994:
990:
986:
982:
970:
965:
963:
958:
956:
951:
950:
948:
947:
944:
939:
931:
926:
921:
919:
914:
909:
908:
906:
905:
898:
895:
893:
890:
888:
887:May's theorem
885:
883:
880:
878:
875:
874:
873:
872:
865:
862:
860:
857:
855:
852:
850:
847:
845:
842:
841:
840:
839:
833:
828:
827:
820:
817:
815:
812:
810:
807:
805:
802:
801:
800:
799:
798:
797:majority rule
795:Paradoxes of
789:
786:
784:
781:
779:
776:
774:
771:
770:
769:
768:
767:
757:
754:
753:
752:
749:
747:
744:
742:
739:
738:
737:
736:
729:
726:
724:
721:
719:
716:
714:
711:
710:
709:
704:
699:
698:
691:
688:
684:
681:
680:
679:
676:
675:
674:
673:
664:
661:
659:
656:
654:
651:
650:
649:
646:
640:
637:
635:
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1996:
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1531:Barry Burden
1524:
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1389:ranked pairs
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388:List-free PR
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301:Score voting
292:
291:
237:
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224:Ranked pairs
195:
194:
127:
4428:(1): 1β62.
4341:December 4,
3630:individual.
3619:j.ctt1nqb90
2642:11603/20937
2200:11603/20937
1856:Sarah Palin
1742:Dan Smith (
1569:Kurt Wright
1537:Third party
1521:Green Party
1517:Cornel West
1160:Borda count
1134:blueberry."
1053:cyclic ties
678:Single vote
581:Conditional
576:Coexistence
425:Quota Borda
415:Schulze STV
373:Closed list
316:STAR voting
261:Borda count
4529:2303.00108
4504:2024-03-24
4435:2004.02350
4367:2301.12075
4292:2024-08-28
4267:2024-08-28
4239:2024-08-28
4186:2024-08-27
4161:2024-08-28
4136:2024-09-06
4111:2024-08-30
4074:2024-08-25
4045:2024-08-28
4020:2023-06-07
3991:2024-08-28
3739:2024-08-24
3673:2024-04-28
3624:2024-09-25
3580:2024-09-25
3537:Smith-IIA.
3531:1804.02973
3490:2111.09846
3368:2024-03-11
3362:2108.00542
3332:2024-09-20
3239:2024-09-19
3116:2019-07-20
3041:2024-08-31
2929:2024-07-16
2896:2024-09-19
2717:2017-01-29
2592:2024-03-11
2586:2108.00542
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2159:2024-03-03
2106:References
2025:vs. 48.5%
2004:vs. 38.6%
1983:vs. 47.4%
1687:RCV winner
1647:Bob Kiss (
1567:, spoiler
1480:See also:
1461:See also:
1268:Different
1171:choose-one
1095:Motivation
783:Truncation
512:Cumulative
335:Party-list
110:By country
101:Comparison
4668:0165-4896
4654:: 57β66.
4597:March 28,
4475:March 23,
4452:1573-7101
4106:0362-4331
3986:0362-4331
3948:237457376
3940:1540-8884
3920:The Forum
3840:1532-673X
3766:Democracy
3660:0034-6535
3567:0034-6527
3507:0746-8342
3466:1573-7101
3422:1573-7187
3319:Anchorage
3111:0028-7504
2815:0165-4896
2687:872601019
2651:1573-7101
2560:1573-7101
2521:1573-7187
2482:1573-7101
2443:1573-7187
2367:0092-5853
2324:0048-5829
2281:872601019
2248:0004-3702
2209:1573-7101
2065:Sortition
1816:plurality
1302:primaries
690:Dual-vote
383:Panachage
378:Open list
368:List type
246:Plurality
142:Two-round
130:plurality
53:Economics
4700:Category
4627:April 1,
4587:Wcax.com
4360:: 1β19.
3997:Clinton.
3900:CBS News
3848:43919948
3170:. SIAM.
3122:pairwise
2923:Archived
2389:. SIAM.
2044:See also
1912:Peltola
1886:Peltola
1784:0/4 Wins
1759:1/4 Wins
1726:2/4 Wins
1680:3/4 Wins
1633:4/4 Wins
1577:Bob Kiss
1432:and the
1191:de facto
1111:rational
1070:and the
1035:without
985:politics
410:Hare STV
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4131:AP News
4069:AP News
4040:AP News
3713:2926632
3668:1924716
3575:2297002
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2948:Georgia
2329:winning
2010:Peltola
1976:Peltola
1959:Winner
1951:Winner
1934:86,197
1931:63,666
1915:79,486
1906:101,438
1894:Begich
1883:Begich
1312:into a
1258:Medians
1240:Medium
1179:parties
1001:spoiled
997:spoiler
989:spoiler
420:CPO-STV
270:Baldwin
219:Schulze
214:Minimax
132:methods
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1980:52.6%
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1956:Loser
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1922:91,375
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1469:, and
1027:, the
285:Coombs
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4544:arXiv
4524:arXiv
4430:arXiv
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3944:S2CID
3844:S2CID
3664:JSTOR
3615:JSTOR
3571:JSTOR
3526:arXiv
3485:arXiv
3357:arXiv
3099:(PDF)
2956:Maine
2772:(PDF)
2581:arXiv
2071:Notes
2018:Palin
1997:Palin
1262:None
1254:Score
1232:High
622:'MMP'
611:'AMS'
4664:ISSN
4629:2016
4599:2016
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